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By a notice of Preliminary Objection dated 14th day of March 2012 but filed on 15th day of March 2012, the defendant raised a preliminary objection praying that this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this Complaint and that the Complaint be struck out. The grounds relied upon are that: i) The Defendant in this suit is not a juristic person thus, it cannot sue nor (sic) be sued. ii) The subject matter of the suit is neither a trade dispute nor an intra union dispute. iii) The subject matter of this case, does not come under any of the subsections of Section 7 of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006. The Notice of Preliminary Objection was accompanied by a Written Address dated 14th March 2012. The Claimant/Respondent did not file any written address but opted to address the court viva voce and the defendant/applicant equally did not file a written reply on points of law but opted reply on points of law orally. The Defendant/Applicant’s counsel adopted his written address in support of the preliminary objection. In the said written address, learned defendant/applicant’s counsel stated that the Claimant who sued as Chairman of Okpe united Football Club, Sapele, Delta State is asking for the following reliefs: 1) A declaration that the Defendant has the statutory duty to make provision for the funding of Okpe Football Club of Sapele, delta State. 2) A declaration that the non provision for the funding of the Club by the Defendant since the year 2009 is illegal, unconstitutional and a breach of the official duty of the Defendant. 3) The sum of N96, 219, 000= (Ninety-six million, two hundred and nineteen thousand naira) being amount expended by the Claimant in the payment of salaries and allowances of the Players and Officials, overhead running of the Club since 2009. 4) An order compelling the Defendant to fund the Okpe Football Club, Sapele as was obtainable prior to the year 2009 when same was stopped abruptly. 5) The sum of N100,000,000=(One hundred million naira) being general damages for the stoppage of funding of the Football Club since the year 2009. That upon the receipt of the above complaint, the Defendant filed a Preliminary Objection raising the issue of jurisdiction of the Honourable Court to adjudicate over this case on three grounds. Learned counsel then submitted that a Court is said to have jurisdiction and competence if: (1) It is properly constituted as regards members and qualifications of the members of the bench and no member is disqualified for one reason or another. (2) The subject matter of the case is within its jurisdictions and there is no feature in the case which prevents the Court from exercising its jurisdictions and (3) The case comes before the Court initiated by due process of Law and upon fulfilment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdictions. Counsel then referred to the decision in Madukolu & Ors vs Nkemdilim (1962) NSCC 34 at 379 line 50-page 380 line 3. He continued that it is trite that once jurisdiction is raised, it is only the process of the Claimant that the Court will consider to ascertain whether it has jurisdiction or not. He stated further that the Defendant/Applicant is relying on three grounds in its application as follows: 1) That the Defendant/Respondent in this suit is not juristic person thus, it cannot sue nor (sic) be sued. Counsel submitted that a person who is made a party to an action either as Plaintiff or a Defendant must be a legal Person or, if not, a body vested by law with power to sue or be sued. He referred to Maersk Line vs Addide Investment Ltd (2002) FWLR (Pt 125) p. 655 C-D and Agbonmgbe Bank Ltd vs General Manager GB Ollivant Ltd (1961) 1 All NLR 116. 2) That the subject matter of the dispute is neither a trade dispute nor an intra union dispute. Counsel submitted that nothing in the entire complaint of the Claimant suggests that the dispute he submitted to this Honourable Court amounts to trade dispute as defined by S. 54 of the Trade Union Act Cap T14 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. That the case the Claimant presented to this Court is in the nature of special and general damages for breach of purported contract which does not fall within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court being a special Court created by Law to handle Trade Disputes and Trade Union matters. He referred to the case Udoh vs O.H.M.B. (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt 304) 139 at 149-150 H-A. Counsel then urged the court to strike out this Suit on this ground. 3) The subject matter of this case does not come under any of the subsections of Section 7(1) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006. Counsel stated that Section 7(1) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 provides “The Court shall have and exercise exclusive jurisdiction in civil causes and matters:- (a) relating to- (i) Labour, including trade unions and industrial relations; and (ii) Environment and conditions of work, health, safety and welfare of labour, and matters incidental thereto: and (b) relating to the ground (sic) of any order to restrain any person or body from taking part in any strike, lockout or any industrial action, or any conduct in contemplation or in furtherance of a strike, lock-out or any industrial action; (c) relating to the determination of any question as to the interpretation of- (i) any collective agreement (ii) any award made by an arbitral tribunal in respect of a labour dispute or an organizational dispute. (iii) the terms of settlement of any labour dispute, organizational dispute as may be recorded in any memorandum of settlement (iv) any trade union constitution, and (v) any award or judgment of the Court”. Learned counsel submitted that the Claimant’s complaint does not come under any of the provisions of Section 7(1) as stated above. The complaint is simply anchored on breach of contract or statutory duties. He urged this Court to decline jurisdiction and strike out this Suit as such. Furthermore, he contended that Section 24 (2) of the National Industrial Court Act supra which deals with the power of transfer of Suit to the Federal/State/F.C.T. High Courts cannot apply to this case because of ground one of this Preliminary Objection. He then urged the court to strike out this suit. In his response learned counsel for the Claimant/Respondent submitted that the objection is misconceived and not based on any known law. He then formulated two issues, namely, 1. Whether the Defendant can sue and be sued; and 2. Whether the subject matter falls within the jurisdiction of this court. On the first issue, counsel submitted that a state Football Association is a state branch of Nigeria Football Association. That by the Nigeria Football Association Act 2004, section 7 thereof, subsection (2)(b) the NFA Council, every chairman of State FA is a member of the NFA Council. By that, it shows that the FA is a juristic person just like the NFA referred to by the Act. He then referred to section 1(2). He continued that even if unincorporated bodies can be sued and sue going by the decisions in the case of Irabor & 2 Ors vs National Executive Council (2011) NLLR (Pt 68) p. 287, ratios 2, 3, and 4; Fawehinmi vs NBA (No.2) 2 NWLR (Pt 105); Kpebimimoh vs Board of Governors, Western Ijaw Teachers Training College (1966) NMLR 30. Counsel submitted that an incorporated association or body can sue and be sued. On the second issue, learned counsel submitted that the issue before the court relates to the releasing of the monies for salaries of footballers and other staff which the Claimant as chairman of Okpe Fooball Club has expended and that this falls within the provisions of section 254C 1 (a) (d) (f) and (k) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as amended. He then urged the court to dismiss the objection as it is misconceived, frivolous and intended only to delay the matter further. Replying orally on points of law, learned counsel for the defendant/applicant submitted that all the cases cited by the learned claimant/respondent’s counsel on legal personality do not support his case. I have carefully considered the processes, arguments and submissions of learned counsel to the parties in this matter. The issues for determination are whether or the defendant in this suit can be sued and whether or not this suit is within the subject matter jurisdiction of this honourable court. On the first issue, the main argument of the counsel for the defendant is that the Delta State Football Association is neither a natural nor a juristic person and therefore not capable of suing or being sued. Learned counsel argued that the Delta State Football Association is like the Nigerian Football Association (NFA) because it, the Delta Football Association is a state branch of the NFA. I have carefully examined the Nigerian Football Association Act Cap N110, Laws of the Federation 2004, and there is nowhere it is stated expressly that a state football association, such as the Delta State Football Association is a branch, of the Nigerian Football Association. However, one finds in section 7 the creation and establishment by the said Act of a National Football Association Council and by virtue of subsection (2)(b) thereof, each state Football Association being made a member of the Council. In my view what this section has done is to contemplate the existence of state Football Associations which shall then become members of the National Council of the NFA. I am not persuaded by the argument that the contemplation of the existence of a state football association is enough to endow such a body, where created, to become imbued with the legal personality conferred on the Nigerian Football Association. For the avoidance of doubt let me reproduce the provisions of Section 1 of the said Act. It says that: (1) There is hereby established an association to be known as the Nigerian Football Association (in this Act referred to as “the Association”). (2) The Association- (a) shall be a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal; and (b) may sue and be sued in its corporate name. The wordings above are very clear. They refer to the Nigerian Football Association as the body with the legal power to sue and be sued. Furthermore, there is nowhere in the said Act where the specific mention of the Defendant/Applicant is made as a body created under the Act or to have such powers or functions of the NFA under the said Act. Consequently, in my view it is not correct to attribute the legal status of the NFA to the Delta State Football Association. Learned counsel for the Claimant/Respondent has also sought to rely on the decision of this court given in Irabor & 2 Ors vs Ilavbare & 3 ors, supra, where this court upheld the legal personality of the National Executive Council (NEC) of Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), on the ground that the NEC is a creation of the Constitution of ASUU and therefore its organ was actionable as a body that had clear responsibility to carry out the functions of ASUU. Counsel also relied on other decisions to expound on the same principle, such as Fawehinmi vs NBA (No.2), supra and Kpebimimoh vs Board of Governors, Western Ijaw Teachers Training College (1966), supra. The distinguishing factor between the instant case and all these authorities cited is that in the present the Defendant is not an organ or body responsible for the carrying out of the functions of the NFA but rather only one of the numerous members of the National Football Association Council. It would have perhaps been a different matter if the Claimant had sued the NFA itself, its Board or the Council as a whole. In consequence therefore, it is my decision that issue one is resolved in favour of the Defendant/Applicant. On issue two, namely, whether the subject matter of the suit falls within the subject matter jurisdiction of this court, learned Defendant/Applicant’s counsel simply referred to sections 54 of the Trade Unions Act T14 Laws of the Federation 2004 and Section 7(1) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006, to say that the case does not come within the jurisdiction of this court. In a nutshell counsel argues that the dispute is not about trade dispute or trade union matters and therefore not fit to be entertained and determined by this court. This does not speak much of the depth of research of learned Defendant/Applicant’s counsel. To start with, the claims of the claimant, from his originating processes is for declarations and orders of court for payment of salaries of footballers and staff of the Defendant. If only the learned Defendant/Applicant’s counsel had carefully considered the provisions of section 7(1) (a) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006 which provides that “the court shall have and exercise exclusive jurisdiction in civil causes and matters:- relating (i) labour, including trade unions and industrial relations...”, he would have understood that labour is amongst the terms used in the said subsection. There is no doubt in my mind that term labour involves work and payment of salaries for work done has always been treated by this court as involving labour. Therefore since the Claimant/Respondent is before the Court in connection with payment of salaries it means that the subject matter for which he has come to court is covered by Section 7 1 (a) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006. Furthermore, there is the reference by the learned Claimant/Respondent’s counsel to the provisions of Section 254C 1 (a) (d) (f) and (k) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as amended as having covered the claims of the claimant/respondent. While all of the subsections of the Constitution referred to by the learned Claimant/Applicant’s counsel are relevant to the claim, the direct and incontrovertible one is subsection (k) thereof which provides as follows: 254C (1)............................................. (k) relating to or connected with disputes arising from payment or non-payment of salaries, wages, pensions, gratuities, allowances, benefits and any other entitlement of any employee, worker, political or public office holder, judicial officer or any civil or public servant in any part of the Federation and matters incidental thereto; It is clear from the above that this Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and entertain matters pertaining to payment or non-payment of salaries and many other work related rights and since the claimant is asking for the payment of the salaries of the claimant, there is no doubt that he is before the right Court. Thus the second issue is now resolved in favour of the Claimant/Applicant. In the circumstance therefore, the Defendant/Applicant’s preliminary objection succeeds in part to the extent that the Suit cannot be maintained against Defendant/Applicant as is presently constituted. Thus the Suit is hereby struck out. I make no order as to costs. Ruling is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice Auwal Ibrahim Presiding Judge