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The applicant took up an originating summons dated and filed on 10th July 2012 against the respondents in this Court for the determination of the following questions – 1. Whether the four-year term fixed by paragraph 4(iv) of Article 42 of the constitution of National Union of Road Transport Workers for its State Executive Committee contemplates or includes any period during which the union is proscribed or purported to be proscribed by any State Authority or any force outside the operation of the constitution of the union. 2. Whether the period when the Oyo State Chapter of the union was proscribed or purported to be proscribed by the Oyo State Government between 7th August 2012 and 27th May 2011 and between 6th June 2011 and 5th May 2012, making a total of 19 months when union activities were totally paralyzed and the State Executive Committee was unable to function will count towards the four-year term fixed by paragraph 4(iv) of Article 4 of the constitution of the union for the State Executive Committee of the union. 3. Whether the constitution of the union contemplates the appointment of a Caretaker Committee to take the place of a duty elected State Executive Committee, when the State Executive Committee has not been suspended or dissolved by a resolution of the National Executive Committee of the union as provided in paragraph 7 of Article 42 of the constitution of the union. The applicant then prayed for the following reliefs – 1. A declaration that the proscription of the Oyo State Chapter of the 1st respondent union by the Oyo State Government having been nullified by the Federal High Court, the period of the said proscriptions, totaling 19 months shall not count towards the term of 4 years for which the applicant was elected Chairman of the Oyo State Chapter of the 1st respondent union on 18th June 2008, and that the term of office of the applicant as Chairman of Oyo State Chapter of the 1st respondent union shall, therefore, be extended by 19 months from the time he resumes his office as Chairman of the Oyo State Chapter of the 1st respondent union. 2. A declaration that the appointment and inauguration of the Caretaker Committee comprising the 2nd to 15th respondents shortly after the nullification by the Federal High Court, Ibadan Division of the proscription order by the Oyo State Government on 5th May 2012 and by which time the State Executive Committee under the Chairmanship of the applicant herein has not been dissolved by the National Executive Committee of the 1st respondent union as required by the constitution of the 1st respondent union is unconstitutional and, therefore, a nullity. 3. A declaration that the applicant is entitled to resume his office as Chairman of the Oyo State Council of the 1st respondent union forthwith and to remain in office for 19 months from the date he resumes office as Chairman of the Oyo State Executive Council of the 1st respondent union. 4. An order of injunction restraining the 1st respondent and the 2nd to 15th respondents in their capacities as officers and members of the Caretaker Committee of the 1st respondent union or in any other capacity whatsoever from holding or hosting any delegates conference of the respondent union for the purpose of electing new officers and a new State Executive Council of the 1st respondent union until the expiration of 19 months from the date the applicant resumes office and completes his term as Chairman of the Oyo State Branch of the 1st respondent union. 5. An order of injunction mandating the 1st respondent to dissolve forthwith the Caretaker Committee of the Oyo State Council of the 1st respondent union comprising the 2nd to 15th respondent hereof and restraining the 1st respondent herein from appointing or selecting another body of persons by whatever name called to take over the control and management of the affairs of the Oyo State Executive Council of the 1st respondent union until the applicant has resumed his office and completed his term as the Chairman of the Oyo State Council of the 1st respondent union. 6. An order of injunction compelling the 1st respondent herein to reinstate the applicant to his office as Chairman of the Oyo State Chapter of the 1st [respondent] union forthwith. In reaction, the respondents filed a preliminary objection dated 24th July 2012 challenging the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the suit. The grounds upon which the objection is based are: 1. The applicant has no locus standi to institute this suit. 2. The suit is incompetent being based on very contentious facts. 3. Reliefs 5 and 6 thereof being in the form of judicial review are incompetent. 4. There is no reasonable cause of action. 5. The suit is an abuse of the court process. At the Court’s sitting of 7th August 2012, the Court suo motu raised further concerns regarding the competence of the suit in terms of a Federal High Court order as to the legality of the proscription of the Oyo State Chapter of the National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW) as well as the issue of multiplicity of suits filed in this Court on issues similar to those at hand. The Court then directed that the preliminary objection and the concerns raised by the Court be addressed and resolved first before any action can be taken regarding the case. While the respondents filed 3 written addresses (dated 24th July 2012, 13th August 2012 and 30th November 2012) regarding the preliminary objection and the issue of multiplicity of suits, the applicant filed 2 written addresses (dated 10th August 2012 and 12th December 2012). The case of the respondents is that there was a crisis in the NURTW, Oyo State Council in 2009 which led to the dissolution of the State Executive Council. The applicant herein filed a suit to challenge his removal (not dissolution) as Chairman but that suit was struck out. Other members of the State Executive Council (who were members by virtue of their being Branch Chairmen and Secretaries respectively) instituted Suit No. NIC/LA/1M/2009 – Alhaji Lateef Olanrewaju & ors v. Alhaji Lateef Salako aka Eleweomo & anor. In the said suit, this Court held inter alia that the dissolution of the State Executive Council was null and void; the appointment of Eleweomo as acting Chairman was null and void; that the applicants (not the applicant herein i.e. Alhaji Lateef Akinsola) were bona fide members of the State Executive Council and that the state of affairs prior to the said dissolution be adhered to “for the unexpired period of their four year term which began on 18th June 2008”. That on 7th August 2010, the bailiff of this Court enforced the judgment by reinstating the applicants in that suit and the applicant herein Alhaji Lateef Akinsola to the State secretariat. (The respondents then stated that there is a video clip which will be shown if this case goes to trial.) That having been restored as State officials, the applicants in that suit were to continue in their official posts as Chairmen and Secretaries in their various branches and units which were based in the parks built by the various Local Governments in the State. Thus they occupied dual positions to wit: (i) Chairmen and Secretaries of Branches and (ii) State Executive Council members, referring to Articles 17(1) and 19(1) of the constitution of the union (Exhibit A1 attached to the summons). The respondents went on that before the applicants could take over the said garages (parks) the State Government banned the activities of the union i.e. it prevented them from operating in the Government owned garages. The said applicants, therefore, sought to return to the State secretariat, the administrative headquarters of the union where Alhaji Lateef Akinsola was operating from as Chairman. However, the said Alhaji Akinsola did not allow peace to reign at the State secretariat as he unilaterally removed some State officers without the sanction of the whole Executive Council in violation of the order of this court which returned them into office and enabled him to be reinstated as Chairman. That this action and other anti-union activities committed by Alhaji Akinsola led to serious crisis which as widely reported in the Newspapers (judicial notice of which we implore this court to take) culminated into the death of several citizens and the second ban placed on the union’s activities within Oyo State. Consequent upon the above facts, the Police declared Alhaji Akinsola wanted for the murder of the said citizens including the National President of the Medical Students Association. That Alhaji Akinsola went into hiding and he is still wanted till today. With this situation, the other members of the Executive Council began disciplinary action against Alhaji Akinsola vide Article 42(5) of the union’s constitution which allows any member of the union to be expelled, fined or suspended if he commits any anti-union activities or conduct prejudicial to the interest of the union. That at a full hearing session of all parties on 12th October 2011, the union (including representatives of Alhaji Akinsola) resolved to ban him and his rival, referring to Exhibits A and B attached to the affidavit of Alhaji Taofeek Oyerinde. The applicant herein challenged his ban at the Federal High Court, Ibadan but it was struck out; therefore, the ban is still subsisting. That consequent upon the union’s resolution of 12th October 2011, a Caretaker Committee comprising members of all factions including the applicant’s faction (represented by Alhaji Abass Adigun and Kasali Lawal) was set up. (The two mentioned are the 10th and 11th respondents herein, referring to the affidavit of Kasali Lawal.) In challenging the competence of this suit, the respondents submitted that it is trite law that once the jurisdiction of the Court is challenged, the objection must be heard first, citing Iroegbu v. Mpama [2010] All FWLR (Pt. 549) 1116 at 1134 A – B. Citing Adetona v. Zenith International Bank Ltd [2008] All FWLR (Pt. 440) 796 at 808 E – G and Imade v. Military Administrator, Edo State [2001] FWLR (Pt. 69) 1385; [2001] 6 NWLR (Pt. 709) 479, the respondents submitted that in the instant case, the applicant has to show a right and his connection to that right. That in determining a person’s locus standi, it is generally his statement of claim (in this case, the originating summons) that is looked at. But in exceptional cases, like in this case, where the jurisdictional issue cannot be determined alone on the originating process, the Court has the right to look at all documents properly filed and established, referring to Ngere v. Eneyo [2010] All FWLR (Pt. 550) – the page is not supplied. In any event that the Court has the right to look at documents in its record properly filed by the parties in determining an issue, citing Mhambe v. Shidi [1994] 2 NWLR (Pt. 236) 321. Referring to Olukunmi Olaifa v. Chairman, Ibadan North East Local Government & anor unreported Appeal No. CA/1/174/2005 delivered on 14th June 2007 (per Augie, JCA), the respondents submitted that in the instant case the applicant in order to deceive this Court claimed in his affidavit that he “is” the Chairman of the NURTW, Oyo State Council thereby suppressing the fact that – (i) He was reinstated as Chairman by the official of this Court on 7th August 2011. (ii) He performed the functions of his office and acted as Chairman when he removed other officers from office and caused serious crisis leading to the Government setting up a panel of inquiry which actions formed the basis of the disciplinary action made against him. (iii) He was thereafter expelled from the union and that a disclaimer was even published in the newspapers. (iv) Even without the ban, his tenure lapsed on 18th June 2012 according to the earlier judgment of this Court. (v) It was his ban from the union that made peace to return to the union and caused the State Government to lift the ban on the union’s activities. (vi) He could not have been banned if he had not been restored as the Chairman of the union. To the respondents, on this alone, according to the cited case, the applicant has acted mala fide and his claims should be dismissed. However, that the question is whether having been banned from holding any office in the union, a challenge on which was struck out, the applicant has any locus standi to institute his action. The respondents also referred the Court to the first and last pages of Exhibit A attached to the affidavit of Taofeek Oyerinde and Exhibit B, a copy of the advertisement in Compass News of 1st March 2012 on the issue of the ban and disclaimer on Alhaji Lateef Akinsola (aka Tokyo) and Alhaji Mukaila Lamidi (aka Auxiliary). That the applicant’s attempt to nullify that decision came to nothing as the suit was struck out. The respondents then posed two questions. What then is the right of the applicant to claim the reliefs being claimed in this suit? Since the applicant has been effectively relieved of any right to be a member of or hold any position in or participate in the activities of the union, how can be then ask the court to add any period to an already lapsed period of his tenure? In answer, the respondents submitted that the applicant has no legal right to claim any position in the union or challenge the appointment of a caretaker committee of the union, urging the Court to hold that the applicant has no locus standi. As an alternative argument, the respondents submitted that the law is trite that where the facts of a case are controversial or contentious and cannot be ascertained without evidence being adduced, originating summons cannot be appropriately used, citing Nwoko v. Ekerete [2010] All FWLR (Pt. 537) 790 at 799 A – B. That in the instant case, the facts in all the affidavits filed in this case are highly contentious; hence the use of originating summons is, therefore, inappropriate and should be struck out. As a further alternative argument, the respondents submitted that reliefs 5 and 6 as worded are strictly orders of mandamus because they seek to compel the 1st respondent to do something. Being judicial review issues, they cannot be applied to the respondents who are not public bodies, as held by this Court in NIC/LA/1M/2009, Alhaji Lateef Olanrewaju & ors v. Alhaji Lateef Salako & anor at page 43 (unreported). They should, therefore, be struck out. The respondents continued by citing Oni v. Igbalajobi [2006] 9 NWLR (Pt. 984) 180, where the Court of Appeal quoted with approval the meaning of a reasonable cause of action stated by Ogwuegbu, JSC in Yusuf v. Akindipe [2000] 8 NWLR (Pt. 669) 376. The respondents then referred to the first of the three questions posed for the determination of this Court by the applicant in his originating summons. To the respondents the first question posed by the applicant postulates that the union was proscribed and the proscription debarred the applicant from holding his office. That the facts relating to this issue are contained in paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 of his affidavit. However, there is nothing in those paragraphs stating or proving that the union was proscribed. The Oxford Learner’s Dictionary defines “proscribed” as saying “officially that something is banned” and to “ban” is “to decide or say officially that something is not allowed” or “to order somebody not to do something, go somewhere etc especially officially”. To the respondents, what the Government proscribed are the activities of the union and not the union. That at no time was the applicant removed from his office at the State secretariat or prevented from performing his administrative duties. In fact, it was in the performance of his said duties that he removed albeit illegally Alhaji Abideen Olajide, the then 2nd Vice-Chairman (and now Acting Vice-Chairman), Comrade Lekan Aleshinloye, the then Secretary (who swore to the affidavit in Suit No. NIC/LA/1M/2009), Alhaji Lateef Bello, the then Treasurer, and Alhaji Bawa Tijani, the then Deputy Chairman. That if the union had been proscribed, he would not have acted as Chairman to remove those officers; there would have been no further crisis; the secretariat would have been vacated and locked up and the issue of ban placed on the applicant would not have occurred, after all one cannot ban or remove a person that is not in office. Referring to the publication marked Exhibit 4 (page 6) and The Nation, the respondents argued that the evidence there from proves two things: (i) that the proscription was limited to the activities of the union and not the union itself (referring also paragraph 11 of applicant’s affidavit); and (ii) that the applicant was in effective control of the secretariat, thereby debunking, his assertion in paragraph 12 of his affidavit. To the respondents, there is a world of difference between the proscription of the activities and proscription of the union or the office of the Chairman. If throughout the period of the proscription of the activities of the union, the applicant was still the Chairman and according to the Newspaper report he occupied his office at the secretariat and his supporters were harassing neighbors at that secretariat, then he has no cause of action and no right to claim that his tenure was broken. That even assuming, without conceding, that paragraph 12 of his affidavit is true, that fact also cannot confer a reasonable right of action on the applicant because he never said he was removed from office. What he alleged is that he and other members of the Executive (which members he had removed) were unable to function because of the proscription. There is a difference between removal from office (which relates to tenure) and inability to perform the functions of that office (which has nothing to do with tenure). For instance, that it is a fact of history that when President Yar’ Adua was sick he was unable to perform the functions of his office, but that inability did not remove him from his office as President of Nigeria. He was still President and no one, not even the Vice-President then, could perform his duties until he was pronounce dead and his Vice sworn in. His tenure of 4 years which commenced on 29th May 2007 lapsed, even despite his death, on May 29th 2011. The respondents went on that since the applicant did not allege that he was removed from office (like the case of Senator Ladoja who was impeached) but later reinstated by the Court vide Inakoju v. Adeleke [2007] All FWLR (Pt. 353) 3, he cannot legally challenge the expiration of his tenure on 18th June 2012 vide the judgment of this Court in NIC/LA/1M/2009 (a case in which he was not even a party). That even in Ladoja’s case, the Supreme Court said the plaintiff cannot have the right to sue to extend his four year term, referring to Ladoja v. INEC [2007] All FWLR (Pt. 377) 934 at 983 – 984 D – A per Tabai, JSC. In summary, the respondents submitted that paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 of the applicant’s affidavit do not support the first question for determination. That those paragraphs deal with proscription of the activities of the union of Oyo State while the question for determination deals with proscription of the union itself. There is, therefore, no reasonable cause of action. On the second question posed in the originating summons by the applicant for the determination of this Court, the respondents submitted that the above argument is also sufficient to answer this question. Furthermore, that the maxim expressio unius est exclusion alterius applies here, citing AG, Abia State v. AG, Federation [2005] All FWLR (Pt. 275) 414 at 452 D – F per Ejiwunmi, JSC adopting the dictum of Karibi-Whyte, JSC in AG, Ondo v. AG, Ekiti [2001] FWLR (Pt. 79) 1431 at 1473. That there is nothing in Article 42(4)(vi) of the union’s constitution (not Art. 42(7)(vi) wrongly cited by the applicant) that provides for force majeure or that the tenure of four years can be extended. Having not so provided, any indication of extension cannot be implied; it is excluded, citing AG Abia v. AG, Federation (supra) at page 450 per Ejiwunmi, JSC. To the respondents, it is to be noted that contrary to the deposition of the applicant, he functioned well as Chairman during the time the activities of the union were proscribed; its effect was only in the garages (parks) where the applicants in Suit No. NIC/LA/1M/2009 were operating. This is also shown by the applicant’s Exhibit A4. That it was never said that a replacement was made for the applicant at the State secretariat and the applicant was not operating from any of the parks; he functioned at the State secretariat Olomi which is not a council park. None of the Branch Managers and Secretaries who used the garages i.e. motor parks and who instituted the said suit ever came to this court to challenge that decision. What right then does he have as regards the council parks i.e. motor garages? In Durayappah v. Fernando [1967] 2 AC 337 it was held that if a person aggrieved does not take any action, no other person can have locus standi. The respondents went on that it is clear from the further counter-affidavit (No. 2) that the applicant herein did not inform or obtain the consent of the purported 2nd – 14th applicants in Suit No. FHC/IB/SC/30/2012 attached as Exhibit A5 before instituting that suit. In consequence, the respondents urged that the second question for determination should fail. Regarding the third question posed by the applicant for the determination of this Court, the respondents argued that by the combined effect of the judgment of this Court in Suit No. NIC/LA/1M/2009 and Article 42(4)(iv) of the NURTW constitution, the tenure of the State Executive Committee expired on 8th June 2012. From that date, the applicant ceased to be the Chairman of the union in Oyo State. He, therefore, has no locus standi to challenge the appointment of the caretaker committee. Furthermore, that there is a ban placed on the applicant from holding any office or participating in any election of the union. Where then is his locus standi? The respondents continued that by virtue of the said judgment the caretaker committee did not take the place of a duly elected Executive Committee because by 18th June 2012 there was no Executive Committee which was replaced or substituted with. More importantly, however, is that the action of the union was in conformity with Article 42(7) which states – 7. CARETAKER In the case of suspension or dissolution of any State/Zonal, Local Branch or unit by either, the National Executive Council, State Council, Local Branch, or Unit, a Caretaker Committee shall be appointed by the appropriate organ to run the affairs of the affected organ. To the respondents, the question is what happens to an Executive Council after the expiration of its tenure. They answered that it stands dissolved, in which case a caretaker will be put in place pending the conduct of fresh elections. There is nothing in that provision that a formal resolution be made by the National Executive Council; in fact, the State Executive Council under that provision can dissolve itself. The act of appointing a caretaker committee presupposes a dissolution of the State Executive Council which by operation of law was no longer existing. There is, therefore, no cause of action. The respondents then urged the Court to also answer this question in the negative. On the issue of abuse of court process, the respondents submitted that in this case, the subsisting judgment of this Court which formed the basis of this claim was categorical as to the end of the applicant’s tenure when it stated that – The applicants remain bona fide members of the Oyo State Executive Council of the NURTW for the unexhausted part of their four year tenure which commenced on June 18, 2008. That what the applicant seeks to do here is to amend that judgment to extend the time beyond the 4 years from 18th June 2008. That this Court is functus officio and has no jurisdiction to do so, citing Ojo v. Olawore [2008] 6 – 7 SC (Pt. 11) 54 at 68 per Mohammed, JSC. To the respondents, it ought to be noted that without the judgment in Suit No. NIC/LA/1M/2009, the applicant herein would have had no right to be returned as Chairman in 2010. That his removal due, to the dissolution of the Executive Council in June 2009, would have effectively debarred him permanently from being in office. Having taken advantage of that judgment, the enforcement of which, as already decided, terminated his tenure on 18th June 2012, any attempt to re-litigate on that tenure is an abuse of court process. This is in pari material with what happened in Ojo v. Olawore (supra). That considered from another angle, this Court has already made a final pronouncement on the tenure of the Executive Council of the union under the applicant. This Court can no longer adjudicate on any matter relating to that tenure otherwise it will be sitting on appeal over its own decision; it has become functus officio, citing Alor v. Ngene [2007] 2 SC 1 at 10 para 8 – 29 per Kalgo, JSC. The respondents then urged the Court to strike out or dismiss the suit. On the effect of the case of Alhaji Lateef Akinsola & ors v. Governor of Oyo State & anor unreported Suit No. FHC/IB/CS/30/2012, which set aside and declared null and void the order of the Governor of Oyo State proscribing the NURTW, Oyo State Council, on the present case, the respondents framed two issues for determination, namely – 1. Whether the said judgment of the Federal High Court can form the basis of a claim before this court in the circumstances of this case. 2. Whether this case is not an abuse of the court’s process in view of the judgment of the Federal High Court. On issue 1, the respondents stated that by an originating motion dated 13th April 2012 but filed on 16th April 2012, the applicant herein despite the commencement of the Third Alteration to the 1999 Constitution sought before the Federal High Court, Ibadan – (i) a declaration under Chapter IV of the Constitution and (ii) (ii) a declaration under the Trade Unions Act. That the Federal High Court granted the said declarations on 25th May 2012. It is this judgment upon which the applicant predicated his claims in the instant case. To the respondents, the following are clear from the facts placed by the applicant before this Court. (i) There was a proscription by the Governor. (ii) The Federal High Court, acting without jurisdiction, set aside that proscription. (iii) Without the Federal High Court judgment, the proscription would still be in force. (iv) If the proscription is in force, the present suit cannot be maintained as there will be nothing to extend. The respondents then referred the Court to section 254(C)(1)(a), (b) and (d) and then submitted that the Federal High Court acted without jurisdiction when it held that the “proscription of the NURTW Oyo State Council by the 1st respondent is a violation of the applicant’s fundamental human rights as enshrined in section 33, 40 and 42 of the 1999 Constitution” and that the proscription of the union was ultra vires, null and void being a trade union registered under the Trade Unions Act. That the Federal High Court had been forbidden by the Constitution from entertaining such matters, referring to Adetona v. Igele Gen. Ent. Ltd [2011] All FWLR (Pt. 569) 1025 at 1052 C – D. The respondents went on that the law is trite that a judgment or order given without jurisdiction is null and void, citing Agip (Nig) Ltd v. Agip Petroli Int. [2010] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1187) 348 at 394F, Adekeye, JSC. To the respondents, the question then is whether this Court can make use of a judgment which was apparently given without jurisdiction and, therefore, null and void. That this case is similar to the case of Offodile v. Egwuatu [2006] 1 NWLR (Pt. 961) 421 where the Federal High Court, without jurisdiction, made an order prohibiting an election tribunal from hearing a petition. The Court of Appeal, while acknowledging that “ordinarily and except in certain defined and specified circumstances, no court of concurrent jurisdiction has power or the jurisdiction to review or set aside an order made by another court or judge of concurrent jurisdiction…” (supra at pages 432H and 433A) held that – The election petition tribunal Awka was right to hold that the order of prohibition made by the Federal High Court in Suit No. EPT/AN/NA/5/2003 was made ultra vires its jurisdiction. The order having been made by a court of concurrent jurisdiction was set aside by the tribunal. (See ibid at page 432F.) This is because, according to the Court – It settled law that an order of court which is made without jurisdiction can be set aside ex debito justitiae by the court who made the order or a court of concurrent jurisdiction. (See supra page 432 H.) See also Nen Ltd v. Asiogu [2008] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1108) 582 B – C). The respondents continued that it is, therefore, clear on the authorities that a void judgment is not binding on any other court. It cannot even be used as estoppel in future proceedings even if it is not set aside because it is a condition precedent to the invocation of the defence of estoppel that the judgment must have been given by a court of competent jurisdiction, citing Balogun v. Ode [2007] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1023) 1 at 20 – 21 H –D. That the effect then is that this Court cannot give effect to that void judgment. There is, therefore, no enforcement order de-proscribing the union in favour of the applicant. In other words, the applicant herein cannot seek for extension of his tenure once the proscription placed on “his” union has not legally been lifted. There is, therefore, no reasonable cause of action before this court. On issue 2, the respondents contended that assuming without conceding that the judgment of the Federal High Court is valid and subsisting having not been set aside, the question is whether the applicant can invoke the jurisdiction of this Court as he has done without it being an abuse of the court’s process. That what was before the Federal High Court was the purported proscription of the union; the same purported proscription is the cause of action in this case. In other words, the causes of action in the two cases are the same but the reliefs are different. It is obvious that what ought to follow the reliefs in the Federal High Court case are the reliefs in this case. Thus the applicant has split his case into two: the one he took to the Federal High Court while bringing the other before this court. That this is termed a piecemeal litigation which is not allowed in law, referring to Kwara State Polytechnic v. Afolabi [2010] All FWLR (Pt. 547) 629 at 656 – 658 D – B. The respondents also cited Savage v. Uwechia [1972] 3 SC 206 at 213 – 214, where the plaintiff earlier sued for specific performance of a contract to transfer property upon “failure of pay a debt, and failed” but latter sued to recover the debt, the Supreme Court held – As had aptly put in Res Judicata by Spencer-Bower and Turner 2nd Ed. Para 458 at p. 380 – Where there is substantially only one cause of action, it is a case, not of ‘splitting separable demands’ but of splitting one demand into two quantitative parts, the plea is sustained. In homely phrase, a party is entitled to swallow two separate cherries in successive gulps, but not to take two bites at the same cherry. He cannot limit his claim to a part of one homogenous whole, and treat the inseparable residue as available for future use, like the good spots in the curate’s egg. And it is immaterial how innocent, or even praiseworthy, his motive may have been in adopting this course, just as, conversely, in cases where the demands are distinct, it does not signify how bad his motive may have been. Thus where the omitted matter is a portion of the entire sum, or an item or parcel of the entire property, recoverable on a single cause of action, the judgment is a bar to any subsequent action, in respect of such omitted matter. Thus in an action for specific performance an inquiry as to damages must be asked for at the hearing and will not otherwise be granted on further consideration. The respondents then continued that in the instant case, it was the purported proscription that led, as alleged, to the applicant’s inability to complete his tenure; then it is in the same suit challenging that proscription that the applicant ought to seek an order extending his tenure. After all, the essence of his challenging that proscription was the effect it had on his tenure and not otherwise. It is, therefore, as abuse. As stated in Savage v. Uwechia (supra) at page 215 (par 9 – 11) “to allow the plaintiff in the instant case to do so, as the learned trial judge had done, is to connive, albeit unintentionally, at a gross abuse of the process of the court”. The respondents then submitted that howsoever looked at, the applicant’s suit is incompetent, frivolous, constitute window shopping and an abuse of the process of the court and should be dismissed. The respondents then proceeded to give what they termed as “the history and analysis of the multiplicity of suits filed by the applicant”. First that the applicant herein filed a suit at the National Industrial Court in Suit No. NIC/IB/15/2012 (Alhaji Lateef Akinsola & 14 ors v. Governor of Oyo State & anor). In the said suit, Alhaji Lateef Akinsola prayed the Court for the following – 1. A declaration that the 1st defendant has no legal right to appoint a Caretaker Committee to run the affairs of the NURTW, Oyo State Chapter. 2. A declaration that the 2nd defendant has no legal right to forward the names of members of the NURTW, Oyo State Chapter’s Caretaker Committee to the 1st Defendant. 3. An order setting aside any Caretaker Committee set up by the 1st Defendant to run the affairs of the NURTW, Oyo State Chapter. 4. An order of injunction restraining the 1st defendant from appointing a Caretaker Committee to run the affairs of the NURTW, Oyo State Chapter. This suit was filed by the law firm of F. A. Bello Esq. However on the 10th July 2012, a counsel in the Chambers of Adetola-Kaseem SAN applied to discontinue the suit by an application filed on 9th July 2012. Secondly, the applicant herein also instituted a suit at the Federal High Court Ibadan in Suit No. FHCC/IB/CS/30/2012 (Alhaji Lateef Akinsola & 13 ors v. Governor of Oyo State & anor) under the fundamental human rights procedure seeking for the following reliefs – i. A declaration that the proscription of the National Union of Road Transport Workers, Oyo State Council by the 1st respondent is a violation of the applicants’ fundamental human rights as enshrined is sections 33, 40 and 42 of the 1999 Constitution and Articles 3, 4, 5, 10 and 22 of the African Charter on Human and People Rights. ii. A declaration that the proscription of the National Union of Road Transport Workers, Oyo State Council is ultra vires the 1st respondent, unconstitutional, null and void being a trade union registered under the Trade Unions Act. iii. An injunction restraining the respondents by itself, servants, agents, privies or howsoever called from giving effect to the said directive or order or in any way interfering with the affairs of the NURTW, Oyo State Council. This suit was also instituted by F. A. Bello Esq. on behalf of the applicants and is still pending before the Federal High Court Ibadan. Thirdly, the applicant also instituted another action on 25th October 2011 at the Oyo State High Court Ring Road Ibadan in Suit No. M/486/2011 (Alhaji Lateef Akinsola v. NURTW & anor) where the following reliefs were sought – i. A declaration that the purported ban of the applicant by the respondent from participating in NURTW activities which statement was made by the 2nd respondent in Ibadan and Abuja which was widely reported by several Newspapers on 13th of October 2011 and 18th October 2011 is wrongful, unlawful, illegal, unconstitutional, discriminatory and a flagrant violation of the applicant’s fundamental rights guaranteed by sections 40 and 42 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and Articles 10, 11 and 28 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Right (Ratification and Enforcement) Act Cap. 10 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria. ii. A declaration that the continued prevention of the applicant by the respondent from performing his official duties as the Chairman of NURTW Oyo State Council/Chapter or taking over control of the activities of NURTW Oyo State Chapter as the Chairman by the respondents is wrongful, illegal, discriminatory and unconstitutional and a flagrant violation of the applicant’s fundamental rights guaranteed by sections 40 and 42 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and Articles 10, 11 and 28 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Right (Ratification and Enforcement) Act Cap. 10 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and also contrary to the judgment of the National Industrial Court delivered on 27th July 2010. iii. A declaration that the proposed forthcoming election being planned by the respondents is illegal, irregular, unconstitutional, null and void and contrary to the judgment of the National Industrial Court delivered on 27th July 2010 and a flagrant violation of the applicant’s fundamental rights guaranteed by sections 40 and 42 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and Articles 10, 11 and 28 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Right (Ratification and Enforcement) Act Cap. 10 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria. iv. An order of injunction restraining the respondents, their servants, agents and privies jointly and severally from conducting any form of election into the Oyo State Chapter of the NURTW except after the expiration of the tenure of the applicant as the Chairman, NURTW Oyo State Chapter on 18th June 2012. v. An order directing the respondents to immediately install the applicant as the Chairman of NURTW Oyo State Council/Chapter to enable him performing (sic) his official duties without any hindrance from the respondents, their servants, agents and privies jointly and severally until the 18th June 2012 when his tenure and that of this Executive Council shall expire in the with the judgment of the National Industrial Court delivered on 27th July 2010. vi. An order of injunction restraining the respondents whether by themselves, their agents, servants and/or functionaries from further infringing on the applicant’s fundamental rights to peaceful assembly and association and freedom from discrimination as contained in sections 40 and 42 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and Articles 10, 11 and 28 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Right (Ratification and Enforcement) Act Cap. 10 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria by allowing him to occupy the office of the Chairman of NURTW Oyo State Chapter/Council and for the purpose of performing of duties attached thereto. That the State High Court however dismissed the suit on the basis that it is only the National Industrial Court that has jurisdiction to entertain a suit that relates to a trade union over any dispute on interpretation and application of the provisions of Chapter IV of the Constitution as provided in section 254C. The ruling was delivered on 31st January 2012, referring to Exhibit 3 to the further counter-affidavit No. 2 of Comrade Lekan Aleshinloye sworn to on 30th July 2012. Fourthly, that the applicant, yet undeterred, and through F. A. Bello Esq., instituted another suit before this Court in Suit No. NICN/IB/24/2012 (Alhaji Lateef Akinsola v. NURTW & 2 ors) where he prayed for the following reliefs – i. A declaration that the claimant is entitled to a term of four uninterrupted years in office as the Chairman, NURTW, Oyo State Council commencing from 18th June 2008 by virtue of Article 42(2)(vi) of the constitution of the NURTW. ii. A declaration that by virtue of Article 42(4)(vi) of the Constitution of the NURTW constitution and the judgments of the National Industrial Court, Lagos in Suit No. NIC/LA/1M/2009 delivered on 27th July 2010 declaring the dissolution of the Oyo State Executive Council of NURTW under the chairmanship of the claimant null and void and reverting the state of affairs of the NURTW in Oyo State prior to the dissolution of the State Executive Council on 22nd June 2009 and the Federal High Court, Ibadan Judicial Division in Suit No. FHC/IB/CS/30/2012 nullifying the purported proscriptions of the NURTW, Oyo State Council, the period of 3 years during which the claimant was removed from office does not form part of the claimant’s term of four years as Chairman, NURTW, Oyo State Council. iii. A declaration that the claimant is entitled to remain in office as the Chairman of the Oyo State Council of the NURTW till 6th June 2013 having regard to the fact that his four year tenure commence on 18th June 2008 and same was illegally and unjustifiably disrupted for a period of 13 (thirteen) months between June 2009 – July 2010 during which one Lateef Salako Eleweomo (now deceased) illegally served as the Chairman of the NURTW Oyo State Council before the National Industrial Court nullified the chairmanship of the said Lateef Salako Eleweomo on 27th July 2010 in its judgment in Suit No. NIC/LA/1M2009 and 1 year and 11 months i.e. between 29/07/2010 and 12/06/2012 the Governor of Oyo State under Alao Akala and Senior Ajimobi proscribed the NURTW, Oyo State Chapter before the Federal High Court Ibadan Judicial Division declared the proscription illegal on 25th May 2012 in Suit No. FHC/IB/CS/30/2012. iv. A declaration that the claimant is not required to vacate office as the Chairman of NURTW, Oyo State Council until June 6 2015, which said date conforms with the NURTW constitutional period of tenure of four years certain as provided in the NURTW constitution. v. An order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants, its agents and privies or howsoever from conducting any form of election into the Oyo State Chapter of the NURTW without first taking into consideration the period of 3 years, when the claimant’s tenure of four year would have been accommodated. The Chambers of Chief G. A. Adetola-Kaseem SAN filed a notice of discontinuance dated the 9th of July 2012 but filed on the 7th November 2012. The processes are still before this Court. Fifthly, the applicant again instituted Suit No. NIC/333/2012 (Alhaji Lateef Akinsola v. NURTW & ors) on 10th July 2012 before this Court where in the claimant prayed for – i. A declaration that the proscription of the Oyo State Chapter of the 1st respondent union by the Oyo State Government having been nullified by the Federal High Court, the period of the said proscriptions, totaling 19 months shall not count towards the term of 4 years for which the applicant was elected Chairman of the Oyo State Chapter of the 1st respondent union on 18th June, 2008 and that the term of office of the applicant as Chairman of Oyo State Chapter of the 1st respondent union shall therefore be extended by 19 months form the time he resumes his office as Chairman of the Oyo Chapter of the 1st respondent union. ii. A declaration that the appointment and inauguration of the Caretaker Committee comprising the 2nd to 15th respondents shortly after the nullification by the Federal High Court, Ibadan Division of the proscription Order by the Oyo State Government on 5th May 2012 and by which time the State Executive Committee under the chairmanship of the applicant herein has not been dissolved by the National Executive Committee of the 1st respondent union as required by the constitution of the 1st respondent union is unconstitutional and therefore a nullity. iii. A declaration that the applicant is entitled to resume his office as Chairman of the Oyo State Council of the 1st respondent union forthwith and to remain in office for 19 months from the date he resumes office as Chairman of the Oyo State Executive Council of the 1st respondent union. iv. An order of injunction restraining the 1st respondent and the 2nd to 15th respondents in their capacities as officers and members of the caretaker committee of the 1st respondent union or in any other capacity whatsoever from holding or hosting and Delegates Conference of the 1st respondent union of the purpose of electing new officers and a new State Executive Council of the 1st respondent. union until the expiration of 19 months from the date the applicant resumes office and completes his term as Chairman of the Oyo State Branch of the 1st respondent union. v. An order of injunction mandating the 1st respondent to dissolve forthwith the Caretaker Committee of the Oyo State Council of the 1st respondent union comprising the 2nd to 15th respondents hereof and restraining the 1st respondent herein from appointing or selecting another body of person by whatever name called to take over the control and management of the affairs union until the applicant has resumed his office and completed his term as the Chairman of the Oyo State Council of the 1st respondent union. vi. An order of injunction compelling the 1st respondent herein to reinstate the applicant to this office as Chairman of the Oyo State Chapter of the 1st defendant union forthwith. The respondents then framed one issue for determination, namely – Whether the filing of multiplicity of suits by the applicant in different courts and by different lawyers against the same defendants amounts to abuse of judicial process. To the respondents, it has been held that the concept of abuse of judicial process is imprecise. It involves circumstances and situations of infinite variety and conditions. Its one common feature is the improper use of the judicial process by a party in litigation to interfere with the due administration of justice, referring to Karibi-Whyte, JSC in Saraki v. Kotoye [1992] 9 NWLR (Pt. 264) 156 at 188 – 189. In African Reinsurance Corporation v. J.D.P Construction Nig Ltd [2003] FWLR (Pt. 153) 251 at 270 B – D, the Supreme Court per Niki Tobi, JSC said – Abuse of court process is a term generally applied to a proceeding which is wanting in bona fide and is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. Abuse of process can also mean abuse of legal procedure or improper use of legal process as in this case. See Amaefule v. State [1988] 2 NWLR (Pt. 75) 156. An abuse of process always involves some bias, malice, some deliberateness, some desire to misuse or pervert the system. See Edet v. State [1988] 4 NWLR (Pt. 91) 722. There is said to be an abuse of the process of the court when a party improperly uses the issue of the judicial process to the irritation and annoyance of his opponent, such as instituting a multiplicity of actions on the same subject-matter against the same opponent on the same issues, as in the instant case. The respondents then submitted that it is clear that the various suits filed by the applicant in three different courts were on the basis of the judgment obtained by the respondents in this case as applicants in Suit No NIC/LA/1M/2009. But rather than seek ratification from the Court on that suit the applicant began a total “legal war” to ensure that he is returned to office despite having exhausted his tenure under that judgment. The respondents went on that the concept of abuse as stated above is not the exercise of the right to institute legal actions but in exercising that mala fide, with bias, malice and to pervert the system. The above is shown by the fact that (i) the claimant knew that by the judgment of this Court in Suit No. NIC/LA/1M/2009 that his tenure expired in August 2012, (ii) that he caused the ban placed on the union (iii) that after his tenure he was banned by the union from participating in the activities of the union and (iv) that after his tenure a caretaker committee was set up. His aim then was to prevent the holding of another election and generally to destabilize the union and stop its progress. His aim was not to enforce a right hence the multiplicity of actions in different courts and publications in newspapers during the pendency of those suits. This is an abuse of court process. The respondents then referred the Court to the case of Tomtec Nigeria Limited v. FHA [2012] “A FWLR” (Pt. 509) 400 at 415 – 416 G – B per Onnoghen, JSC, the citation of which is wrong. To the respondents, in the instant case, the applicant, Alhaji Lateef Akinsola, had so many cases in court against the respondents on the same subject matter aimed at achieving the same purpose. The same purpose in that he wants the Court to restrain the respondents and make him the reinstated chairman by virtue of the judgment delivered by this Court in Suit No. NIC/LA/1M/2009, a suit instituted by the respondents without him, the applicant, being a party thereto. That the applicant is claiming that the tenure as decided by this Court to reinstate him (not the entire executive and the judgment creditor) as the Chairman of NURTW is still subsisting. The respondents continued that it is pathetic that despite his institution of same case before the State High Court whereby it was decided that it is only the National Industrial Court of Nigeria that has jurisdiction in respect of issues that has to do with labour matters and trade unions, he still went ahead to institute Suit No. FHC/IB/CS/30/2012 before the Federal High Court and at the same time three different suits at the National Industrial Court in “NIC/IB/15/2012, NICN/24/2012 and NICN/333/2012” between him and the same defendants in the suit and on the same subject matter. The respondents referred the Court to Suit No. NICN/IB/24/2012 and NICN/333/2012 which were almost filed at the same time and “are still pending before this Court”. That the suit before the Federal High Court is still pending as the applicant is making moves to enforce it and the respondents herein are seeking to set it aside. The respondents then contended that the Court needs to consider how simultaneously the different suits were filled by the applicant to determine the abuse of court processes. To the respondents, a litigant has no right to pursue pari passu two processes which will have the same effect in two courts at the same time, with a view to obtaining victory in one of the processes or in both. Litigation is not a game of chess where players outsmart themselves by dexterity of purpose and traps. On the contrary, litigation is a contest by judicial process where the parties place on the table of justice different positions clearly, plainly and without tricks, referring to the case of Ashley Agwasim & anor v. David Ojiche & anor [2004] 4 S.C (Pt. II) 160. That the applicant herein is using different lawyers to institute multiplicity of actions against the respondents on the same subject matter and also using the media to prejudge, embarrass, harass and irritate the respondents and the courts, including the respondents’ counsel with frivolous and malicious petitions. That the applicant, apart from filing multiplicity of suits before this Court and other Courts, he is also using the media to harass, discomfort the Court in other to pervert the system for his own selfish gain to manipulate the Courts and get rid of the respondents. The respondents continued that the applicant wrote several petitions against the respondents’ lawyer to attack his personality frivolously and maliciously to blackmail and force him from appearing on behalf of the respondents in the various suits he has filed, referring to the case of African Re Corp v. JDP Const Ltd (supra) at 28 B – C. The respondents then submitted that it is trite law that where two actions of similar or same nature and between same parties and subject matter are being prosecuted concurrently before same Court or different Courts, it is the later in time that vacates, referring to the case of Dingyadi v. INEC (No. 2) [2010] 18 NWLR (Pt. 1224) 154 SC. That Suit No. NICN/IB/24/2012 was filed by the applicant on 14th June 2012 by his counsel F. A. Bello Esq., while Suit No. NICN/LA/333/2012 was filed on 10th July 2012. To the respondents, where the Court comes to the conclusion that its process is abused, the proper order is that of dismissal of the process, referring to the case of African Re Corp v. JDP Const Nig Ltd (supra) at 29 C – D, urging the Court to dismiss all these suits as wanting in bona fide, oppressive and irritating so that all parties may have peace. That a final judgment on the tenure of the Executive Council of the NURTW under the chairmanship of the applicant had been given by this Court in Suit No. NIC/LA/1M/2009. Any complaint against its enforcement should only be raised in that suit since this Court has the power to enforce its orders. In conclusion, the respondents urged the Court to dismiss all these suits on the ground that they constitute an abuse of court process by the applicant. In reaction to the preliminary objection of the respondents, the applicant reiterated his case, which is that he was elected Chairman of the Oyo State Executive Council of the 1st respondent union on 18th June 2010 for a four-year term, but that his term of office was interrupted by the instrumentality of the Oyo State Government which proscribed the activities of the 1st respondent union in Oyo State on two occasions between 7th August 2012 and 27th May 2011 and 6th June 2011 and 5th May 2012 when the Federal High Court declared the proscription of the activities of the 1st respondents union as unconstitutional, illegal, null and void, making a total of 19 months. That even after the judgment of the Federal High Court, the 1st respondent, rather than allow the Oyo State Executive Committee under his chairmanship to resume their duties, constituted a Caretaker Committee comprising the 2nd to 15th respondents to run the affairs of the union in Oyo State and planned to hold a State delegate Conference to elect new officers that will constitute the State Executive Council. The applicant then raised one issue for determination, namely – Whether all or any of the grounds upon which the preliminary objection is based can be sustained. To the applicant, it is clear that the grounds upon which the respondents’ preliminary objection is based raise issues of law. That being so, the respondents are deemed to have admitted for that purpose the facts pleaded by the applicant in the statement of fact, citing Woherem v. Emereuwa [2004] 13 NWLR (Pt. 890) 398 at 419 (B – D). In this case, the respondents are deemed to have admitted the facts deposed to by the respondents in support of the originating summons. The following argument of the applicant is, therefore, predicated on those facts. The applicant then submitted that contrary to the contention of the respondents, there is no exceptional circumstance to warrant an examination of the counter-affidavit deposed to on behalf of the respondents, particularly as the matter relates to the construction and application of written documents the existence and relevance of which are not in doubt. The documents sought to be construed and applied, namely the constitution of the union (Exhibit A1), the judgment and ruling of this Court (Exhibits A2 and A3), the newspaper reports of the proscription of the activities of the 1st respondents union in Oyo State (Exhibit A4), which in any case is not disputed by the respondents, and the order of the Federal High Court (Exhibit 5), are clear and do not require any extrinsic evidence to explain or interpret. On whether the applicant lacks the locus standi to institute this action, the applicant contended that according to Fatayi-Williams, CJN in Adesanya v. President of Nigeria [1981] NSCC 146 at 156, the term ‘locus standi’ denotes legal capacity to institute proceedings in a court of law. It is used interchangeably with terms like ‘standing’ or ‘title to sue’. It has also been held that for a person to have locus standi either to institute an action or to prosecute an appeal he has to show that he has special interest, that the interest is not vague or intangible, suppose or speculative or that it is not an interest which he shares with other members of society. Above all, he has to show that such interest has been adversely affected by the act or omission which he seeks to challenge. See In Re Ijelu [1992] 9 NWLR (Pt. 266) 414 at 422 – 423 (H – A), Adesanya v. The President (supra) and Inakoju v. Adeleke [2007] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1025) 437 at 601 – 602 (H – A) That in the instant case, the applicant deposed in paragraph 4 of the affidavit in support of his originating summons that he was duly elected Chairman of the Oyo State Council of the 1st respondent union and “duly sworn in affected and who have chosen not to approach the court for redress. It is their choice. But that does not prevent the applicant from exercising his undoubted constitutional right to approach the court for redress. This Court is urged to so hold”. On whether the applicant’s originating summons raises contentious issues, the applicant referred to Order 3 Rule 5A(1) of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007 as amended by the National Industrial Court Rules Practice Direction 2012, which provides as follows – Any person claiming to be interested under an enactment, constitution, agreement or any other written instrument may apply by originating summons for the determination of any question of construction arising under the instrument and for a declaration of the rights of the persons interested. ……….. Provided that a suit which raises substantial dispute of facts or where substantial dispute of facts is likely to be involved shall not be commenced by an originating summons, but by Complaint as provided in Rule 4 of this Order. That in the instant case, the following facts which are deposed to in the affidavit in support of the originating summons and evidenced by the attached exhibits are given – a) That the affairs of the 1st respondent union are regulated by its constitution, Exhibit A1. b) That the applicant was elected and sworn into office as Chairman of the Oyo State Council of the union on 18th June 2008 for a term of four years as provided in the union constitution. c) That there was a crisis in the union sometime in 2009 which resulted in Suit No. NIC/LA/1M/2009, in which this Court ordered the restoration of the State Executive Council under the chairmanship of the applicant in a judgment, Exhibit A2. d) That the defendants in Suit No. NIC/LA/1M/2009 applied for stay of execution of the judgment, which was refused by this Court, per the ruling Exhibit A3. e) That despite this Court’s refusal to grant stay of execution, and in order to circumvent the judgment of this Court, the Oyo State Government proceeded to proscribe the activities of the Oyo State Branch of the 1st respondent union from 7th August 2012 to 27th May 2011, three days to the expiration of the term of office of the former Governor. f) That the new Governor shortly after assuming office also proceeded to proscribe the activities of the union from 6th June 2011. g) That in Suit No. FHC/IB/CS/30/12 instituted by the applicant, the latter proscription was declared unconstitutional, null and void and consequently invalidated by the Federal High Court on 25th May 2012 per Exhibit A4. h) That rather than allow the applicant to resume his office as Chairman of the Oyo State Council of the union following the nullification of the proscription order by the Oyo State Government, the 1st respondent appointed and constituted the 2nd to 15th respondents into a caretaker committee and are now in the process of conducting election to elect new officers that will constitute the Oyo State Council of the union. The applicant then submitted that there is nothing contentious in the above stated facts. That facts do not become contentious just because the defendants have chosen to make them contentious. What determines the type of originating process to be employed in commencing a suit is the relief sought by the claimant. That based on the incontrovertible facts and documents exhibited in this case, the simple question the applicant wants this Court to determine is whether having regard to the provision of paragraph 4(iv) of Article 4 of the constitution of the union, the proscription of the activities of the NURTW in Oyo state for a total period of 19 months during the tenure of the applicant as Oyo State Chairman of the union has any effect on the four-year term for which the applicant was duly elected and sworn in on 18th June 2008. To the applicant, contrary to the contention of the respondents, no serious dispute of facts or contentious facts arise in this case. All the court is required to do is to construe the relevant provisions of the union constitution attached as Exhibit A1, and apply the facts, borne out by the documentary evidence submitted, to the result of the construction, urging the Court to so hold. In the circumstance, the applicant submitted, contrary to the contention of the respondents, that this suit commenced by an originating summons is quite competent, and this Court is urged to so hold. Regarding the issue whether reliefs 5 and 6 amount to judicial review, the applicant contended that the term ‘judicial review’ has been defined as meaning a court’s power to review the actions of other branches or levels of government, especially the court’s power to invalidate legislative and executive action as being unconstitutional. It also means a court’s review of a lower court’s or administrative body’s factual or legal findings, citing Attorney-General of the Federation v. Abule [2005] 11 NWLR (Pt. 936) 369 at 387 (E – F) and the Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th ed. page 864. To the applicant then, reliefs 5 and 6 do not fit into that definition. Although the reliefs are orders of mandatory injunction, they do not amount to mandamus. Mandatory injunction is an order requiring a party to do a specific act or acts. In an application for judicial review by way of an order of mandamus, the applicant is expected to fulfill certain conditions such as that which requires the applicant to first and foremost request the public body to perform the duty in question and that body must fail and/or refuse to do so before the application for mandamus is presented at the High Court to compel performance of the duty. Whereas in an ordinary claim for mandatory injunction such a precondition does not exist although it is clearly to compel the public body to perform its duties, statutory or otherwise, imposed on it, referring to Ohakim v. Agbaso [2010] 19 NWLR (Pt. 1226) 172 at 225 – 229. The applicant went on that the respondents had linked reliefs 5 and 6 in this case to reliefs 9 and 10 in Suit No. NIC/LA/1M/2009, in which this Court held those reliefs to be judicial review and are liable to be struck out on ground of incompetence. The said reliefs 9 and 10 were as follows – 9. An order of mandamus directing the 1st defendant to hand over the secretariat of the union in Oyo State to the Elected Executive Council aforesaid immediately. 10. An order of mandamus compelling the 2nd defendant to reinstate the complainants and other members of the Executive Council aforesaid into the positions held by them prior to 30th May 2009. To the applicant, this court had no difficulty in holding that the said reliefs having been couched in the form of judicial review cannot be sustained against a trade union which is not a public body and is, therefore, liable to be struck out on ground of incompetence. That the same thing cannot be said of reliefs 5 and 6, which are reliefs sought against a trade union, a non-public body. This, therefore, means that the objection raised by the respondents is obviously misconceived and should be dismissed. On whether the applicant’s suit discloses a reasonable cause of action, the applicant contended that the respondents have combined argument in respect of their preliminary objection with that on the substantive originating summons. Although the principle that only the facts pleaded in the statement of claim are relevant when considering objection on the ground that no reasonable cause of action is disclosed, the applicant submitted that when argument in respect of such objection is combined with argument on the substantive matter as in this case, it is quite legitimate to rely on all the materials placed before the court by the applicant as well as the defense. Indeed, that the respondents relied on facts contained in their counter-affidavit in their combined argument on record. That being so, the applicant proposed on to refer to all the processes filed and exchanged by the parties in his reply address, as may be necessary. To the applicant, the respondents have not disputed that the Oyo State Government made orders of proscription affecting the NURTW, but have suggested that what was proscribed by the Government were the activities of the union and not the union itself. That the dichotomization is a distinction without a difference. The Black’s Law Dictionary defines the word “proscribe” as meaning “to outlaw, to prohibit, forbidding”. If, therefore, the activities in Oyo State, were outlawed or prohibited or forbidden in Oyo State was there anything left for the union Executives, even if they existed, to manage? The answer is clearly that the Executives of the union only existed in name and on paper and not in real term. They were rendered prostrate and impotent while the order of proscription lasted. The applicant continued that the respondent contended that the applicant in his capacity as Chairman of the union in Oyo State took over and occupied the union Secretariat. That even if that were so (and this is not conceded) what was he doing in the union Secretariat when every activity of the union had been outlawed in Oyo State? The clear answer is that he had nothing to do in the union Secretariat. He could not convene or preside over meetings of the union while the proscription lasted, as holding meetings is part of the activities of the union. To the applicant, the above postulation is an assumption. That the real truth is that the applicant was not given any chance to move near the union office, not to talk of taking it over. Incidentally, that the present counsel to the respondents on record was representing the interest of the applicant at the material time. That is why he represented the applicants in Suit No. NIC/LA/1M/2009 before this Court. In his capacity as such counsel, he expressed his disappointment in an open letter to the Governor of Oyo state complaining about the manner the Oyo State Police Commissioner in collusion with the Oyo State Government were frustrating the realization and enforcement of the judgment of this Court, referring to the certified true copy of the said open letter which was published in the Tribune newspaper of 8th June 2011 and is attached as Exhibit A7 to the applicant’s affidavit. In that publication, the learned counsel stated, inter alia, as follows – We act for Alhaji Lateef Akinsola a.k.a (Tokyo), the Court ordered Chairman and the Executive of the National Union of Road Transport Workers Oyo State Council (NURTW) hereinafter referred to as our client. Our clients allege: ….. ix. That the National Industrial Court reinstated our client but Alhaji Bolanta at the request of the former Governor actively prevented the enforcement of the judgment. x. That the Attorney General of the Federation by letter Ref: DPP/ADV./171/10/23 dated 5th August 2010 advised the IGP to enforce the judgment. A copy is attached as Annexure “B”. xi. That the Commissioner of Police Legal/Prosecution Section ‘D’ Department (FCID) by Memo dated 6th August 2010 Abuja also advised the IGP to enforce the Judgment. A copy of its Memo is Annexure ‘C’. xii. That another letter Ref: CB.3514fXILEG/FHQ1ABJfVOL.16/6 of 24th August 2010 from the same Legal Department also advised the IGP to direct Alhaji Bolanta to enforce the Judgment. xiii. That all the above documents were sent to Alhaji Bolanta, despite the IGP’s letter No. CB:3514/IGP.SEC/ABJfVOL.11/963 dated 6th August 2010 by which Alhaji Bolanta was directed to enforce the Judgment. A copy of the letter is attached as Annexure ‘D’. xiv. That in spite of all the above Alhaji Bolanta prevented the enforcement of the Judgment which made Late Salako and Lamidi Mukaila a.k.a Auxiliary to be effectively in control of the garages and the union even though they lost in the court. The applicant went on that most unfortunately, the same counsel in a related case has now filed processes and contending the exact opposite of what he contended during and after the conclusion of Suit No. NIC/LA/1M/2009. That in Registered Trustee of the Association of Community Health Practitioners of Nigeria v. Medical and Health Workers Union of Nigeria [2008] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1072) 575 the Supreme Court deprecated the conduct of counsel who changed the position he took at the trial court by making a U-Turn on that point at the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. That the conduct of counsel in this case in no less so. Continuing, the applicant submitted that quite apart from the professional ethical issue raised by the conduct of counsel, all the processes filed by counsel and his contention in this case lack any credibility and ought, therefore, not to be believed or relied upon, citing Idiok v. State [2006] 12 NWLR (Pt. 993) – the page is not supplied. The applicant went on that the complaint of the applicant was not that he was unable to function because he was removed from office by the union at the material time, but that the State authorities have employed extra-constitutional means and State machinery to forbid him from carrying out his lawful duties as Chairman of the Oyo State Chapter of the union. That the analogy with an officer holder being prevented by ill-health from carrying out the duties of his office is, therefore, most inappropriate. In that case, the President’s constitutional authority as President of Nigeria was not in doubt; it just happened he could not personally exercise that authority, but other functionaries of Government were acting on his behalf. In the instant case on the other hand, the authority of the applicant as the elected Chairman of the union had been removed not by the union itself or by ill-health, but by State forces which are completely outside the contemplation of the union constitution. The applicant went on that what made it impossible for the Supreme Court to order an extension of the tenure of Governor Ladoja by 11 months during which he was illegally impeached was the specific immutable provision of section 180(2) of the 1999 Constitution which tied a Governor’s tenure to the time he took the oath of allegiance and oath of office. In the instant case, there is no similar provision in the constitution of the NURTW. Apart from that, whereas the Constitution contemplates the possibility of a Governor being impeached for improper conduct, the procedure adopted by the Oyo State House of Assembly in carrying out the impeachment was found to be most irregular. In this case, the proscription of a union or the activities of a union by a State Governor or Government is not in the contemplation of the union constitution. The proscription order by the Governor of Oyo State was, therefore, alien to Nigerian Constitution and the union constitution. The comparison between the two instances is, therefore, not apt. In view of the foregoing, the applicant urged the court to discountenance the argument of the respondent and answer the question in the positive. The applicant continued that it is precisely because there is no provision in the union constitution for proscription of the activities of the union by State authorities that the applicant prays this Court not to recognize the cumulative period of the proscription in the computation of his four-year tenure. Again, that this is unlike the position in Ladoja’s case (supra) where there is a specific provision in the constitution against tenure extension. That the assertion that the applicant herein did not obtain the content or authority of the 2nd to 14th applicants in Suit No. FHC/IB/CS/30/2012 before commencing the case in their names is true. It is obvious that 2nd to 14th applicants in that case who were also the applicants in Suit No. NIC/LA/1M/2009 were members of the Executive Council whose tenure were affected first by the usurpation of their officers by the 1st respondent in Suit No. NIC/LA/1M/2009 and later by the proscription of the activities of the union by State authorities. Up to that time they had not shown any unwillingness to join the applicant herein to challenge their oppression by State authorities. In any case, being aware of the pendency of Suit No. FHC/IB/CS/30/2012 and did not protest their joinder as parties in the action, they most certainly consented to the institution of the action at least by conduct. As late as 4th April 2012, Alhaji Lateef Olanrewaju deposed to an affidavit in the registry of this Court in which he deposed to the fact that the applicant herein was still the Chairman of Oyo State NURTW. That document is attached as Exhibit A9 to the applicant’s reply affidavit. What further evidence of loyalty to the applicant, at least up to that time, should the Court look for? The applicant then urged the Court to resolve this issue in favour of the applicant. The applicant went on that in the normal course of things, the tenure of office of the applicant as Chairman of Oyo State Chapter of the 1st respondent union ought to expire on 18th June 2012 (not 8th June as wrongly stated in the respondents’ address). That it is appreciated that at the time this Court delivered its judgment in NIC/LA/IM/2009 on 27th July 2007, the Court envisaged that that was the terminal for the term of office of the State Executive Council. However at the time the election took place in 2008, members did not anticipate the disruption in its activities that occurred in 2009, the litigation that followed, and the flagrant disobedience of court order and the subsequent proscription of the activities of the union between 2010 and 2012. Also, the Court did not envisage that its judgment would not only be disobeyed, but impudently violated and circumvented by State authorities slamming a ban on the activities of the union rather than allow an elected Executive Council to resume its duties and serve its term as envisaged by the union constitution and ordered by the Court. That the respondents’ address also alluded to a ban placed on the applicant. Here the applicant submitted firstly that the word “ban” of a member of the union is alien to the union’s constitution. The constitution of the union (Exhibit A1) stipulates the types of disciplinary measures that can be meted out to a member and the procedure for doing so. That the imposition of any form of disciplinary measure outside those stipulated in the union constitution or any failure on the part of the union to follow the procedure laid down in its constitution for disciplining any member would render such disciplinary measure invalid and, therefore, null and void. The applicant then referred the Court to Article 4 paragraph 5 of Exhibit A1 (the union constitution) which stipulates that any member of the union may be expelled, fined or may have his/her membership suspended if in the opinion of the National Executive Council, such a member has been found guilty of any of the specific offences listed therein. Article 4 paragraph 6 provides the procedure for disciplinary measures. Sub-paragraphs (i) and (vi) provide that: i. In the case of any offence against any member of the State Council such State Council shall initiate disciplinary action, subject to the approval of the Zonal Council. vi. A State Council which in the opinion of the National Executive Council is found guilty of politicizing union matters, or is factionalized, that it is unable to discharge its obligations to the members as prescribed in the constitution or commits acts similar or identical to those listed in Article 42 section 5, sub-section (i) – (xi) of the constitution shall be liable to either a reprimand, suspension or dissolution by the National Executive Council as the case may be. To the applicant, the respondents claimed to have invited the applicant, among other stakeholders, to a meeting of the National Executive Council of the union. That the applicant did not attend the meeting, but sent representatives. The applicant denied receiving any invitation, or that he sent any representative(s) to any meeting of the National Executive Council of the union. Apart from the ipse dixit of the deponents to the counter-affidavits, the respondents did not show any written evidence of the invitation(s) purportedly issued to the applicant among other invitees to the meeting. No copy of the minutes of the NEC meeting showing the list of attendees and record of deliberations at the meeting was exhibited. The only document attached to the respondents’ counter-affidavit as Exhibit A is a document tagged press release. The document is unsigned. In Aiki v. idowu [2006] 9 NWLR (Pt. 984) – the page is not supplied – it was held that where a document which ought to be signed is not, its authenticity is in doubt. In the instant case, that there is no evidence that the Oyo State Executive Council of the union initiated any disciplinary measure against the applicant. There is also no evidence that the National Executive Council met to consider any complaint against the applicant. That in the face of strident denial by the applicant, and in the absence of any written evidence of the meeting and an invitation to the meeting, it is submitted that it is unsafe to believe the assertion of the respondents in preference to the denial by the applicant. Besides the purported decision of the NEC to ban the applicant was not communicated to the applicant. The conclusion is irresistible, therefore, that the applicant was never invited to any NEC meeting where the decision to ban him was taken. The applicant contended further that the language of Article 4 paragraph 5 of the union constitution that any member of the union may be expelled, fined or may have his/her membership suspended if in the opinion of the National Executive Council, such a member has been found guilty presupposes that the member before being found guilty would have been given a hearing, talk less of a fair hearing, any decision taken by the NEC is liable to be set aside as being in breach of the applicant’s constitutional right to fair hearing before he was punished, citing L.P.D.C v. Fawehinmi [1985] 2 NWLR (Pt. 7) and Osumah v. E.B.S [2004] 17 NWLR (Pt. 902), the pages of which are not supplied. Therefore, the decision (if any was actually taken), to ban the applicant from the membership of the 1st respondent union or from participating in all union activities especially and/or participating in any election of the union should be declared a nullity. This is even more so that the alleged decision was not formally conveyed to him, except for him to pick up the information from the air, urging the Court to so hold. In the same vein, the applicant continued that no decision had been taken to dissolve the Oyo State Executive Council of the union before the caretaker committee was set up by the union on 31st May 2012, before the term of office of the State Executive Council expired on 18th June 2012. This is buttressed by the content of the Press Release (Exhibit A) issued as far back as 12th October 2011 as follows – Our appeal become necessary in view of the fact that most of the key actors spearheading the warring factions have by the tenets of the union’s constitution served out the required tenure of the office. That this statement proceeded on the assumption that the tenure of office of the State Executive Committee had run out, when in fact it had not. The appointment of the caretaker committee before the expiration of the tenure of the elected State Executive Council is certainly wrongful and runs against the clear provision of the union’s constitution. The said appointment is, therefore, liable to be set aside. The respondents had hinged their objection to the extension of the tenure of the applicant as Chairman of the Oyo State Executive Committee of the union on the fact that the tenure of the SEC had expired and that the applicant had been banned from holding any office in the union. Here the applicant submitted that once these “decisions” are set aside as being unconstitutional, the coast is clear for the Court to grant the applicant’s prayer for the extension of his tenure by 19 months by which the tenure was affected by the unlawful proscription of the activities of the union by the Oyo State Government between 2010 and 2012, urging the Court to so hold and resolve this issue in favour of the applicant. On the question of abuse of court process, the applicant contended that contrary to the contention of the respondent, this Court is not being invited to review or reverse its judgment in NIC/LA/IM/2009. That at the time this Court declared quite correctly that the tenure of the Oyo State Executive Council was due to expire on 18th June 2012, the Court did not anticipate that its judgment and orders would be so wantonly and flagrantly disobeyed and violated, not just by the 1st respondent union but by the Oyo State authorities. Besides, that the issue in this case has nothing to do with when the tenure of the Oyo State Executive Council sworn in on 18th June 2008 would expire. The applicant recognizes that the tenure of the SEC is for a term of four years. The issue is whether the tenure of four years fixed by the union constitution anticipated or is affected by the illegal and unconstitutional proscription of the activities of the union by the State authorities. The applicant went on that it must be noted that parties in Suit No. NIC/LA/1M/2009 and in this case are not the same. Even though the applicant herein was not listed directly as a party to that suit, it is agreed that the applicants in that case represented the interest of the Oyo State Executive Council of which he is the Chairman. He is, therefore, a privy and beneficiary of that judgment. However, apart from the 1st respondent union and the 2nd and 10th respondents herein who were respectively the 1st, 9th and 3rd applicants in Suit No. NIC/LA/1M/2009, none of the respondents herein were parties in the earlier suit. In any case, the 2nd to 15th respondents herein are sued in their capacities as members of the Caretaker Committee, whose legality is being challenged herein whereas the applicants in Suit No. NIC/LA/1M/2009 sued in their capacities as members of the elected State Executive Council of the union. Clearly, therefore, the parties and the capacities in which they sued, in the earlier and this suit are distinct and different. In the circumstances, the argument that this Court is being asked to either review or sit on appeal over its earlier judgment is totally misplaced and misconceived because the parties and the issues are not the same. The Court is, therefore, urged to discountenance the respondent’s argument and the authorities cited in support thereof as being inappropriate and irrelevant to this case. Furthermore, that the argument that this Court is being asked to sit on appeal over its own judgment is untenable. In fact, rather than asking the Court to sit on appeal over his earlier judgment, the main purpose of this action is to employ the Court’s undoubted authority to enforce its own judgment and discourage the use of brutal force and the unbridled employment of the machinery of State to circumvent and disobey a valid Court’s judgment against which there is no appeal. That the argument is misconceived, and the authority relied upon in support thereof is irrelevant to this case, urging the Court to so hold. The applicant then proceeded to address the issue raised by the Court. To the applicant, this Court expressed concern over two issues, namely – 1. Whether the series of cases filed by different parties at the National Industrial Court on the issue of tenure of the Oyo State Executive Council led by the applicant herein as Chairman would not amount to abuse of court process; and 2. Whether the Federal High Court in Suit No. FHC/IB/CS/30/2012 had the jurisdiction to entertain the case having regard to the provision of Constitution (Third Alteration) Act 2012, and whether the NIC can give effect to that judgment as it is now being asked to do. Regarding the first Court issue, the applicant submitted that the right of citizens to access the Courts is preserved in section 6(6)(b) of the Nigerian Constitution. This provision confers on any aggrieved citizen the right of access to court with appropriate jurisdiction as provided in the Constitution or any law validly enacted and for the time being in force. That the other limitation to this right is that such an action must not constitute an abuse of judicial or court process. In Attahiru v. Bagudu [1998] 3 NWLR (Pt. 543) 656 at 665 (E – G), the Court of Appeal after defining what is meant by abuse of court process quoted the principle stated in Saraki v. Kotoye [1992] 9 NWLR (Pt. 264) 156 thus – An abuse of court process has the same meaning as an abuse of judicial process. An abuse of court process occurs when a plaintiff institutes multiple actions on the same subject matter against the same opponent on the same issues. Thus, the multiplicity of action on the same matter between the same parties even where there exists a right to bring the action is regarded as an abuse. The abuse lies in the multiplicity and manner of the exercise of the right rather than the exercise of the right per se. Thus for a process to constitute an abuse, it must have been a multiple of actions brought by the same plaintiff against the same opponents in respect of the same subject matter on the same issue. So if the parties are not the same, even if the subject matter and issue are same, it would not amount to abuse of court process. The applicant then submitted that even if there is similarity of parties and subject matter, if the issues are different, the process would not amount to an abuse. In the instant case, for example, the subject matter is the tenure of the Oyo State Executive Council of the NURTW sworn in on 18th June 2008 and whose four-year tenure should ordinarily expire on 18th June 2012. But the issue is whether the proscription of the activities of the union for a total period of 19 months had in any way affected the tenure of that Executive Council so as to entitle them to an extension of tenure. Clearly, therefore, the suit cannot be regarded as an abuse of court process. Similarly, that if different parties are litigating over the same subject matter raising the same issue in the same court, all the Court can do to facilitate the hearing and determination of the series of actions is consolidate the actions for hearing by the same judge. However, that consolidation would be impracticable where the actions were instituted in different Courts and with different time intervals. Regarding the second Court issue i.e. whether the Federal High Court in Suit No. FHC/IB/CS/30/2012 had the jurisdiction to have entertained the case having regard to the provision of Constitution (Third Alteration) Act 2012, and whether the NIC can give effect to that judgment as it is now being asked to do, the applicant contended that it is arguable whether the Federal High Court, Ibadan, had the jurisdiction to have entertained Suit No. FHC/IB/CS/30/2012. That the main issue in that case is whether the proscription of the National Union of Road Transport Workers in Oyo State of which the applicants were officers did not violate or infringe the fundamental rights of the applicants as enshrined in sections 33, 40 and 42 of the 1999 Constitution and Articles 3, 4, 5, 10 and 22 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Right. The respondents to the action were the Governor of Oyo State and the Commissioner of Police, Oyo State. To the applicant, by the provision of section 46 of the Constitution any person who alleges that any of the provisions of this chapter has been, is being or likely to be contravened in any State in relation to him may apply to a High Court for redress. That the Supreme Court in a plethora of decisions has held that in fundamental right matters, both the Federal and the State High Courts have concurrent jurisdiction, citing Tukur v. Government of Gongola State [1989] 4 NWLR 517 at 554(D), Jack v. University of Agriculture Makurdi [2004] 5 NWLR (Pt. 865) 208 at 225 and 229(C), and also Order Rule 1 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009. The applicant went on that it may well be that the National Industrial Court has jurisdiction to enforce fundamental right matters, having been defined as having equivalent status to the High Court in section 254D(1) of the Constitution, as amended by the Constitution (Third Alteration) Act 2010. That where this is so, the Court shall exercise the jurisdiction concurrently with other High Courts. Although in Tukur’s case (supra) it was held that where a case raises a number of issues in addition to fundamental rights issue, the Court with jurisdiction to determine the principal issue will have jurisdiction to entertain the matter, that principle does not apply here because the case as framed did not raise any other issue apart from breach of fundamental rights of the applicants. Clearly, therefore, the Federal High Court, Ibadan properly exercised its jurisdiction to have entertained the case. In the circumstances, that there is no question of this Court reviewing the decision of the Federal High Court in Suit No. FHC/IB/CS/30/2012. It would, therefore, be right for this Court to apply that decision to the prayer of the applicant in this case; and the applicant urged the Court to do so. In conclusion, the applicant urged the Court to grant all the reliefs sought by him as prayed. The applicant then proceeded to address the issue whether Suit No. NICN/LA/333/2012 constitutes an abuse of court process. Here the applicant framed one issue for determination, namely – Whether this suit constitutes an abuse of the process of court having regard to other suits filed by, at the instance of or involving the applicant. To the applicant, what amounts to abuse of court process is infinite. Several authorities have stated examples of what would amount to the abuse. Some of the cases are – a) Amachree v. Princewill [2008] 12 NWLR (Pt. 1098) 345 at 362 (D) CA where the Court of Appeal held that “the term or phrase abuse of court process is generally applied to proceedings which are wanting in bona fide, frivolous, vexatious, improper use of rules of practice and procedure of the courts, with intent to harass or embarrass, intimate, initiate and/or annoy a party/parties; that involves some deliberateness to misuse or pervert the smooth orderly and expeditious hearing and determination of matters as provided in the rules of courts. It can manifest itself in many forms and ways that no hard and fast rule can be laid for application in all cases….” b) Ajuwa v. SPDC (Nig.) Ltd [2008] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1094) 64 at 91 (D) CA where Oyebisi Folayemi Omoleye, JCA stated that “an abuse of court process exists when a party deliberately uses, employs or initiates a court process or multiplicity of judicial process to the frustration, irritation and annoyance of his opponent, such as instituting a multiplicity of actions on the same subject matter between the same parties or their privies on the same issues”. c) Jokolo v. Gov. Kebbi State [2009] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1152) 394 at 426 (E) where Baba Alkali Ba’Aba JCA held that “there is said to be an abuse of the process of the court when a party improperly uses the issue of judicial process to the irritation and annoyance of his opponent, such as instituting a multiplicity of action on the same subject matter against the same opponent on the same issue”. The applicant went on to submit that upon briefing a new counsel to handle Suit Nos. NIC/IB/15/2012 and NIC/IB/24/2012 recently filed on his behalf, the new counsel undertook a review of the two suits, came to the conclusion that it was better to file a fresh suit, and advised the applicant about his opinion, and also informed the applicant of the need to first discontinue those two suits before commencing the new suit. The applicant agreed and instructed counsel to proceed accordingly. Counsel then took steps to discontinue Suit Nos. NIC/IB/15/2012 and NIC/IB/24/2012. That the effect of filing a Notice of Discontinuance of a case before the case is set down for hearing is that the matter immediately comes to an end, referring to Ezeonu v. Agheze [1991] 4 NWLR (Pt. 187) 631 at 643 (A – E). The applicant continued that as at the time this Court directed that it should be addressed on the point and even up till now, the defendants in Suits No. NIC/IB/15/2012 and NIC/IB/24/2012 had not taken any step on the matter, and the cases had, therefore, not been set down for hearing before this Court. Those cases were, therefore, practically dead. That the matter having not been set down for hearing, and the defendants in the cases having not taken any step in the proceeding, they are not prejudiced by the Notice of Discountenance in any way. There is also not a necessity to apply to seek the leave of court to discontinue when none of the defendants had filed a defence in the proceeding, citing Babatunde v. Pan Atlantic Shipping and Transport Agency Ltd [2007] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1050) 113 at 140 (E – H). With regard to the uncertainty as to whether the Notice of Discontinue in NIC/IB/24/2012 was actually filed on 10th July 2012 before the commencement of this Suit No. NIC/LA/333/2012, that it is clear that any inadvertence in this regard is clearly the mistake in the Chambers of counsel, which ought not to be visited on the litigant, citing Ogundoyin v. Adeyemi [2001] 13 NWLR (Pt. 730) 403 at 420 (A – B) where the Supreme Court held that “the Courts will generally not punish a litigant for the mistake or inadvertence of his counsel when the mistake or inadvertence is in respect of procedural matters and in such a case the discretion of the court, although always required to be exercised judicially, would be exercised with a leaning towards accommodating the parties’ interest and determination of the case on the merits”. The Court was also referred to NEPA v. Savage [2001] 9 NWLR (Pt. 717) 230 at 242 (B). The applicant submitted further that if, apart from Suit Nos. NIC/IB/15/2012 and NIC/IB/24/2012 earlier commenced by the applicant, other parties had commenced some other suits with respect to the subject matter of this suit against either the National Union of Road Transport Workers or the Oyo State Government, and in which the applicant is not a party, or to which this Suit No. NIC/LA/333/2012 is not a direct response, that other suit would not affect the status of this present suit so as to render it incompetent on the ground that it constitutes an abuse of court process. That in Kotoye v. Saraki [1991] 8 NWLR (Pt. 211) – the page is not supplied – it was held that “the parties as well as the subject matter, claims or issues in the earlier or previous suits must be the same or substantially so with a latter suit in order for the later to amount to an abuse of such process. Therefore, where either the parties or/and the claims, subject matter or issues are different in the suits, then one cannot rightly and properly be said to amount to an abuse of court process in relation to the others”. In final conclusion, the applicant urged the Court to hold that this Suit No. NIC/LA/333/2012 is not filed in abuse of the process of this Court and should, therefore, be considered and determined on its merit. In considering the merit of the issues in this matter, I must right away dispose of some of the arguments of the respondents. I agree with the applicant that the argument of the respondents that reliefs 5 and 6 prayed for by the applicant in his originating summons amount to judicial review is misconceived. Reliefs 5 and 6 are reliefs sought against a trade union, a non-public body, and so cannot amount to judicial review. In the second place, the argument of the respondents against the applicant having commenced this action by way of originating summons on the ground that it involves contentious issues goes to no issue as if that were so, it is curable by the simple expedient of this Court directing that the applicant files the appropriate complaint. In any event, I agree with the applicant that no serious dispute of facts or contentious facts arise in this case; and all that the Court is called upon to do is simply to construe the relevant provisions of the union constitution, and apply the facts, borne out by the documentary evidence submitted, to the result of the construction. Thirdly, regarding the argument of the respondents that the applicant’s suit discloses no reasonable cause of action, I also agree with the applicant that the argument of the respondents in that regard combines the argument in respect of their preliminary objection with that on the substantive originating summons. This line of argument led the applicant to also adopt the same approach, thereby addressing issues that ought to appropriately be left for the substantive originating summons. In doing this, I am of the opinion that both parties jumped the gun. It will, therefore, be idle to consider arguments in that regard as that will amount to deciding the merit of the case even when only it is a preliminary objection that was raised. I shall, therefore, refrain from considering the arguments of both parties in that regard. I must also state that when this Court expressed concern over the Federal High Court case of Suit No. FHC/IB/CS/30/2012, it was in the context of the applicant having gone to the Federal High Court for the reliefs he sought therein, why was it now that he turned to this Court for some sort of enforcement of that decision? Could not the applicant have simply gone back to the Federal High Court? In this regard, the applicant actually got the concern of the Court wrong in the manner that his arguments in that regard were presented. The applicant’s argument that the issue before the Federal High Court was brought for the enforcement of the fundamental rights of the applicant (the matter was filed under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009) raises the fundamental question whether there is a fundamental right as to an office to warrant the applicant going to court via that process and procedure. The applicant laid claim to his unexpired term of office. Is this an item, or is there an issue, of fundamental rights? In my humble opinion, I do not think so. This Court had actually held that section 254C(1)(d) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, cannot be used as the basis of filing claims under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules. See Comrade (Evang.) Olowo Preye Grace v. PENGASSAN & 3 ors unreported Suit No. NIC/EN/10/2011 delivered on July 5, 2011. By analogy to the rule that while a person unlawfully suspended from work can seek redress in the Court and claim his full salary (ACB Ltd v. Ufondu [1997] 10 NWLR (Pt. 523) 169 CA), this can be only by writ of summons, not by an application under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules (Effiong v. Ebong [2006] 18 NWLR (Pt. 1010) 109), I really do not think there is a fundamental right to an office. The rule is stretched further in the recognition of an employer’s right to suspend an employee when necessary, with or without pay or at half pay, which by Ayewa v. University of Jos [2000] 6 NWLR (Pt. 659) 142, Akinyanju v. University of Ilorin [2005] 7 NWLR (Pt. 923) 87 and Longe v. FBN Plc [2010] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1189) 1 SC, cannot amount to breach of the employee’s fundamental rights as it has no bearing with issues of fundamental right under the Constitution. Ant the case of West African Examination Council v. Akinola Oladipo Akinkunmi [2008] 4 SC held that in ascertaining the justiceability or competence of a suit commenced by way of an application under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 1979, the Court must ensure that the enforcement of the fundamental rights under Chapter IV of the Constitution is the main claim and not the ancillary claim. Where the main or principal claim is not the enforcement of a fundamental right the jurisdiction of the court cannot be said to be properly invoked and the action will be liable to be struck out for incompetence. While it is not the place of this Court to pronounce on the legality or otherwise of the applicant going to the Federal High Court under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, it is the place of this Court to inquire into the question that having then gone to the Federal High Court as the applicant did, is it open to him to now come to this Court for some sort of enforcement of the Federal High Court decision (for that is what the instant case is partly about), without having to account for a charge of multiplicity of suits? In all of this, having to traverse the Federal High Court, the Oyo State High Court and this Court (as shown in the submissions of the respondents) in a matter that actually started in this Court calls for closer scrutiny regarding the charge of multiplicity of suits. The critical issue for determination, therefore, is the issue of multiplicity of suits by the applicant in this and the other Courts. The respondents had already given a rundown of the various cases so far filed by the applicant in this and other Courts. I took time to go through the records available to the Court. Before reeling out the cases so far filed in this Court regarding issues pertaining to the instant case, it may be worthwhile to reiterate what transpired in the primary case of Alhaji Lateef Olanrewaju & ors v. Alhaji Lateef Salako a.k.a. Eleweomo & anor unreported Suit No. NIC/LA/1M/2009, the judgment of which was delivered on July 27, 2010. It is this judgment and the ruling of the Federal High Court in Suit No. FHC/IB/CS/30/2012 that the instant case draws its sustenance. In Suit No. NIC/LA/1M/2009, the present applicant was not a party to the case although he was described in the processes available to the Court as Chairman of the Oyo State Executive Council of the NURTW. This was what this Court said regarding his not being a party to the case – Reliefs 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 dealing with declaratory orders all allude to the Oyo State Executive Council of the NURTW and to Alhaji Lateef Akinsola as its Chairman; yet neither the Oyo State Executive Council of the NURTW nor Alhaji Lateef Akinsola as its Chairman, or even both of them, is made a party in this suit. The reason for this is not clear. The defendants consequently made an issue out of this and urged the court to decline jurisdiction given that the applicants in this case are mere unit officers of the branches that make up the Oyo State chapter of the NURTW. Article 17(1) of the NURTW constitution provides that ‘Chairmen, Secretaries and [T]reasurers of all the branches within the State’ shall be members of the State Council. As members of the State Executive Council, the applicants no doubt have an interest (locus standi) in challenging the dissolution of the State Executive if this is not done outside of the provisions of the NURTW constitution. It was the argument of the defendants that the trade unions law does not recognize units/branches as having legal personality for purposes of suing and being sued. This court has…severally held and recognized units/branches/chapters as capable [of] suing in their own right given that their interests may not always and necessarily be coterminous with those of the national body…So the challenge by the defendants as to the right of the applicants to come to this court cannot be tenable and so is hereby rejected. The applicants have sufficient interest to be in this court regarding the matter at hand. The applicant would, however, later surface to claim the benefit of the judgment in the instant case as well as in other suits even when he was not a party. In fact, the 2nd and the 10th applicants in the instant case were the 9th and 3rd applicants in Suit No. NIC/LA/1M/2009. Is the applicant herein competent, therefore, to benefit from a suit he was not a party to especially now that some of the beneficiaries of that suit are amongst those he is suing against? The case of Plateau State of Nigeria v. Attorney-General of the Federation [2006] 1 SC (Pt. I) 1 held that only parties to an action can claim relief flowing from such action; and a person who is not a party to an action cannot claim relief. Even if the applicant herein can benefit from the said suit, is his action in bringing so many suits (the multiplicity of suits argument) on same issues not a disentitling act to any remedy? Not long after Suit No. NIC/LA/1M/2009 was decided, the applicant in the instant case was before this Court in Alhaji Lateef Akinsola v. NURTW unreported Suit No. NIC/LA/2M/2009 the judgment of which was delivered on February 23, 2011. This is what this Court said of the applicant in that case (incidentally the applicant in the instant case) – Aside from all these reasons there is also the issue that the reliefs sought for by the applicant have essentially been pronounced upon by this court in Alhaji Lateef Olanrewaju (Branch Chairman Lagelu mini Bus) of NURTW Oyo State Chapter & ors v. Alhaji Lateef Salako a.k.a. Eleweomo & anor, supra. To our mind, therefore, the applicant is in this suit reopening and/or re-litigating issues that have already been judicially pronounced upon by this court. Note that Babatunde Akinola, who is one of the opposing counsel to the applicant in the instant case was counsel to the applicant in Suit No. NIC/LA/2M/2009. While Suit No. NIC/LA/1M/2009 was going on, the applicant herein and 4 ors on 22nd July 2009 filed an originating summons in Alhaji Lateef Akinsola & 4 ors v. Alhaji Lateef Salako, NURTW & 3 ors unreported Suit No. NIC/LA/22/2009 seeking the determination of the following questions – 1. Whether by virtue of the provisions of the constitution of the NURTW, Executive officials of the union could be illegally removed from office before the expiration of their tenure. 2. Whether duly elected Executive officials of the NURTW can be unlawfully removed from office without complying with the procedure laid down by the constitution of the union. 3. Whether or not by virtue of the provisions of the said constitution of the union, the unlawful act of the 3rd respondent by illegally installing the 1st respondent as a kangaroo chairman of Oyo State Council of the union is null and void [and] offend the provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and rules of natural justice. The applicants therein then prayed for 6 reliefs including reinstatement into their offices as duly elected Executive Council of the Oyo State Chapter. This originating summons was struck out by the Court on 17th March 2010 on the authority of Order 19 Rule 3 of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007. The motion to relist the suit was withdrawn and hence struck out vide this Court’s order of 15th September 2010. On 2rd May 2012, the applicant alongside others filed Alhaji Lateef Akinsola & ors v. Governor of Oyo State & NURTW unreported Suit No. NICN/IB/15/2012 wherein he prayed for – 1. A declaration that the 1st defendant has no legal right to appoint a caretaker committee to run the affairs of the NURTW, Oyo State Chapter. 2. A declaration that the 2nd defendant has no right to forward the names of members of the NURTW, Oyo State Chapter’s Caretaker committee to the 1st defendant. 3. An order setting aside any caretaker committee set up by the 1st defendant to run the affairs of the NURTW. Oyo State Chapter. 4. An order of injunction restraining the 1st defendant from appointing a caretaker committee to run the affairs of the MURTW, Oyo State Chapter. This suit was discontinued by the claimants on the order of the Court on 10th July 2012. On 14th June 2012, the applicant as a single claimant filed Alhaji Lateef Akinsola v. NURTW & 2 ors unreported Suit No. NICN/IB/24/2012. (The 2 others are the 2nd and 14th respondents in the instant case; and were sued for themselves and on behalf of the 14 member Caretaker Committee of the NURTW, Oyo State Chapter just like the respondents in the instant case have been sued.)The applicant prayed for – 1. A declaration that the claimant is entitled to a term of four uninterrupted years in office as Chairman, NURTW, Oyo State Council commencing from 18th June 2008 by virtue of Article 42(4)(vi) of the constitution of the NURTW. 2. A declaration that virtue of Article 42(4)(vi) of the NURTW constitution and the judgments of the National industrial Court, Lagos in Suit No. NIC/LA/1M/2009 delivered on 27th July 2010 declaring the dissolution of the Oyo State Executive Council of the NURTW under the chairmanship of the claimant null and void and reverting the state of affairs of the NURTW Oyo State prior to the dissolution of the State Executive Council on 22nd June 2009 and the Federal High Court, Ibadan Judicial Division in Suit No. FHC/IB/CS/30/2012 nullifying the purported proscriptions of the NURTW, Oyo State Council, the period of 3 years during which the claimant was removed from office does not form part of the claimant’s term of four years as Chairman, NURTW, Oyo State Council. 3. A declaration that the claimant is entitled to remain in office as the Chairman of the Oyo State Council of the NURTW till 6th June 2013 having regard to the fact that his four years tenure commenced on 18yh June 2008 and same was illegally and unjustifiably disrupted for a period of 13 months between June 2009 – July 2010 during which one Lateef Salako Eleweomo (now deceased) illegally served as the Chairman of the NURTW Oyo State Council before the National Industrial Court nullified the chairmanship of the said Lateef Salako Eleweomo on 27th July 2010 in its judgment in Suit No. NIC/LA/1M/2009 and 1 year and 11 months i.e. between 29/07/2010 and 12/6/2012 the Governor of Oyo State under Alao Akala and senator Ajimobi proscribed the NURTW, Oyo State Chapter before the Federal High Court, Ibadan Judicial Division declared the proscription illegal on 25th May 2012 in Suit No. FHC/IB/CS/30/2012. 4. A declaration that the claimant is not required to vacate office as Chairman of NURTW, Oyo State Council until June 6, 2015, which said date conforms with the NURTW constitutional period of tenure of four years certain as provided in the NURTW constitution. 5. An order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants, its agents and privies or howsoever from conducting any form of election into the Oyo State Chapter of the NURTW without first taking into consideration the period of 3 years, when the claimant’s tenure of four years would have been accommodated. The claimant discontinued this suit and on 14th December 2012, this Court struck out the suit and ordered the claimant to pay to the defendants as cost the sum of Fifteen Thousand Naira (N15,000). It is uncertain if this cost has been so paid. The law is that multiplicity of actions which involve the same parties and the same subject matter amount to abuse of court process and a court is duty bound to stop such abuse. See Pavex International Co. Ltd v. IBWA [1994] 5 NWLR (Pt. 347) 685, Okorodudu v. Okoromadu [1977] 3 SC 21 at 32, COP v. Fasehun [1997] 6 NWLR (Pt. 507) 180 – 181 and Chief Ohwovwioghor Ikine v. Chief Olori Edjerode [2001] SC 43. And by Chief Victor Umeh & anor v. Prof. Maurice Iwu (Chairman INEC) & 3 ors [2008] 2 – 3 SC (Pt. I) 135, it is settled law that for there to be an abuse of court process, there must exist a multiplicity of suits between the same parties on the same subject matter and on the same issues which pre-conditions are mutually inclusive as they are conjunctive. Furthermore, it is an abuse of the judicial process for a plaintiff to file a notice of discontinuance so that he may have his way in a new suit. See Olawore v. Olanrewaju [1998] 1 NWLR (Pt. 534) 436 at 455. The authorities go on to state that a trial court has jurisdiction to strike out a matter with an order barring the applicant from instituting the same action where, for instance, an enabling statute or law so specifically provides or when the matter being struck out is an abuse of judicial process. See Registered Trustees of Ifeloju v. Kuku [1991] 5 NWLR (Pt. 189) 65. In order to determine whether an abuse of the judicial process has occurred, Agwasim v. Ojichie [2004] 10 NWLR (Pt. 882) 613 laid down that the Court is expected to consider the content of the first process vis-à-vis the second to see whether they are aimed at achieving the same purpose. By Ntuks & ors v. Nigerian Ports Authority [2007] 5 – 6 SC 1, abuse of court process generally means that a party in litigation takes a most irregular, unusual and precipitate action in the judicial process for the sake of action qua litigation, merely to waste valuable litigation time. It is an action which is one (or more) too many; an action which could be avoided by the party without doing any harm to the matter in dispute. Now, the question that arises is whether these plethora of cases filed by the applicant amount to multiplicity of suits. I have compared the issues for determination in these cases and the reliefs sought for and I am satisfied, and hence have come to the conclusion, that they are similar, if not the same with the those of the instant case. The applicant in the instant case features prominently all through the cases. The respondents are essentially the same although there are additions/subtractions here and there. All of this yields to only one conclusion: the applicant has been a busybody in terms of filing all these cases. I find, therefore, that the allegation of multiplicity of actions is established and that the applicant is responsible for the said multiplicity of cases. When the Federal High Court case of Suit No. FHC/IB/CS/30/2012 is added, I have no hesitation in holding that the charge of multiplicity of suits has been established. In traversing the Oyo State High Court, the Federal High Court and this Court on an issue (the question of his unexpired term of office) that he could simply have had faith and trust in this court to resolve, the applicant had an action that was one too many; and which could have been avoided without doing any harm to the matter (Ntuks & ors v. Nigerian Ports Authority [2007] 5 – 6 SC 1). The applicant had argued that in discontinuing the cases he filed and leaving only the instant case, the charge of multiplicity of suits cannot hold against him. However, Olawole v. Olanrewaju [1998] 1 NWLR (Pt. 534) 455 held that it is an abuse of the judicial process for a plaintiff to file a notice of discontinuance so that he may have his way in a new suit. This was exactly what the applicant did in discontinuing Suit Nos. NICN/IB/15/2012 and NICN/IB/24/2012; and I so find and hold. Having found that the applicant is guilty of multiplicity of suits, what then is the remedy? By Registered Trustees of Ifeloju v. Kuku [1991] 5 NWLR (Pt. 189) 65 at 79 per Tobi, JCA, as he then was, (the case had held that once a party discontinues his case, with leave of Court, that party would not be estopped from re-litigating on the same issue) – There are certain instances when the courts of law have jurisdiction to strike out a matter with an order barring the applicant from instituting the same action at all times and for all times. Such instances occur mostly when an enabling statute or law so specifically provides or when the matter which is being struck out is an abuse of judicial process. For all the reasons given above, it is my holding that the instant case is an abuse of court process. It is accordingly struck out. The applicant is hereby barred from instituting this same action. This order is necessary just so that the applicant will not re-litigate, for instance, Suit Nos. NICN/IB/15/2012 and NICN/IB/24/2012 if the authority of Registered Trustees of Ifeloju v. Kuku [1991] 5 NWLR (Pt. 189) 65 is anything to go by. Ruling is entered accordingly. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip