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By a complaint filed and dated the 11th day of March 2013, the Claimants claims from the Defendants jointly and severally as follows:- 1. DECLARATION that the period of study leave without pay should not count in the computation of retirement age of civil servants in Imo State Public Service as the officer’s service is stopped, he or she does not render any service, and therefore is not paid salary or wage or allowances. 2. DECLARATION that any addition or inclusion of the period of study leave without pay in the computation of or for purpose of computing the retirement age of any civil servant in Imo State Public Service is wrong, unfair, null and void, and of no effect. 3. DECLARATION that the period of study leave without pay in respect of the fifty-one officers of Imo State Civil Service whose names are in the list attached to the letter from the Office of the Governor of Imo State headed “RESTORATION OF PERIOD OF STUDY LEAVE WITHOUT PAY”. Dated 19th April 2011 and signed by the Governor’s Principal Secretary, Mr. Okey U. Anyanwu to the effect that the period of study leave without pay should not be added or included or taken cognizance of in computation of the retirement age of any of the said officers from the Imo State Public Service. 4. DECLARATION that any purpose retirement of any of the said fifty-one officers of Imo State Public Service whose names are in the said list attached to the letter from the Office of the Governor of Imo State headed RESTORATION OF PERIOD OF STUDY LEAVE WITHOUT PAY and dated 19th April 2011 without regard or respect to the waiver contained in the said letter is wrong, unfair, illegal, null and void, and of no effect and, therefore, any affected officer in the said list is entitled to immediate reinstatement to his or her post without loss of pay and/or seniority. 5. DECLARATION that the following members of the Claimant trade union and officers of Imo State Public Service whose names are in the list attached to the letter from the Office of the Governor of Imo State dated 19th April 2011 who are not up to sixty years of age and have not put in thirty-five working years in the Imo State Public Service for them to be due for retirement from the Imo State Civil Service. 6. ORDER OF PERPETUAL INJUNCTION restraining the Defendants by themselves, their officers, workers, agents, servants, aides assigns, representatives, successors or privies from retiring the afore stated officers, or any of them from the Imo State Public Service, or including their names or that of any of them in any list of officers of Imo State Public Service to be retired from the Imo State Public Service, or including or adding their various periods of study leave without pay to their individual dates or periods due for the purpose of retirement from the Imo State Public Service. The Defendants filed a conditional appearance along with a Motion on Notice seeking for an order of this Honourable court striking out the suit for being incompetent. The application was brought on the following grounds:- 1. The suit as constituted is an abuse of court process in that many of the Claimant’s members on whose behalf the Claimant instituted this suit have long filed their individual actions against the same Defendants over the same subject matter. 2. The suit as constituted is not justiceable in that the action is founded on a collective agreement between an employer and union of employees which is not intended to create any legal relations giving rise to any contractual obligations, and did not in law create any contractual obligations. 3. The court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the suit as constituted. The motion is supported by a four paragraph affidavit deposed to by one Mrs. Charity Mezieobi a Chief Litigation Secretary in the Chambers of Ndukwe Nnawuchi SAN & Co. There is also a written address in support of the motion. The Claimants filed a written Address in opposition to the Defendant’s motion to strike out the suit. In addition, the Claimant also filed a Motion on Notice to amend its complaint and other accompanying processes by adding the following words: “Excluding the Claimants in suit Nos. NICN/EN/34/2012 (Donatus Ibe), NICN/EN/35/2012 (Manus Chinyere Ezeogu), NICN/EN/39/2012 (Bernadette C. Ohakwe (nee Anyanwu) and NICN/EN/157/2012 (Azorom C.R. Onyewuchi) who have sued in their individual capacities.” In support of the Motion for Amendment filed by the Claimant, is a 13 paragraph affidavit and a written address. Learned silk for the Defendants/Applicants adopted his written address as the argument in support of their application, while he sought and obtained leave of court to react verbally to the Claimant’s Motion for Amendment which he opposed vehemently. The Claimant’s Counsel also adopted his written address in opposition to the application for striking out as well as the affidavit and written address in support of his motion for amendment. Learned SAN for the Defendants/Applicants submitted that the suit as constituted is an abuse of court process, that the suit is not justiceable, and that the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the suit. He formulated a lone issue for determination, which is: “whether the suit NICN/EN/75/2013 as presently constituted, is competent before the Honourable court”. He chose to argue the sole issue for determination in three parts namely: 1. Whether the suit is an abuse of court process 2. Whether the action is not justifiable and 3. Whether the court has jurisdiction to entertain the action. As regards abuse of court process, learned SAN referred to Exhibits A, B, C, D & E attached to his supporting affidavit which are suits pending at the National Industrial Court on the same issue. Counsel maintained that the Claimants in Exhibit A to E are also co-claimants in this present suit, and therefore, it amounts to an abuse of court process, and urged the court to strike out the suit. With regard to non-justiceability of the suit. It is learned counsel’s submission that the agreement reached between the Claimant and the Defendant, is a collective agreement as envisaged by Section 47 (1) of the TDA; and it is therefore not legally binding, as no legal relations has been created. That there is no privity of contract between the individual employee members of the Claimant and the Claimant and the Defendants. Counsel further submitted that the nature and effect of a collective agreement such as this, is not intended to create any legal relations giving rise to any contractual obligations. That being so, the said agreement is therefore not justiciable since they were not expressly incorporated into the respective contracts of employment of the employees. Counsel placed reliance on the case of Osoh vs. Unity Bank Plc (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1358) Pg. 1 at Pg. 26-27 and U.B.N vs. Edet (1993) 4 NWLR Pt. 287 at 288 and urged the court to hold that the suit is non-justiceable and accordingly have it struck out. On the issue of jurisdiction, counsel submitted that because the suit constitutes an abuse of court process and the reliefs claimed are not justiciable, therefore, the court lacks jurisdiction to hear it. The urged the court to strike out the suit. In reaction, the Claimant’s written address states that the Claimant has filed a Motion for Amendment which if granted, will mean that the Claimant is representing only the 47 members who have not sued in their individual capacities. Claimant’s counsel submitted that a collective agreement is an enforceable Industrial Relations Contract. He cited the provisions of Section 7 (1)(c) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 which confers exclusive jurisdiction on the National Industrial Court in civil matters relating to the determination of any question as to the interpretation of any collective agreement. Counsel also cited Section 254(C) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended which also confers exclusive jurisdiction on the National Industrial Court in civil causes and matters relating to the determination of any questions as to the interpretation of any collective agreement. I have carefully considered the submission of counsel on both sides. As regards the arguments relating to the amendment sought by the Claimants, the defence counsel has submitted that the intention of the Claimants is to overreach the other side by the amendment sought. The Claimant by their affidavit in support of their motion for amendment have stated that the firm of Dureke’s Law Firm had no knowledge that four members of the Claimant had filed separate suits in their personal capacities, and that the decision to remove the names of the four members of the Claimant was taken after they became aware and the Claimant decided to proceed with the remaining 47 members. Much as it would have amounted to an abuse of court process if the multiplicity of action is sustained, the court will not close its eyes to an attempt by the Claimant to stop the abuse by correcting or rectifying the anomaly created by the perceived multiplicity. It is not in doubt that four members out of the 51 members being represented by the Claimant for the purpose of this suit, have proceeded to file individual and independent actions to enforce their individual rights. This they have a right to do. A pertinent question that would arise is: “Does the act of filing individual actions by four members of the claimant union extinguish the rights of action of the other 47 members?” I think not. It has been further averred that upon becoming aware of the existence of the individual actions of four of its members, the Claimant has decided to drop the names of the members who have filed individual actions, and proceed with the other 47 members who have not. Nnamani JSC has held in the case of Edet vs the State (1988) NWLR (Pt 91) pg 722 that “an abuse of process always involves some bias, malice, some deliberateness, some desire to misuse or pervert the system.” I have not seen any bias malice or deliberate desire to pervert justice on the part of the Claimant. I am inclined to grant the Claimant’s application for amendment in the interest of justice and fairness. Section 13 of the NIC Act 2006 confers the right on this court, to administer law and equity concurrently. Besides, the amendment sought is geared towards regularizing the position of the Claimants or rectifying the anomaly complained of. See the case of Babalola vs. Rufus Sunday (2009) 24 WRN 80 at 102. The Court of Appeal has held in the recent case of MTN Communications Ltd vs. Akinyemi Aluko & Anor (2013) LPELR 20473 (CA) that “Amendments are granted so as to ensure that justice is done to the parties to the dispute. It is the, law that where a procedural irregularity can be cured without causing injustice to the adverse party, an amendment would be granted to rectify the anomaly and restore normalcy”. The discretionary power of the court will be exercised, provided the court is satisfied that the amendment sought is honest and genuine, and it is not prejudicial to the other party. I am convinced that the application for amendment before me is not designed to overreach the Defendants. I therefore hold that the application for amendment is granted, and the names of the four members who have instituted individual actions be and are hereby removed from this suit accordingly. Having granted the application for amendment, the 1st ground of the Defendants preliminary objection “that the suit constitutes on abuse of court process”, is overruled, having been overtaken by the event of the grant of the application for amendment. On the 2nd ground of the Defendants’ Preliminary Objection “that the suit is non justiceable”, the Defendants’ case is that the agreement reached between the Claimant and the Defendants is a collective agreement as envisaged by Section 47 (1) of the Trade Dispute Act therefore it is not legally binding. Learned silk submitted that the only situation or circumstance in which such collective agreement may be enforceable and therefore justiceable is where the terms of the agreement have been incorporated expressly or by necessary implication into the respective contracts of employment of the employees. The Claimant’s case is that Section 7(1) (c) of the NIC Act 2006 and Section 254 (C) of the amended constitution having conferred jurisdiction on the NIC to interpret collective agreements, it is trite that such a jurisdiction to interpret cannot be in vain. Counsel submitted that if the jurisdiction of the court is limited to interpretation alone, it would tantamount to a mockery of this court. On this point, I find it necessary to recall the provisions of Section 254 (C) (1) (j) (i) of the 1999 Constitution as amended. “Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 251, 257, 272 and anything contained in the Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters: (j) Relating to the determination of any question as to the interpretation and application of any (i) Collective agreement. Clearly, the arguments proferred by counsel on both sides have not taken into cognizance, the use of the word “application” in the amended constitution. By virtue of the provision of S254 (C) (1) (j) (i) of the 1999 constitution as amended by the Third alteration Act 2010, by virtue of which the NICN has exclusive jurisdiction, both to interpret and apply collective agreements. The Court of Appeal, held in the case of The Rector, Kwara State Polytechnic & ors Mr. Ola Adefila & Ors. (2006) LPELR 8248 (CA). that: “But in modern times, this country has through legislation, attempted to water down this extreme conservatism as far as enforceability of collective agreements are concerned…….” The Court of Appeal in the Kwara Poly case, which was decided in 2006, made reference to the case of UBN vs. Edet (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt. 287) pg. 288 as one of those cases decided when the Nigeria Courts still savoured the euphoria of unenforceability of collective agreements. The case of Osoh vs. Unity Bank Plc (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1358) Pg. 1 at Pg. 26-27 upon which the learned silk has placed reliance, is clearly distinguishable from the case at hand. In the Osoh case, the cause of action arose in 1994 and the judgment of the trial court (the High Court of Edo State) was delivered in August 1996, while the judgment of the Court of Appeal was delivered in March 2001. The erudite judgment of the Supreme Court was given in line with the law in force at the time the suit was commenced. The Trade Dispute Act was the law in force at the time the cause of action arose. It follows therefore that the law applicable would be the relevant law at the time the cause of action arose. The Supreme Court has held per Bello CJN in UTIH vs Onoyivwe (1991) 1 NWLR (pt.116) pg 116, that “It has been decided by this court in several cases, that the relevant law applicable in respect of a cause or matter is the law in force at the time the cause of action arose and in the law relating to jurisdiction when the cause of action was instituted.” See also Arewa Paper Converters Ltd vs NDIC (2006) 15 NWLR (Pt.1002) 404 where Mohammed JSC cited the observation of Uwaifo JSC in the case of Adah vs NYSC (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 891) 639 @648 that: “It ought to be understood that the law which supports a cause of action is not necessarily co-extensive with the law which confers jurisdiction on the court which entertains the suit founded on that cause of action. The relevant law applicable in respect of a cause of action is the law in force at the time the cause of action arose, whereas the jurisdiction of the court to entertain an action is determined upon the state of the law conferring jurisdiction at the point in time the action was instituted and heard.” In the case of OYETAYO vs. MOSOJO (1997) 10 NWLR 627 Okunlola JCA had this to say: “In my view this poser had been resolved by the highest court in this country to the effect that the applicable law for determination of an action is the substantive law existing at the time of the action and that the change of law will not affect accrued rights and obligations unless the change is made retrospective.” It is clear from a painstaking review of the case of Osoh vs. Unity Bank Plc. (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1358) Pg. 1@26-27, that the law applicable for its determination was the Trade Disputes Act as apparent from the length and breadth of the said judgment. The statutory definition of a collective agreement cited at page 29, was cited verbatim from section 47(1) which was the law in force at the time of the cause of action. Ogunbiyi JSC, in agreeing with the lead judgment, touched on the issue of jurisdiction at pages 48-49: “The question is which court has the jurisdiction to entertain the claim at hand. The two courts in issue are the State High Court which jurisdiction was at the material time relevant and stipulated section 236(1) of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979 and the National Industrial Court which was established by section 19(1) of the Trade Disputes Act.” Clearly, the Osoh case was determined based on the laws applicable at the time of the cause of action. I therefore hold that it is not on all fours with the case at hand. It follows therefore from the foregoing, that by virtue of the provision of S254 (C) (1) (j) (i) of the 1999 constitution as amended by the Third alteration Act 2010, the National Industrial Court has exclusive jurisdiction, both to interpret and apply collective agreements. This court therefore assumes jurisdiction accordingly. On the whole, the Defendant/Applicant’s application fails, and is hereby dismissed. The case will proceed to hearing. No order as to cost. Ruling is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O.Y. Anuwe Presiding Judge