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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA IN THE LAGOS JUDICIAL DIVISION HOLDEN AT LAGOS BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP, Hon. Justice B.A. Adejumo, OFR……………………………………………President Date: 24th July, 2012 SUIT NO. NICN/LA/53/2012 BETWEEN: PROF. O. O. ADEBOWALE & 67 OTHERS………………..…………...…………CLAIMANTS/RESPONDENTS AND THE GOVERNING COUNCIL, OLABISI ONABANJO UNIVERSITY & ANOTHER………………………………………………………………….RESPONDENTS/APPLICANTS REPRESENTATION: Mr. Audu Augustine, Esq; for the Claimants/Respondents Folarin Olusola (Miss) for the Respondents/Applicants RULING The General Form of Complaint by which this action was commenced by the Claimants/Respondents against the Respondents/Applicants dated 10th June, 2011 was filed on the same day. The Claimants’ Statement of Facts, List of Witnesses, a copy of the Olabisi Onabanjo University Regulations Governing Conditions of Service of Senior Staff No. 2 of 2006 etc accompanied the General Form of Complaint upon filing. On 22nd September, 2011, the Respondents/Applicants filed a Motion on Notice seeking an order of the Court to extend the time within which they could enter appearance, file and serve their Statement of Defence and other accompanying documents and for an order deeming the Memorandum of Appearance, Statement of Defence and other documents already filed and served as having being properly filed and served. The Motion on Notice was supported by an affidavit of 7 paragraphs. The Motion on Notice was heard and the prayers granted on 28th September, 2011 by this Honourable Court. Let me now take the liberty to say that the Respondents/Applicants herein on the same date, i.e 22nd September, 2011 also filed another Motion on Notice dated the same day. The significance of the Motion on Notice which is the focus of this ruling sought to challenge the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court to hear this suit. The Motion on Notice sought for the following orders which I have found necessary to reproduce below: 1. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court striking out and/or dismissing this suit for lack of jurisdiction by the Court to entertain the matter 2. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court dismissing this suit on the ground that the suit is caught by the statute of limitation. The Respondents’/Applicants’ application was premised on the following grounds: 1. The Claimants, prior to the institution of this action, did not refer their complaints to the Visitor of the 2nd Defendant in compliance with sections 45(1), (2) and (3) of the Olabisi Onabanjo University Law and as such, the Claimants have not fulfilled the condition precedent for the institution of this action. 2. That the appeal to the Visitor of the 2nd Defendant is a condition precedent to the institution of this action. 3. That the Claimants aggrieved by the decisions of the Defendants and the termination of their appointments in the 2nd Defendant ought to have appealed to the Visitor to the 2nd Defendant under section 45(1), (2) and (3) of the Olabisi Onabanjo University Law and the Claimants’ failure to appeal to the Visitor is fatal to this suit, thus rendering this suit incompetent and denies this Honourable Court the jurisdiction to hear the suit. 4. Having regard to the true and proper meaning and intendment of sections 45(1), (2) and (3) of the Olabisi Onabanjo University Law, the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit as constituted. 5. The procedure and the reference mechanism outlined under sections 4, 5, and 6 of the Trade Disputes Act, Cap T8 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 have not been complied with. 6. Within the proper meaning and intendment of sections 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the Trade Disputes Act, 2004 LFN, the subject matter of this suit are (sic) properly within the purview of the Industrial Arbitration Panel to which the dispute has not first been referred before being filed in this Court. 7. The Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit because the suit was filed three months after the act complained of contrary to section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, Cap P41, LFN, 2004 and accordingly, the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 8. The Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit, having regard to the true and proper meaning and intendment of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, Cap P41, LFN, 2004. 9. This suit is statute barred against the Defendants and the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain same. 10. The present suit is incompetent and therefore ought to be dismissed and/or struck out. 11. The Court has no jurisdiction in all circumstances to entertain the suit. Let me pause to mention the fact that the Claimants/Respondents did not file a counter-affidavit to contravene or deny the depositions contained in the affidavit in support of the Motion on Notice. I shall return to this point later in the course of this ruling. The Motion under consideration was heard by this Honourable Court on 18th May, 2012. Mr. O. K. Salau appeared for the Claimants/Respondents while Mr. O. Uye with O. Folarin (Miss) and D. Essien, Esq., appeared for the Defendants/Applicants. Moving his application, Counsel for the Respondents/Applicants submitted that the application was brought under Order 11 Rule 1 of the NIC Rules, 2007; Section 7(3) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006 [NICA 2006]; Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the Trade Disputes Act, Cap T8 LFN, 2004 and under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. Counsel read out the orders sought and as couched in the motion paper. It is not necessary to recapture the orders here; the same having been set out above. Counsel for the Respondents/Applicants informed the Court that the application was supported by a 7-paragraph affidavit deposed to by one Olusola Folarin. Counsel sought to rely on all the paragraphs of the supporting affidavit and on the grounds stated on the motion paper. Counsel urged the Court to take cognizance of the fact that the Claimants/Respondents did not file any counter-affidavit and that the Court should accept the depositions as uncontroverted. In the course of his oral submissions, Counsel for the Respondennts/Applicants formulated two issues for determination, viz: 1. Whether in view of the clear provisions of section 45(1), (2) and (3) of the Olabisi Onabanjo University Law, Cap 20 (2001), Laws of Ogun State, Nigeria, the action is maintainable as constituted when the condition precedent has not been fulfilled; and 2. Whether the action is not statute barred having been commenced outside the 3 months period in violation of Public Officers Protection Act, LFN, 2004. On Issue 1, Counsel for the Respondents/Applicants submitted that the Claimants’ action is challenging the decisions of the Council of the 2nd Defendant/Respondent as contained in the letter dated 25th November, 2009 terminating the appointments of the Claimants. He submitted that it was clear that the Claimants never approached the Visitor to the University or did anything in respect of the said letter of 25th November, 2009 terminating their appointments. Counsel for the Applicants contended that the Claimants/Respondents were obliged to take the step of appealing to the Visitor to the University as stipulated by section 45(2) of the Olabisi Onabanjo University Law supra. Counsel submitted that appealing to the Visitor to the University was a condition precedent that the Claimants were obliged to take before the institution of this suit. Counsel contended that the failure of the Claimants to comply with the condition precedent was fatal to this suit. In support of this proposition, Counsel for the Defendants/Applicants cited and relied on the decisions in PROVISIONAL COUNCIL O.S.U. v. MAKINDE (1991) NWLR (Pt. 175) 613; AKINGBEHIN V. THOMSON (2008) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1083) 270. Counsel for Defendants/Applicants submitted that the effect of the failure of the Claimants/Respondents to comply with the condition precedent was that due process of law was not followed in commencing this action. Counsel cited the case of MADUKOLU V. NKEMDILIM (2001) WLRN 1. At this juncture, Counsel for the Respondents/Applicants applied to the Court to withdraw the portions of the Motion on Notice relating to the Trade Disputes Act, LFN 2004. Counsel for the Claimants/Respondents did not object to the oral application for withdrawal. Consequently, grounds 5 and 6 on the motion paper were struck out by this Honourable Court. On Issue 2, Counsel for the Respondents/Applicants submitted that the letters terminating the appointments of the Claimants were issued on 25th November, 2009, while this action was filed on 10th June, 2011 which meant that the action was filed 18 months after the occurrence of the events complained against the public officer. According to Counsel for the Respondents/Applicants, the effect of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act is that an action, prosecution or proceedings shall not lie or be commenced unless it is commenced within 3 months next after the act, neglect or default complained of or in case of continuance of damage or injury within 3 months next after the ceasure thereof. Counsel therefore argued that since this action was not commenced within the 3 months period referred to above, the action is statute-barred. In support of this submission Counsel for the Defendants/Applicants cited the cases of IBRAHIM V. JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION, KADUNA STATE & ANR (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt. 584) 1 and PERMANENT SECRETARY, FMW V. BALOGUN (1975) 11 NSCC 292; and MICHAEL OMO V. JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION, DELTA STATE (Pt. 688) 444. Finally, Counsel for the Respondents/Applicants contended that a case that is statute-barred discloses no reasonable cause of action and cited the case of OLORIEBI V. KOJEBI (1984) 1 NCNR 390. Counsel urged the Court to dismiss this action for the reasons advanced above. While responding to the submissions on Issue 1, formulated by Counsel for the Respondents/Applicants, O. Uye, of Counsel for the Claimants submitted that the word used in section 45(2) of the Olabisi Onabanjo University Law supra is “may” as opposed to “shall’’. Counsel contended that the provision simply gives the Claimants the opportunity to either appeal to the Visitor to the University or pursue other remedies available to them. He submitted that the use of the word “may” means that it is not mandatory for the Claimants to appeal to the Visitor to the University with respect to the termination of their appointments. Counsel cited and relied on the case of E. EMOPAE V. UNIVERSITY OF BENIN (2002) 17 NWLR (Pt. 795) 139 at 150-153. Relying on this authority Counsel for the Claimants/Respondents submitted that the failure of the Claimants to appeal to the Visitor to the University is in order. On Issue 2 formulated by the Respondents/Applicants, Counsel for the Claimants/Respondents submitted that the provision of section 2(a) of the Public Officer Protection Act, LFN 2004 does not apply to contract of employment. On this proposition, Counsel cited the case of CBN V. ADEDEJI (2005) 26 WRN 38, more particularly, at 61-62 where the Court of Appeal relying on the Supreme Court decision in NPA V. CONSTRUZINI GENERAL FARSURA COGEGAR SPA & ANR (1974) ANLR 945 at 955 or (1974) 12 SC p. 81. Counsel submitted that this decision was applied with approval by this Court in the unreported case of JOHN OVUH V. MESSRS WESTMINSTER GREDGING & MARINE suit No. NIC/9/2002 delivered on 1st April, 2008. Furthermore, Counsel for the Claimants/Applicants submitted that the case of PROVISIONAL COUNCIL O.S.U. v. MAKINDE supra cited by Defendants’/Applicants’ Counsel is dissimilar and distinguishable from the case at hand. He argued that the case of PROVISIONAL COUNCIL O.S.U v. MAKINDE dealt with section 97 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act which provided for the endorsement of writ of summons while section 45(2) of the Olabisi Onabanjo University Law supra in contention deals with the construction of the word ‘may” used in the section. Counsel submitted that the word “may” simply means that the act in question is discretionary. Finally, Counsel for the Claimants/Respondents urged the Court to dismiss the notice of preliminary objection filed by the Respondents/Applicants. Responding on points of law, Counsel for the Respondents/Applicants contended that a community reading of section 45(2) of the Olabisi Onabanjo University Law revealed that the word “may” is used in a mandatory rather than discretionary sense because it creates a condition precedent to doing a thing. On the issue of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act not applicable to contract of employment as argued on behalf of the Claimants/Respondents, Counsel responded that the relationship between the parties herein is regulated by statute, that is, sections 2 & 25 of the Olabisi Onabanjo University Law supra since the Claimants are academic staff of the 2nd Defendant which makes the Court of Appeal decision cited by Counsel for the Claimants/Respondents completely irrelevant. After the close of arguments, and specifically, on 23rd May, 2012, a List of Authorities dated 22nd May, 2012 was filed on behalf of the Respondents/Applicants. The List of Authorities drew the attention of the Court to the decision of the Supreme Court of Nigeria in the case of ADESOLA V. ABIDOYE & ANR (1999) 14 NWLR (Pt. 637) 28 on the construction of the word “may” as being mandatory or obligatory. A copy of this document was served on the Claimants/Respondents through their counsel. The jurisdiction of a court is the authority which a Court possess to decide matters brought before it or to take cognizance of matters presented in a formal way for its decision. Jurisdiction is the pillar or foundation upon which the entire case before a Court of law stands. Commencing an action in a Court of law presupposes that the Court has jurisdiction. But, if a Defendant shows that the court has no jurisdiction, the foundation of the case is not only shaken, it is entirely broken and the case crumbles. Jurisdiction is therefore the foundation and life wire necessary for a court to invoke its power in a matter brought before it. In Shell Development Company Nigeria Limited V. Isaiah (2001) 5 SC (pt. 11) 1, Mohammed JSC (as he then was) cited with approval, the views expressed by the learned author of Halsbury’s Laws of England and observed as follows: ‘’Jurisdiction of a Court has also been judicially defined a very fundamental and priceless ‘’Commodity’’ in the judicial process. It is the fulcrum, center-pin, or the main pillar upon which the validity of any decision of any Court stands and around which other issues rotate. It cannot be assumed or implied, it cannot also be conferred by consent or acquisance of parties’’. A statute by which a Court is established or any other statute with provisions relating to jurisdiction may impose limit on the Court’s authority and power. Likewise the nature of a case, the subject matter, parties and the area of over which the court can exercise jurisdiction that are likely to restrict the exercise of jurisdiction of a court. The principles for exercise of jurisdiction by a court of law are laid down by the Supreme court in the case of Madukolu V. Nkemdllim (1964) 1 All NLR (pt. 4) 557, per Baramian JSC, the Supreme court held that in order for a court to have jurisdiction in a matter it must be : 1. Properly constituted as regards numbers and qualifications of the members of the bench, and no member is disqualified for one reason or another: and 2. The subject matter of the case is within the jurisdiction, and there is no feature in the case which prevents the court from exercising its jurisdiction: and 3. The case comes before the court initiated by due process of law, and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction’’. In OKWONKWO v. OKWONKWO (2010) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1213) 228 at 250-251, Paras. E-A the Supreme Court reiterated the principles governing issue of jurisdiction as follows: Jurisdiction is a radical and crucial question of competence, and once there is defect in competence, it is fatal and the proceedings are a nullity, however well conducted and decided. A court is competent to exercise jurisdiction in respect of a matter before it when: (a) it is properly constituted as regards members and qualification of the members of the bench and no member is disqualified for one reason or the other; (b) the subject-matter of the case is within its jurisdiction and there is no feature in the case which prevents the court from exercising its jurisdiction; and © the case comes by due process of law upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction. The issue of jurisdiction is so fundamental that it can be raised at any time, suo motu by the court or even on appeal. See OKWONKWO v. OKWONKWO supra. Issue 1 as formulated by the Respondents/Applicants was to the effect that this Court lacks the jurisdiction to hear this matter because the Claimants/Respondents did not comply with the condition precedent to bringing this action by failing to appeal first to the Visitor to the University under section 45(2) of the Olabisi Onabanjo University Law cited earlier. For the purposes of clarity, I will quote verbatim the said provision: S. 45(1)………………………………………… (2) Without prejudice to any other reasonable and proper method of bringing matters affecting members of the University to the notice of the Visitor for any direction which he may think fit, any officer of the University mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (h) of Statute 3 or any member of the academic staff of the University who is aggrieved by a determination of the Council under subsection (1) of this section may appeal to the Visitor. (3) The Visitor shall have power to confirm, vary or quash the determination of the Council and to remit the matter to the Council with such directions as the Visitor may think fit for giving effect to the determination or appeal. There is no dispute about the fact that the Claimants never appealed to the Visitor to the University. The Claimants did not claim to have appealed to the Visitor to the University regarding the letter of 25th November, 2009 conveying the decisions of the Council terminating their appointments. The Claimants/Respondents non filing of a counter affidavit to challenge the depositions contained in the affidavit in support of the preliminary objection clearly affirmed that the Claimants/respondents never appealed to the Visitor to the University. Was this an omission or neglect or failure to take the step provided for in section 45(2) of the Law quoted above fatal to the cause of the Claimants action? If yes does this divest this Court of its jurisdiction to hear this matter? It seems to me that the effect of the omission or neglect or failure of the Claimants to comply with section 45(2) of the Olabisi Onabanjo University Law supra will depend on whether the step provided for in the said section 45(2) is mandatory or merely directory or optional. A determination of whether or not this step is mandatory will in turn depend on the construction given to the word “may” as used in the subsection. It was contended on behalf of the Defendants/Applicants that the step provided for in section 45(2) of the Olabisi Onabanjo University is mandatory and that failure to comply with the provision meant that the Claimants did not comply with a condition precedent. On the other hand, it was contended on behalf of the Claimants/Respondents that the step of appealing to the Visitor under section 45(2) is optional and not a condition precedent, the Claimants/Respondents were in order not to have appealed to the Visitor to the University before bringing this action. Is the word “may” in the subsection to be construed as imposing an obligation on a party aggrieved by the decision of the Council under section 45(1) of the Olabisi Onabanjo University Law supra to appeal to the Visitor to the University under section 45(2) of the statute? Counsel for the Defendants/Applicants cited the decision of the Supreme Court of Nigeria in the case of ADESOLA v. ABIDOYE & ANR supra where the Court interpreted the word “may” used in section in 22(5) of the Chiefs Law of Oyo State, 1978. For the avoidance of doubt, it is incumbent on me to reproduce the wording of the subsection under reference thus: Section 22(1)………………………… (2)………………………… (3)………………………… (4)………………………… (5) Any person aggrieved by the decision of the prescribed authority by subsection (2), (3) and (4) of this section, may within twenty-one days from the date of the decision of the prescribed authority, make representations to the Commissioner to whom responsibility for chieftaincy affairs is assigned that the decision be set aside, and the Commissioner may, after considering the representations confirm or set aside the decision. [italics added for emphasis]. The Supreme Court of Nigeria while interpreting the word “may” as used in the subsection I have just quoted above in the case of ADESOLA v. ABIDOYE supra at p. 56 Paras D - F had this to say: Although the etymological meaning of the word “may” is permissive and facultative, and seldom can mean “must” and imperative, it assumes this last mentioned character, when there is anything in the provision that makes the duty on the person on whom the power is conferred to exercise that power. When the exercise of the power is coupled with a duty on the person to whom it is given to exercise it, then it is imperative. In the instant case, where Section 22(5) of the Chiefs Law of Oyo State, 1978 places a duty on an aggrieved persons who desires to set aside the decision of the prescribed authority to make his representation to the Commissioner for Chieftaincy Affairs within twenty-one days of the decision, the use of the expression “may” in this situation is not merely facultative, but mandatory. There is no alternative. The aggrieved has no choice of action in the remedy provided for him. Accordingly, the word “may” in section 22(5) of the Chiefs Law of Oyo State, 1978 should be construed as imperative; the exercise of the right not being optional. The Supreme Court held further that: ‘’Where a statute has prescribed a particular remedy, an aggrieved party should be left to exhaust the remedy. In the instant case, where the appellant has not resorted to the remedies statutorily available to him on the infringement of the alleged right by the prescribed authority, his action is premature and does not give rise to a cognizable cause of action. The appellant jumped the gun in instituting his action. He should first have exhausted the remedies laid down by the relevant laws before embarking on litigation’’. [see Pp. 59, paras. F-G; 60, para. F; 65-66, paras. H-A]. See also the case of OGUALAJI v. AG RIVERS STATE 91997) 6 NWLR (Pt. 508) 209 where the court held that the word “may’ is to be construed as mandatory or “shall” or “must’ where it imposes a duty on a public functionary for the benefit of a private citizen. Similarly, in IYOHO v. EFFIONG (2007) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1044) 31 where the court held that if the word “may” is used to effectuate legislative intent, it must be construed as “shall” or “must”. Applying the principles clearly enunciated by the Supreme Court of Nigeria above to the case at hand, it will be correct to say that a party [such as the Claimants herein] who is/aggrieved with the decision of the Council of the University and desires to have the decision set aside under section 45(2) of the Olabisi Onabanjo University Law supra is required to appeal to the Visitor to the University first who may vary or set aside the decision of the Council in contention. It follows therefore from the decision of the Supreme Court above, that once a party desires to challenge the decision of the Council, section 45(2) of the Olabisi Onabanjo University Law supra prescribed a mandatory procedural step that the party must comply with. Section 45(2) is in effect a statutory remedy that must be exhausted despite the fact that the provision uses the word “may” which I am convinced should be interpreted to mean “shall” or “must”. Accordingly, the word “may” in section 45(2) of the Olabisi Onabanjo University Law is construed to mean ‘shall” on the authority of ADESOLA v. ABIDOYE supra, and it imposes an obligation on the Claimants who desired to challenge the decision of the Council of the University as conveyed to the Claimants by the letter of 25th November, 2009 to first appeal to the Visitor to the University. There is an additional requirement that the appeal to the Visitor to the University is to be made within twenty-one days of the decision of the Council (i.e the 1st Respondent/Applicant. I am not unmindful of the fact that Counsel for the Claimants/Respondents cited the case of EMOKPAE v. UNIVERSITY OF BENIN supra as authority for the interpretation of the word “may” by the Court of Appeal as not being mandatory. In that case, the Court of Appeal while resolving the dispute regarding Clause 7(b) of the Condition of Service of the 1st respondent held as follows: ‘’The word “may” is merely directory and not compulsory. It confers a discretionary power. In the instant case, clause 7(b) of Chapter 10 of exhibit “G”, the Conditions of Service, is a discretionary provision and relates only to cases of general inefficiency while Clause 7(c) is a mandatory provision which the respondents complied with. It was, therefore, not a mandatory provision to serve the appellant three warnings in writing before the one month’s notice or salary in lieu of notice of termination of appointment’’. [see Pp. 150, paras. D-E, paras. F-H]. Let me quickly make two remarks regarding the decision I have just referred to above. First, what the Court of Appeal considered in EMOKPAE v. UNIVERSITY OF BENIN supra was a provision of the Conditions of Service of the 1st respondent and not the express provision of a statute as was the case in the Supreme Court decision in ADESOLA v. ABIDOYE supra. Secondly, the provision or clause of the Condition of Service being construed was not reproduced for our benefit. What is more, this decision cannot stand in the face of the Supreme Court decision in ADESOLA v. ABIDOYE supra where the Court interpreted the word “may’ used in a similar context as the one at hand. I therefore elect to accept and be bound by the Supreme Court decision in the case of ADESOLA v. ABIDOYE supra. As I have noted earlier in the course of this ruling, the Claimants never followed the mandatory procedural step prescribed under section 45(2). What then is the effect of the failure to comply with the provision of section 45(2) of the Olabisi Onabanjo University Law? In the case of PROVISIONAL COUNCIL O.S.U. & ANR. V. MAKINDE supra p. 618 para. F, the Court of Appeal held that: The preconditions providing for the happening of an event or performance of certain act before action is taken in court or before cognizance is taken of the action have never been disallowed nor disregarded by the court and the court would readily accept such stipulations unless they are contrary to public policy. In view of the principles of law that I have considered and applied above flowing from the decisions in ADESOLA v. ABIDOYE supra, PROVISIONAL COUNCIL O.S.U. v. MAKINDE supra and AKINGBEHIN v. THOMPSON supra, I hereby resolve issue 1 as formulated in favour of the Defendants/Applicants. Accordingly, the Claimants having desired to have the decision of the Council of the University set aside but failed to comply with the provision of section 45(2) of the Olabisi Onabanjo University Law had by that reason failed to satisfy a mandatory procedural step. In the result, by instituting this action without first appealing to the Visitor to the Olabisi Onabanjo University had jumped the gun and did not exhaust statutory remedies provided by the enabling statute. I therefore hold that, having failed or neglected to comply with the provision of section 45(2) of the Olabisi Onabanjo University Law, the matter as constituted before the Court is incompetent. Once a matter is incompetently constituted before a Court of law that denies the Court of its jurisdiction to try the matter. The question that now begs for answer is what order a Court of law can make if a condition precedent to bringing an action was not met. In my own view the simple answer is not to dismiss the action as contended by the Respondents/Applicants but struck out the suit for lack of requisite jurisdiction. See MADUKOLU V. NKEMDLLIM supra. In view of what I have said above, I hold that this suit should be struck out and it is accordingly struck out for non compliance with condition precedent. Having resolved issue 1 in favour of the Respondents/Applicants and having struck out the matter, there is nothing left before the Court to be determined. Consequently, it is no longer necessary to consider issue 2 formulated on behalf of the Respondents/Applicants. To do otherwise would in my humble opinion amount to a mere academic exercise. This is because issue of jurisdiction is very vital and important in the realm of the administration of justice. It is the bedrock of all trials. It is such a radical concept that when a court of law does not possess, it cannot exercise any judicial powers whatsoever. Thus, a trial without jurisdiction however well conducted, is a nullity. This is in line with well established principle of law that once a court comes to the conclusion that it lacks jurisdiction to hear a matter before it, it must resist any invitation to proceed with the matter. Any pronouncement by a court without jurisdiction is an exercise in futility. In Utih V. Onoyivwe (1991) 1 NWLR (pt. 166) @ 206, Mohammed Bello CJN, (as he then was) of blessed memory, made the following observation: ‘’Moreover, jurisdiction is blood that gives life to the survival of an action in a Court of law, and without jurisdiction the action will be like an animal that has been drained of its blood. It will cease to have life and any attempt to resuscitate it without infusing of blood into it would be an abortive exercise. Since it had been held that the Courts, including the Court of Appeal, have no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, and it was right in so holding, hearing the submission of Counsel on the cross-appeal by that court would not only be an abortive and unfruitful academic exercise but it would also have unnecessarily wasted the valuable time of the Court’’. The wise counsel of the Supreme Court of Nigeria in the case of ADESOLA v. ABIDOYE supra is apposite here. The Court in that case held and I totally agree that if a court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine a matter before it, any step taken in relation to the matter is a nullity and void. I need not say more. Hon. Justice B. A. Adejumo, OFR President National Industrial Court of Nigeria