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The General Form of Complaint by which the claimant initiated this action against the defendant dated 7th December, 2011 was filed the same date. Going by the endorsement on the Complaint, the claimant is claiming the following reliefs against the defendant: “The Claimant’s claim is for declaration that his termination by the Defendant was for redundancy and an order compelling the defendant to comply with the provisions of section 20(1)(c) of the Labour Act Cap L1, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 by entering negotiation of his Redundancy Payments Or pay him N1.6 million being the amount paid to another officer of the same rank.” The Complaint was accompanied with the Claimant’s Statement of Claim, List of Documents, List of Witnesses, Witness Statement on Oath, Letter of Offer of Employment, Letter of Appointment as Manager (Legal), Confirmation of Appointment, Termination of Appointment, and letters of demand from the claimant to the defendant. On 23rd January, 2012, the defendant filed its memorandum of appearance dated the same date along with the statement of defence, List of Documents pleaded, List of witnesses, defendant’s employment manual and processes from and ruling in suit No. NIC/ABJ/19/2011. Following the exchange of pleadings by the parties, the matter was slated for mention on 19th January, 2012. On that day, the claimant was present and appeared for himself while the defendant was neither present nor represented by counsel. Consequently, the matter was adjourned to 21st February, 2012 for hearing in Abuja. It was the order of this Court that hearing notice be issued and served on the defendant and that proof of service be kept in the case file before the next adjourned date. On the said 21st February, 2012, both the claimant and defendant were in court. The claimant appeared for himself while Femi Toyo, Esq., appeared for the defendant. On 1st February, 2012, the claimant filed a Reply to the Statement of Defence. Also, the claimant on 22nd February, 2012 filed an application for the production of documents supported by an affidavit of 5 paragraphs deposed to by the claimant. On this same date, the claimant equally filed a Further Witness Statement. This application was moved and granted by this Court on 5th June, 2012 whereupon the request of the claimant/applicant for an order of this Court directing the defendant to make available to the claimant the letters terminating the appointments of persons listed on the application was granted. I need to add that the application was not opposed by the defendant. The matter came up for hearing on 9th August, 2012. On this very day, the claimant was in Court and represented himself while Mr. Femi Toyo appeared for the defendant. The claimant opened his case by testifying as PW1. The PW1 was sworn on oath with the Holy Bible. He confirmed his name to be Julius Okpegbulem Mbilitem. He testified that he is a legal practitioner. He confirmed to the Court that he is the claimant in this suit and that the defendant as his former employer. PW1 adopted his written statement on oath dated 7th December, 2011 and filed the same date as his evidence in this case. It is now proper to consider the PW1’s written statement on oath. He deposed that he was the Company Secretary/Legal Adviser of Global Commerce and General Assurance Ltd between October 2000 and March 2007. That his appointment was terminated pursuant to the implementation of a merger agreement between Global Commerce and General Assurance Ltd, Intercontinental Assurance Ltd and Kapital Insurance Company Ltd that required all the staff of the three merging companies to be terminated. He, the PW1 deposed that he was offered a new employment by the surviving company, Kapital Insurance Company Ltd which he accepted and was subsequently designated as the Manager (Legal). He said he was later confirmed as a permanent staff with commendation for good service after due appraisal. The PW1 deposed that he worked dutifully and harmoniously with the Company as Secretary/Legal Adviser. The PW1 deposed to the fact that on 23rd February, 2011 he was served with a letter signed by the Managing Director of Kapital Insurance Company Ltd, Mohammed Kari whose tenure was to expire on 28th February, 2011 terminating his employment. He said that upon perusal of his letter of termination, he discovered that his leave period was not commuted to cash and accordingly complained. He said he later became aware of the fact that 21 other staff who were staff of the 3 companies that merged also had their employments terminated. He deposed to the fact that the other staff whose employments were terminated were paid special benefits as part of their redundancy payments. He deposed to the fact that he is aware that there were no special staff in the company and that these other staff do not have better performance record than he PW1. The witness averred that the company did not declare any performance bonus for any staff. According to PW1, he complained about the non-payment of the special benefits to the Executive Director Finance and Administration who responded that the Executive Management decided who to pay. He said that the Managing Director rebuffed the attempts he made to see him which necessitated his writing a letter demanding payment of the special benefit to him or else he would seek legal redress in court. The PW1 further deposed to the fact that he was invited to the Boardroom for a meeting with Mr. Kari, 2 Executive Directors and the Company Secretary, Bello Abdullahi where he repeated the fact that he was discriminated and prejudiced against as he was not paid like the other staff whose employments were terminated on redundancy. And that some of these other staff who were paid special benefits held positions that were either above, below or even of the same rank with him. He further deposed to the fact that at the said meeting, Mr. Kari said that the issue would have been amicably resolved but for the claimant’s threat to go to court, and those employees from companies that did not contribute much to the capital of the company could not be expected to be paid equally as those from companies that were buoyant. He averred that he, the claimant reminded Mr. Kari that all the staff came into UnityKapital Assurance Plc as new employees and that Kapital Insurance changed its name to Unitykapital Assurance Plc. The PW1 deposed that at the meeting, the Company Secretary, Bello Abdullahi intervened by urging an amicable settlement of the issue. That the said Mr. Bello Mohammed prevailed on him to withdraw the threat letter and that the Executive Management should reciprocate by paying the special benefit to him. That these proposals were agreed to by Mr Kari and himself; with the latter expressing the need for them to part in peace and not acrimoniously. The PW1 stated that it was on the basis of this agreement that he withdrew his threat letter but that he was told at the close of work that day by the Director of Finance and Administration that the Managing Director had changed his mind and refused to pay him the special benefit. He deposed on oath to the fact that he was reliably informed that Mr. Bilazi, a Manager on the same grade as the PW1 was paid special benefit of N1.6 million as part of his redundancy payments. He averred that he had written other letters of demand requesting payment which had not been honoured. He also stated that the Management of UnityKapital Assurance Ltd. did not negotiate with him on the payment of redundancy payments as required by law since there is no union in the Company to represent the interest of the members of staff. He further stated that as at the time of his employment in 2007 there was no employment manual in the company until January 2011 when the Senior Manager, Human Resources sent a mail to his (PW1) Unitykapital Assurance Ltd mail with the title, EMPLOYMENT MANUAL. He averred that on the front page was a note that: “The content of a manual does not constitute nor should be construed as a promise of employment or as a contract between Unitykapital Assurance Plc and any of its employees. The company at its option may change, delete, suspend or discontinue parts or the policy in its entirety at any time without prior notice.” He said that he responded to the mail by stating that he could not be bound by a manual that is coming four years into his employment and that there was no response to his mail. He averred that he was never given a hard copy of the Employment Manual. In the course of his testimony before the Court, the PW1 tendered the following documents without any objection from the other side and the documents were accordingly admitted and marked as exhibits: 1. Letter headed “Termination of Appointment” dated 7th December, 2011 marked Exhibit P1. 2. 5 letters of termination in respect of 5 other former staff of the defendant marked as Exhibits P2-P6. 3. 3 letters of resignation of 3 other staff who resigned from the employment of the defendant marked Exhibits P7-P9. 4. A letter of protest dated 24th February, 2011 written by the PW1 to protest non-payment of 50% special benefit to him admitted and marked as Exhibit P10. Finally, the PW1 urged the Court to give judgment in his favour and grant his prayers. At this point, the matter was adjourned to the following day, 10th August, 2012 for cross examination. On 10th August, 2012, the PW1 entered the Witness Box and was reminded of his oath. During cross examination, the PW1 asserted that he is a lawyer and was called to the Nigerian Bar on 20th August, 1985. He stated that he was working in the defendant Company as a legal practitioner. He testified that he was Manager (Legal) in the employment of the defendant. He answered that he occupied the position of Manager (Legal) senior staff position. He said he came to the conclusion that his appointment was terminated because of redundancy because it was so stated in the letter conveying his termination of employment. The PW1 responded that there were three of them who were lawyers in the employment of the defendant. PW1 responded that he was not the last lawyer to be employed by the defendant and that he received 2 queries while in the employment of the defendant. He stated that he was never stopped from performing any of his duties but that there was a time the schedule of covering management meeting was taken away from him on the ground that he was told by the Managing Director that he was “too senior for that assignment.” He stated that there was no time that he was idle while in the employment of the defendant but that he was always busy. He further informed the Court that he was not aware of any negotiation with those whose appointments were terminated by the defendant. The PW1 said he was paid the sum of N1,082,150.52. He agreed that Mr Bilazi was also paid special benefit of N1,623.225.75 which he was not paid. This sum of N1,082,150.75 is part of the redundancy allowance as per section 20(1)(c) of the Labour Act Cap L1 Laws of the Federation 2004. At this point, counsel for the defendant informed the Court that he had concluded his cross examination. Consequently, the case of the claimant was closed. It is pertinent to mention the fact that the counsel for the defendant elected not to call any witness despite the fact that he had indicated his intention to call one Mrs Nkiru Achara as a witness – as per the List of Witnesses before this Court. Also remarkable is the fact that the witness statement on oath of the said Mrs Nkiru Achara is not before this Court. The Court ordered counsel to the defendant to file and serve his final written address on the claimant’s counsel within 21 days from 10th August, 2012. Counsel for the claimant was also ordered to file and serve his written address on the defendant through its counsel within 21 days from the date of the service of the written address of the defendant on him. The defendant’s counsel was also to file and serve reply on point of law, if any, on counsel to the claimant within 7 days from the date of service of the reply on point of law. Case was adjourned to 12/11/2012 for adoption of written addresses and reply on point of law. On the date set for adoption of written addresses, the parties and their counsel were not in the Court. Consequently, the case was adjourned to 12th December, 2012 for adoption of written addresses. The Court ordered that hearing notices be issued and served on counsel and proof of service be kept in the case file before the next adjourned date. On the 12th of December, 2012, both the claimant and the defendant were in Court. The claimant appeared for himself while Mr. Femi Toyo appeared for the defendant. The claimant applied to withdraw his application to amend his General Form of Complaint dated 15/10/12. This application was not opposed by counsel for the defendant. Hence, the prayer was granted and the application dated 15/10/12 was struck out. The claimant adopted his written address filed on 4/12/12 as his arguments in the case. He submitted that the claimant’s case by virtue of his alternative prayer for the sum of N1.6 million being the same amount paid to another staff of the same rank as the claimant as special benefit still stands. He referred the Court to Article 15 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights Ratification and Enforcement Act Cap A9 LFN 2004. The Court was further referred to section 122(2)(a) of the Evidence Act 2011, and submitted that the Court is expected to take judicial notice of every law. The claimant submitted that pleadings are to contain facts and not law. He further referred the Court to section 14 of National Industrial Court 2006. The Court was also referred to Order 21 Rule 4 of the NIC Rules 2007. Also commended to the Court was the provision of section 7(6) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 which enjoins the Court to have regard to best international practices as the claimant had made out a case that the claimant was unfairly treated. Counsel moved in terms of the endorsements on the processes and the written address. At this juncture, the defendant’s counsel informed the Court that the defendant had filed its final written address dated 4/10/12 and filed on 05/10/12. Counsel applied to the Court to adopt the said written address as arguments on behalf of the defendant in this case. Let me now proceed to review the written addresses of counsel to both the claimant and the defendant in this case. The written address of the defendant is dated 4th October, 2012 and filed on 5th October, 2012. The defendant formulated 2 issues for determination viz: 1. Whether, where termination is due to redundancy, every benefit paid to the employee is consequently a part of redundancy benefits, in other words whether “redundancy benefit” is coterminous with “terminal benefits.” 2. Whether S. 20(1)(c) of the Labour Act or any part of the Act is applicable to the claimant. ISSUE 1 Is the term “redundancy benefits” conterminous with “terminal benefits” where termination is based on redundancy? On Issue 1, counsel for the defendant submitted that the term “redundancy benefit” is not coterminous with “terminal benefits.” In other words, the two terms do not have the same scope as “terminal benefits” refer to all the benefits an employee whose appointment is terminated under an employment contract is entitled to. He submitted that what amounts to terminal benefits is determined by the individual contract of employment, the company’s conditions of employment and that where there is a collective agreement, the terms may be incorporated into individual contract of employment. Counsel submitted that redundancy benefit or allowance can therefore be one of the heads of terminal benefits where termination is for redundancy but that this would depend on the terms of the employment contract, or law, where there is a law on the issue. But that either way, redundancy benefit is one of the several terminal benefits. Counsel cited the case of EVANS BROTHERS (NIG.) PUBLISHERS LTD. V. FALAIYE (2005) 4 NLLR 108 AT 132 Paras. F-G, where the Court of Appeal held that a terminated employee would be paid what is stipulated in the company’s conditions of service, which is made an integral part of his contract of employment, such as gratuities. In that case, the termination of the appointment of the defendant was based on redundancy covered by clause 10 in the company’s conditions of service. The Court stated that that “what the defendant would be entitled to therefore would be what he is required to be paid as stipulated in clause 10 of the booklet, Exhibit N which is made an integral part of his contract of employment, along with his other entitlements such as gratuity due to him etc.” It was submitted on behalf of the defendant that flowing from the above dictum in EVANS BROTHERS (NIG) PUBLISHERS LTD supra, a redundancy benefit is only one part of the defendant’s terminal benefits and it comes under clause 10 of the condition of service. And that the other entitlements outside clause 10 do not therefore form part of the redundancy benefits, but they form part of the terminal benefits. Counsel for the defendant also cited the case of NUHPSW V. ALIFU HOTEL AND CATERING LTD (2006) 4 NLLR (Pt. 9) 162 at 172 where this Court held that by the agreement of the parties, gratuity and redundancy scheme are mutually exclusive. Counsel submitted that in this case, some other benefits were paid to the affected employees which did not come under redundancy and that redundancy scheme was under a separate head and that the mode of its calculation was as stated at page 171 of the Report cited. Counsel argued that redundancy payments were made to the other staff whose letters were tendered by the claimant just as it was paid to the claimant as well. He submitted that the same amount (N1,082,150.52) was paid to each of Bilazi and the claimant as redundancy payments. He further submitted that the other payments made were not part of redundancy benefits but terminal benefits which is not the basis of this action. On Exhibits P2-P6, counsel submitted that Exhibits P2 – P6 reveal that normal benefits and special benefits were paid out by the defendant, and that redundancy allowance is a sub-head under normal benefits. Counsel contended that normal benefits suggest what is contractual and special benefit what is not contractual. He submitted that the claimant did not refer to any term of his contract of employment to guide the Court that he was not paid something he was entitled to. He therefore submitted that what was paid to Bilazi on the same level with the claimant as redundancy allowance was the same thing paid to the claimant. Finally on Issue 1, counsel submitted that no “payments” for redundancy was made to any other staff as averred by the claimant in his statement of claim. ISSUE 2 Let me now consider the arguments of counsel in respect of Issue 2. It was contended by counsel that section 20(1) of the Labour Act as well as the entire Act is applicable to a “worker” as defined in section 91(1) of the Labour Act to mean (quoting the counsel) : “any person who has entered into or works under a contract with an employer, whether the contract is for manual labour or clerical work or is expressed or implied or oral or written, and whether it is a contract of service, or a contract personally to execute any work or labour, but does not include – [inter alia] (b) persons exercising administrative, executive, technical or professional functions as public officers or otherwise.” He submitted that the definition of “worker” under the Act limits the scope of the Act itself to “...a contract for manual labour or clerical work.” In this regards, counsel submitted that the claimant was neither in a contract for manual labour nor clerical work with the defendant. He submitted that the claimant admitted to having been employed as a “manager Legal”, a professional position. And that the claimant at paragraph 8 of his statement of claim averred that he performed purely professional functions in his capacity as Manager Legal. It was therefore submitted that S. 20 or any part of the Labour Act is not applicable to the claimant and cited the case of EVANS BROTHERS (NIG) PUBLISHERS LTD V. FALAIYE where the Court of Appeal held that the provisions of S. 20(1) of the Labour Act are applicable only to a “worker” as defined in S. 91(1) of the Act, and that the defendant who was employed as a Senior Editor in 1985 and whose appointment was terminated when he was Comptroller of Publications was a person exercising administrative, executive or technical functions and the provisions of S. 20(1) are not applicable to him. It was submitted that the claimant’s case discloses no cause of action because it was brought under the provisions of S. 20(1) of the Labour Act as indicated by the last paragraph of the statement of claim to wit: “WHEREOF the claimant has not been paid the statutorily prescribed REDUNDANCY PAYMENTS.” On the meaning of cause of action or reasonable cause of action, defendant’s counsel cited the Supreme Court decision in CHEVRON NIG. LTD V. LONESTAR DRILLING NIG LTD. (2007) 7 SC (Pt. 11) 27 relied upon by this Court in suit No NIC/ABJ/19/2011: JULIUS MBILITEM V. UNITYKAPITAL ASSURANCE (unreported delivered on 29th November, 2010) where the apex Court stated that: “I think a cause of action is constituted by the aggregated (sic) of facts which the law will recognize as giving the plaintiff a substantive right to make the claim against the relief or remedy being sought. Thus the factual situation on which the plaintiff relies to support his claim must not (sic) be recognized by the law as giving rise to a substantive right capable of being claimed or enforced against the defendant. In other words, the factual situation relied upon must constitute the essential ingredient of an enforceable right or claim.” It was further submitted on behalf of the defendant by its counsel that the right created under section 20(1) of the Labour Act does not envisage any factual situation respecting a person of the claimant’s status. On this proposition, counsel cited the decision of this Court in JULIUS MBILITEM V. UNITYKAPITAL ASSURANCE NIG. LTD. supra where this Court held that: ...the claimant has no cause of action or reasonable cause of action in law as it is clear that the court cannot grant reliefs under the law governing the action.” Counsel contended that in the present suit, the court cannot grant relief under the law relied upon by the claimant. Counsel submitted that the claimant did not plead any term of contract that entitles him to receive special benefits and that it was not enough to say that some employees were paid some benefits as the contract of employment is between one individual employee and the employer. The Court of Appeal case of CCB IGERIA PLC V. ROSE (1998) 4 NWLR 544 was cited. Learned counsel for the defendant submitted that the claimant did not plead any breach of his contract of employment and that his action is based exclusively on the Labour Act. Finally, learned counsel submitted that: 1. the claimant was paid redundancy allowance like other staff whose appointments were terminated. 2. redundancy benefit is just one head of terminal benefits and is not coterminous with terminal benefit. 3. the claimant did not plead any term of his contract of employment that entitles him to special benefit and that merely saying others were paid same does not satisfy the requirement that he has to prove his right to it. 4. S. 20(1) Labour Act or any other part of the Act does not apply to the claimant. Let me now review the submission of learned counsel for the claimant in his written address dated 3rd September, 2012 and filed the following day. Two Issues were also formulated for determination as follows: 1. Is the termination of the appointment of the claimant based on redundancy. 2. Is the provision of section 20(i)(c) of the Labour Act, Cap L1 LFN 2004 mandatory for the defendants to comply with and negotiate redundancy payments with the claimant or pay him what others were paid. ISSUE 1 Arguing Issue 1, the claimant representing himself submitted that the letter terminating his appointment, that is, Exhibit P1, shows that payment was made to him for redundancy allowance. The claimant therefore submits that the only inference that could be made from such payment is that the termination of his appointment was on the ground of redundancy. ISSUE 2 On Issue 2, the claimant referred to section 20(1)(c) of the Labour Act which stipulates that in the event of redundancy, an employer shall use his best endeavours to negotiate redundancy payments to any discharged workers who are not protected by regulations made under subsection 2 of the section. He stated that the evidence of the claimant on oath that the defendant did not negotiate redundancy payments with him was not controverted. Counsel submitted that the word “shall” as used in the subsection referred to above makes it clear that an obligation is placed on employers to use their best human resources to negotiate redundancy payments with affected workers. To buttress this position, the claimant referred to the opinion of the learned author, Professor Akintunde Emiola in His book, Nigerian Labour Law at page 68 paragraph 2 where the authors expresses the view that: “...having decided on those employees where employment is to be terminated, the law imposes two other obligations on the employer. First, he is required to inform the trade union of the affected workers where they are members of a union – of the anticipated redundancy. Secondly, he is under a DUTY TO NEGOTIATE redundancy payments to any discharged workers who are not protected by any of the regulations made by the Minister of Labour.” On the mandatory nature of an intended act where a statute uses the word “shall”, the claimant referred to the case of AMOKEODO V. IGP (1999) 6 NWLR (Pt. 607) 467 at 485-486. The claimant also cited the case of ADESANOYE V. ADEWOLE II (2006) 27 NSCQR 783 at 800-801 where the Supreme Court, as per Niki Tobi, JSC (as he then was), stated that: “Where a statute clearly provides for a particular act to be performed, failure to perform the act on the part of the party will not only be interpreted as a delinquent conduct but will be interpreted as not complying with the statutory provision......... In the light of the specific provision of section 6A(2) and particularly with the peremptory “shall” conveying some command, the court could not have waited for any other provision as to non effectiveness in the event of failure of registration as contained in section 6.” The cases of UDE V. NWARA (1993) 2 NWLR (Pt. 278) 661 Para. D and OLUFEAGBA & 43 ORS V. ABUR-RAHEEM & 3 ORS (2009) 12 SC (Pt. II) 1 Per Ogbuagu JSC at p. 64 where the court stated that absolute or mandatory statutory provision must be complied with strictly; were cited. The claimant also referred to page 110 of the book of the learned author, Professor Emiola earlier referred to above. On the whole, the claimant submitted that this Court has the authority to order the defendant to pay the sum of N1,623,225.78 to the claimant as was paid to another officer of his rank. I am not unmindful of the fact that the claimant on 15th October, 2012 also filed a “REPLY TO THE DEFENDANT’S FINAL ADDRESS” of the same date. However, I am persuaded that the procedure adopted by the defendant herein is irregular. Having filed his written address in response to the written address filed and served on him first by the defendant, the claimant could not justifiably take further steps by way of any response. If need be it is the defendant who is entitled in law to file a reply on point of law, if any. Consequently, I shall give no cognizance to the said Reply to the Defendant’s Final Address filed by the claimant. At this juncture, and having painstakingly summarized the evidence given on both sides, and having read and digested relevant processes filed by the parties and the in the light of a careful review of the authorities cited, it is now appropriate for me to determine who is entitled to judgment in this case. In doing this, I shall rely on the issues formulated for determination by the parties. I will start with Issue 1 formulated by the defendant in his written address which is: Whether where termination is due to redundancy, every benefit paid to the employee is consequently a part of redundancy benefits, in other words whether “redundancy benefit” is conterminous with “terminal benefits.” The case of the claimant is that the term redundancy benefit or allowance is an integral part of terminal benefits. In other words, the term terminal benefits is wide in scope and may include redundancy benefit where so stated in the contract of employment between the parties. The case of EVANS BROTHERS (NIG) PUBLISHERS LTD V. FALAIYE was commended to the Court. It was also argued that the claimant like the other staff whose employments were terminated were paid redundancy allowances. In particular, it was shown that the same amount (N1,082,150.52) was paid to the claimant as well as Mr. Bilazi who was also a Manager like the claimant as redundancy allowance. It is instructive that the above contentions of the claimant were not disputed by the defendant either in his statement of claim or written address. The claimant simply claims that redundancy is the basis for the termination of his employment. And the response of the defendant is that this is why the claimant has been paid redundancy benefit. Clearly, Exhibits P2 – P6 reveal that redundancy allowance (among other payments) was indeed paid to these other staff whose appointments were terminated by the defendant. Hence, the staff whose appointments were terminated by the defendant received a number of payments including redundancy allowance. It is incontrovertible that both the claimant and Mr. Bilazi were paid the same amount as redundancy allowance. This is in line with the Employment Manual of the defendant Company which is before this Court. A careful perusal of this document shows that it contains important terms not provided for in Exhibit P1 (which is claimant’s employment letter). These terms regulate the employment relationship between the defendant and its employees including the claimant. Pursuant to the case of MANAGEMENT OF BRIGHTSTAR INDUSTRIES LIMITED V. PRECISION, ELECTRICAL AND RELATED EQUIPMENT WORKERS UNION (1978-2006) DJNIC 334 at 335; the contention of the claimant that he is not bound by the Employment Manual is untenable and I so hold. This is because Exhibit P1 (does not and cannot contain all the salient terms respecting the employment relationship between the claimant and the defendant. In resolving Issue 1 formulated by the defendant, I have no hesitation holding that redundancy allowance is not coterminous with redundancy benefit. I therefore resolve Issue 1 in the negative. Where the employment of an employee is terminated on the basis of redundancy, every benefit paid to the employee is not part of redundancy benefit. I will now consider the second Issue formulated for determination by the defendant. Is S. 20(1) or any part of Labour Act applicable to the claimant? It was contended on behalf of the defendant that going by the definition of the term “worker” in section 91(1) of the Labour Act, neither S. 20(1) nor any part of the Act is applicable to the claimant. I have earlier elucidated on the purport of S. 20 (1) of the Labour Act which mandates an employer to negotiate payments to be made to workers whose employments are terminated for redundancy. I do not need to reproduce the definition of the word “worker” under the Act as I have earlier done this. The defendant argues that the claimant having confirmed that he was Manager Legal and a lawyer while in the employment of the defendant is not covered by the provisions of the Labour Act. This is because he performed professional functions while still in the employment of the defendant. On his part, the claimant argued that his employment was terminated for redundancy and that his evidence that the defendant did not negotiate redundancy payment to him was not disputed by the defendant. He said that the defendant failed to comply with S. 20 (1) of the Labour Act which placed an obligation on the defendant to negotiate with him his redundancy payment. In my considered view, S. 91(1) of the Labour Act is very explicit, certain and unambiguous on the fact that persons performing administrative, executive, technical or professional functions do not fall within the category of persons defined to be workers under the Act. In the case of CALABAR CENTRAL CO-OPERATIVE THRIFT & CREDIT SOCIETY LTD & 2 ORS V. BASSEY EBONG EKPO (2008) 1-2 S.C. 229 at 252, the Supreme Court held that: “It is settled law that where the words of a statute or Constitution are clear and unambiguous, they call for no interpretation, the duty of the court in such a circumstance being to apply the words as used by the legislature...” See also the Supreme Court decision in BALONWU V. GOVERNOR OF ANAMBRA STATE (2010) All FWLR (Pt. 503 1206 at 1240 Paras. A-C. Since there is no dispute about the fact that the claimant expressly admitted to being a lawyer employed as Manager Legal, he is by that very fact not a worker within the contemplation of S. 20(1) of the Labour Act. This position has been judicially affirmed by the Court of Appeal in the case of EVANS BROTHERS (NIG) PUBLISHERS LTD. V. FALAIYE supra. I hold that S. 20(1) or any part of the Labour Act is not applicable to the claimant. I therefore resolve Issue 2 formulated by the defendant in the negative. I should add having resolved Issue 2 above, the second Issue formulated by the claimant is also resolved. Since the Labour Act is not applicable to the claimant as I have held, it follows that no obligation is placed on the defendant to comply with S. 20(1) of the Labour Act. What is left therefore is a determination of the first issue formulated by the claimant. Is the termination of the appointment of the claimant based on redundancy? The claimant simply contended that the letter terminating his appointment (that is Exhibit P1) indicates that his appointment was terminated on the basis of redundancy. He pointed to the payment of redundancy allowance to him as evidence that his appointment was terminated for redundancy. On its part, the defendant did not dispute the notion that the claimant’s employment was terminated for redundancy. If anything, what the defendant sought to established was that the claimant and other staff affected by the exercise were paid redundancy benefits among other terminal benefits. Flowing from the above, I agree that the employment of the claimant was terminated for redundancy. Issue 1 formulated by the claimant is therefore answered in the affirmative. Where then does the pendulum of justice tilt in this case? The defendant has argued very strenuously that since the relief sought by the claimant is not grantable under the provision of S. 20(1) of the Labour Act relied upon by the claimant, this action should be dismissed for want of cause of action or reasonable cause of action. On the face of it, the argument of the defendant in this respect appears rather cogent, unassailable, persuasive and convincing. What this means is that the claimant sought his reliefs under a wrong law. But this is not the end of the matter. I am quite mindful of that remarkable principle of law that where a remedy is provided for by any written law, common law or equity, a claimant who properly claims the remedy cannot be denied such simply because he has applied for it under a wrong law. In JOSEPH O. FALOBI V. ELIZABETH O. FALOBI (1976) 9-10 S.C. 1, the Supreme Court had this to say: “The next question is this. Can a court make an order under the Infants Law notwithstanding the fact that the application to it was made under statute which is clearly inapplicable? In our view, if a relief or remedy is provided for by any written law (or by the common law or in equity for that matter), that relief or remedy, if properly claimed by the party seeking it, cannot be denied to the applicant simply because he has applied for it under the wrong law. To do so will be patently unjust.” [Emphasis provided]. On the above succinct statement of law, see the Court of Appeal decision in the case of OLAWOLE AKINBODE V. CHIEF REGISTRAR (High Court of Oyo State of Nigeria) & 3 ORS (2003) 3 NWLR (Pt. 808) 585 at 601 Paras. F-H where the Court held that: “The essence of the Court is to do substantial justice according to law. Therefore, if a relief or remedy is provided for by any written law, or by the common law or in equity and it is properly claimed by a party, the relief or remedy cannot be denied the party simply because he has applied for it under a wrong law.” See also BUHARI V. OBASANJO (2003) 17 NWLR (Pt. 850) 423 at 477 Paras. C-F. What has emerged from the principle is that a relief or remedy provided for in any written law will be granted to a party seeking it provided it is properly claimed despite the fact that the party is seeking the relief or remedy under a wrong law. What this means is that a defendant cannot be allowed to becloud a court of justice from doing justice by asserting that a remedy to which a claimant has properly claimed ought not to be granted because the claimant has applied for it under a wrong law. This is the import of the principle. It is often not the case that a court of justice will refrain from doing justice on the simple reason that a claimant who has properly claimed a remedy has done so under a wrong law or even under no law at all. The Supreme Court applying the principle of Ubi jus ibi remedium has even expanded the horizon of the principle enunciated in the cases JOSEPH O. FALOBI V. ELIZABETH O. FALOBI supra & BUHARI V. OBASANJO supra. In the case of OYEKANMI V. NEPA (2000) 15 NWLR (Pt. 690)414 at445 Paras. G-H the Supreme Court had this to say: “On the principle of “Ubi jus ibi remedium” if from the facts available before the court, it I satisfied : (i) that the defendant was under a duty to the plaintiff; (ii) that there was a breach of that duty; (iii) that the defendant (sic) suffered legal injury; (iv) that the injury was not too remote. It will surely provide a remedy, that is create one irrespective of the fact that no remedy is provided either at common law or by statute.” It is necessary to point out that there is an error in the framing of the third condition that must exist before a court can of its own create a remedy for a claimant in appropriate cases. A community reading of the four conditions laid down by the Supreme Court will reveal that the word “defendant” as used in condition (iii) should have read “plaintiff.” This is because it is the plaintiff who is owed a duty by the defendant that can suffer legal injury in the event of a breach of that duty. The decision of the Supreme Court OYEKANMI V. NEPA supra is illustrative of the situation at hand. Let me pause to ask, is the defendant herein under any duty to the claimant? Is there a breach of such duty, if any? What legal injury was suffered by the claimant herein? Was the injury remote? Applying the principles laid down above to the case in hand, given that the claimant along with the others were former employees who served the defendant for years, a duty is imposed on the defendant to treat all of them fairly and without discrimination when it comes to the payment of terminal benefits. I therefore hold that the defendant owes a duty to treat the claimant fairly with dignity and without discrimination. Flowing from the above finding, it is correct to say that the non-payment of special benefits to the claimant despite the fact that the same payments were made to the other former employees including Bilazi Abdullahi amounts to a breach of that duty, and I so hold. I have no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the claimant suffers legal injury in the nature of deprivation. He was without justifiable basis denied payment of special benefits as paid to the other former employees. Finally, the legal injury is not remote. It was the immediate reason why the claimant instituted this action to seek judicial remedy. Another case that comes to mind in this respect was the decision of this Court in the case of METAL PRODUCTS SENIOR STAFF ASSOCIATION OF NIGERIA V. MANAGEMENT OF METAL CONSTRUCTION (W.A.) LTD. (1988) DJNIC 237 at 238. In that case, provision was not made for the payment of terminal benefits to a senior staff in his contract of employment. However, the conditions of service contained provisions for the payment of gratuity benefits to junior staff. The Court held as follows: “Where the court finds, as in this case, that there is no provision for terminal benefits payable to a senior staff in his contract of employment, the court will take note of the provisions for gratuity benefits payable to junior workers as specified in the conditions of service for junior workers, and order that the senior staff be paid terminal benefits.” It is remarkable that this Court order the payment of terminal benefits to the senior staff although such payments were not provided for in the contract of employment. The point here is that it is not the purpose of the judicial system that a claimant who has shown his entitlement to judicial relief be sent out empty handed from the throne of justice on the mere basis that the relief or remedy he claims is not provided for by contract, common law or even statute. From the judicial authorities I have made reference to above, it is now crystal clear that this Court was unmindful of the Supreme Court decision in OYEKANMI V.NEPA supra when it gave its interlocutory decision in suit No.NIC/ABJ/19/2011: JULIUS MBILITEM V. UNITYKAPITAL ASSURANCE PLC. Consequently, the decision in the latter case was reached per incuriam. At this juncture, it is appropriate for me to consider whether the claim of the claimant for the sum of N1,623,225.78 can be granted by this Court in view of the authorities and principles I have just considered. This is bearing in mind that the plaintiff maintained in his statement of claim, witness statement on oath and in his final address that the payment of special benefits to some other staff whose appointments were terminated by the defendant (and whose letters of termination have been tendered and admitted in evidence by this Court) is prejudicial against him. For the avoidance of doubt, the claimant in witness statement on oath deposed as follows: “8. I noted that my leave period was not commuted to cash. I accordingly complained. Later the same day I became aware that about 21 other staff were also terminated. Those terminated were staff of the three merged companies. The other terminated staff were paid “Special Benefits as part of their redundancy payments.” ‘9. I am aware that there were no special staff in the company. I am also aware that those other staff don’t have better performance record than me. And the company did not declare any performance bonus for any staff. 10......................................... 11............................................... 12.................................................. 13. The following morning Mr. Kari invited me to the boardroom, wherein were himself, the two Executive Directors and the Company Secretary, Bello Abdullahi. On being given the opportunity to explain why I wrote the demand and threatening letter, I repeated that I was prejudiced and discriminated against. I was not paid like other terminated staff on a redundancy situation. They don’t have better performance or personnel record than me. Some above me, some my rank and some below my rank were paid the special benefit, while I was not paid.” Section 131 Evidence Act 2011 states that whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts shall prove that those facts exist. In order to demonstrate that he was discriminated against, the claimant gave evidence that while some other former employees of the defendant were paid special benefits, he was excluded from such payment. In order to establish his case, the claimant tendered the letters terminating the employment of some former employees of the defendant in persons of: 1. Bilazi, Abdullahi Salihu; 2. Nse Udo Nya; 3. Nwaogwugwu Patrick I.N.; 4. Maria Nwakaego Ugoji; and 5. Isaac Ayoola Popoola. These letters as earlier stated in the course of this judgment are Exhibits P2 – P6. These exhibits indicate that the aforementioned persons were paid special benefits of varying amounts. Specifically, the claimant argued that Bilazi Abdullahi Salihu who occupied the position of a Manager as the claimant received the sum of N1,623,225.78 which was 50% of current annual pay as special benefits. I am of the candid view that the claimant has discharged the burden placed on him to establish discrimination. It is now left to the defendant to present evidence in rebuttal of the assertions made by the claimant. The defendant did not deny the payment of special benefits to its former employees whose letters were tendered in evidence. Neither did the claimant deny the fact that the claimant was no paid special benefits like these other former employees. Rather, the case of the defendant is that the claimant has been paid the benefits he is contractually entitled to be paid as terminal benefits. Also, it argued that the claimant failed to plead any term of his contract of employment that entitles him to the payment of special benefits. It was further the case of the defendant that employment relationship is between an individual employee and the employer. This simply is the case of the defendant. In the interest of justice, this Court is bound to consider the flip side of the coin which is that despite the assertion of the claimant, the defendant neglected or failed to adduce any shred of evidence to show that those who were paid special benefits were entitled to such payments by reason of the terms of their contracts of employment. Such evidence to my mind would probably have negative any consideration that the defendant acted discriminatory in making such payments. This neglect or failure to my mind is fatal to the case of the defendant. For the elaborate reasons I have given above, including the summary of evidence, consideration of statutory as well as judicial authorities, I have come to the irresistible conclusion that the payment of special benefits to some former employees of the defendant including Bilazi Abdullahi Salihu (who was a Manager while with the defendant) without paying similar special benefits to the claimant create the right situation where this Court can create a legal remedy in favour of the claimant who has established that he is entitled to be paid special benefit. This particular claimant will not be allowed to go empty handed from the throne of justice. Consequently, I hold that the claimant is entitled to be paid special benefits. The cases of OYEKANMI V. NEPA and METAL PRODUCTS SENIOR STAFF ASSOCIATION OF NIGERIA V. MANAGEMENT OF METAL CONSTRUCTION (W.A.) LTD supra are the appropriate authorities relied upon in arriving at this decision. I now turn to the issue of appropriate reliefs to be granted to the claimant. The claimant by the endorsement on the Complaint and repeated in his statement of claim seeks the following reliefs: A declaration that his termination by the defendant was for redundancy and an order compelling the defendant to comply with the provisions of section 20(1)(c) of the Labour Act by entering into negotiations for the payment of redundancy benefits. Or to pay him the sum N1.6 million being amount paid to another officer of the same rank. In his written address dated 3rd September, 2012 and filed the following day, the claimant also seeks an order for the payment of an interest rate of not less than 10% per annum to the claimant on the sum of N1,623,225.78 from the 23rd of February, 2011 till when judgment debt is liquidated. In the course of this judgment, I have held that the termination of the appointment of the claimant was on the basis of redundancy. I have also held that redundancy benefits are not coterminous with but integral to terminal benefits. The provisions of section 20(2) as I have stated are in applicable to the case at hand, I have held. Is there a basis for the monetary remedy sought by the claimant? Unimpeachable evidence has been placed before the Court to show that one Bilazi Abdullahi was a Manager just like the claimant while in the employment of the defendant. Incontrovertible evidence was also placed before this Court that the employment of the said Bilazi Abdullahi was terminated about the same time as the claimant and that the former was paid N1,623,225.78 as special benefits. In the Supreme Court case of DIAMOND BANK LTD. V. PARTNERSIP INVESTMENT CO. LTD. & ANOR (2009) LPELR-939 (SC), the apex Court laid down the principle that: “the general rule is that monetary judgment, attracts appropriate interest even where none is claimed.” In like manner, Order 21 Rule 4 of the NIC Rules, 2007 provides that in appropriate cases, this Court may order interest not less than 10 percent per annum to be paid on any judgment. On the these bases, it is appropriate that the defendant be and is hereby ordered to pay to the claimant the sum of N1,623,225.78 as special benefits. This payment is to be made to the claimant within 30 days from the date of this judgment. It is my order that the defendant shall pay to the claimant an interest rate of 10% per annum on the judgment debt due to the claimant from 23rd February, 2011 being the date his appointment was terminated) till the time the judgment debt is finally liquidated. I make no order as to the cost of this action, more so, that the claimant has not placed any evidence before this Court to guide it in this respect. Hon. Justice B. A. Adejumo, OFR President, National Industrial Court of Nigeria