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The claimant originally filed this suit before the Federal High Court by virtue of her Writ of Summons dated 25th May, 2010. By virtue of an order of court dated 30th March, 2012 the Federal High Court transferred this suit to this court. By her Amended General Form of Complaint dated and filed on 1st March, 2013 the claimant seeks the following reliefs: 1. A declaration that the purported termination of the claimant’s appointment through the defendant’s letter of June 24/25, 2008 or otherwise is illegal, null, void and unlawful. 2. A declaration that the non payment of the claimant’s salaries allowances and other emoluments from January 28, 2008 till date is illegal, null, void and unlawful. 3. A declaration that the claimant is still in the lawful employment and services of the defendant. 4. Mandatory Order forthwith reinstating the claimant to the services and employment of the defendant as Manager Grade S5 and consequently directing the defendant to extend and accord to the claimant all her outstanding and accrued salaries, allowances, emoluments and other entitlements of perquisites accrued or accruing to the claimant as a staff of the defendant from January 2008 when the claimant was placed on suspension till the date of judgment in the above suit. 5. Cost of this action. ALTERNATIVELY TO 1, 2 and 3 above A. A declaration that the claimant’s appropriate entitlements as at June 24, 2008 in the event of or when the defendant purported to terminate the claimant’s appointment and employment is the sum of N5,046,745.13 (Five Million, Forty Six Thousand, Seven Hundred and Forty Five Naira, Thirteen Kobo) alleged and stated in the defendant’s letter of June 24/25, 2008. B. A Mandatory Order on the defendant to forthwith pay the following sums of money to the claimant: (a) The sum of N5,046,745.13 (Five Million, Forty Six Thousand, Seven Hundred and Forty Five Naira, Thirteen Kobo) being the appropriate salaries, allowances and other entitlements of the claimant as at June 24, 2008 when the defendant purportedly terminated the claimant’s appointment. (b) The sum of N31,436,474.98 (Thirty One Million, Four Hundred and Thirty Six Thousand, Four Hundred and Seventy Four Naira, Nine Eight Kobo) being the claimant’s salaries, allowances entitlements and benefits up to the claimant’s attainment of the applicable retirement age of 60 (sixty) years by the year 2026. (c) General damages of N10 Million (Ten Million Naira) for the unlawful termination of the claimant’s employment by the defendant. C. Cost of this action. Accompanying the Complaint are Statement of Facts, List of Claimant’s Witnesses, Statement of Witness on Oath and documents to be relied upon at trial. In reaction the defendant filed Statement of Defence, List of Witness, Witness Statement on Oath, List of Documents and documents attached dated 21st September, 2010. The defendant further filed a motion dated 16th February, 2011 praying for the following reliefs: 1. An order of this court striking out this suit for want of requisite jurisdiction of this court to adjudicate on same as the action is statute barred. 2. An for such further order or other orders as this court may deem fit to make in the circumstances of this case. The grounds for the application are as follows: 1. That the defendant is an Agency of the Federal Government of Nigeria. 2. That the claimant was at all material times of the cause of action of this suit a Public Servant in the Public Service of the Federation of Nigeria. 3. That by virtue of the provisions of S.2 of the Public Officers Protection Act, the time limited for commencing this action is three (3) months from the date of the cause of action. 4. That the cause of action in this suit arose on the 24th day of June, 2008 and this suit was not commenced until the 25th day of May, 2010 a period of almost two (2) years. 5. That this court lacks the requisite jurisdiction to adjudicate on this suit. The application is supported by 11 paragraph affidavit sworn to by Mr. Sunday Umukoro, Admin Secretary in the firm of Berkeley Solicitor. By the said affidavit, the deponent stated that the defendant is a Public Liability Company and it is at all material time under the major shareholding and managerial control of the Federal Government of Nigeria through the Central Bank of Nigeria. That the Federal Government of Nigeria owns a whopping sum of seventy-seven percent (77%) of the authorized share capital in the defendant through the Central Bank of Nigeria and another 20.06 percent held by the Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE) which is another Agency of the Federal Government of Nigeria. That the claimant was at all material time of the cause of action a permanent staff in the employment of the defendant and by virtue of which she was a Public Servant in the Public Service of the Federation of Nigeria as defined in Section 318 (1) (g) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. He further stated that the employment of the claimant was terminated by the defendant via a letter dated 24th June, 2008 and on which day it came to her knowledge that she has ceased to be an employee of the defendant since 11th June, 2008. That even though the claimant knew that her employment has been terminated, this action was not commenced till the 25th May, 2010, therefore her right to commence legal proceeding in respect of the subject matter had since elapsed/ceased on the 10th September, 2010 when the cause of action arose or in worst case scenario on the 23rd September, 2008 being three months from her knowledge of her cause of action. That in the circumstances, the action of the claimant has become statute barred and same deprives this court the requisite jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the subject matter. That it is in the interest of justice and to save the time of this court for this application to be granted. In his Written Address, Learned Counsel for the defendant submitted that the defendant is an agency of the Federal Government of Nigeria. He submitted that in the face of clear admission by the claimant in paragraphs 4 (1) and (2) and paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the claimant’s witness statement oath that the defendant is a federal government agency and the defendant need not adduce further proof to establish this fact as facts admitted need no proof. He further submitted that the claimant was at all material times of her employment with the defendant a public servant and falls within the category of a public officer. He referred the court to paragraph 6 of the affidavit in support and paragraphs 8 and 46 of the Statement of Claim and paragraph 12 of claimant’s written statement on oath. Learned Counsel submitted that the claimant is a public officer and that it is taken beyond any contention by Section 318 (g) of the Constitution. On the issue of statute bar, Learned Counsel raised this issue i.e. “Whether the claimant’s action is not statute barred by the express provisions of Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act and thereby ousting the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court”. He reproduced Section 2 and 2 (a) of Public Officers Protection Act as follows: “Where any action, prosecution or other proceedings is commenced against any person for an act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any act or law of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such act, law, duty or authority, the following provision shall have effect (a) the action, prosecution or proceedings shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three (3) months next after the act, neglect or default complained of or in case of a continuance of damage or injury within three (3) months after ceasing thereof”. Learned Counsel submitted that the defendant being a federal government agency is entitled to the categories of persons contemplated by the provisions of Section 2 and 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act. He further submitted that the word “person” has received judicial interpretation in a plethora of cases notably among which is the case Kolo v. A.G of the Federation [2003] 10 NWLR (pt. 829) p. 602, Dauda v. University of Agriculture Makurdi [2003] FWLR (pt. 17) p. 687, Ibrahim v. J.S.C Kaduna State [1998] 14 NWLR (pt. 584) p. 1. He submitted that the term “cause of action” has been variously defined in numerous cases as in the case of Orah v. Nyam [1992] 1 NWLR (pt. 217) p. 280, Ikine v. Adjerode & Ors. [2001] 8 NSC QR p. 342. He further submitted that in determining when the cause of action arose and whether same has become statute barred, the court will have to look at the claimant’s Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim and nothing more. He cited the case of Forestry Research Institute of Nigeria v. Gold [2007] 11 NWLR (pt. 1044) p. 1. He urged the court to look at claimant’s Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim and particularly paragraphs 36, 37 and 38 of the Statement of Claim. That the said paragraphs stated that the claimant’s letter of termination was dated 24th June, 2008 and the said termination took effect from the 11th June, 2008 even though the letter was served on her on 24th June, 2008. He submitted that it is crystal clear that the claimant’s cause of action arose on 24th June, 2008 and that a comparison of the date of the cause of action is established to have accrued and the date the Writ of Summons and the Statement of Claim of this suit were filed will disclose that this suit was filed till a period of two (2) whole years after the cause of action arose. He submitted that when there is a limitation period, time begin to run from the date of the accrual of the cause of action and this time will begin to run even though events occur which make it impossible for the action to be commenced and once the limitation period elapses, the cause of action is automatically extinguished. He cited Halbury’s Laws of England 4th Edition vol. 28 page 622 and 628, Egbe v. Adefarasin [1987] 1 NWLR (pt. 47) p. 1, NPA v. Lotus Plastics Ltd [2005] 24 NSCQR p. 566. Learned Counsel submitted that the consequences of the failure of the claimant to commence her action within the prescribed time period of three months completely deprived her the existence of a cause of action against the defendant. That where the law provides for the bringing of an action within a prescribed time period proceedings cannot be brought after the prescribed time by the statute. He referred the court to the cases of Ogoja Local Govt. Area v. Offoboche [1996] 7 NWLR (pt. 458) p. 4, NPA v. Lotus Plastices Ltd (supra), Bakare v. Nigerian Railway Corporation [2007] 17 NWLR (pt. 1064) p. 606, Nigerian Broadcasting Corp v. Bankole [1972] NSCC p. 220 and Ibekwe v. NNPC [2010] 2 CLRN p. 210. Learned Counsel added that the legal consequences of the claimant’s claim being statute barred is that no court has the jurisdiction to entertain the action citing the cases of Ajayi v. Milad, Ondo State & 2 Ors. [1997] 5 NWLR (pt. 504) p. 237, Amialor v. Nigerian Army & Ors. [1999] 12 NWLR (pt. 631) p. 362. He finally urged the court to dismiss the claimant’s suit with substantial cost. In reaction, the claimant filed a 13 paragraph affidavit sworn to by Miss Chike Diamond Amaefule, an Administrative Officer in the law firm of Nwabu Okoye & Co. She stated that while this suit was still pending in the Federal High Court, Lagos Division (then Suit No. FHC/L/CS/622/2010 the defendant filed a motion on notice dated 16th February, 2011 seeking for the striking out of the above suit which motion was served on our firm, only on 18th November, 2011 now marked as Exhibit G1. That after the service on the firm of Nwabu Okoye & Co. of the defendant’s motion dated 16th February, 2011, in the proceedings of 22nd November, 2011 the Presiding Judge, Honourable Justice A.M. Liman who had been away for several months on a national assignment, raised the issue of whether the Federal High Court will still have jurisdiction to entertain this suit and the proper order to be made the Federal High Court in view of the provisions of Section 254 (c) (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 which expanded the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court and thereafter adjourned the said suit to 19th January, 2012. That it was on 30th that the learned trial Judge of the Federal High Court made an order transferring the above suit to the National Industrial Court and that this suit came up first in the National Industrial Court after the transfer on 5th November, 2012. That it was partly because of the issue of jurisdiction raised by the Federal High Court and consequent transfer of the above suit to the National Industrial Court, that the claimant could not respond earlier to the defendant’s motion on notice dated 16th February, 2012. She further stated that the claimant denies paragraphs 8 to 11 of the affidavit in support of this application. That the right of the claimant to commence legal action against the defendant on the purported termination of the claimant’s contract have not ceased at all or as at 25th May, 2010 when the above suit was instituted or till date or within three (3) months after the purported termination of the employment of the claimant by a letter of the defendant dated both 24th and 25th June, 2008. That the claimant’s suit was first filed on 17th September, 2008 in the Federal High Court with Suit No. FHC/L/CS/574/2008 by the claimant’s former counsel and that the above suit was filed after the earlier suit was struck out for want of diligent prosecution and that the foregoing are stated in paragraphs 48 and 49 in the claimant’s statement of claims. That the limitation period of three (3) months alleged by the defendant for the above suit to have been allegedly instituted does not apply to the claimant’s cause of action in the above suit and the cause of action based on a contract of employment and which suit also alleges malice against the defendant or to the defendant. That the defendant did not act and was not acting in execution or intended execution of any act or law or in execution of a public duty, when it purportedly terminated the claimant’s employment and also refused to pay the claimant for work done. She deposed further that the defendant is a full privatized and commercialized enterprise and independent contractor to the Central Bank of Nigeria and other institutions, operating for its own profit and not at all or at the material times in pursuance of a public duty or act. That this court has jurisdiction to entertain the claimant’s claims. That it is in the interest of justice to dismiss the defendant’s motion on notice dated 16th February, 2011. The claimant’s counsel identified lone issue for resolution as, “whether the provisions of Section 2 in the Public Officers Protection Act, 2004 are applicable to the above suit or to the defendant”. Learned Counsel pointed out that the Defendant’s Written Address of 16th February, 2011 does not contain any statement of facts which failure is a further breach by the defendant of the provisions of Order 22 Rule 6 (11) of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2009 then applicable to the above suit and of Order 20 Rule 2 (ii) in the National Industrial Court, Rules, 2007 now applicable to this suit. He submitted that it is not automatic or axiomatic that every agency of the Federal Government must fall within the contemplation of the Public Officers Protection Act. He contended that to convince this court that the Public Officer Protection Act applies to the defendant and to the claimant’s cause of action the defendant must show not only that it is a Public Officer as alleged but that it acted in pursuance of a public duty, Act or Law when it performed the act or duty or when the neglect occurred for which it seeks protection under the Public Officers Protection Act. He relied on the case of Felix Anozie v. A.G of the Federation & Ors. [2008] 10 NWLR (pt. 1095) p. 278 where the court held that for Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act to avail any person, two conditions must be satisfied and these are: (a) It must be established that the person against whom the action is commenced is a public officer or person acting in the execution of public duties within the meaning of the law; and (b) The act done in respect of which the action is commenced must be an act done in pursuance or execution of any law, public duty or authority or in respect of an alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such law, public duty or authority. Learned Counsel submitted that Section 2 of the Public Officers Act do not apply to this suit and to the defendant. He reproduced Section 2 and 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act Cap. P41 LFN. He further contended that the defendant is one of the enterprises owned fully or partially by the Federal Government whose ownership was fully privatized and whose operations were fully commercialized under the provisions of the Public Enterprises (Privatization and Commercialization) Act (Cap P. 38) LFN, 2004 which commenced on 31st December, 1998. He submitted that by virtue of the commercialization of the defendant pursuant to the provisions of the Public Enterprises Act, the defendant became in its management, operations and duties a commercial enterprise acting solely in its own commercial and economic interest for profit and not in pursuance or execution of any Act or Law or of any public duty or authority. He added that in terminating the claimant’s employment the defendant acted in the normal and ordinary cause of its operations as a privatized and commercialized for profit entity and not in connection to any law act or public duty. To buttress this, Learned Counsel referred the court to Section 1 (2), 8 and Part II in the First Schedule in the Public Enterprises (Privatization and Commercialization) Act (Cap P. 38) LFN, 2004 which the defendant’s counsel contended that the defendant is listed as number 29 among companies to be fully privatized and commercialized by the Federal Government. He further quoted Section 8 of the said Public Enterprises (Privatization and Commercialization) Act as follows: “Notwithstanding the provisions of any other enactment and without prejudice to the generality of Section 6 of this Act, a commercialized enterprise and may, subject to the general regulatory powers of the government of the federation: (a) fix the rates, prices and charges for goods and services it provides; (b) capitalize its assets; (c) borrow money and issue debenture stocks; and (d) sue and be sued in its corporate name.” Claimant’s counsel submitted that it is a principle of statutory interpretation that where the words used in a statute are plain and unambiguous the said words are to be given their ordinary and plain meaning as it is not the function of a court to import into a statute words which will do violence to the provisions of the said statute. He cited the cases of Okumagba v. Egbe [1965] ANLR p. 64, Joseph Olujimi Kolawole Agbaje v. Babatunde Raji Fashola (SAN) & Ors [2008] 6 NWLR (pt. 1082) p. 90. He contended that the meaning of the expression “Notwithstanding the provisions of any other enactment …..” in Section 8 of the Public Enterprises (Privatization and Commercialization) Act is to exclude and render inapplicable the provisions of any other statute such as the Public Officers Protection Act from limiting commercialized enterprises such as the defendant. He also referred the court to page 686 of New Webster’s Dictionary of the English Language and Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Edition) at page 1094 on the meaning of “notwithstanding”. He also cited the cases of A.G. Federation & Ors. v. Abubakar [2007] All FWLR (pt. 389) p. 1264, Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Okem Enterprises Limited [2004] 10 NWLR (pt. 880) p. 107, Senator Rashidi Ladoja v. INEC & Ors. [2007] All FWLR (pt. 377) p. 934. Learned Counsel submitted that the defendant did not act as a public officer or in pursuance of a public duty or Act when it purportedly terminated the claimant’s contract of employment on 24th or 25th June, 2008 therefore, the Public Officers Protection Act is clearly inapplicable to the defendant or this suit. He also referred the court to paragraph 5 at page 20 of the Employee Handbook of the defendant. Similarly, the claimant’s counsel submitted that it is accepted that the provisions of the Public Officers Protection Act apply mainly to tortuous acts and claims and do not apply to contracts, breaches of contracts, cases of recovery of land or claims for work and labour done, citing the cases of Nigeria Ports Authority v. Construction General 1 Fasura Cogefar SPA & Anor. [1974] LL NLR P. 945, Fed. Gov. of Nigeria & Ors. v. Zebra Energy Ltd [2002] 18 NWLR (pt. 98) p. 162, Salako v. L.E.D.B & Anor. 20 NLR p. 169, The Local Board for the District of Withington [1882 – 1883] 11 QBD p. 788, Dr. Reuben Tolorunleke v. Agricultural of Rural Management Training Institute (ATMTI) 2009 All FWLR (pt. 497) p. 152. On the meaning of Independent Contractor, Counsel cited Black’s Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition) at page 720 as “one who in exercise of an independent employment, contracts to do a piece of work according to his own methods and is subject to his employer’s control only as to the end product or final result of his work”. While Learned Counsel conceded that the Federal Government holds majority shares in the defendant company but submitted that he defendant by its major function of printing of bank notes is an independent contractor to the Central Bank of Nigeria with regard to printing bank notes and to other banks for printing security documents. That the defendant does not render or carry out public duty but render services to organizations such as Central Bank of Nigeria. On malice, counsel referred the court to the case of Bendel Newspapers Corp & Anor. v. Okafor [1993] 4 NWLR (pt. 289) p. 617 to the effect that the provisions of the Public Officers Protection Act are not available to a public officer who acted maliciously, citing the case of Lagos City Council v. S.A.J. Ogunbiyi [1969] ANLR p. 287. He further added that the argument of the defendant on “cause of action”, “limitation period” and others are of no effect when there is no proof that the defendant acted in course of a public duty or an Act or Law in purportedly determining the claimant’s employment. He finally urged the court to dismiss the defendant’s motion on notice. In his Reply on Points of Law, Learned Counsel for the defendant filed a 15 paragraph further affidavit and a written brief. It is to be noted that the purpose of a Reply on Points of Law is not for the defendant/applicant to start all over again to elicit facts but to reply on points of law only concerning new issues of law that emanated from the respondent’s response to the motion. In the said Reply on Points of Law dated 5th March, 2013 Learned Counsel for the defendant submitted that both the claimant’s Counter Affidavit filed on 1st March, 2013 and the Written Address are grossly incompetent and he urged this court to discountenance them as they are not worthy of judicial consideration. He submitted that the Rules of Court are made to be obeyed citing the case of M.V. “Arabella” v. N.A.I.C [2008] 11 NWLR (pt. 1097) p. 389. That the claimant’s processes were filed outside the time prescribed by the Rules of this court as well as Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules from which this matter was transferred. He added that both Rules prescribe a time period of seven (7) days after service within which the claimant should file her Counter Affidavit and Written Address. He referred the court to Order 26, Rule 5 of Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2009 and Order 11 Rule 3 of the Rules of this Court, 2007. He stated further that the claimant is in blatant default of filing her processes for a period of almost a year and six months and she did not seek leave of court to extend time within which to file the Counter Affidavit and the Written Address. That the claimant failed to pay the default fee for late filing. Counsel submitted that whereby any law a party requires leave of court to commence an action, an application or file a process, such action or application filed without leave is incompetent. In support of this contention he cited the case of NDIC v. Ifediegwu [2003] 1 NWLR (pt. 800) p. 56, Ndoma Egba v. Govt. of Cross River State [1991] 4 NWLR (pt. 188) p. 773. He pointed out that the claimant has not only failed to give reasons for her failure to comply with the Rules of the Court she went to the extent of misleading this court by her depositions in paragraph 11 (ii) of the Counter Affidavit. He urged the court to hold that the opposing counsel has not reacted to the defendant’s Written Address. He further urged the court to grant this application. I have carefully considered the processes filed, the argument of counsel to both parties and the authorities relied upon. In my view, the issue for determination is whether this action is statute barred in view of the provisions of Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act. There are plethora of judicial authorities to determine if the claimant’s action is statute barred and incompetent and to succeed in that quest the court has a duty to consider the statement of claim to arrive at a decision. See Ibafon Co. Ltd v. Nigerian Ports Authority Plc [2000] 8 NWLR (pt. 667) p. 86 at p. 1000, Agbunnorh v. Nigeria Custom Service Board & Anor. (Unreported) Suit No. NICN/LA/312/2012 delivered on 23rd April, 2013. From paragraph 6 of the Amended Statement of Facts, the claimant was employed as Confidential Secretary 1 of the defendant and in paragraph 36 of the said Statement of Facts the claimant’s employment was terminated by a letter dated 24th June, 2008. The claimant initially filed this action at the Federal High Court, Lagos Division on 25th May, 2010 a period of about two years after the letter terminating the claimant’s employment was issued. Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act provides as follows: “where any action, prosecution or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any act or law or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such act, law, duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect – The action, prosecution or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of or in case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof. In the case of Egbe v. Adefarasin [1985] 1 NWLR (pt. 3) p. 549 at p. 568 the Supreme Court held thus: “where the law provides for the bringing of action within a prescribed period in respect of a cause of action accruing to the Plaintiff, proceeding shall not be brought after the time prescribed by the statute, the action brought outside the prescribed period offends against the provision and does not give rise to a cause of action.” See also Bank of the North Ltd v. Gana [2006] All FWLR (pt. 296) p. 862, Agbunnorh v. Nigeria Custom Service Board & Anor. (supra), Mercantile Bank (Nig) Plc v. Feteco (Nig) Ltd [1998] 2 NWLR (pt. 540) p. 143. Limitation of action is that principle of law requiring a claimant as a matter of obligation to seek prompt remedy for the breach of his or her right in a court of law within the time limited by the law otherwise his or her right of action or cause of action becomes unenforceable at the expiration of the period allowed for commencing an action by the law. See UBRDBDA v. ALKA [1998] 2 NWLR (pt. 537) 328 and Bakare v. N.R.C [2007] 17 NWLR (pt. 1064) p. 635. In the instant suit, the cause of action which is the termination of the claimant’s employment arose on 24th June, 2008 when the claimant’s employment was terminated. The claimant waited for two years before complaining about the termination of her employment by the defendant. I am of the opinion that the cause of action had been extinguished as at 24th September, 2008 and there was no longer right of action available to the claimant on 25th May, 2010 when she filed this suit. The cause of action in this suit is thus statute barred and proceedings cannot be brought because the period of three months provided by the Limitation Act has elapsed. In paragraph 3 of the Amended Statement of Facts, the claimant maintained that the defendant was established by the Federal Government and under the control of the Federal Government of Nigeria. In paragraph 8 of the said Statement of Facts, the claimant stated that by virtue of her employment she is a public servant in the Public Service of the Federation of Nigeria as defined in Section 318 (1) of the 1999 Constitution. In paragraph 46 of Statement of Fact, the claimant stated that as a Public Servant of the Federation she has right to be reinstated into the service. However, the claimant argued that the defendant is not an agency of the Federal Government and is not covered by the Public Officers (Protection) Act the company having been privatized and commercialized. In support the claimant referred the court to Part II of the First Schedule to the Public Enterprises (Privatization and Commercialization) Act (Cap P.38) LFN, 2004 where it alleged the defendant is listed amongst companies to be fully privatized and commercialized by the Federal Government. The claimant could not prove to this court in concrete terms that the defendant has become a private company and is not covered by the provisions of Public Officers (Protection) Act. I am of the view that the defendant is a Federal Government Corporation and is therefore a public officer. In any event in Ibrahim v. JSC [1988] 14 NWLR (pt. 584) at p. 8, the Supreme Court held that the definition of the word “person” in the legal sense under Nigerian law is not limited to natural persons or human beings only. It clearly admits and includes artificial persons such as defendant in this case. The claimant is blowing hot and cold when she on one hand described herself as a Public Servant who deserves an order of reinstatement and on other hand contended that the defendant is a private company not contemplated by the Public Officers (Protection) Act. The claimant cannot approbate and reprobate at the same time. Having found and held that this suit is statute barred, the proper order to be made is one of dismissal. I therefore hold that the claimant’s claim is statute barred. This suit is hereby dismissed. I make no order as to cost. Judgment is entered accordingly. …………………………………… Hon. Justice J. T. Agbadu Fishim Presiding Judge