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The claimant commenced an action by a complaint against the defendants dated and filed on 2nd December 2011. The claimant is claiming for the following reliefs – 1. A declaration that the deed of trust dated 21st October 1985 made in favour of the claimant by the defendants is enforceable. 2. An order of this Court to direct the defendants to give the detail statement of all the benefit and interest accrued over time by virtue of the deed of trust to the claimant. 3. An order directing the defendant to pay to him all what is due and entitled to him by virtue of the deed of trust of 1985. Accompanying the complaint is the statement of facts and the list of witnesses to be called. By a motion on notice dated March 2, 2012 but filed on March 5, 2012 the claimant for and on 19th April 2012 got the leave of this Court to file and serve a copy of the said trust deed of 1985. The defendants entered appearance vide their memorandum of appearance dated and filed on 13th April 2012. Thereafter, the defendants filed their statement of defence and a bundle of documents referred to as Exhibit A. The defendants then proceeded to file a notice of preliminary objection dated and filed on May 7, 2012. The grounds upon which the preliminary objection is based are – 1. The doctrine of res judicata applies in this suit as the reliefs being sought in the complaint have been decided between the parties by the decision of the Federal High Court and Lagos High Court in Suit FHC/L/CS/976/2002 – Octavius Olusola Wey & ors v. Aeromaritime Nig. Ltd & ors and Suits ID/638M/06 and ID/639M/06 – Aderemi Tijani v. Aeromaritime Nig. Ltd & ors and Daniel Akpan v. Aeromaritime Nig. Ltd & ors. 2. The action is a gross abuse of court process as an action in respect of the same subject matter is currently on appeal to the Court of Appeal by 2 of the so called ex-workers. 3. The claim of the respondents is statute-barred – the cause of action having arisen in 1085 when the Deed of trust was purportedly made. 4. The Court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain the action as the reliefs being sought do not fall under any of the items contained in section 254C(1) and (2) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended. 5. The respondent has not pleaded sufficient materials before this Court to show that the purported agreement of 1985 was completely constituted to make it justiciable. The defendants went on to indicate that they will be relying on all the processes filed including Exhibit A which they filed along with the statement of defence. In support of the preliminary objection is an affidavit of 26 paragraphs deposed to by Davidson Azuamairo, Head, Admin/Personnel/Legal Department of the 1st defendant. Also in support of the preliminary objection is a written address. In reaction, the claimant filed a written address dated 18th June 2012. The defendants did not file any reply on points of law. The case of the defendants is that in 2002, a suit was instituted at the Federal High Court by persons representing former and serving employees of Aeromaritime Nig. Ltd. The suit was against the present applicants in this instant case and other defendants. The action was predicated on a purported Trust Deed dated December 1985, same as that in the instant case. That the claimant in the instant case was the 4th plaintiff in that suit. The outcome of the suit was that the Federal High Court in a considered ruling declined to hear the matter for want of jurisdiction and the fact that the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence that the trustees of the said trust Deed were dully registered in accordance with the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA). After losing at the Federal High Court, the plaintiffs filed an appeal at the Court of Appeal; and while the appeal was still pending, two other former employees also filed a fresh action at the Lagos High Court. The Lagos High Court ruled that the action was statute-barred. Again, an appeal was filed against the decision of the Lagos High Court; and while that appeal is being prosecuted, a fresh matter by another former employee has been filed in this Court in the name of the present case. Citing Ahmed Makun & ors v. Federal University of Technology, Minna & ors [2011] 6 – 7 SC (Pt. V) 32 at 71 paragraph 15, the defendants argued that the instant case is caught up by the principle of estoppel per rem judicatam given that the suit at the Federal High Court was on behalf of all the former employees of Aeromaritime Nig. Ltd and was founded on the 1985 Trust Deed, same as in the instant case. That this Court, as a court of coordinate jurisdiction with the Federal High Court and the Lagos High Court means that it cannot sit on appeal over the decisions of the two High Courts. The defendants also argued that this instant case is, therefore, and abuse of court process as the claimant in this case was one of those represented at the Federal High Court and was indeed the 4th plaintiff in that suit. On abuse of court process, the defendants referred the Court to Alhaji Muhammad Dingyadi & ors v. INEC & ors [2010] 6 – 7 SC (Pt. 1) 71 at 127 paragraph 25 where Attorney General, Anambra State v. Uba [2005] All FWLR (Pt. 277) was quoted with approval. To the defendants, prosecuting this case while an appeal is pending on same issue is an abuse of court process. On the question whether the instant case is statute-barred, the defendants referred to sections 8(1) and 32(1) of the Lagos State Limitation Law 2003 which provide a six-year limitation period for actions founded on simple contracts or to recover money or other property or in respect of breach of trust. That the purported Trust Deed was executed in 1985, while the claimant left the employment of Aeromaritime Nig Ltd in 2001 i.e. 16 years after the execution of the purported Trust Deed. That even after all this, the claimant waited another 10 years before filing the present suit. The defendants then referred the Court to Oduola & ors v. Ibadan City Council & anor [1978] NSCC 252 and Amusan v. Obideyi [2005] 21 WRN 1 at 3. On the question whether the claimant has placed sufficient material before the Court to show that the purported agreement of 1985 was a completely constituted trust to make it justiciable, the defendants argued that the claimant had not. That the crux of the instant case is the purported transfer of a certain percentage of the shares of the Aeromaritime Nig. Ltd by Chief Victor Odili to the claimant and others to be held in trust for all former and serving employees of Aeromaritime Nig. Ltd. That the claimant has failed to show that at the time of the purported agreement, the relevant sections 77 and 79 of the then Companies Act 1968 (now sections 151(2) and (3) and 152(2) of CAMA), relating to transfer of shares, were fully adhered to. In consequence, that the claimant has no enforceable claim before this Court. The defendants the argued that this Court cannot assume jurisdiction over the instant case because the claim of the claimant is not one founded on employment as to bring the matter within the purview of section 254C(1) and (2) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended. That the claimant’s claim is for equity participation in Aeromaritime Nig. Ltd based on the 1985 Trust Deed. To the defendants, the present dispute is in respect of rights conferred by the Trust Deed and nothing more. That it is in no way linked to the employment or disengagement of the claimant from the employment of Aeromaritime Nig Ltd; and that being the case, this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the instant case. The Court was referred to Madukalu v. Nkemdilim [2001] 46 WRN 1 at 13. The defendants concluded by urging the Court to dismiss the entire claim of the claimant. In reaction to the submissions of the defendants, the claimants filed their written address wherein they rejected the arguments of the defendants. To the claimant, the instant suit is an employment matter and a contract, hence an employment contract which is personal in nature. That lines 19 and 20 of the Trust Deed provide that the Trust Deed is for “the annual benefit and advantage of the employees of the company”. That by this provision, the Trust Deed becomes ‘part of the document of employment of the entire staff of the 1st Defendant’. The claimant then urged the Court to construe the Trust Deed in line with the dictates in CBN v. Igwillo [2007] All FWLR (Pt. 379) 1385 Ratios 8 and 9. The claimant went on to state that sections 8(1) and 32(1) of the Lagos State Limitation Law 2003 cited by the defendants are inapplicable as they deal with simple contract while the instant case is one dealing with an employment contract, referring to Effiong v. FHA NLLR (Pt. 5). The claimant continued that the instant case is neither caught up by the principle of res judicata nor is an abuse of court process. That the decision of the Federal High Court in Suit No. FHC/L/CS/976/2002 was mainly predicated on procedural defect, the non-production of certificate of incorporation by the plaintiffs to establish proof of their legal personality to sue on behalf of the other staff of the 1st defendant company. That this fact cannot be fatal to the instant case of the claimant for the effect of the Federal High Court case is simply that employees of the 1st Defendant cannot institute a joint and corporate action for the entire staff to recover their benefits. To the claimant, the Federal High Court decision was not a final decision but one on procedure, citing Fardoun v. MBC International Bank [2006] All FWLR (Pt. 297) 1130. That in Ahmed Makun & ors v. Federal University of Technology, Minna (supra) cited by the defendants, the Supreme Court actually decided that for a plea of estoppel per rem judicatam to succeed, the decision relied upon must be valid, subsisting and final. That this condition has not been fulfilled in the instant case. Furthermore, that the instant case is not an abuse of court process. That the Lagos High Court in the consolidated cases of 638M/2006 and 639M/2006 rejected the reliefs in the originating summons on the ground that they were statute-barred. To the claimant, the applicants in the Lagos high Court cases are separate persons from the present claimant; their interest is different because contract of employment is personal. The claimant went on that the Lagos High Court cases sought an interpretation of the trust deed via originating summons. The claimant then urged the Court to refuse the preliminary objection, strike it out and order the matter to proceed to trial. After a careful consideration of the processes and submissions of both counsel in this matter, I must state from the outset that all claims founded on am employment contract or relations are properly within the jurisdictional competence of this Court, if section 254C of the 1999 Constitution is anything to go by. So if the claim of the claimant is that shares of a company are to be given to him in virtue of his employment with the company in question and such were not so given, a claim for the shares as entitlements of employment by the claimant can appropriately fall within the jurisdictional competence of this Court. So for the defendants to argue that this Court has no jurisdiction over the instant case because the claim of the claimant is not that the trust deed is part of his conditions of service or part of his severance package, is actually reading the jurisdictional rules wrongly. But this is not the core of the issue that calls for the determination of this Court. The main issue for determination is whether the cases decided by the Federal High Court and the Lagos High Court are such as to preclude this Court from assuming jurisdiction over the instant case. I looked through the processes relating to the cases heard by the federal High Court and the Lagos State High Court. Regarding the suit at the Federal High Court (Suit No. FHC/L/CS/976/2002, the plaintiffs are four in number with the claimant in the instant case as the 4th plaintiff. The four plaintiffs sued for themselves and on behalf of former and serving employees of Aeromaritime Nigeria limited, the 1st defendant in the instant case. The defendants in that suit are also the defendants in the instant case, although in reverse order. In that suit the plaintiffs are claiming inter alia for 6% of the shares in Aeromaritime Nig Ltd based on the 1985 agreement, the payment of the dividends, bonus shares, rights issues and all privileges accruing on the said 6% shares and the rendering of account of Aeromaritime showing the shares, dividend, bonus shares, rights issues and all other privileges accruing to the plaintiffs under the said agreement between the plaintiffs and the defendants. Although the claims of the claimant in the instant case are worded differently, they approximate to the claims in the Federal high Court case. In terms of parties and claims, therefore, I hold that the instant case and the one at the Federal high Court are similar in all respects. Regarding the suits at the Lagos High Court which were consolidated, the plaintiffs are former employees of Aeromaritime although not specifically named in the suit at the Federal High Court. The defendants are five with the 1st and 2nd defendants being the two defendants in the instant case. The claims of the claimants in the Lagos High Court case essentially are that they are entitled to enjoy any benefit, right, dividend or interest accruing from the deed of trust and as such the 1st and 2nd defendants (the defendants in the instant case) be ordered to perform, obey and abide by the provisions of the deed of trust. Now, in all this, the Trust Deed in issue in all three Courts (Federal High Court, Lagos State High Court and this court) is the same. While the Federal high Court held that it had no jurisdiction over the matter, the Lagos State High Court held that the matter was statute-barred. From the record available to me, there are notices of appeal on both the Federal High Court and the Lagos High Court decisions although there is no evidence whether these notices of appeal have been accorded appeal numbers to indicate that they valid and subsisting. Be that as it may, I am satisfied that the issues and parties in the instant case are similar in all respects to those in the Federal High Court and Lagos High Court cases. Having to, therefore, file the present action in this court, the claimant is indirectly asking this Court to sit on appeal over the decisions of the Federal High Court, courts that are of coordinate jurisdiction with this court. The course of action opened to the claimant is to pursue the appeal at the Court of Appeal and not file a fresh action in this court as he had done. For this reason, I hold that this case is an abuse of court process for even if there was no pending appeal, this Court cannot sit on appeal over the decision of a court of coordinate jurisdiction. The merit of the issue whether the case at hand is statute-barred cannot even be looked into by this court given that a court of coordinate jurisdiction has already made a pronouncement on that issue. This court, therefore, lacks the jurisdiction to hear and determine the case at hand; and I so hold. For all the reasons given, I hold that the preliminary objection of the defendants succeeds. The case of the claimant is accordingly dismissed. Cost is put at N50,000 payable by the claimant to the defendants. Ruling is entered accordingly. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip