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The claimant filed a complaint against the defendant on the 2nd April 2012. By an amended statement of facts dated 5th October 2012, the claimant claimed as follows: (i) A declaration that by virtue of clause 3.3 of the terms and conditions of employment of Intercontinental Bank Plc which regulated the claimant’s employment with the bank, the claimant is not indebted to Intercontinental Bank Plc in respect of outstanding balance (if any) due on the staff share loans granted to the claimant during his employment with the Bank and as such the defendant is not entitled to claim and receive same from the claimant. (ii) A refund of the sum N7,620,249.00 (Seven Million, Six Hundred and Twenty Thousand, Two Hundred and Forty Nine Naira) being the total sum payable by Intercontinental Bank Plc to the claimant as refundable deductions made from claimant’s salaries and emoluments towards the repayment of his staff share loan(s) and which formed part of the liabilities inherited by the defendant as a result of its merger and acquisition of the assets and liabilities of Intercontinental Bank Plc. The claimant also claim interest on the said sum at the rate of 21% per annum from April 2010 until judgement and thereafter at the rate of 21% per annum until liquidation in favour of the claimant. (iii) The sum of N27,335,805.78 being part of the liabilities acquired by the defendant from Intercontinental Bank Plc for unlawfully withholding the Claimant’s 596,982 units of Intercontinental Bank Shares purchased with his pre-merger gratuities paid in 2007 and which shares would have fetched him the sum of N27,335,805.78 when its price was at its peak on 20th May 2008. The claimant also claim interest on the said sum at the rate of 21% per annum from June 2008 until judgement and thereafter at the rate of 21% per annum until liquidation in favour of the claimant. (iv) A declaration that the defendant has failed to substantive claimant’s outstanding debt (if any) on the staff mortgage loan granted to him by Intercontinental Bank Plc during his employment with the Bank. The claimant is also entitled to the release of the title document of his property at Block 3, House 8B, Howson-Wright Estate Oregun-Ikeja Lagos State deposited and pledged as collateral for the staff mortgage loan granted to him by the Bank. (v) An order directing the defendant to release to the claimant the title document of his property at Block 3, House 8B, Howson-Wright Estate Oregun-Ikeja Lagos State deposited and pledged as collateral for the staff mortgage loan granted to the claimant by Intercontinental Bank Plc. The defendant entered a conditional appearance on the 13th July 2012 and filed a notice of preliminary objection dated 9th October 2012. The notice of preliminary objection is brought pursuant to Order 11 Rule 1 of the NIC Rules 2007, section 254C(1) (k) of the 1999 Constitution as amended and under the inherent jurisdiction of the court. The preliminary objection is praying for the following: 1. An order striking out the claimant’s suit and all originating processes served on the defendant/applicant herein. 2. And such further order(s) as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances of this case. The grounds of the objection are as follows: 1. The claimant retired from the defunct Intercontinental Bank Plc on the 3rd of December 2009 and was paid all his entitlements. 2. The claimant is contesting the adequacy or otherwise of his entitlements nor the validity or otherwise of his retirement from the defunct Intercontinental Bank Plc. 3. The staff handbook of the defunct Intercontinental Bank Plc is explicit with regards to the various loans available to its staff that as soon as the contract of employment is terminated for any reason whatsoever, the loans becomes due and repayable and failure to repay same by the debtor within the stipulated period, the said loan shall attract the applicable commercial interest on the loan. In other words, the loan falls into the category of the bank’s commercial loan granted/taken by a customer of the bank. 4. Having validly retired his appointment with the defunct Intercontinental Bank Plc and having received his entitlements, the defendant is no longer a staff of Intercontinental Bank and cannot also be seen as an ex-staff of the defendant. 5. The relationship that exists between the claimant and the defendant in relation to the loans and debts owed the defendant by the claimant is at best a banker/customer relationship which this honourable court does not have jurisdiction to hear and determine. 6. Some of the issues raised also revolve around acquisition and sale of shares, which is an exclusive preserve of the Investment and Securities Tribunal as envisaged under the Investment and Securities Tribunal Act, LFN 2004. The preliminary objection is supported by a 17 paragraph affidavit sworn to by Ifeoma Peters to which are attached 2 exhibits and a written address dated 9th October 2012. The claimant did not file a counter affidavit but filed a written address dated 20th November 2012 in opposition. The learned SAN replied orally on point of law and both counsel adopted their written addresses. The learned SAN framed two issues for the determination of the court as follows: 1. “Whether the National Industrial Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate and determine matters relating to loan transactions with respect to its jurisdiction as highlighted in section 254(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (3rd Alteration) Act.” 2. “Whether the claimant/respondent by the statement of facts before this Honourable Court has disclosed any reasonable cause of action against the defendant/applicant.” He submitted that one of the conditions under which a court can exercise jurisdiction is when the subject matter is within its jurisdiction and there is no feature in the case that prevents the court from exercising it citing Madukolu v Nkemdilim [1962] 1 ANLR 587, SkenConsult v Ukey [1981] 1 S.C.6, Umanah v Attah [2006] 17 NWLR (Pt 1009) 503.. He further submitted that the court only needs to consider the statement of facts in trying to ascertain its jurisdiction. He argued that the subject matter of this suit is a loan which the claimant obtained from the defendants predecessor in title while he was in the Banks employment and does not relate to his condition of service or unjust termination of employment. He argued that it is a settled principle of law that a dispute arising from a relationship between a bank and its customer is regarded as purely contractual and is governed by the common law of contract which the State High Courts have jurisdiction to hear and determine. He cited Unity Bank Plc v Chief S.U. Nwadike & Anor [2008] LPELR-CA/B/85/2003, NDIC v Okem Enterprises Ltd [2004] 10 NWLR (Pt 880) 107, Associated Discount House Ltd v A.T. Ltd [2006] 10 NWLR (Pt. 989) 635. The learned SAN referred to claims (ii) and (iii) and submitted that the Investment and Securities Tribunal (1st) established under section 274 of Investment and Securities Act (ISA) 2007 has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all issues and disputes arising from dealing in shares and the capital market referring to section 284(1) (a) ISA 2007 and urged the court to decline jurisdiction and hold that the Investment and Securities Act (ISA) 2007 has jurisdiction to hear and determine this claim. It was the submission of the learned SAN that jurisdiction to hear and determine suits relating to loans and commercial transactions are not within the scope of section 254C(1) of the 1999 Constitution as amended. He argued that the issue of jurisdiction is fundamental and an objection to it ought to be taken at the earliest opportunity citing Magaji v Matari [2000] 5 SC 46 at 55, Popoola Elabanjo v Dawodu [2006] All FWLR (Pt 328) 604 at 646, Oloriode v Oyebi [1984] 1 SCNLR 390, Oloba v Akereja [1988] 3 NWLR (Pt 84) 508, Kotoye v Saraki [1994] 7 NWLR (Pt 357) 414 at 453, Izenkwe v Nnadozie [1953] WACA 361, Petrojessica Enterprises v Leventis Tech. Company Ltd [1992] 5 NWLR (Pt 244) 675. He submitted that based on the provisions of section 254C(1) of the 1999 Constitution as amended, this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this matter and he urged the court to strike it out. On issue two, he referred to the case of Rhein Mass under section GMBH v Rivway Lines Ltd. (1998) 5 NWLR (Pt. 649) and Mrs O. Adekoya v F.H.A. (2000) 1 NWLR (Pt. 652) Pg 216 for the definition of cause of action and submitted that it is the wrongful act of the defendant that determines when a cause of action arises. He also referred to the case of P.W. Udoh Trading Co. Ltd v Ebere (2001) 11 NWLR (Pt. 732) 114 at 129 and Niger Perkun Industries Ltd v Niger Shoes Ltd (1998) SNWLR (Pt. 93) 138 and Ibrahim v Osim (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt. 45) and submitted that it is the act of the defendant which gives the plaintiff the cause to complain. That for a cause of action to arise against a party in this court, the claim must fall within the provisions of section (254)C of the 1999 Constitution (Third Alteration) Act, 2010 and section 7 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006. He finally submitted that the claimant has not made out any cause of action against the defendant. He prayed the court to strike out this suit with costs of N1,000.00. Learned counsel to the claimant began by submitting that the only process the court needs to consider in determining jurisdiction is the claimants originating process which in this instance is the complaint and the statement of facts. He cited Federal Govt of Nigeria v Oshiomhole [2004] 3 NWLR (Pt 860) 305, A-G Federation v Guardian Newspapers Ltd [1999] 9 NWLR (Pt 618) 187@ 233, A-G Kwara State v Olawale [1993]1 NWLR (Pt 272) 645 @ 674-675. He submitted that the only process the court needs to consider in determining whether there is a reasonable cause of action in a matter is the statement of facts citing Adesokan v Adegorolu [1993] 3 NWLR (Pt 179) 293 @ 305-306. It was his submission that an applicant that applies to have a case dismissed or struck out for lack of reasonable cause of action would be deemed to have admitted all facts contained in the statement of facts citing Henry Steven Engr. Ltd v Yakubu Nig Ltd [2009] 5-6 SC (Pt 1) 60. He submitted that the affidavit in support of the Preliminary objection is not recognisable in law as it is not required for the purpose of determining the issue of jurisdiction and urged the court to so hold. He submitted that issue No 1 formulated by the defendant/objector is wrong and the proper issue ought to be “whether the National Industrial Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine matters relating to loans and transactions in shares (capital market transaction), but whether this Honourable Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the claimant’s suit having regard to the amended statement of facts and the provision of section 254C (1) (k) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Third Alteration Act) 2010”. Regarding the defendant’s issue No 2, he submitted that there is no ground in the notice of preliminary objection which specifically states that the statement of facts did not disclose a reasonable cause of action. He argued that the relationship between grounds of an application and issues for determination is similar to the grounds of appeal and issues for determination in an appeal. He submitted that the issue for determination must relate to the grounds of appeal or else, it is unarguable, incompetent and must be struck out citing Garba v The State [2000] 6 NWLR (Pt 661) 378 @ 386. He submitted that issue No 2 is incompetent and must be struck out. Learned counsel then formulated two issues for determination as follows: 1. Whether this Honourable Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain claimant’s suit having regard to the amended statement of fact and the provision of section 245 (1) (k) of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Third Alteration Act) 2010. 2. Whether the amended statement of fact of the claimant disclose no reasonable cause of action. He argued that the dispute which necessitated the filing of claimant’s claim No 1 arose from the letter of demand for payment written by the defendant to the claimant while claim No 2 is ancillary to claim No 1. He submitted that both claims fall within the jurisdiction conferred on this court by section 254C (1) (k) of the 1999 Constitution as amended. He argued that the shares represents the claimant’s pre-merger gratuity and that the claimants case is not about the acquisition and sales of those shares but the unlawful withholding of the shares which has resulted in loss of value. He submitted that this claim is within the jurisdiction of this court. It was his contention that in interpreting section 254C (1) (k), the word “any other entitlement” is meant to accommodate other types of entitlement that are not specifically mentioned. On issue No 2, learned counsel referred to Thomas v Olufosoye [1986] 1 NWLR (Pt 18) 67, Read v Brown [1888] 22 QBD 128, Cooke v Gill [1873] LR 8 LP 107, Letank v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 222 at 242, for the definition of a reasonable cause of action. He submitted that the defendant is deemed to have admitted all the facts pleaded by the claimant and therefore deemed to have admitted paragraph 9 (i) and (ii) of the amended statement of facts which discloses a reasonable cause of action against the defendant. He submitted that the notice of preliminary objection lacks merit and that it should be dismissed with costs. Replying on point of law and on the necessity to file an affidavit in support of a preliminary objection, the learned SAN submitted that as this is not a demurrer, affidavit evidence is necessary in order to give the court a holistic view of the case. He cited Boothia Maritime Inc v Fareast Mercantile Co Ltd [2001] 9 NWLR (Pt 719) 572, Nwabueze v Okoye [1988] 4 NWLR (Pt 91) 664, Bello v NBN Ltd [1992] 6 NWLR (Pt 246)206. He submitted that where the principal claim does not confer jurisdiction on the court, the ancillary claim cannot confer jurisdiction citing Cotecna v IMB [2006] 6 MJSC 89 @ 105-108. He urged the court to strike out the suit. Having carefully considered the processes filed and the written submissions of the parties, the issue for determination is whether this court has jurisdiction to entertain the claims of the claimant which has been reproduced above. I will begin with the preliminary issue raised by learned counsel that the affidavit filed in support of this objection is not required. There is no mandatory requirement under the Rules of this court for a preliminary objection to be accompanied by an affidavit but if the objection is in the form of a motion on notice, it must be supported by an affidavit. A preliminary objection need not be supported by an affidavit as long as enough material is placed before the court. See ANPP v INEC [2005] All FWLR 971. A notice of preliminary objection without an affidavit in support is suited for matters of law only and could be appropriate where only the statement of claim and complaint are before the court. An affidavit is not a prerequisite to the raising of a preliminary objection on point of law such as in this instance because there is sufficient material before the court. See Bello v NBN Ltd [1992] 6 NWLR (Pt 246) 206, African Reinsurance Corp v J.D.P Construction Nig Ltd [2003] FWLR (Pt 176) 667. It is trite law that it is the claim of the claimant which determines the jurisdiction of the court. The court only needs to consider the complaint and the statement of facts. See A-G Anambra v A-G Federation [1993] 6 NWLR (Pt 302) 692, A-G Federation v Oshiomhole [2004] 3 NWLR (Pt 860) 305. The jurisdiction of this court is today and in the main governed by section 254C (1) (a- l), (2), (3), (4) & (5) of the 1999 Constitution as amended. I will for the purpose of this ruling reproduce section 254C (1) (a) & (k) as follows: (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 251, 257, 272 and anything contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the National Industrial court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters- (a) Relating to or connected with any labour, employment, trade unions, industrial relations and matters arising from the workplace, the conditions of service, including health, safety, welfare of labour, employee, worker and matters incidental thereto or connected therewith; (k) relating to or connected with disputes arising from payment or non-payment of salaries, wages, pensions, gratuities, allowances, benefits, and any other entitlement of any employee, worker, political or public office holder, judicial officer, or any civil or public servant in any part of the Federation and matters incidental thereto. A careful look at the claimant’s claims before the court shows claim 1 is in respect of an outstanding balance due on staff share loans granted the claimant while he was in the employment of Intercontinental Bank, the defendant’s predecessor in title. Claim 2 is in respect of deductions made from the claimant’s salary towards repayment of his loans, while claim 3 is in respect of the withholding of the claimant’s shares purchased with his pre-merger gratuity. While claims 4 & 5 are in respect of the release of his title deeds he pledged as collateral for the staff mortgage loan. A look at the statement of facts reveals that the averments are not related to or connected with his employment or any dispute arising from payment or non payment of his salary, pension, gratuity, allowances, benefits or other entitlements as an employee of the defendant’s predecessor in title. The averments in the claimant’s statement of facts are in respect of the loans he was given while in employment and his alleged indebtedness. I find that the reference to terms and conditions of employment at Intercontinental Bank Plc and the hand book in paragraph 10 of the statement of facts is merely an attempt to enable the claimant bring this action within the ambit of the jurisdiction of this court. This court is not empowered to entertain suits relating to loan transactions. The law is settled that where the principal claim does not confer jurisdiction, the ancillary cannot. See Cotecna International Ltd v Ivory Merchant Bank Ltd [2006] 4 SC (Pt i) 9. The claims of the claimant do not come within the jurisdiction conferred on this court by section 254C (1) (a) to (l) of the 1999 Constitution as amended. I therefore decline jurisdiction to entertain this matter and as such, it is unnecessary to rule on whether or not the statement of facts has disclosed a reasonable cause of action. This suit is struck out for want of jurisdiction. Costs of N10,000 is awarded in favour of the defendant. Ruling is entered. ..……………………..…………….. Hon. Justice O. A. Obaseki-Osaghae