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The claimants had on 17th August 2012 filed a complaint against the defendants praying for the following reliefs - a) A declaration that the Policy on Tenure appointment for all Permanent Secretaries and Directors contained in Circular with Reference Number HCSF/061/S.1/III/68 of 26th August 2009 has no force of law, is illegal, unconstitutional, null and void and of no effect whatsoever. b) A declaration that the Policy on Tenure appointment for all Permanent Secretaries and Directors contained in Circular with Reference Number HCSF/061/S.1/III/68 of 26th August 2009 is not applicable to the employments of the claimants who were respectively Director of Finance and Supplies and Director of Administration in the 1st defendant, an allied Research Institution. c) A declaration that the Staff Conditions of Service of the 1st defendant made by the Board of the 1st defendant in July 1991 pursuant to its powers under section 4 of the Administrative Staff College of Nigeria Act Cap A4, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 are applicable for the purposes of determining the time for retirement of the claimants and other matters on their employment with the 1st defendant. d) A declaration that the purported retrospective retirements of the claimants contained in their respective letters of retirement dated 13th February 2012 with reference numbers: PF /2377/T/3 and 2384/157 are illegal, unlawful, null, void, and of no effect whatsoever for being in flagrant violation of the Staff Conditions of Service of the 1st defendant made by the Board of the 1st defendant in July 1991 pursuant to its powers under section 4 of the Administrative Staff College of Nigeria Act Cap A4, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. e) A declaration that the directive of the defendants that the claimants refund to the 1st defendant all emoluments earned by them from 28th March 2011 to 13th February 2012 is unconscionable, unreasonable, an atrocious violation of fair labour practice, illegal, unlawful, null, void, and of no effect whatsoever for being in flagrant violation of the Staff Conditions of Service of the 1st defendant made by the Board of the 1st defendant in July 1991 pursuant to its powers under section 4 of the Administrative Staff College of Nigeria Act Cap A4, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. f) An order directing the defendants to reinstate the claimants to their posts in the 1st defendant forthwith without any loss as to seniority, salaries, position and other emoluments. g) An order directing the 1st defendant to compute and pay to the claimants all their salaries, allowances and other emoluments due to them from the 13th February 2012 up to the date of judgment. h) Interest at the prevailing commercial banks' rates on the sum arrived at in relief (g) above. i) An order quashing the directive of the defendants that the claimants refund to the 1st defendant all emoluments earned by them from 28th March 2011 to 13th February 2012. j) An order directing the 1st to pay the 1st and 2nd claimants the sum of N5 Million each as general damages. Accompanying the complaint are the statement of facts, list of witnesses, witness statements on oath of the two claimants' witnesses, list of documents and copies of the documents to be relied on at the trial. The defendants entered appearance and reacted by filing their statement of defence. This was later discarded and an amended statement of defence and counter-claim was then filed together with list of documents, copies of the documents to be relied on at the trial and the defendants' witnesses' statements on oath. In reaction, the claimants filed a reply to the defendants' amended statement of defence together with additional witness statement, list of documents and copies of the additional documents to be relied upon. At the trial of the case, the 1st claimant testified as CW1 and the 2nd claimant testified as CW2. Mr. A. A Peters, the Director-General of the 1st defendant testified for the defendants as DW. Thereafter, parties filed and exchanged their respective written addresses. The defendants' is dated 27th June 2013 but filed on 1st July 2013. The claimants' is dated and filed on 7th August 2013. The defendants did not file any reply on points of law. The case of the claimants is that sometime in on 13th February 2012, the 1st defendant wrote similar letters of same date to the claimants purportedly retiring them on the directive of the 2nd defendant allegedly in compliance with a Policy on Tenure Appointment for all Permanent Secretaries and Directors to the effect that all Permanent Secretaries and Directors in the Federal Public Service should retire on the mandatory retirement age of 60 years, 35 years of pensionable service or after 8 years in office as Director whichever comes first. The said Policy on Tenure Appointment is contained in a circular with Reference Number HCSF/061/S.1/III/68 of 26th August 2009. To the claimants, the defendants directed them to refund to the 1st defendant all emoluments earned from 28th March 2011 to 13th February 2012. It is also the claimants' case that the Policy on Tenure Appointment for all Permanent Secretaries and Directors contained in the said circular has no force of law and is inapplicable to them. That the extant terms and conditions of service on salaries, allowances, pensions and other remunerations for all members of staff of the 1st defendant is the Staff Conditions of Service made pursuant to section 4 of the Administrative Staff College of Nigeria Act Cap. A4 LFN 2004 by the Board of the 1st defendant in July 1991 Here, the claimants' case is to the effect that clause 3.5.4 of the Conditions of Service of the 1st defendant unambiguously provides that - (a) An officer shall compulsorily retire from the service of the College - (i) When he has attained the age of 60 years or 35 years' service (compulsory) whichever is earlier. According to the claimants, they have neither attained the age of 60 years nor served for 35 years when the letters of retirement were issued and served on them on 13th February 2012. That they are Public Servants and not Civil Servants in respect of whom the Policy on Tenure appointment for all Permanent Secretaries and Directors contained in the circular is applicable. That the 2nd defendant on 18th February 2010 in a letter written to the solicitors to the Academic Staff Union of Research Institutions with Ref. HCSF/ERO/EIB/RR/S1680/S.2/VIII/101 clarified that the Policy on Tenure Appointment for all Permanent Secretaries and Directors contained in the circular with Reference Number HCSF/061/S.1/III/68 of 26th August 2009 was not applicable to employees or workers of the 1st defendant which is an allied Research Institution. Furthermore, that at a meeting held on 12th August 2011, a former occupant of the office of the 2nd defendant, Professor Oladapo Afolabi, OON advised the management of the 1st defendant to emulate the University System to make, in his exact words, '65 years as the age of retirement for faculty staff and the equivalent of the Registrar and Bursar'. On 16th August 2011, the Director-General of the 1st defendant who signed the purported letters of retirement of the claimants wrote to the 2nd defendant a letter containing the following passage, namely: For the avoidance of doubt, the HCSF may wish to also note that in the College, the ranks of the Director of Administration and Director of Finance and Supplies are equivalent to the positions of the Registrar and Bursar respectively in the University. In view of the above, the HCSF advised that ASCON takes the following pattern: (i) Teaching, Research & Consulting staff - 65 years (ii) Director of Administration (Registrar) - 65 years (iii) Director of Finance & Supplies (Bursar) - 65 years (iv) Others - 60 years or 35 years of service. That on October 21, 2009 the 2nd defendant after noting that 'institutions are established by laws, with varied mandates, specialization, remunerations and other conditions of service' issued the following directive, that is - Accordingly, the Governing Boards of all Parastatals, Agencies and Statutory Corporations of Government, which currently apply 60 years of age and/or 35 years of service for mandatory retirement, are hereby directed to realign their respective Conditions of Service with the recently approved tenure policy and to forward same for the ratification of the Head of the Civil Service of the Federation. To the claimants, the Board of the 1st defendant did not and has not realigned its Conditions of Service with the said Tenure Policy. That unions in Research and Allied Institutions, including the 1st defendant entered into an agreement with the Federal Government extending retirement age of staff to 65 years across board. The claimants went on that the Director-General of the 1st defendant informed them that the former Head of the Civil Service of the Federation informed him that the claimants should not be retired, but cannot understand his sudden volte face on the matter. The claimants continued that in apparent compliance with the agreement, the defendants reinstated four other Academic Directors in the 1st defendant who were also similarly retired along with the claimants. Furthermore, the claimants stated that the Governing Board of the 1st defendant at its 48th meeting held in September 2011 decided that the Director-General of the 1st defendant should not interpret the Tenure Policy as applicable to the claimants. Thereafter on 17th February 2012, the claimants wrote to the 2nd defendant to intervene and reverse their illegal and retroactive retirements. The 2nd defendant replied the letter on 19th April 2012 and merely reiterated that the retirements of the claimants were based on the Tenure Policy for Directors who had spent eight years on the post. To the claimants, under cross-examination of the Director-General of the 1st defendant, the following facts were revealed by oral evidence - a) The controversial policy on tenure appointment for all Permanent Secretaries and Directors of August 26th 2009 emanated from the Office of Head of Service of the Federation and not from the Board of ASCON. b) As at the time the claimants were retired, Exhibit D1 (policy on tenure appointment for all Permanent Secretaries and Directors of August 26th 2009) was not incorporated into the conditions of service of the claimants by the Board of ASCON. c) Furthermore, on referring the Director-General of the 1st defendant to paragraph 45 of his sworn deposition, he revealed that he did not give the claimants a notice in writing to inform them that they have overstayed in the service of the 1st defendant. The case of the defendants is that sometimes on 26th August 2009, the Federal Government of Nigeria, in a bid to reform and reinvigorate the Federal Public Service issued Circular No. HCSF/061/S.1/III/68 dated August 26, 2009 (Exhibit D1) which was also incorporated in Rule 020810(iv)(a) and (b) of the Federal Government Public Service Rules, 2008, to the effect that, Permanent Secretaries shall hold office for a term of four years, renewable for a further term of four years, subject to satisfactory performance, and no more; and that Directors shall compulsorily retire upon serving eight years on post without prejudice to the provisions of the Public Service Rules which stipulate 60 years of age and/or 35 years of service for mandatory retirement. That the claimants as Directors in the 1st defendant were appointed Directors of Finance and Accounts, and Administration respectively on 28th March 2003 and by the decision of the Federal Government they were both expected to have retired by 28th March 2011 having spent 8 years as Directors. They refused and neglected to retire and as a result they were both retired vide letters of retirement dated 13th February 2012 (Exhibits C15 and C16). That despite the admitted facts of their retirement, the claimants held unto the defendants' houses and offices and converted same to personal use to date. Aggrieved by the decisions of the Federal Government to retire them carried out through the defendants, the claimants filed this suit challenging their retirements. The contention of the defendants/counterclaimants in this matter is that since the claimants are not academic staff of the 1st defendant, they cannot take advantage and benefit from the provisions of Rule 020810 of the Federal Government Public Service Rules 2008, which stipulates that Judicial Officers and Academic Staff of Universities and other tertiary institutions shall retire at 70 and 65 years respectively. The defendants are, therefore, contending that the tenure policy of the Federal Government as contained in the Public Service Rules is applicable to the claimants. The defendants/counterclaimants framed two issues for the determination of the Court, namely - a) Whether the claimants have proved their case and are entitled to judgment in this matter. b) Whether the defendants/counterclaimants have established their counterclaim to be entitled to judgment on the counterclaim. Regarding issue a), the defendants/counterclaimants submitted that the claimants have not proved or established their claims to be entitled to the reliefs being sought from this Court. That the law is trite and settled that he who asserts must prove and that the onus is on the claimants to establish or prove their case before the Court and they have both woefully failed to discharge the onus placed on them by law, referring to Alhaji Abubakar Dakingari v. Ward & Green [2001] 5 NWLR (Pt. 707) 718 at 729 B - C. That this position of the law has since been affirmed by the appellate courts in a plethora of cases amongst which is Alhaji Isah T. Sokwo v. Joseph Daku Kpongbo & 3 ors [2008] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1086) 342 at 362 D - F. As to on whom lies the burden of proof in civil proceedings, the Court was referred to Robert Agwarangbo & anor v. Cyriacus Idumogu [2008] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1081) 564 at 572F, Mrs. Vidah C. Ohochukwu v. Attorney-General of Rivers State & 2 ors [2012] 49 NSCQR (Pt. II) 864 at 905 and Sumanya Issah Torri v. The National Park Service of Nigeria [2011] 49 NSCQR 1 at 21. Furthermore, that the law is also settled and trite that in a suit bothering on alleged wrongful termination of employment, the onus is on the employee challenging the termination of his employment to prove how and in what manner the terms of his employment were breached, referring to Patrick Ziideeh v. Rivers State Civil Service Commission [2007] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1022) 554 at 570 A - B, Lateef A. Adams v. Lagos State Development and Property Corporation [2000] 5 NWLR (Pt. 656) 291 at 316 D - E, Chief O. Akinfe & 5 ors v. United Bank for Africa (UBA) Plc [2007] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1041) 185 at 199 - 200, Mr. G. Emokpae v. University of Benin, Benin City & 2 ors [2002] 17 NWLR (Pt. 795) 139 at 152 and Wilfred Igbinovia v. University of Benin Teaching Hospital & anor [2000] 8 NWLR (Pt. 667) 53 at 68 D - H, as well as sections 131, 132, 133 and 134 of the Evidence Act 2011. The defendants continued that the claimants admitted in their evidence-in-chief as well as during cross-examination that they were first employed as Assistant Director Finance and Assistant Director Administration respectively vide Exhibits C1 and C9. That the said Exhibits C1 and C9 clearly indicate that the appointments of the claimants were with the approval of the 2nd defendant herein and that the terms and conditions of service applicable in the Federal Public Service shall equally apply to the claimants. That Exhibits C7 and C8 clearly indicate also that the claimants were initially employees of the defunct Bendel State and Gongola State respectively before they transferred their services to the Federal Public Service by joining the services of the 1st defendant. More so, that the letter appointing the claimants as substantive Directors in the services of the 1st defendant (Exhibits C2 and C7A) equally indicate emphatically that the appointments of the claimants as Director of Finance and Accounts and Director of Administration respectively were subject to the terms and conditions of service applicable in the Federal Public Service. Equally, it is in evidence vide Exhibit C13 that as at the time the claimants were retired, the Governing Board of the 1st defendant had been dissolved and the 2nd defendant was overseeing the affairs of the 1st defendant in line with the provisions of sections 15 and 16 of the Administrative Staff College of Nigeria Act Cap. A4 LFN 2004. The defendants then referred the Court to paragraphs 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 of the defendants' witness statement on oath to the effect that the Board of the 1st defendant had been dissolved and the 2nd defendant was charged with the responsibility of performing the duties of the said Board, which evidence has not been challenged or controverted by the claimants in any way. It is, therefore, the submission of the defendants that the circulars on the Tenure Policy as reflected in the Public Service Rules are applicable to the claimants in this matter. Exhibits C6 and D8 (the Conditions of Service of the 1st defendant) is clear and emphatic on the fact that the provisions of the Federal Government Policies issued vide circulars shall apply and be used in the day to day running of the affairs of the 1st defendant. Rule 1.2 of Exhibits C6 and D8 provides as follows - These Conditions of Service apply to all grades of staff in all Departments or sections of the College except where they are inconsistent with specific terms approved by the Governing Board written into the contract of employment or letters of appointment. In cases of inconsistency, the relevant Governing Board/Circulars will prevail. That the above stated provisions of the Staff Conditions of Service of the 1st defendant makes it clear that Government Circulars, including the Circulars on Tenure Policy are applicable to the claimants in this matter who were not academic staff of the 1st defendant. To the defendants, the claimants who were taking advantage and benefits of the Public Service Rules and Circulars as seen in Exhibit C29 where they both applied and were granted 425 United States of America dollars per day to travel to the United States of America in 2011 as against the sum of 340 United States dollars per day as provided for in Rules 5.2.1(I) of the Staff Conditions of Service of the 1st defendant (Exhibits C6 and D8), cannot now turn around and deny the applicability of the same Rules to them. It is the further submission of the defendants that where the letter of appointment of an officer either expressly or impliedly contemplates the applicability of the Public Service Rules (as in this case), the provisions of the Public Service Rules become relevant in the consideration of a contract of employment, citing Nigerian Airways Limited v. Taiwo Okutubo [2002] 15 NWLR (Pt. 790) 376 at 397 C - D. On where the appointment of a public officer is terminated in accordance with the Public Service Rules, that the Supreme Court in Charles Udegbunam v. Federal Capital Development Authority & 2 ors [2003] 10 NWLR (Pt. 829) 487 at 502 G - H held thus - Where an appointment of a civil servant is terminated in accordance with the Civil Service Rules, the civil servant has no valid cause of action against the terminating authority or body. A civil servant can only sue for wrongful dismissal or termination of appointment where a dismissal or termination is not within the Civil Service Rules. That while it is agreed that the above cited case was decided based on the provisions of the Federal Civil Service Rules 1974, the said Rules has been replaced now by the Public Service Rules 2008 which has substituted the word 'civil' with the word 'public' thereby making the Rules applicable in the entire Public Service of the Federation including the 1st defendant. The defendants then urged the Court to follow the precedent already set and established by the Supreme Court in the case of Charles Udegbunam v. FCDA (supra) and hold that the employments of the claimants were terminated in accordance with the provisions of the Public Service Rules 2008; and that being so, the claimants have no valid cause of action against the defendants. The defendants went on that the claimants both admitted during their examinations-in-chief that they were appointed Director Finance and Accounts and Director of Administration respectively on 28th March 2003 and by 28th March 2011 they had served 8 years as Directors, hence their retirement from the service in line with the provisions of the Public Service Rules and service-wide circulars approved by the Federal Government. More so, the claimants whose testimonies have been seriously challenged by the defence admitted under cross-examination that there is a cadre in the 1st defendant known as Management Development Cadre and that officers in this cadre who are the only academic officers in the 1st defendant rise through the ranks to become Directors of Studies; and that they have never been appointed Directors of Studies in the 1st defendant. That they further admitted under cross-examination that they were both members of Non-Academic Staff Union of Educational and Associated Institutions (NASU) and that NASU on their behalf wrote Exhibits D5 and D6 addressed to the 1st and 2nd defendants; and also that even though they are aware of an Association known as Academic Staff Union of Research Institutions (ASURI), they are not members of ASURI and so ASURI took no action on their behalf. To the defendants, the law is trite that evidence elicited by a party in the course of cross-examination can be used by the party to support his case (Mrs. Eva Anike Akomolafe & anor v. Guardian Press Limited (Printers) & 3 ors [2010] 42 NSCQR (Pt. I) 135 at 153), urging the Court to hold that the claimants, having admitted membership of NASU, are not academic officers of the 1st defendant and, therefore, bound by the 8-year tenure policy for Directors. The defendants then submitted that it was in the exercise of the executive powers of the Federation vested on the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria under sections 5, 130, 147 and 148 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) that the President in Council approved via Exhibit D4 that the 1st defendant remain an Extra-Ministerial Department under the auspices, supervision and control of the 2nd defendant. That it was also in the exercise of the executive powers vested in the President by the 1999 Constitution (as amended) that Exhibits D1, D2, and D3 were issued which stipulate that Directors shall retire upon serving eight (8) years on the post. That Exhibits C10, C11, C12 and C13 cannot be relied upon by the claimants to support their case because they are not academic/research officers of the 1st defendant. Exhibit C10 talks about the retirement age of judicial and academic staff of Universities and other tertiary institutions who retire at 70 or 65 years respectively; while by Exhibit C13, the officers of the 1st defendant who had voluntarily retired from service after serving 8 years as Directors in line with the Federal Government's Tenure Policy were recommended for recall because they were 'academic directors' of which none of the claimants is, and they cannot take advantage of any alleged agreement entered into between Government and Academic or Research officers of tertiary institutions. Exhibit C20 is, therefore, of no relevance in this matter. Whatever alleged agreement between the Federal Government of Nigeria and the Joint Research and Allied Institutions Sector unions was tentative and subject to the final decision of the Government on the matter vide issuance of white papers, circulars or even the amendment of the relevant Rules governing retirement age in the Public Service which has not been done till date. More so, there was even no consensus as seen in paragraph 9.1 of Exhibit C20 as some of the unions totally disagreed with the said recommendation on retirement age. To this extent, no academic Director retired from the services of the 1st defendant under the 8-year Tenure Policy has been recalled back to ASCON to date, as claimed by the claimants. On the status of Exhibit C14 wherein the claimants alleged that the then Head of the Civil Service of the Federation, Prof. Oladapo Afolabi, OON, had advised the Management of the 1st defendant to emulate the University system with regard to the retirement age of the claimants, the defendants submitted that even if such an advice was given (though not conceding), it does not in any way take the force of law and at best it remains an advice and, therefore, not enforceable before this Court. That in the case of Psychiatric Hospital Management Board v. E. O. Ejitagha [2000] FWLR (Pt. 9) 1510 at 1525 F - G, the Supreme Court held thus on the status of a policy statement made by a Minister or government functionary - The 'policy speech' referred to, as averred in paragraph 3(a) of the Statement of Defence, was one alleged to have been made by the Minister of Health sometime in 1991 that "Conditions of Service of the Teaching Hospitals Staff are as available in the Federal Civil Service". It is evident that the alleged "policy speech" was of no relevance to the case since, if the appellant had not been included in the list of bodies to which the Pensions Act would apply, a Minister's policy speech would have no effect in achieving that result. A Minister's policy speech cannot supersede the law. It is, therefore, the submission of the defendants that any alleged statement made in respect of this matter by any individual in authority cannot in any way supersede the law as provided for in the Federal Government circulars and the Public Service Rules. The defendants went on that the claimants admitted under cross-examination that they became aware of the circulars on tenure policy (Exhibits C5, C12, D1, D2 and D3) in 2009 when the said circulars were issued. They had no issues with the implementation of the said circulars, and in fact, the 2nd claimant in his capacity as the Director of Administration in the 1st defendant issued out and signed retirement letters (Exhibits D7A, D7B, D7C and D7D) retiring officers of the 1st defendant based on the provisions of the same circulars and the Public Service Rules they are now challenging. That they are only approbating and reprobating, and blowing hot and cold air at the same time which the law frowns at. The defendants then submitted that the law is trite and settled that, the responsibility of evaluating evidence rests squarely with the trial court and in doing that the trial court is expected to carefully examine all the evidence placed before him before arriving at its decision on the matter, citing Samuel Adeleke & 4 ors v. Chief Adegbenro Balogun & 4 ors [2000] 4 NWLR (Pt. 651) 113 at 126 A - F, Dr. Kevin Ochin & 15 ors v. Prof. Onuoha Louis Victor Ekpechi [2000] 5 NWLR (Pt. 656) 225 at 242, Mustafa Ogunleye & 2 ors v. Raimi Akande Oyewole & anor [2000] 4 NWLR (Pt. 687) 290 at 302 and Anyaegbusi Ozuruoke & ors v. John Okolie & ors [2000] 1 NWLR (Pt. 642) 569 at 575. To the defendants, applying the principle of evaluation of evidence to this case, it is clear that the claimants' case has failed the test as the claimants have not been able to discharge the onus placed on them to establish their case; and that the evidence of the defendants both oral and documentary have remained unshaken and reliable, urging the Court to so hold. The defendants further submitted that in a civil case (as in this case), a plaintiff must and should succeed on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the defence, and where the plaintiff fails to discharge the onus of proof placed on him, his case stands to be dismissed, referring to Clifford Osuji v. Nkemjika Ekeocha [2009] 39 NSCQR 523 at 590 and Edeani Nwavu & 11 ors v. Chief Patrick Okoye & 19 ors [2009] 37 NSCQR 230 at 268. Finally, the defendants urged the Court to resolve this issue in their favour and hold that - a) The claimants have woefully failed to discharge the onus of proof placed on them and are, therefore, not entitled to any of the reliefs being sought from this Court. b) The claimants who admitted not being academic staff of the 1st defendant are bound by the provisions of the circulars on the Federal Government Tenure Policy as contained in the Federal Government Public Service Rules 2008. c) The retirement of the claimants is in order and in line with the Government policy on the tenure of public officers as contained in the circulars and the Federal Government Public Service Rules which by the claimants' employment letters are applicable to the claimants. d) To dismiss this suit in its entirety as being frivolous and lacking in merit and award substantial cost in favour of the defendants. On issue b) i.e. whether the defendants/counterclaimants have established their counterclaim to be entitled to judgment on the counterclaim, the defendants/counterclaimants submitted that they have proved their case in respect of the counterclaim to be entitled to judgment as the evidence on the counterclaim has not in any way been challenged or weakened by the claimants. That it is the law that a counterclaim is a separate, independent and distinct action and that a counterclaimant just like a plaintiff in an action, must prove his claim against the person counterclaimed before obtaining judgment on the counterclaim, citing Munzali Ahmadu Dantata v. Abdulkadir Sanusi Dantata [2002] 4 NWLR (Pt. 756) 144 at 167 G - H, Jeric Nigeria Limited v. Union Bank of Nigeria Plc [2000] 15 NWLR (Pt. 691) 447 at 463 E - G, Alhaji Buba Usman v. Mohammed Taminu Garke [2003] 14 NWLR (Pt. 840) 261 at 284 D - E, First Bank of Nigeria Plc v. A. Mamman (Nigeria) Limited & anor [2001] FWLR (Pt. 31) 2890 at 2907G and Kalgo v. Kalgo [1999] 6 NWLR (Pt. 608) 639. The defendants continued that in a bid to establish and prove the counterclaim, the defendants have testified (which evidence have not been challenged or controverted by the claimants) that the claimants were appointed Directors of Finance and Accounts and Administration respectively on the 28th of March 2003 (as seen in Exhibits C2 and C3); and by 28th March 2011 they had both served 8 years as Directors and ought to have retired from the service in line with the Federal Government policy on the tenure of Permanent Secretaries and Directors in the Public Service of the Federation as contained in Exhibits Dl, D2 and D3 but they failed, refused and neglected to retire and continued to draw salaries and other emoluments until they were served with retirement letters on 15th February 2012. That Exhibit D1 (the circular Ref. HCSF/061/S.1/III/68 dated August 26, 2009) placed the burden of the required notice of retirement on the claimants and they failed and neglected to give the requisite notice. The defendants went on that the 2nd claimant instead of notifying the defendants of his retirement continued to stay in the office and even signed/issued out letters to other staff of the 1st defendant (Exhibits D7A, D7B, D7C and D7D) retiring them from the service on ground of the same tenure policy the claimants are challenging before this Court. That the claimants have not challenged or controverted the evidence of the counterclaimants in any way as they even admitted under cross-examination that they drew salaries and other emoluments until they were retired on 13th February 2012, and also that till date they are still occupying the official quarters allocated to them by the 1st defendant, while in the service of the 1st defendant. To the defendants, DW1 (the Director-General of the 1st defendant) while testifying in support of the defendants' counterclaim, and whose evidence has remained unchallenged and uncontroverted, emphatically told this Court that the claimants who were supposed to have retired on 28th March 2011 refused and neglected to give the necessary notices of retirement and overstayed in their respective offices until they were retired on 13th February 2012; and that the claimants locked up their offices and refused to deliver the keys to the 1st defendant. To further support the evidence of the defendants that the claimants earned other emoluments after they ought to have retired, that Exhibits C27, C28 and C29 clearly show that the claimants travelled to the United States of America and in the course of that trip, the 1st claimants were each paid 2,975 US Dollars. That these are parts of the monies the claimants illegally collected when they were supposed to have retired and the defendants are counterclaiming from them urging this Court to order them to refund to the 1st defendant. The defendants further contended that it is also in evidence that the claimants till date are occupying the staff quarters within the premises of the 1st defendant which have not been sold to them and each of the staff quarters has the annual rental value of 1.5 million Naira. That the claimants were entitled to only three (3) months after their retirements to move out of the residential premises they were occupying but they refused and neglected to move out. That the testimony of DW1 (the DG of the 1st defendant) has not in any way been challenged or controverted by the claimants. Rather, the claimants admitted during examination-in-chief that they are still occupying the premises of the 1st defendant. The addresses they gave in the course of examination-in-chief clearly show that they occupy Nos. FMW 17 and FMW 20 ASCON complex Topo Badagry, Lagos State respectively. Even under cross-examination the claimants admitted being in occupation of the staff quarters allocated to them while in service by the 1st defendant, even when they have been retired from service. To further buttress the submission of the defendants that the claimants have not challenged or controverted the evidence of the defendants regarding the counterclaim, the defendants submitted the claimants while being cross-examined by the defence clearly and unequivocally stated that they have not properly handed over their respective offices. While by Exhibits C15 and C16 (the claimants' retirement letters), the claimants were directed to hand over to the most senior officers in their respective departments, it is curious and surprising that the claimants with their levels of experience and attainment in the Federal Public Service chose not to comply with this simple directive or instruction. The 1st claimant, for example, stated under cross-examination that he handed over the key of his office to one Mr. Ekokeme, Principal Executive Officer (PEO) after admitting that the said Mr. Ekokeme whose rank is Principal Executive Officer (PEO) was not the most senior officer in the department. The 2nd defendant who looked ruffled and shaken admitted under cross-examination too that he handed over to his secretary also having admitted that the secretary was not the most senior officer in his department at the time of his retirement. It is, therefore, the submission of the defendants that the claimants have not handed over their respective offices, urging the Court to so hold and order them to hand over the offices for the effective use of the 1st defendant in order not to continue to hamper the smooth running of the 1st defendant considering the sensitive offices they were occupying in the 1st defendant before their retirement. The provisions of Chapter Ten (10) of Exhibit D8 (the Staff Conditions of Service of the 1st defendant), according to the defendants, are explicitly clear on occupation of the 1st defendant's quarters. Chapter 10.2.6 provides as follows - College quarters must be taken over from, and handed over to the Director of Administration. An outgoing occupant must hand over the keys of the quarters he is vacating to the Director of Administration after obtaining the signature of the college authorized officer to the furniture inventory and key register in acknowledgement of their surrender. An in-coming occupant must acknowledge receipt of the quarters and all articles of college furniture therein by signing the furniture inventory and key register. To the defendants, the claimants having been retired and remained in occupation of the 1st defendant's quarters and making use of the furniture and other appurtenances provided by the 1st defendant without any justifiable reason have to pay for the annual rental value of the said quarters and account for every furniture or item in the quarters belonging to the 1st defendant. It is, therefore, the submission of the defendants/counterclaimants that the requirement for the proof of their counterclaim being that of preponderance of evidence have been met and the defendants/counterclaimants urged the Court to resolve issue b) in their favour and hold that the defendants/counterclaimants have proved their counterclaim and are entitled to judgment on the counterclaim. In conclusion, it is the submission of the defendants/counterclaimants that the claimants having failed to prove and or establish their case as required by law, their claims should be refused and the suit be dismissed; and for the Court to grant the reliefs of the defendants as contained in the counterclaim as follows - 1. An order that, the defendants/counterclaimants are entitled to the full value of any of the properties of the 1st defendant that may be damaged, stolen or destroyed and to the full compensation for any loss of lives of any staff of the 1st defendant or that of their dependants or for the loss, theft or damage to any of their properties while the claimants continue to hold unto the 1st defendant's strategic offices and houses within the premises of the 1st defendant after the cessation of the claimants' employments and expiration of the extant period within which the claimants ought to have surrendered the 1st defendant's offices and institution's houses. 2. A declaration that the defendants are entitled to the refund of the emoluments and funds collected by the claimants for the period the claimants deliberately overstayed in the Public Service of the Federation. 3. A declaration that the defendants are entitled to the sum of Fifteen Million Naira (N15, 000,000.00) monthly from the claimants with effect from 13th February 2012, being the estimated loss suffered by the Public Service of the Federation under the auspices of the defendants when the strategic offices of the 1st defendant previously occupied by the claimants were locked up and converted by the claimants to personal assets. 4. A declaration that the defendants are entitled to the sum of 1.5 Million Naira annually from each of the claimants with effect from three (3) months after the date the claimants' employments with the 1st defendant ceased, until possession of those quarters are fully surrendered with the appurtenances in tenantable conditions; same being annual rental value of the Institution's residences occupied by the claimants within the premises of the 1st defendant. In reacting to the defendants' written address, the claimants highlighted to the Court what they termed to be two main inaccuracies contained in the written address of the defendants. Incidentally, that the two issues are contained in paragraph 4.5 of the said address, that is the last and second to the last paragraphs. First, that the defendants argued that Exhibits C2 and C7A state that the appointments of the claimants as Directors 'were subject to the terms and conditions of service applicable in the Federal Public Service'. A cursory perusal of the Exhibits, however, reveals the exact words, namely - Your appointment is at the pleasure of the Governing Board of the Administrative Staff College of Nigeria and is subject to similar terms and conditions of service applicable to officers of your grade in the Federal Public Service. To the claimants, how 'similar terms' metamorphosed to 'the terms' can only be rationalized as a futile attempt to mislead this Court. That there is no need to submit before this Court and detain the Court needlessly that similar terms do not mean the same or exact terms to make the provision of the Public Service Rules applicable to the employment of the claimants which is governed by a distinct statute. That the employments may be similar in some respects but certainly not in all respects particularly where there are written inconsistencies as would be shown subsequently. Second, that the defendants also submitted that as the Governing Board of the 1st defendant had been dissolved (which is not conceded) the 2nd defendant was overseeing the affairs of the 1st defendant in line with the provisions of sections 15 and 16 of the Administrative Staff College of Nigeria Act Cap. A4 LFN 2004. That sections 15 and 16 of the Act do not confer any power on the 2nd defendant and does not even deal with the points canvassed in the address. In framing the issues for the determination of the Court, the claimants first noted that the defendants erroneously submitted that this suit borders on wrongful termination of the employments of the claimants, referring to paragraph 4.4 of defendants' final address. To the claimants, this suit borders on the premature retirement of the claimants based on the tenure policy of the 2nd defendant which the claimants are challenging. That it must be stated that the claimants were purportedly retired from employment as their employment was never terminated. The claimants then framed two issues for the determination of the Court, namely - 1) Whether circular with Reference Number HCSF/061/S.1/III/68 of 26th August 2009 of the 2nd defendant can override the Staff Conditions of Service of the 1st defendant made by the Board of the 1st defendant in July 1991 pursuant to section 4 of its powers under the Administrative Staff College of Nigeria Act Cap A4 LFN 2004 in determining the time for retirement of the claimants. 2) Whether the defendants are entitled to the reliefs sought in their counterclaim. Regarding issue 1), the claimants submitted that the Staff Conditions of Service of the 1st defendant is applicable to the claimants in determining their employment and tenure in the 1st defendant. That the applicability of the Staff Conditions of Service of the 1st defendant on the claimants is not in doubt as the defendant has also recognized this fact, referring to paragraph 4.18 of the defendants' final address where reliance has been made on chapter 10 of the 1st defendant's Staff Conditions of Service to be applicable to the claimants. To the claimants, the law is clear that a Judge or a court cannot erode rights of parties especially when such rights have not been disputed by parties in a case, citing Omidiora v. Federal Civil Service Commission [2008] 44 WRN 53 at 72 - 73 limes 45 - 5. The claimants then urged the Court to be guided by the reasoning in Omidiora to the effect that the conditions of service of the 1st defendant is applicable to the claimants in this case as same is not in doubt and has not been disputed by parties in this case as the defendants are also relying on the said conditions of service in arguing their case before this Court. The claimants went on that clause 1.2 of the said conditions of service has laid this matter to rest. The said clause 1.2 provides as follows - These Conditions of Service apply to all grades of staff in all Departments or Sections of the college except where they are inconsistent with specific terms approved by the Governing Board written into the contract of employment or letters of appointment. In cases of inconsistency the relevant Governing Board/Circulars will prevail. It is the submission of the claimants that by virtue of their employment, which was done by the Board of the 1st defendant, their employment enjoys statutory flavour. That the law is well settled beyond controversy that when an office or employment has a statutory flavour in the sense that its conditions of service are provided for and protected by statute or regulations there under, any person holding that office or in that employment enjoys a special status over and above the ordinary master and servant relationship, citing Bamgboye v. University of Ilorin [1999] NWLR (Pt. 622) 290 at 320 D - F, and 346 E - G; Shittey-Bey v. Federal Public Service Commission [1981] 1 SC 40 at 56; Olaniyan v. University of Lagos No. 2 [1985] 2 NWLR (Pt. 9) 599 at 612 - 613, 622 - 623; Eperokun v. University of Lagos [1986] 4 NWLR (Pt. 34) 162 at 201; and Olatunbosun v. NISER Council [1988] 3 NWLR (Pt. 80) 25 at 41. To the claimants, the 2nd defendant's circular grossly contravenes the tenure of office of the claimants as provided in clause 3.5.4 of the Conditions of Service of the 1st defendant which unambiguously provides that an officer shall compulsorily retire from the service of the 1st defendant when he has attained the age of 60 years or 35 years' service (compulsory) whichever is earlier. The claimants then submitted and urged the Court to hold that the 2nd defendant's circular, being in conflict with the conditions of service of the 1st defendant, the action of the defendants in retiring the claimants who have not attained the age of 60 years or spent 35 years in service is in breach of the said conditions of service; thus the actions of the defendants are void and of no effect. It is the further submission of the claimants that where an employment is sought to be determined whether by termination or by retirement in a contract with statutory flavour, that is a contract of employment wherein the procedures for employment and discipline including dismissal and tenure of office are spelt out, such contract must be terminated in the way and manner prescribed by statute or the conditions as created by the delegation of a statute. The Courts have held in several decisions that any manner of termination which is inconsistent with the relevant statute or a condition of service is null and void, referring to Jibril v. Military Administrator, Kwara State [2007] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1021) 357 at 386 A - C, Obot v. CBN [1993] 8 NWLR (Pt. 310) 140, Geidam v. NEPA [2001] 2 NWLR (Pt. 696) 45 and UBN v. Ogboh [1995] 2 NWLR (Pt. 380) 647. The claimants went on that the circular of the 2nd defendant with Reference Number HCSF/061/S.1/III/68 of 26th August 2009 cannot be used as a basis for retiring the claimants as same did not emanate from the Board of the 1st defendant. It is the contention of the claimants that the 1st defendant cannot retire the claimants based on a policy of the 2nd defendant which has not been aligned with the conditions of service of the 1st defendant. That under cross-examination of the defendants' witness who is the Director-General of the 1st defendant, it was confirmed that - i) The controversial policy on tenure appointment for all Permanent Secretaries and Directors of August 26, 2009 emanated from the office of Head of Service of the Federation and not from the Board of ASCON. ii) As at the time the claimants were retired, Exhibit D1 (Policy on Tenure Appointment for all Permanent Secretaries and Directors of August 26, 2009) was not incorporated into the conditions of service of the claimants by the Board of ASCON. That in the light of the above, the law is well settled that a plaintiff must succeed on the strength of his case and not on the weakness of the defence, but where the evidence of the defence supports the case of the plaintiff as can be seen in this case, the plaintiff is entitled to rely on same in proof of his case, citing CDC (Nig) Ltd v. SCOA (Nig) Ltd [2007] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1030) 300 at 327 A - F. Furthermore, that the defendants erroneously submitted in paragraph 4.2 of their final address that by rule 1.2 of Exhibits C6 and D8, which is the conditions of service of the 1st defendant, government circulars including the tenure policy are applicable to the claimants. It is the submission of the claimants that it is only a tenure policy or circular of the Board of the 1st defendant that can be applicable to the claimant. For the avoidance of doubt, that the only Board as envisaged in clause 1.2 of the conditions of service, which circulars prevail over the conditions of service, is the Board of the 1st defendant as provided in section 3 of the Administrative Staff College of Nigeria Act LFN 2004 which composition and membership is provided in section 2 of the Act. Section 3 of the Administrative Staff College of Nigeria Act 2004 provides thus - Subject to the provisions of this Act, the board shall be the governing body of the College and shall have the general management of the affairs of the college, and in particular, the general control of the college and power to do anything which in its opinion is calculated to facilitate the carrying out of the objects of the college and to promote its best interest. The membership of the Board of the 1st defendant is provided in section 2 of the Administrative Staff College of Nigeria Act 2004. To the claimants, the logical and striking question to ask is that can the claimants be retired based on a tenure policy that was not issued and approved by the Board of the 1st defendant? That the clear and simple answer is an obvious NO. That the claimants cannot be retired on a policy issued by the 2nd defendant, as the 2nd defendant cannot unilaterally constitute himself as the Board of 1st defendant, urging the Court to so hold. Furthermore, that it is important to review the said clause 1.2 of the conditions of service which the defendants are relying on. The said clause provides that - These Conditions of Service apply to all grades of staff in all Departments or Sections of the college except where they are inconsistent with specific terms approved by the Governing Board written into the contract of employment or letters of appointment. In cases of inconsistency the relevant Governing Board/Circulars will prevail. The claimants then submitted that it is clear upon a proper construction of the clause reproduced above that the defendants cannot rely on the said clause in justifying the premature and mandatory retirement of the claimants based on the controversial circular of 26th August 2009 as the defendants failed to meet any of the conditions as can be deduced from the clause. To the claimants, before the defendants can justify the retirement of the claimants based on the tenure policy as contained in the circular of 26th August 2009, the following conditions must be met, to wit - a) The tenure policy must emanate from the Board of the 1st defendant. b) The said circular must be approved by the Board of the 1st defendant. c) The said circular must be included in the conditions of service of the 1st defendant. d) The said circular must be written into the letters of appointment or contract of employment of the claimants. The claimants went on that unfortunately for the defendants, the controversial tenure policy - a) Did not emanate from the Board of the 1st defendant but rather from the 2nd defendant who is not the Board of the 1st defendant. b) The said circular was not approved by the Board of the 1st defendant. c) The said circular has not been included or realigned with the conditions of service of the 1st defendant. d) The said circular was not written into the letters of appointment of the claimants. The claimants then submitted that the defendants having failed to meet the conditions above, the purported retirement of the claimants is void ab initio, urging the Court to so hold. It is important, according to the claimants, to state that the Conditions of Service of the 1st defendant is a creation of the delegated authority of the Board of the 1st defendant as can be seen from section 4(d) of the ASCON Act. Section 4 of the Act provides as follows - Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of section 3, the Board shall have and exercise the following power - 4(d) to prescribe the terms and conditions of service including salaries, allowances, pensions and other remunerations for all members of staff of the College. The claimants then submitted that by virtue of the power of delegation to the Board as created by section 4(d) of the ASCON Act and the subsequent conditions of service by the Board, employment of the claimants can be said beyond doubt to be one of statutory flavour. That an employment is said to have statutory flavour if the employment is directly governed or regulated by statute or a section(s) of a statute delegates power to an authority or body to make regulations or conditions of service as the case may be, citing Ujam v. IMT [2007] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1019) 470 at 492 B - C. Furthermore, that the defendants have in a desperate attempt to mislead this Court submitted in paragraph 4 of their final address that there was no Governing Board as of the time the claimants were retired. The claimants referred the Court to paragraph 8 of the claimants' reply to the defendants' amended statement of defence where the claimants led evidence to the fact that there was a Governing Board of the 1st defendant when the purported circular was issued. The claimants stated that there was a Governing Board from the 22nd May 2009 to 20th October 2011 and the Director-General of the 1st defendant was a member and Secretary of the Board. The claimant then urged the Court to hold that the "1st defendant circular" is not a circular as envisaged and contemplated by clause 1.2 of the 1st defendant's Conditions of Service as same was not issued by the Board of the 1st defendant. That the 1st defendant being a creature of statute cannot act except within and under the powers conferred on them by the relevant statute. The supreme Court has in the case of CBN v. Igwillo [2007] 25 WRN 1 at 21 lines 5 - 25 and Olaniyan v. University of Lagos [2004] 15 WRN 44; [2001] FWLR (Pt. 56) 778; [1985] 2 NWLR (Pt. 9) 599 held that public servants in the established and pensionable cadre of the Federal Government service do not hold their offices at the pleasure of the Federal Government. Rather, their appointments are based upon rules and regulations, statutes or memoranda of appointment. Also, that it was clearly stated by the Supreme Court in Olaniyan v. University of Lagos (supra) that the University of Lagos and the University Council, both being creatures of statute, cannot act except within and under the powers conferred on them by the relevant statute. The Supreme Court held in CBN v. Igwillo (supra) that both the bank and officials acting on its behalf cannot act except within and under the powers conferred on them by relevant statute. The Court held further that any action taken outside the powers conferred by statute or regulations made thereof will be ultra vires, null and void. It is the submission of the claimants that the only available provision that regulate the time of retirement of the claimants is the 1st defendant's conditions of service. That it is important to state that the Board of the t" defendant in exercise of the powers prescribed from section 4 of the Act establishing it, has made conditions of service that regulate and prescribe the tenure of the claimants. The claimants then urged the Court to hold that the claimant's retirement based on the 2nd defendant's tenure policy is null and void and of no effect whatsoever as the circular was not issued and approved by the Board of the 1st defendant and same is not contained in the 1st defendant's conditions of service. Furthermore, that the defendants have painfully tried to make a futile and baseless argument in paragraphs 4.7 and 4.8 to the effect that the claimants not being academic staff, the said tenure policy is applicable to them. To the claimants, the law is clear that a document speaks for itself. The law is clear that a document tendered in court is the best proof of the contents of such document and no oral evidence will be allowed to discredit or contradict its contents except in cases where fraud is pleaded. Documentary evidence, according to the claimants, being permanent in form is more reliable than oral evidence, and it is used as a hanger to test creditability of oral evidence, referring to Anyanwu v. Uzowuaka [2009] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1159) 445 at 468 A - D and CDC (Nig) Ltd v. SCOA (Nig) Ltd [2007] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1030) 300 at 366 G - H. That the law is well settled that extrinsic evidence is not admissible to add, vary or subtract from terms of any written instrument or contradict the terms of a written instrument, citing Larmic v. DPMS Ltd [2006] 12 WRN 150 at 177 - 178 lines 40 - 15, Union Bank of Nigeria Ltd v. Ozigi [1994] 3 NWLR (Pt. 333) 385, Eke v. Odufin [1961] All NLR 842, Colonial Development Board v. Kamson [1955] 21 NLR 75 and Mololade v. Molade [1958] SC NLR 206. The claimants went on that, without conceding that even if the controversial policy is applicable to the claimants, nowhere is it stated in the controversial tenure circular/policy of 26th August 2009 that same is to apply to non-academic staff of any institution to the exclusion of academic staff. Furthermore, that there is no prevailing existing distinction between academic and non-academic staff in the conditions of service with respect to age of retirement in the 1st defendant. The claimants submitted further that the right to be reinstated is a right that follows consequent on a declaration that a termination or retirement was unlawful, null and void, citing Omidiora v. Federal Civil Service Commission [2008] 11 WRN Vol. 44 at 53 paragraph 20. The claimant continued that the law is clear on interpretation of statutes that an express mention of one thing in a statutory provision automatically excludes any other which otherwise would have been included by implication. This is the "expression unius est excusio alterius" rule, referring to Ojukwu v. Yar' Adua [2008] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1078) 435 at 461B. That the Public Service Rules 020810(IV)(a) and (b) goes to no issue as it is inapplicable to the claimants as same is inconsistent with clause 3.5.4 of the Conditions of Service of the 1st defendant which also is a clause governing their tenure of the claimant. Furthermore, that the said rule has not been written into the conditions of service of the 1st defendant which governs the employment of the claimants; nor has the said rule been written in the letters of employments of the claimants. To the claimants, it must be noted that the Public Service Rules clearly state in chapter one Rule 010101 that it shall apply to all officers except where they are in conflict with specific terms approved by the Federal Government and written into the contract of employment or letters of appointment. The said Rule 010101 is as follows - It shall be the duty of every officer to acquaint himself/herself with the Public Service Rules, other regulations and extant circulars. These Public Service Rules apply to all officers except where they conflict with specific terms approved by the Federal Government and written into the contract of employment or letters of appointment.... Furthermore, that the Public Service Rules and the said controversial tenure policy of the defendants are strictly meant for a Permanent Secretary and Head of Extra-Ministerial Offices in Ministries and Extra-Ministerial offices, referring to the definitions of Civil Service and Head of Department as defined in Public Service Rules 01003 (2008) edition. "Civil Service" is defined in the Public Service Rules as a body or organ which enjoys continuity of existence. Essentially, it covers Ministries and Extra-Ministerial Offices. "Head of Department" is defined to mean a Permanent Secretary/Head of Extra-Ministerial Office. To the claimants, they were neither Permanent Secretaries nor Heads of any Extra-Ministerial Office as at the time they were purportedly retired on the tenure policy of the 2nd defendant; neither is the 1st defendant a Ministry or an Extra-Ministerial Office. The claimants went on that a careful perusal of the Act establishing the 1st defendant will reveal that the 1st defendant is a research institution. It is the contention of the claimants that the 1st defendant is not an Extra-Ministerial Department under the Office of the Head of Civil Service of the Federation. That the 1st defendant is an institution established by law with varied mandates and a body corporate with perpetual succession and common seal which was established under law. That the provisions of the Administrative Staff College of Nigeria Act show clearly that the 1st defendant is not an Extra-Ministerial but clearly a research institution, referring to sections 1(2)(a) - (g), 4(e) and 7(2)(b) of the Administrative Staff College Act 2004. That it is apposite that these sections of the Administrative Staff College Act reveal a clear picture that the 1st defendant is a research institution as clearly stated in the 2nd defendant's letter with Ref. HCSF/ERO/EIB/RR/S1680/S.2/VIII/101 dated 18th February 2010 (Exhibit C10). The claimants then urged the Court to hold that by virtue of the Act establishing the 1st defendant, the 1st defendant is not a Ministry or an Extra-Ministerial Department and as such the tenure policy is not applicable to the claimants. The claimants continued that the rules of interpretation of statutes are very like those which apply to the construction of documents. This is more so as regards the important point that words of an enactment must be construed as a whole so as to give a sensible meaning to them. In other words, words in a statute ought to be construed ut res magis valeat quam-pereat. The rule of interpretation synchronises with another established principle of interpretation to the effect that a statute must be read together as a whole and construed together in order to get to the true meaning of the statute and intention of the lawmaker in enacting it. Therefore, in this regard words of a statute have to be construed as bearing their natural and ordinary meaning and where, in the process, there is no ambiguity or resulting absurdity, there will be no need applying any other rules of interpretation, referring to Ugwu v, Ararume [2007] 12 NWLR (Pt. 1048) at 367. That a statute should be construed as a whole and should be given an interpretation consistent with the object and general context of the entire statute. A section of a statute has to be read in whole to get to the meaning of the section and the section should not be construed in bits and pieces in a truncated form, citing Bakare v. NRC [2007] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1064) 606 at 639 C - D. The claimants then urged the Court to resolve this issue in favour of them by holding that circular with Reference Number HCSF/061/S.1/III/68 of 26th August 2009 of the 2nd defendant cannot override the Staff Conditions of Service of the 1st defendant made by the Board of the 1st defendant in July 1991 pursuant to section 4 of its powers under the Administrative Staff College of Nigeria Act 2004 in determining the time for retirement of the claimants. On issue 2) i.e. whether the defendants are entitled to the reliefs sought in their counterclaim, the claimants submitted that the defendants are not entitled to any of the reliefs sought in their counterclaim as the said claim is alien to the jurisdiction of this Court. To the claimants, the purported counterclaim of the defendants is clearly bereft of labour issues. That the jurisdiction of this Court is subject matter based and the said counterclaim is alien and not covered by section 254C of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, and section 7 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006. That the said section 254C of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, and section 7 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 do not give this Court jurisdiction to determine landlord and tenant matters or actions that border or relate to the recovery of premises, urging the Court to so hold. The claimants continued that the purported counterclaim as constituted is grossly incompetent and does not disclose a reasonable cause of action as same is wholly premature and speculative. That a court can make inferences or analytical deductions from certain facts and situations before it but the Court must never speculate as speculation is a mere imaginative guess, which even where appears plausible should not be allowed by the Court to fill any gap in the evidence before it, referring to Olalomi Ind. Ltd v. NIDB Ltd [2009] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1167) 266 at 303 - 304 H - B. Also that the purported counterclaim of the defendants is grossly hypothetical and imaginary and not based on real facts which this Court cannot entertain. To the claimants, the courts have held that a suit is merely theoretical and hypothetical if it is imaginary and not based on real facts. Such a suit is hypothetical if it looks like a mirage to deceive the defendant and the Court as to the reality of the cause of action. The claimants then urged the Court to hold that the counterclaim imaginary, speculative and alien to the jurisdiction of this Court given that courts of law do not build upon hypothesis as formulated by the defendants in their counterclaim, citing Adeogun v. Fashogbun [2008] 17 NWLR (Pt. 115) 149 at 180 - 181 B - A. In any event, that the defendants have failed to lead evidence as to how they are entitled to the reliefs sought. That they have even failed to bring any document before this Court justifying the reliefs sought. The claimants then referred the Court to Omidiora v. Federal Civil Service Commission (supra) per Ogunwumiju, JCA at p. 73 lines 5 - 20 and Oyinloye v. Esinkin [1999] 10 NWLR (Pt. 624) 540. The claimants further submitted that this Court cannot grant the said reliefs of the defendants as same will amount to draconian unfair labour practice, which this Court frowns at. To the claimants, it is quite surprising that the defendants could argue that the claimants failed to notify the defendants that they were supposed to have retired by March 28, 2011. That referring the Director-General of the 1st defendant to paragraph 45 of his sworn deposition, he revealed that he did not give the claimants a notice in writing notifying them that they overstayed in the service of the 1st defendant. Interestingly, that the 1st claimant testified by written deposition, which has not been challenged by the defendants, on how the claimants were gainfully engaged by the 1st defendant during the period of 28th March 2011 to 13th February 2012. That the law is clear that when evidence called by the plaintiff is neither challenged nor contradicted the onus of proof on him is discharged on a minimum of proof. The law is also now settled that unchallenged evidence ought to be accepted by the court as such, citing NBC Plc v. Abubakar [2006] 16 WRN 175 at 207B and Kosile v. Folarin [1989] 3 NWLR (Pt. 107) 1. More so, that at paragraphs 18 of the claimants' further witness statement on oath, the 1st claimant stated how he was invited by the defendants to participate in the selection exercise for the appointment of Accountant-General of the Federation, wherein the Director-General of the 1st defendant nominated the 1st claimant for the said appointment. That the point being made here is: if the claimants have overstayed in their office at the material time why the recommendation and nomination by the defendants? That the defendants are thus estopped from approbating and reprobating on the claimants' tenure in office, urging the Court to discountenance the defendants' circular with Reference Number HCSF/061/S.1/III/68 of 26th August 2009 as it is not applicable to claimants in the instant case. It is the submission of the claimants that the 1st defendant who was still engaging the claimants during the purported period of overstay in office made the claimants to believe the fact that they were still in the employment of the 1st defendant. That the fact that the 1st defendant was using the services of the claimants and the payment of salaries to them during the period in contention, the defendants are estopped from contending that the claimants overstayed in office and also to demand from the claimants a refund of the emoluments and funds justly earned by them. Furthermore, that with the conduct of the 1st defendant in prescribing schedule of duties for the claimants, which was carried out by them, the defendants cannot turn around to say the claimants unlawfully stayed in office. That the fact of keeping the claimants in office, utilizing their services and paying them the emoluments of their office will raise a presumption that the controversial tenure policy never applied to the claimants. To the claimants, an employer of an employee with statutory flavour has no right to terminate his appointment at will because the employee does not hold the appointment at the pleasure of such employer, citing Governor Ekiti State v. Ojo [2007] 16 WRN 56 at 79 - 80 lines 40 - 5 and NEPA v. Ango [2001] 15 NWLR (Pt. 737) 627 at 647/648. The claimants went on that the law is clear that a party who by his declaration, made another party to believe a thing to be true and act on such belief, is not allowed to deny the truth of that act, citing section 169 of the Evidence Act 2011 and Governor Ekiti State v. Ojo [2007] 16 WRN 56 at 78, Otto v. Mobamije [2004] 17 NWLR (Pt. 903) 489 at 504 and Ondo State University v. Folayan [1994] 7 NWLR (Pt. 354) 1 SC 34 at 61. That Ondo State University v. Folayan (supra), the University had appointed Dr Folayan for a probationary period of three years. Without extending the tenure of Dr. Folayan, the University continued to use his services and pay him his salaries for three years. The Supreme Court held that the University was estopped from contending that the employment had come to an end at the end of the three years probationary period. The claimants then urged the Court to be guided by the authorities cited above and hold that the conduct of the defendants in keeping the claimants in office after March 28, 2011 to the time they were wrongfully retired utilizing their services and paying them the emoluments of their office raise a presumption that they were still in the employment of the 1st defendant. That the full implication of Folayan (supra) is that Exhibits C15 and C16 evince an intention of the defendants to the effect that the tenure policy is inapplicable to the claimants and that they are estopped from applying the policy to the claimants. The said Exhibits dated 13th February 2012 clearly stated that 'your retirement was due on 28th March 2011', urging the Court to hold that the defendants are estopped from applying the policy retrospectively to the claimants. In conclusion, the claimants urged the Court to give the defendants' counterclaim a befitting burial by dismissing and striking out same as it is grossly lacking in merit. The claimants also urged the Court to grant their claims. I heard learned counsel in the matter and considered all the processes and submissions advanced. The claimants had raised the issue of jurisdiction regarding the defendant's counterclaim arguing that this Court has no jurisdiction over the reliefs counterclaimed by the defendants. The argument of the claimants here comes in two strands: that the jurisdiction of this Court is subject matter based and because the counterclaim is bereft of labour issue, this Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over it; and that the counterclaim is premature and speculative - as such it does not disclose a reasonable cause of action. In the first place, the defendants, in not filing any reply on points of law, means that they did not react to this claimants' challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court. This, however, does not absolve the claimants from the minimal evidential rule, which is to the effect that a plaintiff cannot assume that he is entitled to automatic judgment just because the other party did not adduce evidence before the trial court as held in Mr. Lawrence Azenabor v. Bayero University, Kano [2011] 25 NLLR (Pt. 70) 45 CA at 69 and Ogunyade v. Oshunkeye [2007] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1057) 218 SC at 247. See also AG, Osun State v. NLC (Osun State Council) & 2 ors unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/275/2012 the judgment of which was delivered on December 19, 2012 and Mr. Joel Adewumi v. Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE) & 2 ors unreported Suit No. NICN/IB/18/2012 the judgment of which was delivered on December 16, 2013. I indicated that the grounds upon which the claimants raised the issue of jurisdiction of the Court over the counterclaim of the defendants are that the reliefs sought under the counterclaim are bereft of labour issues and that they are speculative. A look at the reliefs will show that what the defendants are counterclaiming are the refund of emoluments and funds collected by the claimants for the period they supposedly overstayed in service, the sum of N15 million monthly for estimated loss of the refusal of the claimants to surrender their offices to the defendants, the sum of N1.5 million annually as the rental value of the residences occupied by the claimants, and the full value of any of the properties of the 1st defendant that may be damaged, stolen or destroyed as well as full compensation for any loss of lives and properties of any staff of the 1st defendant or that of their dependants. Are these claims within the jurisdictional mandate of this Court? This remains the question. This Court under sections 7 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 and 254C of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, is vested with jurisdiction over all labour and employment matters, and matters incidental thereto. Is a claim by an employer for refund of emoluments paid to an employee a labour/employment issue? Yes, I think so. Is a claim by an employer for a monthly sum of money for an employee's refusal to surrender his office a labour/employment issue? I think it is one incidental to a labour/employment issue. Is a claim by an employer for a sum of money as annual rental value for residential accommodation given to employee as a perquisite of the employment a labour/employment issue? Yes, I think so. And is a claim by an employer from an employee for the full value of any of its properties that may be damaged, stolen or destroyed as well as full compensation for any loss of lives and properties of any staff of the 1st defendant or that of their dependants a labour/employment issue or one incidental? I do not think so, it being vague and speculative. I, however, note here that by Osakwe v. Nigerian Paper Mill Ltd [1998] 10 NWLR (Pt. 568) 1 SC an employee is expected always to be of good conduct by diligently serving the employer and protecting the employer's property and to be in good harmony with other employees. I consequently agree with the claimants that relief 1 of the defendants' counterclaim does not come within the jurisdiction of this Court. It is speculative, which no court of law can grant. Except for fundamental rights where a claim can be made if there is the fear that any of them may be infringed, judicial power by section 6(6)(b) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, only extends to all matters between persons, or between government or authority and to any person in Nigeria, and to all actions and proceedings relating thereto, for the determination of any question as to the civil rights and obligations of that person. Speculative matters such as in relief 1 of the counterclaim are not contemplated as part of the matters worthy of the exercise of judicial powers. However, in terms of reliefs 2 - 4 of the counterclaim, I find and hold that this Court has the jurisdiction to entertain them. Even when the claimants argued in paragraph 6.11 of their written address that this Court cannot grant the counterclaim of the defendants "as same will amount to draconian unfair labour practice which this Court frowns at", they implicitly are acceding to the fact of the jurisdiction of this Court since this Court has jurisdiction over unfair labour practices under section 254C of the 1999 Constitution, as amended. However, the claimants did not indicate to the Court how the grant of the counterclaim would amount to "draconian unfair labour practice". As to whether the defendants have proved their counterclaim is what I will return to after addressing merit of the claimants' case. The case of the claimants, and which this Court is to determine, is that by the conditions of service of their employer, the 1st defendant, they are to retire from service upon reaching the retiring age of 60 or upon putting in 35 years of service, whichever comes earlier. Instead of this being the case, they were served with retirement letters dated 13th February 2012 (Exhibits C4 and C15) wherein they were told that they ought to have retired from service as at 28th March 2011 having put in 8 years of service as Directors, having been so appointed on 28th March 2003. The claimants are accordingly praying the Court to inter alia hold and rule that their retirement is not only premature, it is null and void. In order words, the 8-year tenure rule upon which they were retired is inapplicable to them - they solely governed by the conditions of service of the 1st defendant and not the Public Service Rules. As a sub-text, the claimants are thereby challenging the validity of the 8-year tenure rule as it applies to them. In this sense, this case differs from that of Ambassador D. C. B. Nwanna v. National Intelligence Agency unreported Suit No NICN/ABJ/123/2011 the judgment of which was delivered on December 16, 2013 where the 8-year tenure rule was not challenged but only how it applies to the claimant, and whether or not notional promotion is to be factored in regarding the application of the policy. At the close of addresses, the claimants sent to the Court a copy of the Supreme Court decision in PHCN v. Offoelo [2013] 16 WRN 28. The claimants had submitted in paragraph 6.12 of their written address that referring the Director-General of the 1st defendant to paragraph 45 of his sworn deposition, he revealed that he did not give the claimants a notice in writing notifying them that they overstayed in the service of the 1st defendant. The decision in PHCN v. Offoelo is, therefore, to substantiate the importance of proper communication of a message, which in law has its importance. That where there is a failure to communicate (a break in communication or lack of communication) the whole purpose of the message is completely defeated. If any step or action is taken by the issuing authority in spite of the fact of non-communication (non-service), the step or action goes to naught and amounts to a nullity in law. Furthermore, that the case held that to force a public servant into retirement before he gets to his retirement age is an unusual action against him in his career and same is null and void and of no legal effect whatsoever. The thing about this case is that it was based on the applicable conditions of service regulating the employment of the respondent. In that respect, the Supreme Court was quite emphatic that in retiring the respondent with "immediate effect" the conditions of service was not complied with since there is no provision in the conditions of service sanctioning retirement with "immediate effect" or for payment of entitlements in lieu of notice. That all the conditions of service required is that all established employees shall be put on three months' notice before the retirement takes effect. The Supreme Court then agreed with the trial Court that the appellant did not follow these provisions of the conditions of service in terminating the appointment of the respondent. The Supreme Court arrived at this conclusion having first held the employment of the respondent to be statutory; for only in that regard is the duty on the appellant to follow strictly the applicable conditions of service. There was no issue as to whether the applicable conditions of service are superimposed by the Public Service Rules as is the case in the instant matter. Even when the Supreme Court confirmed the statement of principle to the effect that "to force a public servant into retirement, that is, before he gets to his retirement age, is an unusual action against him in his career", this was in the context that the applicable conditions of service are followed; and there was no contest as to what the applicable conditions of service were. In the instant case, there is the issue whether it is only the conditions of service of the claimants that applies or that it is supplanted by the Public Service Rules in terms of the tenure policy. In order to then decide this issue, it may be necessary to first determine the legal character of the Public Service Rules. The current Public Service Rules took over from the erstwhile Civil Service Rules. This is how the Courts variously described the Civil Service Rules, the precursor to the Public Service Rules. By FCSC v. Laoye [1989] 2 NWLR (Pt. 106) 652 SC, although the Civil Service Rules were made before the 1979 Constitution, they, however, took effect by virtue of section 274 of the 1979 Constitution with necessary modifications. And by Iderima v. RSCSC [2005] 16 NWLR (Pt. 951) 378, the Civil Service Rules of the Federal Public Service governs the conditions of service of Federal Public Servants and they are made pursuant to the powers conferred by the Constitution. The Rules, therefore, have constitutional force and they invest the public servant, over whom they prevail, a legal status, which place their employment over and above the common law relationship of master and servant; and introduces in such employment relationship, the vires element of administrative law. What this means is that a fortiori the Public Service Rules are a product of the Constitution and so have constitutional force. Since this is the case, can the conditions of service of the 1st defendant supersede the Public Service Rules? Chapter 16 of the Public Service Rules (2008 Edition) of 25th August 2009 deals with the application of the Public Service Rules to Federal Government Parastatals. In Rule 160103, it is provided as follows - Parastatals are to retain and improve existing rules, procedures and practices in their establishments and ensure that there are no deviations from the general principles contained in the Public Service Rules. For example, variations in probationary periods and maturity periods for promotion only reflect organisational peculiarities and not inconsistencies with the Public Service Rules. However, in the absence of internal rules and regulations on any matter, the relevant provisions of the Public Service Rules shall apply. Rule 160401 then goes on to provide that - (a) The provision of Section 8 in Chapter 2 of the Public Service Rules on leaving the service shall apply to all Parastatals, as contained in each Parastatal's conditions of service. (b) All such Conditions of Service for Parastatals shall be approved by their respective Boards and ratified by the Head of Civil Service of the Federation. It is under Section 8 of Chapter 2 of the Public Service Rules that Rule 020810, which provides for the tenure policy, is enacted. Rule 020810 provides as follows - (i) The compulsory retirement age for all grades in the Service shall be 60 years or 35 years of pensionable service whichever is earlier. (ii) No officer shall be allowed to remain in service after attaining the retirement age of 60 years or 35 years of pensionable service whichever is earlier. (iii) The provision of (i) and (ii) of this Rule is without prejudice to prevailing requirements for Judicial Officers and Academic Staff of Universities and other tertiary Institutions who retire to 70 and 65 years respectively. (iv) Provided the officer would not have attained the retirement age of 60 years or spent 35 years of pensionable service, whichever is earlier: (a) a Director shall compulsorily retire upon serving eight years on the post; and (b) a Permanent secretary shall hold office for a term of four years and renewable for a further term of four years, subject to satisfactory performance, and no more. From all of these provisions, it can be seen that the Public Service Rules provisions regarding leaving service, under which will be found Rule 020810(iv) - the rule that lays down the tenure policy - overrides any other provision in the conditions of service of Parastatals. So the argument of the claimants that the conditions of service of the 1st defendant under which they were employed supersede the Public Service Rules cannot be tenable; and I so find and hold. The Public Service Rules have constitutional force and so must be read to supersede the conditions of service of the claimants especially in terms of the provisions dealing with leaving of service. This means that the Public Service Rules are applicable to the claimants; and so the claimants are bound by the tenure policy as provided in Rule 020810(iv) - and I so find and hold. The claimants, however, argued that even if the tenure policy applies to them, the 1st defendant as a research institute means that the staff are covered by the exception to the application of the tenure policy. When Rule 020810(iii) is considered only "Judicial Officers and Academic Staff of Universities and other tertiary Institutions who retire to 70 and 65 years respectively" are exempted from the application of the tenure policy. Even when the 1st claimant testified under cross-examination that he was also engaged in teaching in the 1st defendant, this did not make the claimants academic staff of a tertiary institution. The parties all agreed that the claimants were Directors (the 1st claimant was Director of Finance and Supply, while the 2nd claimant was Director of Administration). In these ranks, the claimants were certainly not academic staff of the 1st defendant to warrant the application of Rule 020810(iii) on them; and I so find and hold. And this is so notwithstanding the argument of the defendants in paragraph 4.7 of their written address that the claimants, having admitted membership of NASU, are not academic officers of the 1st defendant. This is because, by this argument, the defendants seem to suggest that an employee's membership of a union is itself proof of membership the career or occupation covered by that union. This, without more, cannot be correct as the fact of membership of the union itself may have been wrong as were workers wrongly join (or are wrongly unionised by) a union. The claimants made an issue of and so argued that the Public Service Rules and the said controversial tenure policy of the defendants are strictly meant for a Permanent Secretary and Head of Extra-Ministerial Offices in Ministries and Extra-Ministerial Offices. In that respect, the claimants referred to the definitions of Civil Service and Head of Department as defined in Rule 01003 of the Public Service Rules (2008 Edition) and then submitted that they were neither Permanent Secretaries nor Heads of any Extra-Ministerial Office as at the time they were purportedly retired on the tenure policy of the 2nd defendant; neither is the 1st defendant a Ministry or an Extra-Ministerial Office. All the claimants said is that as a research institution governed by its own enabling law, the 1st defendant is not an Extra-Ministerial Department; and the defendants reacted that the 1st defendant is not a research institute but a training college and as such is an Extra-Ministerial Department. In all of this, however, the claimants did not actually define what an Extra-Ministerial Office is in order to really situate whether or not the claimants belong to that office or even that the office comes within the ambit of the application of the tenure policy. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that Exhibit D1 (the circular that gave rise to the tenure policy) and the subsequent clarifying circulars as to the ambit of the tenure policy (Exhibits D2 and D3) were all addressed to respective Officers of the Federal Government including "All Permanent Secretaries and Heads of Extra-Ministerial Departments" and "Directors-General and Chief Executives of Parastatals". If the argument of the claimants is that the 1st defendant (ASCON) is not an "Extra-Ministerial Office", does it not come within the rubric of "Parastatal"? I think so. Rule 160101 of the Public Service Rules (2008 Edition) of 25th August 2009 states that - A Parastatal is a government-owned organisation established by statute to render specified service(s) to the public. It is structured and operates according to the instrument establishing it and also comes under the policy directives of Government. Rule 160102 then classifies Parastatals into four categories: Regulatory Agencies; General Services; Infrastructure/Utility Agencies; and Security Agencies. In any event, the claimants did not refer to or make an issue out of Exhibit D4, a circular dated 26th January 2009 with Ref. No. HCSF/PSO/PMD/1051/T2 from the Office of the Head of the Civil Service of the Federation (OHCSF) dealing with the restructuring of the OHCSF itself. In paragraph 3 of Exhibit D4, it is provided that - Please be further informed that the Civil Service College (now Public service Institute of Nigeria); the Administrative Staff College of Nigeria (ASCON); the West African Development Institute (WAMDEVIN); the Federal Government Staff Housing Loans Board (FGSHLB) and all Federal Training Centres still remain Extra-Ministerial Departments under the Office of the Head of the Civil Service of the Federation. Within the context of the rights of an employer (the Federal Government in terms of the Public Service of the Federation is an employer), EM Rao, the author of Industrial Jurisprudence: A Critical Commentary (LexisNexis Butterworths: New Delhi, India), 2008 at pages 271 - 336 has elaborately discussed the rights of employers two of which are relevant for present purposes, to wit: right to manage affairs and reorganize the organization in question with the attendant implication for job/employment security (encompassing issues like technology upgrading, installation of labour saving machinery, physical/geographical restructuring, expansion and diversification, and mergers and acquisitions); and right to change the conditions of service ( for instance, Mbachu v. AIRBDA [2006] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1000) 691 SC held that an employer can at his discretion prune the schedule of duties of an employee, and the employee cannot preclude the employer from doing so). If an employer has the right to reorganize his organization and change conditions of service, a fortiori, is the Federal Government as an employer not entitled to do likewise? I think so. In consequence, having to brand the 1st defendant as an Extra-Ministerial Department is within the right of the Federal Government. I therefore find and hold that the 1st defendant is an Extra-Ministerial Department/Parastatal contrary to the argument of the claimants. The claimants had argued in paragraphs 6.14 - 6.21 of their written address that the defendants are estopped from denying that the claimants are staff of the 1st defendant irrespective of the 8-year tenure policy given that they were continually engaged by the 1st defendant even when they ought to have retired. The claimants went on to rely on section 169 of the Evidence Act 2011. While there is little problem in raising this argument as a defence to the counterclaim, having to use is as a basis to challenge the validity of the 8-year tenure policy falls short given that no attempt was made by the claimants to show to this Court how the rule of estoppel as couched in section 169 of the Evidence Act 2011 can defeat a clear statutory provision such as Rule 020810(iv) of the Public Service Rules. Section 169 of the Evidence Act 2011 talks of an existing court judgment, deed or agreement, declaration, act or omission, which caused or permitted another person (the claimants in our case) to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief. Can estoppel operate in this circumstance as to take away the effect of a statutory instrument? I do not think so. Even when the claimants narrated the facts of Ondo State University v. Folayan (supra), the claimants did not show the Court how being on probation is similar to the direct statutory enactment of the 8-year tenure policy under Rule 020810(iv) of the Public Service Rules. Note should be taken of the fact that the provision as to probation did not state that once the probationary period elapses and the employee is not confirmed, then the employee automatically ceases to be an employee. Without such a direct provision, the case of estoppel can clearly be made out. This is not the case in the instant case where the 8-year tenure policy is specific and direct. The claimants made an issue out of paragraph 4.4 of defendants' final address, arguing that the defendants are in error in submitting that this suit borders on wrongful termination of the employments of the claimants. Yet in arguing that the employments of the claimants enjoy statutory flavour, the defendants fell into the same error when in paragraph 4.09 of their written address they equally made submissions and cited cases in that regard. On the whole, the claimants have not made out any of their claims in reliefs a), b), c), d), f), g), h) and j). These claims lack merit and are accordingly dismissed. In any event, note should be taken that in both the complaint and the statement of facts, relief j) claimed by the claimants is for "an order directing the 1st to pay the 1st and 2nd claimants the sum of N5 Million each as general damages". As can be seen, this claim in being a relief directed against "the 1st" is not directed against anyone. Reliefs e) and i) are tied to the counterclaim of the defendants and so will be considered alongside the counterclaim. Relief e) is for a declaration that the directive of the defendants that the claimants refund to the 1st defendant all emoluments earned by them from 28th March 2011 to 13th February 2012 is unconscionable, unreasonable, an atrocious violation of fair labour practice, illegal, unlawful, null, void, and of no effect whatsoever for being in flagrant violation of the Staff Conditions of Service of the 1st defendant made by the Board of the 1st defendant in July 1991 pursuant to its powers under section 4 of the Administrative Staff College of Nigeria Act Cap A4, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. And relief i) is for an order quashing the directive of the defendants that the claimants refund to the 1st defendant all emoluments earned by them from 28th March 2011 to 13th February 2012. The reliefs sought by way of the counterclaim by the defendants are the refund of emoluments and funds collected by the claimants for the period they supposedly overstayed in service, the sum of N15 million monthly for estimated loss of the refusal of the claimants to surrender their offices to the defendants, the sum of N1.5 million annually as the rental value of the residences occupied by the claimants, and the full value of any of the properties of the 1st defendant that may be damaged, stolen or destroyed as well as full compensation for any loss of lives and properties of any staff of the 1st defendant or that of their dependants. I looked through all the processes of the defendants and except for the written statement on oath of DW where these counterclaims were made there is no evidence whatsoever to indicate how the sums counterclaimed were arrived at. Regarding the emoluments of the claimants, not even the pay-slip was frontloaded. How N15 million monthly was arrived at as the estimated loss of the refusal of the claimants to surrender their offices to the defendants and N1.5 million annually as the rental value of the residences occupied by the claimants is not indicated to the Court. And the claim for the full value of any of the properties of the 1st defendant that may be damaged, stolen or destroyed as well as full compensation for any loss of lives and properties of any staff of the 1st defendant or that of their dependants is speculative and has been struck out for want of jurisdiction. Even if the Court had jurisdiction, it is one that no court can grant. In general, on the authority of the Supreme Court decision in University of Jos v. Dr M. C. Ikegwuoha [2013] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1360) 478, the reliefs counterclaimed by the defendants are vague and nebulous and so cannot be granted. On the whole, the defendants have failed to prove their counterclaim against the claimants. The counterclaim is accordingly dismissed. In consequence, reliefs e) and i) prayed for by the claimants succeed only in so far as the counterclaim of the defendants have been dismissed. Judgment is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip