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By a motion on notice dated and filed on the 27th of February 2012, brought pursuant to Order 19 Rule 18(1)(e) and Order 25 Rule 4 of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007 and under the inherent jurisdiction of the Honourable Court, the Claimant/Applicant prayed the court for the following orders: 1. An order reviewing its decision to deliver its ruling on the Applicant’s motion for Interlocutory injunction on the 12th day of March 2012 to a later date. 2. An order revoking its order/directive of 14 February 2012 deeming the Respondents written address filed out of time as having been properly filed and served. OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE 3. An order extending the time within which the Applicant may file her Reply on Points of Law in support of her motion for Interlocutory Injunction out of time. 4. An order deeming the Reply on Points of Law already filed as having been properly filed and served. 5. AND FOR such further or other order(s) as the Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances. The motion was supported by an affidavit of eight (8) paragraphs deposed to by Doris Eseoghene Ogbodu, the Claimant/Applicant in this matter. Attached to said affidavit are two exhibits, Exhibits A and B. The Claimant/Applicant’s counsel equally filed a written address in support of the said motion for review. The Defendants/Respondents counsel also filed a counter affidavit of eight paragraphs deposed to by Blessing Akpovbobo, a staff in the firm of the counsel to the defendants/respondents. Accompanying the said affidavit is one exhibit, Exhibit A. There is also a written address in opposition to the motion for review of the court’s order. The Claimant/Applicant filed a further and better affidavit of eight (8) paragraphs sworn to by Doris Eseoghene Ogbodu the Claimant in this case. There is also a reply on points of law in relation to the motion for review filed by the Claimant/Applicant. The parties adopted their respective written addresses. In his written address in support of the application learned claimant/applicant’s counsel formulated one issue for the determination of the court, namely, whether the Applicant is entitled to the relief she is seeking. 3.0 ARGUMENTS 3.1 By virtue of order 19 Rule 18 [1] this Honourable Court is empowered either of its own motion or on application by any of the parties to the proceedings to review any order made by it and may, on such review, revoke, or vary that order on the ground that [e] the interest of justice requires such review. An ‘order is defined by the Black’s law dictionary as ‘a command, direction or instruction’. 3.2 The direction given by this Honourable Court on the 14th day of February 2012 is that its ruling on the Applicant’s motion for interlocutory injunction will be delivered on the 12th day of March 2012. The Honourable court also granted the Respondents prayer deeming the written address [filed as an exhibit to the motion for extension of time] as having been properly filed and served 3.3 There is no record that the default fees were paid by the Respondents in compliance with the proviso of Order 25 Rule 4 of the Rules of this Honourable Court. The Applicant submits that payment of default fees by the Respondents is a condition precedent to the assumption of jurisdiction of this Honourable Court to hear them in the matter. The Proviso to Order 25 Rule 4 states thus: ‘Provided that any party who defaults in performing an act within the time authorized by the Court or under these Rules, SHALL pay to the court an additional fee of =N=50.00 [Fifty Naira] for each day of default at the time of compliance’. Our humble submission is that the word ‘shall’ used in the proviso makes it mandatory for the Respondents to pay the default fees failing which their rights to be heard should be denied. 3.5 There is no indication that the default fees were paid by the Respondents in compliance with the proviso of Order 25 Rule 4 of the Rules of this Honourable Court as the Respondents stated in their motion paper [under prayer 2 for a deeming order] that they paid appropriate filing fees. They did not state that they paid default fees. The Law is clear. The Rules of the Court must be obeyed. The Court of Appeal in the case of U.l.C Ltd v T.A Hammond (Nig) Ltd. (1998) 9 NWLR (Pt 565) 340 @ 346-347 ratio 18 held that Rules of court are meant to be followed because the rules of court are designed to promote quick dispensation of justice in accordance with the rule of natural justice “ audi alterem partem” and to avoid the element of surprise on the other party. [George v Dominion Flour Mills (1963) 1 SCNLR 11 7 referred to]. 3.6 Furthermore, it is on record that the written address of the Respondents is attached to their motion for extension of time as Exhibit A. A litigant praying the Court for a deeming order has a responsibility to file the document [he seeks to be deemed as having been properly filed and served] separately and not as an exhibit otherwise the deeming order will be refused and he would be directed to properly file in the document. See Order 20 Rule 4 of the Rules of this Honourable Court. 3.7 The Applicant also submits that the 7 days period for her to file her Reply on Points of Law begins to count from the date of the service of the filed written address. On the issue of the affidavit in support of the motion for extension of time which is not sworn to before a Commissioner for oaths, we refer the Court to the case of Agusiobo v Onyekwelu(2003) 14 NWLR (pt 839) 34 at pages 52 CD and 54 AC the counter-affidavit of the Appellant was not sworn or signed by the appropriate authority even all fees were paid and the deponent had signed his column. All the parties including the court labored under the impression that the affidavit was proper. It was the respondent’s counsel urged the lower court to hold that there was infact no counter-affidavit to his application. The lower court agreed. On appeal, the court of Appeal though agreed that the defect was not one that S.84 could cure, it held that an application ought to have been made under this provision for leave for the affidavit to be taken to the commissioner for Oaths to sign it since the fault or omission was that of the Commissioner for oaths to sign it since the fault or omission was that of the commissioner for Oaths. It is therefore in the interest of justice that the Honourable court revokes its order/directive of 14th February 2012 deeming the Respondents’ written address as having been properly filed and served for non compliance with the Rules of Court. ON PRAYERS 2 & 3 3.8 Order 5 Rule 3 of the Rules of this Honourable Court provides that the Court may direct a departure from these rules where the interest of justice so requires. Our humble submission is that it is in the interest of justice that the Applicant be permitted to file her Reply on Points of Law out of time and that the Reply on Point of Law filed be deemed to be properly filed and served having paid the penalty for late filing. 3.9 The Applicant in her supporting affidavit herein states that her Counsel Mrs. M. O. Ogbe through a colleague contacted Barrister E. Nwekenze to hold her brief in this suit with the firm instruction that she will handle the motion for interlocutory injunction personally. See paragraph 2[ii] of the supporting affidavit. That immediately she received the Respondents’ motion for extension of time, she called the said Barrister E. Nwekenze to inform him that she was preparing the Applicants Reply on Points of Law as the Respondents raised issues that needed to (sic) addressed and that based on the above, she refrained from sending copies of the Respondents motion for extension of time to him. [See paragraph 2 [iii] of the supporting affidavit]. 3.10 The Applicant states further that subsequently and especially on the 13th of February and early on the 14th day of February 2012 she called the said Barrister E. Nwekenze to brief him on the next line of action which is that she was collating authorities for the Applicants Reply on Points of Law as the 7 day period granted her by the Rules of this Honourable Could would start counting from the date leave is granted the Respondent to file their Written address out of time as what the Respondents attached to their motion for extension of time is an Exhibit and they needed to file another written address if they wanted a deeming order. [paragraph 2 [iv]of the supporting affidavit]. The Applicant states further that the said Barrister E. Nwekenze gave her the impression that he understood the instruction as she asked him to inform the Court that the Respondents’ written address which was attached to his motion for extension of time was not properly before the Court as same was attached to the motion as an exhibit and had not filed separately since they were asking for a deeming order and there Was no proof that they had complied with the proviso of Order 25 Rule 4 and that she further informed him that he should object to prayer 2 of the Respondents motion for a deeming order as counsel to the Respondents must file his written address separately and pay the necessary default fees. Also that the affidavit in support of the Respondents motion was not sworn to by a Commissioner for oaths. [paragraph 2 v-vu of the supporting affidavit]. The Applicant states further that at no time was Barrister E. Nwekerze ever instructed to move her motion for interlocutory injunction. [paragraph 2 viii of the supporting affidavit]. Exhibit A attached to Applicant’s supporting affidavit is the instruction given to the said Barrister E. Nwekenze on what to do in court but he went ahead to move the Applicant’s motion. 3.11. We have shown from paragraph 2 viii and Exhibit A that Banister E. Nwenkeze- Counsel holding the brief of the Applicant’s counsel- did not act within the scope of the authority given him as he was never asked to move the motion for interlocutory injunction. See AFEGBAI vs. AG. EDO STATE & ANOR [2001] 6 MJSC 37 @ 43 ratio 16 It is trite that the Court will not punish a litigant for the mistake or inadvertence of his counsel. The discretion of the court although always exercised judicially will be exercised with a leaning towards accommodating the party’s interest and the determination of the case on its merits. The Supreme Court in the case of Ogundoyin v Adeyemi (2001) 8 M.J.S.C 134 135-136 held that: The court will not punish a litigant for the mistake or inadvertence of his counsel. This is when the mistake or inadvertence is in respect of procedural matters. In such a case the discretion of the court although always exercised judicially will be exercised with a leaning towards accommodating the parties interest and the determination of the case is on merit [Bowaje v. Adediwura 1976 6 S.C 143 Page 147, Akinyede v. The Appraiser (1971) 1 All N.L.R 162, Ahmadu v. Salawu (1974) 1 All N.L.R (Pt 2) 318. [P.114] paras. F-G 3.12 That it is in the interest of justice that this application be granted as the Respondents will not be prejudiced in any way. See paragraph 7 & 2 xiii of the supporting affidavit. Furthermore, that in the interest of justice and to ensure a speedy adjudication of this matter filed our Reply on Points of Law we also urge the Honourable Court to deem the Applicant’s Reply on Points of Law already filed as having been properly filed and served. The Defendants/Respondents’ counsel, in his written address formulated one issue for the determination of the court which is: WHETHER A PARTY DULY REPRESENTED BY A COUNSEL IN COURT CAN APPROBATE AND REPROBATE ON INSTRUCTIONS ACTED UPON BY PARTY’S COUNSEL 7.0 ARGUMENT 7.01 It is our humble submission that where a counsel conducting a case has acted and unequivocally represented to the court that he had full instructions of the party he is representing in conducting the case, the party is estopped from resiling from the steps taken by the counsel in projecting her case. On this we humbly refer my Lord to the Supreme Court decision in the case of: FALOWO vs BANIGBE (1998 6 SCNJ 42 @ 64 PARA 34 and RATIO 26. Where it was held as follows: “Once counsel announces his appearance in court, whether he is holding brief for another counsel or not, the court takes it that he is fully mandated and/or authorised to conduct the case on behalf of his principal or his client, If however, he is not in a position for any reason to do so, it is his duty to apply for an adjournment, stating his reason to the court for the application whereupon the court, upon a consideration of such reasons, shall decide whether or not the case should in the interest of justice, be adjourned, otherwise the court would proceed with the hearing of the cause or matter. In the absence of such application, the court is entitled to assume that counsel is fully instructed and/or mandated to get on with the case.” My Lord, in the present case, it was the Plaintiff’s Counsel, E. Nwekenze esq. who orally applied to the Honourable court on 14th February that he was ready and wants to move his motion for interlocutory injunction and adopt the written address which the court granted and he consequently did. 7.03 With profound humility my Lord, it is conclusive that the Plaintiff’s counsel in deciding to move his motion for interlocutory injunction and adopting his written address, he was fully aware of his right to a written reply on point of law and which he decided to dispense with, and for whatever advantage that may accrue to his client by the step he took. 7.04 My Lord, we submit with respect that where a counsel appearing for a party as in this case, decided to adopt a procedure in conducting the case of that party which he believed to have inherent advantage to that party, the party and the Counsel are estopped from denying the approach he adopted and should be prepared to acknowledge whatever may result from their plan and strategy which they may have considered quick, advantageous and convenient. On this we humbly refer my Lord to the case of: AGBI vs OGBE (2OO4 2 S.C.N.J 1 @ 34 and RATIO 9 where it was held by the Supreme Court that, “Where, as in this case, counsel appearing for a party decided to adopt a procedure for the prosecution of the case of that party which he thought would be advantageous to that party, and the procedure turned out negatively, he cannot be allowed to deny that approach which adopted on his own voliti on. The party he represented and the counsel must be prepared to acknowledge whatever resulted from their plan and strategy which they had conceived as a quick and convenient resolution of the dispute.” 7.05 On the point canvassed by the counsel to the Plaintiff/Applicant that the Affidavit deposed to by our Administrative legal Manager, Blessing Akpovbovbo, was not signed by the Commissioner for oaths, whose duty it is to sign the said document, our exhibit A attached to our counter affidavit to this motion clearly shows that the Respondents’ copy was dully signed by the Commissioner for oaths and that this enough evidence that the said affidavit has been duly sworn before a person duly authorised. We submit with humility that in this circumstance, the Honourable Court can permit the use of the said affidavit in accordance with S. 113 of the Evidence Act, 2011, which states that: “The court may permit an affidavit to be used, notwithstanding that it is defective in form according to this Act, if it is satisfied that it has been sworn before a duly authorised person.” 7.06 My Lord, the fact that the Commissioner for oaths duly signed the Respondents’ copy of the said affidavit but did not sign that for the Applicant is conclusively a mistake by the court official. It is our humble submission that in this circumstance a litigant cannot be punished for the mistake of the officer of the court. We humbly refer my Lord to the case of: C & C LTD vs ALTIMATE INV. LTD. (2004) 2 NWLR(PT.857) 274 @ 295 PARAS. F — H and RATIO 7 Where it was held that: “A litigant will not be punished for the mistakes of the court and its officials. In the instant case, the nature of defect which the trial court regarded as vitiating the affidavit verifying the notice of intention to defend, that is, the failure of the Commissioner for Oaths to skin the affidavit is a mistake of the court and its officials. The litigant ought not to be punished for this.” 8.0 CONCLUSION In view of the foregoing, we humbly urge the Honourable Court to resolve the issue in favour of the Respondents1 dismiss the Plaintiff’s Application uphold its orders made on 14th February 2012. in this suit and go ahead to deliver its ruling on the interlocutory motion of the Plaintiff dated 03/11/2011. REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW Having read the address of the Respondent there is the need to respond to some of the issues raised on grounds of Law. 1.0 INTRODUCTION & OBSERVATION 1.1 The Applicant filed her motion for review on the 27th day of February 2012, same was duly served on the Respondents Solicitors on the 29th day of February 2012 but they only filed their Counter affidavit and written address on the 12th day of March 2012. By the provisions of Order 11 Rule 2 of the Rules of this Honourable Court the Respondents have 7 days to file their Counter affidavit. The 7 days lapsed on the 7th day of March 2012. The Respondents failed to file a motion to regularize their position and also to pay the appropriate penalty fees in line with the proviso of Order 25 rule 4. 2.0 ARGUMENTS 2.1 The Respondent relied on the case of FALOWO vs. BANIGBE to the effect that the Court is entitled to assume that counsel (referring to Barrister E. Nwekenze) whether holding brief for another counsel or not ‘is fully mandated and /or authorized to conduct the case on behalf of his principal or his client’. The issue to be decided by the Court is whether or not the said Barrister E. Nwekenze acted within the scope of his authority in moving the Applicants motion for Interlocutory Injunction on the 14th day of February 2012 after the Applicants Counsel had informed him on phone that she was preparing the Applicant’s Further & Better affidavit & Reply on Points of Law? Exhibit A is the written instruction by the Applicant’s counsel to Barrister E. Nwekenze on how to conduct the case on the 14th day of February 2012. 2.2 The law is clear that presumptions generally however raised in any matter are not conclusive proof of the facts stated because a party who has evidence to the contrary can do so to cast doubt on the said presumption. See AWOJUGBAGBE LIGHT INDUSTIES LTD VS. CHINUKWE [1993] I NWLR [Part 270] 485 @ 505DH It is clear from Exhibit A therefore that Barrister E Nwenkeze did not comply with the written instructions contained in Exhibit A. See paragraph 5 (ii) of Applicant’s Further & better affidavit. 2.3 The duty of the Court is to do justice between the parties. We submit most respectfully that the justice of the case in the face of the overwhelmingly proof of the written instruction (Exhibit A) given to counsel- Barrister E. Nwenkeze tilts in favour of the Applicant. In the case of ENIGBOKAN VS BARUWA [1998] 8 NWLR Part 560 page 96 @ 99 -100 ratio 6, the Court of Appeal held that once counsel is instructed and his appearance and announcement in court raises the presumption of his authority, he assumes full control of his client’s case. He is to accept AND MUST ADHERE TO HIS INSTRUCTIONS BUT ONCE HE IS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS INSTRUCTIONS, counsel has responsibility as to the manner he would carry those instructions. Apart from that, he has full control over the conduct of the case. (Adewunmi v. Plastex Nigeria Ltd (1986) 3 NWLR (Part 32) 767 We submit that from Exhibit A it is clear that the said Barrister E. Nwenkeze did not adhere to his instructions and thus did not act within the scope of his authority thus jeopardizing the rights of the Applicant. 2.4 Furthermore, the Honourable Court would observe that the Respondents merely denied the averments in paragraphs 2(ii) – (xv) of the Applicants supporting affidavit. See paragraph 3 (a) of Respondents counter affidavit. They did not challenge the truth in the Applicant’s supporting affidavit. The law is clear that where there is no counter affidavit challenging the truth of what is deposed to in the main affidavit supporting the motion, the court is to treat the main affidavit as having established the facts therein stated see the case of AJOMALE VS. YADUAT [NO. 2] 1991 5 NWLR PT 191 257 AT PP 282-3 HA SC AND ALSO ALAGBA V. ABIMBOLA [1978] 2 Sc 39 @ 40. Thus, the denial in a counter affidavit must be clear and specific. Specific depositions in an affidavit cannot be controverted by sweeping or general denials in a counter affidavit. Denials must be by facts which if believed (and should be credible of being believed] will sway the mind of the court from accepting the facts in the affidavit he is opposing. See OGUNSOLA VS. USMAN [2002] 14 NWLR [Pt 788] page 636 @ 657 DH 2.5 The attitude of all present day superior courts of record is the attainment of deciding in the existing suit all controversy between the parties by doing substantial justice. See the case of EJIWUNMI vs. COSTAIN [W.A] PLC 1998 12 NWLR PART 576 149 @ 154 RATIO 8. We submit that the principal object of the courts is to decide the rights of the parties and not to punish them for mistakes, they [or their counsel] may make in the conduct of their cases by deciding otherwise than in accordance with those rights. See the case of BANGO VS. CHADO [1998] 9 NWLR PT 564 PAGE 139 @ 141 RATIO 3 2.6 The Respondents relied on the case of AGBI vs. OGBE and our humble submission is that the case is inapplicable in view of the fact that the Counsel did not act within the scope of his authority as aforementioned. The Supreme Court in the case of OKAFOR VS. FELIX NNAIFE (1987) ALL NLR Page 517 @ 525, HELD that ‘justice and fairness demand that the ratio of a case should not be pulled in by the hair of the head and made to apply willy-nilly to cases where the surrounding circumstances are different’. 2.7 Finally, with respect to affidavit evidence, it is clear that there must be strict compliance with the provisions of Section 115 (3) & (4) of the Evidence Act 2011. The said provisions are mandatory and that failure to comply, the offending paragraphs must the struck out. See the case of MILITARY GOVERNOR OF LAGOS STATE VS.OJUKWU [1986] A NLR 233 @ 250. Section 115 (4) of the Evidence Act 2011 provides that ‘when such belief is derived from information received from another person, the name of the informant SHALL be stated AND reasonable particulars SHALL be given respecting the INFORMANT, AND THE TIME, PLACE AND CIRCUMSTANCE OF THE INFORMATION’. The Respondents failed to comply with the said provision. See paragraph 3 of the Respondents counter affidavit. 2.8 The word ‘SHALL’ used in Section 115 (3) & (4) of the EVIDENCE ACT 2011 shows that compliance is mandatory. See also the cases of OSIAN VS. FLOUR MILLS LTD (1968) ALL NLR 432 @4 34 In the case of CEDER STATIONARIES LTD VS. I. B. W. A LTD [2000] 15 NWLR [Pt. 690] 338 © 349 -50 HD the court per Salami JCA in striking out the offending paragraphs stated the law in these strong words ‘All the paragraphs referred to the submission of the learned counsel for the applicant without an exception viz, paragraphs 7,8,9,11,12,13,16,17 & 18 do not comply with the provisions of Section 88 & 89 of the Evidence Act cap 62 of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990 (NOW SECTIONS 115 [3] & [4] of the EVIDENCE ACT 2011) It is incumbent on a person who deposes to his belief in a matter of fact, and whose belief is based on any source or sources other than his personal knowledge, unequivocally MUST disclose the facts and circumstances forming the basis of his belief. Further more, when the belief is founded upon information received from another person, the name of his informant must be stated in the affidavit AND MUST STATE REASONABLEE PARTICULARS OF SUCH AN INFORMANT INCLUDING THE TIME, PLACE AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE PARTICULARS OF THE INFORMATION. In the instant case, the deponent woefully defaulted in stating the particulars of the various informants from whom he derived his information…The paragraphs deposed to by the staff of Mr. Offiong without due heed to the provisions of Section 88 & 69 of the Evidence Act, cap 90 deserve to be struck out and are accordingly struck out by me’ See also AMAECHI vs. CHEVRONTIN [2002] 2 RHCR 309 @ pp 313-5 where the Rivers State High Court, per Tobi J as he then was for the same reason struck out paragraphs of the affidavit in his ruling. We urge the Honourable Court to hold and rightly too that there is no counter affidavit before the court for Respondents failure to comply with the provisions of Section 115 (3) & 4) of the EVIDENCE ACT 2011. We further urge this Honourable Court to grant the Applicant’s application. I have carefully considered the processes, arguments and submissions of the parties on this matter and the main issue for determination is whether or not the Court should grant the application of the Claimant/Applicant for the review of the order of court made on 14th day of February, 2012. The review sought by the claimant is over the order of court made to ask parties to adopt their respective written addresses in relation to the interlocutory injunction of the Claimant and also the order of adjournment of same for Ruling by the court. The Claimant’s grounds are that the learned counsel that appeared for her on the 14th day of February, 2012 exceeded his authority by going ahead to adopt the written address of the claimant/applicant in support. That the said counsel was categorically asked to request for an adjournment to enable the claimant/applicant’s counsel file a reply on points of law in the matter. The response of the Defendants/Respondents is that the Claimant/Applicant was properly represented on the said date of 14th day of February, 2012 and the counsel that represented it should be presumed to have all the authority to do what he did, i.e., in the adoption of the Claimant/Applicant’s written address without the reply on points of law. Both parties have made other arguments and submissions but the ones germane to the issue under consideration are what I have tried to summarize above. The application was brought under Order 19 rule 18(1)(e) of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007, which provides as follows: 18.-(1) The Court may, either of its own motion or on application by any of the parties to the proceedings, review any order made by it and may, on such a review, revoke or vary that order on the grounds that: (e) the interest of justice requires such review. The same rule has sub-rule 2 which provides that: (2) An application under sub-rule (1) of this rule shall be made within 14 days of the date of the order. The ground relied upon by the Claimant/Applicant is the interest of justice. I have carefully examined the claimant/applicant’s processes especially the supporting affidavit and attached exhibits and it is clear that the Claimant/Applicant indeed had prepared a reply on points of law which has been attached to the application as it was being filed. The justice of the case includes, in my humble view, the granting of the necessary opportunity to both parties before it, to present their cases before it arrives at a decision. The main problem here though is whether such an opportunity should be granted a party after an order of court adjourning for Ruling on an issue had been made? A look at the provisions of Order 19 generally provides for circumstances such as this where a party believes it has the ground to move the court to review its order in order to accommodate it in a given situation. The only critical point is as provided in Rule 18 (2) of Order 19 cited above, to the effect that such an application must be brought within 14 days of the making of the Order. I have examined the date of the Claimant’s application and it shows that the application was made on 27th of February, 2012, well within the fourteen days stipulated by the said Rule. This means that the application was made within time and going by the substance of the application, that the counsel that represented the Claimant on the 14th of February, 2012 exceeded the scope of his authority as shown in the exhibit attached to the application, and the fact that a reply on points of law is essentially to enable the court look at more legal points in arriving at a just decision, it is in the interest of justice that the application be granted, and I so hold. Consequently, therefore, the application of the Claimant/Applicant for a review of the order of 14th February, 2012 in this matter ordering parties to adopt their respective addresses and the adjournment for Ruling is hereby varied. There is also the argument of the Claimant/Applicant in support of prayer 2 to the effect that the respondent’s written address be discountenanced for being filed out of time cannot be tenable in view of the fact that the Rules under Order 5 Rules 1 and 3 of the Rules of this Court, the NIC Rules, 2007, allow the Court to consider non-compliance with the Rules of the Court as mere irregularity and/or order a departure from the Rules in the interest of justice. I have examined the submissions of both counsel and I am of the view that the non-compliance alleged is such as should be considered an irregularity in line with Order 5 Rules 1 and 3 and I so hold. In the circumstance therefore, the Court hereby grants prayers 1, 3, and 4 of the Claimant/Applicant while prayer 2 is accordingly refused. The written address of the Claimant, the reply address of the Defendants as well as the Reply on Points of Law of the Claimant in relation to the Application for Interlocutory Injunction of the Claimant dated and filed 12th of December 2011, are all hereby declared properly before the Court and parties are hereby directed to re-adopt same. I make no order as to costs. Ruling is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice Auwal Ibrahim Presiding Judge