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This is a matter referred to this Court by the Honourable Minister of Labour by an instrument dated 10th April 2012, and acting pursuant to his power under section 17 of the Trade Disputes Act (TDA) Cap. T8 LFN 2004. By the referral instrument, this Court is asked – To inquire into the dispute existing between Astral Contracting Services Limited/Chevron Nigeria Limited and the National Union of Petroleum & Natural gas Workers (NUPENG); over: i. Incessant, unilateral & unlawful stoppage of work ii. Union’s insistence that management should continue to operate the retirement benefits in the Collective Agreement side by side with the provisions of the new Pension Reform Act 2004 on Contributory Pension Scheme; a practice that has put unbearable burden on the Management iii. Refusal of the Union to accept the exercise of Management’s prerogative over the issues of promotion and Merit Increment. Accompanying the referral instrument is Form TD/3, the Notification of Trade Disputes, Inter and Intra-Union Disputes by Employer/Workers Organisation, etc. dated 28th March 2012. When the case first came up for mention on 15th June 2012, this Court gave directives as to how the matter shall be heard with Astral Contracting Services Ltd as the 1st claimant, Chevron Nigeria Ltd, the 2nd claimant, and the National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) being the defendant. By the next sitting of the Court, the 2nd claimant indicated to the Court that it will be filing an objection; in which event the Court directed that the objection will be resolved first before any enquiry into the issues referred to the Court by the Minister of Labour will be considered. On 27th July 2012, the 2nd claimant filed a motion dated 25th July 2012 brought pursuant to section 6(6)(a) and (b) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, as well as the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. The motion prayed for the name of the name of the 2nd claimant to be struck-off this case on the following grounds – 1. There is no nexus between the 2nd claimant/applicant and the defendant in respect to the issues referred to and now pending before this Court. 2. The 2nd claimant/applicant has no claims against the defendant. The application is supported by a 9-paragraph affidavit deposed to by one Abimbola Akintunde, an attorney in the law firm of Siji Soetan & Co. Counsel to the 2nd claimant/applicant with four exhibits, namely, Exhibits A, B, C and D attached. Also accompanying the motion is the 1st claimant’s written address dated 25th July 2012 but filed on 27th July 2012. In reaction, the defendant filed a counter-affidavit deposed to on 8th August 2012 together with its written address dated 8th August 2012. The 2nd claimant, in reaction, filed a reply affidavit (which the court struck out on 13th November 2012) and a reply on points of law dated 7th September 2012. The 1st claimant had intimated the Court that it will not be reacting, one way or the other, to the 2nd claimant’s motion. To the 2nd claimant, the facts of the case are that the 1st claimant’s employees are members of NUPENG, the defendant union. The 1st claimant and its employees entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) made on the 6th April 2012and stated to take effect from September 2009. The 1st claimant and its employees are locked in a trade dispute over the defendant’s insistence that the 1st claimant continue to operate retirement benefits accruable under the said Collective Agreement side by side the provisions of the Pension Act 2004. That the claimant declared a trade dispute over the mater and parties appeared before the Minister of Labour and Productivity. The 2nd claimant was only present in the meeting as an observer because it had entered into a contract with the 1st claimant to provide labour and personnel to the 2nd claimant. The inability to settle the dispute brought the referral of the matter to this Court by the Honourable Minister. That the 2nd claimant is not a party to Exhibit B and has no relationship with the 1st claimant’s employees and neither does it have any dispute with the defendant over the issues now referred to this Court for resolution. The only nexus of the 2nd claimant to the matter is that it entered into Exhibit A with the 1st claimant. The 2nd claimant then framed one issue for determination, namely – Whether in the light of the [2nd claimant’s] statement that it has no dispute with the defendant and in the absence of any privity of contract or other relevant nexus between the [2nd claimant] and the defendant in respect of the issues referred to this court by the Honorable Minister of Labour and Productivity, the [2nd claimant] ought not to be struck out from the suit. The argument of the 2nd claimant going by paragraph 6(h) of its affidavit in support that it has no dispute with the defendant over the issues now referred to this Court for resolution. In other words, it has no claims against the defendant and its presence in the suit is not necessary for a full and effectual determination of the rights of the parties either under the Pensions Act or under Exhibit B. that under Nigerian Law a party cannot be made a claimant against its will. In other words even if there is a cause of action and the affected party is unwilling to pursue its right of action then no other party can oblige the said affected party to seek the enforcement of that right. This is a general principle. In this case, that the 2nd claimant has stated that it has no claim against the defendant. Under such circumstances there is nothing to pursue before the court. It is the submission of the 2nd claimant that there being no nexus between it and the defendant in respect to the issues referred to this court and the 2nd claimant having no claims against the defendant ought to be struck out of this as he cannot be said to be a proper party to this suit. That the 2nd claimant has clearly shown in its affidavit that it has no interest whatsoever in the present suit. Therefore, it cannot be made a party to the suit as a claimant or a co-claimant. The Supreme Court in Shibkau v. A.G. Zamfara State [2010] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1202) 312 at 315 held that – A plaintiff can only approach a court of law to seek redress, if he has interest which the law regards as sufficient…. The 2nd claimant then submitted that it lacks sufficient legal interest in the suit to be regarded as a co-claimant. The 2nd claimant continued that the even if it wanted to, it could not maintain a cause of action against the defendant. That the Supreme Court in S. G. Ogbimi v. Beauty Ololo [1993] 7 NWLR (Pt. 304) 128 136 defined a cause of action as – The bundle or aggregate of facts which the law will recognize as giving the plaintiff a substantive right to make a claim against the relief or remedy being sought. Thus the factual situation on which the plaintiff relies to support his claim must be recognized by the law as giving rise to substantive right capable of being claimed or enforced against the defendant…. The 2nd claimant also referred the Court to Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited v. Ayeni [2010] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1185) 586 at 603. To the 2nd claimant, a cause of action arises the moment a wrong is done to the plaintiff by the defendant. This wrong which is the basis of a dispute represents a factual situation which entitles the plaintiff to seek a remedy in a court of law, referring to Adekoya v. Federal Housing Authority [2008] 4 SC 167. That it is clear from the documents forwarded to this court by the Minister and the exhibits attached to the affidavit in support that there is no nexus between the 2nd claimant and the defendant. In fact, that Exhibit C, which specifically mentions other companies like JZ and Tobinsco, Delog and TA Amusan does not mention the 2nd claimant. It cannot be in the interest of justice for the 2nd claimant who has stated that it has no claim against the defendant to be made to institute and prosecute an action. The 2nd claimant continued that on the requirement for joinder of a party as co-plaintiff, the Court of Appeal in Hyson (Nig) Ltd v. Ijeoma [2008] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1097) 1 at 3 listed the requirements for parties to be joined as co-plaintiffs to include – (a) the right to the relief claimed must be commonly vested in the plaintiffs jointly or severally or in the alternative; and (b) if the plaintiffs had instituted separate actions, a common question of law or fact would arise in all such actions. The 2nd claimant then is submitted that there exists no common question of law, facts or series of transactions between it and the 1st claimant so as to permit it to join in the suit as co-plaintiffs in this suit. That the 2nd claimant claims no relief from the defendant. Therefore, it cannot be said to have a common right with the 1st claimant. That the 2nd claimant did not institute this action against the defendant; the Minister referred the matter to this Court. That the referral by the Minister has given the 2nd claimant a right of action without the necessary precondition of cause of action. To the 2nd claimant, if the defendant believes that there is a dispute between it and the 2nd claimant it is well within the defendant’s right to file “a counter-claim” against the 2nd claimant as long as such “counter-claim” falls within the terms of reference made by the Honourable Minister. In conclusion, the 2nd claimant submitted that the facts of this suit show that there is no nexus between it and the defendant in respect of the issues referred to and now pending before this Court. That the 2nd claimant has no claims against the defendant and cannot maintain a cause of action against the defendant. Therefore, the 2nd claimant is not a party to this suit, urging the Court to strike out the 2nd claimant from this suit. The defendant opposed the 2nd claimant’s motion. The contention of the defendant is that its members are in a triangular employment relationship with the claimants who now dispute the pension and gratuity rights of the said members. That whereas it is the position of the defendant that its members should enjoy the pension and retirement benefits in the Collective Agreement side by side with the one emanating from statute, that is the Pension Reform Act 2004, the claimants both consider this to be a double dipping. It is this dispute essentially that was referred to this Court by the Honorable Minister of Labour and Productivity that the second claimant now seeks to exit by its application. This present action is thus instituted by the referral of the Honorable Minister of Labour and Productivity acting upon powers vested on him by section 17 of the Trade Disputes Act Cap. T8 LFN 2004. The sole question that arises for the determination of this Court in this application is, therefore, whether the second claimant can apply to have his name struck out from this proceeding. In this regard, the defendant posed two alternative questions – 1. Can the second claimant apply to have his name struck out from this proceedings commenced vide a referral from the Honorable Minister of Labour and Productivity? 2. Put differently, can a party who did not originate an action apply that his name be struck out of the action on the grounds that he has no cause of action against the other party or indeed on any grounds at all? It is the contention of the defendant that the “second claimant has in error equated the proceedings here with proceedings commenced as if by writ of summons or by General Form of Complaint but commenced by the free willing claimant and thereby came to an erroneous conclusion”. In any case, that the defendant has shown by its counter-affidavit that the second claimant is a part and parcel of the dispute and that the second claimant was at all times prior to the Minister’s referral an active participant in the dispute. The defendant also contended that the second claimant is also a direct beneficiary of the resolution of this dispute by this Court no matter how it may be resolved. That the “incessant strikes” complained of is actually stoppage of work carried on for the second claimant and the funds for the payment of the pension and retirement benefits are actually as provided for by the second claimant in the agreement between the second claimant and the first claimant and an increase in this funding will be to the detriment of the second claimant, and a reduction of same to the benefit of the said second claimant. It is thus intriguing that the second claimant now alleges that she was a mere observer at the meeting preceding the ministerial referral. Whilst the defendant insisted that the second claimant was actually a participant at those meetings canvassing her own positions and leading the first claimant, it is at a loss as to what the interest in the whole process at the prior stage was for the 2nd claimant to be an observer thereat but to now want to exit this instant process. That it is strange even for the second claimant to claim to be a mere observer if indeed she had no interest to protect. The defendant then submitted that this application is strange and extremely novel to the extent that it flows out of the mouth of a claimant. That it is usual for a defendant to allege that a claimant lacks a cause or a reasonable cause of action against a defendant. That the defendant is unable to successfully research a case of a claimant alleging that the claimant itself lacks a cause or a reasonable cause of action against a defendant, and the second claimant has referred to none. Again, “stranger still that the second claimant in this action, who participated fully and aggressively in the proceedings preceding this action at the National Pension Commission upon the Commission’s invitation at the instance of the claimant; officials of the Federal Ministry of Labour and Productivity, the Minister of Labour and Productivity will now turn round to deny having a cause of action against the defendant or a dispute with the defendant or an interest in the subject matter in dispute in this action”. To the defendant, the second claimant occupies a joint employer status with the first claimant in respect of the first claimant’s employees who are employed to work for second claimant. Again, that the second claimant canvassed side by side with the first claimant the position now canvassed here in this action by the first claimant vide its “statement of facts at the National Pension Commission upon the Commission’s invitation at the instance of the claimants; officials of the Federal Ministry of Labour and Productivity, the Minister of Labour and Productivity”. In fact, that the second claimant was “leading” the first claimant at the National Pensions Commission and the Federal Ministry of Labour and Productivity and before the Minister of Labour and Productivity or at best presented a joint position. It was on the basis of this that the Honourable Minister in his wisdom referred this matter to this Court for an interpretation of the issues and laws in dispute and placing both claimants together as a SINGLE JOINT CLAIMANT. That it must be noted that it was this Court in its wisdom that bifurcated the joint claimants into first and second claimant during the proceedings of June 15, 2012. The second claimant’s prayer in essence seeks for a striking out of the ministerial referral which originated the action. This, the defendant submitted, is not an option open to the second claimant nor is it one that ought to be sanctioned by this Court, urging the Court to so hold. The defendant continued that a cause of action arises from circumstances containing different facts that give rise to a claim that can be enforced in a court of law, and thus leads to the right to sue a person responsible for the existence, either directly or by extension of such circumstances. That there must in essence be wrongful act of a party, that is, the reason to complain in a court of law for remedy of consequent damage to the party aggrieved. That in Alhaji Madi Mohammed Abubakar v. Bebeji Oil and Allied Productions Ltd & ors [2007] (Pt. 362) 1855 at 1887 E – F), it was held that to ascertain a cause of action, the immediate materials a court should look at are the writ of summons and the averments in the statement of claim, for it is by examining them that a court can satisfy itself on the actual grouse of a party and the remedy or relief it is seeking from the court. The defendant then submitted that in the instant case it is ministerial referral that this Court should peruse to determine the cause of action. That once the ministerial referral discloses some cause of action, or raises some question of fact or law fit to be decided by the judge, then the fact that the case is weak and/or unlikely to succeed or that the second claimant in the instant case seems to be developing cold feet is not a ground for striking out of his name as to do so will actually be striking out the ministerial referral. Finally, the defendant asserted that it has a counterclaim against the second claimant emanating from the issues in referral and can only properly ground such a counterclaim against the second claimant if she indeed does remain a claimant in the action. In conclusion, the defendant submitted that on the basis of all the arguments canvassed, the Court ought to refuse the instant application, strike out same and order the second claimant to file her relevant processes or simply adopt as hers, the relevant processes already filed by the first claimant. In its reply on points of law, the 2nd claimant indicated that the defendant raised one issue in its written address and submitted that the 2nd claimant, being a party to the Collective Agreement which is the basis of this suit, cannot apply to have its name struck out of the suit referred to this Court by the Honorable Minister of Labour. The 2nd claimant then addressed two issues of law arising from the defendant’s counter-affidavit and the written address in support, which are – a. who can sue and be sued on the Collective Agreement which is the basis of this suit; and b. the effect of paragraphs 9, 10 and 14 of the defendant’s counter-affidavit. Regarding the question of who can sue and sued on the Collective Agreement which is the basis of this suit, the 2nd claimant submitted that from various pronouncements of this Court it has been decided that only parties who are signatory to a Collective Agreement can benefit or suffer from it, citing National Union of Hotel and Personal Service Workers v. Paliso Nigeria Limited and anor page 547 DJNIC and National Union of Hotel and Personal Service Workers v. Whassan Eurest (Nigeria) Limited page 452 DJNIC. That the 2nd claimant has clearly argued that it is neither a party nor a signatory to the said Collective Agreement. The 2nd claimant can, therefore, not be made to sue or be sued under an agreement which has no bearing with it. On the effect of paragraphs 9, 10 and 14 of the defendant’s counter-affidavit, the 2nd claimant reproduced paragraph 9, which says – I know and verily believe that all parties to this action are in a triangular employment relationship and further that the second claimant occupies a joint employer status with the 1st claimant in respect of the first claimant’s employees, employed to work for the 1st claimant. That the defendant has by its paragraph 9 not only deposed to statements of facts but has formed a legal argument in clear contradiction of section 115(2) of the Evidence Act 2011 which provides – An affidavit shall not contain extraneous matter, by way of objection, prayer or legal argument or conclusion. The 2nd claimant then referred the Court to NIPSS v. Osigwe [2008] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1083) 239, where the Court of Appeal in its ruling had this to say – By virtue of section 87 of the Evidence Act (now section 115 of the new Evidence Act 2011), an affidavit shall not contain extraneous matter by way of objection or prayer or legal argument or conclusion. Any paragraph of an affidavit which offends the provisions of section 87 of the Evidence Act will be struck out and if not struck out will be discountenanced by the court when giving judgment. The 2nd defendant continued that in that case the Court of Appeal found out that some paragraphs of the respondent’s counter-affidavit were statements of legal opinion or conclusion and not facts. Consequently, the Court of Appeal struck out the offending paragraphs of the affidavit. The 2nd claimant then prayed the Court to discountenance paragraph 9 of the defendant’s counter-affidavit. The 2nd claimant continued that the defendant is by paragraphs 10 and 14 of its counter-affidavit seeking to interpret and enforce a contract which it is not privy to and which does not form part of the issues referred to this Court by the Minister of Labour. The 2nd claimant went on and referred the Court to section 21 of Exhibit A, which reads – 21.1 No person who is not a party to this contract has any right under this contract or may enforce any provision of this contract, except as specified in section 21.2 21.2 To the fullest extent permitted by law, each member of a released contract group has the right to enforce the provisions of section 12 against contractor for its own benefit, but otherwise has no third party rights under this contract. The 2nd claimant then argued that the defendant is neither a party to Exhibit A nor does it come under the exception. Continuing, the 2nd claimant posited that the parties to the said contract are not in dispute over the provisions of the contract and may seek to vary the terms of their contract as it pleases them, referring to Nissan (Nig) Ltd v. Yaganathan [2010] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1183) 135 and SPDCN Ltd v. Amadi [2010] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1210) 82. In conclusion, the 2nd claimant submitted that the defendant’s counter-affidavit and written address in support has failed to clearly show the nexus between the applicant and the said Collective Agreement on which this suit is based and has also failed to give this court substantive and reasonable argument why the 2nd claimant should be forced to remain in a suit which it clearly has no legal interest in. The 2nd claimant then urged the Court to discountenance the counter-affidavit in its entirety and grant the application. In resolving the issue at hand, it may be necessary to restate the antecedents of this case. In the exercise of his powers under section 17 of the TDA, the Honourable Minister of Labour referred this matter to this Court, by-passing especially the arbitral process at the Industrial Arbitration Panel (IAP) that Part I of the TDA enjoins if the Honourable Minister of Labour had not acted pursuant to section 17 of the TDA. The referral instrument of 10th April 2012 in its heading, first recital and terms of reference, indicated that the dispute is between Astral Contracting Services Limited/Chevron Nigeria Limited, on the one part, and Nigeria Union of Petroleum & Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG), on the other part. In the second recital, the referral instrument indicated that efforts to promote settlement through conciliation failed and NUPENG is currently on strike in Chevron Nigeria Limited locations managed by Astral Contracting Services Limited. The accompanying Form TD/3, the Notification of Trade Disputes, Inter and Intra-Union Disputes by Employer/Workers Organisation, etc. dated 28th March 2012, however, puts Astral Contracting Services Ltd & 5 others, namely, GIL Warri, J2 Warri, Tobinsco PHC, Delog Lagos & TA Amussan Lagos, as the complainants in the dispute with NUPEND as the party against whom the complaint is filed. It is against this backdrop that when the matter first came before this Court, the Court gave directions as to, inter alia, the status of the parties i.e. which party becomes the claimant(s) and which becomes the defendant. Since the referral instrument put Astral Contracting Services Limited/Chevron Nigeria Ltd as the complainant, the Court directed that Astral Contracting Services Ltd should be the 1st claimant, and Chevron Nigeria Ltd the 2nd claimant. NUPENG consequently became the defendant. The Court then directed that the claimants should file originating processes. It was at this point that the 2nd claimant raised an objection as to its position as a party (a claimant) in the case, arguing that it has no claim at all against the defendant to warrant it being made a claimant in this case. The question that, therefore, calls for determination is whether, in the circumstances of this case, the 2nd claimant, who did not file a complaint as per Form TD/3 but is made a party by the Honourable Minister of Labour vide the referral instrument, can be a claimant in this case even when, as it argues, it does not have a claim against the defendant. The argument of the 2nd claimant is that there are essentially two principal contracts: a Master Contractor Services Contract between the 2nd and the 1st claimant (Exhibit A), and a Collective Agreement between the Chevron Contract Managements and NUPENG Branches of Contract Labour Employees (Exhibit B). That these contracts are separate and distinct and cannot be related to one another; and since it is through Exhibit B that the defendant has a contract with the 1st claimant and upon which its claims of the defendant are hinged, the 2nd claimant is not privy to that contract and so has no claim against the defendant. However, it must be noted, that privity of contract is not an absolute rule. This Court pointed this out in Stephen Ayaogo & ors v. Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited & anor unreported Suit No. NIC/LA/38/2010 the ruling of which was delivered on December 13, 2012 in the following words – In hinging its argument on privity of contract, the 1st defendant stressed the formalism of the two contracts in issue. While the privity rule is clear in its general prescription that one cannot benefit or suffer from a contract one is not a party to, this rule remains what it is: a general rule that is not absolute. In appropriate circumstances, it admits of exceptions. So when the 1st defendant talked of the privity rule as if it is sacrosanct, it missed out the point that the rule is not absolute. The defendant in reaction produced Exhibit “mee 2”, a letter from the 2nd claimant to the Group General Manager, NNPC National Petroleum Investment Management Services (NAPIMS) dated May 5, 2012 (ostensibly written after the commencement of this action) and titled, “Financial Payoff on Labour Contracts”. By this letter, the 2nd claimant is seeking for approval and authorization to close the six labour contracts and pay end of contract benefits of a maximum amount of $297,368,802 to 1,703 workers as per their Collective Bargaining Agreement. The six labour contracts talked of in the letter are the contracts in relation to the six labour contractors as represented by the 1st claimant in this case. By the 4th paragraph of the Exhibit “mee 2”, the contract closure prayed for “involves giving the contracts a 30 day notice and paying off a severance package to all 1,703 personnel under these contracts, according to the provisions of the Collective bargaining Agreement (CBA) that these contracts are currently linked to”. By this letter, therefore, there is actually a link between Exhibits A and B, despite the argument of the 2nd claimant to the contrary. Is this link between Exhibits A and B, therefore, sufficient to keep the 2nd claimant as a party in this Suit? The answer would depend on whether the 2nd claimant can assist in the resolution of the terms of reference referred to this Court by the Honourable Minister of Labour. The second term of reference requires this Court to inquire into the – Union’s insistence that management should continue to operate the retirement benefits in the Collective Agreement side by side with the provisions of the new Pension Reform Act 2004 on Contributory Pension Scheme; a practice that has put unbearable burden on the Management. This term of reference relates to the question of the operation of retirement benefits as it affects members of the defendant. I indicated earlier how by Exhibit “mee 2”, generated after the commencement of this action, the 2nd claimant seeks to take steps that may overreach members of the defendant in this case. It does not look like the resolution of this suit can be judiciously done without the 2nd claimant continuing as a party. The hallmark of adjudication in this Court was succinctly put in the case of Dr. O. Odusote & anor v. Lagos State Government & ors [2012] 28 NLLR (Pt. 80) 225 at 264 – 265. In that case, this Court held itself guided by the instructive and incisive holding of the Supreme Court of India in NTF Mills Ltd v. The 2nd Punjab Tribunal, AIR 1957 SC 329, which is that – The Industrial Courts are to adjudicate on the disputes between employers and their workmen, etc. and in the course of such adjudication they must determine the ‘rights’ and ‘wrong’ of the claim made, and in so doing they are undoubtedly free to apply the principles of justice, equity and good conscience, keeping in view the further principle that their jurisdiction is invoked not for the enforcement of mere contractual rights but for preventing labour practices regarded as unfair and for restoring industrial peace on the basis of collective bargaining. The process does not cease to be judicial by reason of that elasticity or by reason of the application of the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. On this ground this Court at page 269 went on to grant legal recognition to an otherwise unregistered body on the following rationalization – In any event, the legal recognition is not so much as saying that thereby Medical Guild is a legal personality as understood in law, but it is meant to serve the sole purpose of affording the Court the opportunity of holding the parties answerable to their actions, legal or otherwise. In this sense, I will recognize the claimants as capable of suing for the convenience of determining, in the words of the Supreme Court of India in NTF Mills Ltd v. The 2nd Punjab Tribunal (supra), “the ‘rights’ and ‘wrong’ of the claim made” and as thrust before this Court in this matter. In the instant case, the same rationale applies. This Court is not being called upon by the Honourable Minister of Labour to enforce mere contractual rights but to prevent labour practices that may be regarded as unfair so as to restore industrial peace amongst the parties on the basis of the collective agreement in issue. This more than explains why the Honourable Minister of Labour lumped Astral Contracting Services Ltd/Chevron Nig. Ltd as the complaining party when the referral of this matter to this Court was made. The justice of the case requires that the Court must have the opportunity of having before it all parties that may be answerable to the issues referred to it by the Honourable Minister of Labour in this case; and the 2nd claimant, to me, appears to be one such party. On the whole, and for the reasons I have given, and coupled with the fact that section 14 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 enjoins this Court to do all such things as would ensure justice and avoid multiplicity of suits, I hold that the 2nd claimant is a proper party in the determination of this case as referred by the Honourable Minister of Labour. Ruling is entered accordingly. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip