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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT HOLDEN AT ABUJA BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip — Presiding Judge Hon. Justice V. N. Okobi — Judge Hon. Justice M. B. Dadda — Judge DATE: SEPTEMBER 30, 2009 SUIT No. NIC/5/2002 BETWEEN Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria (ASCSN) - Applicant AND 1. Government of Yobe State 2. Head of service, Yobe State. 3. Attorney General, Yobe State 4. Accountant General, Yobe State…………………………1st Set of Respondents 1. Government of Bauchi State. 2. Head of Service, Bauchi State. 3. Attorney General, Bauchi State. 4. Accountant General, Bauchi State ……………………….2nd Set of Respondents 1. Government of Niger State. 2. Head of Service, Niger State. 3. Attorney General, Niger State. 4. Accountant General, Niger State ………………………….3rd Set of Respondents Nigeria Civil Service Union……………………………………… 4th Respondent (Consolidated By The Order of Court Made on 25th June, 2002) IN THE MATTER OF THE ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENT OF THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT IN SUIT NO. NIC/5/93 DELIVERED ON 27TH JUNE 1995 IN THE MATTER OF THE JURISDICTIONAL SCOPE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF SENIOR CIVIL SERVANTS OF NIGERIA AND THE NIGERIA CIVIL SERVICE UNION REPRESENTATION Enoong Etteh, for the applicant. Saleh Samanja, Solicitor-General, Yobe State, with him is I. S. Kogo, Director, Civil Litigation, Yobe State, for the 1st set of respondents. S. M. Sambowal, Senior State Counsel I, Bauchi State, for the 2 set of respondents. Usman Nureini Baba, Principal State Counsel, Niger State, for the 3 set of respondents B. F. Mbagwu, for the 4 respondent JUDGMENT The applicant had filed three separate motions on noticed brought pursuant to Rule 25(3) of the NIC Rules Cap.432 LFN 1990. Cumulatively, the motions are praying, inter alia, for orders compelling the 1st, 2nd and 3rd sets of respondents to, forthwith, pay to the applicant, union dues deducted from eligible members of the applicant union on grade level 07 and above in the services of Yobe, Bauchi and Niger states respectively in terms of the judgment of this court of 27th June, 1995 in Suit No. NIC/5/93. The applicant further seeks an order on the 1st to 3rd respondents to either issue circulars or implement the ones already issued for the enforcement of the said judgment. By order of this court, the 4th respondent was joined after hearing is motion for joinder. On 25th, June 2002, this court ordered the consolidation of the motions into the present one. Parties exchanged briefs of argument in respect of the substantive motion for enforcement. Before the briefs of argument could be formally adopted, the 4 respondent brought a motion on notice pursuant to section 295 of the 1999 constitution and Rule 4 of the NIC Rules praying the court for reference (case stated) of some questions to the Court of Appeal. By a considered ruling delivered on June 29, 2007, this court rejected the prayer of the 4th respondent for the case stated. in like manner, the preliminary objection raised by the 4 respondent challenging the jurisdiction of this court to hear and determine the matter was considered and rejected by the court. The matter consequently proceeded to hearing and parties formally adopted and orally expatiated on their respective briefs of argument. MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENT OF THE APPLICANT The judgment on 27th June 1995 in Suit No. NIC/5/95, which the applicant wants this court to enforce, is to the effect that (i) The Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria is entitled to unionise civil servants on grade level 07 and above including those of them in the Personal Assistant cadre (formerly Executive Officer cadre) except those who are typists/stenographers, nurses and midwives, pharmacists and medical technologists. (ii) The Nigeria Civil Service Union is entitled to unionise civil servants of grade level 01-06 excluding customs, immigration, technical, typists and stenographìc staff. (iii) As from the date of this judgment i.e. 27th June, 1995 union dues deducted from (sic) civil servants on grade level 07 and above should be paid to the Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria. Monies already paid contrary to the present ruling of this court should not be disturbed. The enforcement proceedings were taken out on 30th April 2002 against the 1st, 2nd and 3rd sets of respondents respectively. In the applications, the applicant deposed variously to the following salient facts- (i) That the 1st, 2nd and 3rd sets of respondents are employers of the members of the applicant and the 4th respondent. Consequently, that it is the statutory duty of the1st, 2nd and 3rd sets of respondents to deduct union dues from the salaries of the eligible members of both unions and pay same over to the appropriate unions in line with the judgment of this court. (ii) that the governments of Yobe, Bauchi and Niger States have been deducting the said union dues without remitting same to the applicant. The applicant stated that these deducted sums of money are being misappropriated iii) That the respective state Governments have issued circulars for the implementation of the said judgment but the circulars are not being implemented and would therefore require an order of court to ensure implementation. To the applicant, all the 4 sets of respondents in response filed counter-affidavit- That the 1st set of respondents, the Government of Yobe State, admitted issuing Exhibit D, a circular ref: LAB/32/VOL.1/72 of 13/06/2001 directing all the functionaries of the 1st respondents in Ministries and Extra Ministerial Departments in Yobe State to deduct union dues from the salary of senior civil servants on grade level 07 arid above and pay same to the applicant. According to the set of respondents in paragraph D of the counter—affidavit, the said circular was in not implemented due to protests from other unions including the 4th respondent. That the 1st set of respondents has, however, re—issued a fresh circular ref: LAB/32/T.I/27 dated 21st October, 2003 following the 1995 judgment of this Court, now sought to been forced, referring to Exhibit YBS 4 and paragraph 17 of the said counter-affidavit. That this exhibits affirms the jurisdiction of the applicant and the 4 respondent in terms of the 1995 judgment. The applicant continued that the 2nd set of respondent also admitted issuing Exhibit D, a circular ref: No: GO/ESM/S/LAB/56/V.I dated 23rd May, 2001 directing compliance with the 1995 judgment but contended that the circular had not been implemented due to the problem of identifying the members of the applicant referring to paragraph 7 and of the counter-affidavit of the 2nd set of respondents. That on the part of the 3rd set of respondents, they contended that the eligible members of the applicant were not unionised in Niger State even though it issued Circular Ref: NG/LAB/48/VOL/II/245 of 14th March, 2001. The said circular attached to the applicants affidavit Exhibit D. The 3rd set of respondents further stated that they were not parties to the original action that led to the judgment and were not aware of it either. That the 4th respondent on its part contends that the judgment is unenforceable in that: (i) The applicant was proscribed and abolished by virtue of the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 4 of 1996. (ii) Sequel to the said proscription, the 4th respondent became entitled to unionize civil servants on grade level 07 and above excluding those in the administrative and professional cadres. (iii) The 1995 judgment used salary grade level in the classification of members of the applicant and the 4th respondent, whereas the said Decree No. 4 of 1 996 adopted “Cadre” as the basis for such classification. (iv) Consequently, the 1995 judgment had been vitiated by the 1996 Decree and the position remained the same under the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 1 of 1999. (v) The award of IAP (not the judgment of this Honourable Court) was made subject to section 5 of the Labour Act and, therefore, the applicant is only entitled to have the check—off dues of civil servants who have voluntarily authorized such deductions to be made and given to the applicant. The applicant then proceeded to frame three issues for the determination of the court. They are- (I) whether the judgment of this Court in Suit No. NIC/5/93 delivered on 27th June 1995 is valid, subsisting and enforceable. (2) whether the said judgment is subject to the award of the Industrial Arbitration Panel regarding section 5 of the Labour Act, or, in the alternative, (3) Whether section 5(4) of the Labour Act Cap. 198 LFN 1990 has not been impliedly repealed in view of section 16A of the Trade Unions Act Cap. 437 LFN 1990, as amended by the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 1 of 1999 ISSUE 1 To the applicant, the issue whether the judgment of this court in Suit No. NIC/5/93 delivered on 27th June 1995 is valid, subsisting and enforceable is the gravamen of this application; and then submitted that the judgment is valid, subsisting and enforceable. That it is trite law that a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction remains valid and binding until it is set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction, referring to Chucks v. Cremor 47 ER 884; Hadkinson v. Hadkinson [1952] 2 All ER 567; Babtunde v. Olatunji [2000] FWLR (Pt.5 ) 874 at 883 para. G. the applicant continued that unless and until the judgment is set aside, it subsists and must be obeyed. It cannot for any reason under our law be ignored, referring to babtunde’s case supra at page 884 para. E and Oba Aladegbemi v. Oba fasanmade [1998] 3 NWLR (Pt. 81) 129. To the applicant, the Supreme Court has stated in many cases that a party who knows of an order or judgment, whether null or valid, regular or irregular, given by a court of competent jurisdiction, cannot be permitted to disobey it. That his unqualified obligation is to obey time order or judgment unless and until that order or judgment has been discharged or set aside, referring to J.C. Ltd and ors v. Ezenwa [1996] 4 NWLR (Pt.443) 391. Continuing, the applicant submitted that the contention of the respondents is that the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 4 of 1996 and Decrec No. 1 of 1999 had the effect of first, abolishing the applicant and second, vitiating the judgment. That this position or contention cannot be correct both in law and common sense. In the first place, that there was no provision in the 1996 amendment of the Trade Unions Act where the senior staff and the employers’ associations were abolished, proscribed or their certificates cancelled or withdrawn. That the Trade Unions Act has carefully stipulated the process by which a trade union can “cease to exist” as a trade union. This is provided for in sections 7, 8 and 9 of the Trade Unions Act Cap. 437 LFN 1990. That the respondents have a very heavy burden or onus to prove that any of these provisions had been complied with in order to establish that the applicant was abolished by Decree 4 of 1996. Furthermore, that for a recognised and registered trade union to be proscribed, such proscription must be published in the Federal Gazette and the original Certificate of Registration of the union withdrawn by the Registrar of Trade Unions, referring the court to I Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette No. 8 Vol. 81 of 24th August 1994 at pages A1-A137 on the proscription of the National Executive Council of the NLC, NUPENG, and PENGASSAN; and also the Federal gazette No. 41 Vol. 83 of 21st August 1996 on the proscription of the National Executive and Branch Executives of NASU, ASUU, and SSAUTHRAI. The applicant then challenged the respondents to produce similar publications if they are to be taken seriously by this court. The applicant continued that the 4th respondents’ contention seems to be that the deletion of Part B of the Third Schedule to the Trade Unions Act by Decree No. 4 of 1996 meant the proscription or abolition of the applicant union; and then submitted that this contention is not only erroneous but also fallacious and repugnant to the restructuring exercise carried out by Decree No. 4 of 1996. First, that the illogical purport of the contention of the 4th respondent is that all the senior staff associations and the employers associations who were listed in Part B of the Third Schedule were all proscribed in one fell swoop. The applicant then asked how far this can be from the truth. Very far, it answered. That this can only happen as a figment of the imagination of the respondents. The applicant then submitted that the whole exercise of restructuring of trade unions under the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 4 of 1996 was limited to trade unions affiliated to the Nigeria Labour Congress (the emphasis is the applicant’s). That this is eloquently captured in the preamble to Decree No. 4 of 1996, which preamble has given us sufficient peep into the intention of the lawmakers should there be any ambiguity for which the applicant does not concede. Secondly, the applicant further submitted that no trade union owes its existence to the listing in the list of trade unions in the Third Schedule to the Trade Unions Act. Rather, that the purposes of the said list of trade unions are two fold: (i) It contains names of trade unions entitled to automatic registration and recognition without more. These trade unions are exempted from fulfilling the preconditions for registration as enshrined in the Act. (ii) The list operates to compartmentalize trade unions into two categories, that is, workers unions or junior staff unions otherwise called the NLC affiliated unions on the one hand and the senior staff and employers association on the other hand. The applicant then submitted that the deletion of the list from the Third Schedule to the Act has nothing to do with the existence of the trade unions listed therein as their existence is premised or dependent upon the certificate of registration issued them at the time of registration. Thirdly, that the restructuring exercise of 1996 was limited to the NLC affiliated unions only. Therefore, the amendment in the Third Schedule was intended to capture the restructured unions affiliated to the NLC; and that is all the list of trade unions in Third Schedule to Decree No. 4 of 1996 achieved. To the applicant, having thoroughly dealt with the foregoing issue, the consequence which the respondents have placed on Decree 4 of 1996, flowing from the argument that the senior staff associations had been abolished, is totally unfounded and misleading. It cannot, therefore, be correct that the 4th respondent inherited the membership of the applicant since the applicant had never died or “ceased to exist” for the issue of inheritance to arise at all. The applicant urged the court to so hold. The applicant went on to submit that the ruling of this Court made on 7th March, 1996 and sentimentally relied upon by the respondents does not support or assist their contention in any way whatsoever. That the ruling is attached to the 4th respondent’s affidavit as Exhibit RA2. That the phrase which caught the fancy of the 4th respondent with frenzy is “substantial changes to the law”. To the applicant, the question that naturally arises from the ruling is what were the substantial changes which Decree No. 4 of 1996 introduced? That the Court fell short of stating those substantial changes simply because there was no application before the Court in that regard. To date, that there has not been any application which has sought the review of that judgment pursuant to the applicable Rule 26 of the 1979 National Industrial Court Rules. That if the respondents felt strongly that the substantial changes was in their favour, by now the 4th respondent would have applied for the review of the judgment. But they have failed to do so to their own peril. To the applicant, the truth of the matter is that it was the 4th respondent that had a judgment hanging over its head. That the applicant union was opposed to the granting of the application. If the application was struck out, by whatever means, it was to the advantage of the applicant union. In that application, the court was not disposed to granting it. Same was struck out because of “substantial changes in the law”. That the 4th respondent’s motion was a hurdle to the applicant union’s enjoyment of the fruit of its victory/judgment. That the ruling cleared the way for the implementation and/or enforcement of the judgment to the benefit of the applicant union. The applicant continued that it has immensely taken advantage of the judgment since then through “administrative dialogue”. This explains why it did not lie in the mouth of the applicant union to attack the striking out of the respondent’s application then. That the Federal Government and most States of the Federation have implemented the judgment. That it is only the states and some few Federal Ministries that did not embrace dialogue that were brought to Court. The applicant continued that whatever wrong impression/interpretation which may have arisen from the language of Decree No. 4 of 1996 (which is not conceded), such was cured with the promulgation of Decree No. 1 of 1999. From the language of the provisions of the 1978 and the 1999 enactments, the applicant submitted that the jurisdictional scope of the Nigeria Civil Service Union (the 4th respondent) is presented or worded in two parts, to wit, the “operative part” and the “exclusionary part”. The operative part stipulates who are eligible to belong to the union and the exclusionary part stipulates those excluded from the membership of the union irrespective of whether or not they meet the qualification as stipulated in the operative part. To the applicant, the “operative part” stipulates “All junior employees of the Federal and State Civil Service...” and then submitted that the language of both enactments are clear, simple and unambiguous. In other words, it means nothing other than “all junior employees”. This court has defined “all junior employees” to mean “civil servants on salary grade level 01-06”. Again this calls for no controversy. The phrase “all junior employees” as used in the 1978 enactment is in pari materia with the phrase used in the 1999 enactment. In other words, that the meaning assigned to the phrase in the 1978 enactment applies mutatis mutandis to the 1999 enactment, pure and simple. Consequently, that the operative part of both enactments confer jurisdiction on the 4th respondent to unionize only junior employees and only these group of workers are eligible to belong to the 4th respondent. The applicant continued that all the depositions in the 4th respondent’s counter-affidavit on Reports and Recommendations of the Nigeria Labour Advisory Council, the address of the head of the Civil Service of the Federation and that of the Federal Ministry of Labour and Productivity are irrelevant for the purpose of this interpretation for two reasons. First, that there is no ambiguity to warrant the court to resort to the history of the legislation. That under the jurisdictional scope of the 4th respondent, the statute (Decree No. 1 of 1999) used the language of both the 1978 enactment and the judgment of this Court now sought to be enforced. On the meaning of enactment which includes Government Notice, the applicant referred the court to Egbo v. Laguna [1988] 3 NWLR (Pt. 80) 109 at 119. For a better appreciation of this point, the applicant reproduced the provisions of both enactments in the following manner — The 1999 enactment states: NIGERIA CIVIL SERVICE UNION “All junior employees of the Federal and State Governments but excluding enforcement employees in the Nigeria Customs and immigration Services, Technical Typist, Stenographic, Medical, Nurses and Midwives and recognized professional and administrative cadres”. The 1978 enactment states: 22. NIGERIA CIVIL SERVICE UNION “All junior employees of the Federal and State Governments excluding Customs and Immigration, Technical, Typist and Stenographic”. For emphasis, the applicant reiterated that if any ambiguity was created by the non-inclusion of the word “junior” for Nigeria Civil Service Union in the 1996 enactment, that ambiguity was eliminated by Decree No. 1 of 1999. To the applicant, it used the word ‘ambiguity’ because Decree No. 4 of 1996 did not alter the status quo on the jurisdictional scope of the 4th respondent and any ruling to the contrary as appears in the portion of the decision in Association of Senior Civil Servant of Nigeria v. Government of Akwa Ibom State (unreported) Suit No. NIC/9M/2000 which states that “the 1 Respondent shall forthwith pay to the Nigeria Civil Service Union ( Respondent) union dues deducted from Civil servants on grade levels 07 and above for period January, 1996 to 31 August, 1998” was, with respect, given per incur/am. The applicant then urged the court to depart from it. That what is, however, important is that the provisions of Decree No. 4 (in the Third Schedule thereto) on jurisdictional scope of the 4th respondent has been repealed by Decree No. 1 of 1999. Consequently, belabouring the issue will only amount to an academic exercise which we do not want to waste the time of this Court on, urging the Court to so hold. Continuing, the applicant submitted that three things are crucial in law for the determination of this application. They are: (i) The date of the commencement of the enforcement; (ii) The law in force as at that date; and (iii) Whether the law in force has derogated from the judgment sought to be enforcement. To the applicant, one very important fact, which the respondents have overlooked to their detriment, is that the applicant commenced the enforcement proceedings after the coming into force of the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 1 of 1999. That Decree came into force in September 1998. That these enforcement proceedings were commenced simultaneously on the 16th October, 2000. As to whether the judgment is enforceable, that the court is only required to examine the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 1 of 1999. As stated earlier, that Decree No. 4 of 1996 is irrelevant for this purpose because: 1. The provision of Part B of the Third Schedule of the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 4 of 1996 dealing with the jurisdictional scope of the 41 respondent was amended by Decree No. 1 of 1999. 2. The law in force on the jurisdictional scope of the 4(11 respondent as at the time of the enforcement of the judgment is Decree No. 1 of 1999 and not Decree No. 4 of 1996. 3. The court is to consider whether the judex of the judgment is affected by any existing law at the date of enforcement or when the enforcement proceeding was commenced and not otherwise. In other words, that the judgment sought to be enforced can only be read in the light of any existing law and not otherwise, urging the Court to so hold. Consequently, that the question is whether the provisions of Part B of the Third Schedule to the Trade Unions Act as amended by the Trade Union (Amendment) Decree No. 1 of 1999 prescribe a jurisdictional scope for the applicant and the 4th respondent different from the terms of the judgment of this Court delivered 27 June, 1995? The applicant answered in the negative and then submitted that the operative words or orders on the jurisdictional scope as prescribed in the judgment are “All junior employees”. That these were the same operative words in Gazette No. 6 of 1978 and in Decree No. 1 of 1999. In other words, the jurisdictional scope of the 4 respondent covers all junior employees in the Federal and State Civil Services. That this is, however, not without some exception or exclusion, which can be found in the judgment as well as in Decree No. 1 of 1999. Similarly, that the jurisdictional scope of the applicant has always remained “All senior staff’ in the Federal and State Civil Service. The applicant continued that it is emboldened in its submission by the fact that the jurisdiction of the applicant, which it is seeking to enforce, is prescribed in the 1978 enactment. Besides the 1978 enactment, there is no other enactment, which prescribes the jurisdiction of the applicant, or any other senior staff association for that matter. That was the basis of the judgment in 1995 and remains the basis till date. In effect, that both under the 1978 enactment and under the subsequent Decree No. 1 of 1999, the jurisdiction of the applicant and the 4th respondent respectively is as pronounced upon in the 1995 judgment, urging the Court to so hold. To the applicant, in the unlikely event that the Court refuses to depart from its earlier decision in Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria v. Government of Akwa Ibom State (unreported) Suit No: NIC/9M/2000, it well urge the court to hold that if the provisions of Decree No. 4 of 1996 had any effect at all, which is not conceded, the judex was restored by the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. I of 1999 as was held by this Court in the ruling in Association of Senior Civil Servant of Nigeria v. Government of Akwa Ibom State (supra). In concluding this part of the submissions, the applicant contended that the Supreme Court has stated in many cases that a party who knows of an order or judgment, whether null or valid, regular or irregular given by a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be permitted to disobey it. He has an unqualified obligation to obey the order or judgment unless and until that order or judgment has been discharged or set aside, referring to J.C. Ltd. and ors vs. Ezenwa [4 NWLR (Pt. 443) 391. Furthermore, that His Lordship Achike, JSC in Babatunde‘s case at page 887, paras. H — A sounded the following priceless warning, which should be of immense benefit to the respondents — I would only wish to add one word or so. Matters appertaining to judicial orders or judgments, for that matter, are not generally treated with arrogance or levity. Speaking for myself, it is rather officious and treading on perilous path for one to arrogate to oneself the right to choose and pick between court orders in terms of whether they are valid or null and void in fact. Since there is a strong presumption in favour of the validity of a court’s order, it behoves everyone to keep faith with the order of the court. It makes no different that ex facie it appears that the court that made the order is without jurisdiction because at the end of the day an order of the court subsists and must be obeyed until set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction. To, therefore, disobey an order of the court on the fancied belief that the said order is null for any reason whatsoever — even if it subsequently turns out that the order in fact is proved to be null — is a risky and inadvisable decision because until the said order is finally determined to be null and void by the court, it subsists with the string attaching to it unmitigated. Therefore, that sheer common sense as well as prudence demands that every order of the court should be accorded due respect and no attempt made to flout the order on the flimsy reason that it is null and void. ISSUES 2 AND3 The applicant argued the second and third alternative issues together. Regarding the second issue i.e. whether the judgment of this Court delivered on 27th June 1995 is subject to the award of the Industrial Arbitration Panel regarding section 5 of the Labour Act, the applicant submitted that the respondents’ contention relating to the IAP award on section 5(4) of the Labour Act is misplaced and cannot be correct. That it is elementary that the judgment of the National Industrial Court overrides or replaces the IAP award except the National Industrial Court expressly incorporates the IAP award as part of its judgment, referring, for ex to Order No.2 at page 11 in the case of Alhaji Shamusideen Adelaja & ors v. Chief Sunday Ogunyade & 6 ors (unreported) Suit No. NIC/12/95, delivered on Friday 29th June 2001, where the court expressly confirmed the IAP award and yet made it subject to its judgment. That this was not the case in the judgment sought to be enforced in which this Court gave a conclusive judgment without subjecting it to the TAP award or vice versa; urging the Court to so hold. The applicant then asked whether alternatively, section 5(4) of the Labour Act Cap. 198 LFN 1990 has not been impliedly repealed by section l6A of the Trade Unions Act Cap. 437 LFN 1990 as amended by the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 4 of 1996 and the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. I of 1999; and then answered the question in the affirmative. To the applicant, to hold the view that members of the applicant must signify in writing their intention to contribute check-off deductions to the applicant does not represent the law as at the time of enforcement of the judgment. That the relevant law imposes a statutory duty on the 3 sets of respondents to deduct check-off dues from the wages of its employees and to pay same to the appropriate trade unions. This dates back to 1986 with the promulgation of the Trade Unions (Miscellaneous Provisions) Decree No. 17 of 1986 wherein section 5 of the Labour Act was amended to introduce the issue of statutory check off deductions from the wages of employees. That section 5(3) of the Labour Act dealt with deductions in favour of trade unions specified in Part A of Schedule 3 to the Trade Unions Act, that is, the trade unions affiliated to the Nigeria Labour Congress while section 5(4) of the Labour Act dealt with deductions in favour of trade unions specified in Part B of the said Schedule 3 to the Trade Unions Act, that is, Senior Staff Associations. The applicant conceded that under the 1986 Amendment, there was a clear distinction between unions, which were entitled to automatic check-off deductions (the unions specified in Part A of Schedule 3 to the Trade Unions Act) and unions, which were entitled to voluntary check-off deductions (the unions specified in Part B of Schedule 3 to the Trade Unions Act), referring to section 5(3) and (4) of the Labour Act as amended by the Trade Unions (Misc. Provisions) Decree No. 17 of 1986. But that even as at this, the employer was still saddled with the responsibility of making deductions from the wages of workers eligible to be members of a registered and recognised union for the purpose of paying contributions to the trade union so recognised. That the distinction between unions in Part A and Part B of Schedule 3 to the Trade Unions Act for the purpose of check-off deductions was, however, eliminated in 1996 when the then Federal Military Government decided to codify the laws relating to trade unions by transferring the provisions on check-off deductions from the Labour Act to the Principal legislation, the Trade Unions Act, referring to section 3 of the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 4 of 1996 where a new section 16A was inserted immediately after the existing section 16 of the Principal Act. The said section 16A provides: Upon the registration and recognition of any of the unions specified in the Third Schedule to this Act, the employer shall — (a) make deduction from the wages of every worker who is eligible to be a member of any of the trade unions for the purpose of paying contributions to the trade union so registered; and (b) pay any sum so deducted directly to the registered office of the trade union after deducting what is due and payable to the Central Labour Organisation. The applicant continued that reading section 16A(b), a prima facie impression is erroneously created that every deduction made whether for the benefit of junior staff unions or senior staff associations must be subjected to a further deduction in favour of the Central Labour Organisation. That this erroneous impression was corrected by the 1999 amendment to the Principal Act. The subsection now reads: (a) pay any sum so deducted directly to the registered office of the trade union. To the applicant, these amendments underscore the very important point that section 16A was intended to apply to all the registered and recognized trade unions irrespective of whether or not it is a trade union affiliated to the Nigeria Labour Congress. Having made the point that section 16A is applicable to all trade unions, the applicant further contended that should there be any doubt as to the intention of the lawmaker, such doubt was cleared when the lawmakers’ carefully excluded the following phrases in the Trade Unions Act, “any of the trade unions specified in Part A of Schedule 3 to the Trade Unions Act...” hitherto found in section 5(3) of the Labour Act; and “any of the trade unions specified in Part B of Schedule 3 to the Trade Unions Act...” hitherto found in section 5(4) of the Labour Act. That what we now have is and all embracing phrase covering all registered and recognised trade unions in Nigeria, which reads: “any of the trade unions specified in the Third Schedule to this Act....” The applicant then submitted that the intention of the Lawmakers to abrogate the dichotomy between trade unions for the purposes of automatic check-off deductions and voluntary check-off deductions has been expressed in very lucid, clear and unambiguous language. All trade unions specified in the Third Schedule are entitled to automatic check-off deductions. That effect must be given to clear and unambiguous words in a statute, referring to Union Bank Plc v. Ozigi [ 3 NWLR (Pt. 333) 385 and Awolowo v. Shagari [ 6—9 SC 51. To the applicant, this leaves us with the legal status of section 5 of the Labour Act. That the question is whether that sub-section been impliedly repealed. That the answer will be found in the interpretative principle of repeal by implication. For this, the applicant relied on the celebrated pronouncement of the respected authors of the Haisbury Laws of England 4 Edition at paragraph 1290 where it is stated thus: Where a later enactment does not expressly amend an earlier enactment, but the provisions of the later enactment are inconsistent with those of the earlier, the later by implication amends the earlier so far as is necessary to remove the inconsistency between them. On the strength of this principle of interpretation, the applicant submitted that section 5(4) of the Labour Act has been impliedly repealed, urging the Court to so hold. Having made the point that the dichotomy between automatic/voluntary check-off deductions has been legally abrogated, the applicant then asked what the statutory duty of the employer (1st-3rd sets of respondents) is as regards deductions from wages of employees eligible to be members of the applicant (a Senior Staff Association). That the only relevant and extant legislation governing the issue of the duty of an employer to make deductions from wages of employees for trade union purposes is the Trade Unions Act Cap. 437 LFN 1990 as amended by Decree No. 4 of 1996 and Decree No. I of 1999. That by the provisions of section 16A of the Principal Act, the 1st — 3rd sets of respondents have the statutory duty to make automatic deduction from the wages of every worker who is eligible to be a member of the applicant union for the purpose of paying contributions to the applicant being a registered and recognised trade union in Nigeria. That this statutory duty is mandatory given that the said section 16A has the phrase, “the employer shall make deductions....” The applicant went on to give a brief background even though it was repetitive. That prior to 1986, there was no legal regime for the deduction or collection of check-off dues. It was voluntary for all the unions. With the promulgation of the Trade Unions (Miscellaneous Provisions) Decree No. 17 of 1986, the deduction and collection of check-off dues became regulated by statute. That what the law did at that time was to introduce two methods of check-off deduction — one automatic and the other voluntary. That this system was greeted with much protest by the Senior Staff Associations because the Senior Staff Associations had very weak financial base to carry out their statutory functions, which in any case, are similar to those of the junior staff or NLC affiliated unions. That this state of affairs continued until the 1996 amendment with further clarification in 1999. That now all unions in the Third Schedule arc entitled to automatic check-off deductions. In fact, that the 1996 and 1999 amendments clearly state that all trade unions shall have the same powers. Consequently, the statutory duty of an employer as the law stands today is mandatory and for the benefit of all unions without discrimination. Furthermore, the applicant submitted that it is the statutory duty of the employer to apply the provisions of the relevant enactments on the jurisdictional scope of trade unions in order to ascertain which of its employees are eligible to belong to any particular trade union. This statutory duty is also enshrined in section 1 6A(a) of the Trade Unions Act, which states, inter alia — ….the employer shall — (a) Make deductions from the wages of every worker who is eligible to be a member of any of the Trade Unions... (the emphasis is the applicant’s). The applicant then urged the court to so hold. In conclusion, the applicant summarized its submissions as follows — (1) The jurisdictional scope of all Senior Staff Associations, including the Associations of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria is expressly stated in the Federal Government of Nigeria Legal Notice No. 92 published in the Extra Ordinary Gazette No. 6 vol. 65 0 February 1978. (2) The jurisdictional scope of the Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria is spelt out in item No. 23 at page 154 of the said Legal Notice as — “All employees, other than junior staff of Federal and State Government.” (3) That as at the time the judgment of this court was delivered in this suit, the jurisdictional scope of the Nigeria Civil Service Union was stipulated in the said Legal Notice at item No. 23 as “all junior employees of Federal and State Government excluding Customs, Immigration, Technical Typist and Stenographic staff.” (4) That this Court in its judgment sought to be enforced clearly defined what constitutes “junior employees” as staff on salary grade level 01 — 06 and “senior staff’ as staff on salary grade level 07 and above with certain exceptions stated therein. (5) That at all material times to the commencement of the present enforcement proceedings — l6th October 2000 — the existing law on trade unions i.e. the Trade Unions Act Cap. 437 LFN as amended by the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. I of -1999 clearly retains the jurisdictional scope of the Nigeria Civil Service Union as prescribed in the 1978 Legal Notice No. 92 as a trade union for “all junior employees” subject, however, to a specified class of ineligible junior employees, which class has been enlarged by the addition of junior employees in the professional and administrative cadres under Decree I of 1999. (6) That the jurisdictional scope of the applicant as prescribed in the said Legal Notice and the judgment sought to be enforced remains sacrosanct as per the judgment of this court. (7) That Decree No. 4 of 1996 did not proscribe the applicant or have the effect of proscribing the applicant as a registered trade union. (8) That it is an academic exercise to pronounce on the provisions of Decree No. 4 of 1996 on the jurisdictional scope of the 4 respondents having been repealed by Decree No. I of 1999. (9) That the judgment of this Court supersedes the award of the TAP except otherwise stated by the National Industrial Court in its judgment. (10) That section 5(4) of the Labour Act has been impliedly repealed by the subsequent legislation, that is, section 16A of Trade Unions Act as amended by Decree No. I of 1999. (11) That by the cumulative effect of section 16A of the Trade Unions Act as amended and the Third Schedule thereto, the dichotomy between unions entitled to automatic check-off systems and those entitled to voluntary check-off systems stood abrogated from the date of commencement of Decree No. 1 of 1999. (12) That every employer including the 1 — 3 sets of respondents herein have a mandatory duty to deduct check-off dues from the eligible members of each union and pay same to the appropriate trade union; and (13) That, in the light of the foregoing, the judgment sought to be enforced is valid, subsisting and enforceable thereby making the applicant entitled to the orders sought. The applicant then urged the Court to grant its application for enforcement. MEMORADUM OR ARGUMENT OF THE 1ST SET OF RESPONDENTS The 1st set of respondents in their written address introduced the matter at hand and briefly restated the facts in issue. To the 1 set of respondents, in their determination to comply with judgment of this Court in Suit No: NIC/5/93 delivered on the 27 June 1995, the 1st set of respondents issued circulars with reference No: LAB/3 2/VOL. 1/72 dated 13 June, 2001 directing all the Ministries and Extra-Ministerial Departments in Yobe State to deduct union dues from the salaries of Senior Civil Servants on grade level 07 and above and remit same to the Association of Senior Civil Servants in the State. Another circular dated 21 October 2003 bearing Ref: LAB/32/T.1/27 was again issued. Both circulars are referred as Exhibits Dl and D2 in their counter-affidavit. They are also attached to the written brief of argument and referred to as Exhibits A and B respectively. That in accordance with the judgment of this Court 0 June 1995, the Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria is entitled to unionise Civil Servants on grade level 07 including those in Personal Assistant cadre (formerly Executive Officer cadre) except those who are Tvpists/Stenographers, Nurses and Midwives, Pharmacists and Medical Technologists. The 1st set of respondents then framed two issues for the determination of this court which are — (1) Whether it is the responsibility of the Yobe State Government (the 1st set of respondents) to make deductions from wages of its Civil Servants and pay it to the applicant. (2) Whether it is the responsibility of the applicant to unionise their members and collect union dues. The 1st set of respondents then submitted that it is not their responsibility to collect union dues from Civil Servants working under it and pay it to the applicant because of the fact that the Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria (the applicant) does not fall within the category of unions mentioned by section 3 of the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 4 of 1996 more especially Part A of the Third Schedule, which recognized only the unions listed therein. Thai the unions listed therein are the ones legally recognised by the said Decree, which enforces a duty on the employer to make deductions from the wages of workers and pay same to the registered office of the trade union in issue. That the applicant is not among the trade unions recognized as such and so is not entitled to the payment of deductions from the 1st set of respondents. The 1st set of respondents further submitted that they have discharged the responsibility placed upon them by the judgment of this Court of 27th June 1995 compelling it to recognize the applicant within Yobe State which it has already done as can be apparently seen in Exhibits A and B attached. In addition, that section 16A of Decree No. 4 of 1996, which the applicant quoted at page 12 of its memorandum of argument does not enforce any legal duty on the 1st set of respondents to the applicants because it does not recognised the applicant. In conclusion, the 1st set of respondents urged the Court to hold that the set respondents (Yobe State) have discharged the responsibility placed upon them by judgment of 27th June, 1995 to recognise the applicants’ existence in Yobe State, which has been complied with through the issuance of circulars LAB/32/VOL.1/72 of 13/06/2001 and LAB/32/T.l/27 of 21 October 2003. MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENT OF THE 2ND SET OF RESPONDENTS Like the 1st set of respondents, the 2nd set of respondents in their written address introduced the matter at hand and then briefly reiterated the facts of the case before the court. In reiterating the facts of the case, the 2nd set of respondents asserted that after several meetings and much entreaties, the 2nd set of respondents through their Head of Service issued a circular notifying all Ministries and Departments and functionaries that the membership of the applicant are civil servants on grade level 07 and above except Typists/Stenographers, Nurses and Midwives, Pharmacist and Medical Technologists. That the said circular issued in 2001 is Exhibit “0” attached to the applicant’s main Motion. That for over one year since the issuance of the said circular on 23rd May, 2002 and before this present application was filed in April, 2002 for enforcement of the judgment of this Court delivered on 27th June, 1995, the applicant held several meetings with the 2nd set of respondents in order to secure the co operation of the Ministries and Departments in the Bauchi State Civil Service regarding the implementation of the terms of the said judgment of this court; all to no avail, hence this application, where this Court is prayed by the applicant to make an order directing the 2nd set of respondents to implement the said judgment of this court by issuing an appropriate circular, The 2nd set of respondents then framed two issues for the determination of this court, which are - 1. Whether there is a valid and subsisting judgment of this Court in this matter, vis-à vis Decree No. 4 of 1996 and Decree No. 1 of 1999 to be enforced. 2. If issue 1 above is answered in the affirmative whether the said judgment of this Court should be obeyed in its terms. ISSUE 1 Regarding the first issue, the 2nd set of respondents submitted that the issue should he answered in the affirmative. That it is the contention of the 4th respondent that the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 4 of 1996 abolished and proscribed the applicant’s union which thereby ceased to exist as a registered and recognized union under the Trade Unions Act Cap. 437 LEN 1990 as from 5th January, 1996 till 1st September 1998 when Decree No. 4 of 1996 was amended by the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 1 of 1999, which brought back the applicant to live as a Trade Union recognized under the Trade Unions Act Cap. 437 LFN 1990. To the 2nd set of respondents, it is trite law that a judgment or order of court subsists until it is set aside or upturned on appeal. That what was proscribed by Decree No. 4 of 1996 is the applicant union and not the subsisting judgment of this Court, which is final, urging the court to so hold. ISSUE 2 The second issue as formulated by the 2nd set of respondents is that if the first issue is answered in the affirmative, whether the said judgment of this Court should be obeyed in its terms. The 2nd set of respondents then urged the Court to answer the question in the affirmative. They submitted that the terms of the judgment delivered on 27th June 1995 has not been varied or altered by this court or any other court. To the 2nd set of respondents, it is the contention of the 4th respondent that Decree No. 4 of 1996 has effectively reversed the judgment of this court by classifying the jurisdictional scope of the said unions on the basis of cadre. That assuming, without conceding, that the above contention is correct, then Decree No. 1 of 1999, which brought back the applicant to life has also effectively and radically reverted back to the said decision or judgment of this court. That the applicant is a recognized trade union under Part C of the Third Schedule to the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 1 of 1999. Continuing, the 2nd set of respondents submitted that under section 33(3) of the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 1 of 1999, the names and the jurisdictional scope of the trade unions areas arc as specified in Pail B of the Third Schedule to the Act. That the Nigeria Civil Service Union, the 4th respondent in this suit, is the 19th listed trade union in Part B of the Third Schedule to the Act. That the area of jurisdiction of the 4 respondent in Part B of the Third Schedule is defined as follows — All Junior employees of the Federal and State Civil Service but excluding enforcement employees in the Nigerian Custom and Immigration Services, Technical, Typist, Stenographic, Medical, Nurses and Midwives and recognized professional and Administrative cadres. The 2nd set of respondents then submitted that the above definition of the area of jurisdiction of the 4th respondent is in the spirit and terms of the said judgment of this Court. That junior employees in the Civil Service either in the Federal or State Civil Service are known to fall within Grade Level 01 — 06 while senior employees in the Civil Service are known to fall within Grade Levels 07 and above and this includes those of them in the Personnel Assistant cadre (formerly Executive Officers cadre) which is in consonance with the judgment of this Court. The 2nd set of respondents then informed the court that they are relying on the 23- paragraphed affidavit dated 3rd June 2002, which they filed particularly paragraphs 6 — 21. In terms of the affidavit, the 2nd set of respondents deposed to the fact that are ready to comply with the judgment of this Court once they know those who are actually the members of the applicant to guide the deduction of applicant’s members’ dues and remit same to the applicant. That once this handicap is sorted out by the applicant, deductions and remittance of union dues from eligible members of the applicant in Bauchi State will be remitted to the applicant. That the 2nd set of respondents have demonstrated their intention to comply with the judgment of this court by issuing out Exhibit ‘D’ attached to the applicant’s affidavit. Finally, the 2nd set of respondents submitted that they are ready to abide by any order made by this court in respect of this matter in the interest of justice. MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENT OF THE 3RD SET OF RESPONDENTS The 3rd set of respondents prefaced its written submissions with a brief introduction of the facts of the matter at hand and then asserted that they filed a 5-paragraphed counter-affidavit on May 25, 2002 in response to the depositions of the applicant. Among the salient facts they deposed to are (i) That the 3rd sets of respondents were not parties to Suit No NIC/5/93 decided on the 27th June 1 995 and, therefore, could not be bound by the said judgment. (ii) That eligible members were never unionized in Niger State when the said judgment was delivered and, therefore, no monthly deductions could have been made on behalf of the applicant. (iii) That membership of trade unions is a voluntary affair. The 3rd set of respondents then formulated two issues for determination of this Court, which are (i) Whether the judgment of this Court in Suit No: NIC/5/93 delivered on 27th June 1995 is binding on a non-party to the suit for the purposes of enforcement of same on the 3 set of respondents who were not parties to that suit. (ii) \Vhether the applicant can force eligible senior Civil Servants to belong to its association even if they have not indicated interest in joining the association in view of the provisions of the 1999 Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria. ISSUE 1 To the 3rd set of respondents, the only argument of the applicant in support of its application for enforcement of the judgment in suit No NIC/5/93 delivered on the 27th day of June 1995 against the 3rd set of respondents, who were not parties to the suit, is that the 3rd set of respondents are the employers of eligible members of the applicant union and the only body statutorily vested with the powers to make deductions pursuant to section 16A of the Trade Unions Act. In reply to this argument, the 3rd set of respondents submitted that orders or judgment in a particular case are only enforceable against parties and/or their privies. That the Niger State Government was not a party to the suit in which the applicant seeks to enforce the judgment nor is it a privy to any of the parties. That this court has no jurisdiction to make an order against a person who is not a party to the suit before it. That the 3rd set of respondents was not heard in Suit No. NIC/5/93 and, therefore, its judgment could not be binding on the 3rd set of respondents, talk less of enforcing it against the respondents, referring the court to the case of Habib Nigerid Bank Ltd v. Opomulero [2000] 15 NWLR (Pt, 690) 315 at 321 Ratio 17. Continuing, the 3rd set of respondents submitted that in Civil actions all parties necessary for invocation of the judicial powers of the Court must be joined in an action and the parties must come before the court to give the Court jurisdiction to grant the reliefs sought; that this was not done in this case. That the applicant knew very well that the respondents were the only statutory body vested with the power to make deductions pursuant to section 1 6A of the Trade Unions Act and yet did not join them in Suit No. NIC/5/93 but now wants it to be bound by the case. They then contended that this Court cannot or has no jurisdiction to make any order against the respondents who were not parties to the said Suit No. NIC/15/93, referring to the case of Awoniyi v. Reg. Trustees of AMORC [2000] 10 NWLR (Pt. 676) 522 at 528 and 529 Ratios 9, 10, 11 and 12. That both the action and the judgment were in personam, which can only be binding on the parties to the suit, urging the Court to so hold. Furthermore, that it is the submission of the applicant that other States in the Federation including Lagos State (referring to Exh. C annexed to the applicant’s application) have complied with the judgment. In reply, the 3rd set of respondents submitted that that is those States’ business if they decided to comply. That it is not the business of the 3 set of respondents to comply since there is no judgment binding on it, as the judgment was not a judgment in rem, but in personam. That the Court can consolidate actions as the law allows it hut cannot consolidate judgment, referring to the case of Habib Nigeria Bank Ltd v. Opomulero (supra) at 319 Ratio 8, urging the court to so hold. ISSUE 2 To the 3rd set of respondents, the applicant, the Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria, is listed in Part B of the Third Schedule of the Trade Unions Act Cap. 437 LFN 1990. That the Niger State Civil Service comprises of junior and senior Civil Servants. The said Civil Servants, be they senior or junior, have the right to belong to any association individually or collectively or not to belong to any association at all, referring to section 40 of the 1999 Constitution. That section 40 of 1999 Constitution is in pan material with section 37 of the 1979 Constitution, which was applicable when Suit No. NIC/5/93 was determined. The 3rd set of respondents then contended that being a Civil Servant, senior or junior, in any State of the Federation does not make compulsorily a person to belong to either of the association. To them, that explains why in 1993 there was the applicant association in some states including Lagos State, while there was none in Niger State. Continuing, the 3rd set of respondents contended that the averments in paragraphs 10 to 20 of the applicant’s affidavit are not true as they relate to Niger State. It was not until the l4th when the Niger State Government gave the Association of Senior Civil(Servants recognition to unionize all senior civil servants on grade levels 07 — 16 in the State Civil Service, referring to Exh. D annexed to the applicant’s application. That Exh. D is not per se evidence of unionization of the senior Civil Servants in the State. They then submitted that since there was no Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria in Niger State, the 3rd set of respondents couldn’t have been making any deduction for remittance to the applicant. That Exh. D is only telling the applicant to unionise the eligible members and not that the applicant has already unionised the members. that check-off dues can only be deducted and remitted to the applicant where it exists and only if section 5(4) of the Labour Act Cap. 198 LFN 1990 is complied with. The said section 5(4) of the said Act provides that — No deductions shall be made from the wages and salaries of persons who are eligible members of any of the trade unions specified in Part B of the Third Schedule to the Trade Unions Act except the person concerned has accepted in writing, to make voluntary contributions to the trade union. That there is nothing before this Court evidencing that the applicant has unionised eligible members in Niger State; and so the 3rd set of respondents cannot be compelled to make any deduction to the applicant who has no presence in the State. For the reasons above the 3rd set of respondents prayed the Court to dismiss the application of the applicant as there is no ground for such an application against them. The 3rd set of respondents then summarized their submissions as follows — (i) That they were not a party in Suit No. NIC/5/93 and so the judgment in that matter cannot bind the 3rd set of respondents. (ii) That the issues as formulated and argued by the applicant are for academic exercise and have no bearing with the real issue before the Court, which is whether the Court can enforce the judgment in Suit No. NIC/5/93 on non-parties to the suit. (iii) That the applicant is not in Niger State. Full evidence must be produced by the applicant of its presence, which has not been done. (iv) That the judgment cannot be enforced on non-parties to the judgment as the judgment was in personam and not in rem. They concluded by urging the Court to dismiss all the reliefs sought by the applicant against the 3rd set of respondents. MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENT OF THE 4TH RESPONDENT Like all the other respondents, the 4 respondent introduced the matter at hand by reiterating the facts of the matter, albeit in greater details. To the 41 respondent, sometime in 1978, the Federal Government of Nigeria issued the Extra-Ordinary Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette No. Vol. 65 of 81 February, 1978 titled RESTRUCTURING OF TRADE UNIONS wherein the existing trade unions were restructured to 71 industrial unions, and the jurisdiction of each union spelt out in the gazette. The Nigeria Civil Service Union, the 4th respondent herein, was listed at page 154 as No. 22 among the 71 industrial unions listed in the gazette, and under it the membership was defined as — All junior employees of Federal and State Governments excluding Customs, Immigration, Typists and Stenographic staff. The Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria, the applicant herein, was listed as No. 23 at page 155 and under it the membership was defined as — All employees other than junior staff of Federal and State Governments. That following an inter-union dispute, which arose between the 4th respondent and the applicant in Suit No. IAP/HB/3468/5, the Industrial Arbitration Panel determined the issue of jurisdictional scope of the two unions mainly on the interpretation of the terms “junior employee/staff’ and “senior employee/staff’ as used in the gazette, on the basis of salary grade levels i.e. “junior staff to mean employees on grade levels 01 to 06 and “senior staff’ to mean employees on grade level 07 and above. Consequently, the tribunal came to the following decision, inter alia — In the inter-union dispute between the Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria (First Party) and the Nigeria Civil Service Union (Second Party) the Tribunal awards as follows: (1) The Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria is a registered and recognised trade union as per No. 23 page 155 of Federal Gazette No. 6Volume 65 of 8 February, 1978, and as per Schedule 3 to the Trade Unions Decree No. 22 of 1978 and the fact of its being a full and recognised member of the Public Service Negotiating Council and the Joint Public Service Negotiating Council. (ii) The Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria is entitled to unionize Civil Servants on Grade Level 07 and above, including those of them in the Personnel Assistant Cadre (formerly Executive Officer Cadre), except those who are Typists, Stenographers, Nurses and Midwives and Pharmacists, Medical Technologists. (iii) The Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria is entitled to union dues deducted from Civil Servants on GL 07 and above, who are members of the Association subject to the provisions of section 5(4) of the Labour Act Cap. 198 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990. This award is to take effect from the date of its confirmation. The Tribunal therefore makes no Award in respect of union dues already deducted from Civil Servants on GL 07 and above and paid over to the Second Party in the suit. That the said decision was on 27 June 1995 upheld by this Court in Suit No. NIC/5/93 upon an appeal thereon by the Nigeria Civil Service Union, the 4 respondent herein. That this Court in its judgment held as follows — The summary of the findings of this Court is as follows: (i) The Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria is entitled to unionise Civil Servants on grade levels 07 and above, including those of them in the Personnel Assistant Cadre (formerly Executive Officer Cadre), except those who are typists/stenographers, nurses and midwives, pharmacists and medical technologists. (ii) The Nigeria Civil Service Union is entitled to unionise civil servants on grade levels 01-06 excluding Customs, Immigrations, Technical, Typists, and Stenographic staff. (iii,) As from the date of this judgment i.e. 27 June 1995 union dues deducted from civil servants on grade levels 07 and above should be paid to the Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria. Monies already paid contrary to the present ruling of this Court should not be disturbed. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. Judgment is entered accordingly. Thereafter, the 4th respondent herein, by a Motion on Notice, applied to the National Industrial Court, inter alia, for an interpretation of its judgment and an order granting the union a period of time from February to 3rd March, 1996, or any such period of time as the Court considered reasonable, to arrange for effective disengagement at the National and State levels of officers affected by the said judgment That while the aforesaid Motion was still pending before the National Industrial Court, the Federal Government promulgated the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 4 of 1 996, which completely altered the position of the Law under which the afore-mentioned judgments were given. That the main effect of Decree No. 4 of 1996 was that by virtue of sections 6(a) and 10 thereof, as well as Part B of the Third Schedule, the membership of trade unions in the Civil Service was not based on salary grade levels as contained in the said judgments, but was rather based on the “cadre” of the workers. Consequently, by the said Decree No. 4 of 1996, the membership of the Nigeria Civil Service Union include civil servants in the Personnel Assistant Cadre (formerly Executive Officer Cadre) irrespective of whether they are on salary grade level 07 and above. Part B of the Third Schedule to the Decree defined the jurisdictional scope of the Nigeria Civil Service Union as follows — NIGERIA CIVIL SERVICE UNION All workers of the Federal arid State Governments but excluding enforcement employees in Customs and Immigration Services, Technical, Typists, Stenographic, Medical, Nurses and Midwives and recognised Professional and Administrative cadres. To the 4th respondent, the effect of the substantial changes made by Decree No. 4 of 1996 on the law as it affects the court judgment was acknowledged by the National Industrial Court when the said Motion came up before it on 7th March 1996. In the circumstance, that the Court viewed the Motion as an academic exercise and decided that — in view of Decree 4 of 1996, Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree, which has made very substantial changes in the law, the Court hereby strikes out this application. Thereafter, nothing was heard or done in respect of the said Suit No. NIC/5/93 or the judgment therein for over five years until sometime in April 2002, when the applicant filed the respective substantive applications herein against the 1st set of respondents in Suit No. NIC/5/2002, namely, Government of Yobe State and others, the 2nd set of respondents in Suit No. NIC/6/2002, namely, Government of Bauchi State and others and the 3rd set of respondents in Suit No. NIC/7/2002, namely, Government of Niger State and others, praying for the reliefs stated in the applicant’s application. Meanwhile, that the Nigeria Civil Service Union became aware of the various slits and immediately applied to the Court by way of different Motions on Notice for orders to be joined as t