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NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT HOLDEN AT LAGOS BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS Hon. Justice B.A. Adejumo President Hon. Justice B.B. Kanyip Judge Hon. Justice M.B. Dadda Judge DATE: 1st April, 2008 SUIT NO. NIC/9/2002 BETWEEN John Ovoh (suing for himself and as representative Of 679 junior staffs of Nigeria Dredging and Marine……………………………Appellant AND The Nigerian Westminster Dredging and Marine Ltd…….……………………Respondent REPRESENTATION Fola Adekoya Esq., for applicants Babajide Koku, for respondents RULING This Court had on l7lh July, 2007 delivered judgment in respect of this matter. The respondent, however, brought the present action dated 22nd July, 2007 by way of Motion on Notice pursuant to Rule 26 of the now repealed National Industrial Court Rules 1979 and the inherent jurisdiction of the court seeking for the following reliefs: I. An order revoking the said decision of this Court delivered on 17th July, 2007 2. An order staying execution of judgment of the Court delivered on the 17th of July 2007 pending the hearing and determination of this application. 3. And for such further or other orders as this Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances. The motion is supported by a 5-paragraphed affidavit dated 31st July 2007 and filed on the same date with Exhibit ‘A' attached. The applicant on the other hand filed on 16th August 2007 an affidavit of urgency made up of 17 paragraphs sworn to by Fola Adekoya Esq., counsel to applicant with Exhibit "FA1" attached. Also, on 16°1 August, 2007 the applicants filed a Motion on Notice dated 10th August, 2007 pursuant to sections 10 and 47 of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Act 2006 and sections 20 and 25 of the Sheriff find Civil Procedure Process Act Cap. 86 LFN 2004. Attached to the motion is a 2 l-paragraphed affidavit dated 16th August, 2003 which was sworn to by Fola Adekoya Esq., counsel to the applicant with Exhibits 'FA2' - 'FA5' attached. The respondent in reaction filed on l2uI September, 2007 a counter-affidavit of 15 paragraphs deposed to by one Orji Uchenna, a liaison officer to the respondent. With the consent of the parties, the court directed that parties should file written addresses, which the parties did. The respondent's written address is dated 3rd Oct. 2007, while that of the applicant is dated 26th October 2007. The respondent also filed on 7th November 2007 a written reply on points of law in reaction to the applicant's written address. All of these written addresses were respectively adopted by the parties. The respondent pointed out that the judgment of this Court was delivered on the 17th of July 2007 and its application was filed on the 31st July 2007, which is within 14 days as required under Order 19( 18)(2) of the N IC Rules 2007. The respondent then went on to set out the issues for the determination of the Court. To the respondent, the issues for determination in this application are:- (a) Whether the Court is functus officio and precluded from reviewing its judgment of 17th July 2007 with a view to resolving or setting it aside. (b) Whether the Court had jurisdiction to entertain the applicants' claim and/or cause as at the 19th June 2002. On the first issue, the respondent relied on Order 19(18)(1)(e) and submitted that this Court is statutorily empowered by its Rules to review its judgment if the interest of justice requires such , . a review, referring the Court to the case of SANUSI v. A YOOLA [1992] 9 NWLR (PL 265) 275 at 292 – 293 where KARBI WHYTE, JSC as he then was, held as follows: There is the well settled elementary and fundamental principle of law that a Court 011 disposing of a cause before it renders itself functus officio. It ceases to have jurisdiction in respect of such case. See Ekerete v. Eke [1925] 6 NLR 118, Akinyede v. The Appraiser [1971] 1 ALL NLR 162. It cannot assume the status of an appellate court over its own decision, except there is statutory power to do so. See Fritz v. Hobson (1880) 14 Ch.D 542. The power of the Court to do so can only he statutory and in this case, it is provided in Order 32 rule 4 (supra). To the respondent, the interest of justice requires such a review as section 9 of the NIC Act 2006 restricts the right of appeal from decisions of this Court to the Court of Appeal. The respondent continued that a plethora of decisions from the superior courts accept the view that a Court is competent to set aside its own judgment, order or decision where it is authorized by its rules or by statute or where such judgment is a nullity in the sense that the Court acted without jurisdiction. That in the case of ALAO v. ACB LIMITED [2000] 6 SC (Pt.1) 27 at 37 - 38, the Supreme Court held as follows: I consider it appropriate to answer the criticisms of the applicant that the decision of this court should be set aside ex debito justitiae. It is interesting to observe that the reasons relied upon by the applicant do not fall within any of the grounds stated in the application or the principles of ex debito justitiae enunciated by learned Counsel. I have already pointed out in this judgment that the applicant's view is that there should be an inherent power to set aside a judgment given in the absence of jurisdiction or where the procedure adopted is such as to deprive the decisions of the character of a legitimate adjudication. Without doubt the proposition is unarguably correct and falls squarely within the principles enunciated in Madukolu and ors v. Nkemdillin and ors [1962] 1 All NLR 587. A Court is competent after, i. It is properly constituted as regards numbers and qualifications of members of the bench, and no member is disqualified for one reason of another; and ii. The subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction and there is no failure in the case which prevents the court from exercising its jurisdiction; and iii. The case comes before the Court initiated by due process of law and upon fulfillrnent of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction. These principles are well settled and accepted. None of the issues stated above has been raised in the application before us. Applicant is not challenging the jurisdiction of the court. If that was his position, he would have relied on the general rule that any Court of record has an inherent power to set aside its judgment or order which is a nullity. See Skenconsult (Nig) Ltd v. Sekondy-Ukey [1981] I SC 6. He has also not alleged any procedural irregularity sufficient to vitiate the judgment. To the respondent, in the case of ALAMIEYESEIGH.A v. YEIWA [2002] 7 NWLR (Pt. 767) 581 at 603 paragraphs B - F, Justice Musdapher, JCA (as he then was) held that- Now, the law has been settled by a number of cases that every Court of record has inherent jurisdiction to set aside on a proper application before it, its null orders and judgments given without jurisdiction or competence. See Skenconsult (supra), Tabaa v. Lababedi [1974] 4 SC 139. It is not every time a Court delivers a judgment that it is in order. It is not in order if the judgment or order is a nullity for reasons of want of competence or jurisdiction. This is based on the principle in Nihillo Nihil Venit meaning "out of nothing, nothing comes or flows. And that in the case of ROSSEK v. ACB LTD [1993] 8 NWLR (Pl. 312) 382 at 437, Ogundare, JSC held as follows: On the authorities, the law seems to be that where a Court acts without jurisdiction or competence the decision or order made by it is void and will be so declared by either the Court itself or an Appeal Court. But where there is competence or jurisdiction, an erroneous decision or order made by a Court is a matter for appeal and may be set aside or varied as the Appeal Court may deem fit. Finally on this point, the respondent cited the case of YAKUBU v. GOV. of KOGI STATE [1997] 7 NWLR (Pl. 511) 66 at 87, where Salami, JCA held as follows: I wish to observe, however, that it is not every time a court delivers a judgment, ruling or makes an order that it is functus officio and resort is had to appeal process. The court or another court of co-ordinate jurisdiction can set aside judgment of a court if the judgment or ruling is a nullity for reasons of want of jurisdiction. Skenconsul (Nigeria) Limited v Ukey [1981] 1 SC 6. This appears to be based on the principle in nihillo nihil venit meaning out of nothing, nothing comes or flows On the basis of the foregoing, the respondent submitted that a court can legitimately revisit its judgment and set aside the same either when the rules of the court concerned so provide or when he judgment amounts to a nullity for want of jurisdiction. The respondent went further to say that the basis for its prayer in this application is that the judgment sought to be revoked was given without jurisdiction in that the court did not have the competence to embark upon the case ab initio. The respondent submitted further that a defect in jurisdiction or lack of it relates to the act of embarking on the case and not any errors committed in the course of the hearing nor to the correctness of the judgment, referring the court to the case of UNIJOS v. CARLEN (NIG) LIMITED [1992] 5 NWLR (Pt. 241) 352 at 363-364. The respondent then stressed that it is not by this application challenging the correctness of the judgment of the Court, rather it is challenging the competence of the court to entertain the applicant’s claims or cause of action at the time it was presented before the Court. The respondent then submitted that the court is not functus officio under the circumstances of the present application and urge the court to resolve this in its favour. On the second issue for determination, the respondent submitted that the underlying reason for seeking a revocation of the Court’s judgment stems from the fact that the applicant’s cause of action is time-barred. The respondent then went on to say that the issue of time/statute-bar is jurisdictional in nature and goes to the competence of a Court to entertain a matter, referring the Court to the case of RALEIGH INDUSTRIES (NIGERIA) LIMITED v. NWAIWU [1994] 4 NWLR (Pt. 341) 760 at 772H where Opene, JCA held as follows: Once an action is caught by the Limitation Act, the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the matter. There is a feature in the case which prevents the Court from exercising its jurisdiction and further the condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction is not fulfilled. To the respondent, in UBA LIMITED v. ABIMB0LU [1995] 9 NWLR (Pt. 419) 371 at 383, the Court of Appeal held that- Where an action is statute barred, a plaintiff who might have had a cause of action losses the right to enforce the cause of action by judicial process because the period of time laid down by the limitation law for instituting such an action has elapsed. And that in AJAYI v. MILITARY ADMINISTRATOR ONDO STATE [1997] 5 NWLR (Pt.604) pg 237 at pg. 254C, where the Court held that: The issue of whether or not an action has been statute- barred is one touching upon the jurisdiction of the Court. For once, an action has been found to be statute barred, although plaintiff may still have his cause of action, his right of action, that is, his legal right to prosecute that action has been taken away by statute. In that circumstance, NO COURT has jurisdiction to entertain his action. To the respondent, the rationale for limitation of actions is founded on public policy and is i intended to ensure that litigants do not go to sleep on their rights because: - (a) Long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them; (b) A defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a claim; and (c) That persons with good causes of action should pursue them with reasonable diligence. The respondent then cited the case of P.N. UDDOH TRADING CO. LTD v. ABERE [1996] 8 NWLR (Pt. 467) 479 at 492 paragraphs E - G where Kutsina Alu, JCA (as he then was) held that: One of the principles of the Statutes of Limitation is that a person who sleeps on his right should not be assisted by the Courts in an action for the recovery of his property. Equity aids the vigilant and not the indolent. The respondent cited further the case of KOLO v. A.G. FEDERATION [2003] 10 NWLR (Pt.829) 602 at 627 where the Court held as follows: It is also conceded that it is necessary as a matter of public policy by legislation, to impose pre-conditions for the exercise of rights so that claims to rights may not he exercised in perpetuity as inter alia:- (a) Long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them; (b) The defendant must have lost the evidence to disprove the stale claim; and (c) Persons with good cause of action should pursue them with reasonable diligence; (d) Those who go to sleep on their claims should not be assisted by the Courts in recovering their property; and (e) That there should be an end to stale demands. The respondent then submitted that the point of time from which a statutory period for proceedings is expressed to run is the date on which the cause of action accrued. A cause of action in the context simply means the factual situation which, if substantiated, entitles the applicant to a remedy against the respondent. The applicants' cause of action in this matter as found by the judgment of this Court relates to the ex-gratia payment of N 100,000 each calculated in the agreement signed between the applicants and the respondent on the 30th June 1994. That by the provisions of the limitation law in operation where the respondent was sued, which is section 8 of the Limitation Law of Lagos State Cap L67 (which law is identical with the Limitation Laws in all States nationwide), the following action shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date in which the cause of action accrued - (a) Action founded on simple contract; (b) Action founded on quasi contract. The respondent went on to submit that the applicants' cause of action flows from the agreement dated 30th of June 1994. That the applicants' seek in the main an interpretation of terminal benefits embodied in that agreement and an order directing the respondent to comply with the interpretation within 30 days thereof. The respondent continued that the agreement of 3rd June 1994 is a collective agreement within the meaning of the law. That a collective agreement has been defined in the Wikipedia Encyclopedia as a labour contract between an employer and one or more unions. The respondent also referred the court to the Black's Law Dictionary, 7th Edition p. 257 where a collective bargaining agreement is defined as follows: - A contract that is made between an employer and a labour union and that regulates employment conditions. A contract that is made between an emp To the respondent, the contractual status of a collective agreement has been endorsed by academic and judicial authorities, referring the Court to Chitty on Contract 28th Edition p. 162 - 163 where it was stated that - the terms of a collective agreement between trade unions and employers (or employers association) may be incorporated in individual employment contracts and so become binding on the parties to the contracts. In other words, the law assumes a collective agreement to be a contract. The respondent then cited the case of NNB PLC v. EGUN [2001] 7 NWLR (Pt. 711) 1 at 19, where the Court found that the respondent could not enforce the provisions of a collective agreement as he was not privy to the contract embodied therein. To the respondent, the applicants' cause of action is founded in contract and ought to have been instituted within six years from 30th June 1994. It then argued that if time is computed from (the 30th of June 1994 till the 19th of June 2002 when this action was filed, it would be obvious that (his action was instituted well outside the six year period prescribed by law. The respondent then referred to the applicants' counter-affidavit filed on the 16th August 2007 where the applicants deposed that their action was instituted within time and they have exhibited a further, and better affidavit of the respondent as Exhibit "FA4" to buttress their point. The respondent argued that Exhibit "FA4" does not contain any admission by the respondent that this action was instituted within time or any admission of liability to the applicants. On the contrary, that the respondent has consistently maintained from the inception of this suit that the agreement of the 30th June 1994 was procured under duress. The respondent further submitted that the applicants' attempt to suggest that negotiations between themselves and the respondent delayed the institution of the present action will not avail them as the law is emphatic that on-going negotiations will not prevent time from running for the purposes of determining the date of accrual of the cause of action, referring to the case of EBOIGBE v. NNPC [1994] 5 NWLR (Pt. 347) 649 at 659 - 660 paragraphs F - G where the Court held that:- "The next question is whether there are circumstances, in this case, warranting the relaxation or complete non-application of the provisions of the relevant limitation laws. Certainly, illiteracy of some members of the Appellant's family is totally irrelevant because ignorance of the law is not an excuse. As for the period during which the parties engaged in negotiation, the law is that when in respect of a cause of action, the period of limitation begins to run, it is not broken and it does not cease to run merely because the parties engaged in negotiation. The best cause for a person to whom a right has accrued is to institute an action against the other party so as to protect his interest or right in case the negotiation fails. If, as in this case, the negotiation does not result in a settlement or in an admission of liability, the law will not allow the time devoted to negotiation to be excluded from the period which should be taken into consideration for the determination of the question whether a claim has been statute barred. Negotiation by the parties does not prevent or stop time from running." To the respondent, another compelling reason why the judgment of this Court should be set aside is because collective agreements have been held to be unenforceable by judicial process unless it is incorporated into the contract of employment, referring the Court to the case of UNION BANK OF NIGERIA LTD AND ANOR v. EDET [1993] 4 NWLR (Pt. 287) 288 at 298 paragraphs C - H, where it was held that- I feel obliged to say, with due respect, that the learned Judge misunderstood the purposes and effect of Exhibit 13. It is a collective agreement between employers and employees in their capacities as bodies of certain institutions. Such collective agreements are not intended or capable to give individual employees a right to litigate over an alleged breach of their terms as may be conceived by them to have affected their interest, nor are they meant to supplant or even supplement their contract of service. In other words, failure to act in strict compliance with collective labour agreement is not justiciable. The Court was also referred to the cases of NNB PLC v. EGUN (supra) p. 18 paragraphs C- G and TEXACO (NIG) PLC v. KEHINDE [2001] 6 NWLR (Pt. 708) 224 at 238 - 240 paragraphs F - II, where the Court held as follows: The next sub-issue to be determined is the legal status of Exhibit 5 - a collective agreement. Both Counsels agree that a collective agreement is at best a gentleman's agreement, an extra-legal document devoid of sanctions. However, learned Counsel for the respondent has submitted that where such a collective agreement is incorporated by reference to the contract of employment between the parties it becomes justiciable. I agree with the submission of learned Counsel for the respondent in this respect. In ACB Plc v. Nwodika [1996] 4 NWLR (Pt. 443) 470 at 484 Tobi JCA stated the position of the law as follows: "It is clear from the state of the case law that where a collective agreement is incorporated or embodied into the conditions or contract of service, it will be binding on the parties. Otherwise, No" I agree completely with my learned brother on the above statement of the law. The respondent then submitted that the agreement of the 30th June 1994 was not incorporated into the applicants' contract of service which had already been determined as at that date. To the respondent then, the applicants' prayer requesting the Court to enforce compliance and the judgment of the court interpreting the amount payable to each of the applicants cannot cloak the applicants' cause of action with justiciability against the tenor of decided cases. The respondent then urged the Court to equally resolve this issue in its favour and set aside the judgment. Regarding the relief for stay of execution, the respondent submitted that every Court of record has the inherent jurisdiction to slay execution of its own judgment or preserve the res, referring the Court to the case NZERJBE v. DAVE ENGINEERING CO. LTD [1994] 8 NWLR (Pt.361) 124 at 142. The respondent then submitted that it has shown special circumstances in its supporting affidavit as well as in its reply to the applicants' counter affidavit demonstrating that the respondent will be irreparably prejudiced if execution of the judgment of the court is not stayed. The special circumstances are that: (1) The respondent will be unable to prosecute its case further and run its operations if the colossal sum of N63,650,000 is paid over to the applicants or tied down in an account to abide the determination of the present application (2) The applicants will be unable to refund the judgment debt should the respondent’s application succeed. The respondent contended further that the above depositions were never controverted by the applicants and urged the Court to accordingly deem them as being correct, referring to the cases of PAMOL (NIGERIA) LIMITED v. IILAH AGRIC PROJECT LIMITED [2003] 8 NWLR (Pt. 821) 38 at 52 and GOV of OYO STATE v. AKINYEMI [2003] 1 NWLR (Pt. 800) 1, where the special circumstances highlighted above were upheld as constituting grounds for granting of a stay of execution. The respondent continued that a further compelling reason why a stay of execution should be granted in this case is because it is challenging the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the claim and seeking a revocation of the judgment based on a claim that is statute-barred. That it is well settled that where a court has no jurisdiction it cannot enforce its: coercive powers, referring the Court to the case of AKINBOBOLA v. PLISSON FISKO [1991] I NWLR (PI. 167) 270 at 284. To the respondent then, the interest of justice leans in favour of preserving the res so that the respondent will not be prejudiced by the inability the applicants to refund the judgment debt if this court revokes its earlier judgment. The respondent then urged the court to grant its application. The respondent then went on to refute the applicants' challenge to its application as constituting an abuse of the court process, arguing that an abuse of court process will only lie where there has been an improper use of the judicial process and citing the case of KOTOYE v. SARAKI [1991]8 NWLR (Pt. 211) 638 at 646 - 647 paragraphs H - A. To the respondent, its application is well founded in law and has been endorsed by the decisions of the superior courts cited earlier. The respondent then urged the Court to strike out the applicants' Motion dated the 10th August 2007 for being an abuse of process given that its content is identical with the contents of their counter-affidavit and they both seek to achieve the same result, referring the Court to the case of AGWASIM v. OJICHIE [2004] 10 NWLR (Pl. 882) 013 at 624 - 5. In reaction, the applicants prefaced their submissions by reiterating that this case was instituted in this court sometime in 2002 after the High Court of Lagos State declined jurisdiction on the ground that the subject matter does not fall within the purview of the High Court. That the parties in this case participated effectively throughout the period of the court proceedings that span over a period of five years. That within this period, the respondent contested and opposed the applicants' various application and even raised several issues of jurisdiction which this Court resolved in favour of the applicants. The applicants then went on to state that it is important to note that if the applicants' claim had been statute-barred, the respondent would have raised this issue much earlier going by its antecedent. To the applicants, the present application of the respondent as constituted is a deliberate ploy to deprive the applicants from reaping the fruit of their judgment. The applicants then framed five issues that call for determination in the consideration of the respondent's application, namely- (a) Whether or not the respondent's application is competent. (b) Whether or not the Court can review its own judgment. (c) Whether or not the Statute of Limitation is applicable to this matter. (d) Whether or not this matter is caught by limitation of time. (e) Whether or not the court can grant an application for a stay of execution. Regarding the first issue i.e. whether or not the respondent's application is competent, the applicants contended that the Rules of court are made for the efficient administration of justice and if behooves parties in a matter to ensure strict compliance with the Rules of the Court. To the applicants, since the respondent's application was brought under the old Rules of this Court in total disrespect to the directive of this Court issued while sitting at the Enugu Judicial Division that parties should comply with the provisions of the new rules, then the application or the respondent is improper and irregular and same is not competent before this court and should be struck out. The applicants further submitted that by the provisions of Order 25 Rule 4 of the NIC Rules 2007, it is a conditional precedent that a defaulter of time within the provisions of the rule pays the penalty fees and files an affidavit of compliance before proceeding to file its papers in the court. That since the respondent has failed to do the needful, its application is improper and irregular and same is not competent before this Court and should be struck out. On the second issue i.e. whether or not this Court can review its own judgment, the applicants argued that it is trite law that the power of a court to review its earlier order is usually provided in the statute that established the court or the Rules of that particular court. That Order 19 Rule 18 of the NIC Rules 2007 stipulated the various grounds on which this Court may review its order. To the applicants, the respondent had argued that its application is premised on the provision of Order 19 Rule 18(1)(e) which anchors of judgment based on the ground of "in 'the interest of Justice". In this regard, the applicants submitted that the provisions of order 19 Rule 18( I )(c) of the N1C Rules 2007 cannot avail the respondent in that not only did the respondent effectively participate in the court proceedings during the period of trial, the respondent virtually opposed all the interlocutory applications of the applicants and this Court delivered considered rulings on all the issues raised therein including but not limited to the issue of jurisdiction raised by the respondent. That they are sure that if the respondent was really convinced that the claims of the applicants were statute-barred it would have raised it at the earliest opportunity, The applicants then submitted that since the respondent was given adequate fair hearing throughout the court proceedings in this matter, the respondent cannot now be heard complaining about the final judgment delivered in this matter. The applicants then urged this court to discountenance and strike out the request of the respondent asking it to review its final judgment on the ground that the respondent's application cannot be situated within the provisions of Order 19 Rule 18(l)(e) of the NIC Rules 2007. That this Court cannot exercise its judicial powers in favour of the respondent having become functus officio with effect from the date of delivery of the final judgment. Regarding the third, issue i.e. whether or not the Statute of Limitation is applicable to this matter, the applicants submitted that the subject matter involved in this case is a peculiar one and is a specialized area of law regulated by its peculiar laws. That this matter involves the rights of the workers which are inalienable rights safeguarded by special laws and conventions to which Nigeria is a signatory. Consequently, that the knowledge of the general law is not applicable stricto sensu as this area of law requires a specialized knowledge which with the respondent's counsel either seems not to appreciate or is deliberately making frantic efforts to frustrate the applicants from reaping the fruit of their judgment. The applicants then submitted that the agreement under consideration in this matter is a collective agreement and not a simple contract agreement which, as envisaged by the respondent, is regulated by the provisions of the statute of limitation. To the applicants, the respondent had argued that the applicants' claim is caught by time, that is, statute-barred. That the respondent had premised its argument on the Limitation Law or Lagos State and the fact that what the applicants sought to enforce is a simple contract. The applicants then submitted that this argument of the respondent is totally misconceived in that it is premised on the lack of understanding of the principles guiding labour laws. In the first place, that the agreement in issue is not a simple contract agreement but rather a collective agreement which section 54 or the NIC Act defines as "any agreement in writing regarding working conditions and terms of employment concluded between (a) an organization of employers or an organization representing employers (or an association of such organization) of the one part, and (b) an organization of employees or an organization representing employees (or an association of such organization) of the other part." The applicants then urged that the rights of the applicants being situated in a collective agreement which emanated as a result of work done for the' employer confers a right of action in equity and this alone takes away the case from the realm of the limitation law. The applicants further submitted that all the cases cited by the respondent are totally irrelevant and inapplicable to this case in that the issues/facts in those cases are different from those ill the present matter where the issues/facts border on labour. On the fourth issue i.e. whether or not this matter is caught by the Statute of Limitation, the applicants contended that, assuming but not conceding, and for the benefit of argument, the statute of limitation is applicable to this matter, the question to be asked is whether this matter still would have been caught by limitation of time. The applicants went on to state that it is trite law that the period of limitation begins to run from the date on which the cause of action commences. That to determine whether an action is statute-barred, all that is required is for one to examine the writ of summons and the statement of claims alleging when the wrong was committed and which gave the plaintiff a cause or action, and comparing that date with the date on which the writ of summons was tiled. That if the time on the writ is beyond the period allowed by the limitation law, then the action is statute-barred. To the applicants, the respondent had contended that the cause of action in this matter arose on the 30th day of June, 1994. That this contention of the respondent is totally misconceived and is a demonstration of the lack of knowledge of the workings of the specialized nature of labour law. That at the initial hearing of this matter the respondent had contended that the collective agreement dated 30th June, 1994 does not exist and that the only operative collective agreement is the one dated 31st August, 1994. That if this contention were to be true even the agreement dated 30th June, 1994 would be totally irrelevant. However, that the true facts of the matter which were stated in the judgment of the court is that upon the execution of the of the agreement dated 30th June 1994, the parties then engaged themselves severally and continually on settlement of the obligations created in the said agreement. That the respondent then employing or what one would refer to as abusing state instrument of coercion induced another agreement dated 31st August, 1994, which said agreement was described in the judgment of this court as complementary to that of 30th June, 1994. In this circumstance, the applicants queried how 30th June, 1994 could be the cut off time [or the purpose of the statute of limitation. The applicants' further submitted that since the respondent has not deemed it fit to controvert all the facts deposed to in their counter-affidavit, same should be taken as admitted and established. That by the said deposition in the applicants' counter-affidavit, the true position of things is as reflected in the agreement dated 30th day of June, 1994, which is that the respondent had always admitted liability for the payment of the entitlement of the applicants. In fact, that the respondent had never denied that the applicants were entitled to the payment; all that the respondent requested for was time to enable it obtain funds from its home office. That this was the prevailing situation before the then respondent's solicitors suddenly somersaulted and turned around to deny its client's admission. To the applicants, it is trite law that time does not run when a party has admitted liability which is what happened in this case. That the applicants .only resolved to institute this matter when the respondent denied liability. In view of the preceding paragraphs, the applicants submitted that their claim is not caught by time; it is not statute barred and can never be because the applicants having worked for their entitlement cannot be deprived of same. That equity would not allow the law to be used as an engine of fraud. The applicants then prayed the Court that by virtue of sections 13 and 14 the NIC Act the respondent's application should be struck out on the ground that it is a ploy to deprive the applicants from reaping the fruit of their judgment. On the fifth issue i.e. whether or not the court can grant an application for a stay of execution, the applicants contended that it is trite law that before this Court can grant an application for stay of execution, the respondent must have of necessity complied with the requirements stated ill the provisions of Order 30 of the NIC Rules 2007. That failure on the part of the respondent to so comply renders the application and the reliefs sought therein improper and irregular and same should be struck out in view of the provisions of section 47. of the NIC Act. The applicants went on to urge that, assuming but not conceding, that this court is disposed to granting this application, then the court, in granting the application, should make it conditional upon payment of the judgment sum into an escrow yielding account. The applicants concluded by submitting that the application of the respondent is baseless, frivolous and filed mala fide and same should be struck out on the basis of its incompetence. The respondent reacted to the five issues raised by the applicants. With respect to issue 1, the respondent submitted that the applicants' challenge of the competence of the respondent's application is misconceived. That the respondent's application was filed on the 31st of July 2007 before the commencement of the .new Rules of the NIC on the 1st of August, 2007. That Order l Rule 3 of the new Rules provides that "these Rules shall apply to all proceedings including part-heard causes and matters in respect of steps to be further taken [the emphasis is the respondent's] in such causes and matters for the attainment of a just, efficient and speedy dispensation of justice." To the respondent, this provision saves processes filed prior to the commencement date of the new Rules given that the new Rules do not have a retrospective effect. Furthermore, that the applicants' account or tile proceedings of this Court on the 20th of September 2007 at its Enugu Division is misleading. That the Court on that day did not direct the respondent to file a fresh application, rather the respondent sought leave of the Court to present written submissions ill support of its application which was granted as prayed. That the appropriate penalty for late filing of the respondent's address has been paid and an affidavit of compliance filed to that effect. The respondent accordingly urged the Court to discountenance the objection raised by the applicant under issue 1. On issue 2, the respondent submitted that the applicants' contention in the main is that the respondent is belatedly seeking a review of the Court’s judgment on grounds of statute-bar when the Court has become functus officio. The respondent then submitted that the applicants themselves have conceded that a Court can review its judgment or orders. That the position of the law, which is well settled, is that issues bordering on jurisdiction can be raised at any stage even for the first time on appeal. To the respondent, the extenuating circumstance that would compel a review of the Court's judgment is founded on the interest of justice principle since the right to appeal from the decision of the NIC is restricted. With respect to issue 3, the respondent indicated that the applicants had canvassed the view that a statute of limitation will not apply to the subject matter of this suit because of the peculiar laws applicable to labour issues. That rather than refer to judicial, academic or statutory authorities that support their submission, the applicants have sought refuge under the principles of equity and international conventions. That the provisions of the conventions and how they apply to the facts of this case have not been provided. The respondent then submitted that the law remains supreme over equity, referring to the case of MUDIAGA-ERHUEI-I v. INEC [2003 J 5 NWLR (Pt. 812) 70 at 91 paragraphs G - H where the Court of Appeal held as follows: It is trite that equity follows the law. At the same time I cannot be swayed by the submission of learned Counsel to the Appellant, that where there is a conflict between the common law and equity, the rules of equity shall prevail. Equity should not be treated as a phenomenon threatening the existence of the law; both exist jointly for the purposes of achieving justice according to the law. In the same vein, that international conventions, to which Nigeria is a signatory, would have no binding force in Nigeria unless they are domesticated locally by the National Assembly as part , of our municipal laws, referring the court to decision of the Supreme Court in the case of ABACHA v. FAWEHINMI [2000] 6 NWLR (Pt. 660) 228 at 288 paragraphs F - G where the Court held that "an international treaty entered into by the Government of Nigeria does not become binding until enacted into law by the National Assembly, it had no such force of law as to make its provisions justiciable in our Courts." That this was the tenor of section 12(1) of the 1979 Constitution now reenacted in section 12(1) of the 1999 Constitution. The respondent then submitted that the peculiarity of the subject matter of this case does not take it out of the ambit of the principle of public policy expressed in the maxim "interest rei publicae ut sit finis utus", which means "interest of the public demands that litigation must come to an end". That this principle is well entrenched in Nigerian law and equity will certainly not aid the indolent to enforce dormant rights. On issue 4, the respondent submitted that for the purpose of reckoning the time of accrual of the cause of action, if the 30th June 1994 or indeed the 31st August 1994 is used as the relevant date, the matter would still be statute-barred as it was filed beyond six years. The respondent went on to submit that the applicants' attempts to embellish the facts cannot displace the affidavit evidence before the Court. That contrary to the applicants' contention that the respondent admitted liability to the applicants, the respondent in fact joined issues with the applicants in its reply to the applicants' counter-affidavit by stating that it never at any lime admitted liability to the applicants' claims. In any event, that for an admission to be binding it must be voluntarily made and must be free from ambiguity. The respondent further submitted that no admission of liability was made by it from the evidence benne this court to suspend the operation of the limitation law. The respondent then stressed that the defence of statute-bar does not necessarily deny the existence of a right; it merely prevents a party from enforcing a stale claim by resort to the judicial process. With respect to issue 5, the respondent submitted that the applicants' reference of the provisions of Order 30 Rules 1 and 3 as a bar to the respondent's prayer for slay of execution is misconceived. That the respondent's application for stay of execution in this case is not predicated on the existence of a pending appeal; it merely seeks a stay of execution pending the hearing and determination of its application for the review of the Court's judgment. The respondent concluded by submitting that the submissions or the applicants do not find support in law and so the Court should grant the respondent's application. We have carefully considered all the processes filed and the written arguments conversed by counsel to the parties. The respondent is seeking for an order of this court revoking its earlier judgment delivered on 17th July, 2007 on the ground that at the time the original action was brought to court, the subject matter was already statute-barred. In filing the present application, the respondent came under the old Rules of this Court given that the new Rules were not effective then. Incidentally, the provisions under the old Rules (Rule 26 of the NIC Rules Cap. 432 LPN 1990) which govern the power of this court to review or revoke its order is similarly worded with those under the new Rules (Order 19 Rules 18 and 19 of the NIC Rules 2007). Given that by Order I Rule 2 of the 2007 Rules the old Rules are repealed and Order 1 Rule 1 (3) requires that all part-heard matters be governed by the new Rules, we shall restrict ourselves to the provisions of the new the Rules. This means that we agree with the respondent that, as against the argument of the applicants, that the respondent's application to have the judgment of this court delivered on 17th July 2007 reviewed is competent before this court. Order 19 Rule 18, under which the respondent's application must now be considered,' provides that- (I) The Court may, either of its own motion or on application by any of the parties to the proceedings, review any order made by it and may, on such a review, revoke or vary that order on the grounds that: (a) the order was wrongly made as a result of an error on the part of the court staff (b) a party did not receive proper notice of the proceedings leading to the order; (c) the order was made in the absence of a party entitled to be heard; (d) new evidence has become available since the making of the order; or (c) tile interest of justice requires such review. (2) An application under sub-rule (I) of this rule shall be made within 14 days of tile date of tile order. And by Order 19 Rule 19, a clerical mistake or error in any order arising from an accidental slip or omission may at any time be corrected by or on the authority of tile Court. The respondent has, however, made is clear in its processes that it is seeking a review from this Court under Order 19 Rule 18(1)(e) i.e. under the requirement of the interest of justice. This Court had previously had the opportunity to consider the ambit of this provision under Rule 26 of the old Rules in the case of National Union of Local Government Employees v. Medical and Health Workers Union of Nigeria [2005] 2 NLLR (Pt. 4) 166 where we held that this Court has the power to review its previous decision. Incidentally, both counsel in this matter agree that this Court has such power even under the new Rules. The only issue outstanding then is whether the respondent has made out a case for us to exercise the power of review in the present circumstance of this case. The case of the respondent is that when the applicants filed their action out of time and so the matter was statute-barred for which this Court should set aside. A number of issues arise here. For instance, is the question of limitation of action one of jurisdiction or one of defence? Alternatively put, when a party says that a matter is statute-barred, should this be an issue as to the jurisdiction of the Court or should it be one can only be raised as a defence to the action? The respondent seems to think that it is one that goes to the jurisdiction of the Court; and because issues of jurisdiction can be raised at anytime and stage of proceedings, that is why the respondent is raising it at this stage. We, however, do not think the issue of limitation of action is one that goes to jurisdiction. We think it is one that should be raised as a defence to an action for a Court may have the jurisdiction to entertain a matter but may nevertheless rule in favour of the defence on the ground that the matter is statute-barred. In this sense, the question of limitation of action is simply one of disability. It is not that the claimant has no rightful claim, or that the Court has no jurisdiction; only that the claimant is disabled by time from pursuing the claim in issue. This said, we think that we had jurisdiction when we entertained the substantive matter; and because the issue of limitation of action was not raised throughout the hearing until now, we are of the view that it is now at best a matter for appeal to a higher Court, not review by this Court. In this sense, the statement of Ogundare, JSC in the case of ROSSEK v. ACB LTD, supra, to the effect that where there is competence or jurisdiction, an erroneous decision: or order made by a Court is a matter for appeal find may be set aside or varied as the Appeal Court may deem fit, becomes pertinent. The respondent argued that it had to bring this application because of the limited right of appeal in respect of the decisions of this Court to a higher court. The right of appeal regarding the decisions of this Court is no doubt limited; but fair hearing is enough of an omnibus ground to facilitate an appeal if the respondent so desires. The only problem though is that the respondent had all the opportunity to raise the issue of limitation of action during the hearing of the substantive matter but failed to do so. Assuming we are wrong in all we have said so far, and it is that issues of limitation of action actually go to jurisdiction, the point remains whether labour rights are covered by the limitation laws. The respondent seems to think so, arguing in the process that collective agreements are contracts and so covered by the limitation laws. We do not share this view of the respondent. The limitation laws cited by the respondent talk of simple or quasi contracts. We do not think collective agreements can be so branded. It is wrong for the respondent to go to the dictionaries for the definition of a collective agreement when the Trade Disputes Act (TDA) Cap. 432 LFN 1990 in section 47(1) and the NIC Act 2006 in section 54(1) have statutorily defined a collective agreement. A collective agreement is not a simple or a quasi contract, but one that is specialized, dealing with matters statutorily laid down, and for which this Court has interpretative jurisdiction specifically provided for in section 7 of the NIC Act. Consequently, we do not think that the rights of workers are caught up by the limitation laws; for to think otherwise would mean that even rights as to salaries and entitlements of an office would be time-barred. For all these reasons, therefore, the respondent's application for review of our judgment of 11th July 2007 must fail. We do not see any reason to warrant such a review as prayed by the respondent. Having said all this, the only other issue remaining is the prayer of the respondent to stay execution of our judgment of 17th July 2007. Since we declined to review the said judgment, we hereby decline to grunt tilt prayer for stay of execution. Ruling is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice B.A. Adejumo President Hon. Justice B.B. Kanyip Hon. Justice M.B. Dadda Judge Judge