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The claimant filed this complaint against the defendants on the 8th June 2012 seeking the following reliefs: 1. A declaration that the letter of dismissal with Reference Number RL/EFM/P.386 dated the 12th of October, 2011 and signed by F.T. Ale (Mrs.) for the General Manager of the defendant purporting to dismiss the claimant from the employment of defendant is ultra vires, null and void and of no effect whatsoever. 2. A declaration that the allegation of extortion of money contained in the letter of dismissal with Reference Number RL/EFM/P.386 dated the 12th of October, 2011 and signed by F.T. Ale (Mrs.) on behalf of the General Manager of the defendant purporting to dismiss the claimant from the employment of defendant is an allegation of crime which only a court of law vested with criminal jurisdiction can determine. 3. A declaration that the conduct of the Investigative Panel chaired Mr L.A. Lawal which investigated the allegation of extortion against the claimant was in violation of section 36 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 4. A declaration that the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Lawal Investigative Panel that investigated allegation of extortion of money against the claimant are unreasonable, irregular, and/or acted in bad faith, and/or ultra vires null and void and of no effect. 5. An order quashing the indictments of the claimant by the Investigating Panel chaired by Mr L.A. Lawal which investigated the allegation of extortion of money against the claimant. 6. An order quashing the letter of dismissal and reinstating the claimant to his post as the Assistant Producer 1 of the defendant. 7. An order compelling the defendant to pay the claimant his salaries and other entitlements from the date of the wrongful termination of his employment till the date of reinstatement and thereafter. Accompanying the complaint is the statement of facts, names of witness and copies of documents to be relied on. The defendants entered appearance filed their statement of defence, list of witnesses, copies of documents to be relied on and a motion on notice on the 22nd November 2012. The motion on notice is brought pursuant to section 2(a) CAP P.26 of the Public Officers Protection Law of Lagos State 2003 and under the inherent jurisdiction of the court. It is praying for the following orders: 1. An order of court striking out this suit. 2. And for such other or further order as this Honourable court may deem fit to make in the circumstances. The application is brought upon the following grounds: (a) By virtue of S.2(a) Cap P.26 Public Officers (Protection) Law of Lagos State 2003, any action filed against Public Officers shall not be brought after the expiration of three months from the date on which the cause of action accured. The motion is supported by a five paragraph affidavit sworn to by Tejumade Olota State Counsel and a written address dated 21st November 2012. In opposition, the claimant filed a nine paragraph counter affidavit on the 7th January 2013 sworn to by Hammed Adeleke a litigation officer and a written address in support. The defendants filed a reply dated 10th January 2013. Learned counsel to defendants submitted one issue for determination as follows: Whether this action is statute barred by virtue of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law CAP P.26 Laws of Lagos State 2003. She submitted that this action is caught by the provisions of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law which is a Statute of Limitation and as such the action is time barred. She stated that the cause of action arose on the 12th October 2011 and this action was filed on the 8th June 2012 which is outside the three months statutory period. She argued that the effect of the Public Officers Protection Law is to remove the right of action, the right of enforcement and the right to judicial relief from a claimant; leaving him with a bare and empty cause of action which he cannot enforce if instituted outside the three months period allowed by law. She cited Ibrahim v JSC [1998] 14 NWLR (Pt 584) 1 at 31-32, Araka v Ejeagwu [2000] 12 SC (Pt 1) 99 at 122-123, Egbe v Adefarasin [1985] 1 NWLR (Pt 3) 549, F.R.I.N. v Gold [2007] 4 FWLR 7097 at 7118, W.A.P.C. Plc v Adeyeri [2003] 12 NWLR (Pt 835) 517, Kasanbudu v Ultimate Petroleum Ltd [2008] 3 FWLR 4335. She then urged the court to strike out the suit. Learned counsel to the claimant raised two issues for determination as follows: 1. Whether it is proper for the claimant to commence a fresh suit at the National Industrial Court outside the prescribe period, on the failure of the first action filed by the said claimant at the State High Court within the said prescribed period. 2. If the answer to the first issue is in the affirmative, whether the provision of the Limitation Laws of Lagos State (section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection) Law of Lagos State) will apply. He stated that the first action wrongly filed at the Lagos State High court was within time but was discontinued by the new counsel engaged by the claimant who realised that the State High Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the matter. He argued that the mistake of counsel should not be visited on the innocent claimant who showed reasonable diligence in prosecuting this matter citing Ahmadu v Ngeri [2009] Vol. 23 WRN 149, Iroegbu v Okwordu [1990]6 NWLR (Pt 150) 643, Akanbi v Alao [1989] 3 NWLR (Pt108) SC 118. He referred to Sasegbon’s Laws of Nigeria, 1st Edition vol. 15, Page 600 paragraph 2070 to 2072 for the Philosophy behind the Statues of Limitation. He argued that the Limitation period could be postponed where fraud, concealment or honest mistake can be established citing Administrators/Executors of the Estate of Abacha v Eke Spiff [2009] 7 NWLR (PT 1139) 97 at 118/119. It was the contention of counsel that the claimant is entitled to be given the opportunity to be heard in the interest of justice as it is constitutional right by virtue of section 36 of the 1999 Constitution as amended. He argued that the matter filed at the State High Court which was discontinued and struck out was non-suited; and as such the claimant can file a fresh action against the defendant as if non had been filed before or as if time did not run citing Okpala v Iheme [1989] 2 NWLR (Pt 102) 208. He referred to the book Limitation of Action (Statutory & Equitable Principles) Volume 1 by Jerry Amadi, pages 330-341 with the heading ‘Failure of First Action within time, whether claimant can file another Action outside time’. He submitted that the institution of this suit is proper, not statute barred and that the court has jurisdiction to entertain the action. Replying on point of law, learned counsel to the defendants submitted that where the law provides for the bringing of an action within a prescribed period, proceedings shall not be brought outside the time citing Obi v Okoye [1985] 1 NWLR (Pt 3) 549. She submitted that the law is settled that once the period of Limitation commences, it is not broken by any subsequent accruing disability, as the time begins to run from the moment the cause of action arises. She cited R.C.C. (Nig) Ltd v Buratto [1993] 8 NWLR (Pt 312) 508 at 573, Shell Petroleum Development Company v Farah [1995] 3 NWLR (Pt 382) 148 at 185. She submitted that the action is incompetent and urged the court to strike it out. Having considered the processes filed, submissions of counsel and the authorities cited, the issue for determination is whether the mistake of counsel in filing the earlier action at the Lagos State High Court can be used as a basis to discontinue the pending action without a fresh action being caught up by the Limitation. Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law, CAP P26 Laws of Lagos State 2003 provides as follows: 2. Actions against public officers. Where any action, prosecution, or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Law or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such Law, duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect- Limitation of time (a) The action, prosecution, or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof: Provided that if the action, prosecution or proceeding be at the instance of any person for cause arising which such person was a convict prisoner, it may be commenced within three months after the discharge of such person from prison. The cause of action arose on the 12th October 2011. This action was filed on 8th June 2012 which is 5 months outside the prescribed period. A cause of action is said to be statute barred if in respect of its proceedings it cannot be brought because the period laid down by the limitation law has elapsed. See Egbe v Adefarasin [1987] 1 NWLR (Pt 47) 1 at 20, Udoh Trading Co. Ltd v Abere [2001] 11 NWLR (Pt 723)114. The Third Alteration Act 2010 which commenced from 4th March 2011 gives this court exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of this suit. The earlier action in the Lagos State High Court was filed on the 13th December 2011 which is about 9 months after the commencement. It is a well known fact and principle that ignorance of the law is no excuse. Having made this mistake of filing in the wrong court, recourse should have been to section 24(3) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 which provides a remedy as follows: (3) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any enactment or law, no cause or matter shall be struck out by the Federal High Court or the high Court of a state or of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja on the ground that such cause or matter was not brought in the appropriate court in which it ought to have been brought, and the court before whom such cause or matter is brought may cause such cause or matter to be transferred to the appropriate Judicial Division of the Court in accordance with such rules of court as may be in force in that High Court or made under any enactment or law empowering the making of rules of court generally which enactment or law shall by virtue of this subsection be deemed also to include the power to make rules of court for the purposes of this subsection This provision has been interpreted by the Court of Appeal in Echelunkwo John O & 90 Others v Igbo-Etiti Local Government Area Appeal No. CA/E/261/2011 delivered on 10th December 2012 and its purpose succinctly stated per John Inyang Okoro J.C.A. at pages 8 & 12 of the Judgement as follows: It appears to me as was also observed by learned counsel to both parties in this appeal, that section 24(3) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 is divided into two parts. The first part states clearly and unequivocally that notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any enactment or law, no cause or matter SHALL be struck out by the Federal High Court or the High Court of a State of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja on the ground that such cause or matter was not brought in the appropriate court in which it ought to have been brought. The clear and ordinary meaning of this first part is to save all suits filed in the Federal State and Federal Capital Territory High Courts which ordinarily ought to have been filed at the National Industrial Court…………………………………… Before I end this judgement, I wish to observe and agree with learned counsel for the Appellant that section 24(3) of the National Industrial Act, 2006 was not made for the fun of it. It has a purpose to serve. Following the enactment of the Constitution (third alteration) Act, 2010 which gave exclusive jurisdiction to the National Industrial Court on Labour matters, both State and Federal High Courts including that of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja ceased to have jurisdiction in those matters pending before them. If they are struck out and there is need to file them afresh, some of them may be caught by statute of limitation and the plaintiffs in such situation, without no fault of theirs, would suffer grave injustice. It became necessary to make such provisions as section 24(3) of the National Industrial Court Act in order to preserve such suits and be transferred to the National Industrial Court for proper adjudication. The effect of not applying for an order of transfer of the pending suit at the Lagos State High Court to this court is that this action is caught by the Limitation. The defendants who fall within the meaning of Public Officers are protected by section 2(a) of the Act as this action was commenced outside the three months period prescribed. I therefore hold that this action is statute barred. It is hereby dismissed. I make no order as to costs as provided by section 2(b) of the Act because the defendants have incurred no costs in filing its processes. Ruling is entered accordingly. ____________________________ Hon Justice O.A.Obaseki-Osaghae