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This matter was transferred from the Federal High Court, Bauchi Judicial Division pursuant to the order of transfer dated 31st October 2011 and section 22(1) of the Federal High Court Act. The said transfer was consequent upon the 3rd Alteration to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria which came into effect on 4th March 2011. The claimant’s claim is for: (a) An order or declaration that the conversion of his employment from permanent and pensionable employment to contract employment made by a letter dated the 2nd June 2010 is null and void having breached the Claimant’s right to fair hearing and procedures laid down in the Nigerian Railway Corporation Act. (b) An order setting aside the reversion of the claimant’s employment from permanent and pensionable employment to contract employment. (c) A declaration that the claimant is still a bonafide staff of the 1st Respondents and is entitled to all rights, benefits and privileges conferred on him by the Nigerian Railway Corporation Act. (d) An order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants, their agents, privies, cohorts or any other person, authority from them, from reviewing the appointment of the claimant from permanent and pensionable to a contract appointment or doing anything whatsoever that is tantamount to depriving or affecting the claimant’s rights, benefits, privileges and interest as a bonafide staff of the 1st respondent. (e) A sum of One Million Naira being general and exemplary damages. (f) Cost of this action. Filed along the summons are statement of claim, Claimant’s list of Documents, List of Witnesses and Claimant’s witness Statement on Oath. The Respondents entered appearance and filed a notice of preliminary objection along with their statement of defence. The preliminary objection is dated 12th December, 2011 and filed on the same date. The grounds of the preliminary objection are as follows:- 1. This Suit as constituted is incompetent and the Court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain same. 2. The condition precedent for instituting this action was not satisfied. That the Claimant did not serve any notice on the defendants. 3. The Suit is statute- barred, that the Claimant’s employment was reviewed on 18th August 2010, but the Claimant only filed this Suit on the 24th January, 2011. 4. The Defendants are Public officers under the Public officers (Protection) Act and the Suit ought to have been filed within three months from when the cause of action arose. 5. The 2nd Defendant is an agent of the 1st Defendant and is not liable to be sued for an act of the disclosed principal, and is not a juristic entity. Accompanying the notice of preliminary objection is a six paragraphed affidavit deposed to by E. E. Dabo Esq, counsel in the law firm representing the respondents. The motion is also accompanied by a written address dated and filed on 12th December, 2012. In the said written address, counsel to the respondents, raised one issue for determination. That is : (1) Whether this Court has the jurisdiction to entertain this Suit. The Respondents counsel submitted that the Respondents are Public officers by the Provisions of the Constitution and the Public officers Act. That the 1st Respondent is a creation of statute, with clear provisions to discharge public statutory duties in line with provisions of the enabling statute. That the 1st Respondent is also a corporation within the Provisions of Section 318 of the 1999 Constitution. That the 2nd Respondent is in the Public Service of the Federation and therefore a Public officer, referring the Court to Ibrahim V J.S.C (1998) 14 NWLR (pt. 584) 1 at 36 where Iguh, J.S.C held. “It is beyond dispute that the word “Person” when used in a legal parlance, such as in a legislation or statute, connotes both a Natural Person,” that is to say, a “Human being and an Artificial Person” such as a Corporation sole or Public bodies corporate or incorporate”. To counsel, every action involving a Public officer therefore must be within the context of the Public officers (Protection) Act. That this act requires every action against a Public officer to be commenced within three months of the commencement of the cause of action. That the Claimant in this Suit is challenging the letter of 18th August 2010, which reviewed his terms of employment for the purpose of determining same at the end of the current tour which ended on the 2nd September, 2010. That it then follows that by the 2nd September 2010, the Claimant ceased to be in the employment of the Defendant. That as at the date of filling this Suit the Claimant ceased to be a staff of the 1st Respondent. Learned counsel therefore submitted that the Claimants cause of action arose from the 2nd September 2010, when his employment was determined by the contents of the letter of 18th October, 2010. The Respondents counsel submitted that the Claimant did not however commence this action until January, 2011 which is outside the three months period prescribed for actions, challenging the actions of Public officers. That, by the Public officers (Protection) Act, the Claimants’ Suit is statute- barred ab initio. That Section 2(a) of Public officers (Protection) Act, provides as follows: “No Suit against the Corporation or any Servant of the Corporation, shall lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act neglect or default complained of…………” That in AGI V ENO (2010) 5 NWLR (PT. 1188) 626 at 642, Ngwuta JCA (as he then was) held thus: “From the relevant process filed the cause of action arose on 13/1/05 the date of the letter evidencing his expulsion and on which letter he founded his action. The action commenced more than 3 months stipulated in S. 2(a) of the Public officers (Protection) Act, 2004. The Suit is statute-barred and I so declare. The 1st Respondent’s right to commence an action against his expulsion as embodied in the letter dated 13/1/2005 is extinguished by law. See Egbe V Adefarasin (Supra) and Aghovia V Saibu (1991) 2 NWLR (pt. 175) 516” Also in urging this Court to hold that this action is statute-barred, Counsel submitted that a Court of Law cannot ignore mandatory or obligatory provisions of a statute and tow the line of justice in the event that the statute has not done justice, citing C.C.C.T.C.S Ltd V Ekpo (2008) 6 NWLR (pt. 1083) 398 where Tobi JSC held thus: “…………A Court of law cannot ignore provisions of a statute which are mandatory or obligatory and tow the line of justice in the event that the statute has not done justice. Courts of Law can only do so in the absence of a mandatory or obligatory provision of a statute. In other words, where the provisions of a statute are mandatory or obligatory, Courts of Law cannot legitimately brush the provisions aside just because it wants to do justice in the matter. That will be adulterating the provisions of the statute and that is not my function, the Judge that I am. On the effect of an action being statute barred, Onnoghen, JCA (as he then was) held in I.T.F.V.N.R.C. (2007) 3, NWLR (PT. 1020) 28 at p. 62 as follows: “Therefore where an action is statute barred, a plaintiff who would have had a cause of action automatically losses the right to enforce the cause of action by judicial process because the time laid down by limitation law for instituting such as action has elapsed.” The respondents counsel therefore submitted that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this matter. Secondly, the Respondents counsel submitted also that the Claimant failed to satisfy the condition precedent to the commencement of an action of this nature, and this invariably robs this Court of the jurisdiction to entertain this action. That by Section 83(2) of the Nigerian Railway Corporation Act; it provides as follows: “No Suit can be commenced against the corporation until three months at least after written notice of intention to commence the Suit shall have been served upon the corporation by the intending plaintiff or his agent, and such notice shall clearly and explicitly state the cause of action, the particulars of claim, the name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff and the relief which he claims”. That the said letter of review served by the 1st Defendant on the Claimant is dated 18th August, 2010 and the Claimant’s writ of Summons and Statement of claim were filed and served without a written notice of intention to sue served on the Corporation as stipulated by the statute. That this pre-suppose that the three months prescribed for written notice of intention to sue was not compiled with by the Claimant, before commencing this action as required by the statute, citing Olutola V Unilorin (2004) 18 NWLR (PT. 905) paras E- F (incomplete citation). That it is incumbent on the Claimant to show from his statement of claim that the condition precedent for commencement of this Suit was fulfilled by proof of service of pre-action notice. Citing Odoemelan V Amadiume (2008) 2 NWLR (pt. 1070) 179 at 188 – 189 where Ngwuta, JCA (as he then was) said : “Since pre-action notice is a condition precedent to the institution of the Suit, the onus is on the appellant to satisfy the Court that the condition was fulfilled and the only way he can do this on the facts before the Court is to show that he pleaded the notice in the Statement of claim.” Learned counsel further submitted that there is nothing in the Claimant’s Statement of claim to show that any pre-action notice was written before the Suit was filed. That there is also nothing in the list of documents filed by the Claimant or in the documents attached to show that Defendants were served with any pre – action notice. That the absence of pre – action notice strips the Court of jurisdiction to entertain the action. On the issue of privity of contract, the Respondents counsel submitted that it is settled law that an agent is not vicariously liable for the acts of a disclosed principal, that there is no privity of contract between the Claimant and the 2nd Defendant, since in law, by the principle of vicarious liability, the act of the Agent or Servant is the act of the Company citing Iyere V. B.F,F.M. Ltd (2008) 18 NWLR (PT. 1119) p. 332 paras E – G. Submitting finally that on the strength of the foregoing argument, the Claimant has no enforceable cause of action, and the appropriate order to make is one of striking out. In opposition to the preliminary objection, the claimant through his counsel filed a five paragraphed counter affidavit deposed to by Blessing Joseph the litigation Secretary in the law firm of the Claimant’s counsel. The Claimant’s counsel also filed a written address. Both processes were dated and filed on the 6th January, 2012. The Claimant’s counsel raised two issues for determination. These are: (1) Whether the plaintiff has complied with the enabling laws, Rules and Statute in Instituting this action. (2) Whether by the pronouncement of the Federal High Court, Bauchi in respect of the same issue, the issue has become resjudicata. On the first issue, the Claimant’s counsel submitted that the claimant has complied with all the conditions precedent in instituting this action. The defendant’s letter of conversion of the claimant’s appointment was dated 18th August 2010, which purported to review the claimant employment from permanent and pensionable to contract appointment. That at that material time this Court was on vacation. That the claimant had no option but to rush to the Bauchi State High Court to institute an action against the respondents where he sought and was granted an interim injunction to save his job by restraining the Defendants from putting into effect the condition precedent for instituting an action against the defendants. The claimant withdrew the action earlier filed at the State High Court and a pre-action notice was sent to the defendants by a registered courier (UPS). That this is in pursuant to the provisions of section 84 of the Nigerian Railway Corporation Act. That the receipt of the way bill is exhibit ‘KK’. Learned Counsel further submitted that there are a plethora of authorities decided by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court to the effect that Public Officers (Protection) Act relied upon by the defendants do not extend to contract, even contract of employment. That the suit relates to breach of contract of employment and so the Provisions of the Public Officers (Protection) Act does not apply to it. Citing C.B.N V Adedeji (2004) NWLR (pt. 890) p. 226 at 232. Also, learned counsel argued that the law is settled in Akuman V NEPA (2006) WRN 187 at 193 Ratio 7 : where it was held that: “ The Public Officers (Protection) Act gives full protection to all Public officers or persons who at all material time acted within the context of their duty. That once they step outside the bounds of their public authority and act outside the colour of their office, or employment or outside the statutory or constitutional duty, they automatically loose the protection of the law. Thus in such situations, a public officer can be sued outside the limitation period of three months. In view of the above, counsel urged this Court to hold that the plaintiff has complied with the provisions of the law in instituting this action and that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this matter. On the issue of resjudicata raised by the claimant. Learned counsel submitted that this same issue had already been determined by the Federal High Court, Bauchi and urged this Court to take judicial notice of the proceedings of the Federal High Court. Counsel referred the Court to the case of Dim V Enemuo (2009) NSCOR, VOL. 38 pt.2 at 873, Odutola V Oderinde (2004) NSC QR vol. 18 pt.2 pg 577 at 579 and urged this Court to refuse the defendants application and allow the matter to be heard on merit. There was no reply on point of law. After a careful consideration of the processes filed, submission of counsel and authorities cited, the issues for consideration in my view are whether or not this Suit is statute-barred and whether the claimant complied with the provisions as to pre-action notice as prescribed in Section 83(2) of the Nigerian Railway Corporation Act. The defendant’s counsel has argued that the cause of action in this case accrued as at 18th August 2010 when the Claimant was served with a letter converting his employment from permanent and pensionable to a contract employment which contract was to end on 2nd September, 2010. That the Claimant waited until 21st January 2011 a period of more than three months before instituting the present action at the Federal High Court, Bauchi, before same was transferred to this Court. To the Respondent therefore this Suit is incurably incompetent as it offends Section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act. A perusal of the averments in the statement of claim and all the supporting processes in this case, it is not in doubt that the claimant was issued with a letter dated 18th August 2010 converting his permanent and pensionable employment to contract. That is to say the cause of action in this case accrued on 18th August 2010. That the Claimant waited up till January 21st 2011 before instituting this action is clearly outside the period prescribed by the Public Officers (Protection) Act. Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act provides as follows: “Where any action prosecution or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any law or of any Public duty or authority or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of such law, duty or authority, the following shall have effect. (a) The action, prosecution or proceeding shall not lie, or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in the case of a continuance of damage or injury, three months next after the cessation there of”. In the case at hand, it is clear that the claimants’ cause of action is no longer alive. Its life has been taken away by the provisions of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act quoted above. This Suit was instituted more than three months after the accrual of cause of action. In my humble view, it is therefore Statute barred. In Egbe V Adefarasin (1985) 1 NWLR (pt. 3) p. 549 at 568, the Supreme Court held that “the general principle of law is that where the law provides for the bringing of action within a prescribed period in respect of a cause of action accruing to the plaintiff, proceeding shall not be brought after the time prescribed by the Statute. See also Obiofuna V Okoye (1961)1 ALL NLR 357, Woherem V Emereuwa (2000) 3 NWLR (pt. 650) 529, Bank of the North V Gana (2006) ALL FWLR pt. 296, p. 862. The Claimants counsel’s argument that the cause of action arose while this court was on vacation which necessited him to file the Suit at the State High Court is not tenable. This is because the case was only transferred from the Federal High Court, Bauchi to this Court, it was never filed in this Court even after the Court’s vacation. In any event, even after Court’s vacation, the Claimant waited until January 21st 2011 before filing this action at the Federal High Court. I am not aware that Courts annual vacation continued up till December 2010 as the Claimant would want me to believe. As to whether the word Public Officer admits and includes non natural person i.e Public Institutions like the 1st respondent. See Ibrahim V J.S.C Kaduana State (Supra) Offoboche V Ogoja Local Government & Anor (2001) FWLR (pt.68) 1051, N.I.I.A V Ayanfalu (2006) ALL FWLR (pt. 325) at p.159. And this Court’s rulings in Mallam Bala Suleiman V. State Universal Basic Education Board (SUBEB) Bauchi State & Anor, unreported Suit No. NICN /JOS/11/2012, a ruling delivered on September, 26, 2012 and Mallam Ibrahim M. Jummat & Ors. V N.T.D.C Suit No. NIC/ABJ/78/2011, unreported a ruling delivered on September 26, 2012. All these authorities are in agreement that persons in Section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act admits and include artificial persons. On the authority of and in line with the above cited cases, I find and hold that this action is Statute barred. Having found and held that the Claimant’s action is Statute barred, I hereby dismiss the claimant’s claim. In consequence thereof I do not see the need to go into consideration of other issues raised by the parties. This is because to consider those other issues will be a mere academic exercise which I am not willing to embark upon. On the whole and in the final analysis, I hold that the preliminary objection of the respondents succeeds. This Suit is hereby dismissed. I make no order as to cost. Ruling is entered accordingly. …………………………………… Hon. Justice J. T. Agbadu- Fishim Presiding Judge