Download PDF
IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT HOLDEN AT LAGOS BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip - Presiding Judge Ion. Justice V. N. Okobi - Judge Hon. Justice F. I. Kola-Olalere - Judge Hon. Justice O. A. Obaseki-Osaghae - Judge Hon. Justice J. T. Agbadu-Fishim - Judge DATE: OCTOBER 14, 2009 SUIT NO.NIC/49/2008 BETWEEN Mr. Sydney Opara ...Claimant AND Bestow Helicopters (Nig.) Ltd Respondent REPRESENTATION E. C. Nwata, for the claimant Fela Somoye, for the respondent The claimant by a way of a complaint letter dated 19th August 2008 claims - a) The sum of three million, sixty one thousand, three hundred naira fourteen kobo only (3,061,300.14) being the short fall and outstanding balance due to the claimant as redundancy benefit from the defendant. b) And/or in (he alternative, the claimant claims ,my short fall in the redundancy benefit paid to him by the defendant as may be calculated and ordered by the court. The court on the 6th of October 2008 suo moto raised the issue of jurisdiction and asked parties to address it on the question of whether the court has original jurisdiction in the circumstances of this matter and ordered that the decision on this issue will bind the two cases of Suit No NIC/48/2008 and NIC/50/2008. I The claimant filed a thirteen-paragraphed affidavit of facts with five exhibits A - E with Exhibits A, B and C being pay slips issued by the defendant indicating the dues payable to the National Union of Air Transport Employees (NUATE) which dues were deducted at source. Exhibit D is the redundancy benefit agreement made for the benefit of the claimant and all other employees of the respondent affected by the redundancy exercise. Exhibit E is a letter from the claimant to the National Union of Air Transport Employees (NUATE) requesting it to pursue his claim. The claimant filed a written address dated -19th February and filed on 20th February 2009 wherein he submitted that section 7 of the National Industrial Court confers jurisdiction on the National Industrial Court in civil causes and matters - (a) relating to - (i) Labour, including trade unions and industrial relations and (ii) Environment and conditions of work, health, safety and welfare of labour, and matters incidental thereto; and b) relating to the grant of any order to restrain any person or body from taking part in any strike, lock-out or any industrial action; c) relating to the determination of any question as to the interpretation of any collective agreement any award made by an arbitral tribunal in respect of a labour dispute or any organizational dispute the terms of settlement of any labour dispute, organizational dispute as may be recorded in any memorandum for settlement, (iv) any trade union constitution and, (v) any award or judgment of the court. The claimant further asserted that the redundancy benefit agreement qualifies as a collective agreement and referred the court to section 47(1) of the Trade Disputes Act Cap. 432 LFN 1990, which defines a collective agreement as any agreement in writing for the settlement of disputes and relating to terms of employment and physical conditions of work concluded between an employer and a group of employees or one or more organizations representing employers on the one hand and one or more trade unions or organizations representing employees on the other hand. The claimant then submitted that a trade union in negotiating or executing a collective agreement acts as agent for its principal, and referred the court to a series of text books, namely - 1. Emeka Chianu - Employment Lmv (Bemicov Pub. (Nig) Ltd), 2004 at p. 92 to the effect that "Trade union acts as agent for its principal, its members, when it bargains. The union is itself a party to no contract; the action is brought by the individual employees on their personal contracts of hire". 2. R. Gregory, CO "The enforcement of collective labour agreements in the United States" (1968) 21 Current Legal Problems p. 159, 160. 3. E. E. Uvieghara - Labor Law in Nigeria (Malthouse Press Limited), 2001 at p. 431. 4. Robert N. Covington and Kurt H. Decker - Individual Employee Rights (West Group), 1995 at p. 202. To the claimant, the union (NUATE) was not willing to be an advocate for or to champion the cause of the claimant. That a clear indication of lack of interest by the union can be inferred from the complete refusal of the union to even make contact and/or write lo the respondent despite the receipt of Exhibit E. The claimant then urged the court to uphold its right to sue in this court as the respondent failed to initiate the necessary arbitral steps, having failed to discharge its duty of fair representation to the claimant. The claimants also referred the court to the section 2 of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act 1965 in India which according to the claimant attempts to mitigate some of the hardships caused as a result of judicial pronouncements. Ordinarily before the enactment of the said act, cases of individual dismissals and discharges could not be taken up for conciliation or arbitration or referred to adjudication under the Industrial Disputes Act, unless they were sponsored by union or a number of workmen. That S. C. Srivastava in his book, Industrial Relations and Labour Laws (Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd), 2004, 5th edition, states that the said section 2 provides that dispute or difference between an individual workman and his employer connected with or arising out of (i) discharge, (ii) dismissal (iii) retrenchment (iv) or otherwise termination of service of an individual workman, shall be deemed to be an "industrial dispute" even though no fellow workmen or any union of workers is a party to the said dispute. The net effect of section 2A is that by legislative action such a dispute is deemed to be an industrial dispute even where it is not espoused by a trade union or appreciable number of workmen. The claimant then referred the court to statements made by the President of me National Industrial Court in his paper tilled, "The role of National Industrial Court in Trade Disputes Resolution" delivered at a seminar in Ondo State directorate on the 4th of December 2007 where he stated that labour issues are purely economic issues which require equitable approach rather than pure partisan approach…………………… That under the common law a demand for higher wages cannot be justiciable except on the basis of what has been contracted or has been prescribed by a statute in Nigeria, whereas such issues can be justiciable before the National Industrial Court if it is the product of collective bargaining with a valid collective agreement entered into in that regard. The claimant concluded by asking the court to have in mind the provision of section 15 of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006 which urges the court to apply rules of equity and to hold that it has the requisite jurisdiction to entertain this case and the other two sister cases in the light of the principle of ibijus ibi rememdium. In reaction, the respondent, in its written address, dated and filed on 10lh March 2009, submitted that it declared the claimant redundant by a letter dated 4lh April 2008 and that prior to this the respondent had entered into negotiations with the claimant's union (NUATE), which culminated into a redundancy benefit agreement dated 3rd April 2008. Subsequently the respondent honoured the claimant with the sum of N2, 829, 720.67 out of which the sum of N2, 3 17,797.76 constituted the agreed redundancy benefit. However, that the claimant's claim is for the sum of N3, 061, 300. 14 being the short fall and outstanding or any sum calculated by the court as the short fall between the amount due and the amount actually paid to him by the respondent. On the main issue of whether the National Industrial Court has original jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter, the respondent argued that jurisdiction is a threshold issue which is fundamental to the adjudication of any matter and referred the court to the case of KLM AIRLINES v. KUMZHI [2004] 8 NWLR (Pt 875) 231 at 252 - 252 and the case of MADUKOLU & ORS v. NKEMDILI [1962] ANLR 581 where it was held that a court is competent when — 1) it is properly constituted as regards numbers and qualification of members of the bench, and no member is disqualified for one reason or another; 2) the subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction and there is no feature in the case which prevents the court from exercising its jurisdiction; and 3) the case comes before the court initiated by due process of law, and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction. The respondent then submitted that following these conditions, it is its belief that condition 3 above has not been complied with. The respondent further argued that the law governing the settlement of trade disputes is the Trade Disputes Act Cap T8 LFN 2004 (TDA) to which the conditions precedent for the institution of a matter at the National Industrial Court are set out. That by the combined effect of sections 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 17 and 33 of the TDA, the procedure to be followed in resolving a trade dispute is as follows - 1) Parties settle in accordance with pre-agreed means (if any exist). 2) If there is no pre-agreed means of settlement or settlement fails, then within 7 days parties meet by themselves or through representatives under the presidency of a mutually agreed mediator with a view to amicable settlement of the dispute. 3) If no settlement is reached within 7 days of mediator's appointment, written report of the dispute is to be made to the Minister within 3 days of the end of the 7 days. 4) If the Minster is not satisfied that the foregoing requirements have been met, he issues a notice to the parties specifying what they must do and if the dispute remains unsettled thereafter, the Minister may exercise any of his powers under the act, to wit: appoint a conciliator, make a direct reference to the National Industrial Court or appoint a board of inquiry. 5) Within 14 days after receipt of report under 3 above, or if conciliation fails, the Minister may refer the dispute to the Industrial Arbitration Panel (IAP). 6) Finally, if a party duly objects to the award of the IAP, the Minister shall then refer dispute to National Industrial Court. The respondent submitted that once a dispute qualifies as trade dispute under the TDA an aggrieved party must first exhaust the procedure outlined above before he may be heard to invoke this court's jurisdiction. That the word "shall" was repeatedly employed and follows that the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court can only be triggered after exhausting the steps outlined in 1-6 above. That the procedure outlined above amounts to a condition precedent within condition 3 of the MADUKOLU's case which if not complied with robs the court of jurisdiction. That the only permissible exception under which a party may directly approach the National Industrial Court is provided under section 16(1) of the TDA. The section empowers "any party to a collective agreement" to apply to the National Industrial Court for an interpretation of any term or provision of the collective agreement. That, however, this case does not come under the above exception because the claimant, not being a party to the redundancy benefit agreement between the respondent and NUATE (within the meaning of section 16) cannot make such application to the National Industrial Court. The respondent then referred the court to paragraph 7 of the claimant's statement of facts wherein he pleaded that the redundancy benefit agreement was made between NUATC and the respondent and that when determining the question of jurisdiction the court must confine itself to the statement of facts. The respondent referred the court to the case of ADELEKE v. OSHA [2006] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1006) 608 and ITPP LTD v. UBN PLC [2006] 12 NWLR (Pt. 995) 483 at 501. The respondent submitted further that the definition of trade dispute in section 48 of the TDA is "any dispute between employers and workers or between workers and workers, which is connected with the employment or non-employment, or the terms of employment and physical conditions of work of any person"; while the National Industrial Court Act in section 54 defines it as any dispute between employers and employees, including disputes between their respective organizations and federation which is connected with the employment or non-employment of any person. That this case concerns the non-employment of the claimant and, therefore, amounts to a trade dispute. That a dispute does not have to be between the employer and the employee union to qualify as a trade dispute deserving of being taken compulsorily through the procedure outlined above. That section 4(2) of the Trade Dispute Act compels the parties to a trade dispute to "meet together by themselves or through representatives" in order to amicably settle their dispute. The respondent also submitted that Professor Uvieghara in his book, Labour Law in Nigeria (Malthouse Press Ltd), 2001 at p 431 opined that "a trade dispute remains a trade dispute whether or not an employee is represented by a trade union'. The respondent went on to cite the case of NIGERIAN TOBACCO COMPANY v. NATIONAL UNION OF FOOD BEVERAGES & TOBACCO EMPLOYEES [1982 r- 83] N1CLR 164 at 178. That since the claimant is not a party to the redundancy benefit agreement (as admitted by implication under paragraph 7 of its statement of facts), this action is consequently caught by the principle of privity of contract between the claimant and the respondent vis-a-vis the redundancy benefit agreement which constitute a feature in the case and thereby preventing this court from exercising its jurisdiction. The respondent referred the court to the case of UBN Ltd v. SPALDING BREWERIES LTD & ORS [1997] 5 NWLR (Pt. 505) 344 and UBN v. EDET [1993] 4 NWLR (Pt. 287) 288. The respondent further submitted that section 7 of the NIC Act, which confers jurisdiction on the court in specific matters, does not prejudice the validity of the TDA by virtue of section 315 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the TDA being an existing law. That the effect of section 53(2) of the NIC Act is recognized but the procedure required under the TDA to be followed before this court's jurisdiction may be invoked is not consistent with the provisions of NIC Act. To that extent the respondent submitted that section 7 of the NIC Act does not and is not intended to render the dispute settlement procedure under the TDA inoperative. That the repeal of Part II of the TDA does not affect dispute settlement procedure which is contained under Part I thereof. In response to the claimant's written address, the respondent urged the court to discountenance and set aside the affidavit of facts as it is irregular and it amounts to amending the claimant's statement of facts before this court. That by the combined effect of Order 11 Rule 1(1), Order 15 and Order 26 Rule 13 of the NIC Rules 2007, the claimant should have come by way of amendment in order for the facts averred in the affidavit of facts to be properly before this court. That when determining the question of jurisdiction, the court must confine itself to the statement of claim, referring the court to the case of ADENlKE v. OSHA and ITPP LTD v. UBN PLC, all supra. That the claimant in its address urged the court to, pursuant to section 7(6) of the NIC Act, have regard to the practice in the United States of America. The respondent submitted that the claimant cannot find any assistance thereunder as the section presupposes the presence of jurisdiction in the court as its opening words. That the court cannot have recourse to practices in foreign jurisdiction (no matter how perfect) in obstinate disregard for domestic law. In conclusion, the respondent claimed that the claimant by its action seeks to leapfrog and by-pass established procedure for settling a trade dispute; that the claimant is trying to enforce a contract to which he is not a party to. They referred the court to the case of CHUKWURAH v. SPDC LTD [ 1993] 4 NWLR 512 and urged the court to decline jurisdiction. On the 11lh March 2009 when the matter came up for adoption of written address on the question of the court's jurisdiction, the court granted leave to the respondent to file a supplementary written address. The said address was dated 17lh March 2009 and filed on the 18th of March 2009 and sought to persuade the court to depart from the court's decision in GODWIN TOSAWUMI v. GULF AGENCY AND SHIPPING NIGERIA LTD unreported Suit No. NIC/18/2006 delivered on 14th June 2007 where the court held that- ...in any event, the fact is that given the TDA dispensation, individuals cannot access the dispute resolution processes of Part I of the TDA. The respondent submitted that this court has no jurisdiction to entertain the claimant's claim since the claimant has not met the condition precedent (i.e. the observance of the conciliatory procedures set out in the TDA) for the invocation of this court's jurisdiction. That this court has recently held that although the conciliatory procedures set out in the TDA must be followed (as a condition precedent) in the resolution of a trade dispute before this court's jurisdiction can be properly activated, where a claimant is an individual who is not represented by a union, he may directly approach this court and invoke its original jurisdiction. This conclusion was premised on the above case and that the dispute resolution processes of Part I of the TDA are open to individuals as they are to individuals coming under the umbrella of trade union. That the quoted part of the decision in TOSAWUMI CASE (supra) was wrong and ought to be reversed or altered in the interest of justice due to the following reasons. Firstly, that no section of the TDA provides that individuals cannot access the dispute resolution processes of Part I of the TDA. On the contrary, that section 1(2), the definition section of Part I of the TDA. …………unless the context otherwise requires, it means a party to the dispute. That it follows that wherever the word party appears in the entire 19 sections making up Part I of the TDA, unless the context otherwise requires, the act is referring to any of the "trade disputants" either as claimants or respondents. That the TDA does not distinguish between individual workers as parties to a trade dispute. The respondent referred the court to the case of MLITARY GOV, ANAMBRA STATE v. EZEMUOKWE [1997] 3 NWLR (Pt. 494) 374 at 385, where it was held that - Where, as in this case, the word or expression, to be construed is in a statute and the word or expression has been assigned a meaning in the definition section of the statute, the intention of the law maker is that the meaning so assigned is to be given to that word or expression in that statute unless the subject or context renders the meaning repugnant or will result in manifest absurdity. The respondent then submitted that nothing in the subject or context renders the meaning of the word 'party' as defined in the TDA absurd, nor will such ascribed meaning result in manifest absurdity. It follows, therefore, that given section 1(1) of the TDA, Part I of the TDA applies with equal force to an individual worker (once he is a party to a trade union), as it does to a worker represented by a trade union. They referred to the case of IBRAHIM v. BARDE [1996] 9 NWLR (Pt. 474) 513 at 577, where it was held that- It is a cardinal rule of the construction of statues that statutes should be construed according to the intention expressed in the statutes themselves. If the words of the statutes are themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more is necessary than to expound the words in their natural and ordinary sense. The word of the statutes do alone, in such a case, best declare the intention of the lawmaker. Secondly, that many of the provisions of the TDA will be rendered meaningless by the conclusion reached in TOSAWUMI (supra) and this will amount to a violation of the principle of law that "like equity the law does nothing in vain" (IBRAHIM v. BARDE (supra) at 582). The respondent referred the court to the provisions of section 18(1) of the TDA, which provides that - (1) An employer shall not declare or take part in a lock-out and a Worker shall not take part in a strike in connection with any trade dispute where - a) The procedure specified in section 4 or 6 of this Act has not been complied with in relation to the dispute; or b) A conciliator has been appointed under section 8 of this Act for the purpose of effecting a settlement of the dispute; or c) The dispute has been referred for settlement to the Industrial Arbitration Panel under section 9 of this Act. or d) An award by an Arbitration Tribunal has become binding under section 13(3) of this Act; or……………………The National Industrial Court has issued an award on the reference. That the above provision is unambiguous in making it mandatory for a worker to first go through the specified conciliatory procedures before embarking on a strike. Contravention of the foregoing is criminalized under section 18(2). That the foregoing provision is a cogent demonstration of the legislature's intention to make "the dispute resolution processes of Part 1 of the TDA" open to individual workers. To reason otherwise will result in an absurdity which renders the act of the legislature void. That as much as we appreciate the untidiness of requiring the claimant in the instant case to first go through the specified conciliatory procedures before coming before this court, the respondent submitted that the court's hands are tied and referred the court to the case of ADEBOWALE v. MILITARY GOV, OGUN STATE [1995] 4 NWLR (Pt. 392) 733 at 751 - 752 where it was held that- ...once a statute had been properly made the courts are bound to give effect to it, and the remedy of anyone who considers that his right have unduly been affected or invaded is to explore constitutional means to have it amended or repealed. I am strengthened in this view by the decision of the Privy Council in Labrador Company v. The Queen (1893) AC 104 at 123 where the Lord Hannan said: "this is an absolute statement by the legislature that there was Seigneuri of Minga. Even if it could be proved that the legislature was deceived, it would not be competent for a court of law to disregard its enactments. If a mistake has been made, the legislature alone can correct it. The Act of parliament has declared that there was a seigneurie of Mingan and trial thence-forward its tenure shall be changed into that of tranc aleu roturier. The courts of law cannot sit in judgement on the legislature, but must obey and give effect to its determination. Finally, the respondent submitted that a court although bound by its previous decision may yet depart from same where it is satisfied that the decision was wrong and that it ought to be reversed or altered in the interest of justice. The respondent then referred the court to the case GLOBAL v. FREE ENT [2001] 5 NWLR (Pt. 706) 426 at 441 and urged the court to depart from the TOSAWUMI CASE and hold that the provisions of Part I of the TDA apply to individuals and strike out this case for want of jurisdiction. The claimant's reply written address on the issue of jurisdiction dated and filed on 26th March 2009 raised four issues, couched as questions, for the determination of the court, namely -1. Does the court have the requisite jurisdiction to entertain this action? 2. Does an individual have the capacity to access the National Industrial Court? 3. Must an individual access the dispute resolution processes before having access to the NIC? 4. Does the need to depart from the decision in GODWIN TOSAWUMI v. GULF AGENCY AND SHIPPING NIGERIA LTD arise in this case? On the first issue the claimant submitted that the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court is regulated by section 7 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 as held in the case of NIGERIAN UNION OF PHARMACISTS, MEDICAL TECHNOLOGISTS AND PROFESSIONS ALLIED TO MEDICINE v. OBAFEMI AWOLOWO UNIVERSITY TEACHING HOSPITAL COMPLEX MANAGEMENT BOARD, IN RE-MEDICAL AND DENTAL ASSOCIATION (unreported) Suit No. NIC/8/2006 delivered on the 22nd of May 2007, where this court held that jurisdiction is subject-based. He argued that based on the aforementioned decision of this court the appropriate enquiry to make is whether the cause of action in this case comes within any of the subject matter provided for by section 7 of the NIC Act, 2006. That the appropriate question is, what is the claimant's claim in this case? That the claim is, inter alia, for the sum of N3,061,300, being the short fall and outstanding balance due to the claimant as redundancy benefit arising from a redundancy benefit agreement dated the 3riJ April 2008. That the claim does not only relate to labour, welfare of labour and matters incidental thereto, but equally relates to the appropriate question or interpretation to be given to the said collective and/or redundancy benefit agreement of 3rd April. That in the case of GODWIN TOSAWUMI v. GULF AGENCY AND SHIPPING NIGERIA LTD (supra), the court referred to the wide ambit of matters that fall within the meaning of the term "labour" and held that "any matter that qualifies as "labour" or incidental to it will qualify as such and so would confer jurisdiction on this court. This is the only way section 7 of the NIC Act will make meaning. That to hold that the section confers jurisdiction on the basis of persons, would mean that provisions such as that which permits this court to hear matters regarding the suit whether to grant an order to restrain a person from embarking on a strike or lock-out would come to naught. The claimant's counsel referred the court to and relied on the ruling of this court in the case of MR. OLABODE OGUNYALE. & ORS v. GLOBACOM NIGERIA LTD unreported Suit No. NIC/30/2008 delivered on the 11th March, 2009. He submitted that for a claim to be actionable in this court, the claims must relate to issues relating to labour including trade unions, and industrial relations; and environment and conditions of work, health, safety and welfare of labour and matters incidental thereto as provided in section 7(l)(a)(i) and (ii) of the NIC Act, 2006. The claimant then urged the court to hold that the subject matter of this case, which ordinarily qualifies for trade or labour dispute falls within the purview of section 7(1) of the NIC Act, 2006, hence the court has the requisite jurisdiction to entertain the matter. On the second issue, the claimant referred the court to section 54 of NICA 2006, page 1530 of the Black's Law Dictionary 8th edition where the word "trade dispute" was defined to mean a dispute between an employer and employees over pay, working conditions or other employment related matters, and the decision in the case of MR. OLABODE OGUNYALE & ORS v. GLOBACOM, supra. Section 54(1) of the NIC Act 2006 defines an employee to mean "a person employed by another under oral or written contract of employment whether on a continuous, part time or casual basis". The aforementioned section further defines a party to include every person served with notice of pr attending any proceedings who although not named on the record of the proceeding has the like interest in the subject matter of the proceedings as a person named on the record of proceedings. The claimant argued that it is trite that where the provisions of a statute are clear and unambiguous, the court must give those provisions, their literal and ordinary interpretation. He referred the court to the case of OJOKOLOBO & ORS v. ALAMU & ANOR [1987] 3 NWLR (Pt. 61) 377; [1987] 7 SCNJ 98. That the wordings of the aforementioned interpretation section of the NIC Act 2006 are clear and unambiguous. The jurisdiction of the court is intended to be liberal and to welcome both individuals and trade unions alike; to hold otherwise will result in manifest injustice, especially as the law regards persons with ordinary interests as parties even though not named in the processes filed in the court. Me urged the court to hold that the claimant can access the court as an individual. On the third issue, the claimant submitted that this court held in the case of TOSAWUMI (supra) as follows - The fact is that given the Trade Disputes Act dispensation, individuals cannot access the dispute resolution processes of Part I of the Trade Disputes Act. To shut them out of this court would be manifestly unjust. We are, therefore, in agreement with the submissions of the claimant and the nmicus curae that individuals can access this court on matters within the purview of section 7 of the National Industrial Court Act. The claim before this court is one that falls within the subject matter of labour. The claimant is, therefore, right in approaching this court for the determination of the matter. The claimant then submitted that this case does not need to go through the processes of Part I of the Trade Disputes Act. Me referred the court to the case of ALOYS1US ODOCHA v. ALAN DICK & COMPANY (WEST AFRICA) unreported Suit No. NIC/58/2007 delivered on the 26"' November 2008. On the fourth issue, the claimant submitted that the decision of the National Industrial Court in the aforementioned case of TOSAWUMI (supra) represents sound judgment and makes good sense. The intention of the court in coming to the aforementioned decision is to allow unhindered access to individuals to ventilate their grievances in matters within the purview of section 7 of the NIC Act 2006. This is in accordance with the. provisions of the 1999 Constitution, which seeks to allow citizens easy and unhindered access to the courts. The claimant further submitted that the aforementioned decision in TOSAWUMI's case does not need to be departed from as the liberal and ordinary words of the National Industrial Court, Act 2006, which are clear and evince an intention to accord unhindered access to the court to both individuals and trade unions - ONOCHIE & ORS v. ODOGWU & ORS (supra). That she decision in the TOSAWUMI case accords with the intention of the legislature in enacting the National Industrial Court Act 2006. The essence of the Act is to provide and eliminate the inadequacy of the system under the Trade Disputes Act. That with the enactment of the NIC Act 2006, the old dispensation changed, hence a clear perusal of the provisions of the NIC Act 2006 show that individuals can come to the court to press individual disputes. That section 7(6) of National Industrial Court Act, 2006 enjoins it to have due regard to international best practices. They submitted that a burning and current international best practice is to allow individuals unrestrained access to the courts in all fields of human endeavor. To do otherwise will be to derogate from the current trend and world order. That the decision in the TOSAWUMI case is in line with current trend the world over, hence the need for a departure there from does not arise as it will limit access to our courts. The claimant concluded his arguments by urging the court to hold that it has the requisite jurisdiction to entertain this action and the sister cases. Having carefully considered all the submissions of counsel in this matter, the main issue for the determination of this court is whether individuals can activate the original jurisdiction of this court directly. In the case of TOSAWUMI, this court held that individuals can access this court directly if the issue in dispute falls within the purview of section 7 of the NIC Act 2006. This court reasoned that because individuals cannot access the dispute resolution processes of Part I of the TDA, it will be unjust to deny them access to this court when they are aggrieved. The respondent in the main prayed that this court reconsiders its decision in TOSAWUMI and depart from it by holding that individuals should exhaust the processes of Part I of the TDA before coming to this court. We carefully considered the submissions of the respondent in this regard we still do not see any reason why the decision of this court in TOSAWUMI should be disturbed. The provisions of Part I of the TDA are applicable only when a trade dispute exists; and a trade dispute by definition is a dispute between an employer and workers or between workers and workers, which is connected with the employment or non-employment, or the terms of employment and physical conditions of work of any person. The contemplation here is that the dispute involves workers in their collective capacity, not in their individual capacities. So when section 1(2) of the TDA states that "party" means a party to the dispute, this must necessarily refer to the trade dispute in issue i.e. the dispute involving workers in their collective sense. In this regard, there is no way Part I of the TDA could have made direct provisions specifically stopping individuals from coming to the National Industrial Court. Part I of the TDA was not meant for individuals and so there could have been no provision relating to an individual. In determining whether this court has the jurisdiction to entertain a matter, all that has to be done is to look at the provisions of the NIC Act 2006. If the subject matter, for instance, falls within section 7 then this court will have jurisdiction to entertain the matter. The reason why group or collective disputes must go through the dispute resolution processes of Part I of the TDA is because section 7(3) of the NIC Act enjoins it. Individuals are not contemplated and so can now come to this court with their grievances. We are of the view, therefore, that section 7 of the NIC Act confers jurisdiction based on subject matter as has been held by this court in NIGERIA UNION OF PHARMACISTS, MEDICAL TECHNOLOGISTS AND* PROFESSIONS ALLIED TO MEDICINE v. OBAFEMI AWOLOWO UNIVERSITY TEACHING HOSPITAL COMPLEX MANAGEMENT BOARD, supra. The matter before us is a claim by the applicant for the shortfall and outstanding balance due to him as redundancy benefit from the respondent and this comes clearly under the subject matter of labour or a matter incidental to labour. It equally relates to the appropriate interpretation to be given to the said collective and/or redundancy benefit agreement of April 3, 2008. This in our opinion falls within the purview of section 7 of the NIC Act 2006. Arguments raised by the claimant as to the applicability of international best practice as permitted under section 7(6) of the NIC Act go to no issue for present purposes. The court must first have jurisdiction regarding the subject matter in issue before the talk of the application of international best practice can arise. International best practice cannot be used to determine jurisdiction; it can only be used to aid the court in determining issues that it has jurisdiction to entertain. It is, therefore, premature and indeed out of place, to plead international best practice on the question of jurisdiction. Issues were raised on the question of privity of contract. We must state that the issue of privity of contract is not an issue at this stage. If anything, it is an issue of defence to be addressed when the merits of the case is being addressed. It is not one that can be raised as an issue of jurisdiction. We, therefore, agree with the submissions of the claimant that individuals can access this court on matters within the purview of section 7 of the NIC Act 2006 and the claimant is right to approach this court for the determination of this matter. We consequently hold that this court has the jurisdiction to hear this matter and this ruling shall bind the sister cases of Suit Nos. NIC/48/2008 and NIC/50/2008 as decided by the court on the 6th October 2008. Ruling is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip Presiding Judge Hon. Justice V. N. Okobi Hon. Justice F. I. Kola-OIalere Judge Judge Hon. Justice O.A. Obaseki-Osaghae Hon. Justice J. T. Agbadu-Fishim Judge Judge