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The claimant filed a complaint dated 11th November 2011 claiming as follows: a. A declaration that the purported verbal termination of the claimant’s employment was wrongful, unlawful, unconstitutional and null and void and of no effect whatsoever; b. A declaration that the verbal termination of the claimant employment by the defendant is invalid and as such the claimant was at all points in time an employee of the defendant for the period with which the Project Employment Agreement was scheduled to endure, from August 2009 – August 2010; c. An order that the defendant pay the claimant the sum of US$208,800.00 being the total sum of his salaries from December 2009 to August 2010, Daily living Allowance and outstanding from salaries of September and November 2009, and the sum of 334.50 for unpaid reimbursable Expenses for the re-entry visa; and d. An order that the defendant pay to the claimant Twenty-one per cent (21%) interest on the total sum of the claimant’s full salaries, entitlement and benefits, from the date of his purported verbal termination up to the date of judgment, thereafter Ten percent (10%) interest per annum on the judgment sum, from the date the judgment is delivered and until the judgment sum is fully liquidated. From the statement of claim accompanying the complaint, the particulars of claim are – a. Salaries for the month of December 2009 to August 2010……US$194,400.00 b. Daily living Allowance from December 2009 to August 2010 ...US$13,500.00 c. Outstanding from Salaries of September and November…………..US$900.00 d. Unpaid Reimbursable Expenses for re-entry visa application of £334.50 TOTAL……………………………………………….US$208,800.00 and £334.50 Further accompanying the complaint are the list of witness, list of documents to be relied upon at the trial and copies of the documents. In reaction, the defendant entered appearance by filing the memorandum of appearance dated and filed on 7th March 2012. Later, the defendant filed its statement of defence, list of witness, list of documents to be relied upon at the trial and copies of the documents. Both parties then led evidence by calling a witness each. Thereafter, the parties filed their respective written addresses starting with the defendant. The defendant’s written address is dated and filed on 12th July 2012. The claimant’s written address is dated and filed on 6th August 2012. The defendant’s reply on points of law is dated and filed on 16th August 2012. The claimant testified on his behalf as CW. In his testimony, the claimant testified that by profession he is Senior Piping Designer; and he has been in the profession for close to 40 years. He worked in Uzbekistan for 6 months in a 2 – 5 year contract, when he was contacted by an agency in England on behalf of Batelitwin (the defendant) asking whether he was interested in working in Nigeria. After terms and conditions were agreed, he accepted the job in Lagos. He went on that he signed contract with the terms and conditions with the defendant; and started work with the defendant on 31st August 2009. That the contract was, however, terminated on 25th November 2009. He continued that he was paid as remuneration USD 90 per hour and expected to work 55 hours per week. That he was entitled to USD50 per day for all days in Nigeria to cover meals, laundry and other expenses. He was allowed travelling expenses from home in Scotland to the airport in order to travel to Nigeria; and he was entitled to business class air travel to Nigeria. That the company (the defendant) was to pay for visas and immunizations. He was also entitled to share a car with other employees for transportation in Lagos. To him, all expenses were recovered except that in October 2009 taxi fares in Scotland were not paid, payment for yellow fever injection was not paid; and replacement of passport cost was not paid. The value of all these expenses came to 378.50 Pounds Sterling for which he has not been reimbursed. He continued in his testimony that on 25th November 2009, he left the office for the hotel in the shared transport and Mr. McCormick (who is an Engineering Manager in charge of all engineering duties for NETCO and Batelitwin, and had the final say on hiring or dismissing staff) informed him that his employment had been terminated with immediate effect. That he was given no termination letter and no reason whatsoever. That he was taken to the office the following day; and the Batelitwin lawyer was unaware that his employment had been terminated. He tried subsequently to contract Batelitwin but no one would return or take his calls. He tried to contract the company lawyer, whose name he can’t remember. He went on that on 4th December 2009, a company driver came to his hotel and gave him an envelope with his passport and ticket. There was no other documentation. Thereafter, he was taken to airport on Sunday 6th December 2009 and then he left Nigeria. He continued that he was taken to the airport not at his own volition or request. That the company has so far made no attempt to contact him. He then told the Court that he would like the Court to take into account that November and December 2009 were very stressful times. He left a secured job to come to Nigeria. He was going home to UK in a recession at Christmas of 2009 with no prospective employment. He then prayed the Court to declare that he was wrongly dismissed and to declare that his contract should be paid out in full till August 2010 including interest. In cross-examination, CW testified that he worked for 3 months for the defendant. He was dismissed on 25th November 2009. On being asked the name of the defendant, he answered that it is Batelitwin but he cannot remember the full name. That he was retained as a technical hand as a specialist. He affirmatively stated that he was a specialist for the services he was retained for, which is as a Piping Designer. That he was retained to design pipe routing and FPSO i.e. Floating Production Storage Operation. He acknowledged that he was expected to be skilled in the use of certain applications and software such as AUTOCAD and PEMS (a 3 dimensional design system). He further acknowledged that he could use these applications effectively. He then stated that he was not aware that local hands were employed to do what he was employed to do because he had any shortcomings. That there was no bad blood between him and the company or between him and any other employee. There was no re-examination of CW. Mrs. Nimisore Akano, the Admin Manager/General Counsel of Batelitwin Global Services Ltd, the defendant, testified for the defendant as DW. She acknowledged knowing the claimant as a former expatriate contract staff who is no longer an employee of the defendant. That the claimant worked for the defendant for about 3 months. He was paid for work done during this period. He was paid his salary and allowances for the said period; and he is not owed any sum at all by the defendant. That aside from his salary and allowances and ticket to and fro, there were no other allowances payable to the claimant. DW continued that the claimant’s employment was terminated because he could not use the software needed to perform the scope of duties he was employed to do. He was thus found to be incompetent. That a local Engineer (a Nigeria) was in fact employed to do what the claimant was employed to do. This generated enmity between the claimant and the local/Nigerian Engineer. Altercations ensued between the claimant and his Supervisor and the Nigerian Engineer. The company found all this to be gross misconduct coupled with the fact that the claimant was incompetent. DW went on that there were correspondences within Management staff regarding the claimant. That Mr. McCormick was the Engineering Manager supervising the project that the claimant was working on. That Mr. McCormack does not have the power to hire and fire. He (Mr. McCormack) too was on contract. That the claimant was given a letter of termination. He was served the termination letter on 4th December 2009 together with his tickets. That he did not acknowledge the receipt of the letter of termination; but he received the ticket and his international passport. That he refused to receive the termination letter. In cross-examination, DW acknowledged that it was communicated to the claimant that he was incompetent and this communication was at project meetings and through emails. (There is, however, no documentary evidence of this before the Court.) DW went on that she does not know whether the claimant was issued with any queries for his gross misconduct. That it was the office driver who took the claimant to the airport; and there was no way the driver could have forced the claimant to accept the termination letter. There was no re-examination of DW. Parties were then asked to file and serve their respective written addresses. The defendant’s final written address is dated and filed on 12th July 2012. That of the claimant is dated and filed on 6th August 2012. The defendant also filed a reply on points of law dated and filed on 16th August 2012. The defendant in its written address drew the Court’s attention to the fact that the claimant did not file a reply to the defendant’s statement of defence and consequently all averments in the defence on which issues were not joined must be deemed admitted by the claimant. The defendant then framed two issues for the determination of the Court, namely – 1. Whether the claimant’s employment was properly terminated by the defendant. 2. Whether the claimant discharged the onus on him to prove his entitlement to his claims as contained in his statement of claim. Regarding issue 1 i.e. whether the claimant’s employment was properly terminated by the defendant, the defendant started off with the definition of a servant as a person employed by another to do work under the control and directions of the employer (Black’s Law Dictionary Seventh Edition). That the employment of a contract staff is regulated by his contract of employment. In the same vein, when a person (servant) is employed to provide services for a project, and a specific employment agreement is entered between that person and his employer (master) to regulate the nature and manner of the employment relationship, the terms and conditions as contained in the said employment agreement strictly regulate the affairs of the employment especially when expressed to operate as such. That it is trite that the law recognizes and respects the sanctity of contracts. That the Latin maxim, pacta sunt servanda, is a sacred doctrine for the preservation of contracts which is entitled to the greatest respect. Hence, where parties have reduced the termination conditions for service into an agreement, the conditions must be observed. To the defendant, by a Project Employment Agreement (pleaded and frontloaded by the claimant) dated the 29th June 2009, but executed by the defendant on the 10th of August 2009 and executed by the claimant on the 10th of September 2009, the parties entered into terms and conditions to regulate the claimant’s employment. Item 4 (headed Notice Period) of the said agreement provides that if either the claimant or the defendant wishes to terminate the claimant’s employment, one month notice in writing must be given by the party wishing to terminate. It is, however, further provided in the said item 4 that the defendant reserves the right to terminate the claimant’s employment without notice in the event of gross misconduct or breach of conduct. That in Chukwumah v. Shell Petroleum Development Company [1993] 4 NWLR (Pt. 289) 512 at 562D, it was held that where a word or phrase is plain and unambiguous, same must be given its ordinary plain meaning. Also in Nigerian Gas Company Ltd v. Unuavwodo [2003] FWLR (Pt. 169) 1196 at 1205, it was held that where a contract between parties is clear and unequivocal, the Court must , in construing the relationship of the parties , confine itself to the terms and contract of service between the parties. To the defendant, what this means is that it is outside the province of the Court to look for terms of termination other than the contract. The defendant pleaded in her statement of claim (sic), and the defence witness testified on oath that the claimant employment was terminated without prior notice on grounds of misconduct, and a termination letter in that regard was accordingly served on him. That a court of law is helpless to interfere in a dispute where the terms of contract have been complied with and will refrain from reading extraneous matters into the contract. That on bindingness of terms of contract on parties thereto, the Supreme Court per Tobi, JSC in Idoniboye-Obu v. NNPC [2003] 2 NWLR (Pt. 805) 589 at 652 A – C stated as follows – A party who has opened his heart, mind and eyes to enter into an agreement is clearly bound by the terms of the agreement and he cannot seek for better terms midstream or when the agreement is subject of litigation, when things are no longer at ease. Although a party may seek for better terms, the court is bound by the original terms of the agreement and will interpret them in the interest of justice. A party has no right to elevate an ordinary contract of master and servant to the status of one with statutory flavor just because he will have better deal. The courts will not allow that. The defendant submitted that that the defendant acted in line with its powers and right as contained in the Project Employment Agreement executed by both parties, praying the Court to so hold. That in CBN v. Archibong [2001] FWLR (Pt. 58) 1032 at 1047 – 1048, it was the Court of Appeal’s position that where a contract of employment empowers either party to terminate the employment with or without notice, it becomes irrelevant and immaterial to examine motive impelling termination. Likewise in Lake Chad Research Institute v. Mallam Mohammed [2004] All FWLR (Pt. 225) 40 at 60 – 61, it was the Court’s position that an employer need not show any motive or give any reason for determining the employment of its employee. It is not the law that motive vitiates the validity of the exercise of a right of an employer. The exercise is entirely independent of the motive that prompted the exercise. It is not the business of the Court to inquire into the motive for the exercise of discretion of an employer to terminate his employee’s employment. In a purely master and servant relationship, untenable reason for termination does not make termination wrongful. The Supreme Court per Ayoola JSC in Kato v. CBN [1999] 6 NWLR (Pt. 607) 390 at 414 B – C stated as follows – The law is now clear beyond per adventure that in a purely master and servant relationship devoid of statutory flavor and in which the relationship is purely contractual, termination of an employment by the employer cannot be wrongful, unless it is in breach of contract. Notwithstanding that the employer gave a totally untenable reason for the termination, once he had complied with the terms of the contract, there would be no breach of contract of employment. The defendant continued that the only situation where an employee can successfully seek remedy is when the terms of employment is breached and not for the reason for termination as held in NEPA v. Enyong [2001] FWLR (Pt. 175) 452 at 468. Furthermore, that rules of natural justice need not be observed in termination of the employment of an employee in a master and servant relationship devoid of statutory flavor. An employee’s appointment can lawfully be terminated without first telling the employee what is alleged against him and hearing his defense. This was the Supreme Court’s view in Olanrewaju v. Afribank Plc [2001] 13 NWLR (Pt. 731) 691 at 705 D – F where Katsina-Alu, JSC (as he then was) said as follows – The master has power to terminate the contract with his servant at any time and for any reason or for none…What this means is this. In this class of cases, an officer’s appointment can lawfully be terminated without first telling him what is alleged against him and hearing his defence or explanation. Similarly, an officer in this class can lawfully be dismissed without observing the principles of natural justice. That this was followed by the Court of Appeal in Gateway Bank v. Abosede [2001] FWLR (Pt. 79) 1316 at 1335. Also in Angel Spinning & Dyeing Ltd v. Ajah [2000] FWLR (Pt. 23) 1332 and CBN v. Archibong [2001] FWLR (Pt. 58) 1032 at 1054 – 1055, It was held that fair hearing is not appropriate in master servant matters. From the foregoing submissions, the defendant prayed the Court to hold that the claimant’s employment was properly terminated. That this is all the more so because the defendant’s witness gave uncontroverted testimony that the defendant was indeed served with the appropriate notice terminating his contract but he refused to collect or acknowledge receipt of the said letter. On issue 2 i.e. whether the claimant discharged the onus on him to prove his entitlement to his claims as contained in his statement of claim, the defendant contended that there is a difference between an ordinary employment and an employment with statutory flavor. That an employment is said to have statutory flavor when it is codified in statute i.e. the terms and conditions of service are expressly set out by statute or statutory regulations made under subsidiary legislation. That this position was well espoused by the Supreme Court in the case of Chief Idoniboye-Obu v. NNPC [2003] 2 NWLR (Pt. 805) 589. In Isievwore v. NEPA [2002] 12 NWLR (Pt. 784) 417, the Supreme Court held that it is statutory flavor that puts an employment over and above ordinary master and servant relationship. Same was the position of the Court of Appeal in SPDC (Nig) Ltd v. Chief Olanrewaju [2003] FWLR (Pt. 140) 1640 at 1670 – 1671. The defendant continued that when a claimant in an employment without statutory flavor, as in this case, is aggrieved over the termination of his employment, what such a claimant can sue for is “wrongful termination” (i.e. if the termination was done contrary to the employment agreement) and not that the termination is null and void. That assuming but definitely not conceding, that the termination of the claimant’s employment was wrongful i.e. not done in accordance with the Project Employment Agreement, the claimant ought to have sued solely for wrongful termination which provides him grounds for the available remedy which is a claim for damages. Wrongful termination or dismissal is already a complete act or exercise, and a claimant can only claim, and the defendant can only be liable for damages in that regard. This is because an employee in an employment without statutory flavor cannot be imposed by a court on an unwilling master, even with wrongful, unjustifiable, unfounded or repulsive behavior of the master in getting rid of the servant as held in Evan Brothers (Nig) Ltd publishers v. Falaiye [2003] 13 NWLR (Pt. 838) 564. Same was the position of the Supreme Court in the case of The Shell Petroleum Co Ltd v. Ifeta [2006] 4 SC (Pt. I) 136 at 151 where it was held that termination of a contract of employment even if wrongful brings to an end the relationship of master and servant which cannot continue in the absence of mutuality. Further, the measure of the damages where the contract of employment is governed by stipulations as to notice of termination in deserving instances is for period of the notice i.e. what the claimant would have earned over the period of notice required to lawfully terminate his employment as held in Chief Idoniboye-Obu v. NNPC (supra) where the Court per Uwaifo, JSC at page 627B stated as follows – In any event, in case of breach, the employee’s remedy lies in damages calculated on the basis of what he would have earned for the period of notice agreed for ending the employment. That same was held by the Court of Appeal in the earlier case of CBN v. Ismaila J. Jidda [2001] FWLR (Pt. 47) 1065 at 1085. In Onalaja v. Africa Petroleum Ltd [1991] 7 NWLR (Pt. 206) Ratio 1, the Court held that the measure of damages in cases of wrongful dismissal is always the amount of money that is payable during the period of notice to be given by the employer as stipulated in the contract of employment and not salaries up to retirement age. Even if no period of notice was prescribed, then the common law rule will apply, namely that a reasonable period would be given, usually one month or three months depending on the category of staff being dismissed. This position stems from the fact that that is what is involved as damages in the contemplation of the parties at the time of the contract as the probable result of the breach. In Opua v. NNPC & anor [2002] FWLR (Pt. 84) 11 at 27 and 28, it was the Court’s position that termination under a contract of employment without statutory flavor cannot be declared null and void and of no effect as the Court will not foist a servant on an unwilling master and vice versa. In the same vein, wages/salary cannot be sued for by treating the contract as subsisting and a claim for service not rendered cannot stand except a claim for damages under a suit for wrongful dismissal – Evan Brothers (Nig) Ltd Publishers v. Falaiye (supra). In Co-operative & Commerce Bank Ltd & anor v. Okonkwo [2002] FWLR (Pt. 97) 637 at 653 – 654 and 657, the Court of Appeal clarified the position that “unlawful termination” is akin to statutory employment, whilst “wrongful termination” is akin to contractual employment. In Garuba v. Kwara Investment Co. Ltd & ors [2005] 1 SC (Pt. II) 80, the Supreme Court held that measure of damages for the wrongful termination of the appellant was one month’s salary in lieu of notice. Quantum of damages awardable for wrongful termination is that stipulated for the period of notice. The defendant went on that looking at the claimant’s claim in this suit and considering the existing judicial authorities on this subject, it is clear that the remedies sought by the claimant are surely not in tandem with the nature of the employment he had with the defendant. The claimant seeks a declaration that the termination of his employment is unlawful, unconstitutional, null and void and of no effect whatsoever. He also seeks a declaration that the termination of his employment is invalid, hence was still subsisting. He also, seeks an order of Court that the defendant should pay him salary for services not rendered, and further seeks interest over the projected earnings. That assuming, but not conceding, that the claimant’s employment termination was wrongful, going by the existing judicial authorities cited, the remedies sought by the claimant are clearly out of place and cannot be granted by this Court, praying the Court to so hold. That the applicable remedy the claimant should have sought for is damages which would have been his month’s salary in lieu of notice. Not having asked for damages, that this Court cannot grant same, praying the Court to so hold. That the Court is not a Father Christmas. That is why the Supreme Court in Oladunjoye v. Akinterinwa [2000] 4 SC (Pt. 1) 19 held that a court has no jurisdiction to grant a relief a claimant or party has not asked for, praying the Court to uphold same. That the Supreme Court per Oguntade, JSC in Garuba v. Kwara Investment Co Ltd & ors [2005] 1 SC (Pt. II) 80 at 93 paragraphs 15 to 30 had this to say on this issue – …it is the law generally that a court not being a charitable institution would not grant to a party reliefs not claimed from court…Even if the trial court had been minded to grant the plaintiff an award, there was no claim before it upon which to hinge such an award. It is trite that an appellate court cannot grant a party a relief which that party had not sought from the court of trial…[T]he plaintiff would have been entitled to an award of one month’s salary in lieu of notice but as the plaintiff made no such claim, he could not get that award. On the whole, one gets the impression that the plaintiff’s case could have been better presented before the trial court. The defendant went on it is the law that the sanctity of a contract/agreement shall be respected by the court of law. Hence, what a contract/agreement does not contain, shall not be read into it. In Nigeria Gas Company Ltd v. Unuavwodo (supra), the court reiterated the enshrined position that where contract between parties is clear and unequivocal, the court must, in construing the relationship of the parties, confine itself to the terms. That the claimant in paragraphs 6 and 7 of his statement of claim pleaded that there was a clear agreement between him and the defendant that they will be responsible for his visa acquisition cost, and that there was a clear understanding that the defendant would reimburse his visa acquisition expenses personally expended by him. In the bid to urge this Court to hold same, the claimant pleaded and relied on an email sent to him by one TEC Group (which he identified as recruiting consultants), who are not a party to the agreement entered between the claimant and the defendant, telling him that the said initial visa acquisition cost (which the claimant never revealed) will be requested from him, which he should pay for, but will be reimbursed by the defendant. In paragraph 10 of his statement of claim the claimant further claimed reimbursement of £129.50 for re-entry visa application, £29 for yellow fever vaccination and £176 for cab services. The appropriate document to be construed to determine if truly there was an accord as to the above is the Project Employment Agreement between the parties. That there is nowhere in the agreement where such accord exists. Even as regards transportation/travel as contained in the Agreement (items 6 and 13) and the Appendix to it (item 7), local transportation i.e. transport within Nigeria is limited to provision of a business class ticket to the airport nearest to the claimant’s point of hire via the most direct and economical route (see items 6 and 13 of the Project Employment Agreement, and item 7 of the Appendix thereto). That the document speaks for itself. The general rule is that where parties have embodied the terms of their contract in a written document, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to add to, vary subtract from or contradict the terms of the written instrument. This, the Court held in Union Bank of Nig v. Prof. A. O. Ozigi [1994] 4 NWLR (Pt. 333) 385 Ratio 2. Also, in Chukwumah v. Shell Petroleum Development Company (supra) it was held that where a word or phrase is plain and unambiguous, same must be given its ordinary plain meaning. The defendant then prayed the Court to hold that no such accord exists as regards the expenses and reimbursement which the claimant claims. They were unilateral actions in his own interest and for his own benefit to obtain/retain his employment. That one even wonders why the claimant will expend money again for his re-entry visa after going on holiday when his expense on the initial entry visa, which he is still protesting, has not been reimbursed as claimed. Continuing still, the defendant submitted that discrepancy in pleading/evidence or contradictory pleading/evidence should be treated with suspicion and belief. When a piece of evidence, material to determination of an issue is enveloped in discrepancy and/or contradiction, same ought to be discountenanced. That this was purport of the decision in Lawson v. Afani Cont. Co. Ltd [2002] 2 NWLR (Pt. 752) 585. In paragraph 8 of the claimant’s statement, he pleaded that he commenced his employment in August 2011 but testified during examination that he commenced same in August 2009. In paragraph 13 of the statement of claim, he pleaded that he was taken to the airport on the 7th December 2009 and left on a flight back home, but testified that he was taken to the airport on the 6th of December 2009 and left Nigeria. In paragraph 10 of his statement of claim, he pleaded that he expended £129.50 for his re-entry visa application back into Nigeria, £29 for his yellow fever vaccination, and £176 for cab services in Scotland; hence he pleaded/claimed the total sum of £334.50 in paragraphs 18 and 19(c) of his statement of claim as reimbursement for the expenditure. However in the course of examination while giving testimony on oath, he stated that the total value of all the expenses was £378.50. While the claimant pleaded that the sum of £129.50 was expended for his re-entry visa application back to Nigeria, the piece of document Frontloaded in proof of same shows that the said sum was actually expended for his passport application which the claimant actually testified to during examination after admitting that all other expenses were covered. It is worthy of note that evidence led on unpleaded facts goes to no issue. The claimant also pleaded in paragraph 9 of his statement of claim that for the months of September and November he was owed wages of 5 hours work respectively, but went on to plead in paragraph 18 and claim 19(c) that it was for the months of September and October. The claimant pleaded in paragraph 16 of his statement of claim that by virtue of the Project Employment Agreement which the parties executed, his employment was fixed from August 2009 to August 2010 (i.e. 13 months) which he took into account in calculating his claim, but to the contrary the frontloaded project employment agreement (which the claimant actually executed on the 10th of September 2009) only states that his assignment was to start in August with an anticipated duration of one year. That the inconsistency, discrepancy and contradictions espoused by the claimant is such that this Court cannot safely consider the issues which they bother on, praying the Court to so hold and discountenance same. To the defendant, it is the law that special damages as claimed by the claimant in this case in the form of his particularized claim must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved. Anything short of a strict proof is fatal to the case of the claimant as in this case. This has been so decided in many cases amongst which are: Osijinrin v. Elias [1970] 1 All NLR 153; Elohim Nigeria Ltd v. Mbadiwe [1986] 1 NWLR (Pt. 14) 47; Osuji v. Isiocha [1989] 3 NWLR (Pt. 111) 623; and Oladiti v. Sungas Co. Ltd [1994] 1 NWLR (Pt. 321) 433 at 459. The defendant then submitted that by reason of the material inconsistencies in the pleadings and oral testimony of the claimant in this case, the Court is duty bound to hold that the claim in the nature of special damages by the claimant has not been strictly proved in deference to the decisions of appellate courts cited above. The defendant went on that it is trite that signature is what gives authenticity to a document requiring same. That the claimant in the bid to prove hours worked for and appropriate earnings, frontloaded a supposed worksheet belonging to him. The supposed worksheet by its form and nature is required to be signed by the employee (the claimant), the lead engineer, project manager, and the approving authority. The said worksheet does not bear the signature of any of these officers, including that of the employee himself. This makes the document highly questionable. In Ogudo v. State [2011] 18 NWLR (Pt. 1278) 1 at 30F, the Supreme Court per Rhodes-Vivour, JSC stated as follows – Relying on an unsigned…statement calls for extreme caution and very little or no weight should be attached to such statement. After all an unsigned document is worthless. That same was the position in the earlier case of Edilco (Nig) Ltd v. UBA [2000] FWLR (Pt. 21) at 792. From the foregoing, the defendant contended that it is clear that the Court cannot rely on the unsigned worksheet, praying the Court to so hold and discountenance the unsigned worksheet. That the claimant admitted in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the statement of claim that he was paid salary for the months of August, September, October and November 2009, as well as living allowance for the months of September, October and November and pleads his salary payment credit advice, as well as his living allowance advice for this periods which the defendant also relied on in proving this position. To the defendant then, this represents the claimant’s true entitlements for the periods worked for as testified by the defendant, praying the Court to so hold. To the defendant, frontloaded documents though already before the court and forms parts of the Court’s record does not on this basis automatically amount to evidence. That all frontloaded documents intended to be relied on in proof of a case still needs to be adopted and tendered through a witness on oath giving room for the other side to readily challenge its admissibility or not before it can effectively amount to evidence. In the case of NBCI v. Alfijir Mining Nigeria Ltd [1993] 4 NWLR (Pt. 287) 346, it was held that a Court can only act on the basis of evidence placed before it. Also in Oba R. A. A. Oyediran v. Oba Alebiosu II [1992] 6 NWLR (Pt. 249) 550, the Supreme Court held that where a document is pleaded but not tendered in evidence, that paragraph in the pleading as per the document is deemed abandoned. Therefore, counsel’s submission on a fact which was never pleaded nor adduced in evidence cannot be acted upon by the Court. In Wakwah v. Ossai [2002] 2 NWLR (Pt. 752) 548, the Court of Appeal held that a trial court ought not to admit and mark a document as an exhibit suo motu other than during trial because such procedure of reception of evidence will occasion a miscarriage of justice. On this issue, Akpiroroh, JCA at 563 E – G had this to say – From the above it is quite clear that the learned trail Judge suo motu admitted and marked the document Exhibit A and not during trial as ought to be. The learned trial judge based his judgment on Exhibit A which was wrongly admitted by him. Suffice it to say that the manner in which Exhibit A became an exhibit in the judgment rather than during trial is improper and such procedure of reception of evidence occasioned miscarriage of justice. That the claimant’s frontloaded documents not having been adopted and tendered through the witness on oath as evidence cannot be taken as same, praying the Court to so hold. In conclusion, the defendant urged the Court to dismiss this action with substantial costs as the claimant herein has not discharged the onus on him to prove his entitlement to his claims, especially considering that he never filed a reply to the defendant’s statement of defence because the points/issues raised by the defendant in its pleadings are deemed admitted in law, referring to the case of Salzgitter Stahl (GMBH) v. Tunji Dosunmu Industries Ltd [2010] 43 NSCQR 1085 at 1109 per C. M. Chukwuma-Eneh, JSC. That a master is not bound to give reason for termination of employment of his servant. He can terminate for any reason or none. There can be no specific performance of a contract for service, save in employment protected by statute. That rule of natural justice need not be observed by a master (employer) in termination of the services of his servant (employee) in an employment without statutory flavor. Hence, such an employee’s appointment can lawfully be terminated without first telling the employee what is alleged against him and hearing his evidence: Olarenwaju v. Afribank Plc (supra). In reaction, the claimant raised two issues for the determination of the Court, namely – a) Whether the employment of the claimant was properly terminated by the defendant. b) Whether the claimant discharged the onus on him to prove his entitlement to his claims as contained in his statement of claim. Regarding issue a), the claimant reiterated that he had stated in his statement of claim and also led evidence to attest to the fact that he was employed by the defendant as a Senior Piping Designer via a Project Employment Agreement dated 29th June 2009, which he exhibited. The claimant then went on to reiterate his oral testimony. To the claimant even though the Project Employment Agreement provided that all his travel expenses would be borne by the defendant, the defendant, however, failed to refund to the claimant expenditures on transportation to the airport from his home, yellow fever vaccination and the cost of replacing his international passport, which were all borne by the claimant during his annual leave in October 2009. The claimant then referred the Court to the provision of paragraph 6 of the Project Employment Agreement, which states as follows – All travel will be provided to and from your point of hire via the most direct and economical route. The claimant also submitted that he was orally informed that his employment with the defendant had been terminated without the commensurate written notice as required by paragraph 4 of the Project Employment Agreement, which provides as follows – If either you or the company wishes to terminate your employment one month’s notice in writing must be given by the party wishing to terminate. The company reserves the right to terminate employment without notice in the event of gross misconduct or breach of conduct. Whilst assigned under this contract you should not show disrespect to the civil and religious institutions, customs and practices of the inhabitants, or such country of territory, or insult or interfere with or obstruct or attempt to destruct such institutions, customs or practices. The claimant referred the Court to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Jubril Adetunji Ladipo v. Chevron Nigeria Limited [2005] 1 NWLR (Pt. 907) 227 at 289 D – F, where it was held as follows – The point had admirably been made by the trial court and the parties to this appeal in their arguments too, even though more so by the latter, that in an ordinary master and servant relationship, the right to bring such relationship to an end had always enured to the parties to the relationship. The right is either provided by the very contract between the parties or read into such contract if omitted. It is equally the law that once a contract of service had provided for the determination of the contract, whether or not a determination of appointment pursuant to the contract had rightly been carried out would depend on what the contract itself provided. Also referred to the Court is the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Peugeot Automobile Nigeria Limited v. Saliu Oje & 3 ors [1997] 11 NWLR (Pt. 530) 625 at 632 – 633 H – A, where it was held that – I think I should start by re-stating the well settled principle of law relating to contracts of employment and that is where parties have agreed to be bound in their relationship by written agreements, such a contract must be governed by the terms of the contract. That the Court of Appeal also held in University of Benin v. Andrew Erinmwionren [2001] 17 NWLR (Pt. 743) 548 at 563F as follows – It is well settled that where there is a contract of service, there is an implied term that the contract of employment can only be terminated by notice. The claimant then submitted that he is indeed entitled to be paid consequential damages by the defendant as a result of the claimant’s wrongful termination, referring to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Nigeria Telecommunication Plc v. I. A. Ocholi [2001] 10 NWLR (Pt. 720) 188 at 216D, where it was held thus – In the event the termination of the appointment was carried out contrary to the terms of the agreement between the parties, the employer must pay damages for the breach. To the claimant, the defendant has by its statement of defense, and by the oral testimony of its witness, Mrs. Nimisore Akano, sought to contend that the claimant was dismissed for incompetence. That the defendant, however, failed to establish that the claimant was informed by the defendant at any point in time during the duration of the claimant’s employment with them that the claimant had been found incompetent. The defendant failed also to exhibit any document showing that the claimant was informed of his purported incompetence. Even though the defendant’s witness claimed that the defendant’s management had during their weekly meetings informed the claimant of his purported incompetence, the defendant failed to exhibit the minutes of the said meeting where this issue was discussed. That in deciding whether a dismissal is wrongful or proper, this Court should consider whether the principle of audi alterem partem was observed, which imposes a duty of fair hearing on the employer, referring to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Momoh v. CBN [2007] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1055) 504 at 526 B – C, where it was held that – In cases of this nature where an employee complains to the court of his dismissal on grounds of misconduct what the court is expected to look out for first is whether the dismissal was in accordance with the terms of the employment and secondly whether the principles of audi alterem partem which imposes a duty upon the employer to act fairly has been observed. Acting fairly in the circumstance entails the employer giving the employee an opportunity to explain himself before taking any decision which would affect his proprietary right. Also referred to the Court are the decisions of the Supreme Court in Olatubosun v. Nigerian Institute for Social and Economic Research [1988] 3 NWLR (Pt. 80) 25 at 52 and University of Calabar v. Essien [1996] 10 NWLR (Pt. 477) 225 at 262. The claimant went on that the defendant exhibited and sought to rely on electronic mail correspondence between its management staff dated 25th November 2009, 26th November 2009 and 4th December 2009 respectively showing that some members of the management staff had discussed the dismissal of the claimant. The claimant then submitted that the management staff of the defendant were required to inform the claimant, where they had any complaints against him, as opposed to keeping these complaints amongst themselves. That the defendant, however, failed to exhibit any documents to show that they had informed the claimant of any complaint they had against him. Furthermore, that these electronic mail correspondence fall under the category of documents that require a signature as provided in section 93 of the Evidence Act which provides as follows – (2) Where a rule of evidence requires a signature, or provides for certain consequences if a document is not signed, an electronic signature satisfies that rule of law or avoids those consequences. (3) An electronic signature may be proved in any manner, including by showing that a procedure existed by which it is necessary for a person, in order to proceed further with a transaction, to have executed a symbol or security procedure for the purpose of verifying that an electronic record is that of the person. The claimant then submitted that since the electronic mail correspondence tendered by the defendant did not carry any electronic signature whatsoever, they should be disregarded by this Court. Furthermore, even if these electronic mails were to be considered by this Court, that the defendant was required to inform the claimant of the conduct complained of and not just discuss it among its management staff. In concluding this issue, the claimant submitted that the purported termination and dismissal of the claimant was wrongful, urging the Court to so hold. Regarding issue b) i.e. whether the claimant discharged the onus on him to prove the entitlement to his claims, the claimant submitted that the Court of Appeal in Momoh v. CBN (supra) at 530 – 531 H – B provided what a plaintiff who alleges that his employment was wrongfully terminated must establish in the following words – It is a time hallowed principle of law that a plaintiff as in the instant case in a contractual employment who alleges that his appointment was wrongfully terminated has a strict burden placed upon him to establish the following material facts: (a) That he is an employee of the defendant. (b) The terms and conditions of his employment. (c) The way and manner by which he can be removed. To the claimant, he gave oral testimony to establish that he was an employee of the defendant; he exhibited the Project Employment Agreement entered into between him and the defendant; he established the terms and conditions of his employment as these terms and conditions have been set out in the Project Employment Agreement which he exhibited in this suit; and he established the way and manner by which his employment can be terminated by exhibiting the Project Management Agreement. That the provisions of paragraph 4 of the Project Employment Agreement clearly set out the way and manner in which the claimant’s employment can be terminated. The claimant then submitted that he has discharged the onus on him to prove his entitlement to his claims. In response to the contention of the defendant that there are discrepancies in the claimant’s pleadings and evidence, the claimant stated that the discrepancies are merely typographical errors which were made by counsel whilst drafting the statement of claim. That this Court should visit the sin of counsel on the litigant, referring to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Nwabueze v. NIPOST [2006] 8 NWLR (Pt. 983) 480 at 526C, where it was held that it “has long been accepted by the courts that the sins of counsel cannot be visited on the litigant”. Also referred to the Court are the cases of Ibodo v. Enorofia [1980] 5 – 7 SC 42 at 57 and Bello & ors v. Attorney General of Oyo State [1986] 12 SC 1. That the Supreme Court in Akaninwo v. Nsirim [2008] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1093) 439 at 494 C – G held as follows – Hence, it is said in law, with all emphasis that parties to a case, in the superior court of record are bound rigidly to their pleadings. But in preparation of pleadings, counsel are bound to or may be prone to make mistakes. Then must a party lose his rights to have the dispute between him and his adversary, decided on its merits simply because a mistake has been made in the preparation of the pleadings? I think not. It must always be remembered that the object of courts is to decide the rights of the parties and not to punish them for the mistakes which they make in the conduct of their cases by deciding otherwise in accordance with their rights. If it is seen that the mistakes made in the course of preparing the case of a party to litigation is not fraudulent nor is it calculated to overreach the opponent, the court must be ready to correct such a mistake upon an application to it. After all, courts do not exist for the sake of discipline but for the sake of deciding issues in controversy. With regard to the conflict between the amount stated by the claimant’s witness as his travel expenses during his oral testimony and the statement of claim, the claimant submitted that the amount stated in the statement of claim should be accepted as the correct amount, as this amount is also corroborated by the documents exhibited by the claimant. That it is trite law that where there is conflict between oral testimony and documentary evidence, the Court would accept the documentary evidence as the preferred evidence, referring to the decision of the Court of Appeal in C.A.P Plc v. Vital Inv. Ltd [2006] 6 NWLR (Pt. 976) 220 at 267 A – B, where it was held as follows – Where there is conflict between oral testimony and documentary evidence the latter should be preferred. Where there is oral evidence as well as documentary evidence, the documentary evidence should be used as hangar from which to assess oral testimony. See also Obiekwe v. Obi [2006] All FWLR (Pt. 315) 152 at 167. With regard to the issue of the effect of the failure of the claimant’s witness to adopt all documents already frontloaded on oath, the claimant referred the Court to its directive that all documents, once frontloaded are deemed to be adopted and tendered. In conclusion, the claimant prayed the Court to enter judgment in favour of the claimant against the defendant as it is clear that the defendant has failed to clearly establish that it has a proper defence to the action of the claimant. In its reply on points of law, the defendant first responded that it is trite law that where parties to an agreement have embodied the terms of their contract in a written document, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to add to, vary, subtract from or contradict the terms of the written instrument, referring to Union Bank of Nig. Ltd v. Prof. A. O. Ozigi [1994] 4 NWLR (Pt. 333) 385 Ratio 2. And in Chukwumah v. Shell Petroleum Development Company [1993] 4 NWLR (Pt. 289) 512, it was held that where a word or phrase is plain and unambiguous, same must be given its ordinary plain meaning. That there is nowhere in the Project Employment Agreement that the defendant agreed to or is to be responsible for the claimant’s transportation to the airport from home in his home country, yellow fever vaccination, cost of replacing the claimant’s international passport (which till this moment the defendant has no idea why the claimant processed another passport while on his leave). That the defendant’s responsibility to the claimant as regards transport/travel as decipherable from the Project Employment Agreement entered by the parties is clearly limited to shared use of motor vehicle and a local driver (local transportation i.e. transport within Nigeria), and the provisions of the business class ticket from the airport nearest to the claimants point of hire via the most direct and economical route. (See item 6 and 13 of the Project Employment Agreement, and Item 7 of the Appendix thereto. Item 8 of the Appendix to Agreement also emphasizes the responsibility to air travel alone.) The defendant continued that it pleaded in its statement of defence, and also gave oral testimony through its witness that the claimant’s appointment was terminated summarily due to gross misconduct on the claimant’s part and particularly for his inability to perform as contracted, and a termination letter was accordingly issued to the claimant, which he refused to acknowledge, though he received his air ticket and passport. This, the claimant neither traversed nor deemed it fit to reply to by filing a reply to the defendant’s statement of defence. That it is the law that points/issues raised by the defendant in his pleadings if not traversed or contradicted by the other party are deemed admitted in law, referring to Salzgitter Stahl (GMBH) v. Tunji Dosunmu Industries Ltd [2010] 42 NSCQR 1085 at 1109 per C. M. Chukwuma-Eneh, JSC. That the actions of the defendant are in line with the terms of the Project Employment Agreement between the parties, and the defendant has acted within the scope of her rights to terminate as contained in item 4 of the said agreement. The wordings are clear and unambiguous, and embodied in a written document, hence should be given its ordinary meaning, and should not be varied. With regard to the claim for consequential damages, the defendant submitted that it is a desperate ploy by the claimant to surreptitiously slot in, vide his Final Written Address, a “claim” which was never put before this Court in his originating processes, in a bid to overreach the defendant’s argument. That the Supreme Court in Oladunjoye v. Akinterinwa [2000] 4 SC (Part I) 19 held that a court has no jurisdiction to grant a relief a claimant or party has not asked for, praying the Court to uphold same. With regard to the authorities cited by the claimant on the issue regarding the defendant not proving the incompetence of the claimant and not informing the claimant the basis for dismissing or giving him fair hearing on the issue, the defendant submitted that the case authorities cited and relied on by the claimant to champion his argument/submissions in those regards are clearly not applicable as they border on cases where the employment was with statutory flavor. That there is a difference between an employment with statutory flavor and employment without statutory flavor. The nature of the employment of the claimant is definitely one without statutory flavor. An employment is said to have statutory flavor when it is codified in statute i.e. the terms and conditions of service are expressly set out by statute or statutory regulations made under subsidiary legislation. That this position was well espoused by the Supreme Court in the case of Chief Idoniboye-Obu v. NNPC [2003] 2 NWLR (Pt. 805) 589. In Isievwore v. NEPA [2002] 12 NWLR (Pt. 784) 417, the Supreme Court held that it is statutory flavor that puts an employment over and above ordinary master and servant relationship. Same was the position of the Court of Appeal in SPDC (Nig) Ltd v. Chief Olanrewaju [2003] FWLR (Pt. 140) 1640 at 1670 – 1671. To the defendant, in an ordinary master and servant relationship just as between the claimant and the defendant herein, the master has the power to hire and fire at will, without recourse to the rules of fair hearing. Even if there is a contract of employment between the master and the servant which also provides the mode of termination of the employment, same does not provide a right to fair hearing, all that is expected of the master is to abide by the mode of termination; and only in default can the servant make a claim for damages for wrongful termination which is not more than the what the servant would have earned over the period of notice required to lawfully terminate his employment as held in Chief Idoniboye-Obu v. NNPC (supra). That rules of natural justice need not be observed in termination of the employment of an employee in a master and servant relationship devoid of statutory flavor. An employee’s appointment can lawfully be terminated without first telling the employee what is alleged against him and hearing his defense. That this was the Supreme Court’s view in Olarewaju v Afribank Plc [2001] 13 NWLR (Pt. 731) 691 at 705 D – F, per Katsina-Alu, JSC, which was followed in Gateway Bank v. Abosede [2001] FWLR (Pt. 79) 1316 at 1335, Angel Spinning & Dyeing v. Ajah [2000] FWLR (Pt. 23) 1332 and CBN v. Archibong [2001] FWLR (Pt. 58) 1032 at 1054 – 1055. With regard to the argument relating to the emails, the defendant submitted that the electronic mail correspondences duly carry electronic signatures and satisfy the provision of section 93(3) of the Evidence Act as sending an electronic mail requires a process by which the sender must necessarily, in order to proceed further with the email sending, execute a security procedure (i.e. entering a private and confidential username and password). This is in addition to the fact that the email correspondences clearly bear the name and particulars of the respective senders. On the issue of the inconsistencies, contradictions and discrepancies inherent in the claimant’s prosecution of his case, the defendant submitted that they are not honest errors which the claimant’s counsel prays this Court to play blind to but grave fall-outs/disconnects resulting from the claimant’s drive to manipulate facts in the bid to use the machinery of the Court to obtain unjust enrichment. To the defendant, it is not in all cases that the argument that a litigant will not be punished for the inadvertence of counsel will avail a litigant, just as in this case, where what is alleged as inadvertence on the part of counsel is evidently incompetence. In Chief Boniface Amadi Ogbuehi & 3 ors v. The Governor of Imo State & 3ors [1995] 9 NWLR (Pt. 417) 53, it was held that counsel acting within the scope of his authority, express or implied, binds the client. Also in Ayua v. Gbaka [1997] 7 NWLR (Pt. 514) 659 at 671D, the Court held that if a counsel handles a case of his client carelessly or negligently and created a situation which imposes an injury on his client, such counsel places himself at the risk of being sued for professional negligence by his client. That this clearly espouses the need for counsel to apply skill, competence and diligence throughout the course of prosecuting a case. The claimant and his counsel had ample time to have vetted the presentation and prosecution of their case, and not seek to overreach the defendant’s case/submission by attempting to change the colour of their case after being served with the defendant’s Final Written Address. With regard to the argument as to the conflict between the amount stated by CW as his travel expenses during oral testimony and the statement of claim, the defendant submitted that the argument/submission of the claimant is well misplaced as there is great difference between a situation when opposing evidence i.e. an oral testimony of a party (Party A) conflicts with the documentary evidence of another party (Party B), and a situation whereby the conflicting evidence i.e. oral testimony and documentary evidence emanates from the same party (in this instance, the claimant). In the latter case, same ought to be discountenance. That this was the purport of the decision in the case of Lawson v. Afani Cont. Co Ltd [2002] 2 NWLR (Pt. 752) 585. In conclusion, the defendant urged the Court to hold that counsel’s submission on behalf of the claimant is non-sequitur and that the authorities cited are not applicable in the circumstances of this case. That this Court should consequently uphold their submissions. In considering the merit of the argument of the parties in this case, I must right away state that the reply on points of law of the defendant was almost entirely a re-argument of the issues already canvassed in it written address. I shall, therefore, discountenance same for purposes of this judgment. Secondly, I must also dispose of the argument of the defendant that because the frontloaded documents were not formally tendered and admitted as such during the oral testimonies of the parties, they necessarily cannot be used in this case and should be discountenanced. Even when the Court explained its practice and procedure in that regard in open Court to the parties, the defendant in still choosing to make an issue out of it (especially after it also placed reliance its own frontloaded documents even when they too were not formally tendered and admitted in the manner canvassed by the defendant) shows the level of degeneration that legal practice and counsel are getting to. The essence of frontloading of documents is that all parties get to know what case they are meeting in Court. Once no objection as to any of the documents is raised, they are deemed admitted and is left out is the weight and probative value to be placed on each of them. All of this was explained to the parties in open Court. The defendant did not object to any of the documents being deemed admitted; and only now turns around to make an issue out of this. Section 12 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 is quiet clear in providing that though this Court is expected to apply the Evidence Act, the Court may depart from it if the interest of justice demands or would not be jeopardized. In that regard, in AG, Osun State v. NLC, Osun State Council & 2 ors unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/275/2012 the judgment of which was delivered on December 19, 2012, this Court held that – …the practice in this Court, going by sections 36 and 37 of the Trade Disputes Act 2004, section 12 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 and Kurt Severinsen v. Emerging Markets Telecommunication Services Limited [2012] 27 NLLR (Pt. 78) 374 at 454, in allowing the frontloading of documents assumes them to be automatically admitted except specifically objected to by the opposing party. The question of the weight or probative value to be attached to the frontloaded documents is, however, separately and independently considered by the Court when evaluating the frontloaded documents. The argument of the defendant in that regard is, therefore, untenable and so goes to no issue as far as this case is concerned. Thirdly, the arguments of the defendant as to the discrepancies in paragraphs 8, 13, 18(c) and 19(c) of the statement of claim all go to no issue as vide a motion on notice, this Court permitted the correction of the typographical errors therein in a ruling of the Court at its sitting of February 5, 2013. Fourthly, the objection of the claimant to Exhibit C (copies of emails) frontloaded by the defendant on the ground that they were not signed goes to no issue. I take judicial notice of the fact that such emails are usually not signed in the manner argued by the claimant. They are consequently valid emails and would be used as such in this judgment. In deciding this case, it is not in doubt that the claimant was employed by the defendant. Exhibit 1 frontloaded by the claimant is a letter to him from the defendant dated 29th June 2009 and which contains the employment agreement between the parties. This agreement contains the terms and conditions of employment between the parties both in the agreement itself and the appendix to (an integral part of) the agreement. By the agreement, the start date of the contract is August 2009 and its anticipated duration is one. Now, the case of the claimant is that for an employment contract of a one year period (August 2009 – August 2010), his employment was terminated by the defendant on November 25, 2009, although it was on December 4, 2009 that he was given his passport and ticket, thus cutting short his employment, which termination is, therefore, “wrongful, unlawful, unconstitutional and null and void and of no effect whatsoever”. To the defendant, however, the fact that the contract is for an “anticipated duration”, it cannot be that it is actually for one year as to make it a fixed contract. In any event, that the claimant’s contract was terminated for incompetence and gross misconduct. The two issues calling for determination here are whether the employment contract is one for a fixed term of one year; and whether the claimant was dismissed for incompetence and gross misconduct, and not merely termination. To take the issue whether the contract is for a fixed term, the contract agreement talks of “anticipated duration”. What does this phrase mean? The key here is the meaning of the word, “anticipated”. The word means “expected”. The expected duration of the contract is, therefore, one year. Conceptually, if one expects something to happen, or expects a person to do something, one believes that it is one’s right to have that thing, or the person’s duty to do it for one. In like manner, therefore, if the anticipated duration of the contract is one year, then the expectation of the parties is that it will be for one year. In other words, both parties believe that it is their right to have the contract run for year. In this sense, the contract of employment between the parties is for a fixed term of one year; and I so find and hold. This means that the argument of the defendant as to the distinction between an employment contract with statutory flavor and that of master-servant goes no issue and so is discountenanced for purposes of this judgment. The next issue is whether the claimant’s contract was terminated for incompetence and gross misconduct. Paragraph 4 of the Project Employment Agreement provides, inter alia, as follows – If either you or the company wishes to terminate your employment one month’s notice in writing must be given by the party wishing to terminate. The company reserves the right to terminate employment without notice in the event of gross misconduct or breach of conduct. Whilst assigned under this contract you should not show disrespect to the civil and religious institutions, customs and practices of the inhabitants, or such country of territory, or insult or interfere with or obstruct or attempt to destruct such institutions, customs or practices. The argument of the defendant is that the claimant’s employment was terminated for incompetence and gross misconduct. DW had testified that the claimant’s employment was terminated because he could not use the software needed to perform the scope of duties he was employed to do and thus was found to be incompetent. That a local Engineer (a Nigeria) was in fact employed to do what the claimant was employed to do. This generated enmity between the claimant and the local/Nigerian Engineer. Altercations then ensued between the claimant and his Supervisor and the Nigerian Engineer. That the company found all this to be gross misconduct coupled with the fact that the claimant was incompetent. And under cross-examination, DW testified and acknowledged that it was communicated to the claimant that he was incompetent and this communication was at project meetings and through emails. There is, however, no documentary evidence of this before the Court. There are no minutes of any meeting; and the emails frontloaded by the defendant were not communications to the claimant. In fact DW went on to state that she does not even know whether the claimant was issued with any queries for the gross misconduct he is accused of. Two things arise here: was the claimant actually incompetent; and is there sufficient evidence of the said altercations between the claimant and his Supervisor/Nigerian Engineer? In the first place, the defendant did not bring as a witness any of the dramatis personae – not the Supervisor, not the Nigerian Engineer to testify as to the altercations between them and the claimant. The witness brought is DW, the Admin Manager/General Counsel of the defendant, whose evidence is not direct in terms of the events that happened. The claimant, directly involved, had testified under cross-examination that there was no bad blood between him and the company or between him and any other employee, a fact I find more believable. These facts, coupled with the fact that there is no documentary evidence before the Court as to the fact of any meeting or any communication to the claimant means that not much can be attached to the testimony of DW; and this is so despite the argument of the defendant that because the claimant did not reply to the statement of defence, he must be taken to have admitted all the averments therein. Secondly, the evidence of the defendant regarding the charge of incompetence is that the claimant could not use the software needed to perform the scope of duties he was employed to do. From the employment contract, the scope of duties of the claimant by paragraph 3 is – You will perform the duties specified in Appendix A and any other duties that may be reasonably related to this role. And in the Appendix, the job title and duties is said to be – Senior Piping Designer for Piping design and other related functional aspect for the JV of Netco/BATELitwin for the Project. The argument of the defendant is that because the claimant had no knowledge of the requisite software, he was incompetent and so had to be sacked. However, the claimant himself under cross-examination had acknowledged that he was expected to be skilled in the use of certain applications and software such as AUTOCAD and PEMS (a 3 dimensional design system), but that he could actually use these applications effectively. Now, the defendant did not state in its evidence the exact software (except that one of the emails in Exhibit C frontloaded by the defendant talks of PDMS software as the software that the claimant has no knowledge of) the knowledge of which the claimant is required to have; but the claimant indicated the software necessary for his job. I find the evidence of the claimant more believable in that regard. In any event, it is worrisome that at the point of employing the claimant, the defendant did not know that the claimant was deficient as to the software it said he was deficient in; or that the defendant could easily find a Nigerian Engineer to fill up for the claimant when it found him deficient, yet at the point that the claimant was employed there was no Nigerian Engineer to employ. I think that the whole thing about the claimant being deficient in the knowledge of an undisclosed software is just so that there can be a justification for the termination. It must also be appreciated here that the claimant worked from August 2009 to November 2009 i.e. for three months yet it was on December 4, 2009 (going by the third email in Exhibit C) that for the first time it was raised that the claimant is deficient in PDMS software knowledge. The second of the emails in Exhibit C merely stated that the claimant “will be demobbed from Egina project effective 25th Nov. ’09 due to non-performance”. Meanwhile, the first email in Exhibit C dated November 25, 2009 starts with the statement – I have just had an e-mail from Total…that John Muir has to finish tonight on the project and Mike Gorman has to finish P6 then go after we have talks. The email then reiterates the provisions of paragraph 4 of the employment contract between the claimant and the defendant. The email concludes with statement – Michael, we need to be very carefully (sic) as we need the company to put in writing the resin (sic) he has been terminated? My take from all of this is that the sequence of events here appears to be that the defendant had made up its mind to terminate the contract of employment of the claimant but had to shop for reasons to so terminate the contract. Otherwise, why the question: we need to be very [careful] as we need the company to put in writing the [reason] he has been terminated? In all, therefore, I do not believe the defendant that the claimant’s employment was terminated because he was incompetent. The talk of incompetence of the claimant was merely conjured up as an afterthought just so that the requirement of paragraph 4 of the contract of employment can be met; and I so find and hold. Exhibit D frontloaded by the defendant is supposedly the letter of termination of the employment of the claimant and is dated 4th December 2009. The claimant stated in evidence that he was not given any termination letter. The defendant, however, stated that it was the claimant who refused to receive the letter, which it gave to a driver to give to the claimant. Given my finding as to Exhibit C in terms of the sequence of events, I believe the evidence of the claimant that he was not given any termination letter. The second email in Exhibit C dated November 25, 2009 is clear in stating that the claimant “will be demobbed [meaning demobilized]”. I, therefore, believe the evidence of the claimant that his termination was verbal; and I so find and hold. In consequence of all of this, the claimant is entitled to (and I hereby grant him) reliefs a) and b) as claimed, namely – a) A declaration that the purported verbal termination of the claimant’s employment was wrongful, unlawful, unconstitutional and null and void and of no effect whatsoever. b) A declaration that the verbal termination of the claimant employment by the defendant is invalid and as such the claimant was at all points in time an employee of the defendant for the period with which the Project Employment Agreement was scheduled to endure, from August 2009 – August 2010. Having found and declared that the contract of employment of the claimant is a fixed contract of employment and that the reason for terminating the contract on grounds of incompetence and gross misconduct is not tenable as well as the finding that the termination of the employment of the claimant was verbal, what remedy is open to the claimant? By the case of College of Education, Ekiadolor v. Osayande [2010] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1191) 423 it was held that – 1. Where a contract of service is for a fixed term, the employee cannot be removed during the period of the term contracted, except for misconduct or where the employee dies. 2. Where the contract of an employment is determined before the expiration of the term agreed, the employer shall be made to pay the employee the full salary he would have earned for the period of his fixed contractual term. Going by my findings and declarations above and this judicial authority, the claimant is entitled to the payment of salary for the remainder part of his fixed contract of employment. This means that the claim for salaries for the month of December 2009 to August 2010 has been made out by the claimant. Paragraph 8 of the employment contract provides that the rate of pay is as specified in the Appendix, and payable monthly in arrears. The Appendix then provides that the payment is US$90 per hour and the standard work week is 55 – 60hrs. Now between December 2009 and August 2009, there are 39 weeks. So taking the minimum of 55hrs per week and US$90 per hour, if we multiply 55hrs per week times US$90 per hour, we will have US$4,950 per week. Multiply US$4,950 by 39 weeks, we will have US$193,050, not US$194,400.00 as claimed by the claimant. The claimant is therefore entitled to only US$193,050 as unpaid salary for the unexpired period of December 2009 – August 2009 of his fixed contract of employment. The next claim of the claimant is daily living allowance from December 2009 to August 2010, which comes to US$13,500.00. The contract of employment in paragraph 10 provides that the company will, in addition to providing accommodation, pay a daily allowance. This Living Allowance will cover all meals, laundry and personal expenditure. The Appendix then provides that the Living Allowance shall be $50 paid in Naira. From the tenor of this provision, the Living allowance is supposed to aid the claimant in terms of his stay and work in Nigeria; that is why it is to be paid in Naira. Since the claimant’s work has come to end and he is no longer in Nigeria, he cannot be entitled to this Living Allowance. His claim for that allowance, therefore, fails; and I so find and hold. The next claim of the claimant is the claim for outstanding from salaries of September and November, which comes to US$900.00. The claimant did not make any case as regards this claim. The claim consequently fails; and I so find and hold. Then there is the claimant’s claim for unpaid reimbursable expenses for re-entry visa application of £334.50. Paragraph 6 of the employment contract provides that “[a]ll travel will be provided to and from your point of hire via the most direct and economical route”. The Appendix then provides in respect of travel that “[a] business class ticket will be provided to the airport nearest to your point of hire, via the most direct and economical route”. There is nothing in the employment contract that talks of the employer footing the bill of visa application, not to talk of “re-entry visa application”. What the employment contract simply provides for in terms of travel is the air ticket to and from Nigeria. The claimant himself acknowledged that when his contract was terminated the defendant gave him an air ticket and taken to the airport. The claimant’s claim for unpaid reimbursable expenses for re-entry visa application of £334.50, therefore, fails; and I so find and hold. The last claim of the claimant is for – An order that the defendant pay to the claimant Twenty-one per cent (21%) interest on the total sum of the claimant’s full salaries, entitlement and benefits, from the date of his purported verbal termination up to the date of judgment, thereafter Ten percent (10%) interest per annum on the judgment sum, from the date the judgment is delivered and until the judgment sum is fully liquidated. In Kurt Severinsen v. Emerging Markets Telecommunication Services Limited [2012] 27 NLLR (Pt. 78) 374, this Court held as follows – The claimant also claimed for interest at the rate of 15% per annum from 1st December 2009 until the judgment debt is fully liquidated. By Order 21 Rule 4 of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007, this Court at the time of delivering a judgment or making an order may direct the time within which payment is to be made or other act is to be done and may order interest at a rate not less than 10% per annum to be paid upon any judgment. This means that, as argued by the defendant, the claimant cannot ask for pre-judgment interest. The Court can only award interest on judgment as from the date of judgment. Applying this case to the instant case, the claim for pre-judgment interest by the claimant must fail; and I so find and hold. On the whole and for the avoidance of doubt, I order as follows – 1. The claimant is entitled to only One Hundred and Ninety-Three Thousand and Fifty United States Dollars (US$193,050) as unpaid salary for the unexpired period of December 2009 – August 2009 of his fixed contract of employment. 2. The said sum of One Hundred and Ninety-Three Thousand and Fifty United States Dollars (US$193,050) is to be paid by the defendant to the claimant within 30 days from the date of this judgment. 3. Cost of the case is put at One Hundred Thousand Naira payable by the defendant to the claimant within 30 days from the date of this judgment. Judgment is entered accordingly.