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The claimant initially filed this Suit at the Federal High Court, Bauchi Division, through an Originating Summons dated and filed on 3rd November, 2009 with Suit No. FHC/BAU/C5/8/2009. By virtue of a Court Order dated 26th October, 2011, the Federal High Court, Bauchi pursuant to Section 22 (1) of the Federal High Court Act, transferred this Suit to this court. The said transfer was on the strength of the provisions of Section 254 (c) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria third Alteration Act, 2010. By the said Originating Summons, the claimant seeks the determination of the following questions:- (1) Whether in view of the provisions of paragraph 3 (2) (a) (ii) of 2nd schedule to the Federal Polytechnics Act, Cap. 139, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, the (Senior Staff) Appointments and Promotions Committee of the Federal Polytechnic, Bauchi, has the power to investigate alleged acts of misconduct made against the claimant and recommend disciplinary measure particularly the termination of the claimants appointment with the respondent. (2) Whether in view of provisions of the Federal Polytechnic Act, the Federal Ministry of Education can act on recommendations of the (Senior Staff) Appointments and Promotions Committee of the claimant and effect the termination of the claimant’s employment with the respondent. (3) Whether without observing the statutory removal procedure of academic staff provided by Section 12 (1) of Federal Polytechnic Act, the termination of the claimant’s appointment by the respondent’s termination of appointment letter of 19th February, 2004 is valid. (4) If the answer to all the above questions is in the negative, whether termination of the claimant’s appointment with the respondent done apparently in breach of all the relevant provisions of the Federal Polytechnic Act, Cap. 139, is valid. (5) In the light of answers to the above questions, is the termination of the claimant’s employment with the respondent right:- (i) When the Senior Staff Appointments and Promotions Committee exceeded its statutory powers by recommending the termination of claimant’s employment with the respondent. (ii) When the respondent referred the recommendations of the Appointments and Promotions Committee to the Federal Ministry of Education which approved same, instead of referring it to the Council of the Polytechnic, which has exclusive statutory responsibility of acing on recommendations of the said Appointments and Promotions Committee. (iii) When the mandatory statutory removal procedure of academic staff provided by Section 12 (1) of the Federal Polytechnic Act was not followed before the termination of plaintiff’s employment with the respondent. AND TAKE NOTICE that the claimant shall seek the following orders: (a) An order setting aside the termination of the claimant’s appointment with the respondent, the process having breached the statutory procedure. (b) An order of payment of all the claimant’s salaries and allowances from date of termination letter to date of judgment. (c) An order deeming the claimant as still being staff of the respondent, and being entitled to all rights and privileges of his position. (d) And for such ancillary or further orders as may be deemed appropriate. Accompanying the Originating Summons is a 20th paragraphed affidavit deposed to by Mr. Ayo Ade-Farayola, who is the claimant in this Suit, the claimant’s witness statement on oath, a list of witness and documents to be relied on at the trial. The respondent on its part filed a memorandum of appearance, statement of defence, witness written statement on oath and documents to be relied upon at the trial. Both parties adopted and relied on all the processes earlier filed at the Federal High Court before the Suit was transferred to this court. The claimant’s case is that he was a staff of the respondent. That he was appointed an Assistant Lecturer in the Department of Accountancy on the 6th June, 1991. That his appointment was confirmed on the 17th June, 1993. That he rose through the ranks to the position of Lecturer 1 with effect from May 23, 2003. Claimant averred that he continued his teaching job satisfactorily, until the 19th January 2004, when he received a query from his Head of Department, asking for his explanation as to why he could not give out his examination question papers up till 10.am on an examination date because he was not around. That he replied the query and explained that his wife took ill overnight and he had to take her to the hospital early that morning and that accounted for his delay in coming to work. That after that his head of department in a letter advised him to desist from acts that could distort any of the school programme or activity. That after that the Registrar of the respondent wrote to him inviting him to appear before the Senior Staff Appointments and Promotions Committee to defend himself against act of misconduct. That he appeared before the said Senior Staff Appointments and Promotions Committee, and explained to the Committee that his wife was sick, that she had mental illness which required him to be around during her treatment. That the Appointment and Promotions Committee investigated the allegations of misconduct made against him and recommended to the Federal Ministry of Education that his appointment be terminated. That on 19th February 2004, the respondent wrote to him a letter terminating his appointment in which it stated inter alia that the Federal Ministry of Education has upheld the recommendation of the Senior Staff Appointments and Promotions Committee that his services was no longer needed with immediate effect. That he made several appeals for consideration but was unsuccessful. The claimant averred further that by the time his appointment was terminated, he was already a confirmed and pensionable staff, and the respondent no longer had the power to terminate him based on his temporary appointment letter. That the Senior Staff Appointments and Promotions Committee is a creation of statute, created by paragraph 3 (2) (a) 2nd schedule to the Federal Polytechnic Act Cap. 139, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, and its powers and responsibilities are special and limited to making recommendations to the Council of the Polytechnic on issues of appointments and promotions of Academic Staff only. That it has no power to recommend disciplinary measures or termination of staff appointment. That the said Appointments and Promotions Committee can only make recommendation to the Council, which is created by Section 3 of the Federal Polytechnic Act but not to the Federal Ministry of Education. That the Federal Ministry of Education has no statutory power to accept any recommendation made to it by the Senior Staff Appointments and Promotions Committee, and that the termination of the plaintiff’s appointment was not done within the provisions of the Federal Polytechnic Act. He continued that being an academic staff of the respondent, Section 12 (1) of the Federal Polytechnic Act must be complied with before the claimant’s appointment can be lawfully terminated. The claimant therefore prayed the court for the following orders: (a) An order setting aside the termination of the claimant’s appointment with the respondent, the process having breached the statutory procedure. (b) An order of payment of all the claimant’s salaries and allowances from the date of termination to the date of Judgment. (c) An order deeming the claimant as still staff of the respondent, and being entitled to all rights and privileges of his position. (d) And for such ancillary or further orders as may be deemed appropriate. The claimant’s witness statement on oath is in the main the same as the pleadings and so need no repetition. The claimant as CW1 affirmed to speak the truth and thereafter adopted his written statement on oath as was cross examined by counsel to the respondent. Responding – under cross examination, the claimant answered that the Appointment and Promotion Committee invited him. He also answered that the proceedings of the Appointment and Promotion Committee was in writing. Also that his salaries have been reviewed from time to time by the Federal Government. There was no re-examination of the Witness. The claimant thereafter closed his case. The statement of defence of the respondent is that the claimant was issued a query but denied that the claimant did his teaching job satisfactorily. The respondent admits that the Senior Staff Appointments and Promotions Committee investigated the allegations of misconduct against the claimant but never recommended the termination of the claimant’s appointment based on any allegations of misconduct. That the Federal Ministry of Education relied on the recommendation of the Senior Staff Appointments and Promotions Committee and terminated the appointment of the claimant based on services no longer required simpliciter. The respondent averred further that the claimant’s appointment was never terminated as a temporary staff but was based on the provisions of the staff condition of services of the respondent. That the act creating the respondent empowers the Minister of Education to enquire or take up any function of the respondent or to do anything that it deems fit to make. Furthermore, that the Governing Council of the respondent was constituted in August 2000 for a three years period, that as at the time the issue of the claimant came up, there was no council so the matter was referred to the visitor under Section 4 of the Federal Polytechnic Act. The respondent pleaded that the termination of appointment of the claimant was done in substantial compliance with the relevant laws. That the provision of Section 12 (1) of the Federal Polytechnic Act applies only to situation where an academic staff is terminated based on allegations of misconduct. That the claimant’s appointment was terminated for “services no longer required,†only. That the letter terminating the appointment of the claimant did not state any reason apart from services no longer required. That the claimant has collected all his retirement benefits including his pension and gratuity. The respondent therefore urged the court to dismiss the case of the claimant. The witness statement on oath of the respondent’s witness I.B. Dansidi, the Chief Executive Officer Administration with respondent is on all focus with the statement of defence and so needs no repetition. The respondent’s witness, Inuwa Bala Wasidi who was in court affirmed to speak the truth and thereafter adopted his written statement on oath. Under cross examination, the witness told the court that he knows the claimant. That the claimant was a staff of the respondent. He also agreed that the claimant’s services were terminated by the respondent. That the claimant was a Lecturer with the respondent in the Department of Accountancy. The witness agreed that the claimant was a confirmed staff of the respondent. He agreed that it was the management of the respondent terminated the claimant. He in another breath answered that it was the Council of the Polytechnic the terminated his appointment. That the claimant appeared before the Disciplinary Committee of the respondent. That the claimant appeared before the Senior Staff Disciplinary Committee. That the Committee found the claimant guilty of misconduct. He answered that there is a report to that effect. That it was the Federal Ministry of Education that confirmed the claimant’s termination. Under re-examination, the witness answered that in the absence of council, the Federal Ministry of Education takes charge of the Polytechnic affairs. That as at the time the claimant was terminated, there was no Governing Council in place. The respondent thereafter closed its case. In its final written address, dated and filed on 14th August 2010, the respondent’s counsel raised the following issues for determination:- (1) Whether the services of the claimant with the respondent were terminated for any reason other than for services no longer needed. (2) If the answer to issue 1 above is in the negative, whether the respondent ought to comply with the procedures laid down in Section 12 (1) (Now Section 17 (1) of the Federal Polytechnic Act). (3) If the answer to issue 2 above is to the negative, whether the Federal Ministry of Education could approve the termination of appointment of the claimant. (4) Whether the plaintiff has made out a case worthy of being considered by this court. Arguing on issue one, the respondent’s counsel submitted that considering the evidence adduced by the claimant before this court, it is obvious that the claimant is alleging that his services was terminated by the respondent on allegation of misconduct. To the respondent’s counsel, it is trite law that he who assert must prove. That the claimant has failed, refused and or neglected to prove this assertion. That exhibit H which terminated the claimant’s appointment unequivocally asserts that his services were no longer needed. To the respondent’s counsel, the burden is therefore on the claimant to shoe by preponderance of evidence that the respondent terminated his appointment based on misconduct. That exhibit H which severed the relationship between the claimant and the respondent has not mentioned any reason other than “Services no longer neededâ€, citing the case of FAKUADE v. OAU [1993] 6 SCNJ pt. 1, pg 35 at 40. The respondent’s counsel submitted that the claimant cannot adduce oral evidence to contradict, add, amend and or substitute a documentary evidence. That Exhibit ‘H’ is the document which severed the relationship between the claimant and the respondent, and the reason (if any) adduced by the respondent is for service no longer needed. That the claimant’s oral testimony alleging misconduct cannot and shall not in any way counter, amend, vary or substitute the unequivocal, clear and unambiguous wordings of exhibit H. Counsel cited the case of LARMIE v. DATA PROCESSING LTD [2005] NSCQLR, 24 p. 321 at 322 para 1 when the Supreme Court held thus: “It is the law that where parties have embodied the terms of their contract in a written document, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to add, vary, subtract from or contradict the terms of the written instrument.†Also that Section 128 (1) of the Evidence Act provides that: “when any judgment of any court or any other judicial or official proceedings or any contract, or any grant or other deposition of property has been reduced to the form of a document or series of documents, no evidence may be given of such judgment or proceedings or of the terms of such contract, grant or disposition of property except of its contents in cases in which secondary evidence is admissible under this Act, no may the contents of any such document be contradicted, altered, added to or varied by oral evidence.†On issue two, the respondent’s counsel submitted that the termination of appointment of the claimant was not based on any misconduct or negligence, that the respondent terminated the claimant’s appointment in accordance with the terms laid down in its condition of service, citing FAKUADE v. OAU (Supra). To counsel, it is not the duty of the respondent to show that it has terminated the appointment of the claimant in compliance with its laws, rules and regulations, referring to the case of OBU v. NNPC [2003] 2 WLRNC (pt. 7) 1 at 7 para 9 where the Supreme Court held thus: “A servant who complains that this employment has been wrongfully brought to an end must find claim on the contract of service and show in what manner the wrong was done. He must plead and prove the contract of service which is the bedrock of his case. It is not the duty of the employer as defendant to prove that the termination was not wrongful.†Learned counsel submitted further that in this case, the claimant has failed, refused and or neglected to exhibit the condition of service of the respondent to show where the respondent erred. And so this court should not go into voyage of discovery to discover extrinsic matters or make a case for the claimant. That the claimant will win or lose his case on the strength of his case and not on the weakness of the respondent’s case. On allegation of misconduct being echoed by the claimant, the respondent’s counsel contended that the claimant agreed under cross examination that the proceedings of the Appointment and Promotions Committee was documented and so it is the duty of the claimant to prove same by producing a certified copy of such proceedings, but that there is no such document before the court. That being the case counsel argued that this court cannot therefore rely on oral evidence to prove the allegation or existence of any misconduct proceedings against the claimant. And that being the case counsel submitted that the only tangible and cogent facts to be relied upon by this court is the fact that the claimant’s employment was terminated for no reason other than for services no longer needed. That the termination of the appointment of the claimant was not based on any misconduct or negligence, that the said termination was in accordance with his letter of appointment i.e. exhibit ‘A’. Learned counsel therefore argued that since the claimant’s appointment was not terminated or dispensed with for any misconduct or indiscipline or as a result of any query, Section 12 (1) (now Section 17 (1) of the Federal Polytechnic Act) will not apply. That the issue of misconduct is not and has not being the reason why the respondent terminated the claimant’s appointment, as the issue was finally settled by Exhibit ‘F’ which is a letter of advice from the claimant’s head of department, which letter advised the claimant to desist from further act that will distort any of the school programmes or activities. To counsel, a mere invitation to appear before Senior Staff Appointment and Promotion Committee is not a conclusive evidence that indeed the claimant had appeared before that committee. That it is only the production of a certified True Copy of the proceedings of such committee and the verdict or decision taken that can be tendered before this court to prove such allegation, referring the court to LARMIE v. DATA PROCESSING LTD (Supra) at p. 322. The respondent’s counsel also urged this court to expunge paragraphs 11 and 12 of the claimant’s deposition as it offends Section 115 (2) of the Evidence Act 2011. On issue three, the respondent’s counsel submitted that it was the Federal Ministry of Education which approved the termination of the claimant because in the absence of the Governing Council, the Federal Ministry of Education can take over the functions of the council. That it is the respondent’s averment that the Governing Council of the respondent having been appointed in August 2000 for a period of three years, was dissolved before the claimant’s issue came up, and at that point in time, there was no Governing Council in place so the matter was referred to the Federal Ministry by virtue of Section 4 of the Federal Polytechnic Act. That these averments of the respondent have not been denied or challenged by way of reply to the statement of defence and it is trite law that since it is unchallenged, it is deemed admitted, citing the case of Muhammadu Buhari v. INEC & 4 Ors [2009] 4 EPR p. 623 at 677. On issue four, the respondent’s counsel submitted that considering paragraph 17 of the claimant’s statement of claim, this court cannot grant any of the reliefs sought by the claimant considering the fact that no scintilla of evidence has been adduced to prove such allegation. On the claim of salaries and allowances, the position of the law is that salaries and allowances are special damages which must be specifically headed and proved, citing the case of Udegbunam v. FCDA [2003] WLRCN (pt. 6) p.1 at ratio 4. That the claimant failed to show how much is his salaries, what are his allowances e.t.c. That under cross-examination the claimant admitted that the salaries and allowances were reviewed. And that it is not the duty of this court to find out how much is the claimant salaries or allowances. Learned counsel further submitted that Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F, G and H tendered in support of the claimant’s case were merely dumped and will not have any probative value in law or in fact as no oral evidence was adduced to explain their purport. That in the absence of such, the said documents goes to no issue, he cited the case of Chief Ayogu Eze v. Brig. Gen. JOJ Okoloagu [2010] 3 NWLR (pt. 1180) 183 at 211. Learned counsel therefore submitted that the claimant does not have right in law to claim as per paragraphs 17, a, b, c and d of his statement of claim but that the remedy available to his is the claim for damages but not otherwise. Concluding his submission, the respondent’s counsel summarized his argument to the effect that the claimant has failed to show or prove that the respondent terminated his appointment based on misconduct, that Section 4 of the Federal Polytechnic Act gives the Federal Ministry of Education in the absence of the council unfettered right to perform the functions of the council, that the exhibits tendered before this court by the claimant, Exhibit ‘H’ did not state anything other than “Services no longer needed,†that the claimant failed to file a reply to the averment of the respondent that the Federal Ministry of Education approved the termination of the claimant’s appointment in the absence of the council which amounts to a tacit admission by the claimant. The respondent’s counsel finally urged this court to dismiss this action in its entirety as being frivolous, vexatious, gold digging and a journey on a fluoric of discovery which has no basis in law whatsoever. The claimant on the other hand in his final address dated and filed on 10th September, 2012 also raised four issues for determination of this court and these are: (1) Whether the employment of the claimant has statutory flavor. (2) Whether the respondent complied with the procedure in Section 17 (1) of the Federal Polytechnic Act together with the tenets of natural justice in removing and/or disciplining the claimant. (3) Whether the court can grant the reliefs (a – d) in the claimant’s statement of claim. (4) Whether the burden of proving the existence or non existence of a fact rest squarely on the claimant? On issue one, the claimant’s counsel submitted that an employment is said to have statutory flavour when the appointment is protected by statute or laid down regulations made pursuant to the provisions of a statute to govern the procedure for employment and discipline of an employee and any other employment outside that category is governed by the terms under which parties agreed to be master and servant citing the case of CBN v. IGWILO [2007] 14 NWLR pt. 1054, 393 at 396, PC IMOLOAME v. WAEC [1992] 9 NWLR (PT. 265) 303 and IDONIDOYE – OBU v. NNPC [2003] 2 NWLR (pt. 805) at 632 – 633 which highlighted two fundamental ingredients which must coexist before a contract of employment can be said to have statutory flavour – (a) The employer must be a body set up by statute. (b) The establishing statute must make express provisions regulating the employment of the staff of the category of the employee concerned especially in matters of discipline. Learned counsel submitted that as regards (a) above, the respondent is the Federal Polytechnic Bauchi and it is created by Section 1 and first schedule to the Federal Polytechnic Bauchi Act Cap. F17 LFN 2004 and therefore a body set up by statute. That in view of (b) above it is not in doubt that the claimant was an employee of the respondent and also that he was issued a query in the course of performing his academic duty of carrying his examination paper late to the exam hall before his service was unjustly terminated by the respondent on 19th February, 2004. That these facts are contained in paragraphs 1 to 5 of the claimant’s statement of claim and the respondent admitted that the claimant was its employee and was issued with query in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the respondent’s statement of defence respectively. That it is trite law that facts admitted need not be proved, and referred to CBN v. DINNEH [2010] 17 NWLR (pt. 1221) 125 at 162 paras C – D. Counsel also submitted that the claimant’s appointment as an Academic Staff was provided for in Section 7 (3) of the Federal Polytechnics Act Cap. 139 LFN 1990 and as a Senior Staff is also provided for in Section 13 (2) (a) of the Federal Polytechnics Act and in accordance with paragraph 3 (3) (2) (a) of the second schedule to the Act, referring the court to Exhibit B which is the confirmation letter. That the Federal Polytechnic Act in its wisdom made provisions for the removal and discipline of an academic staff which the claimant is, citing Section 17 (1) of the Federal Polytechnic Act. To counsel this is the only Section that talks about the removal and discipline of an Academic Staff and that this in itself is very vital and cannot be circumvented by contract of service, referring to the case of Jibril v. Mil. Admin [2002] 3 NWLR (pt. 1021) at p. 364. Learned counsel equally argued that in the light and spirit of the case of CBN v. Igwilo and Idonidoye – Obu v. NNPC (Supra) together with Sections 13 (2) (a) and 17 (1) of the Federal Polytechnic Act, counsel urged this court to hold that the employment of the claimant has statutory flavour and resolve this issue in favour of the claimant. On issue two, claimant’s counsel submitted that the respondent did not comply with Section 17 (1) of the Federal Polytechnics Act neither did it comply with the rules of natural justice. To counsel it is an established fact that the claimant’s employment has statutory flavour and therefore the decisions in the cases of Olufeagba v. Abdul – Rasheed [2009] (incomplete citation) and Council of Federal Polytechnic Mubi v. Yusuf [1998] 55 LRCN 2855 applies. Learned counsel further argued that a careful perusal of Exhibit ‘H’ reveals that the claimant was treated as a temporary employee of the respondent and that it is the duty of the respondent to put before this court any document which will show that the claimant’s employment was lawfully terminated. That there is nothing before the court to show that the claimant’s service was terminated in compliance with the rules of natural justice as enshrined in Section 36 (1) of the 1999 Constitution as amended. Counsel referred the court to the case of Haruna Awwal Chinade v. Nigerian Railway Corporation, unreported Suit No. NIC/ABJ/81/2011, the judgment of this court delivered on July 23, 2012. Also that in NITEL PLC v. AWALA [2004] 1 NLLR (pt. 1) 82 it was held that an employer has an unquestionable right, once it has observed its own rules for the determination of the appointment of their staff to so determine it. That in determining its employee’s appointment, the employer must comply with rules of Natural Justice, citing Federal Civil Service Commission v. Laoye [1989] 4SC (pt. 11) at 160. Learned counsel also submitted that the claimant’s employment is one that has statutory flavour and therefore his termination must be in line with the statutory provisions and so the claimant’s employment can only be terminated in the manner provided under 17 of the statute establishing the respondent having regards to the enabling law in force. The claimant’s counsel also submitted that the claimant was offered a temporary appointment vide a letter dated 6th June, 1991 and that all the conditions contained in the said appointment letter especially in paragraph 3 (a), (b), (c) and (d) all refer to a staff on temporary appointment only. Furthermore that the claimant’s service was confirmed by the respondent vide a letter of confirmation dated 7/11/1995 and that by the confirmation the claimant is entitled to all rights and privileges of a confirmed member of staff of the institution as contained in the condition of service which is in the statute and other conditions made pursuant of the statute. The claimant’s counsel also reproduced the provisions of Section 17 (3) of the Federal Polytechnics Act 2004 and argued that it is clear from Exhibit ‘H’ i.e. the letter of termination that the above provision which regulates the service of the claimant was not complied with and the claimant being a statutorily protected employee of the respondent, his employment can only be terminated as provided in the Federal Polytechnic Act. To counsel, there is no evidence before this court to show that the Minister of Education or Federal Ministry of Education actually investigated and/or approved the termination of the claimant and there is nothing in the said letter of termination to infer that it was issued in compliance with Section 17 (1) of the Federal Polytechnics Act and the tenets of natural justice. Learned counsel also reproduced the contents of letter terminating the claimant’s appointment and argued that the said letter was not issued by the appropriate authority which is the council. To counsel, by the provisions of Section 3 (1) of the Federal Polytechnics Act, the Governing Council is a body corporate with perpetual succession therefore the claim by the respondent that there was no council is a misnomer notwithstanding the erroneous belief of the respondent’s counsel. That the Senior Staff Appointments and Promotions Committee and the Federal Ministry of Education ought not to have been made to usurp the powers of the council. That there is no provision for delegation of the council’s power of removal and discipline in the Federal Polytechnics Act. Learned counsel also referred the court to the case of council of Federal Polytechnic v. Yusuf [1998] 55 LRCN, p. 2865, the Supreme Court held that: “In all the Institutions set up by statute, it is incumbent, that statutory provisions be adhered to when it comes to removal of its officers from office because the Institution owe their existence to their statutes and must abide by the statutory provisions governing term, removal from office is not impossible once the statutory provisions governing term, removal from office is not impossible once the statutory provisions are adhered to in carrying out the exercise.†Learned counsel on this issue urged the court to hold that the principle of natural justice together with Section 17 has not been complied with and resolve the issue in favour of the claimant. On issue three, the claimant’s counsel argued that the termination is unlawful having breached statutory provisions. That since the allegation of misconduct or service no longer required was not brought to the notice of the claimant by the council and the claimant was not given opportunity to appear in person before the council and the council did not direct the issuance of the letter of termination to the claimant, there have been absolute non-compliance with Section 17 (1) of the Federal Polytechnics Act, 2004. To counsel, one cannot put something on nothing and expect it to stand, that exhibit ‘H’ should not be looked at alone but conjunctively with Section 17 of the Federal Polytechnics Act and other documents tendered by the claimant because this would help the court to reach a just conclusion the allegations against the claimant was allegedly investigated by a committee that does not have the mandate to do so, let alone its recommendation being up held by the Federal Ministry of Education who is also not regarded in the Federal Polytechnics Act. In response to the respondent’s argument in its issue four, the claimant submitted that it is trite law that evidence cannot be led to prove reliefs but pleadings. On the issue of salary, the claimant submitted that it is not in doubt that he was an employee of the respondent. He referred to the case of CBN v. Igwillo [2007] 14 NWLR (pt. 1054) 393 at 422 where the Supreme Court held that “where an employee’s service is protected by statute and his employment is wrongfully terminated, he would be entitled to re-instatement in his office and in addition damages….†Also, that in Olufeagba v. Abdul-Raheem (Supra) the Supreme Court held that an employee with statutory flavour and whose employment was illegally terminated is entitled to re-instatement even if he had secured other employment during the pendency of the case. The case of Omidiora v. F.C.S.C [2007] 14 NWLR (pt. 1053) 17 p. 31 was also cited by the claimant. On the issue of dumping exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F, G and H on this court without leading evidence, the claimant responded that once a document is tendered and admitted before the court, no oral evidence can be led to add or alter the content. That these documents were tendered and admitted without objection and by the rule of this court, documents alone can constitute evidence without calling a witness. On issue four raised by the claimant, learned counsel argued that the burden of proof in civil proceedings preponderates. That it does not stay in one place or rest squarely on the claimant, citing Nsejik v. Muna [2007] 10 NWLR (pt. 1043) p. 506. That the respondent did not adduce any remarkable evidence to substantiate its position and so the claimant has proved its case as required of him by law. Concluding, the claimant summarized his submissions and urged the court to grant him the reliefs as prayed. There was no reply on points of law. After a careful consideration of the facts of this case as presented by the parties, the processes and documents filed and the authorities along with the written addresses, in my considered opinion, only two issues call for determination by this court. These are: (1) Whether the employment of the claimant has statutory flavour and if so whether the respondent can dispense with the services of the claimant in the manner it did. (2) Whether the Federal Ministry of Education could approve the termination of the claimant instead of the council of the respondent. Regarding the 1st issue, the argument of the claimant is that he was not accorded fair hearing before his appointment was terminated, that having been accused of misconduct, the procedure for his removal and discipline as provided by the Federal Polytechnic Act was not complied with. To the respondent however, the appointment of the claimant was not terminated based on any grounds of misconduct, but because his services were no longer needed. In my considered view even though the claimant and the respondent held different views as regards the reason for the termination of the claimant’s appointment, it is the defence put forward by the respondent that will be evaluated to see whether it avails the respondent. This is because having terminated the employment of the claimant, it is now the duty of the respondent, in an action such as this to defend its action. Like I said, the respondent’s position is that it terminated the employment of the claimant for services no longer required, this means that the respondent terminated the claimant’s appointment at will. The claimant on his part had argued that his employment being one with statutory flavor, i.e. one made pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Polytechnic Act, Cap. F17 LFN 2004 the procedure for his removal cannot be circumvented. In order to determine whether the claimant’s employment is one with statutory flavor, we have to take a look at the relevant law guiding the employment. From the records, the claimant has been a Lecturer in the Department of Accountancy, of the respondent having risen to the position of Lecturer 1. The respondent is a Federal Polytechnic established pursuant to the Federal Polytechnics Act Cap. F17 LFN 2004. On the appointment of senior staff, Section 13 (1) provides as follows: The council may appoint such other persons to be employees of the Polytechnics as the council may determine to assist the Rector and the principal officers of the Polytechnic in the performance of their functions under this Act. (2) The power to appoint all other employees of the Polytechnic staff shall be exercised – (a) In the case of senior employees, by the council on the recommendation of the Appointment and Promotions Committee set up under the provisions of paragraph 3 (2) (a) of the second schedule to this Act. Also Section 1 of the Federal Polytechnics Act 2004 provides for the establishment of the respondent as follows: “There are hereby established the Federal Polytechnics specified in the first schedule to this Act, (hereinafter in this Act severally referred to as the Polytechnic) which shall have such powers and exercise such functions as are specified in this Act.†And Section 3 (1) of the same Act provides as follows: “There shall be established for each Polytechnic a Council (hereinafter in this Act referred to as (the Council) which shall be a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal and may sue and be sued in its corporate name.†Evaluating the above provisions, I am of the considered view that the claimant’s appointment is one with statutory flavor. More so the claimant is a senior academic of the rank of Lecturer 1 and has been a Lecturer for more than Ten years. Having found that the claimant’s appointment is with statutory flavor, the question is, can the respondent terminate such appointment at will or the way it likes? This question has arisen because the defence of the respondent as the reason for the said termination is that his services are no longer needed, without more. In other words, since the claimant’s appointment is with statutory flavour, can the respondent just decide to terminate it just like that without reason? To put in another way was the employment of the claimant held at the pleasure of the respondent so as to terminate it at will? I do not think so. This is because the claimant being a senior academic is by law a member of the Public Service whose tenure is subject to the relevant statutes or regulations and not subject to the whims and caprices of any person or authority. In NEPA v. ANGO [2001] 15 NWLR (pt. 737) 627 at 631, it was held that an employer whose employee’s appointment has statutory flavor has no right to terminate his appointment at will because the employee does not hold his appointment at the pleasure of such employer. See also Ogiera v. Igbinedion [2005] All FWLR (pt. 260) p. 85. An employment is said to have a statutory flavor when the appointment has been protected by statute. An employment is protected by statute when statutory provisions govern the appointment and termination of the said employment. See Ogiera v. Igbinedion [2005] All FWLR (pt. 260) 99 – 100, Olufeagba v. Abdul-Raheem [2009] MJSC, 164, Oloruntoba-Oju v. Abdulraheem [2009] All FWLR (pt. 325) 141. Also in NEPA v. ANGO (Supra) the Court of Appeal on the need to protect employment with statutory flavor had this to say:- “Employees who are members of the Public Service should have their tenure jealously guarded and all rules, regulations and procedural provisions appertaining to them meticulously followed. Their position therefore is not that of mere master and servant relationship. It is a position recognized as having statutory flavor. To remove a public servant in flagrant contravention of the rules governing him, whether under contract or under provisions of a statute or regulations made there under is to act capriciously and to destabilize the security of tenure of the public servant, frustrate his hopes and aspirations and thereby act in a manner inimical to order good government and well being of the society.†Similarly in NBTE v. Anyanwu [2005] All FWLR pt. 256 p. 1266, the Court of Appeal again held that: “An employer of an employee whose appointment has statutory flavor has no right to terminate his appointment at will because the employee does not hold the appointment at the pleasure of such an employer. To determine the appointment, the employer has a duty to comply with the condition precedent laid down in the conditions of employment failing which such termination will be held to be ineffectual or invalid.†As regards the claimant, the Federal Polytechnics Act has made provisions for the appointment and removal of a senior academic staff such as the claimant. Section 17 of the Federal Polytechnics Act 2004 provides as follows: “17 (1) If it appears to the Council that there are reasons for believing that any person employed as a member of the academic, administrative or technical staff of the Polytechnic, other than the Rector, should be removed from office on grounds of misconduct or inability to perform the functions of his office, the council shall – (a) give notice of those reasons to the person in question; (b) afford him an opportunity of making representations in person on the matter to the council; and (c) if he or any three members of the council so request within the period of one month beginning with the date of the notice, make arrangements – (i) if he is an academic staff, for a joint committee of the council and the Academic Board to investigate the matter and to report on it to the council, or (ii) for a committee of the council to investigate the matter, where it relates to any other member of staff of the Polytechnic and to report on it to the council, and (iii) for the person in question to be afforded an opportunity of appearing before and being heard by the investigating committee with respect to the matter. The law also provides that if the council, after considering the report of the investigating committee, is satisfied that the person in question should be removed as aforesaid, the council may so remove him by an instrument in writing signed on the directions of the council. In all of these provisions, there is nothing to indicate that an academic staff of any Polytechnic the respondent inclusive can be removed due to service no longer required, that is to say removal for no reason. I therefore hold that the claimant being an academic staff of the respondent, his employment has statutory flavor, and so in removing the claimant from service, the respondent did not follow the required procedure prescribed for his removal by the Federal Polytechnics Act. Instead the respondent chose to terminate the claimant due to service no longer needed. I do not think that the claimant belongs to the category of employees whose employment could be terminated at will as was done in this case. I therefore hold that it is an unfair labour practice for the respondent to terminate the claimant’s employment in this manner and without reason especially that his employment has statutory flavour. This is more so that the claimant has been an academic staff with the respondent for more than 10 years. Therefore the unilateral termination of the employment of the claimant with statutory flavour did not in law terminate the employment. See Ogiera v. Igbinedion (Supra), NEPA v. ANGO, (Supra). I therefore find and hold that the termination of the claimant was null and void. On the issue of whether the Federal Ministry of Education instead of the Council of the respondent could approve the termination of the claimant appointment as argued by the respondent’s counsel, I do not think so. The respondent’s counsel has argued that due to the non-constitution of the Council of the respondent, the power to approve the termination of the claimant, a senior academic fell on the Federal Ministry of Education. This much was evident in the letter conveying the claimant’s termination of appointment. The respondent did not exhibit the law that gave such powers to the Federal Ministry of Education instead or in lieu of Council. I have searched through the entire provisions of the Federal Polytechnic Act 2004, I could not come across any provision of the Act which gave such powers to the Federal Ministry of Education as canvassed by the respondent’s counsel. The entire provisions of Section 17 of the Federal Polytechnic Act which makes comprehensive provisions for discipline of senior staff of Polytechnic did not have any such provision which empowers the Federal Ministry of Education instead of the council to exercise disciplinary powers of termination or dismissal of senior staff of the respondent. I am therefore unable to agree with the submissions of the respondent in that regard. In the absence of any law empowering the Federal Ministry and Education to exercise disciplinary powers over senior academic of the respondent, I find and hold that the termination of the appointment of the claimant by the Federal Ministry of Education instead of the council is illegal, null and void and of no effect. Having earlier held that the employment of the claimant is one with statutory flavor and is one that cannot be terminated without reason or as the respondent put it for services no longer needed, I hereby set aside the termination of the claimant’s appointment. This is because having made a finding that the termination of the claimant is null and void, there is therefore no termination in the eyes of the law. What the respondent did is a nullity. See N.I.I.A v. Ayanfalu [2006] All FWLR pt. 325 at 157, Imoloame v. WAEC [1992] 9 NWLR (pt 265) 303, UTC v. Nwokoniku [1993] 3 NWLR (pt. 281) 295. The case of the claimant therefore succeeds. For the avoidance of doubt, I hereby hold and order as follows: (1) The termination of the claimant’s appointment is hereby set aside. (2) The claimant is to be reinstated to his position with immediate effect. (3) The claimant is to be paid all his salaries and allowances from the date of termination to date. The respondent is to pay N50,000 cost. Judgment is entered accordingly. …………………………………… Hon. Justice J. T. Agbadu Fishim Judge