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The defendants/applicants in this case filed a notice of preliminary objection dated 6th June 2012 on the 11th of June 2012, praying the court for the following orders: 1. Dismissing this action for being incompetent not having been initiated by due process of law being(sic). 2. And for such further order(s) as the Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances. The grounds of the application were stated as follows: 1. The suit is incompetent. 2. The suit is not issued in due compliance with the provision of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act. 3. The suit is an abuse of Court process. 4. This suit is statute barred on the Public Officers Protection Act, Chapter 14, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. The notice of preliminary objection is supported by an affidavit of 15 paragraphs deposed to by one Onukwugha Comfort, a litigation officer in the Ministry of Justice, Owerri. Annexed to the said affidavit are exhibits A and B. There is attached to the notice a written address also dated 6th day of June 2012. The defendants/applicants filed a further affidavit of 5 paragraphs deposed to by one Onukwugha Comfort, a litigation officer in the ministry of Justice, Owerri. Annexed to the further affidavit is exhibit A. a copy of the Originating Summons before the High Court of Justice of Imo State. The Claimant/Respondent on the other hand on 6th of November 2012 filed a counter affidavit of 5 paragraphs deposed to by Mrs Charity Mezieobi, a litigation clerk in the law firm of the claimant’s counsel. Annexed thereto is one exhibit, marked exhibit C1. There is also a written address in support dated 18th day of July 2012 filed along. The Defendants/Applicants also filed a reply on points of law dated 5th of November, 2012 but filed on 10th day of November, 2012. Learned counsel to the parties adopted their respective written addresses on the 28th day of January, 2013. This is the Ruling in respect thereof. I have carefully considered the processes, arguments and submissions of the parties on the preliminary objection of the defendants. The issues that stand out for consideration are: 1. Whether this suit is statute barred or not? 2. Whether the suit is an abuse of court process? On the first issue, once the issue of statute bar is raised the duty of the court is to look at the processes of the claimant and determine whether indeed he has filed his action outside the limitation period set by statute, and if that is so the court must declare same as statute barred and does not have the jurisdiction to hear and determine same. See Adekoya vs Federal Housing Authority (2008) 4 S.C. 167. In the instant case the claimant/respondent stated in her affidavit in support of the originating summons that the defendants/applicants have purportedly retired her through a letter dated 8th June 2011, exhibit L. See paragraphs 14 and 15 of the said affidavit in support of the originating summons. Thus the cause of action against the defendants arose on the said 8th of June 2011. See Egbe vs Adefarasin (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 47) p. 1 at 20. The Claimant/Respondent then filed this suit on the 25th of April, 2012. The question is has the action been filed within the period stipulated in the Public Officers Protection law? The Defendants/Applicants have placed reliance on Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act Cap P41, laws of the Federation, 2004 (LFN 2004). This section has set the time limit within which an aggrieved person must come to court to be three months. In his own response the claimant/respondent’s counsel argued that the said section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act does not apply to the present case. This is because according to him the defendants/applicants are not in the class of persons that could be protected as public officers as they are “public offices” and not persons. He relied on old decisions of Alapiki vs Governor of Rivers State (1991) 8 NWLR (Pt. 211) 575 at 597, Tafida vs Abubakar (1992) 3 NWLR (Pt. 230) 511, Per Katsina Alu JCA, (as he then was). He also referred to and relied on Fakolade vs Police Service Commission (1993) 1 NWLR (Pt. 271) 639 at 644. I have looked closely at the authorities cited by learned claimant/respondent’s counsel and with all due respect to counsel the position of the law has since shifted and public bodies, organs and institutions now do enjoy the said protection as public officers. See the case of Alhaji Aliyu Ibrahim vs JSC Kaduna & Anor (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt. 583) p.1. See also the very recent decision in the case of Sulgrave Holdings Inc & 19 Ors vs FGN & 3 Ors (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1329) p. 309 at 338. Therefore is not correct for the learned claimant/respondent’s counsel to argue that the protection created under Section 2(a) Public Officers Protection Act does not avail the defendants in this case. However, there is the further submission made by the claimant/respondent that the Public Officers Protection Act or limitation law does not apply to cases of contract, which in the instant case relates to contract of employment. Counsel referred to the decisions in JSC vs Alaka (1982) 8-10 S-C 42 at 65, and NPA vs Construzioni Generalli (1974) 12 SC 89. However, here too I must point out to the learned claimant/respondent’s counsel that the law is that limitation of action laws do apply to contracts of employment generally. See the case of John Egbele vs The Post Master General (NIPOST) (2009) LPELR-8870 (CA); Forestry Research Institute of Nigeria vs Gold (2007) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1044) and Bakara vs Nigeria Railway Corporation (2007) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1064) 628. Therefore this defence does not equally avail the claimant/respondent. The next point raised and argued by the claimant/respondent in opposition to the issue of statute bar is the exception to the applicability of the defence of statute bar on the ground of the fact that the affected public officer must have acted in pursuance or execution or intended execution of law or of any public duty or authority. In arguing this point counsel relied on the letter published by the Secretary to the Imo State Government, Exhibit L attached to the affidavit in support of Originating Summons, to submit that the appropriate person to dismiss the claimant/respondent is the 3rd respondent/applicant and therefore the Secretary to the Government who wrote on the directive of the 1st defendant had no power to so do and therefore he should not enjoy the public officers protection under the said section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act. Learned counsel on this issue referred to the case of Alapiki vs Governor of Rivers State (1991), supra. I have considered the submission of the claimant/respondent as well as that of the Respondents/Applicants on the issue, I am not convinced that the Secretary to the Imo state Government can be said not to have acted under the power or authority of his duties or law in the writing of the said circular. This is because for the defence to avail a claimant the duty on him is to show that the Public officer has acted in pursuance or execution or intended execution of law or of any public duty or authority. In other words the public officer must have acted outside the colour of the authority of his office. See the case Ibrahim vs JSC, supra. The reliance on the case Alapiki, supra, by the Claimant/respondent in his submission, with all due respect, is misplaced because the decision in that case was that the Governor of Rivers State had no power to terminate the appointment of the Plaintiff, in view of the fact that it was the State Civil service Commission that had the power to so terminate. In the Instant case, the letter was written by the Secretary to the Government of Imo State and there is nothing to show that he was not acting within the colour of his authority in writing the said letter. The issue of whether or not it was right for the Governor to have instructed the writing of the said letter and that the said letter, Exhibit L, should be declared null and void are issues for the substantive matter which cannot be determined at the preliminary stage. Rather at this stage the duty of the claimant is to show that the particular defendants who are before the Court have not acted in pursuance or execution or intended execution of law or of any public duty or authority so that the limitation law raised by the defendants/applicants cannot avail them. In any event the purpose of the limitation law is not to say that the claimant does not have a cause of action or that the defendant was not qualified in his action but that the claimant did not come to court within the period stipulated by the limitation law; and therefore he does not have the right to pursue his before the Court. In the instant case that i have already pointed out that the cause of action arose on the 8th of June 2011 and the Claimant/Respondent came to Court only on the 25th of April, 2012. The Claimant/respondent should have come to Court within three months as stipulated by the Public Officers Protection Act, Section 2 (a), thereof, but having not done so she has been caught by the said limitation law and i so find and hold. With this holding i do not think it is necessary to go into the second issue as that would be academic. i make no order as to costs. Ruling is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice Auwal Ibrahim Presiding Judge.