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The Claimant caused a complaint to be filed against the defendants claiming the following reliefs-- i. a declaration that the provision of section 266(1) of the Companies and Allied Matters Act as a director the claimant may not be removed unless he is first given a notice to attend a meeting at which the removal will be discussed; otherwise, the removal of the claimant as Managing Director/Chief Executive of the 1st defendant without a notice to him, to attend the meeting at which the decision was taken is a clear violation of section 266(1) and (2) of the Companies and Allied \matters Act; and that such violation attracts the penalty prescribed by law under section 266(3) that the said meeting is under the law invalid and the removal of the claimant is not in accordance with the law; ii. a declaration that the act of the defendants during his regime of engagement of the 1st defendant as Managing director thereof, the 1st defendant through the 2nd defendant's February 20th and 21st 2012 initiative to exclude the claimant from carrying on in the business of the 1st defendant company in the usual way as statutory employee thereof is unlawful, illegal and null and void; iii. a declaration that legitimate and bona fide acts of the company are by law mandated to be through its members in general meeting or its board of directors or through officers or agents, appointed by, or under authority derived from, the members in general meeting or the board of directors; iv. a declaration that the disallowance of the claimant from engagement and the discharge of his statutory functions otherwise than in accordance with the Companies and Allied Matters Act is unlawful, illegal null and void; v. a declaration that the deprivation of the claimant of notice of any meeting where decisions concerning a change of direction or deviation from the usual way through the claimant, of the discharge of the functions of the 1st defendant of which the claimant is statutorily entitled to notification is unlawful, illegal null and void; vi. a declaration that the claimant's contract being a contract with statutory flavour the employment is protected by statute i.e. the Companies and Allied Matters Act of which the defendants did not strict adhere to or at all in the event of termination of his employment with statutory flavour thereof which cannot be waived; vii. a declaration that the forcible restraint of the claimant by the 2nd and 3rd defendants from ingress and egress of the 1st defendant through functionaries of different and separate companies acting or claiming to act under the auspices of directives of the 1st and 2nd defendants is unlawful, illegal and null and void; viii. a declaration that the claimant cannot be excluded from meetings, and that the claimant has been wrongfully deprived of his employment and for an order of reinstatement; ix. a declaration that any purported implementation of the alleged/purported decision made by the Board of the 1st defendant on an unspecified date (including any appointment to the office held by the claimant in the defendant company) is ineffective unlawful and null and void; x. An order of injunction restraining the said defendants from giving effect or continuing to give effect to any of the decisions or purported decisions of the Board mentioned in claims hereof without first complying with the mandatory procedural requirements stipulated in Section 266(3) of the Companies and Allied Matters Act; xi. a declaration that the indefinite suspension of the claimant is arbitrary, and the claimant has suffered damages by the defendants' unlawful incursion into his right to carry on his statutory function by way of employment and blockade thereof together with continuous deprivation of his salaries; xii. a declaration that the claimant is entitled to remain in the premises allocated to him by the defendant including the enjoyment of all associated services until the expiration of a reasonable time from the date of any lawful and valid termination of his contract of service with the defendant; xiii. An order that the claimant as entitled to his emoluments; by way of salaries together with allowances for the month of February 2012 till the date of reinstatement thereof as follows: Salaries at the rate of N296,947.50 per month Allowances (Entertainment/ Lunch/Fuel) at the rate of N89,800.00 per month xiv. Arrears of salaries and other emoluments outstanding totalling: N15,661,738 and $16,750 made up as follows: Arrears of salaries - N5,234,710 Arrears of Leave allowances - N1,476,392 Arrears of Medical allowances - N1,075,000 Arrears of Lunch Subsidy - N412,000 Arrears of Travel allowances - $16,750 xv. An order for general damages of N250,000,000 (Two Hundred and fifty Million Naira) as exemplary damages for anguish caused as a result of the defendants' cavalier conduct and oppressive treatment of the claimant. xvi. In the alternative to the foregoing, the claimant claims the sum of N35,609,623.00 (Thirty-Five Million, six Hundred and Nine Thousand, Six Hundred and Twenty-Three Naira) being the amount due and owing to the claimant as at February 28th 2013. xvii. Interest on the said sum of (N35,609,623.00) from the date of their having fallen due at the rate of 21% per annum or at such other ;rate of interest as the Court may adjudge to be fair and just for being kept out of payment. The defendant entered an appearance on protest and filed a notice of preliminary objection dated 16th Sept, 2013 and filed on 18th Sept, 2013 praying for an order striking out this suit in its entirety as this Honourable Court lacks the necessary jurisdiction to adjudicate on this matter as constituted. The grounds upon which the objection is filed are:- 1. All the claims of the claimant in this matter as set out in the Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim calls for the interpretation and determination of the provisions of Section 266 (1), 266 (2) and 266 (3) of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, 1990 as it relates to the position and emoluments the claimant as a Director and the Managing Director in the 1st defendant Company. 2. By virtue of the mandatory provisions of Section 251 (1)(e) of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) the proper forum for the adjudication of this matter is the Federal High Court. 'A sole issue was raised for the consideration of the Court viz-- ''Whether this Honourable Court is competent and has the necessary jurisdiction to entertain the claimant's claim as presently constituted having regard to the provision of Section 251(1) (e) of the 1999 Constitution as amended.'' It was the submission of learned defence counsel that jurisdiction is so paramount that any action taken by a Court without same acts in vain. To him the competence of a Court is important before it could adjudicate on matters before it. The cases of AKEGBEJO V ATAGA [1998] 1 NWLR (PT.534), P 459 @ 461; MADUKOLU V NKEMDILIM [1962] 2 SCNLR, 341; SENATE PRESIDENT V NZERIBE[2004] 9 NWLR (PT. 878) @ P 251-257. Whilst quoting Section 251(1)(e) of the 1999 Constitution as amended( hereafter called the Constitution), thus- '' Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court in civil cases and matters: Arising from the operation of the Companies and Allied Matters Act or any other enactment replacing the Act or regulating the operation of companies incorporated under the Companies and Allied Matters Act'' It was the further submission of the defence that by both the complaint and the statement of facts, shows that this Court has no jurisdiction as the claims relates to matters under Companies and Allied Matters Act ( hereafter called 'CAMA') which is a case for the Federal High Court. He also argued that the interpretation of Sections 266 (1), 266(2) and 266(3) of CAMA as relates to the position of the claimant as the Director of the 1st defendant company and that is beyond the powers of this Court. Placing reliance on the position of the case of TUKUR V GOVERNMENT OF GONGOLA STATE [1989] 4 NWLR(PT. 117) 517; learned defence counsel urged the Court to strike out this suit with substantial cost for lack of jurisdiction. In response to the Notice of Preliminary Objection, the claimant filed a written address dated and filed on 26th of Sept, 2013 wherein two issues for the consideration of the Court were raised thus; 1. whether this Honourable Court lacks jurisdiction to admit the complaint of the complainant despite the provision of Section 254(C) of the Constitution ( 3rd Alteration) ; 2. whether by virtue of the litigation history of the dereliction of the defendants and the unarguable issue prompted by the objection the defendants should not be damned in costs in exercise of the disciplinary jurisdiction of this Honourable Court?. Learned claimant counsel submitted that when the Court is faced with issues bordering on jurisdiction counsel is in agreement with the position of the law as also submitted by the defence counsel that the writ of summons( the complaint) and the statement of facts are relevant. The attention of the Court was equally drawn to the fact that the defendant/applicant did not file an affidavit with this motion. In his reaction to the assertion by the defendant that the claims of the claimant is as regards employment and nothing about statutory interpretation. It was contended that by the provision of Section 254(C)(1) of the Constitution, the NICN has been cloth with exclusive jurisdiction. It was the argument of counsel to the claimant that the word 'Notwithstanding' is used in a statute to exclude an impending effect of any other provision of the statute or other subordinate legislation, so that the section may fulfil itself and thus submitted that Section 251 is subordinate to the provision of Section 254(C). It was posited that the case of TANAREWA NIG.LTD V PLATIFARM LTD [2003] 14 NWLR (PT.840)@ 355-376; is distinguishable from this present, while PLATIFARM'S case is about receivership a 2003 case and precedes the enactment of the 3rd alteration, this case is about termination of appointment of a Director thus not relevant in this instance. Learned Claimant counsel submitted further that the employment or removal of a director is an employment case that should be decided in this Court and no other Court. The cases of LONGE V FIRST BANK OF NIG. PLC [2010] 42 NSCQR, 618; CADBURY PLC V ONI [2013] ALL FWLR (PT.665) 251 @277 Finally, it was the prayers of the claimant that the Court should dismiss the NPO with substantial cost as same is a ploy to delay the trial. In their reply on points of law filed on 4th of Oct, 2013, the defendants submitted that this Court's jurisdiction is limited to issues under section 254(C) (1) (a) of the Constitution. It was the reaction of the learned defence counsel that the use of the word 'Notwithstanding' in the Section excludes all other Courts as submitted by the claimant but he has to convince the Court that his claims comes under the items listed in Section 254(C)(1)(a) of the Constitution. It was submitted that the claimant has not been able to show through his claims that his claims relates to or connected with labour, employment, trade union, industrial relations and matters arising from work place, the conditions of service, including health, safety, welfare of labour, employee, worker and matters incidental therewith. Counsel quoted the decision of the Apex Court in the case of NNPC V ORHIOWASELE [2013] 13 NWLR (PT 1371)211 @ 226 paras B-D Per RHODES VIVOUR J.S.C. Thus, ''Notwithstanding' in section 230(1) of the 1999 Constitution means that no provision in the Constitution itself or any statute or legislation shall be allowed to prevail over the provisions of section 230(1) supra. Notwithstanding is thus a term of exclusion. The federal High Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the eighteen items, (a) to (g), but for the Federal High Court to have jurisdiction to adjudicate, the cause of action must be or arise from one of the (a) to (g) and one of the parties must be the Federal Government or an agency of the Federal Government.'' It was the submission of counsel that the claims of the claimant as endorsed on the General Form of Complaint and the statement of facts are all in relation to his position as the Managing Director of the 1st Defendant's company. It was posited that all the items from (i)- (xvii) of the General Form of Compliant and paragraphs 1,3, 5, 6, 10, 15, 16, 17, 18 , 19 and 20 of the statement of claim are all matters under the operation of CAMA in relation to the position of the claimant Managing Director of the 1st defendant company and not employment as alleged by the claimant. Learned defence counsel further contended that he need not file an affidavit along with the notice of preliminary objection as the issues raised are issues of law and not facts and urged the Court to grant their application and strike out this suit for lack of jurisdiction. After a calm consideration of the processes filed, i.e. the complaint, the statement of facts as reproduced above, the motion on notice challenging the jurisdiction of this Court, the written addresses filed and authorities cited therein by both parties in this suit, I formulate a sole issue for the determination of the Court i.e. Whether or not this Court has jurisdiction/competence to sit over this case as constituted? In answering this question, I wish to first and foremost address the issue of the effect of non filing of an affidavit with the defendant's motion on notice. Order 11 under which this application was filed did not make it a mandatory requirement for an applicant to file an affidavit with a preliminary objection. Order 11 Rule (3) of the practice direction which replaced the provisions of Order 11 Rule 1 of the extant Rules of this Court 2007, states thus ''(3) Every notice(e.g. Notice of Preliminary Objection) shall be accompanied with a Written Address, and shall similarly be served within 5 days filing.'' The above provision is explicit on the requirement of the rules as to the procedure for filing a Notice of Preliminary Objection and that is exactly what the applicant did in this case. See ANPP V INEC [2004]7 NWLR (PT.871) 76. It is discretionary for an applicant filing a notice of preliminary objection to either support an application with an affidavit or not, what is of paramount is that material facts must be placed before the Court. Failure of the applicant in this case to file an affidavit in this case is not harmful in any way to this application, as a matter of fact, an objection may be taken at any stage by a party orally and not necessarily by way of motion on notice. The apex Court in OWNERS OF MV ARABELLA V NAIC [2008] 11 NWLR (PT 1097), 182 was apt on this. Tobi JSC,( as he then was) in OKORO V EGBUOH [2006] 15 NWLR (PT 1001) P 1 @ 23-24; stated thus; ''Although jurisdiction is a word of large purport and significance in the judicial process, it is not a subject of speculation or gossip... it is a matter of strict and hard law donated by the constitution and statutes...'' Taking refuge in the above decision and all litany of cases that hold the same view, I agree with the submission of learned defence counsel that since jurisdiction is stricto sensu an issue of law, it is not mandatory for an applicant to file an affidavit with this application. Consequently, the NPO filed by the applicant is proper and competent before this Court. I so hold and find. It no longer admits of any argument in our adjectival law as agreed by both counsel in their submissions that in determining whether or not a court has the jurisdiction or the legal power to entertain a suit, it is to the claim and statement of facts of the claimant that a resort must be had. See these case law authorities; FIRST BANK OF NIG. PLC V ABRAHAM[2008] 18 NWLR (PT. 1118), 172. INAKOJU V ADELEKE [2007] 4 NWLR (PT 1025) P 423. Now, having read through the endorsement on the complaint and the statement of facts filed by the claimant, it is apparent that the claims of the claimant as stated therein including his written statement on oath that he is an employee and Managing Director of the 1st defendant's company before his appointment was terminated. He went on to state in paragraph 6 of his statement of facts also that he is the directing mind and will as well as the alter ego of the 1st defendant company through which the 1st defendant acts. He is challenging his suspension from office, salaries and benefits. He is equally claiming as enumerated amongst others above that - '' vi. A declaration that the claimant's contract being a contract with statutory- the employment is protected by statute i.e. the Companies and Allied Matters Act of which the defendants did not strictly adhered to or at all in the event of termination of his employment with statutory flavour thereof which cannot be waived'' There is no dispute about the status of the claimant or his claims as endorsed in his compliant and statement of facts above. The only dispute in this case is whether or not the claims of the claimant fall under section 254(C) (1) of the 1999 Constitution as amended(i.e. third alteration) and whether the word 'Notwithstanding' used in Section 254(C)(1) excludes the jurisdiction of all Courts on matters that relate to or connected with labour, employment, trade union, industrial relations and matters arising from work place, the conditions of service, including health, safety, welfare of labour, employee, worker, wages, salaries, gratuities etc. The provisions of Section 254(C)(1) is hereunder reproduced for purposes of clarity; ''254(C)(1). Notwithstanding the provision of Section 251, 257, 272 and anything Contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be Conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the National Industrial Court Shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters- (a) relating to or connected with any labour, employment, trade union, industrial relations and matters arising from workplace, the condition of service, including Health, Safety, welfare of labour, employee, worker and matters incidental thereto or connected therewith. (k) Relating to or connected with disputes arising from payment or non payment of salaries, wages, pensions, gratuities, allowances, benefit and any other entitlement of any employee, worker, political or public office holder, judicial officer or any civil or public servant in any part of the Federation and matters incidental thereto;'' The answer is in the affirmative. The word "NOTWITHSTANDING" has been defined by the Blacks' Law Dictionary 9th Edition page 1168 to mean Despite; in spite of; while according to the Thesaurus defines "Notwithstanding" as but, despite, for all that, howbeit, in spite of, nevertheless, regardless of; The word "Notwithstanding" has been held in the case law authority of ADEBAYO & ORS V PDP & ORS [2013] LPELR 20342; wherein the apex Court adopted the interpretation ascribe to same in the case of PETER OBI V INEC [2007] ALL FWLR (Pt.378) 1116 at 1166 as excluding any impending effect of any other provision of the statute or other subordinate legislation so that the said section may fulfil itself. I agree with the submission of learned Counsel to the claimant/Respondent that 'Notwithstanding' also means despite any other thing and thus means notwithstanding the powers earlier conferred on the Federal High Court under Section 251, the NICN shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over the above enumerated causes and matters to the exclusion of all Courts in the land. The word "Notwithstanding" when used in a statute is meant to exclude any assumption or ominous effect of any other provision of the statute. It follows that as used in Section 254(C)(1) of the 1999 Constitution, no provision of that Constitution shall be capable of undermining the said Section that relates or connected with labour, employment, trade Union, industrial relations etc as stated above. In other words the NICN has been empowered by the Constitution to the exclusion of all other Courts with regards to matters first above stated and nothing more. I quiet agree with the position of learned defence counsel only to the extent that as the same Constitution chose the NICN as the only adjudicator on the items enumerated in section 254(C)(1) of the 3rd alteration, it also has jurisdiction over matters enumerated under Section 251 of the Constitution as it relates to employment, suspension, salaries and emoluments of a Director or Managing Director. The apex Court decided in plethora of cases that the mere fact that the conduct complained of in the Statement of claim (statement of fact) is attributable to matters relating to CAMA, then the Federal High Court will of necessity assume jurisdiction, I discountenance with this argument as put up by the defence. The position of the Law is admirably captured by Section 254(C)(1). See also: ADETONA & ORS V IGELE GENERAL ENTERPRISES LTD[2011]LPELR 159S.C. The law is trite that where words employed in a statute are plain and unambigous, the rule of interpretation of statutes enjoins courts to give such words their natural literal and ordinary meaning. See OUR LINE LTD V S.C.C NIG LTD [2009] 17 NWLR (PT. 1170) 382. It is also the law that statute should be construed as a whole and should be given an interpretation consistent with the object and general context of the entire statute. See Bakare v. N.R.C. (2007) ALL FWLR, 1579 at 1599, paras G - H, (2007) 7 .The legislature would have expressly excluded the jurisdiction of this Court over matters under Section 251 of the Constitution as it relates to employment with statutory flavour, if that is what their intention was when the 3rd alteration was enacted. It is obvious from the claimant's claim that he is challenging the procedure employed by the defendants in terminating his appointment as provided under CAMA, thus making it a statutory employment. This is a matter contemplated by the provision of Section 254(C)(1) hence it is the intendment of the legislature that despite the provisions of sections 251, 257 and 272 of the Constitution and anything contained in this Constitution...'' the NICN shall exercise jurisdiction over matters as enumerated under Section 254(C)(1). What could be deduced from all the above is that the NICN has competence to the exclusion of any other Court to handle matters as enumerated under the Third alteration as stated above. This Court is not only empowered to handle cases under the section 254(C)(1)(a)-(m) but also has jurisdiction over matters of employment as it relates to application of Companies and Allied Matters Act. The claims of the claimant as constituted are claims for this Court as provided under Section 254(C)(1)(a) and (k) of the Constitution as amended. Consequently, having held that this Court is competent to handle cases over the claims as constituted, the notice of preliminary objection is hereby dismissed with cost of N10,000.00 awarded in favour of the claimant. This case shall proceed to trail. Ruling is entered accordingly. HON. JUSTICE OYEWUMI O.O. JUDGE