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By a motion on notice dated 22nd day of December, 2011 but filed on the 23rd day of December 2011 the Claimant prayed the Court for the following reliefs: (A) A Declaration that by virtue of section 42(2) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution, no Nigerian citizen shall be subjected to any disability or deprivation merely by reason of the circumstances of his birth. (B) A Declaration that the administrative/executive Backloading on Transfer of Non indigenes in the Abia State Public Service to their states of origin dated August 25, 2011 and approved by the 1st Respondent and issued by the 3rd Respondent, which circular directed/ordered the transfer of all non indigenes working in the public service of Abia State (except those in the tertiary institutions) to their States of origin with effect from 1st October, 2011, or howsoever such a policy is intended to be effected is contrary to section 42 of the 1999 Constitution and unconstitutional. (C) A Declaration that any law made by the 4th Respondent in connection or contemplation of the said circular which seeks to subject any Public Servant in Respondents service who are of non Abia State origin to any disability or deprivation merely by reason of his state of origin is unlawful and unconstitutional and of no effect (D) An order setting aside or nullifying any executive or administrative order or law made by the 1st to 4th Respondents in respect thereof that is inconsistent with section 42 of the 1999 Constitution. (E) An injunction restraining the Respondents from enforcing any directive, order, policy or law in relation to transferring or sacking of Public Servants of Abia State who are non natives. (F) An order directing all the Respondents to reinstate all those already discriminated against, transferred or sacked pursuant to the policy or directive and any law. Accompanying the Motion on notice is another process titled Statement in which a description of the applicant and that of each of the Respondents was given and thereafter the following paragraphs were provided: 2. RELIFS SOUGHT BY THE APPLICANT: (i) A Declaration that by virtue of section 42(2) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution, no Nigerian citizen shall be subjected to any disability or deprivation merely by reason of the circumstances of his birth. (ii) A Declaration that the administrative/executive directives/orders contained in a circular entitled Backloading on Transfer of Non indigenes in the Abia State Public Service to their states of origin dated August 25, 2011 and approved by the 1st Respondent and issued by the 3rd Respondent, which circular directed/ordered the transfer of all non indigenes working in the public service of Abia State (except those in the tertiary institutions) to their States of origin with effect from 1st October, 2011, or howsoever such a policy is intended to be effected is contrary to section 42 of the 1999 Constitution and unconstitutional. (iii) A Declaration that any law or resolution made by the 4th Respondent in connection or contemplation of the said circular which seeks to subject any Public Servant in Respondents service who are of non Abia State origin to any disability or deprivation merely by reason of his state of origin is unlawful and unconstitutional and of no effect (iv) An order setting aside or nullifying any executive or administrative order or law made by the 1st to 4th Respondents in respect thereof that is consistent with section 42 of the 1999 Constitution. (v) An injunction restraining the Respondents from enforcing any directive, order, policy or law in relation to transferring or sacking of Public Servants of Abia State who are non natives. (vi) An order directing all the Respondents to reinstate all those already discriminated against, transferred or sacked pursuant to the policy or directive and any law. The grounds upon which the reliefs are sought are that: (a) By virtue of section 42(1) no citizen of Nigeria of any place of origin or ethnic group shall by reason only that he is such a person be subjected to any disability or restrictions through any law, administrative or executive action. (b) The circular issued and signed by the Abia State Head of Service, the 2nd Respondent-directing the transfer of non Abians in the Abia State Public Service except for those in tertiary institutions) to their States of origin is very discriminative and a subjection of non Abians to great disability and restrictions. Indeed, the word transfer is a Euphemism for sack of the non Abians Public Servants. There is no guarantee that the victims will be reabsorbed in their states of origin and so far there is no arrangement with the states of origin and its restricted their right of choice to work in particular area in Nigeria and to work for a particular establishment. This is contrary to the provisions of the constitution. (c) The Public Service of Abia State is being divided between indigenes and non indigenes and this situation may spill over to other states leading to sacking of many other Nigerians. The Motion is supported by an affidavit of 19 paragraphs, deposed to by Godson Ibekwe Umelo, a Human Rights activist and a member of Applicant Organization. Attached to the said affidavit are Exhibits A and B and a Written Address. The 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th 8th and 10th Respondents entered appearance in the matter and filed various processes. However, the court, suo motu, asked the parties to address it on whether or not it has jurisdiction to entertain this suit as it is presently constituted. In particular, whether the Applicants have the locus standi to institute this suit? In response the Applicant filed his written address dated 30th April, 2012 but filed on 3rd of May 2012. Thereafter the 7th Respondent filed his written address dated 29th day of June 2012 on 2nd July 2012.Then the 4th Respondent filed his written address dated 2nd day of July 2012 but filed on 12th day of July 2012. This was followed by the Written Address of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th& 6th Respondents dated 1st day of August 2012 but filed on 7th day of August 2012. Learned counsel to the parties adopted their respective written addresses. In his written address learned counsel for the Claimant reproduced the provisions of Section 254C 1 (a)-(m), 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and then argued that this Court has the jurisdiction to entertain, hear and determine its application which is based on the constitutionality or otherwise of the actions of the 1st to the 4th Respondents in relation to a circular transferring Public servants who are non-indigenes of Abia State back to their respective states of origin, except for those in tertiary institutions. The Applicant is contending that the said circular violates section 42 of the 1999 Constitution. Learned counsel further argued that the issue of locus standi is of secondary importance and referred the Court to the decision in Governor of Ekiti State and 15 Ors vs Hon. Kola Fakiyesi and Anor (2010) 29 WRN p. 61 at p. 67 ratio 3 and A-G Kaduna State vs Hassan (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 8) 483. Furthermore learned counsel relied on the decision of the Court of Appeal in Gani Fawehinmi vs Federal Republic of Nigeria (2007) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1054) to the effect that once it is shown that the issue in dispute involves infringement of the constitution, then every citizen of Nigeria has legal capacity or locus standi. He then submitted that the Applicant has satisfied the necessary conditions for locus standi as follows: 1. That the action must be justiciable. 2. That there must be dispute between the parties. On how the applicant satisfied these conditions counsel stated that their action was not brought under Chapter 2 of the 1999 Constitution but rather under section 42 which is under Chapter 4 of the Constitution. That based on Section 6(6) of the 1999 Constitution the action is justiciable. Going further counsel stated that going by the depositions contained in paragraphs 1 to 18 of the affidavit in support of the application there is a dispute between the parties. Learned Applicant’s counsel further argued that the application is brought pursuant to Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure 2009. He then reproduced the preamble to the said Rules and submitted that the Applicants are sufficiently covered by same. The essence of the said preamble is that an application for the enforcement of fundamental rights is not to be defeated on grounds of locus standi. On his own part, learned counsel for the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 6th Respondents submitted that the Applicant’s claim to infraction of the fundamental rights of its members does not arise from or relate to any of the matters to which jurisdiction is conferred on this court. Learned counsel also referred to section 254C of the Constitution as amended, which according to him expressly limited the jurisdiction of this court with regard to the enforcement of fundamental rights to the specific matters in respect of which the Court is competent to exercise jurisdiction. Thus to the learned counsel the argument is not whether the Applicant can enforce the fundamental rights of its members or whether the court has jurisdiction or not to entertain an issue of enforcement of the fundamental rights of the Applicant’s members, but rather whether from the facts of the case, this action falls within the contemplation of section 254C of the Constitution as amended. Counsel then referred to the case of Tukur vs Government of Gongola State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt 117) 517. Therefore, according to counsel, since the principal claim or issue of the Applicant before the court is the backloading on transfer of workers from the civil service of Abia State to their states of origin, the position of the law is that this court cannot venture into an area where it can adjudicate only on the ancillary issue of enforcement, where it has no jurisdiction to try the principal issue of transfer from the civil service of a state to the civil service of another state. To counsel this is outside the constitutional provision of section 254C that vested jurisdiction on this court. Counsel then submitted that the subject matter of the suit is not covered by Chapter IV of the Constitution. Learned counsel further argued and submitted that a court of law will not make an order in vain or entertain an academic claim. He referred to Agbareh vs Mimra (2008) vol. 158 LRCN 325; Yusuf vs Toluhi (2008) vol. 162 LRCN 120. Counsel then asked the question who are the beneficiaries of the declaration that the court would make? And he answered that there are none as the individuals or persons affected by the transfer policy of the 1st Respondent were not identified in the application. Orders of court, argued learned counsel, are not made in vacuo. In the final analysis, counsel submitted that this action to enforce the fundamental rights of indeterminate persons is incompetent and that this court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain the action for the reasons canvassed in his address, and he urged the court to strike out the suit. On his part, the learned counsel for the 4th Respondent in his written address referred to the jurisdiction of the Court as provided under section 7 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 and submitted that none of the reliefs sought by the Applicant falls within the stated provisions. He then referred to the decision in Raymond S. Dangote vs Civil Service Commission Plateau State & 2 Ors (2001) 5 SCM p. 59. He also submitted that the 1999 Constitution (as amended), by its sections 251 and 257 has provided for the courts that have jurisdiction over Fundamental Rights. Learned counsel further cited and relied on various authorities and then submitted that the Court lacks the necessary jurisdiction either to entertain Fundamental Right application considering its jurisdictional provisions or to enlarge the definition and intention of the provision of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) to accommodate the reliefs sought by the Applicant. He then urged the Court to strike out the case relying on the decision in Ndili vs Akinsumade (2000) 7NWLR (Pt. 668) p. 293. Furthermore, on his own part, the counsel for the 7th Respondent predicated his response on the issue that the application of the Applicants is for enforcement of fundamental rights based on employment issues and the alleged transfer of workers of Abia State to their various states based on their places of origin. That the substratum of this action is mainly predicated on labour and employment matters but then the issues concerning labour and employment is not within the purview of Fundamental Rights Provision of the Constitution that is Chapter IV of the 1999 constitution as amended. Counsel then submitted that the application is incompetent and should be treated as such by the Honourable Court. He then referred to the case of Dangote vs C.S.C Plateau State (2001) 9 NWLR (Pt. 717) 132 at 152 per Karibi Whyte where the Court held that “any exercise of jurisdiction in respect of matters in terms of Fundamental Rights outside chapter IV is without Jurisdiction, unconstitutional and void. See also the case of RansomeKuti vs AG Federation (1985) (Pt. 6) 211.” Learned counsel further submitted that the breach of a fundamental right alleged by an applicant must be the main plank in the application for enforcement of fundamental rights. Thus where the violation of a fundamental right is merely incidental or ancillary to the principal claim or relief it is improper to institute the action as one for the enforcement of a fundamental right. He then referred to the decision in Sea Trucks Nigeria Ltd vs Anigboro (2001) 10 WRN 1; Tukur vs Govt. of Taraba State (1997) 6 NWLR (Pt. 510) 549 and Basil vs Borno Radio Television Corporation (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt. 288) 13. Learned counsel further contended that the applicant’s application is for empty reliefs because the issue of transferred workers has been laid to rest. He referred to his counter affidavit in reply to the main application. He then stated that the applicant is at best a busy body and clearly on a frolic of its own. He contended that since the issue of transfer has been laid to rest any benefit which would have been accruable to the applicant if the court grants the injunctive order sought has already lapsed making the order an empty one with no beneficiary and it is an elementary principle of law that orders of court are not made in vain, referring to the case of John Holt Nig. Ltd & Anor vs Holts African Workers union Nig. Ltd & Cameroons (1963) All NLR 385; (1963) 2 SCNLR 383. Continuing counsel argued that the there is no serious question to be tried in this case and that the applicant has no legal right which ought to be protected since the directive/policy of the Government of the Abia State in the exercise of its constitutional powers had directed that public servants of Abia State who are not indigenes be transferred to their various states has already been carried out and the affected people had already been reabsorbed. Finally counsel submitted that this fundamental right enforcement application is incompetent and robs the court of jurisdiction and it should therefore be struck out. He referred to and relied on the case of Adeyemi vs T.R.S. Ike-Oluwa& Sons Ltd(1993) 8 NWLR (Pt. 309). I have carefully considered the processes, arguments and submissions of learned counsel to the parties in this application. The main question for determination is whether or not this court has jurisdiction to entertain this suit as it is presently constituted. It is not in doubt that the Applicant in this matter has come for the enforcement of the fundamental right of public servants of Abia State who by a circular have been directed to go back to their various states of origin. The allegation of the Applicant is that the directive or policy of the Abia State Government runs contrary to the provisions of section 42 of the 1999 Constitution and therefore the Abia State Government should be restrained by an injunction where the court declares the said circular unconstitutional and discriminatory. The first question though is whether the Applicant has the capacity to institute this action. It is clear from its affidavit in support of its motion that it is not a trade union representing the members of the applicant organization. It is an Incorporated Trustees registered by the Corporate Affairs Commission pursuant to the Companies and Allied Matters Act. See Exhibit A annexed to the affidavit in support of the application. The capacity to bring an action before a court of law is crucial if the court is to assume jurisdiction and determine such a matter. See the case of Umar vs W.G.C. (2007) 7 NWLR (pt. 1032) p. 117 at 151 where the Court of Appeal held that locus standi touches on the question of jurisdiction of court, in that, if a plaintiff or an appellant does not have locus or the required standing to institute an action, the court cannot properly assume jurisdiction to entertain the matter. The locus standi of a plaintiff is a condition precedent before the court can proceed to hearing a matter on merit. See also Mr Olujogun Yusuf Lawal vs Beton Bau Nig. Ltd (2010) 20 NLLR (Pt 56) p. 258; Abraham Adesanya vs President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Anor (1981) NCLR 385, and Ojimba vs Ojimba (1996) 4 NWLR (Pt 440) 32 at 39. After stating this principle, the next point is to look at the application before the court which is for the enforcement of the fundamental rights of persons affected by the contents of the circular earlier referred to and exhibited as Exhibit B attached to the affidavit in support of the Applicant’s application. The issue before the court is basically to declare the content of the circular as being unconstitutional and to further make an injunctive order. See the reliefs contained in the paragraphs of application earlier reproduced in this Ruling. The jurisdiction of this court which has been conferred by the Constitution and the National Industrial Court Act 2006 is clearly related to labour, employment and industrial relations. See Section 254C 1(a) to (m) of the 1999 Constitution as amended and sections 7(1), 16, 17, and 18 of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006. Learned counsel for the Applicant has predicated its application on the enforcement of section 42 of the 1999 Constitution. The problem with this application is that even though the application seeks for reliefs that relate to the employment of certain persons, that employment is not between the applicant and the respondents or between determined members of the applicant in an employment relationship with the respondents. This court, being primarily concerned with labour, employment and industrial relations must always ensure that the parties before it are the proper parties and that the dispute falls clearly within its jurisdictional scope to handle. The applicant in this application has not satisfied the court by way of its affidavit and other processes in court that it has the legal capacity based on sufficient interest in the matter, wherein a right is clearly vested in it, to enable it pursue the employment-related case. In the case of Umar vs WGG Nig Ltd, supra, the court said: Locus standi denotes the legal capacity based upon sufficient interest in a subject matter, to institute proceedings in a court of law to pursue a certain cause. In order to ascertain whether a plaintiff has locus standi, the statement of claim must be seen to disclose a cause of action vested in the plaintiff and also establish the rights and obligations or interests of the plaintiff which have been or are about to be violated, and in respect of which he ought to be heard upon the reliefs he seeks. See Adenuga vs Odumeru (2003) 8 NWLR (Pt 821) 163. The Applicant has simply emphasized the fact that its application is for the enforcement of fundamental human rights. Granted that this court has the jurisdiction to, under section 254C of the constitution, determine human rights issues as they relate to employment, an applicant before it must come properly and human rights issue would always take an ancillary position as the focus is on the employment relationship between the applicant and the respondent before the court. At the end of the day it is always for the court to look at the case of the parties before it to determine whether the employment relationship has been affected one way or the other and make the necessary orders in terms of reliefs sought. See the cases of Sea Trucks Nigeria Ltd vs Anigboro (2001) supra; Tukur Govt. of Taraba State (1997) supra 549 and Basil vs Borno Radio Television Corporation (1993) supra. I refer here to the submission of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, and 6threspondents in this matter that the procedure by which the applicant came before this court, the enforcement of fundamental rights procedure, is not the appropriate procedure since it relates to determination of employment relationship on the grounds of discrimination. I agree here with the learned counsel and his reliance on the authority of Dangote vs C.S.C Plateau State (2001) 9 NWLR (Pt. 717) 132 at 152. It is quite clear to me that the proper procedure is for the complainant(s) to come by way of Complaint or Writ of Summons so that all the facts that would be thrashed out in terms of persons actually affected by the directive or policy and whether or not what has been done amounts to discrimination, especially in view of the International best practices in Labour and Industrial Relations and other considerations. Further in this regard, the decision in the case of Basil v Borno Radio Corporation, supra, per Kutigi JSC (as then was), is instructive. His Lordship said; i think learned counsel is right when he said the facts of this case are quite distinguishable from the facts in Tukur's case above. But i say straight away that there are similarities and that the principles involved is the same in both cases. In Tukur, the claims were partly chieftancy claim which ought to have been initiated by a writ of summons and heard on pleadings and not affidavit evidence, all the claims principal and accessory or subsidiary, which flowed from it ought to have been struck out as incompetent. The claims are therefore struck out. In this appeal, the claims are partly for wrongful dismissal and termination of appointment and partly for breach of fundamental rights. But here as in Tukur, the principal claim being wrongful termination of appointment which ought to have been commenced by a writ of summons which was not then all the claims, principal and subsidiary which flow directly from it are incompetent and ought to be struck out. That was what the Court of Appeal did in this case. I believe it was right. Therefore, the applicant's application having been tied to the employment rights of the affected public servants of Abia State and the determination of the said employment rights being the platform on which the applicant approached this court, whose jurisdiction is basically employment and labour rights, it is not difficult to see the incompetence of the fundamental right enforcement procedure adopted by the applicant in this matter, and i so hold. In the circumstance and for all the reasons given above, i hereby hold that this court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain this suit as it is presently constituted. The suit is hereby accordingly struck out. I make no order as to cost. Ibrahim Ruling is entered according Hon. Justice A. Ibrahim Presiding Judge