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REPRESENTATIONS: Uche Wisdom Dureke Esq., with him, Nnadozie C. Ohanyere Esq; for the Claimant/Respondent L. M. Alozie Esq. for the 1st and 2nd Defendants/Applicants B. N. Amagheronu, Asst. Chief State Counsel, for the 3rd and 4th Defendants/Applicants RULING The Claimant brought this action by way of Complaint dated and filed on the 6th day of December 2012, claiming against the Defendants jointly and severally the following reliefs: 1. A DECLARATION that the staff of Imo Transport Company Ltd, 1st Defendant, are not staff of Global Ginikana Services Ltd, 2nd Defendant, and therefore, the terms and conditions of services of the staff of the 1st Defendant are governed or regulated by the existing negotiated conditions of service in the 1st Defendant, Imo Transport Co. Ltd. 2. A DECLARATION that Global Ginikana Services Limited is bound by the existing negotiated conditions of service or regulations in the 1st Defendant and all other agreements reached and or entered into with the Claimant in respect of the conditions or terms or welfare of the employees of the 1st Defendant, Imo Transport Company Limited, or any other agreement with the claimant in respect of the management of the Imo Transport company Limited, as it affects or might affect the staff of Imo Transport Company Ltd. 3. A DECLARATION that the indefinite suspension of seven members of the Claimant, staff of the 1st Defendant - Anthonia Ejemenu (Nee Onyedinma), Ogechi Ibe, Sylvia Anuforo Amarachi Ewurum Ifeanyi Abazie, Philomena Ulogwara (Nee Enwereaku) and Caroline Unegbu (Nee Njoku) and without pay by the 2nd Defendant amounts to a breach of Article 8.6 of the regulations governing the conditions of service of the staff of the 1st defendant and therefore, order that they should return to work without loss of pay - arrears of salaries and allowances or Seniority. 4. A DECLARATION that the retirement of the following staff of the Imo Transport Company Limited, namely: Mr. V. C. Alabaraonye, Mr. Festus Nkwocha and Mr. J. U. Ukazu are null and void as they were made contrary to the existing rules and regulations governing employment in Imo Transport Co Ltd. 5. A DECLARATION that the meditated agreement reached between the Claimant trade union and the 1st Defendant on 7th August 2012, which was witnessed by the representative of the Ministry of Labour and Productivity is binding; and an order that the said agreement be implemented accordingly and forthwith by the management or managers, whichever called, of the Imo Transport Company Limited. 6. A DECLARATION that the drivers in the employment of the 1st Defendant whose vehicles were auctioned by 2nd Defendant and have not been issued with letters of disengagement are still staff of Imo Transport Company Limited and therefore entitled to their salaries and allowances under the conditions of service. 7. AN ORDER restraining the Defendants by themselves, their officers, workers, agents, servants, assigns, representatives, successors or privies from further running or continuing to manage the affairs of the 1st Defendant's staff without adherence to the existing rules and regulations governing the staff conditions of service in the 1st Defendant and the relevant provisions of the labour law. 8. AN ORDER that the staff of the 1st Defendant should be paid with the existing salary structure of the 1st Defendant and all their pending arrears of salaries and allowances. And in the alternative: A DECLARATION that every action and/or decision taken by the 2nd Defendant, Global Ginikana Services Limited, affecting, or concerning the employment of any staff or staff - whether it is retirement, or indefinite suspension, or termination, reduction of salary etc. or the terms of employment of any staff or staff of the 1st Defendant Imo Transport Company Ltd - whether it is reduction of salaries and/or allowances, more works of work, etc. are null, void and of no effect as the 2nd Defendant the taking over of the management' and operations of the 1st Defendant is illegal, null and void and abuse of due process. By a Motion on Notice filed on the 14th day of June, 2013 and brought pursuant to Order 11 Rule 2 of the NIC Rules 2007 and under the inherent jurisdiction of this court, the Defendants/Applicants seek for the following reliefs: 1. An order striking out the names of the 3rd &4th Defendants in this suit as they are not proper parties. 2. An order striking out paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 26, 27, 29 and 31 of the Statement of Facts for being vexatious, scandalous and in particular for raising issues outside the jurisdiction of this honorable court. 3. An order striking out the alternative relief as contained in the complaint and statement of claim. And for such further order or order as this honorable court may deem fit to make in this circumstance. The motion, which is supported by a 5 paragraph affidavit deposed to by one Chizoba Onyeneke a litigation secretary in the law firm of the L. M. Alozie & Co., is also accompanied by a written address wherein Counsel formulated three issues for determination. 1. Whether the 3rd & 4th defendants ought to have being joined as parties to this suit? 2. Whether the paragraph 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 26, 27, 29, and 31 of the Statement of Facts do not raise issues outside the jurisdiction of this Honorable court. 3. Whether in the event that the court holds that paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 26, 27, 29 and 31 of the Statement of Facts raise issues outside the court jurisdiction, the alternative relief ought not to be struck out. Counsel to the defendant/applicant in arguing ISSUE ONE, submitted that from the Claimant's averments in the Statement of Facts, it is evident that the rationale for joining the 3rd and 4th defendants as parties to this suit is premised on the basis that the 1st defendant is a public corporation established by the law of the Imo State Government (the government which is represented by the 3rd and 4th defendants). That the claimant having averred that the 1st and 2nd defendants are Companies incorporated under the Companies and Allied Matters Act, the only nexus between the 1st and 2nd defendants and the 3rd and 4th defendants is that the 3rd and 4th defendants appear to own controlling shares in the 1st defendant and executed a management lease in favour of the 2nd defendant who is presently running the 1st defendant's affairs at variance with the claimant's wishes. Counsel answered in the negative, a question as to whether the 3rd and 4th Defendants stand in a position that necessitates being sued as defendants in this suit. He stated that from a long line of judicial and statutory authorities, having a controlling number of shares in a company is not synonymous with its ownership. Once incorporated, a company acquires an entity of its own and its own separate legal existence. He relied on the case of OKOMU OIL PALM CO. LTD vs. ISERHENRHIEN (2001) 6 NWLR (Pt. 710) 660 and submitted that the mere fact that the government holds a controlling number of shares in a company, does not make the company's employees "civil servants" or "technicians in public corporations." This decision, he said, was appropriately followed by the Court of Appeal in OKOMU OIL PALM LTD vs. OKPAME (2007) 3 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 1020) 71 It is Counsel’s submission that the law is settled that a party is only necessary to the adjudication of a suit if his presence will enable the court to adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved or in controversy. See GREEN vs. GREEN (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 61) 80. He stated that the courts have consistently held that the only reason which makes it necessary to make a person a party to an action, is that there must be a question in the action which cannot be effectively and completely settled unless he is a party. Applicant’s Counsel submitted that 1st defendant is a legal entity separate from its management, having been incorporated under the Companies and Allied Matters Act; and that it has a separate and distinct life and existence and its officers and members are covered by the company's veil of incorporation which cannot be lifted for the purpose of attaching legal responsibility or liability to its officers carrying on the usual business of the company. See Section 65 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, 1990.; C. B. Ltd vs. INTERCITY BANK PLC (2009) N.W.L.R. 445; and OGBODU v. QUALITY FINANCE LTD (2003) 6 N.W.L.R (pt.815) 147. The 1st and 2nd defendants having been sued as legal persons can be held liable for their actions. The 3rd and 4th Defendants are therefore unnecessary to the effective adjudication of this suit, irrespective of whether they have an interest as owners or members of the 1st and 2nd Defendants who are in themselves legal persons and therefore sufficient for the effective adjudication of this case. Counsel raised a question as to whether the case discloses a cause of action against the 3rd and 4th Defendants. To this, he submitted that a cause of action arises from circumstances containing a set of facts that give rise to a claim that can be enforced in a court of law, and that a party sued must have done a wrongful act which has injured the claimant or given the claimant a reason to complain in a court of law. He cited the case of LABODE vs. OTUBU (2001) 7 NWLR (Pt. 712) 256; and A.G. FEDERATION vs. A.G. ABIA STATE (2001)11 NWLR (Pt. 725) 689. Applicant’s Counsel pointed out that a study of the Statement of Facts filed by the Claimant reveals that the base of the complaint giving rise to their action is the avalanche of wrongs purportedly done to the claimant by the 1st and 2nd Defendants who are limited liability companies and not acts done by the 3rd and 4th Defendants. He said that the 1st and 2nd Defendants are not agents, but corporate bodies different from the 3rd and 4th Defendants who are their owners. He thus reiterated that the claimant has no cause of action against the 3rd and 4th defendants. Their names should therefore be struck out accordingly In arguing ISSUE TWO, counsel to the Applicant’s Counsel cited Section 251(1) (e) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) which confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal High Court to hear and determine matters arising from the operation of the Companies and Allied Matters Act or any other enactment replacing the Act or regulating the operation of companies incorporated under the Companies and Allied Matters Act. Counsel summarized into two, the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court as conferred by section 254(C) (1) of the 1999 constitution (as amended): (a) Civil matters or causes relating to labour, employment, trade unions and work place conditions. (b) Civil matters or causes arising from Factories Act, Trade Disputes Act, Trade Unions Act, Employees Compensation Act, or other Laws or Act relating to Labour, employment and industrial relations. He then stated that the operation or management of companies are clearly exempt from the jurisdiction of the NIC. Counsel submitted that the facts stated in paragraphs 15, 16, 17 , 18, 19, 26, 27, 29 and 31 of the claimant's statement of facts can be summarized thus:- The management and operations of the 1st defendant were transferred to the 2nd defendant via a lease agreement signed by representatives of the 1st and 3rd defendants. The 2nd defendants in execution of their managerial roles have also been buying new vehicles for operation and selling off old vehicles. The 2nd defendants have not been carrying out their managerial duties in the manner the 1st defendant carried them out. Counsel attempted to differentiate between members of a union and a worker. He said that a trade dispute does not exist because union members do not qualify as workers within the meaning of the Trade Disputes Act; and that since the Claimant is a union, it does not qualify as a worker. See N.U.R.T.W vs. OGBODO (1998) 2 NWLR (Pt. 537) 193 and OSHIOMOLE vs. F.G.N (2007) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1035) 63. He submitted that to stretch the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court to cover issues relating to the internal management and operation of a company (the 1st defendant) contrary to its Memorandum and Articles of Association, is to negate the spirit of the Constitution that clearly provides for the jurisdiction of courts created by it. An examination of the parties’ pleadings would ascertain whether the subject matter of a suit falls within the jurisdiction of the court the action is brought. See TRADE BANK PLC vs. BENILUX (NIG) LTD (2003) FWLR (Pt. 162) 1871. He said that the facts contained in paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 26, 27, 29 and 31 of the Statement of Facts relates to the management of a Company, the jurisdiction of which is exclusively vested on the Federal High Court and that the National Industrial Court has no jurisdiction over the operation and management of companies. Counsel therefore urged the court to strike out paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 26, 27, 29 and 31 of the Statement of Facts, as they relate to facts outside the Jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court. In arguing ISSUE THREE, Counsel submitted that the averments in the Statement of Claim show that the claimant's action cannot be adjudicated upon without the Memorandum and Articles of Incorporation of the 1st defendant. The Companies and Allied Matters Act govern the duties and liabilities of the officers. Jurisdiction over these matters is vested in the Federal High Court by virtue of section 251(1) of the 1999 constitution (as amended). He stated that jurisdiction exists when the point to be decided is within the powers of the court; and that where a court lacks jurisdiction, it automatically lacks the necessary competence to try the case. See ARJAY LTD vs. A.M.S. LTD (2003) 7 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 820) 577; WEMA BANK PLC vs. CHRISROCK LABORATORY LTD (2002) 8 N.W.L.R. (Pt.770) 634; ACHEBE vs. NWOSU (2003) FWLR (Pt. 136) 891; and AFRIBANK (NIG) PLC vs. BONIK INDU. LTD (2006) 5 NWLR (Pt. 973) 300. Counsel stated that the court not being seised with jurisdiction to adjudicate on a subject matter relating to the operation of companies cannot grant reliefs because it lacks jurisdiction. Any such relief granted without jurisdiction will amount to nothing. The alternative relief sought by the claimant embodies facts relating to the operation of a company and are not labour related thus the National Industrial Court cannot grant same. It should therefore be struck out. In conclusion Counsel to the Defendant/Applicant urged this honorable court to answer the three issues raised in this address in favour of the applicant and strike out, the names of the 3rd and 4th defendants in this suit, paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 26, 27, 29 and 31 of the Statement of Facts; and the alternative relief sought by the claimant. Counsel to the Claimant/Respondent, in his written address in opposition to the motion on notice, formulated three issues for determination. ISSUE ONE relates to whether the 3rd and 4th Defendants ought to have been joined as parties to the suit. In arguing this issue, counsel to the Claimants/Respondents submitted that the 3rd and 4th Defendants were parties from the day the action was commenced. The Statement of Facts and documents sought to be relied upon at the trial connect them. The 2nd relief in the 1st and 2nd Defendants’ counter claim is for: "A Declaration that the Claimant and its members who are neither the shareholders nor directors of the 1st Defendant company; and who are not signatories to the lease agreement between the Government of Imo State and the 1st Defendant on one part and the 2nd Defendant on the other part has no right in law to challenge or enforce the terms of that agreement." Counsel submitted that the instant application is an abuse of the process of law as the Applicants cannot approbate and reprobate on the issue. The quarrel of the Applicants is based on the last words in the alternative relief, which are as follows: "as the taking and or handing over of the management and operations of the 1st Defendant to the 2nd Defendant is illegal, null and void, and abuse of due process.” He said the handing over was consequent upon the lease agreement, which is the basis of the Counter Claim; that it will serve the interest of justice and fairness that the issue is raised and canvassed at the trial. The court will then be in a position to see and ascertain if the lease agreement which is before it, truly contains workers' issues and welfare or not, and whether the workers can lay any claims. The court cannot speculate on the rights contained in a document that is not placed before it. To strike out the names of the 3rd and 4th Defendants will do injustice to the case of the claimant. A document speaks for itself and issues are adjudged based on its content. Granting this application will therefore tantamount to hearing and determination of the Defendant’s Counter-Claim. Counsel argued that the 3rd and 4th defendants are necessary parties and indeed desirable parties to the suit. The lease agreement in question contains staff issues and welfare, thereby forming the basis for which the 2nd Defendant is terrorizing the workers. It is therefore wrong to conclude that the State Government who is a signatory to the lease agreement is not a proper party to be joined in this suit. Counsel sought to correct the misconception which the 1st and 2nd defendants obviously have towards the Claimant’s case. He stated that the lease agreement is brought in to enable the court resolve these important issues: • Who is the employer of the workers presently? • Who should, therefore, be responsible for the welfare of the workers and their salaries? He said these are clearly labour related issues, which the presence of the 3rd and 4th Defendants as parties to the suit will be required in addressing. Counsel submitted that by the facts and circumstances of the case, there are acts or actions of the Imo State Government that justify the presence of the 3rd and 4th Defendants in this suit. Also, that ITC remains a corporation, since the law that established it has not been repealed. Counsel stated that Paragraph 19 of the statement of Facts shows that the Imo state Government and the claimant, in pursuit of industrial relations practice, discussed the issue. He submitted that the trial will bring forth what they discussed and agreed on. These material facts will aid or help the honourable court in doing substantial justice in the case. Counsel stated that if the names of the 3rd and 4th Defendants are struck out at this stage, it will affect the justice of the case. The fact of impoverishment of drivers contained in 31 ix and x of the Statement of Facts is a material allegation which needs to be resolved at the trial, and which cannot be resolved without the 3rd and 4th defendants being heard in the suit. He said that the issue of whether the workers of ITC are public servants or not does not arise as the jurisdiction of this Court covers both public servants and non-public servants, once the issue has to do with labour. On ISSUE TWO, counsel submitted that paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 26, 27, 29 and 31 of the Claimant's Statement of Facts are material facts in the case. They do not raise issues outside the jurisdiction of this honourable Court. Also, that they are not indecent or offensive or indeed scandalous. Counsel briefly x-rayed the said paragraphs seriatim to show that they are not scandalous or vexatious or raising issues outside the jurisdiction of this Court. Paragraph 15 is to the effect that without notice, the representatives of the 2nd Defendant introduced themselves to the workers that the 2nd Defendant had taken over the management and operations of the 1st Defendant, including issues and affairs of the workers. Counsel cited Section 10(1) of the Labour Act to submit on this point that that if there should be transfer of workers employment to a new owner, the workers should know. Paragraph 16 is to the effect that the 2nd Defendant froze the 1st Defendant's bank accounts without notice or order of Court, which affected workers payment. Thus workers’ salaries were not paid because of the 2nd Defendant's act. A community reading of Paragraphs 17 and 18 shows that the Claimant complained "of the hardship and deprivation the handover of the ITC to the 2nd Defendant would cause its members." The complaint is presently the situation. Paragraph 19 shows that the Imo State Government and the Claimant, in pursuit of industrial relations practice, have been dialoguing on the issue. The paragraph does not only refer of the status of the lease agreement that the 2nd Defendant is anchoring upon in dealing with workers' issues and welfare. Paragraph 26 is that the 2nd Defendant is presently craftily causing drivers of ITC to become redundant and leave without pay by selling serviceable vehicles of ITC. Paragraph 27 is that the 2nd Defendant is causing loss of the workers' jobs by leasing out the 1st Defendant's vehicles to unknown persons and Companies outside Imo State. Paragraph 29 is to the effect that the 2nd Defendant is now replacing the existing staff of ITC with new staff without notice. Paragraph 31 alleges that the 2nd Defendant is running the 1st Defendant Like a family business and by this, has no regard to the interest of the workers of ITC. It is Counsel’s submission that the content of the paragraphs the Applicant seeks to strike out, are in no way vexatious or scandalous. They are issues that touch on workers’ rights, harsh and oppressive conditions of work, unfair labour practices, job security and workers’ interests. And that since they all touch on labour and employment, they fall within the jurisdiction of this court. Counsel further made reference to the sub-paragraphs which make the complaint clearer as follows: i. The deduction of N200.00 for insurance touches on the workers income and wages. Non- crediting of the sums deducted for the workers is exploitation and corruption. See Section 5(2) of the Labour Act, 2004 which provides that a deduction from a worker's wages or income must be by his or her consent. ii. Withholding of the workers' check off dues deduction is a serious issue under the Trade Unions Act (as amended). The law is settled that the employer deducts check off dues and remits the sum to the union. It is not for keeps by the employer. Where it happens as in this case, it is a matter that this honourable court will hear. iii. The parties met on 7th August 2012 and agreed on three burning items, which included the wrongful retirement of three staff but the 1st Defendant and the 2nd Defendants have refused to honour the agreement. iv. Is an allegation of increasing threats to the lives and the jobs of the union leaders and activist members of the Claimant in ITC. v - viii. Are to show how the 2nd Defendant is craftily making the workers redundant in order to cause them to go. ix - x. Alleges that the 2nd Defendant collects undocumented daily insurance levy of Two Hundred Naira from drivers. This is a serious issue in industrial relations as it affects the workers’ wages and income. xi. Complains that the 2nd Defendant has refused or failed to pay the ITC workers with the approved and existing salary structure and that it is withholding the workers allowances, like hospital allowance. xii. Is that the 2nd Defendant has refused to pay workers the arrears of minimum wage. xiii. Complains of sifting freedom of expression as a worker who expresses any view or displeasure over harsh policy in ITC is visited with punitive redeployment geared towards frustrating him or her into redundancy. xiv. Is complaining of discriminatory workplace practice by the 2nd Defendant. That new drivers employed by 2nd Defendant are being favoured over original ITC drivers. xv. The averment here is that the workers now work with great fear of being rendered redundant or suspended indefinitely as that have become the order of the day. Counsel submitted that the above paragraphs are not among the matters contemplated in Section 251(1)(e) of the Constitution, as matters falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. He further submitted that the said paragraphs are not scandalous or vexatious, and that they fall within the jurisdiction of this Court. It is Counsel’s further submission on this point that it is settled law that a set of facts can present two different causes of action, which different Courts have jurisdiction over. He stated that the Application to strike out the said paragraphs is a subtle attempt by the 1st and 2nd Defendants to pull the rug of the Claimant's feet in the case without the important issues in the matter being heard by the court. In arguing ISSUE THREE, counsel to the Claimants/Respondents reproduced the alternative relief as follows: "A DECLARATION that every action and or decision taken by the 2nd Defendant, Global Ginikana Services Limited, affecting or concerning the employment of any staff or staff - whether it is retirement, or indefinite suspension, or termination reduction of salary etc. or the terms of employment of any staff or staff of the 1st Defendant, Imo Transport Company Ltd - whether it is reduction of salaries and or allowances, more hours of work, etc. are null, void and of no effect as the 2nd Defendant taking over of the management and operations of the 1st Defendant is illegal, null and void, and abuse of due process." Counsel submitted that the alternative prayer is proper and should not be struck out. A critical look at the relief will show that it is merely challenging the actions and or decisions of the 2nd Defendant affecting or concerning the employment of the ITC workers. This is a labour related relief. The facts in support of the relief are pleaded in the Statement of Facts. However, being an alternative relief, it is of no moment because it will be considered, if and when the main prayer fails. It is also a declaratory relief. Counsel further stated that the quarrel of the 1st and 2nd Defendants seem to be with the last three lines of the relief which are “as the 2nd Defendant taking over of the management and operations of the 1st Defendant is illegal, null and void, and abuse of due process.” On this note, Claimant’s Counsel, while urging that the alternative prayer should not be struck out, applied for leave of court to expunge the said words from the alternative relief, especially as the relief would still be complete and reasonable if the words are expunged. Counsel submitted that the 1st and 2nd Defendants’ Application is misconceived and lacking in merit, and ought to be struck out. There is a cause of action, disclosed in the suit. Also, that there are issues that make the presence of the 3rd and 4th Defendants necessary in the suit alternative relief is not improper. More so, now that the claimant has sought that the honourable court, by its inherent powers, allows amendment of the relief by expunging the last three lines of the relief. I have gone through the processes filed by both counsel before this honourable court and also perused their various submissions painstakingly. A few questions have arisen, flowing from the submissions of counsel. The first question is whether the 3rd and 4th defendants stand in a position that necessitates being sued as defendants in this suit. “Parties to an action have been classified into three namely: (a) Proper parties; (b) Desirable parties; and (c) Necessary parties. Proper parties are those who, though not interested in the plaintiff’s claims are made parties for some good reasons. Desirable parties are those who have an interest in the suit or who may be affected by the result thereof. Necessary parties are those who are not only interested in the subject matter of the proceedings but also who in their absence, the proceedings could not be fairly dealt with. That is to say, the issue or question to be determined in the matter between the existing parties should be one which cannot be properly settled unless they are parties to the action. ” This was the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of GREEN vs. GREEN (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 61) 480.” Per Oputa JSC. One of the preliminary factors a party must consider before commencing an action is that the right parties must properly be before the court before a court can effectively and completely determine a question before it. It is important to identify whether looking at the case before this court the 3rd and 4th defendant can be said to be proper parties or necessary parties. From the averments in the Statement of Facts before this court which was not controverted in any way by the defendants, the 3rd and 4th defendant are major shareholders in the 1st and 2nd defendants company. The applicant’s counsel, in his written address, had used the following words while arguing this application and I quote: “the 1st and 2nd Defendants are not agents, but corporate bodies different from the 3rd and 4th Defendants who are their owners.” Flowing from the distinction made by the Supreme Court in the case of Green vs. Green (supra), upon which many other decisions have been based, it is safe to say that the 3rd & 4th defendant are necessary parties to this suit, especially flowing from the uncontroverted fact of their ownership of the 1st and 2nd defendants. Their presence is therefore necessary for a fair consideration of the case before the court. They can also be said to be proper parties. This is because, based on the submissions of both counsel, the 3rd and 4th defendants were fully involved in the events leading to the cause of action. See Green vs. Green (Supra). See also Babayeju v. Ashamu (1998) 9 NWLR (Pt. 567) p. 546. Another ground that must be considered before joining a party in a suit is the cause of action. Oputa JSC in ADIMORA vs. AJUFO (1988) 3NWLR (Pt. 80) 1@ 17 defined cause of action thus: “The “cause of action” in a suit is defined as consisting “every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove if traversed in order to support its right to judgment”” Cause of action is further defined by Karibi Whyte JSC in AYINDE & ORS vs ADIGUN (1993) 11 SCNJ 1 thus: “Now, the cause of action of the plaintiff is the factual situation relied upon by him as entitling him to a remedy against the defendant.” The combined effect of the above definitions viz-a-viz the case before the court which is based on a lease agreement entered into between the 3rd & 4th Defendants and the 1st and 2nd defendants company, would suggest that there exists a cause of action against all the defendants. It is therefore of importance, that the 3rd & 4th defendant are sued, and I hold that they are properly sued in this action. See LABODE v OTUBU (2001)7 NWLR (Pt. 712) 256. See also A.G., FEDERATION V.A.G. ABIA STATE (2001)11 NWLR (pt. 725) 689. Of utmost importance for consideration is the fact that the 3rd and 4th defendants, duly represented by B. N. Amagheronu, Asst. Chief State Counsel, did not file anything either in support or in opposition to this application. One would have expected that the 3rd and 4th Defendants ought to speak for themselves in this regard. Incidentally, while the application was being moved in Court, Mr. Amagheronu for the 3rd and 4th Defendants stated when asked to react, that “I did not file anything. I have nothing to add.” I hold that the 3rd and 4th defendant are proper and necessary parties. I therefore refuse the first prayer for an order striking out the names of the 3rd and 4th defendants. Another pertinent question is whether the averments in paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 26, 27, 29, and 31 of the statement of facts of the claimants ought to be struck out for being vexatious, scandalous and in particular for raising issues outside the jurisdiction of this Court. I wish to refer to the details of the said averments as earlier catalogued by the Claimant’s counsel thus: Paragraph 15 is to the effect that without notice, the representatives of the 2nd Defendant introduced themselves to the workers that the 2nd Defendant had taken over the management and operations of the 1st Defendant, including issues and affairs of the workers. Counsel cited Section 10(1) of the Labour Act to submit on this point that that if there should be transfer of workers employment to a new owner, the workers should know. Paragraph 16 is to the effect that the 2nd Defendant froze the 1st Defendant's bank accounts without notice or order of Court, which affected workers payment. Thus workers’ salaries were not paid because of the 2nd Defendant's act. A community reading of Paragraphs 17 and 18 shows that the Claimant complained "of the hardship and deprivation the handover of the ITC to the 2nd Defendant would cause its members." The complaint is presently the situation. Paragraph 19 shows that the Imo State Government and the Claimant, in pursuit of industrial relations practice, have been dialoguing on the issue. The paragraph does not only refer of the status of the lease agreement that the 2nd Defendant is anchoring upon in dealing with workers' issues and welfare. Paragraph 26 is that the 2nd Defendant is presently craftily causing drivers of ITC to become redundant and leave without pay by selling serviceable vehicles of ITC. Paragraph 27 is that the 2nd Defendant is causing loss of the workers' jobs by leasing out the 1st Defendant's vehicles to unknown persons and Companies outside Imo State. Paragraph 29 is to the effect that the 2nd Defendant is now replacing the existing staff of ITC with new staff without notice. Paragraph 31 alleges that the 2nd Defendant is running the 1st Defendant Like a family business and by this, has no regard to the interest of the workers of ITC. Claimant’s Counsel followed this with a submission that the content of the paragraphs the Applicant seeks to strike out, are in no way vexatious or scandalous. They are issues that touch on workers’ rights, harsh and oppressive conditions of work, unfair labour practices, job security and workers’ interests. And that since they all touch on labour and employment, they fall within the jurisdiction of this court. Two fundamental questions that would then arise from this are: i) “Can the claimant’s prove their case without referring to the catalogue of events narrated in the said paragraphs which the defendants seek to have struck out?” and ii) “Does the Claim itself and the reliefs sought by the Claimants rob this court of jurisdiction to hear this matter?” I would answer both questions in the negative. It is a trite law that the fundamental principle of jurisdiction is determined by the plaintiffs claim. In other words, it is the claim before the court that has to be looked at or examined to ascertain whether it comes within the jurisdiction conferred on the court. The claim and indeed the pleadings of the parties have shown that there has/had existed an employment relationship between the Claimants and the defendants. The only medium to be used in conveying facts to support the case of the Claimants is the Statement of Facts, which ought to contain complete details of events leading to the wrong complained of. The said events need not be limited to issues falling within the court’s jurisdiction. They are facts, and not reliefs. “It must be appreciated that there cannot be a better notice of the case a party intends to make than his pleadings.” Per Olatawura JSC in the case of HON. JUSTICE KALU ANYAH vs. AFRICAN NEWSPAPERS OF NIGERIA LTD. (1992) 7 SCNJ 47. Karibi Whyte JSC has clearly highlighted the functions of pleadings in the case of UKAEGBU & ORS vs. UGOJI & ORS (1991) 6 NWLR (Pt. 196) 127 when he stated thus: “It is now generally accepted that the main function of pleadings in litigation made up of the statement of claim of the plaintiff and the statement of defence of the defendant is to enable the parties ascertain as much as possible the various matters actually in dispute and in which there is agreement.” He went further to state that: “The rules relating to sufficiency, accuracy, comprehensiveness and freedom from ambiguity formulated to control pleadings during trial of an action are designed to ensure inter alia, the following important goals. First, to ascertain to both parties the issues between them and to enable each other prepare to meet the issue. Secondly, it enables the court to determine the scope and limits of the issues to be tried and to determine the nature and mode of the trial. Thirdly, it eliminates the element of surprise. Fourthly, it limits the scope of the evidence that can be adduced during the trial. Parties are bound strictly by, and are not allowed to depart from their pleadings.” He added that: “Evidence led which is not supported by the pleadings goes to no issue. Such evidence if inadvertently admitted will be expunged.” From the above reasoning, it is my view that the Paragraphs the defendants are complaining about are averments that merely catalogue the events or better put, which represent facts that would help the court to determine whether or not the Claimants are entitled to the reliefs sought. I have not seen anything vexatious or scandalous in the said paragraphs. It is my holding therefore, that the applicant’s second prayer for an order striking out paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 26, 27, 29 and 31 of the Claimant's Statement of Facts is hereby refused. The defendants have not complained that the reliefs sought by the Claimants do not fall within the scope of jurisdiction of this Court as conferred by the 1999 Constitution (as amended); except of course the alternative claim which reads thus: "A DECLARATION that every action and or decision taken by the 2nd Defendant, Global Ginikana Services Limited, affecting or concerning the employment of any staff or staff - whether it is retirement, or indefinite suspension, or termination reduction of salary etc. or the terms of employment of any staff or staff of the 1st Defendant, Imo Transport Company Ltd - whether it is reduction of salaries and or allowances, more hours of work, etc. are null, void and of no effect as the 2nd Defendant taking over of the management and operations of the 1st Defendant is illegal, null and void, and abuse of due process." (Underlining mine). I am in agreement with Claimant’s counsel’s submission that the first part of the alternative relief relates to the actions and or decisions of the 2nd Defendant affecting or concerning the employment of the ITC workers, and that it is a labour related relief, and should not be struck out. However, while urging that the alternative prayer should not be struck out, Counsel applied for leave of court to expunge the following words from the alternative relief: “as the 2nd Defendant taking over of the management and operations of the 1st Defendant is illegal, null and void, and abuse of due process.” The said words are hereby expunged from the alternative claim, which will now read as follows: "A DECLARATION that every action and or decision taken by the 2nd Defendant, Global Ginikana Services Limited, affecting or concerning the employment of any staff or staff - whether it is retirement, or indefinite suspension, or termination reduction of salary etc. or the terms of employment of any staff or staff of the 1st Defendant, Imo Transport Company Ltd - whether it is reduction of salaries and or allowances, more hours of work, etc. are null, void and of no effect.” On the whole and for all the reasons given, the defendant/applicant’s motion on notice fails, and is hereby dismissed. This case will now proceed to hearing. No order as to cost. Ruling is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Presiding Judge