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The claimant filed a complaint in this Court on 21st December 2011. In the complaint, the claimant is praying this Court for the following reliefs – 1. For the sum of Eight Hundred and Sixty-One Thousand, Five Hundred and Eighty-One Naira, Ninety-Eight Kobo (N861,581.98) only being money owing by the defendant to the claimant arising from the defendant’s deductions of car loan from the applicant’s salary without providing value for same from July 2008 to January 2011 at the rate of N41,666.67k per month totaling N791,666.73k; and the additional sum of N69,915.25k of Employer Pension Contribution of N3,679.75k per month owing by the defendant to the claimant from July 2009 to January 2011, which sum is due and payable by the defendant to the claimant. 2. Interests on the afore-stated amount owing at the rate of 10% per month from January 2011 until judgment is delivered in the case. Accompanying the complaint are the statement of facts, an application for summary judgment dated 14th December 2011 and brought pursuant to Order 10 Rule 1 of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Rules 2007 and under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court, the affidavit in support of the application for summary judgment deposed to by the claimant himself with eight exhibits (Exhibits A – H) attached. The claimant had moved his application for summary judgment but because the defendant entered appearance and filed defence processes, the Court permitted the matter to go for trial upon the application by the claimant to withdraw the said application for summary judgment. Thereafter, the claimant filed a reply to the statement of defence, list of documents to be relied upon at the trial, list of witnesses and witness statement on oath. The defence processes filed by the defendant are the memorandum of appearance, the statement of defence, list of additional witness (the original list of witness(es) was withdrawn by the defendant) and witness statement on oath of the additional witness. The defendant did not frontload any document. By agreement of counsel in the matter, given that the claims and issues are similar, and the authority of section 12(2)(a) of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Act 2006, which permits the Court to “regulate its procedure and proceedings as it thinks fit”, the decision in this case is to abide the sister cases of – 1. Omosola Sandra Oluwakemi v. Global Fleet Oil & Gas Ltd Suit No. NIC/LA/225/2011; 2. Mr. Chukwurah I. Ifeanyi v. Global Fleet Oil & Gas Ltd Suit No. NIC/LA/226/2011; 3. Mr. Odiase Allen v. Global Fleet Oil & Gas Ltd Suit No. NIC/LA/228/2011; 4. Mr. Bello Kamaldeen v. Global Fleet Oil & Gas Ltd Suit No. NIC/LA/230/2011; 5. Mr. Elugbaju Samson Olaposi v. Global Fleet Oil & Gas Ltd Suit No. NIC/LA/231/2011; 6. Mr. Osemwengie E. Lugard v. Global Fleet Oil & Gas Ltd Suit No. NIC/LA/232/2011; 7. Mr. Obajulaye Rotimi v. Global Fleet Oil & Gas Ltd Suit No. NIC/LA/235/2011; 8. Mr. Mustapha O. Hakeem v. Global Fleet Oil & Gas Ltd Suit No. NIC/LA/236/2011; and 9. Mr. Adewunmi M. Gbenga v. Global Fleet Oil & Gas Ltd Suit No. NIC/LA/239/2011. At the trial, both parties called a witness each to testify. The claimant testified on his own behalf as CW; while Sunday Inegbedion, a Business Development Manager in the defendant company, testified for the defendant as DW. The case of the claimant, as can be discerned from the statement of facts, the witness statement on oath of the claimant himself and his oral testimony, is that he was employed as an auditor and so was an employee of the defendant from 16th June 2009 until 1st February 2011 when he was relieved of his service. That as a staff of the defendant, the sum of N41,666.67 was deducted from his monthly salary for purposes of providing him with a car. That the total deductions of this sum from “July 2008 to January 2011” is N791,663.73. In addition, that the defendant deducted the sum of N3,679.75 per month from his salary from “July 2008 to January 2011” amounting to a total sum of N69,915.25 to pay for its own share of Employer Pension Contribution instead of using its own money to do so as required by law. The claimant then prayed the Court to order the payment to him of these sums which when added up come to N861,581.98. It should be noted that though the claimant stated that his employment as auditor commenced on 16th June 2009, his claims are from “July 2008 to January 2011”. The case of the defendant, as can be discerned from the statement of defence and the testimony of DW, is that by a letter of employment dated 15th June 2009, the claimant was employed by the defendant. One of the conditions of service is that the defendant would provide a fully air conditioned staff bus for the claimant. In addition to the staff bus, the defendant also paid the claimant transportation allowance. That the claimant enjoyed the transportation service provided by the defendant in the form of a staff bus during his employment. This fact was not denied in the claimant’s testimony. Because of the provision of this transportation service, the defendant deducted a fixed sum of money from the claimant’s salary every month. That this was also one of the conditions of the employment and the claimant never objected to same. That had the deductions not been made, the claimant would have been benefiting from free transportation services and receiving transportation allowance of about N41,666.67 (Forty-One Thousand, Six Hundred and Sixty-Six Naira, Sixty-Seven Kobo) every month. Furthermore, that the defendant, in line with the Pension Reform Act 2004 remitted the pension contribution deducted at source from the claimant’s salary to the latter’s Pension Fund Administrators. The defendant also remitted its own share of the pension fund to the same Pension Fund Administrator in compliance with the Act. The defendant continued that as a result of the global economic downturn, the defendant resolved to downsize its operations and workforce. For this reason, the claimant vide letter dated 1st February 2011 was informed that his services would no longer be required by the defendant company. The claimant thereafter commenced this action claiming as per his statement of facts. The defendant, in its written address dated 10th December 2012, then framed one issues for the determination of the court, namely – Whether the claimant has adduced cogent, compelling and convincing evidence to establish on the balance of probabilities that he is entitled to the reliefs sought. Before addressing this sole issue, the defendant raised an objection regarding the admissibility of Exhibit ‘D’ – a computer generated print out from the claimant’s Pension Fund Managers. That the position of the law is clear on the admissibility or otherwise of computer generated documents. Section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011 provides the conditions to be satisfied before an electronically generated document can be admitted. By subsection (4) of the section, there ought to be a certificate identifying the said document and describing the manner and the state of the devices through which the said document was produced. That in the absence of the certificate, the e-statement ought not to be admitted, urging the Court to expunge the e-statement as being inadmissible in law and referring the Court to the Supreme Court decision in Dr. Imoro Kubor & anor v. Honourable Seriake Dickson & ors unreported Suit No. SC/369/2012 delivered on 29th October 2012. The defendant submitted further that Exhibit ‘D’ has no importance or relevance to the instant case. This is because while the employer on record is Global Fleet Oil & Gas Limited, Exhibit ‘D’ shows the employer as Metrotech Global Project Limited which is a totally different entity with no connection whatsoever to the defendant company. That admissibility is a rule of evidence based on relevancy. For this proposition, the defendant referred the Court to Sadau v. The State [1968] 1 All NLR 124 and then submitted that Exhibit ‘D’ ought not to have been admitted ab initio. Not being relevant to the instant proceedings, the defendant contended that Exhibit ‘D’ ought not to have been admitted in the first instance. The defendant went on that Exhibit ‘D’ ought not to have been admitted in evidence in the first instance. However, having been admitted in evidence at the trial, that this Court has the power to expunge it as an inadmissible evidence, referring to N.I.P.C Ltd. v. Thompson Organisation Ltd [1966] 1 NMLR 99 at 104 per Lewis, JSC. Furthermore, that in the case of Rene Antoun v. Benson Oghene [2012] LPELR – CA/L/486/05, a case which arose from an employment contract the Court of Appeal held as follows – …the evidence led, not having gone to any issue ought have been disregarded. I so expunge the said evidence as led. The evidence is at variance with the pleadings and the fact that it was not challenged does not confer legitimacy on it. See UBN v. SAX [1994] 8 NWLR (Pt. 361) 150 at 171. Also referred to the Court are: Kanhia v. Maigemu [2003] 6 NWLR (Pt. 817) 496 and Owonyin v. Omotosho [1961] 2 SCNLR 53. The defendant continued that in the instant case, the claimant stated in paragraph 4 of his statement of facts as follows – … the defendant also deducted the sum of N3,679.75k per month from the claimant’s salary from July 2008 to January 2011 amounting to a total sum of N69,915.25k to pay for its (defendant’s) own share of Employer Pension Contribution...the claimant herein plead and shall rely during trial on a copy of...the Pension Managers Statement. To the defendant, Exhibit ‘D’, which is a computer generated statement from the claimant’s Pension Fund Managers tendered by the claimant in support of paragraph 4 of its statement of claim, states that the claimant’s employer is Metrotech Global Project Limited. The pertinent question, therefore, is whether Exhibit ‘D’, which was not pleaded but frontloaded by the claimant ought not to be expunged as it is not relevant to this proceeding, is at variance with the claimant’s pleadings and inadmissible for non-compliance with section 84 of the Evidence Act (as amended) 2011. That one would have expected the claimant to tender a document showing, without any iota or shadow of doubt, that the defendant company did not remit its own share of pension contributions instead of frontloading a document showing a totally different company which is alien to this proceeding. The defendant then invited the Court to peruse Exhibit ‘D’ which states Metrotech Global Project Limited as the employer of the claimant. Having failed to adduce any evidence in support of the averments contained in paragraph 4 with respect to the pension contributions, the defendant urged the Court to expunge Exhibit ‘D’. The defendant went on that facts not supported by evidence are deemed abandoned, referring the Court to the following cases: Falae v. Obasanjo (No. 2) [1999] 4 NWLR (Pt. 599) 476, Omoboriowo v. Ajasin [1984] 1 SCNLR 108 and Adegbite v. Ogunfaolu [1990] 4 NWLR (Pt. 146) 178. That having failed to adduce any evidence in support of the averments contained in paragraph 4 with respect to the pension contributions, the Court should hold that the said averments have been abandoned by the claimant. To the defendant, the law is also trite that evidence contrary to pleadings go to no issue and such pleaded facts are deemed abandoned, referring to ACB Plc v. Haston (Nig.) Ltd [1997] 8 NWLR (Pt. 515) 110 at 131 CA, Emegokwue v. Okadigbo [1973] 4 SC 113 at 117 and Woluchem v. Gudi [1981] 5 SC 291 para. 15. That Exhibit ‘D’ does not support the averments in paragraph 4; therefore, the Court should hold that Exhibit ‘D’ goes to no issue. The claimant has not proved that the defendant company failed to remit its own share of the pension contribution. Neither has it proved what sum was remitted by the defendant to the Pension Fund Managers. Therefore, the Court should expunge Exhibit ‘D’ and disregard the facts which the exhibit seeks to support. On the strength of the foregoing, that the Court should expunge Exhibit ‘D’ as it was not pleaded, is inadmissible ab initio for not being in compliance with the Evidence Act, and is at variance with the claimant’s pleadings or alternatively attach no probative value to the said Exhibit. Having canvassed arguments in support of its objection, the defendant proceeded to the other issues. First, the defendant posited that a party must succeed on the strength of its case. In this regard, the defendant argued that it is a cardinal principle of law that a claimant must succeed on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of his opponent’s case, referring to the Supreme Court decision in Akintola v. Olowo [1962] 1 SCNLR 352, Igwegbe v. Ezuma [1999] 6 NWLR (Pt. 606) 228 at 242 paras C – D and Agharuka v. FBN Ltd [2010] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1182) 465 at 481. That it is also trite that he who asserts must prove, referring to Rene Antoun v. Benson Oghene (supra). In the instant case, that the claimant’s relief is based on two claims, to wit: the pension deductions and car loan deductions. With respect to the pension deductions, the defendant canvassed arguments that Exhibit ‘D’, the document tendered in support of the claimant’s claim, is at variance with the claimant’s pleadings and not pleaded. The defendant relied on those arguments and submitted that the claimant cannot rely on that document to support its case, urging the Court to hold that the claimant has failed to prove its case in respect of the pension deductions. Furthermore, that the pay-slips which show a deduction of a fixed sum as pension deduction is not proof positive to this Court in showing what amount the defendant company remitted to the Pension Fund Managers. That adducing cogent evidence in support of its case is a burden imposed by law on the claimant, which he has failed to discharge and so the Court should dismiss the claim for pension funds and enter judgment in favour of the defendant. Next the defendant contended that parties are bound by the terms of the contract entered into. That with respect to the second leg of the claimant’s reliefs i.e. the car loan deductions, the defendant referred the Court to the document headed “Breakdown of Remuneration Package for Auditor”. That this document forms part of the terms of engagement of the claimant and it is contractual in nature. To the defendant, where parties have entered into a contract they are bound by the terms thereof, referring to Koiki v. Magnusson [1999] 8 NWLR (Pt. 615) 492 at 592 SC, Baba v. NCAC [1991] 5 NWLR (Pt.192) 388, UBN Ltd v. Umeh & Sons Ltd [1996] 1 NWLR (Pt. 426) 565 and SCOA v. Bourdex Ltd [1990] 3 NWLR (Pt. 138) 380. The defendant went on that the document headed “Breakdown of Remuneration Package for Auditor” is clear and its contents are express. The defendant then submitted that words in a document must be given their simple and ordinary meaning and under no circumstance may new or additional words be imported into the text, referring to UBN v. Ozigi [1994] 3 NWLR (Pt. 333) 385 at 404 SC. That in the instant case, the said document clearly states as follows: “Transport Allowance 500,000.00 (Deductible for two years and terminal thereafter)”. To the defendant, it is clear that the contract between the claimant and the defendant company clearly provided for the sum of N500,000.00 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira) to be deducted every year for two years. This is in fact what happened. That the defendant paid to the claimant the sum of N41,666.67 (Forty One Thousand Six Hundred and Sixty Six Naira Sixty Seven Kobo) as transportation allowance. It then deducted that amount, in accordance with the employment contract, from the claimant’s salary in the form of car loan deduction. That N41,666.67 multiplied by 12 months amounts to N500,000.04 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira Four Kobo). That doing otherwise would have been in breach of the contract entered into between the claimant and the defendant company. The defendant continued that the said document is a summary of the remuneration due to the claimant and it clearly shows that the transportation allowance paid to the claimants is deductible for 2 years and terminal thereafter. That the claimant is aware of this document and had accepted same. He is, therefore, estopped from challenging the deductions made from his salary having accepted and acquiesced to same, referring to Agidigbi v. Agidigbi [1992] 2 NWLR (Pt. 221) 98 at 120 CA. Continuing, the defendant submitted that having contracted with the defendant as per the terms of the said document, benefitted from same and having been bound by same throughout his period of employment, the claimant cannot, upon the termination of his employment, challenge the deductions as same was expressly stated in the said document. The defendant then referred the Court to Fasade v. Babalola [2003] 11 NWLR (Pt. 830) 26 and Ariori v. Elemo [1983] 1 SCNLR 13. That in a contract of master and servant, the main function of the Court is to interpret the contract. A court cannot go outside the terms of an employment contract neither can it rewrite the contract for the parties, referring to Rene Antoun v. Benson Oghene (supra), UBN v. Ozigi (supra) at 404 and Oyenuga v. Provincial Council of the University of Ife [1965] NMLR 9. Flowing from the above, the defendant invited the Court to interpret the document titled, “Breakdown of Remuneration Package for Auditor” and hold that the defendant acted as per the terms of that contract by deducting the said sum. In fact, acting in any manner otherwise would have been in breach of that contract. Lastly, the defendant contended that facts not supported by evidence are deemed abandoned, referring to Yesufu v. Oyetunde [1998] 12 NWLR (Pt. 579) 483, Omoboriowo v. Ajasin [1984] 1 SCNLR 108 and Adegbite v. Ogunfaolu [1990] 4 NWLR (Pt. 146) 178. That in the instant case, the defendant company both in its pleadings and in the testimony of its witness stated that it provided a staff bus for its employees, the claimant inclusive. Although, in the claimant’s reply dated 3rd June 2012 to the statement of defence, the claimant denied that fact, however, no such evidence was led in support of that denial, referring to the witness statement of Iroko Lateef, which does not contain any evidence in support of the pleading. That being so, the defendant urged the Court to disregard the general traverse contained in paragraph 1 of the claimant’s reply because it was not contained in his testimony as evidence and hold that, having not been supported by evidence, it has been abandoned. In conclusion, the defendant urged the Court to dismiss the claimant’s claims and enter judgment in favour of the defendant. The claimant’s reply written address is dated 25th January 2013. In it, the claimant framed three issues for the determination of the Court, namely – 1. Whether the claimant is entitled to a refund of N791,666.73 as deductions for car loan by the defendant. 2. Whether the defendant complied fully with the provisions of the Pension Reform Act LFN 2004. 3. Whether the claimant is entitled to a refund of N34, 957.62 as excess of money deducted as pension’s contributory fund. Regarding issue 1 i.e. whether the claimant is entitled to refund of the car loan deduction, the claimant contended that an employer has no right to deduct from the amount payable to an employee what is not agreed upon or to deduct over and above what is agreed upon. That the claim of the claimant is founded upon the equitable doctrine of where there is a right, there is a remedy. To the claimant, the best way to determine the rights and liabilities of the parties in a contract of employment is to examine the terms and conditions of the contract, referring to Ansambe v. Bank of the North Limited [2005] 8 NWLR (Pt. 928) 650 at 662. That the meaning to be placed on a contract is the plain, clear and obvious result of the terms used. In the instant case, that there is no ambiguity in terms of contract of employment as to what is to be deducted which is transport allowance, referring to Exhibit ‘A’ i.e. the letter of employment and breakdown of remuneration package for auditor. The claimant continued that his remedy is to recover the amount deducted as car loan (referring to Exhibit ‘C’) that was never provided. The claimant then referred the Court to Nika Fishing Company Limited v. Lavina Corporation [2008] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1114) 509 at 542 where it was held that when construing a document in dispute between two parties, the proper course is to discover the intention or contemplation of the parties and not to import into the contract an idea not patent on the face of the document; and that the main duty of the Court is to interpret that contract and give effect to the wishes of the parties as expressed in the contract document. That in the construction of documents, the question is not what the parties to the document may have intended to do by entering into the document, but what is the meaning of the words used in the document, referring to Amizzi v. Nzeribe [1989] 4 NWLR (Pt. 118) 775 and Oduye v. Nigeria Airways Limited [1987] 2 NWLR (Pt. 55) 126. To the claimant, the contention of the defendant that an air-conditioner bus was provided in lieu of car loan is not acceptable and it is tantamount to breach of contract of employment given that a contract must be strictly followed, referring to Niger Dam Authority v. Lajide [1973] 5 SC 207, Nimateks Associates v. Macro Construction Company Limited [1991] 2 NWLR (Pt. 174) 411 and African Reinsurance Corporation v. Fantoye [1986] 1 NWLR (Pt. 111) 113. In the light of the above, that Exhibit ‘A’ i.e. the breakdown of remuneration and the letter of employment, stipulates a specific amount of money to be deducted for transport allowance and Exhibit ‘C’ shows ‘car loan’ deductions. It is obvious that transport allowance is not synonymous to ‘car loan’ deduction. Therefore, whatever is deducted as car loan that was not provided should be returned; otherwise, it will be tantamount to robbing Paul to pay Peter. That the Court is bound to confine itself with the clear words and contents of the document before it, referring to Abalogu v. Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria [2003] FWLR 191 1672. That the ingenious argument of the defendant that the deduction is legal and that the contract of employment cannot be re-written is faulty and misconstrued. The claimant continued that in his written deposition before this Court, he testified that the defendant failed to provide him with a car for which money was deducted. He then submitted that where evidence was given by a party and is not controverted by the other party who has the opportunity to do so, and such evidence is inherently credible, the Court is to accord credibility to such evidence, as posited in Okoebor v. Police Council [2003] FWLR (Pt. 1611) at 189; [2003] 12 NWLR (Pt. 834) 444 and Asafa Food Factory v. Alraine (Nig.) Ltd [2002] 12 NWLR (Pt. 781) 253. To the claimant, it is firmly settled in law that any facts in a pleading and admitted by other party need no more proof, citing section 123 of the Evidence Act 2011. In answer to the objection of the defendant, the claimant contended that it is trite in law that relevancy is the rule of admissibility. That whenever a document is relevant, it is admissible; while the issue of weight to be attached to the evidence is the discretion of the Court. Therefore, that the objection of the defendant to admissibility of Exhibit “D” cannot be sustained in law since the said document is relevant. This proposition finds support in the case of Ogbe v. Asade [2009] 18 NWLR (Pt. 1172) 106 at 138, where the Court held that: “It is now firmly settled that in determining the admissibility of evidence, it is the relevance of evidence, such as a document, that is important”. On the argument of the defendant that the failure of the claimant to tender a certificate in support of Exhibit “D” renders it inadmissible, the claimant submitted, on the strength of section 12 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006, that the Court is vested with power to regulate its procedure and proceedings as it thinks fit and also to depart from the provisions of the Evidence Act in the interest of justice. Regarding issue 2 i.e. whether the defendant complied fully with the provisions of the Pension Reform Act LFN 2004, the claimant contended that the Act in section 11(1) provides thus – Every employee shall maintain an account (in this Act referred to as Retirement Savings Account) in his name with any Pension Fund Administrator of his choice. That the claimant before his appointment with the defendant in June 2009 already opened a Savings Retirement Account with a pension fund administrator of his choice in consonance with the Act and which was in his personal name and that of his former employer known as ‘Metrotech Global Project Limited’. The Act further provides in section 13 that – Where an employee transfers his service or employment from one employer or organization to another, the same retirement savings Account shall continue to be maintained by the employee. To the claimant, therefore, the proposition of the defendant that Exhibit ‘D’ is inadmissible and should be expunged is a misplaced argument. The claimant then submitted that Exhibit ‘D’ is relevant and is in full compliance with the provision of the Pension Reform Act 2004. The claimant continued that it is evidently shown on Exhibit ‘D’ that the sum of N3,679.75k was deducted monthly from the salary of the claimant; this claim was never rebutted by the defendant. The claimant led evidence at the trial that he was an ex-employee of the defendant and the statement of facts substantiated the fact with the letter of employment tendered as Exhibits ‘A’ and ‘B’. That in line with the above argument, the defendant is in breach of the provisions of section 9(1)(c) of the Act which enumerates the rate of contribution of both the employee and the employer as “a minimum of seven and a half per cent by the employer and a minimum of seven and a half percent by the employee”. As to whether the claimant is entitled to a refund of N343, 957.62k as excess of money deducted as pension contributory fund, the claimant contended that a person cannot benefit from its own wrong; therefore, the Court has a duty to prevent injustice, citing Teriba v. Adeyemo [2010] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1211) 242 at 263 per Tabai, JSC. That Exhibit ‘D’ is the retirement savings account statement of the claimant indicating a deduction of N3,579.76k monthly which is in excess of the statutory contribution of the claimant as required by section 9(1)(c) of the Pension Reform Act. The claimant then submitted that the claimant is entitled to recover the excess deductions from his monthly salary culminating in the pension’s fund. The claimant went on that the defendant spuriously argued that the claimant had not successful proved his case because the pay-slips tendered before the Court do not cover the entire period of the employment. There is an irrebutable presumption that the claimant was in the employment of the defendant till 1st February 2011 and he earned salary for the entire period. To the claimant, Exhibit ‘C’ is the pay-slip of the defendant. The onus is on the defendant to disclaim it as not authentic. That the burden is on the defendant to show or deny that the amount stated on Exhibit ‘C’ was not deducted from the salary of the claimant. Thus, in civil matters where the plaintiff, as in this case, had proved his case or facts in the pleadings, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove otherwise, referring to section 136(1) of the Evidence Act 2011. In conclusion, the claimant prayed the Court to hold that the claimant is entitled to recover the excess of money deducted as pension contributory fund and the sum of money deducted for car loan. He also urged the Court to discountenance the arguments of the defendant as they lack merit and without substance and to enter judgment in favour of the claimant. The defendant’s reply on points of law is dated 8th February 2013. To the defendant, the claimant in his address raised the following issues – a) That the contract of employment in the instant case provided for deductions for transport allowance and not car loan deductions. b) That Exhibit ‘D’ – a computer generated statement struck out by this Court on 15th June 2012 – is relevant. c) That the claimant is entitled to the sum of N343, 957.62 (Three Hundred and Forty Three Thousand, Nine Hundred and Fifty Seven Naira, Sixty Two Kobo). The defendant then proceeded to treat these issues seriatim. Regarding issue a), the defendant asked whether the provision of an official car or a staff bus was in the contract of employment. The answer to it is a resounding no. That the provision of vehicles by the defendant company was not one of the terms in the contract of employment. Therefore, that neither an official car nor a staff bus is a right accruable to the claimant as per the contract of employment hence, no remedy accrues in that regard. The defendant agreed with the claimant that, relying of the case of Nika Fishing Company Limited v. Lavina Corporation [2008] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1114) 509 at 542, when construing a document in dispute, the proper course is to discover the intention of the parties. That this is because it is both the claimant and defendant’s intention that a particular sum of money would be deducted from the claimant’s salary for a definite period (2 years). The defendant then drew the Court’s attention to paragraph 4.10 of the claimant’s address where the claimant admitted that the contract of employment provided for certain deductions. That in accordance with the intention of parties, the defendant deducted the stipulated amount and for the fixed period. The defendant, however, conceded that the deductions made from the claimant’s salary were referred to as car loan deductions as opposed to transport allowance; nonetheless, that in interpreting a contract the Court is bound to look at the intention of the parties, which is that a fixed sum of money for a particular period be deducted from claimant’s salary. That in the instant case, the defendant complied with the terms of the contract by (a) deducting the exact sum as provided in the contract, and (b) deducting the exact sum for the period stipulated. That the only difference being the nomenclature of the deduction. While the contract stated that the sum of N500,000 (Five Hundred thousand Naira) would be deducted for 2 years as “transport allowance” what was actually deducted was N500,000.00 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira) as “car loan”. The defendant then submitted that it is the intention of the parties that the Court ought to look at, urging the Court to apply the test laid down in the Nika case and hold that the intention of both parties was that the defendant would deduct the sum of N500,00.00 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira) for two years. That this is what the defendant company did. To the defendant, the courts have a duty to give effect to a contract freely entered by parties, citing Yusuf & Company v. Kebbi State Government [2010] LPELR – CA/S/148/2000, Daodu v. UBA Plc [2004] 9 NWLR (Pt. 878) 24 and Olaloye v. Balogun [1990] 5 NWLR (Pt. 148) 24. That in the instant case, the wishes and intention of the parties, as expressed in the contract of employment, is that the sum of N500,000.00 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira) be deducted for a period of 2 years. To the defendant, the most important consideration is that not more money was deducted than was intended by the parties. Therefore, that the Court should hold that substantial performance/compliance was observed in carrying out the intendment of the contract of employment and any change in nomenclature from ‘transport allowance’ to ‘car loan deductions’ is a mere error or irregularity on the part of the defendant. That the Court is also bound to do substantial justice even more so in the case of substantial performance, citing Jack Phillips v. Arco Ltd [1971] LPELR – SC.149/1969. The defendant went on that in the unlikely event that the Court disagrees with its position, then the Court still has a duty to give effect to the contract of employment dated 16th June 2009. That is to say, by that contract, the defendant company is still entitled to make the deductions as provided therein. In response to paragraphs 4.14 – 4.15 of the claimant’s address, the defendant submitted that the claimant was cross-examined and then drew the Court’s attention to the antics of the claimant while in the witness box – the claimant sought to pass as his own witness statement, the witness statement of one Chukwurah Ifeanyi the claimant in Suit No. NIC/L/227/2011. That by so doing, the integrity of the witness has been put into question, citing Onuoha v. State [1989] 2 NWLR (Pt. 101) 25 where the Supreme Court held that the integrity of a witness is a determinant factor in deciding whether a witness was credible or not. Furthermore, that nowhere in the claimant’s written deposition is it denied that a staff bus was provided to the claimant. That the claimant did not deny in that statement that a staff bus was provided for his use. Therefore, that facts upon which no evidence was led are deemed abandoned, citing Omoboriowo v. Ajasin [1984] 1 SCNLR 108. That having not led any evidence on this point, the need to cross-examine the claimant in respect of the staff bus did not arise. In the light of the foregoing, the defendant urged the Court to hold that the deductions made were contractual and in accordance with the terms of the contract of employment dated 16th June 2006. Regarding issue b), that the claimant relied on section 13 of the Pension Reform Act 2004. However, that one pertinent question which arises is whether this Court, relying on Exhibit ‘D’, can make a finding of fact that the sums remitted to the account emanated from the defendant company. The defendant then urged the Court to answer this question in the negative because Exhibit ‘D’ refers to the employer as Metrotech Global Project Limited and not Global Fleet Oil & Gas Ltd. The defendant went to submit that a document speaks for itself, referring to Governor of Ogun State v. Mr. Adegboyega Adebola Coker [2008] All FWLR (Pt. 406) 1900 at 1913, Divine Ideas Limited v. Haja Mero Umoru [2007] All FWLR (Pt. 380) 1468 at 1500 and Vera Ezomo v. New Nigeria Bank Plc & anor [2007] All FWLR (Pt. 368) 1032 at 1065. That oral evidence is inadmissible to vary, add to or contradict the contents of a document, citing Ogundele v. Agiri [2009] 18 NWLR (Pt. 1173) 219 SC. In the instant case, that Exhibit ‘D’ is a document which speaks for itself. It is the best evidence and the law forbids any variation, addition or contradiction, by oral evidence, to the contents thereof. That the claimant cannot by oral evidence change the contents of Exhibit ‘D’. The defendant then urged the Court to take Exhibit ‘D’ as it is when it states that the employer who has been making remittances is Metrotech Global Project Limited. That the claimant has a duty to prove its case on the balance of probability. It has woefully failed in so doing and the Court should so hold. The defendant went on to call on the Court to expunge Exhibit ‘D’ as it is inadmissible for not fulfilling the conditions precedent outlined in section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011 or, alternatively, attach no probative value or weight to it as it does not have any bearing to the instant case, more so as this Court cannot make any finding on it with relation to the defendant. Regarding issue c), the defendant contended that the claimant’s claim for the sum of N343,957.62 (Three Hundred and Forty-Three Thousand, Nine Hundred and Fifty-Seven Naira, Sixty-Two Kobo) is ludicrous because nowhere in the General Form of Complaint or Statement of Facts did the claimant claim the said sum. That a party is bound by its pleadings and estopped from sneaking in a separate claim by way of a final address different from what was claimed in the General Form of Complaint, citing Ademolaju v. Adenipekun [1999] 1 NWLR (Pt. 587) 440 CA, Ehimare v. Emhonyon [1985] 1 NWLR (Pt. 2) 177, George v. Dominion Flour Mills Ltd [1963] 1 All NLR 71; [1963] 1 SCNLR 117, Metaliplex v. A.G. Leventis (Nig.) Ltd [1976] 2 SC 91, Ochonma v. Unosi [1965] NMLR 321, and Total (Nigeria) Ltd v. Nwako [1978] 5 SC 1. Furthermore, that a Court cannot award a relief not claimed, referring to the dictum of Augie, JCA in Unokan Enterprises v. Omuvwie [2005] 1 NWLR (Pt. 907) 293 to the effect. Also referred to the Court are: NBCI v. Standard (Nig.) Eng. Co. Ltd [2002] 8 NWLR (Pt. 768) 104, Ndulue v. Isezim [2002] 12 NWLR (Pt. 780) 139 and Ogun v. Asemah [2002] 4 NWLR (Pt. 756) 208. That a court is not Santa Claus and cannot grant more than what is asked, citing Unokan Enterprises v. Omuvwie, supra. The defendant went on that in the instant case, the claimant’s claim is for N861,581.98 (Eight Hundred and Sixty-One Thousand, Five Hundred and Eighty-One Naira, Ninety-Eight Kobo) only. He did not ask the court, in his pleadings, for the sum of N343,957.62 (Three Hundred and Forty-Three Thousand, Nine Hundred and Fifty-Seven Naira, Sixty-Two Kobo) which he now does by way of a final address. The position of the law is clear; an address is no substitute for pleadings, citing Reynolds Construction Co. RBB [1993] 6 NWLR (Pt. 297) 122, NNSL v. Emenike [1987] 4 NWLR (Pt. 63) 77, and Buraimoh v. Bamgbose [1989] 3 NWLR (Pt. 109) 352 at 365. In consequence, that the claim for N343,957.62 (Three Hundred and Forty-Three Thousand, Nine Hundred and Fifty-Seven Naira, Sixty-Two Kobo) ought to fail. In conclusion, the defendant urged the Court to dismiss the claim in its entirety and enter judgment in favour of the defendant. In considering the merit of the case, I must first point out that the defendant’s reply on points of law is anything but a reply on points of law. What the defendant did was simply to reargue its case or to raise issues it forgot to raise when it filed its first written address. For instance, the defendant in paragraph 2.6 of its said reply on points of law raised the issue of the credibility of the claimant as a witness and asserting in the process that the claimant played out some antics. The defendant did not raise this issue in its first written address so as to give the claimant the opportunity to react. Instead, it raised it at the stage of reply on points of law, effectively denying the claimant a right of reply. Furthermore, in its said reply on points of law, the defendant made issue b) supposedly raised by the claimant as – That Exhibit ‘D’ – a computer generated statement struck out by this Court on 15th June 2012 – is relevant. Two issues arise here. First, the court did not strike Exhibit ‘D’ on 15th June 2012. What happened was that the claimant applied to withdraw his motion for summary judgment which the Court granted. The documents frontloaded were not struck out as there was already a compliant as per the Rules of the Court. The confusion created here was cleared by the Court on 13th February 2013 in restoring all the documents frontloaded by the claimant. Secondly, when the defendant put issue b) as it did, one expected that it would pursue its argument in that regard. However, nowhere in its said reply on points of law did it substantiate the assertion that Exhibit ‘D’ was struck out by the Court. In other words, the defendant deliberately made that assertion up and made no attempt whatsoever to substantiate it. Why the defendant had to state that Exhibit ‘D’ was struck out by the court without substantiating it remains a mystery. If this is how advocacy is turning to today, then the legal profession must really be going down. On the whole, therefore, the said replied on points of law is hereby discountenanced for purposes of this judgment. The next issue is the objection raised by the defendant as to the admissibility of Exhibit ‘D’, a computer generated document. The argument of the defendant is that Exhibit ‘D’ did not satisfy the conditions in section 84 of the Evidence Act and so it is inadmissible; hence it should be expunged. A similar argument was raised by Olamide Akinla Esq. (counsel to the defendant in the present case) who was also counsel to the defendant in Lucky Ihanza & anor v. Global Fleet Oil & Gas Limited unreported Suit No. NIC/LA/217/2011 the judgment of which was delivered on March 27, 2013, a case similar in facts to the present case. Relying on section 12 of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Act 2006, which provides that though this Court shall be bound by the Evidence Act but may depart from it in the interest of justice, my learned brother Agbadu-Fishim J rejected the argument of Olamide Akinla Esq. I see no reason to depart from the sound reasoning of my learned brother in that regard. I only wish to add that this Court is not expected to be bound by formality and technicalities. Counsel to the defendant is not challenging the authenticity of Exhibit ‘D’; only that it is not accompanied by a certificate identifying it and describing the manner and the state of the device(s) through which it was produced. The interest of justice in the instant case will not be served by recourse to this undue technicality; and I so find and hold. I, therefore, hold that in the interest of justice Exhibit ‘D’ is admissible and relevant for the determination of this matter. The case of the claimant is that the defendant promised a car and in that regard made deductions from his monthly salary. That he was neither given the car nor were the deductions made from his monthly salary refunded to him. Secondly, that the defendant further made deductions from the claimant’s monthly salary to pay for its (employer’s) own share of Employer Pension Contribution instead of using its (employer’s) own money to do so as required by law. In both claims, it should be noted that though the claimant stated that his employment as auditor commenced on 16th June 2009, his claims are from “July 2008 to January 2011”. Given that his employment, by Exhibit A, commenced on 16th June 2009, I shall use 16th June 2009 to January 2011 as the benchmark. The question to be presently answered is whether from the exhibits in this case, a case is founded for the claims of the claimant. Exhibit A is the letter of employment of the claimant. Nowhere in this letter of employment is a car promised the claimant. Exhibit B is the breakdown of the remuneration package of the claimant. The relevant entitlements of the claimant from this exhibit are: “Employer Cont. (Pension) – 44,157.00”; “Transport Allowance – 500,000.00 (Deductible for two years and terminated thereafter)”; “Fuel Allowance – 36,000.00” and “Driver’s Allowance – 50,400.00”. Now, all these sums are couched as allowances payable to the claimant, not as deductible claims against the claimant. Exhibit C has two copies of the pay-slip of the claimant for the months of August 2010 and November 2010. It indicates as Transport allowance for each month the sum of 41,666.67. It then goes on to indicate for each month the same sum of 41,666.67 as car loan deduction. Pension deduction for each month is put at 3,679.75. Exhibit D is the retirement savings account of the claimant with Stanbic IBTC Pension Managers from 01 January 2008 to 30 June 2011. It indicates the net contribution for the respective months from September 2009 to December 2010 as 3,579.76 i.e. about N100 short of what was actually deducted. Regarding Exhibit D, the defendant had argued that it does not disclose the defendant as the employer of the claimant. Instead it discloses Metrotech Global Project Limited as the claimant’s employer. I am satisfied with the explanation of counsel to the claimant that legally speaking, as provided in sections 11 and 13 of the Pension Reform Act 2004, the retirement savings account chosen by an employee shall continued to be maintained by the employee where he/she changed jobs. From Exhibit C, the monthly basic salary of the claimant is N23,333.33; transport allowance is N41,666.67; and the housing allowance is N10,786.83. These three payments total N75,786.83. Now section 9(1)(c) of the Pension Reform Act No. 2 of 2004 mandates the employee and the employer to each contribute for the employee’s pension a minimum of seven and half percent of the employee’s monthly emoluments. The phrase “monthly emoluments” is defined in section 102 of the Pension Act to mean ‘a total sum of basic salary, housing allowance and transport allowance’. This means a minimum of seven and half percent of N75,786.83 will come to N5,684.01. What this means is that the N3,679.75 actually deducted from the claimant’s pay-slip as pension contribution is not even up to the seven and half percent enjoined by section 9 of the Pension Reform Act as the contribution of the employee to his pension account. Of course, it also means that the employer did not pay its own share of the contribution, which is a minimum of seven and half percent, to the pension account of the claimant. On this issue, therefore, I find that – 1. The employer did not comply with the mandatory provision of section 9 of the Pension Act as to contributions to the pension account of the claimant. What it did instead was to split the sum of the employee into two, and then apportion half as employee’s contribution and the other half as employer’s contribution. 2. The deductions from the monthly emolument of the claimant as his contribution to his pension account falls short of the mandatory minimum, which is seven and half percent. 3. The employer did not pay its own share of the contribution, which is a minimum of seven and half percent, to the pension account of the claimant. I indicated earlier that in Exhibit C it will be seen that Transport allowance for each of the months of August and November of 2010 is the sum of N41,666.67 and the same sum of N41,666.67 for the two months is classified as car loan deduction. What this shows is that the employer did not give the claimant his transport allowance as an entitlement. It was cancelled out by the same amount taken out as car loan. In this regard, I believe the averment of the claimant that deductions were made from his monthly salary for a car, which car was not given to him, neither was the money returned to him. On this score, I find for the claimant; and this is so irrespective of the fact that Exhibit A did not contain any provision promising a car to the claimant. The argument of the defendant that the deductions made from the claimant’s salary were referred to as car loan deductions as opposed to transport allowance (the only difference being the nomenclature of the deduction) go to no issue here as allowances and deductions cannot be one and the same. Consequently, the prayer of the defendant that the Court should uphold that the defendant complied with the terms of the contract by (a) deducting the exact sum as provided in the contract, and (b) deducting the exact sum for the period stipulated cannot be granted and is hereby denied. The defendant had argued that one of the conditions of service is that the defendant would provide a fully air conditioned staff bus for the claimant There is no evidence of this assertion. In Exhibit A, the employment contract, there is no provision to this effect. The argument of the defendant that the sum of N41,666.67 if multiplied by 12 months comes to N500,000.04 which is the “N500,000 (Deductible for two years and terminal thereafter)” indicated as transport allowance in the breakdown of remuneration package for auditor attached to Exhibit A, goes to no issue. For one, conceptually an allowance to an employee is an earning and so it cannot at the same time be classified as deductible, as if it was an expense. A contract, such as Exhibit A, which brands a sum as both an allowance and a deduction is unfair in such a term and can only amount to unfair labour practice if it is found to be in an employment contract. The claimant in his complaint, therefore, claimed for the N41,666.67 per month from July 2008 to January 2011 i.e. for 31 months. However, by Exhibit A, the claimant’s employment commenced on 16th June 2009. So the period I will use here is 16th June 2009 to January 2011 i.e. 19 months. When N41,666.67 is multiplied by 19 months, what we have is N791,666.73. This is the amount due and payable by the defendant to the claimant. It represents the transport allowance which should have been paid to the claimant by the defendant but was not. It was instead erroneously withheld as a deductible. On this I find for the claimant. Also, the claimant in his complaint had claimed for “…the additional sum of N69,915.25K of Employer Pension Contribution of N3,679.75k per month owing by the defendant to the claimant from July 2008 to January 2011, which sum is due and payable by the defendant to the claimant”. But in paragraph 6.0 of his written address, the counsel to the claimant had asked “whether the claimant is entitled to a refund of N343,957.62k as excess of money deducted as pension contribution fund”. On this, the defendant argued that a court cannot give a claimant what it did not ask for. In other words, because the said sum of N343,957.62k was not indicated in the complaint, the claimant cannot in the written address ask for it. I agree with the defendant in this regard. The question, however, remains what the claimant actually asked for in his complaint. As indicated above, the claimant asked the Court to order the payment to him of – …the additional sum of N69,915.25k of Employer Pension Contribution of N3,679.75k per month owing by the defendant to the claimant from July 2008 to January 2011, which sum is due and payable by the defendant to the claimant. Now I earlier found that the defendant did not remit its own contribution regarding the pension fund of the claimant. In this regard, the claimant is claiming for the period July 2008 to January 2011, which is 31 months. But in using the 19 month benchmark I adopted, if N3,679.75k is multiplied by 19 months, what we have is N69,915.25. This is the part of the contribution of the defendant that it failed to remit in respect of the pension fund of the claimant. I, therefore, find and hold that this sum of N69,915.25 is due and payable from the defendant to the claimant. The last claim of the claimant is for interests on the sums owing at the rate of 10% per month from January 2011 until judgment is delivered in the case. In Kurt Severinsen v. Emerging Markets Telecommunication Services Limited [2012] 27 NLLR (Pt. 78) 374, this Court held as follows – The claimant also claimed for interest at the rate of 15% per annum from 1st December 2009 until the judgment debt is fully liquidated. By Order 21 Rule 4 of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007, this Court at the time of delivering a judgment or making an order may direct the time within which payment is to be made or other act is to be done and may order interest at a rate not less than 10% per annum to be paid upon any judgment. This means that, as argued by the defendant, the claimant cannot ask for pre-judgment interest. The Court can only award interest on judgment as from the date of judgment. Applying this case to the instant case, the claim for pre-judgment interest by the claimant must fail; and I so find and hold. On the whole, I find for the claimant in terms of his complaint but only to the following extent – 1. The defendant shall, within 30 days of this judgment, pay to the claimant the sum of N791,666.73 being the N41,666.67 erroneously deducted per month from July 2009 to January 2011. 2. The defendant shall, within 30 days of this judgment, pay to the claimant the sum of N69,915.25 being its part of the contribution to the claimant’s pension fund that it did not remit. 3. Cost of the case is put at Twenty-Five Thousand Naira payable, within 30 days of this judgment, by the defendant to the claimant. Judgment is entered accordingly.