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This is a motion on notice filed by the claimant on the 13th April 2012. It is brought pursuant to Order 11 Rule 1 and Order 14 Rule 1 of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007. It is praying for the following orders: 1. An order of Interlocutory Injunction restraining the respondents, their servants, officers, agents or privies from picketing, disrupting or carrying out any other activity capable of paralyzing the banking activities of the claimant pending the hearing and determination of this suit. 2. Such further order or other orders as this Honourable court may deem fit to make in the circumstances. The grounds upon which the application is made are: (i) The former members of staff of the claimant as represented by the 1st to 3rd respondents were paid all their entitlements and other benefits, including their gratuities at the time they left the service of the claimant. (ii) The respondents have continued to make spurious demands for the payment of additional sums as gratuities from the claimant. (iii) At the moment, the respondents have given notice to the claimant that all the claimant’s branches nationwide would be picketed if their demands were not met by the claimant. (iv) The threat by the respondents would definitely paralyze all the commercial activities of the claimant nationwide and lead to a colossal loss on the part of the claimant. (v) The respondents have no legal right to demand for any further payment as gratuity from the claimant. (vi) It is just and equitable for this Honourable Court to restrain the respondents from continuously threatening and harassing the claimant. (vii) The present application is imperative to preserve the corporate existence of the claimant. The motion is supported by an 11 paragraph affidavit sworn to by Adebisi Oyelade, a legal practitioner to which is annexed eight exhibits. The written address in support is dated 14th June 2012 and filed same day. In opposition, the 1st, 2nd & 5th defendants filed a 23 paragraph counter affidavit sworn to by Victor Adefisan on the 28th May 2012 and a written address dated 28th June 2012. The 4th defendant in opposition filed a counter affidavit of 7 paragraphs on the 21st May 2012 which was sworn to by Adeniyi Pokanu a legal practitioner and a written address dated 21st May 2012. The claimant filed a 7 paragraph reply affidavit to the 1st, 2nd & 5th respondents counter affidavit and also an 8 paragraph reply to the 4th respondents counter affidavit the replies were sworn to by Adebisi Oyelade on the 14th June 2012. The claimants reply on points of law is dated 6th July 2012 but filed on the 10th July 2012. The parties adopted their written addresses. Learned counsel to the claimant raised one issue for determination as follows: Whether on the affidavit evidence before the court, there is sufficient justification to grant the order of interlocutory injunction as sought by the applicant. He submitted that the factors the court has to consider are (i) whether the applicant has a legal right which ought to be protected; (ii) whether there is a serious issue to be tried in respect of the substantive suit; (iii) the conduct of the parties; (iv) the balance of convenience; (v) whether damages will be adequate compensation for the injury sought to be prevented. He cited Obeya Memorial Hospital v A.G. Federation [1987] 3 NWLR (Pt 60) 325, Akapo v Hakeem-Habeeb [1992] 6 NWLR (Pt 274) 266, Colito (Nig) Ltd v Daibu [2010] 2 NWLR (Pt 1178) 213. Learned counsel submitted that the claimant/applicant has a legal right to protect its business and corporate existence from asphyxiation by the respondents as they have threatened to disrupt its banking operations by resorting to a “do or die” picketing. He submitted that there are serious issues to be tried as can be seen from the complaint and statement of facts. He stated that the grouse of the respondents is that their retirement benefits was wrongly computed while the position of the applicant is that at the relevant time, their benefits were correctly computed. He argued that after the respondents were served with the interim order of injunction, they carried out actions that were inimical to the order. He referred to the applicant’s exhibits FOF 9, FOF 10 and FOF 11 which are letters written by the respondents and submitted that the contents of the letters indicate that they are in contempt of the interim order. He argued that the applicant will suffer more if the order of interlocutory injunction is not granted as its banking operations will be disrupted and its customers put to hardship. He argued that the balance of convenience is in its favour and that damages will not be an adequate compensation for the injury sought to be prevented. He urged the court to discountenance the respondents counter affidavit and grant the order as sought. Learned counsel to the 1st, 2nd and 5th respondents submitted the following issue for determination: Whether the claimant is entitled to the grant of this application. He referred to the case of Obeya Memorial Hospital v A-G Federation [1987] 3 NWLR (Pt 60) 325 for the principles guiding the grant and refusal of an interlocutory injunction. He submitted that the claimant has failed to prove that his legal right has been infringed by the respondents and has not shown any legal right recognisable in law to be protected. He submitted that a court will not grant an interlocutory injunction where the claimant is unable to show an actionable wrong. It was his further submission that the fact that the act of the defendant is injurious to the claimant is not enough as long as such act does not constitute an infringement of a legally enforceable right citing Yusuf v I.I.T.A [2009] (Pt 1133) 5 NWLR 15 at 39. He submitted further that an injunction will not normally be granted to restrain a right which a defendant is entitled to exercise citing CBN v S.A.P (Nig) Ltd [2005] (Pt 911) 152 at 206. Learned counsel argued that the respondents have a right to picket the offices of the claimant in furtherance of their demands, which right is statutorily protected by sections 42 and 43 of the Trade Unions Act CAP T14 LFN 2004. It was his contention that courts are enjoined not to decide the substantive suit at an interlocutory stage and that the grant of this order will amount to the substantive action being decided at the interlocutory stage. He urged the court to rather accelerate the hearing of this matter. He referred to the case of N.A.U. Awka v Nweke [2008] 1 NWLR (Pt 1069) 504 at 512, D.P.C.C v B.P.C. Ltd [2008] 4 NWLR (Pt 1077) 376 at 407 and urged the court to dismiss the application with costs. Learned counsel to the 4th respondent submitted two issues for determination as follows: 1. Whether the applicant has satisfied the conditions for the granting of an interlocutory injunction and is entitled to the grant thereby? 2. Whether this Honourable Court can grant the relief as sought by the applicant viz: an injunction to restrain the respondents from embarking on picketing or protest for the enforcement of their rights? He referred to the cases of Kotoye v CBN [1999] 1NWLR (Pt 98) 419, Obeya Memorial Hospital v A-G Federation supra, ACB v Awogboro [1991] 2 NWLR (Pt 176) 711, Ojukwu v Governor of Lags State [1986] 3 NWLR (Pt 26) 39, Ita v Nyong [1994] 1 NWLR (Pt 318) 56, Igwe v Kalu [1993] 4 NWLR (Pt 285) 1, N.U.J. v Mil Gov Lagos State [1995] 3 NWLR (Pt 385) 603 at 606 for the principles guiding the grant of an interlocutory injunction. It was his submission that the applicant has not disclosed any legal right recognisable in law to be protected citing Akapo v Hakeem [1992] 7 SCNJ 119 at 137, Seidu v A-G Lagos [1986] 2 NWLR (Pt 21) 165. He argued that the applicant has not showed in any respect the inconvenience that it will suffer if the application is refused. He contended that it is the respondents who are suffering and being denied their rights, and that as this court sits both as a court of law and equity and would not aid its instrumentality to be used for the oppression of the respondents citing Ezeze v State [2004] 14 NWLR (Pt 894). On the burden on an applicant seeking an interlocutory injunction he cited Adenuga v Odumeru [2003] 8 NWLR (Pt 821) 163 at 171. On issue 2, he submitted that picketing is statutorily provided for in section 42 and 43 of the Trade Unions Act and is an adjunct of the respondents right to protest and freely express their views guaranteed by sections 39 and 40 the 1999 Constitution as amended. That the applicant cannot by its acts, omissions and shortcomings curtail such rights. Learned counsel argued that the interim order of injunction granted on 17 April 2012 against the respondents amounts to a Prior Restraint on their constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights to freedom of expression referring to American Constitutional Law by Prof Lawrence Tribe (1978) Chapter 12 page 724-725 titled “Constitutional Limits on the use of Prior Restraints on freedom of Expression”. He argued that any curtailment of these rights must be in conformity with section 45 of the constitution. He then submitted that the applicant has failed to satisfy the conditions for the grant of an interlocutory injunction and urged the court to dismiss the application with costs. Replying on point of law, learned counsel to the applicant submitted that the applicant has a legitimate basis for invoking the jurisdiction of this court pursuant to section 6 (6) (b) of the 1999 Constitution. He submitted that sections 39 and 40 of the Constitution are not relevant in the circumstances and that the rights in sections 42 and 43 of the Trade Unions Act are not absolute and can be curtailed in appropriate cases referring to section 45 (1) of the 1999 Constitution. He urged the court to grant the order sought pending the hearing and determination of the substantive suit. I have carefully considered the processes filed, the arguments for and against and the authorities referred to. The issue is whether the applicant is entitled to this injunctive order pending the determination of the substantive suit. The court is mindful at this stage of an interlocutory application, that there is no trial on the merits and so the court should not attempt to go into the matter in controversy so as not to determine the same issues that would arise for determination in the substantive suit. In deciding whether or not to grant this order, the applicant must satisfy the court that there is a serious question to be tried, that the balance of convenience is on its side, that its conduct is not reprehensible and that damages cannot be an adequate compensation for injury done to it if it succeeds at the end of the trial of this matter. See Obeya Memorial Hospital v A-G Federation supra, Kotoye v Central Bank Of Nigeria supra, Tidex Nig Ltd v NUPENG [1998] 11 NWLR (Pt 573) 263, Chief S.A.Falomo v Oba Omoniyi Banigbe [19998] 7 NWLR (Pt 559) 679. The complaint and reliefs being sought for reveal serious questions to be tried which are the right of the applicant to carry on its business peacefully without threats of industrial action and the right of the respondents to be paid their correct terminal benefits. The issues raised in this application are also the issues for determination in the substantive complaint for which the court cannot delve into at this stage. There is nothing before me to show that the applicants conduct has not been within the confines of the law. However, I find that the respondents in spite of having been served with the interim order wrote a letter to the applicant dated 23 April 2012 in which they said “ We will therefore not be able to hold our members under control and whatever actions they choose to take, we should not be held responsible”. Another letter dated 27th May 2012 was also written by the respondents to the Inspector General of Police, the Commissioner of Police Lagos, the Director General State Security Service Lagos. They wrote: “This is to inform you of Anti-Labour activities of Union Bank of Nigeria Plc management against those forcefully retired between 2006-2008; (now called the Aggrieved Retired UBN Plc staff 2006-2008) have come to seek for your permission to conduct a peaceful picketing of Union Bank branches and Head Office, for the under listed reasons:” This has not been denied and is a clear intention on the part of the respondents to breach the interim order restraining them from picketing, disrupting the banking business of the applicant and maintaining the status quo. Furthermore, the respondents have not denied that they did not disrupt the activities of the applicant’s Oba-Akran branch on the 28/05/12 and Awolowo Road branch on 30/05/12 when the interim order was in place. It is trite law that facts not denied are deemed admitted. On the balance of convenience, two questions must be asked. Will the applicant suffer more inconvenience if the injunction is not granted or will the respondents suffer more inconvenience if the injunction is granted? The applicant has in paragraph 6 (iii) of its affidavit made the following deposition: “The threatened act of the respondents would not only disrupt the commercial activities of the claimant but totally paralyze same.” There is the need to protect the banking operations of the applicant and in the process ensure that its customers are able to transact their banking business without disruption in any part of Nigeria. It is my considered view that the applicant will suffer a greater injustice if this application to restrain the respondents is refused. This is borne out of the fact that in spite of the interim order, they have disrupted the applicants banking operations in its Oba Akran and Awolowo Road Branches and they are still seeking to picket other Branches of the applicant. I therefore find that the applicants have discharged the onus of proving that the balance of convenience is on its side. The applicant has argued that an award of damages cannot compensate for the injury it will suffer if this application is not granted. It has also given an undertaking to pay damages to the respondents if it turns out that this order ought not to have been granted. Consequently and for all the reasons given above, I hold that the applicant has made out a case for the grant of an interlocutory injunction and hereby make the following orders: 1. An order of interlocutory injunction restraining the respondents, their servants, officers, agents or privies from picketing, disrupting or carrying out any other activity capable of paralysing the banking activities of the claimant. 2. This order shall be in force pending the hearing and final determination of the substantive suit. I make no order as to costs. Ruling is entered accordingly. _____________________________ Hon Justice O.A.Obaseki-Osaghae