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The Claimant brought this action by way of a Complaint dated and filed on the 31st day of October 2011 claiming the following reliefs against the Defendants jointly and severally: a. Arrears of monthly salary at N512, 884.84 per month from March 2010 to May 2011 - N7, 693, 272.60K b. Severance allowance - N4,011.675.00K c. A declaration that the Claimant is entitled to retain his official vehicle (Toyota Lexus Jeep LX 570) upon the deduction of an agreed sum of N2,000,000 from his severance allowance entitlement at the expiration of the tenure of 4 years for which he was elected. d. An Order restraining the Defendants, their agents, Servants and/or Privies from using force or any other means to recover the Claimant’s official vehicle (Toyota Lexus Jeep LX 570) which is in the Claimant’s possession. The Complaint was accompanied with a Statement of Facts in which all above stated reliefs were endorsed, and copies of documents to be relied upon at trial, and list of witnesses. The defendants filed a preliminary objection which was heard and determined and a considered ruling delivered on 23rd of April, 2012 in which it was dismissed. The Defendants entered appearance and filed their joint statement of defence and its accompanying process with leave of court granted on 18th June 2012. Thereafter the Claimant amended his Statement of facts finally on 9th of October 2012 in which the following reliefs were sought against the defendants jointly and severally by the Claimant: a. A declaration that the act of the 1st Defendant in preventing the claimant from sitting after the suspension placed on him by the 1st Defendant on the 22/02/2010 expired on the 24/02/2010 due to the operation of the law is unlawful. b. A declaration that the claimant is entitled to arrears of his monthly salary and monthly overheads from March 2010-May 2011, furniture allowance and severance allowance due to him as a member of the 1st Defendant from June 2007-May 2011 as damages for the 1st Defendant from June 2007-May 2011 as damages for the 1st Defendant aforesaid unlawful act. c. Arrears of monthly salary at N512, 884.84 per month from March 2010 to May 2011 - N7, 693, 272.60K d. Furniture Allowance - N4,011.675 e. Severance Allowance -N4, 011.675 f. Monthly overhead at N700,000.00 per month from March 2010 to May 2011 = N10,500,000.00. g. A declaration that the Claimant is entitled to retain his official vehicle (Toyota Lexus Jeep LX 570) with Chasis No. JTJ YHOOW 89023545, Engine No. 3 UR-0356441 and Registration No. Abuja, CL 822 RBC upon the deduction of an agreed sum of N2,000,000.00 from his severance allowance at the expiration of the tenure of 4 years for which he was elected. h. An Order restraining the Defendants, their agents, Servants and/or Privies from using force or any other means to recover the Claimant’s official vehicle (Toyota Lexus Jeep LX 570) which is in the Claimant’s possession. The Claimant further filed additional copies of documents to be relied upon at trial and a written statement on oath of himself as witness. The Defendants equally amended their joint statement of Defence and filed additional copies of documents to be relied upon at trial as well as an additional witness in the matter. The matter went into full trial and the Claimant called one witness while the defendants called two witnesses and exhibits A, B, C, C1, C2, C3, D, E, F, G, H, J, K, L, M, N, O and P were tendered and admitted by the Court. The learned counsel for the parties filed final addresses. The final written address of the defendants’ counsel is dated 26th day of July 2012 but filed on 27th of July 2012. The Claimant counsel’s reply final address is dated and filed on 16th August 2012. Thereafter the Defendants counsel filed a reply on points of law dated 8th day of October, 2012 but filed on 9th day of October, 2012. Learned counsel adopted their respective addresses. In his written address, the learned counsel for the Defendants formulated issues for the determination of the Court. The first issue is whether the lifting of the Claimant’s suspension on 20/12/2010 was done in accordance to(sic) the law? Learned counsel submitted that the suspension of the Claimant and the lifting of same was carried out in accordance with the provision of the Law and counsel referred to the Votes and proceedings of Monday, 22nd February, 2010. That from the above stated document, it would be observed that there was a petition before the House signed by 16 Honourable Members in respect of the impeachment of Mr. Speaker (Claimant) and the Deputy Speaker, there was a fracas in the House, sitting was disturbed and offensive weapons were used on members causing them to disperse. Furthermore, the 1st Defendant reconvened at 12.35 pm to constitute a 3 member AD HOC Committee to investigate the matter and the report submitted indicted the Claimant, Hon. Zakawanu Garuba and some other members and that the Claimant amongst others is standing trial in a criminal case with charge No. B/94C/10 in the High Court of Justice, Edo State of Nigeria. Counsel submitted that the Claimant’s suspension did not lapse on 24/02/2010 but rather on 20/12/2010. He referred the court to the Votes and proceedings of the 1st Defendant on 20/12/2010. That Section 103 (1) of the 1999 Constitutionempowers the 1st Defendant to appoint a committee. The said S.103(1) states as follows:- A House of Assembly may appoint a committee of its members for any special or general purpose as in its opinion would be better regulated and managed by means of such a committee, and may by resolution, regulation or otherwise as it thinks fit delegate any functions exercisable by it to any such committee. Counsel continued that by the procedure whereby Public officers are placed on suspension or told to keep off from their places of duty while an investigation into their stewardship is being carried out is an accepted and recognized practice. The Claimant was suspended based on a petition signed by some members of the 1st Defendant on the allegation of misapplication of the funds of the 1st Defendant. That his suspension was carried out and a committee was set up to look into the matter and reference was made to S.103 of the 1999 Constitution. Counsel also referred to the case of Speaker K.S.H.A. VS. Adegbe (2010) 10 N.W.L.R. Pg. 45 at 50 and 51 Ratio 2, 4, 5, pg. 73 paragraph B — F; and the case of El-Rufai Vs. House of Representatives (2003) F.W.L.R. (Pt. 173) Pg. 1652 at 1700 where the learned Justices stated thus: The powers granted to the legislature under the 1999 Constitution to make Laws for the peace, order, and good government of the Federation are very wide and extraneous and there is no doubt that in the exercise of such powers the legislature can conduct inquiries and investigate to fully inform itself. Learned counsel then argued therefore that it is not correct to state that the Claimant’s suspension lapsed on 24/02/2010 but rather on 20/12/2010. The 1st Defendant acted in accordance with the constitution and needed time to investigate all the allegations raised in the Notice of Impeachment served on the Claimant. Counsel further submitted that at no time was the Claimant prevented from entering the 1st Defendant’s premises. That on the issue of the security men on duty on 13th April, 2012, Mr. Clement Ederefo in his Written Statement on Oath deposed in paragraph 5 of his Statement “That the Claimant was never at the premises of the 1st Defendant on 13th of April, 2012 or any other date.” That even after the suspension Order was lifted the Claimant choose to sleep at home. Counsel then submitted that it is unreasonable for someone who tells you to come to prevent you from entering. It means that the case of the Defence who testified that he never resumed should be taken and accepted, counsel added. Furthermore, Counsel submitted that the burden of proof has shifted back to the Claimant as he stated that he was prevented from entering the 1st defendant’s premises. The defendants on the other hand having called evidence to show that the Claimant was not prevented the burden of proof has shifted to the Claimant and he has failed to discharge same by adducing any evidence to prove otherwise or by puncturing the evidence of the defendants witness. Counsel referred to the case of Orji Vs. D.T.M. (Nig) Ltd. (2009) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1173) p.467 at p.493 — 494 paras G-C, 505 paras F-H ratio 12. In addition, counsel continued, during cross examination, when the Claimant was asked the meaning of “to successfully complete his tenure” he stated that it means when his seat was not declared vacant. To counsel, this cannot be the meaning of to successfully complete one’s tenure as to successfully complete a tenure means to disengage honourably without blemish and this was not the case of the Claimant. Furthermore, counsel continued, during the period when the Claimant was on suspension his seat was not declared vacant because he was still on suspension however, the seats of other members who choose to act in solidarity with Claimant and stay away from sittings in the House were declared vacant. He referred to the Votes and Proceedings of the Edo State House of Assembly, Tuesday 31st May 2011. That also, the seat of the other members who failed to attend sittings were declared vacant because they failed to sit for the required number of days prescribed by the Constitution.He referred to S.104 of the 1999 Constitution. Counsel then submitted that the duties of the Sergeant-at-Arms are clearly stated in the Rules of the Edo State House of Assembly as amended and counsel referred the court to Rule II. He argued that the Sergeant-at-Arms did not prevent the Claimant from gaining access to the 1st Defendant’s premises as Claimant stayed away from the day he was suspended 22/2/2010 till the end of his tenure on 4/6/2011. Counsel also stated that the Claimant did not call the Sergeant-At-Arms as a witness and he submitted that S. 167(d) of the Evidence Act 2011 (as Amended) should be invoked in favour of the Defence. He submitted further that the Claimant admitted during cross examination that he did not challenge his purported prevention (even though not conceding as he was never at the 1st Defendant’s premises) in any court of law and neither did he report this anywhere. Counsel urged the court to hold that the lifting of the Claimant’s suspension on 20/12/10 was done in accordance to (sic) the law. On the second issue, which is whether the Claimant is entitled to the sum claimed as overhead, counsel stated that it is correct to state that the Claimant who was not attending sittings is not entitled to overhead. That overhead is money used in running day to day expenses in an office. The question is which office the Claimant was running from 22/2/2010 to 4/6/2011? That claimant stated during cross examination that he was running an office in his constituency. However, according to counsel, he did not state these facts in his pleadings nor lead evidence to show names of his workers, their vouchers, (and) address where the said office was situate. Counsel then submitted that evidence adduced in respect of fact not pleaded or contrary to the fact pleaded goes to no issue. He referred to the authority of the case of AtandaVs. Ajani (1989) 3 N.W.L.R. (Pt. III) 511. That the issue of overhead is a special damage that requires strict proof. This the claimant also failed to prove. According to counsel the Clerk of the 1st Defendant was not cross examined on all this. This monthly over head was money given by the 1st Defendant as running cost for the Claimant’s office as a member of the 1st Defendant. Secondly, the Claimant who did not resume sitting is not entitled to this. It is not an entitlement nor part of his remuneration. He has no right to this under the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and fiscal commission for political office holder Abuja 2007. The third issue is whether the Claimant is entitled to the Toyota Lexus Jeep LX 570 claimed? Learned Defendants’ counsel submitted that the Claimant failed to tender any written agreement between him and the 1st Defendant. The Clerk of the 1st Defendant was not even cross examined as regards this. It is therefore not correct to state that the Claimant is entitled to the Toyota Lexus Jeep LX 570 subject to the deduction of the sum of N2,000,000.00 (2m) from his severance allowance. That the word agreement/understanding cannot be deduced from a copy of the letter written to the Claimant by the 1st Defendant through the 2nd Defendant. Counsel referred the court to paragraphs 22 and 23 of the Written Statement on oath of EgbeEvbuornwan, Clerk of the 1st Defendant dated and filed on 15/3/2012. Counsel submitted that the Claimant is not entitled to take home his official vehicle Toyota Lexus Jeep LX 570 and he relied on Vol. II of 2007 Edo State Reviewed Remuneration Package for Legislature and Revenue Mobilization Allocation and fiscal Commission, Abuja. This statute did not provide that Claimant is to go home with his official Car. On the issue of severance allowance, counsel stated that the law on severance allowances is very clear as to who is entitled. That the law says that the affected officer will enjoy this after the successful completion of each tenure. That is, the affected officer would have disengaged honourably, and he referred to Revenue Mobilization Allocation and fiscal Commission, Abuja. Counsel submitted that even though the Claimant has served more than 2 years before his impeachment and suspension he is not entitled to severance allowance for the following reasons:- (1) The Claimant is standing trial in a criminal matter in the Edo State High Court of Justice Benin City. The Court is referred to the charge sheet. (2) He has not successfully completed his tenure. (3) He did not disengage honourably. To counsel, flowing from the above, the claimant cannot be said to have successfully completed his tenure as he was disengaged dishonourably. He was given an opportunity by the 1st Defendant to purge himself of his disgraceful act on the floor of the proceedings but he refused to do so. The Claimant cannot be heard to complain about the consequences of his willful acts or omissions. On the effect of an employee abandoning his Job, counsel referred to the case of Jeremiah Vs. Ziregbe (1996) 7 N.W.L.R. (Pt 460) p.346 at p.348, R2. Continuing, counsel stated that another issue for consideration is whether the Claimant is entitled to Salaries having not resumed sitting after his suspension was lifted by the Defendant i.e., the claim for arrears of salary. He submitted that the Claimant who was suspended by the 1st Defendant on 22/2/2010 is not entitled to arrears of salaries from 22/2/2010 till 20/12/2010 when the suspension order was lifted. He referred the Court to the provisions of Section 32(2) of the Legislative Houses (Powers and Privileges) Laws Cap 87 Laws of the Defunct Bendel State 1976 Vol. IV which specifically apply to Legislators. It states as follows:- “No salary or allowance payable to a member of the House for his service as such shall be paid in respect of any period during which he is suspended from the service of the House under the provisions of this Section”. In view of the above the Claimant is not entitled to any salary or allowance for the period in which he was suspended from the Edo State House of Assembly. On the issue of Claimant’s salaries from 20/12/2010 till May 2011, when the tenure of the 1st Defendant ended, counsel submitted that the Claimant did not resume sittings after the suspension Order was lifted by the Defendant. The suspension Order was lifted on 20/12/2010, he refused to resume to perform his legislative duties. Salaries are wages paid for work done. During cross examination, the Claimant admitted that he did not resume work from 20th December, 2010 till 4th June, 2011 when the tenure of the 1st Defendant ended. Therefore the Claimant is not entitled to the arrears of monthly Salaries he claimed which is N7,693,272.60k. That the Claimant chose to abandon his Job. On the effect of an employee abandoning his Job, counsel referred to the case of Jeremiah Vs. Ziregbe (Supra). That an employee who abandons his job is deemed to have committed a major breach of contract of employment. Such a breach is so fundamental that the employer is entitled to treat the contract as having been duly terminated. The Claimant failed to lead evidence as to the actual date he first reported in the 1st Defendant’s premises after the suspension order was lifted. Failure to do is very vital to his case. That it is not correct to state that the Claimant’s suspension Order ought to be lifted by the next sitting of the 1st Defendant. S.103 (l) of 1999 Constitution empowers the 1st Defendant to set up a committee to investigate all the allegations against the Claimant. There was need for sufficient time to enable proper investigation as in the case of the claimant. In conclusion, Counsel submitted that the Claimant is not entitled to the Arrears of salaries, severance allowance of N4,011,675.00, monthly overhead and the Toyota Lexus Jeep LX 570. That this case should be dismissed as the Claimant has failed to prove his case on preponderance of evidence. In his own final address, learned Claimant’s counsel formulated the following issues for the determination of the Court: 1. Whether the suspension placed on the Claimant on the 22/2/2010 by the 1st Defendant expired by operation of the law on the 24/2/2010? 2. Whether it was lawful for the 1st Defendant to continue to prevent the Claimant from sitting between 24/2/2010 and 31/5/2011 when the 1stDefendant held its last sitting? 3. Whether the Claimant is entitled to his salaries and allowances and other remuneration due to him as a member of the 1st Defendant for the period he was unlawfully prevented from sitting? 4. Whether the Claimant is entitled to retain his Lexus Jeep official Car subject to deduction of the agreed sum of N2,000,000.00 (Two Million Naira) deducted from his severance allowance. On the first issue, which is whether the suspension placed on the Claimant on 22/2/2010 by the 1stDefendant expired by operation of law on 24/2/2010, counsel submitted that the suspension placed on the Claimant by the 1stDefendant effectively expired on 24/2/2010. The extant law regulating the conduct and procedure of the Defendant is Legislative Houses (Power and Privileges) Law CAP 87 Laws of Bendel State 1976 and now applicable to Edo State. It is the aforesaid law that empowered the Defendant to discipline any of its members by way of suspension and it is under the said law that the 1st Defendant derived the power to suspend the Claimant in this case. The said law also provided for the duration which such suspension can remain. The 1st Defendant took advantage of the said provision of the law to suspend the Claimant but ignored the provision of the same law that provided for when the suspension lapses. The relevant section of the law is reproduced herein under: “31. (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, the punishment which may be imposed by the House for an offence under this part shall be the administration by the President or the Speaker of a reprimand at the Bar of the House or removal from the precints of the House or both. (2)In the case of an offence committed by member of the House, the House may, in addition to or instead of any punishment specified in subsection (1) of this section, order his suspension from the service of the House for such period as it may determine: Provided that such period shall not extend beyond the last day of the meeting next following that in which the order is passed, or of the session in which the order is passed, whichever shall first occur. (3) In the case of an offence committed by a person who is not a member, the House may in addition to the punishment specified in subsection (1) of this section, order that such person shall be prohibited from entering the House or its precints for a period not exceeding six months. 32. (1) A member of the House who has been suspended from the service of the House shall not enter or remain within the Chamber or precints of the House while such suspension remains in force, and, if any member is found within the Chamber or precints of the House in contravention of this section, he may be forcibly removed there from by any officer of the House and no proceedings shall lie in any court against such officer in respect of such period. (2)No salary or allowance payable to a member of the House for his service as such shall be paid in respect of any period during which he is suspended from the service of the provisions of this section.” Counsel submitted that from the above it is clear that by virtue of the proviso to S. 3I (2), any suspension order placed on a member of the House by the 1st Defendant automatically lapses by the next sitting of the House, or at the end of the session of the House in which the member is suspended, whichever one Occurs first. For emphasis, the proviso is reproduced hereinafter: “Provided that such period shall not extend beyond the last day of the meeting next following that in which, the order was passed, or of the session in which the order is passed, whichever shall first occur”. Counsel continued that there is evidence before the court both oral and documentary by both the Claimant and the Defendants to wit: that the Claimant was suspended by the 1stDefendant on 22/2/2010 and also that the 1st Defendant after the suspension sat on 24/2/2010. The votes and proceedings of the 1st Defendant of 22/2/2010 is Exhibit “C” and that of 24/2/2010 is Exhibit “C1”. Counsel therefore submitted that there is no dispute as to whether or not the 1st Defendant sat on the 24/2/2010 after the suspension of the Claimant. It must be noted that there is uncontroverted evidence that the session of the house in which the claimant was suspended commenced on the 5/6/2009 and ended on the 4/6/2010; See paragraph 12 of the Claimant’s Statement on Oath. The word used in the proviso reproduced above is “Shall”. The use of the word ‘Shall’ is mandatory. It therefore means that any suspension placed on a member of the House must lapse at the next sitting of the House. The Speaker of the House or indeed the House has no option in the matter. A recall of such suspended member by the Speaker or the House is unnecessary. It is also unnecessary for the affected member to go to court to seek a declaration that such suspension has lapsed before he should be admitted back to the House. Interpreting S. 103 (1) (f) of the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria which provides for the vacancy of the seat of a member of the House of Assembly by operation of law, the Supreme Court in the case of M. O. Oloyo V. Alegbe (1962 — 2011) Vol. 1 LLRN, P.337, per KayodeEso JSC held at P.354, Para 40 The word “shall” used in the section must therefore be imperative and not directive. It means ‘must’ and it gives the member who is affected by the provision no choice of decision. In other words, once any of the events happens, such member no longer has any decision to make. His tenure of office have become automatically at an end. It ceases by operation of law and it does not require any further action in the matter. In the case of OloyoVs. Alegbe (Supra) the issue before court was interpretation of S.103 (1) (f) of 1979 Constitution which provided as follows: “A member of the House of Assembly shall vacate his seat in the House if: (a) (b) (c) (d) (f) Without just cause is absent from meetings of the Houseof Assembly for a period amounting in the aggregate tomore than one-third of the total number of days during which the House meet in one year.” The question before the court in the case was Whether the House of Assembly or Any Speaker or any Presiding Officer can tell the member who had absented himself from the meetings of the House that by operation of the provision of S. 103 (1) (f) of the 1979 constitution, the seat of the absentee member has now become vacant, therefore the absentee member is no longer a member of the House, or Whether the House or the Speaker shall take the matter to court before telling the member that he has by his action forfeited the seat. The Supreme Court per KayodeEso JSC held at P.358, Para 5 as follows: “Now, I have already held that where an event has happened whereby the seat of a member of a Legislative House has become vacant, the member has no longer a decision to make in the matter as to whether to quit or not. His seat is already vacant. Equally, it does not admit of any further determination by the Speaker as there is nothing for him to determine. Again the seat having become vacant by operation of law, there is nothing further for anyone to do to make the seat vacant under section 103 (1) of the Constitution.” In the instant case, the Claimant was suspended on 22/2/2010, see Exhibit “C”, and the House sat on 24/2/2010, See Exhibit “C1”. The law that empowers the House to suspend the Claimant also provides that the suspension shall lapse at the next sitting of the House, or at the end of the session of the that year, whichever comes first, and in the instant case, the sitting of the House came up first on 24/2/2010. Learned counsel therefore submitted that the suspension of the Claimant lapsed by operation of law on 24/2/2010. Following the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Oloyo Vv. Alegbe (Supra) neither the 1stDefendant nor the Speaker had any discretion in the matter. The Suspension of the Claimant lapsed automatically. The Claimant need not go to court to seek a declaration that his suspension has lapsed. On issue two which is whether it was lawful for the 1st Defendant to continue to prevent the Claimant from sitting between 24/2/2010 and the 31/5/2011 when the 1st Defendant held its last sitting, counsel submitted that the 1st Defendant has no power to suspend the Claimant beyond the period prescribed by the law that empowered (it) to suspend a member. This is because according to counsel, any suspension of a member of the House beyond the provision of the law is null and void. He submitted that from the foregoing, the Claimant not sitting between 24/2/2010 and 31/5/2011 was due to the act of the Defendant who erroneously believed that his suspension was indefinite. The argument of the Defendants’ Counsel in her final address that the Claimant was never prevented from sitting is baseless. The DW1 also told court under cross examination that there were conditions attached to the lifting of the suspension of the Claimant on the 24/2/2010 and that the Claimant would not have been allowed into the premises of the 1st Defendant without meeting the conditions. He referred to “Exhibit M”.That in the case of Hon. Dino Malaye& 4 Ors Vs. The Speaker, House of Representatives & 2 Ors unreported Suit No: FHC/ABJ/CS/480/2010, the House of Representatives suspended the Plaintiffs in that case from the House indefinitely whereas Order X Rules 5 (4) of the Rules of the House upon which their suspension was based, provides for 14 days suspension. His lordship, Bello J., sitting in the Federal High Court Abuja in declaring the suspension null and void held as follows: With the above as my backdrop and having found that the initial suspension of the Plaintiff beyond 14 days permitted by order X, Rules 5(4,) (Supra,) was done in breach of the rules or in excess of the power granted by the Standing Orders and by extension in breach of the constitution which gives the House power to regulate their own procedure, I hold that the initial suspension of the Plaintiff indefinitely beyond 14 days is clearly wrongful, illegal, null and void. That the act of the Defendant in preventing the Claimant from sitting from the 24/2/2010 becomes clearly illegal and unlawful: The 1st Defendant cannot at the same time claim that the Claimant is not entitled to his salaries and allowances for the period they unlawfully prevented him from sitting on the ground that he did not carry out his legislative duties (i.e. from 24/2/2010 to 31/5/2011). The acts of the 1stDefendant in preventing the Claimant from sitting from 24/2/2010 until the last sitting of the House is clearly unlawful in the above circumstances. On issue three which is whether the Claimant is entitled to his salaries and allowances and other remuneration due to him as a member of the 1st Defendant for the period he was unlawfully prevented from sitting, counsel submitted that the Claimant in the above circumstances is entitled to his salaries and allowances as a member of the 1stDefendant for the period he was unlawfully prevented from sitting. That from the evidence led, both by the Claimant and the Defendants, the Claimant did not voluntarily withdraw from sitting. The Claimant has given ample evidence in his written deposition that he was prevented from entering the premises of the 1st Defendant and that on one occasion, he gained entrance and the Speaker of the House said that he should be removed from the premises. The DWI in apparent corroboration of the evidence of the Claimant told court under cross-examination that any member on suspension is not permitted to enter the premises of the 1st Defendant. ThatS. 32(1) of the Legislative Houses (Power and Privileges) Law Cap. 87 Law of Bendel State of Nigeria now Applicable in Edo State provides as follows:- A member of the House who has been suspended from the service of the House shall not enter or remain within the chamber or precints of the House while such suspension remains in force, and if any such member is found within the chambers or precints of the House in contravention of the section, he may forcibly be removed there from by any officer of the House and no proceeding shall lie in any court against such officer in respect of such removal. Counsel submitted that from the foregoing that the Claimant not sitting within the period i.e. from 24/2/2010 to 31/5/2011 was as a result of the illegal act of the 1stDefendant. In the case of SPDC Nig. Ltd. Vs. Emehuru (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 381) 1694 the CA per DogbanMensen JCA at page 1718 Para “E” while justifying the award of 8 years salary to the Respondent for the period he was unlawfully suspended held as follows: Where an employee is placed on suspension, he is placed on hold, he lives day by day in anticipation of either being recalled or being laid off. He is not at liberty to utilize his time elsewhere as he desires. The above case dealt with a master-servant relationship. In the instant case the Claimant is even more in a precarious condition. The Claimant was elected into the Edo State House of Assembly for a period of 4 years, and within that period he is a Public Officer by virtue of the 5th Schedule of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) Part 2, Item 3, and as a Public Officer he is prohibited from engaging in any other form of employment during the period. He referred to Part 1, Item 2, 5th Schedule of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) which provides as follows: Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing paragraph, a public officer shall not — (a) receive or be paid the emoluments of any public office at the same time as he receives or is paid the emoluments of any other public officer; or (b) except where he is not employed on full time basis, engage or participate in the management or running of any private business, profession or trade. There is also evidence at trial which is (see Claimant’s Statement on Oath) to the effect that within the period he was prevented from sitting, he continued to carry on other duties of his office which include maintaining his Constituency Office and payment of salaries to the staff employed by him in that office. Counsel submitted that if this Honourable Court finds that the suspension of the Claimant by the 1st Defendant from sitting on 22/2/2010 lapsed by operation of law on 24/2/2010, the Claimant is entitled to his salaries and allowances for that period he was unlawfully prevented from sitting and denied salaries and allowances. In the case of Government of Ekiti State Vs. Ojo (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 331) Page 1298, pursuant to Ekiti State Local Government Service Commission Law (2000), the Respondents were appointed as Chairman and Members of the Local Government Commission of Ekiti State for initial term of 3 years, with effect from 16/12/2002. On the 2/12/2003 the 1st Appellant dissolved the Commission. Consequently the Respondents were prevented from entering the premises to perform their duties. The Respondents consequently instituted an action claiming reinstatement or in the alternative payment of their total remuneration due to them up till and including 15/12/2005 when their tenure would have expired, the Court of Appeal per Abdullahi JCA at Page 1325 justifying the grant of a1ternatve relief for total remuneration due to the Respondents for the period they would have been in office held as follows: In the case of IgbeVs. Government of Bendel State (1993)I SCLR page 73 where, as in this case Chairman andMembers of Civil Service Commission of Bendel State wereremoved from their offices without compliance with statutory provisions, the Supreme court awarded damages in lieu of reinstatement because reinstatement was not appropriate in the circumstance. Again in Contract of Employment with statutory flavour, the court will however grant damages as reliefs where there is evidence of situation and circumstances which make it impossible to order reinstatement. In view of the above I am of the firm view that the trial judge exercised his discretion judicially and judiciously and he should be commended for his judicial sagacity in ordering the Appellant/Respondents to pay the alternative claim of damages instead of reinstatement.” Counsel urged the court to hold in the instant case that the Claimant is entitled to his salaries and allowances from the date he was unlawfully prevented from sitting and denied salaries and allowances by the Defendants. To counsel, it is noteworthy to state that the seat of the Claimant was neither declared vacant nor was any other person elected to replace him. He represented his Constituency until the tenure of the House expired. That if the Court looks clearly at “Exhibit E2 and E3 ”, it would observe that the Claimant (Hon. ZakawanuGaruba) was listed as a member representing EtsakoWest Constituency I. Those whose seats were vacant were so indicated. “Exhibit E2” is the vote and proceedings of the last sitting of the 1stDefendant and “Exhibit E3” is the vote and proceedings of the valedictory session of the 1stDefendant bringing four years for which its members were elected to an end. On issue four, which is whether the Claimant is entitled to retain hisLexus Jeepofficial car subject to deduction of the agreed sum of N2,000,000.00 deducted from his severance allowance, counsel submitted that the Claimant is entitled to retain his Lexus Jeep LX 570 given to him as an official car subject to the deduction of the assessed sum of 2 Million Naira, based on the practice of the 1st Defendant which applied to other members of the House elected at the same time with the Claimant; See Paragraphs 26, 27, and 33 of the Claimant’s Statement on Oath. Learned claimant’s counsel stated that by Paragraph 25 of the Statement on Oath of EgbeEvbuomwan (DW1) he stated that no threat was issued through the 2ndDefendant to the Claimant to retrieve the aforesaid vehicles. That by paragraph 23 of the Statement on Oath of EgbeEvbuomwan he stated that the Claimant was not entitled to the said vehicle because he did not conclude his tenure as a member of the 1st Defendant. He submitted therefore that if this Honourable Court finds that at the end of trial that the Claimant successfully completed his tenure then the prayer sought on the issue of the vehicle should be granted. It is not the case of the Defendants that other members were not entitled to their official cars. RESPONSE TO THE DEFENDANTS’ COUNSEL FINAL ADDRESS 1. The Defendants’ Counsel asserted in his final address that the Claimant is not entitled to overhead allowance because it is not contained in “Exhibit D” (i.e. Reviewed Remuneration Package for Legislature at Federal, States and Local Government Levels Vol. II). Counsel submitted that there is evidence before the court that monthly overhead allowance of N700,000.00 per month is paid by the 1st Defendant, to its elected members. The Claimant received the said allowance from the date he was sworn in i.e. 5/6/2007 till February 2010 when he was purportedly suspended. The 1stDefendant also denied him salary for the period. It is not the case of the Defendants that such allowance was not paid to members by the 1st Defendant. He therefore submitted that the argument of the Counsel to the Defendants that the Claimant is not entitled to the allowance because it is not contained in “Exhibit D” is baseless and goes to no issue. 2. To the claimant’s counsel, the Defendants’ Counsel also made a heavy whether of the fact that during cross examination, the Claimant stated that he was running his Constituency Office and paying the staff employed therein and this fact the Counsel alleged was not pleaded. Counsel submitted that the fact of the Claimant running his Constituency office and paying staff therein during the period of his purported suspension was eloquently pleaded inparagraph 33 (b) of the Further Amended Statement of’ Facts of9thJuly, 2012. 3. OBJECTION TO “EXHIBIT E”. Learned claimant’s counsel submitted that “Exhibit E” is not relevant to this proceeding. It is a purported charge against Claimant dated 3/6/2011. That the Claimant told court under cross examination that he was not aware of the existence of the charge. The 1stDefendant concluded its last sitting for the four years period on the 31/5/2011 and valedictory session signaling the end of the four years was held on the 1/6/2011, See “Exhibit C2 and C3”. “Exhibit E” was purportedly filed on the 3/6/2011 when the period for which the Claimant was elected had lapsed. He submitted therefore that “Exhibit E” is not relevant to this case. It must be noted that it is not the case of the 1st Defendant that the Claimant is not entitled to his claim because he is standing criminal trial. 4.The Counsel to the Defendant submitted that the Claimant is not entitled to severance allowance or gratuity because he did not successfully complete his tenure in the House. He submitted that if this Honourable Court finds that the purported suspension of the Claimant is unlawful, then the Claimant is entitled to his severance allowance in full. Even if the court finds otherwise the Claimant is still entitled because he has spent over 2 years in the House before the purported indefinite suspension; See page 38 Item XXI of Exhibit “D” which provides as follows: “XXI SEVERANCE GRATUITY This allowance shall be maintained at 300% of the annual basic salary, enjoyable after the successful completion of each tenure. That is, the affected officers would have disengaged honourably, by which is meant that cessation of service must not be due to dismissal or termination of appointment due to proven case of impropriety and or related offences. However, ruling out the foregoing excuses for disengagement, any officer who has served a minimum of 2 years of the period of tenure would be deemed due for payment of severance gratuity on a pro-rata basis”. In the instant case, there is no proven case of impropriety and or related offences established against the Claimant before this Honourable Court. Besides the Claimant was sworn in as a member on the 5/6/2007 and was purportedly suspended on the 22/2/2010. Between the 5/6/2007 - 22/2/2010. The Claimant has spent 2 years and 9 months in the House. The learned counsel stated that the court would also observe that at page 4 Paragraph I of Exhibit “C”, the Claimant and others were “suspended indefinitely as they cannot be judge in their own case”. It is certainly not due to proven case of impropriety and or related offences as anticipated by “Exhibit D”. He therefore submitted that the Claimant is entitled to his severance allowance or gratuity. The point has been made earlier that the Claimant represented his Constituency in the House until the end of the period, he was elected. His seat was neither declared vacant nor was anybody elected to replace him. He referred to Roll Call of members on Page I of “Exhibits C2 and C3” respectively. That the DW1, the Clerk of the 1stDefendant under cross examination stated the grounds upon which an elected member of the 1stDefendant can cease to be a member and stated clearly that none of the events happened in the case of the Claimant. In the above circumstances he urged the court to grant the relief sought. 6. OBJECTION TO EXHIBIT “F”. The claimant’s counsel stated that “Exhibit F” is the Rules of the 1st Defendant and the said “Exhibit F” was approved for publication on 10/5/2011 after all the events leading to this case had happened. The Claimant also told court that “Exhibit F” was not Rules applicable to him for the 4 years he was elected. That most importantly, according to counsel, Rules of the 1st Defendant was the first Casualty on the 22/2/2010. Before members of the 1st Defendant proceeded to suspend the Claimant and others, they first suspended the Rules of the House; See paragraph 2 of page 3 of “Exhibit C” (Votes and Proceedings of the 1stDefendant on the 22/2/2010). Same is reproduced hereunder: Motion made and question proposed that the Rules of the House be suspended to enable the House proceed with deliberation: Hon. Ohonbamu Paul (Egor). Debate arising Question put and agreed to resolve in the Affirmative. Thus from the foregoing, counsel submitted, the Rules of the 1st Defendant is irrelevant to this proceeding same having been suspended before the Claimant was suspended. Any reference to the Rules of the 1st Defendant in this proceeding is made in vain. In conclusion, counsel urged this Court to grant all the reliefs sought by theClaimant, the Claimant having proved his case on preponderance of evidence. The Defendants in reply on points of law to the Claimant’s final written address submitted as follows: On the issue of whether the Claimant’s suspension expired by operation of Law on 24/2/2010, counsel submitted that the provision of the Legislative Houses (Power and Privileges) Law Cap 87 Laws of Bendel State 1976 applicable to Edo State, under which the Claimant is hiding to assert that he should have been recalled at the next day of sitting, did not cover a situation where a member of the House of Assembly would be a subject of investigation for a serious offence such as attempted murder. See Exhibit G. (The charge sheet). Furthermore, assuming without conceding that the above stated Legislative Houses (Power and Privileges) Law would avail the Claimant, the Claimant never resumed sitting in the House even when his suspension was lifted. Therefore, according to counsel, the Claimant cannot benefit from his wrong. In addition, the Defendant alleged that the Claimant never resumed sitting and called evidence, one Mr. Clement Ederefo to prove same, the Claimant merely denied the assertion but never discharged that burden of proof. In the adjectival system of law in operation in this country, it is always more often than not, the plaintiff that is required by the law to plead and support what he has pleaded by credible and convincing evidence and that suchevidence should preponderate in civil matters before his claims can be acceded to by the courts. Where he fails to discharge such onus, then his claim must fail flatly. Per MUHAMMAD J.SC in HAMZA V KURE (2010) 10 NWLR PT. 1203, P. 630 at 649 paragraph G — H ratio. 3. See also VEEPEE INDUSTRIES LTD V COCOA INDUSTRIES LTD (2008) 13 NWLR PT 1105 at 486. Thirdly, on the issue of whether the Claimant is entitled to severance allowances, Counsel submitted that there is a difference between severance allowance and damages while severance allowance is the entitlement to a member who has successfully completed his tenure, Damages is compensation to an individual who has suffered. If the Claimant who was never prevented from sitting actually resumed when the suspension was lifted, he would have been entitled to severance allowance. That severance allowance and damages are two different things and one cannot take the place of the other particularly as the claimant did not suffer anything. He did not even run his constituency during the period. Finally, counsel commended the case of OLAGUNJU V ADESOYE (2009) 9 NWLR PT. 1146, 225 at 255 paras. G-H to the court on the issue that no matter how eloquent or beautifully written an address of counsel is couched, it cannot amount to evidence. That the Claimant’s counsel cannot address the court on facts not pleaded or facts on which evidence was not led in court. This Honourable Court is humbly urged to refuse the reliefs sought by the claimant as he has failed to prove his case and adduce evidence sufficient for him to succeed I have carefully considered the processes, arguments and submissions of the parties in this case. The issues for determination in this case are: 1. Whether the Claimant’s suspension on 22nd day of February 2010 terminated by operation of law on 24th of February 2010 or on 20th of December 2010 by the Resolution of the 1st Defendant? 2. Whether or not the Defendants prevented the Claimant from sitting in the House between 24/2/2010 and 31/5/2011 when the 1st Defendant held its last sitting? 3. Whether the Claimant is entitled to his salaries and allowances and other remuneration due to him as a member of the 1st Defendant for any period after the suspension of 22nd of February, 2010 up to the end of the last sitting of the House on 21st of May, 2011? 4. Whether the Claimant is entitled to retain his Toyota Lexus Jeep LX 570 official Car subject to deduction of the agreed sum of 2,000,000.00 (Two Million Naira) deducted from his severance allowance? On the first issue, the case of the claimant is that he was suspended by a Resolution of the 1st Defendant on the 22/02/2010. The defendants in their joint Statement of defence are agreed with the claimant on this. Thus there is no dispute on the suspension itself of 22/02/2010. The point of divergence is on when the said suspension came to an end. Here while the claimant insists that his suspension expired by operation of law in accordance with the provisions of the Legislative Houses (Power and Privileges) Law Cap 87 Laws of Bendel State 1976 applicable to Edo State, the defendants maintain that the suspension of the claimant was only terminated following the Resolution of the 1st Defendant passed on the 20th of December, 2010. The relevant sections of the law are Sections 31 and 32 of the said Legislative Houses (Powers and Privileges) Law as applicable to Edo State are hereby reproduced hereunder: “31. (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, the punishment which may be imposed by the House for an offence under this part shall be the administration by the President or the Speaker of a reprimand at the Bar of the House or removal from the precints of the House or both. (2) In the case of an offence committed by member of the House, the House may, in addition to or instead of any punishment specified in subsection (1) of this section, order his suspension from the service of the House for such period as it may determine: Provided that such period shall not extend beyond the last day of the meeting next following that in which the order is passed, or of the session in which the order is passed, whichever shall first occur. (3) In the case of an offence committed by a person who is not a member, the House may in addition to the punishment specified in subsection (1) of this section, order that such person shall be prohibited from entering the House or its precints for a period not exceeding six months. 32. (1) A member of the House who has been suspended from the service of the House shall not enter or remain within the Chamber or precints of the House while such suspension remains in force, and, if any member is found within the Chamber or precints of the House in contravention of this section, he may be forcibly removed there from by any officer of the House and no proceedings shall lie in any court against such officer in respect of such period. (2)No salary or allowance payable to a member of the House for his service as such shall be paid in respect of any period during which he is suspended from the service of the provisions of this section.” From the proviso to S. 31 (2) cited above, the question is can any suspension order placed on a member of the House by the 1st Defendant automatically lapse by the next sitting of the House, or at the end of the session of the House in which the member is suspended, whichever one Occurs first, as submitted by the learned claimant’s counsel? For emphasis, the proviso is hereby reproduced again: (2) In the case of an offence committed by member of the House, the House may, in addition to or instead of any punishment specified in subsection (1) of this section, order his suspension from the service of the House for such period as it may determine: Provided that such period shall not extend beyond the last day of the meeting next following that in which the order is passed, or of the session in which the order is passed, whichever shall first occur. The answer in my humble view is in the affirmative to the effect that indeed the House of Assembly has the power rightly to suspend a member of the House from the sitting of the House, but then such power has been circumscribed by the said law that gave it such power. Thus while the House of Assembly can suspend a member such suspension is limited to what has been provided in the proviso to the said Section 31(2) of the Legislative Houses (Powers and Privileges) Law of Bendel State, applicable to Edo State and this is clearly stated in the provision to “the last day of the meeting next following that in which the order is passed, or of the session in which the order is passed, whichever shall first occur.” The defendants counsel had argued that the suspension was for an indefinite period and therefore continued to subsist until it was resolved by the House of Assembly, the 1st Defendant, on 20t/12/2010 to lift same. The point here is the inability of the learned counsel to point to any provisions of any law that justified the taking of the step by the 1st Defendant in suspending the claimant indefinitely or lifting same when it deemed fit. The 1st Defendant is bound by the provisions of the law and its actions too must be guided and justified on the basis of the law. Here the decision of my learned brother, Bello, J in the case of Hon. Dino Melaye& 4 Ors Vs. The Speaker, House of Representatives & 2 Ors unreported Suit No: FHC/ABJ/CS/480/2010,in which the court held that theHouse of Representatives had no power to suspend the plaintiffs for more than 14 days in line with the provisions of Order X Rule 5 (4) of the Rules of the House is apposite. Here the decision is of strong persuasive authority to which I entirely agree that a legislative House cannot be said to possess the power to act in breach of its powers and resorting to its whims and caprices by shoving aside the clear and unambiguous provisions of the law in the name of punishing any person whether its member or not. Furthermore, there is evidence before the court that the Claimant was suspended by the 1stDefendant on 22/2/2010 and also that the 1st Defendant after the suspension sat on 24/2/2010. See the votes and proceedings of the 1st Defendant of 22/2/2010, Exhibit “C” and that of 24/2/2010, Exhibit “C1”. Thus there is no dispute as to whether or not the 1st Defendant sat on the 24/2/2010 after the suspension of the Claimant. Also the session of the house in which the claimant was suspended commenced on the 5/6/2009 and ended on the 4/6/2010; See paragraph 12 of the Claimant’s Statement on Oath. These pieces of evidence all go to show that the claimant’s suspension had elapsed by operation of law in accordance with the provisions of Section 31(2) of the Legislative Houses (Powers and Privileges) Law of defunct Bendel State, applicable to Edo State on the 24th day of February, 2010 which was the legislative day next after the suspension and came first before the expiration of the legislative session which came later on 4/6/2010. See the Black’s Law Dictionary, Ninth Edition, page 1201 wherein ‘operation of law’ was defined to mean “the means by which a right or a liability is created for a party regardless of the party’s actual intent”. Thus the 1st issue is hereby resolved in favour of the claimant. On the second issue, which is whether or not the Defendants prevented the claimant from sitting in the House after the 24/2/2010, the date on which his suspension elapsed by force of law, the Claimant stated in his evidence on oath that he was prevented from entering the premises of the 1st Defendant and that on the only day he gained entry onto the Chamber of the 1st Defendant he was ordered to be and was removed from the said Chamber. See paragraphs 15 and 16 of the written statement on oath of CW1 and his evidence under cross examination. However, the Defendant’s witness DW1 gave evidence that the Claimant was never at the premises of the 1st Defendant on 24th April, 2010 or at any other time and so therefore the claimant cannot be said to have been refused entry after the lifting of his suspension from the sittings of the 1st Defendant. I have carefully considered the evidence of both witnesses for the claimant and the defendants on the issue of the prevention of the claimant from gaining entry into and participating in the proceedings of the 1st defendant. I accept the evidence of the claimant that on 24th April, 2010 he went into the Chambers of the 1st Defendant but was ordered removed by the Speaker of the 1stDefendant, ostensibly on the ground that the claimant was still under suspension. I also do not believe the evidence of the defendants on this because putting the said evidence on the scale of justice, it is more likely to tilt in favour of the claimant since both Defendants in this case acted on the belief that the Claimant was rightly on suspension up until the 20th of December, 2010, a position which this court has held not to be the case as the said suspension lapsed by operation of law on 24th day of February, 2010. Thus the Claimant was unlawfully prevented from sitting after his suspension had lapsed by operation of law on 24th of February, 2010. Therefore the claimant has successfully discharged the burden on him and I so hold. See Orji Vs. D.T.M. (Nig.) Ltd. (2009) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1173) p.467; HAMZA V KURE (2010) 10 NWLR PT. 1203, P. 630 at 649 paragraph G — H ratio. 3. and VEEPEE INDUSTRIES LTD V COCOA INDUSTRIES LTD (2008) 13 NWLR PT 1105 at 486. The second issue is therefore hereby resolved in favour of the claimant. On the third issue, which is whether the Claimant is entitled to his salaries and allowances and other remuneration due to him as a member of the 1st Defendant for any period after the suspension of 22nd of February, 2010 up to the end of the last sitting of the House on 21st of May, 2011, the major plank of the defendants argument is that the claimant was not entitled to the said salaries and allowances and other remuneration on the ground that he was on suspension from the 22nd of February 2010 up until the 20th of December 2010 and thereafter he refused to resume sitting on his own volition and thus abandoned his work as a member of the Edo State House of Assembly, the 1st Defendant in this suit. And the legal authority for this, according to the defendants is found in section 32(2) of the Legislative Houses (Powers and Privileges) Law of defunct Bendel State applicable to Edo State and decision in Jeremiah Vs. Ziregbe (1996) 7 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 460) p.346 at p.348, R2. The said Section 32(2) of the Legislative Houses (Powers and Privileges) Law Cap 87 Laws of the Defunct Bendel State 1976 Vol. IV now applicable to Edo State and which specifically applies to members of the legislative House provides that: No salary or allowance payable to a member of the House for his service as such shall be paid in respect of any period during which he is suspended from the service of the House under the provisions of this Section. Learned defendants counsel rightly submitted that the provision is very clear and should be given its clear meaning and application. With this provision the claimant cannot be entitled to any salaries or allowances during the period he was under suspension. However, the question is when was the period of suspension? With the finding and holding of this court that the claimant’s suspension terminated by operation of law on the 24th of February, 2010, it means that the only period he was not entitled for the salary and allowances was the period between the 22nd of February, 2010 and 24th of February, 2010. Thus from the 24th of February, 2010 up to the end of the legislative session on the 31st of May, 2011, the said section 32(2) of the Legislative Houses (Powers and Privileges) Law, Cap 87 Laws of the defunct Bendel State now applicable to Edo State cannot be applied to the claimant to stop him from earning his salary and allowances. So also the submission by the defendants that he had abandoned his work and therefore not entitled to the payment of his salary and allowances on the authority of Jeremiah vs Zeregbe, supra, is not tenable on the finding and holding of the court that the claimant’s suspension expired by operation of law. There is also the issue of the claim for other remuneration such as overhead allowance which is to the tune of N700, 000.00 (Seven hundred thousand naira) monthly which the claimant says he is entitled to. The defendants have sought to dislodge this claim by arguing that since the claimant had been suspended and not attending the sittings of the House, he was not entitled to that allowance and also that the evidence of the claimant in cross examination that he in fact maintained a constituency office was not supported by the pleadings. The defendants equally submitted that the claimant had not led evidence to show names of his workers, their vouchers and address of the where the office was situated. On his own part however, the claimant has given evidence that the said amount of N700,000.00 was given to him monthly as an allowance from his inauguration in June 2007 to February, 2010 when he was suspended. Furthermore, the claimant has pleaded in his further amended statement of facts that he had employed and paid constituency workers. See paragraph 33(b) of the Further Amended Statement of Facts of 9th July 2012. On the issue of overhead allowance, putting the evidence of the claimant on the issue and the submissions of counsel to the parties side by side, I have no difficulty in seeing that the scale of justice tilts in favour of the claimant who has pleaded and given evidence on oath that he indeed maintained a constituency office and paid the staff thereof during the period in question. The argument and submissions of learned counsel for the defendants that the payment had not been proved because no names of the employees of the constituency office had been provided does not hold water because the defendants had not shown that to be the requirement for the payment to a serving member of the House of Assembly of the said overhead allowance. Rather what was pleaded by the defendants in their defence to paragraph 33(b) of the Further Amended Statement of defence of the Claimant was that the claimant was not entitled to the said monthly overhead, along with the arrears of salary and severance allowances, because he did not complete his term in accordance with the law. See paragraph 39 of the Defendants Further Amended Joint Statement of Defence of the 1st, 2nd 3rd Defendants. Thus it is my holding that the said issue is resolved in favour of the Claimant. On the issue of the entitlement of the Claimant to the retention of his Lexus Jeep official car subject to deduction of the agreed sum of N2,000,000.00 deducted from his severance allowance, it is the case of the claimant he is entitled to his official car, subject to the payment of an agreed sum. The Claimant has stated that the agreed sum is two Million Naira (N2,000, 000.00) only. However, the claimant has not put forward any credible evidence on the agreement that led to the entitlement. I find this critical as the claim of the claimant relates to an “agreed” sum of money. The question is where is that agreement or what was the basis of that agreement? No evidence has been put forward by the claimant to prove that there indeed exists an agreement which makes the claimant entitled to the said official car, subject only to the payment of the agreed sum which is to be deducted from the severance allowance of the claimant. The evidence that is before the court which is relevant to this point is contained in exhibits A, B and F. These pieces of evidence have all not shown that there is any such agreement which entitles the Claimant to retain the said official car upon the payment of any agreed sum of money, talk less of having same deducted from the severance allowance of the claimant. Furthermore, exhibit F is the document of the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission, Abuja wherein the reviewed remuneration package for the legislature at the Federal, State and Local Government levels were stated. There is no mention in that exhibit F of the entitlement of the Claimant to an official vehicle subject to the payment of N2,000,000.00 deductible from his severance allowance, and I so find and hold. Accordingly therefore, in the absence of such evidence the claim of the claimant must fail. See Hamza vs Kure (2010) 10 NWLR (PT. 1203) p. 630 at 649 and Veepee Industries Ltd vs Cocoa Industries Ltd (2008) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1105) p. 486. This issue is hereby resolved in favour of the defendants. In the circumstance and for all the reasons given above, the case of the claimant succeeds in part and the Court hereby declares that the Claimant’s suspension by the 1st Defendant on the 22nd of February, 2010 terminated by force of law on the 24th of February, 2010. Consequently therefore, the Court hereby makes the following orders: 1. The Claimant is entitled to his monthly salary, Furniture allowance, Severance allowance and monthly overheads for the period March 2010 to May 2011, the suspension placed on him by the 1st defendant on the 22nd of February, 2010 having lapsed by operation of law on 24th of February, 2010. Accordingly, the claimant shall be served as follows: a. Monthly salary at N512,884.84 per month from March 2010 to May 2011 totaling the sum of N7,693,272.60k b. Furniture allowance of N4,011,675.00k c. Severance allowance of N,011,675.00k d. Overhead allowance of N700,000.00k per Month from March 2010 to May 2011 totaling the sum of N10,500,000.00k 2. The Claimant's reliefs in relation to his Lexus Jeep LX 570 official car with Chassis No JTJ HYOOW 89023545, Engine No. 3UR-0356441 as contained in his Further Amended Statement of Facts are hereby refused. I make no order as to costs. Judgment is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice Auwal Ibrahim Presiding Judge