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RULING The claimant took up a complaint dated 6th January 2012 against the defendants praying for – 1. A declaratory order that the drivers which the claimant posted to Chevron Nigeria Limited are employees of the claimant and contract staff to Chevron Nigeria Limited by virtue of a Contractor Services Contract dated 28th December 2009, thereby making the contract staff subject to the internal working policies of the claimant. 2. A court declaration that the claimant being an Employer/Service Provider reserves the right to post, transfer and or second any member of its staff to or from any of its contracting clients, including Chevron Nigeria Limited, according to the internal working policies of the claimant. 3. An order of perpetual injunction restraining the 2nd defendant from foisting membership recognition of the 1st defendant on the claimant’s staff attached to Chevron Nigeria Limited without considering or to the detriment of the operational working exigencies and continuity of the claimant. 4. An order of perpetual injunction restraining the 1st defendant, its branches and or members working with, or attached as contract staff with Chevron Nigeria Limited from embarking on industrial action, picketing or strike action within the premises of Chevron Nigeria Limited or any of its facilities in Lagos or anywhere within Nigerian territory. 5. An order of perpetual injunction restraining the “defendant”, its national, zonal or local executives, agents, servants or members from mobilizing support in whatever manner in order to embark on industrial action, picketing or strike action in the premises of Chevron Nigeria Limited or any of its facilities in Lagos or anywhere within Nigerian territory. The 1st defendant in reaction entered appearance and then filed a motion on notice dated 14th February 2012 pursuant to Order 11 Rules 1, 2 and 3 of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007 and under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court praying essentially for – An order of this Court dismissing this action upon the grounds set out in the Schedule to this…Motion and upon the facts deposed to in the accompanying affidavit. The grounds upon which the motion is brought are that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this action in that – 1. The conditions precedent to the commencement of this action has not been satisfied. 2. The claimant lacks the requisite locus standi to commence and maintain this action. 3. The claimant's action does not disclose a reasonable cause of action. 4. The claimant's action is a gross and flagrant abuse of the process of this Court in that there is pending before this Court Suit No. NIC/LA/37/2010 between Chevron Nigeria Limited v. National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) & Logistics and Facilities Affairs Limited (LFA), where the claimant therein claiming similar reliefs in that action as the claimant herein now claim in this action before this Court. The 1st defendant then indicated that at the hearing of this application, it rely on all the documents filed alongside the Statement of Facts and/or documents to be relied upon by the claimant at the hearing and also all the documents filed alongside the 1st defendant's Statement of Defence and/or documents to be relied upon by the 1st defendant at the hearing. In support of the motion on notice is a 21 (but listed as 20)-paragraphed affidavit (there two paragraphs 5 in the affidavit) deposed to by Isaac Aberare, the Deputy General Secretary (Operations) to the 1st defendant/applicant. The relevant paragraphs in the affidavit are – 5. Claimant is a company duly registered under the Companies and Allied Matters Act with her Registered Office at No. 35A Adetokunbo Ademola Street, Victoria Island, Lagos and is one of the conduit by which Chevron Nigeria Limited carries out a series of unfair labour practices including but not limited to her nebulous “outsourcing”. Chevron Nigeria Limited is a limited liability company duly registered under the Companies and Allied Matters Act with her Registered Office at No. 2 Chevron Drive, Lekki Lagos and carries out the business of oil and petroleum exploration with operational bases all over Nigeria. 6. 1st defendant is a registered trade union whose jurisdictional scope and constitution welcome and entertain members who inter alia work for and in oil, gas and petroleum exploration companies. 7. In a bid to downscale, avoid and deny her responsibilities towards her workers, Chevron Nigeria Limited devised a means whereby she employs workers, then seconds them to other companies such as the claimant company who pay the said workers on the instructions of Chevron Nigeria Limited. These workers not only work inside the premises of Chevron Nigeria Limited, they actually work for Chevron Nigeria Limited. 8. Though Chevron Nigeria Limited avers that these set of workers generally and as in the case at hand are not her workers, it is Chevron Nigeria Limited that actually interviews, employs, trains, deploys and pays these workers. It is only at the point of payment of salaries and emoluments that the “outsourced companies” like the claimant comes in. The claimant only pays the workers, it is Chevron Nigeria Limited that determines what is to be paid to what worker of the claimant and like “outsourced companies”. It is also Chevron Nigeria Limited who can discipline the workers she avers belong to the claimant and like “outsourced companies”. 9. 1st defendant members who are her members in virtue of their membership of NUPENG DELOG BRANCH, NUPENG T. A. AMUSSAH & SONS LIMITED BRANCH, NUPENG J2 CONSTRUCTION & GENERAL SERVICES BRANCH, NUPENG TOBINSCO NIGERIA LIMITED BRANCH, NUPENG ASTRAL CONTRACTING LIMITED BRANCH, NUPENG GLADWYN INVESTMENTS LIMITED BRANCH amongst other NUPENG Branches in Chevron Nigeria Limited act as “back to back” with workers of the claimant and act in exchange of duties with them. 10. Workers of the claimant in early 2010 applied to join and were accepted to become members of the 1st defendant union and after an election for the said nascent branch was held, claimant was duly informed and an introductory meeting called for. 11. Rather than accede to the said introductory meeting, the claimant under the control and guidance of Chevron Nigeria Limited not only declined to take part in any such meeting but proceeded to purport to terminate the several employments of the union leaders in her company upon the instigation of Chevron Nigeria Limited. 12. This denial of a right to freely join a union of their choice for the protection of their interests led the workers of the claimant working in Chevron Nigeria Limited’s premises to down tools at the locations where they work and render services; and gradually the other branches of the 1st defendant working for and in Chevron Nigeria Limited’s premises in sympathy also downed tools at the locations where they work and render services. 13. It was essentially a strike action and not a picket. The action was devoid of any unwarranted behavior(s) as the workers only carried placards and sang solidarity songs. 14. I know and verily believe that known to the claimant herein who is the 2nd defendant therein, there is pending before this Court Suit No. NIC/LA/37/2010 between Chevron Nigeria Limited v. National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) & anor where – a) The claimant therein is claiming similar reliefs as the claimant herein who is the 2nd defendant therein. b) The 2nd defendant therein is not opposed to any of the reliefs claimed by the claimant therein. c) The Statement of Facts of the claimant herein is strikingly similar to the Statement of Defence of the 2nd defendant therein. d) There is an interim order therein granted ex parte restraining the 1st defendant from picketing on the premises of Chevron Nigeria Limited pending the hearing of the motion on notice. e) The motion on notice restraining the 1st defendant from picketing on the premises of Chevron Nigeria Limited was granted without argument of same or opposition from the 1st defendant who indicated a willingness to abide by the said order. 15. I know and verily believe that in consequence of the policy statement from the 2nd defendant, the claimant has since recognized the 1st defendant and a communiqué duly signed by both parties after an introductory meeting between the 1st defendant, the 1st defendant LFA Branch Executives and the claimant. The 1st defendant is not foisting membership recognition on the claimant’s employees who freely and voluntarily applied to join her union. 16. There does not exist any trade dispute between the claimant and the 1st defendant on recognition as the claimant has complied with the October 4, 2011 policy statement of the 2nd defendant. The 1st defendant is in full obedience of the existing orders made in Suit No. NIC/LA/37/2010 and there is no threat whatsoever to “picket and or embark on strike action and paralyze the day to day economic activities of Chevron Nigeria Limited”. 17. I know and verily believe that the processes contained in part I of the Trade Disputes Act have not been satisfied and exhausted before the claimant filed this action in this Court. 18. I know and verily believe that the claimant lacks the requisite locus standi to commence and maintain this action. 19. I know and verily believe that the claimant’s action does not disclose any reasonable cause of action against the 1st defendant. 20. Now shown to me and marked respectively as a) Exhibit “mee1” is a certified true copy of the General Form of Complaint in Suit No. NIC/LA/37/2010 above referred to. b) Exhibit “mee2” is a certified true copy of the Enrolled Order of Interim Injunction in Suit No. NIC/LA/37/20 10 above referred to. c) Exhibit “mee3” is a certified true copy of the 2nd defendant’s Statement of Defence and documents thereto attached in Suit No. NIC/LA/37/2010 above referred to. The claimant in reaction to the 1st defendant’s objection filed a 17-paragraphed counter-affidavit on 27th February 2012 deposed to by Odunayo Salako, a Litigation Officer in the chambers of the claimant’s counsel. The relevant paragraphs of the counter-affidavit are – 3. The claimant denies every paragraph therein except paragraphs 2, 4 and 6. 4. That the c1aimant engages in providing companies with vehicle leasing and other related support services on a call out basis. 5. Furtherance to paragraph 4 above, the claimant recruits professional drivers for its contracting clients, some are posted with attached vehicles to such clients, while some drive contracting clients’ vehicles, among such clients are Elephant Group Ltd, Metro Guards Ltd, Ratos Autos Nig Limited and Chevron Nigeria Ltd. 6. That the claimant, in accordance to its operational working policy reserves the right and discretion to transfer its drivers from one company to another as and when due. 7. That the Claimant embarked on a mass transfer of its drivers in 2010 among the contracting clients, all its drivers complied except those in Chevron Nigeria Ltd, rather than complying like other drivers they embarked on industrial action and went on strike. 8. That the said strike eventually resulted into the policy statement declaration by the 2nd defendant, which is now one of issues in the present case and a subject of litigation. 9. That in as much as the claimant's employees have the right to exercise their freedom to associate, it must be in consciousness of the operational policy of their employer, while ensuring that their mission to Chevron or wherever they are posted is not defeated. 10. The fact that both the claimant and the 1st defendant are already involved in Suit No. NIC/LA/31/2010 does not necessarily mean they cannot still have related fact in the new matter, though with different issues. 11. The claimant avers that the parties in the earlier suit are not clinically the same as the parties herein. 12. That the main issue in the earlier matter is that members of 1st defendant who are employees of the claimant cannot strike or demonstrate in the premises of Chevron as they don't have direct relationship with Chevron, they can only show their grievances (if any) to their employer, the claimant (and at its office) who has contract with Chevron Nig. Ltd, and not at the premises of Chevron Nig Ltd. 13. That the present matter is basically hinged on 2 critical issues: (a) the ambiguity of the minister's policy statement, which is silent on the undeniable right an employer has over its employees. (b) that the right of claimant's employees to freely join any association ceases from the point it becomes an infringement on the right of their employer, particularly when it becomes detrimental or a snare to the operational policy and continuity of the claimant who employed them. 14. That the matter in Suit No. NIC/LA/37/2010 and the present one are clearly distinguished, though may have related facts, due to involvement of claimant and 1st defendant in an earlier suit, but are neither same parties nor same issues. 15. That there have been continuous threat by the 1st defendant to embark on strike action and paralyse the economic activities of Chevron Nig Ltd, if recognition is not giving to the ambiguous policy statement of the Honourable Minister which does not serve the best interest of justice but now a subject of litigation. 16. That the 1st defendant motion is not only uncalled for, but frivolous, laden with prejudice and will not in any way serve the best interest of justice and as such should be struck out with substantial cost. In its written address, the 1st defendant framed 4 issues for the determination of the Court, namely – 1. Whether this Court has original jurisdiction to entertain this matter in that same is a trade dispute and that the conditions precedent to the invocation of its jurisdiction has not been satisfied. 2. Assuming but by no means conceding that issue 1 is resolved in the affirmative, whether this Court has an original jurisdiction to entertain this matter for want of locus standi of the claimant to commence and maintain this action. 3. Again, assuming but by no means conceding that issue 2 is resolved in the affirmative, whether the claimant’s action has disclosed a reasonable cause of action against the defendants. 4. Finally, even if this Court finds in the claimant's favour on the issues above, whether the action is not liable to be struck out for it being an abuse of the processes of Court. Regarding issue 1 i.e. whether this Court has original jurisdiction to entertain this matter given that same is a trade dispute and that the conditions precedent to the invocation of its jurisdiction has not been satisfied, counsel to the 1st defendant contended that it is now trite that in the determination of the subject matter of a suit and the jurisdiction of Court to entertain same, it is the writ of summons and statement of claim (in this case the complaint and statement of facts) that the Court should have regard to. That a collegiate scrutiny of the complaint and statement of facts would reveal that the subject matter of this suit and hence the bone of contention is the membership of the 1st defendant union by workers of the claimant company. It is further submitted that it is only the complaint and statement of facts and not any subsequent depositions of the parties that the Court can and must only have recourse to, referring to the cases of Federal Ministry of Commerce and Tourism v. Chief Benedict Eze [2006] All FWLR (Pt. 323) 1704 at 1723 paras E – F and Ineabedion v. Selo-Ojemen [2004] All FWLR (Pt. 221) 1445 at 1458 paras F – G where it was held that it is the claim of the plaintiff that determines the jurisdiction of the Court. Counsel contended further that the subject matter of this action is outside the jurisdiction of this Court. In Federal Ministry of Commerce and Tourism v. Chief Benedict Eze (supra) at 1723 – 1724 paras F – A, a court was said to have the requisite jurisdiction and competence to hear and determine a matter before it in the following instances: a) if it is properly constituted with respect to number and qualification of its membership; b) the subject matter of the action is within its jurisdiction; c) the action is initiated by due process of law; and d) any condition precedent to the exercise of its jurisdiction has been fulfilled. To counsel, the issues the claimant brought before the Court classically do revolve around what has been described as a trade dispute and/or an industrial relations dispute. That in Road Transport Employers Association of Nigeria & anor v. National Union of Road Transport Workers & 5 ors [2005] All FWLR (Pt. 254) 920 at 930 paras G – H trade dispute is defined as meaning any dispute between employers and workers or between workers and workers which is connected with the employment or non-employment and physical condition of work of any person. The same interpretation was given by the Court of Appeal in Attorney General of Oyo State v. Nigeria Labour Congress, Oyo State Chapter & 4 ors [2003] 8 NWLR (Pt. 821) 1 at 23 paras B – D. That by virtue of section 47 of the Trade Disputes Act Cap. 432 LFN 1990 (as amended) now section 48 of the Trade Disputes Act Cap. T8 LFN 2004, a trade dispute is any dispute between employers and workers or between workers and workers which is connected with the employment or non¬-employment and physical conditions of work of any person. In Attorney General of Oyo State v. Nigeria Labour Congress, Oyo State Chapter & 4 ors (supra) at 28 paras D – H, the Court further held that for a dispute to be declared a trade dispute within the meaning of section 47 of the Trade Disputes Act Cap. 432 LFN 1990 (as amended) now section 48 of the Trade Disputes Act Cap. T8 LFN 2004 the following ingredients must be present – a) there must be a dispute; b) the dispute must involve a trade; c) the dispute must be between i) employers and workers; ii) workers and workers; d) the dispute must be connected with i) the employment or non-employment; ii) the terms of employment; iii) the physical conditions of work of any person. Counsel continued that in Attorney General of Oyo State v. Nigeria Labour Congress, Oyo State Chapter & 4 ors (supra), the Court of Appeal in interpreting section 47 of the Trade Disputes Act 1990 (as amended), now section 48 of the Trade Disputes Act 2004, made it absolutely clear that all the conditions therein must be present for a trade dispute to arise. To counsel, this position is further strengthened by the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of National Union of Electricity Employees & anor v. Bureau of Public Enterprises [2010] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1194) 538 at 564 – 565 paras C – G and 565 – 566 paras H – H. That in the instant case, “though there is a dispute, the dispute does involve a trade abd it is a dispute connected with the employment or non-employment of any person; the terms of employment of the workers involved; the physical conditions of the said workers; and the workers are the employees of the claimant”. In the above circumstance, counsel urged the Court “to decline jurisdiction as it is clearly devoid of an original jurisdiction to entertain this suit in that this dispute have passed the test of a trade dispute according to law must mandatorily satisfy certain conditions precedent before it can be heard by this Court”. Counsel further contended that the original jurisdiction of this Court cannot be invoked unless under the special circumstances provided in Part I of the Trade Disputes Act (supra). In support of this position, counsel urged the Court to consider the extant and unambiguous provisions of sections 4(1) and (2), 5(1) and (2), 6(1), 7(1) and (2), 9 (1) and (2), 17(a) and (b) and 21(1) and (2) of the Trade Disputes Act which incidentally are saved by a community reading of the provisions of sections 7(1), (3) and 53(2) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006. To counsel, the provisions of the sections of the Trade Disputes Act listed above make it abundantly clear that the original jurisdiction of this Court can only be exercisable under the following circumstances in trade disputes as an appellate or referral jurisdiction and not original. In other words, the processes of Part I of the Trade Disputes Act must be exhausted and satisfied before the intervention of this Court can be sought. Again, that only parties to a collective agreement (where such exists) or the Minister of Labour and Productivity (under special circumstances) may approach this Court, whether in its original or appellate jurisdiction. That in the instant case, there is neither a collective agreement nor a Ministerial referral. Even so, it is only in the special and exceptional circumstances enumerated in section 17 of the Trade Disputes Act that the Minister (only) is entitled to make a direct reference to the National Industrial Court, without recourse to the provisions of section 7 of the Trade Disputes Act. Further, that the claimant has not shown anywhere that it has exhausted all the processes to be taken towards an amicable resolution or where all attempts at an amicable resolution fail; neither has it been able to establish that its action comes within the exceptions anticipated by law. This of course can even only be possible if it is the Minister of Labour that referred the matter for adjudication under the circumstances provided under section 17 of the Trade Disputes Act. That this is not the situation in this case. Counsel continued that it must be borne in mind that this Court in like trade disputes have placed reliance on section 7(2) and (3) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 in a line of cases held that Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act must be exhausted before this Court can assume her jurisdiction, referring to PMAN & 10 ors v. Lasode & 4 ors [1978 – 2006] DJNIC 530 at 531 paras 1 and 2 where this Court held that – The jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court in inter and intra union dispute is appellate not original. The provision of section 1A of the Trade Disputes Act, as inserted by Decree No. 47 of 1992 bars commencement of an action relating to a trade dispute, inter or intra-union dispute in any court of law and the National Industrial Court is also a court of law...Consequently, the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court in case of inter and intra-union disputes is appellate and not original. Furthermore, that the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court is in virtue of section 7 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 in subsection (1) states that – The court shall have and exercise exclusive jurisdiction in civil causes and matters (a) relating to – (i) labour, including trade unions and industrial relations, and (ii) environment and conditions of work. health, safety and welfare of labour and matters incidental thereto. And in subsection (3) states that – Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act or any other enactment or law, the National Assembly may by an Act prescribe that any matter under subsection (1)(a) of this section may go through the process of conciliation and arbitration before such matter Is heard by the Court. To counsel, section 7 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 thus saves and incorporates the very provisions of Part I of the Trade Disputes Act as has been severally held by this Court. That in line with section 7(2) and (3) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 this Court has in a line of cases held that Part I of the Trade Disputes Act must be exhausted before this Court can assume her jurisdiction. The said cases include – 1. Corporate Affairs Commission v. Amalgamated Union of Public Corporations, Civil Service Technical and Recreational Service Employees [2004] 1 NLLR (Pt. 1) 1. 2. Mix and Bake Flour Mills Industries Limited v. National Union of Food, Beverages and Tobacco Employees [2004] 1 NLLR (Pt. 2) 247. 3. Peter Okafor &. ors v. Anthony Uaozor & ors delivered on March 11, 2008 unreported Suit No. NIC/6/2007. 4. Association of Senior Staff of Banks Insurance and Financial Institutions v. Union Bank of Nigeria Plc & ors unreported Suit No. NIC/11/2007 delivered on January 24, 2008. 5. Association of Senior Staff of Banks Insurance and Financial Institutions v. United Bank for Africa Plc & ors unreported Suit No. NIC/12/2007 delivered on January 24, 2008. 6. Comrade Udeagalanya Anthony & Ors v. Comrade Francis IIoduba & ors unreported Suit No. NIC/36/2008: Suit No. NIC/36/2008 delivered on January 20, 2009. 7. National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers v. Oil and Industrial Services Limited Suit No. NIC/LA/20/2009 delivered on April 21, 2010. Counsel continued that flowing from the above, therefore, there was non-compliance with the mandatory conditions precedent for setting the legal process in motion and the action itself is thus incompetent thereby making the Court equally incompetent in entertaining the action as held by the Supreme Court in Ajlbola v. Sogeke [2002] FWLR (Pt. 93) 1959 at 1987 paras B – C to the effect that – Where there is non-compliance with a stipulated pre-condition for setting the legal process in motion, any suit instituted in contravention of the condition is incompetent and the court is equally incompetent to entertain the suit. Regarding issue 2 i.e. whether this Court has original jurisdiction to entertain this matter for want of locus standi of the claimant to commence and maintain this action, counsel contended that locus standi denotes the legal capacity to institute proceedings for the reliefs sought in a court, referring to the Court of Appeal cases of Attorney General, Akwa Ibom State v. Essien [2004] All FWLR (Pt. 233) 1730 at 1760 paras A – B and Ayowe v. Obasanjo [2006] All FWLR (Part 333) 1967 at 1979 para C. To counsel, whether a plaintiff in an action has locus standi is determined from the totality of all the averments in his statement of claim, in the instant action his statement of facts. That in dealing with the locus standi of a plaintiff it is only the statement of claim that the Court scrutinizes with a view to ascertaining whether the plaintiff's interest has been disclosed and how such interest has arisen in the subject matter of the action. On this, counsel referred to Attorney General, Akwa Ibom State v. Essien (supra) at 1761 paras A – B. That locus standi exists where the statement of claim discloses the plaintiff's interest which has been or are in danger of being violated or for acts of the defendant which adversely affects the interests of the plaintiff, citing Ayowe v. Obasanjo (supra) at 1980 para E. Clearly the General Form of Complaint and the claimant's statement of facts have not disclosed his interest which is being violated by the defendant and which naturally adversely affects the claimant. In ordinary civil cases, that is cases not involving an individual and the State, there are two indices of determining the existence of locus standi, namely – i) Is the issue/action “justiceable”? ii) Is there a dispute between the parties? Counsel continued that again “there is no dispute between the parties and the dispute is justiceable” referring to the cases of Ayowe v. Obasanjo (supra) at 1980 paras F – H and Christian Outreach Ministries Inc v. Cobham [2006] All FWLR (Pt. 310) 1675 at 1697 paras E – G. That the complaint reveals five reliefs claimed. The first two reliefs appear to be neither here nor there. But a deeper look at them would reveal that those two reliefs formed the bases upon which the third relief is sought. Even though the first two reliefs are merely declaratory and thus unenforceable, it is “meet” that they be taken together with the third relief which is for an injunctive order. Now the third relief talks about recognition of workers union. To counsel, there does not seem to be any locus present in an employer to worry himself or to want to determine which union his workers should or must belong to. That it is the workers themselves who have such right to complain one way or the other, urging the Court to so hold. The fourth and fifth reliefs sought which are similar in every respect places the lack of locus standi of the claimant beyond peradventure as it seeks orders that do not in any way inure to it but to a different person, not a party to this action, to wit: Chevron Nigeria Limited. This is a moving instance of weeping more than the bereaved as the claimant does not have the locus standi to on behalf of Chevron Nigeria Limited seek reliefs to the benefit of the said Chevron Nigeria Limited. Obviously, therefore, there does not exist a dispute between the parties on record from all the reliefs sought and thus the claimant lacks the locus standi to commence the instant action, referring to the cases of Ayowe v. Obasanio (supra) at 1980 paras F – H and Christian Outreach Ministries Inc v. Cobham (supra) at 1697 paras E – G. That clearly, the claimant lacks the legal capacity to institute proceedings for the reliefs sought in a court vide its complaint. Counsel urged the Court to hold that in the circumstances the claimant lacks the locus standi to commence and maintain this action and in doing so dismiss same. Furthermore, that it is obvious that the claimant thus lacks the locus standi to approach this Court directly as he lacks the requisite authority in law to refer same to this Court in defiance of the provisions of the Act as stated above. Counsel then submitted that the claimant lacks the locus standi to institute this action directly in this Court; and that where a claimant lacks the locus standi, the Court is thereby bereft of jurisdiction as there is no proper party before it. Counsel referred to the case of Madukolu v. Nkemdilim [1962] 2 SCNLR 341 and urged Court to so similarly hold. Regarding issue 3 i.e. whether the claimant’s action has disclosed a reasonable cause of action, counsel contended that a cause of action is constituted by the bundle or aggregate of facts which the law recognizes as giving the plaintiff a substantive right to make a claim for relief. These two elements must be present and specifically pleaded in the statement of claims and not in the statement of defence. The two elements that give rise to a right to sue are the wrongful act of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint and the subsequent damage, referring to the cases of Nwokedi v. Egbe [2004] All FWLR (Pt. 216) 546 at 560 paras E – F and UBN Plc v. Umeoduagu [2004] All FWLR (Pt. 221) 1552 at 1560 – 1561 paras G – F. That it is the plaintiff's originating process that must be looked at to come to a conclusion whether a claim discloses a reasonable cause of action or not as held in Nwokedi v. Egbe (supra) at 560 paras D – E. Counsel continued that as argued above under locus standi, the claimant has not pleaded the set of facts that gives it a substantive right to claim the reliefs sought in the face of the perceived wrongful act of the defendants that gave it a cause of complaint. That it is the pleadings of the claimant that reveal whether a reasonable cause of action is disclosed and not the reliefs claimed. And going through the entire gamut of the statement of facts, no paragraph therein discloses any reasonable cause of action against either of the defendants. That even the policy statement of the 2nd defendant does not found a reasonable cause of action against him. On issue 4 i.e. whether the action is not an abuse of the processes of court, counsel contended that no court ought to allow an abuse of its process and if a court comes to a conclusion that a process is an abuse, that process is liable to be dismissed, referring to African Reinsurance Corporation v. JDP Construction Nigeria Limited [2003] 1 FWLR (Pt. 153) 251 at 270 paras B – D and Christian Outreach Ministries Inc v. Cobham (supra) at 1692 paras E – H, 1693 paras D – G and 1693 – 1694 paras H – B. In African Reinsurance Corporation v. JDP Construction Nigeria Limited (supra) at 270 paras B – D an abuse was defined as – Abuse of process of court is a term generally applied to a proceeding which is wanting in bona fide and is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. Abuse of process can also mean abuse of legal procedure or improper use of legal process as in this case. An abuse of process always involves some bias, malice, some deliberateness, some desire to misuse or prevent the system. There is said to be an abuse of the process of the court when a party improperly uses the issue of the judicial process to the irritation and annoyance of his opponent, such as instituting a multiplicity of actions on the same subject matter against the same opponent on the same issues. To counsel, they have shown by their uncontroverted affidavit evidence the existence and pendency of Suit No. NIC/LA/37/2010 between Chevron Nigeria Limited v. National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) & Logistics and Facilities Affairs Limited (LFA), where the claimant therein claiming similar reliefs in that action as the claimant herein now claims in this action before this Court. That it is instructive that the 4th and 5th reliefs (and indeed all the reliefs) sought for by the claimant in this action are similar to reliefs sought for by the claimant in Suit No. NIC/LA/37/2010. That it is also instructive that the claimant is the 2nd defendant in Suit No. NIC/LA/37/20 10 and is not opposed to any of the prayers sought for by the claimant in Suit No. NIC/LA/37/2010. Counsel then urged Court to hold in the circumstance that the claimant's action is a gross and flagrant abuse of the process of this Court and, upon the authority of African Reinsurance Corporation's case, dismiss this action. Counsel concluded by asserting that in the circumstances, it is abundantly clear that the institution of this case before this Court by the claimant is clearly misconceived and premature, urging the Court to so hold and to dismiss same with costs. The 1st defendant went on to file an 8-paragraphed further affidavit in support of its motion on notice deposed to by Aike Akeju, a Litigation Assistant in the Law Firm of counsel to the 1st defendant/applicant. The essence of filing this further affidavit, going by paragraphs 6 – 8 of the said further affidavit, is to exhibit Exhibits “mee1” (a certified true copy of the General Form of Complaint in Suit No. NIC/LA/37/2010), “mee2” (a certified true copy of the Enrolled Order of Interim Injunction in Suit No. NIC /LA/37 /2010) and “mee3” (a certified true copy of the 2nd defendant's Statement of Defence and documents thereto attached in Suit No. NIC/LA/37/2010), which were not attached to the main affidavit in support even when they were so referred to. The claimant reacted by filing its written address dated and filed on 23rd March 2012. To the claimant, following the policy statement of the 2nd defendant issued in respect of the earlier trade dispute involving the claimant (the employer) and the 1st defendant (the employee), the claimant is of the view that its right of control over its employees has been infringed upon. The same policy statement compels the claimant to recognize its workers’ membership of the 1st defendant, while it remains silent on the employer's right of control over its employee. This has contributed to the employees’ misconception and defiant insistence that their employer cannot deploy them in accordance to the working exigencies of the organization. That it is for this reason that the claimant has refused to accord recognition to a policy which is a subtle subversion of employer’s right of control over its own workers thus leading to the employees’ threat to embark on strike action, for which we approached this Court as the claimant while the workers’ union and maker of the policy are made defendants. The claimant the structured its arguments along the following issues – 1. Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the matter. 2. Whether the claimant has locus standi to institute the action. 3. Whether the Minister is a proper party or not. 4. Abuse of court process. Regarding issue 1 (whether the Court has jurisdiction over the matter), the claimant contended that considering claims (a) and (b) in claimant's statement of facts, it is never in dispute, neither was it ever disputed that the drivers posted to Chevron are not employees of the claimant by virtue of the Contractor Services Contract No. SCM-2009-CW 744207. To the claimant, the right of control of an employer over its employee is an undeniable and inalienable right which cannot also be disputed. Indeed that it is asking for the obvious; thus making the two prayers not to be qualified as trade dispute. Both prayers are never objects of dispute or contention; they are unimpeachable rights and living facts. That by the authority of Francis Dola v. Cecilia John [1973] NMLR 14; [1973] 1 NMLR 68, the court further confirmed that employer/employee relationship has a distinguishing test of control; even such cannot be taken from the employer. That the Supreme Court decision in Shell Petroleum v. Nwawka [2004] 1 NLLR 401 at 420 A – B is clearer and louder that the Court cannot review employer’s decision to deploy or not to deploy its workers; it is an exercise for which the court is ill-suited. It is trite that the court cannot redraft contractual agreement between parties. The claimant continued that despite the fact that the two prayers are living facts and inalienable right of the employer which have never been in dispute and, therefore, not qualifying as a trade dispute, the declaratory reliefs are sought for the purpose of putting on permanent record and echoing same into the consciousness of the 1st defendant and as a way of dosing off the 1st defendant’s unrepentant/recurring threat of strike action despite a subsisting court order. To the claimant, section 7(1)(c)(iii) of the National Industrial Court Act gives the Court the exclusive jurisdiction to interpret the Minister’s ambiguous policy statement which has exclusively eroded the right of control of the claimant over its “employers”, submitting that from the above therefore – i) if the first 2 prayers in the c1aim are never issue of dispute, but constant truth and right and so not qualifying as trade dispute ii) if the court has jurisdiction to interpret the minister's policy statement, a memorandum of settlement of an earlier organizational dispute by virtue of section 7(1)(c)(iii) of the NIC Act, then the Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine this matter, urging the court to so hold. Regarding issue 2 (whether the claimant has locus standi to institute the action), the claimant contended that deciding whether a party has locus standi or not, calls for such party to – i) have shown sufficient interest in the action; ii) the interest of such party must be in danger of being trampled/infringed upon; and iii) there must be a possible threat of injury such party stands to suffer from such infringement. To the claimant, therefore, it, as the employer of members of the 1st defendant, cannot be said not to have or to have shown sufficient interest in this matter and cannot be said that its guaranteed right of control as employer of the employee to deploy its workers are not in danger of being infringed upon by the Minister’s policy statement it is contesting, which is silent on such right of control. That the authority of Okafor v. Asoh [1999] 3 NWLR (Pt. 593) at 35 CA is “instinctive” on this assertion. That the 1st defendant’s insistence to embark on strike action based on the Minister’s policy statement which the claimant refused to accord recognition and is presently contesting, is a threat of injury the claimant stands to suffer from the infringement/ambiguity complained of. There exists, therefore, the legal right of the claimant to invoke the judicial power of the court and hence the locus standi to institute this matter, referring to AG, Akwa Ibom State v. Essien [2004] 7 NWLR (Pt. 872) 288 CA. Regarding issue 3 (whether the Minister is a proper party or not), the claimant submitted that the Minister of Labour is a competent and proper party, being the maker of the policy statement which constitutes the present issue of contention. That the rule is that persons against whom complaints are made in an action must be made parties to the suit, referring to Mobil Oil Plc v. D.E.N.R Ltd [2004] 1 NWLR (Pt. 853) 142 CA. That the claimant’s “complaint is against the policy statement of the Minister of Labour which failed to consider/silent over the employer's right of control over its employee”. That the members of the 1st defendant once resisted that right when they refused to be transferred to other contracting clients. To the claimant then, it is that policy statement it is presently contesting and it is the claimant’s non-recognition of same that the workers are now threatening with strike action. That from which ever angle it is viewed, the Minister who made that policy statement though may not be interested in the claimant’s claim, he is certainly a proper party to the suit. To the claimant, the Supreme Court decision in the case of Adisa v. Oyinwola [2006] 6 SC (Pt. 11) 47 provides that “the plaintiff has a duty to bring to court the parties which presence are crucial to the resolution of a matter”. That the presence of the Labour Minister, the maker of the said policy statements, is crucial to the resolution of this matter. He is, therefore, a proper party. The claimant then urged the Court to so hold. Regarding issue 4 on abuse of court process, the claimant contended that concerning the 4th and 5th reliefs of the claimant, the issue of strike mentioned therein had been carried out in the earlier suit; but in the present suit, it has not been embarked upon. It is threatened to be carried out if recognition is not given to the Minister’s policy statement, which was never an issue in the earlier suit. Therefore, that the prayer herein cannot be said to be same with the prayer therein. Furthermore, that abuse of court process is defined as multiplicity of action – i. with same party; ii. with same rights; iii. with same opponent; iv. with same issue; or v. instituting different actions between same parties simultaneously in different courts. The claimant then referred the Court to Opekun v. Sadiq [2003] 5 NWLR (Pt. 841) 475 CA and ANPP v. Harona [2003] 5 NWLR (Pt. 841) 546 CA. The claimant continued that from the facts of this case, the parties are not the same in the following manner – i) Chevron, which is a party and the claimant in the earlier suit, is not a party herein. ii) The Minister of Labour, who is a defendant herein, is not a party in the earlier suit. iii) The claimant herein was a defendant in the other case. To the claimant, in fact the two cases as presently constituted are so different in terms of parties that they cannot be consolidated, questioning what title will be given to it. That “even the issues are different, the major issue herein or the cause of other allied issues is the Minister's policy statement which was not in existence as at the commencement of the earlier suit and which is never an issue therein”. The claimant continued that the Supreme Court decision in Plateau State v. A.G. Federation [2003] 3 NWLR (Pt. 967) 346 provides that the institution of two suits will not amount to an abuse of court process where the parties in the suits are different, the reliefs sought or issued raised are not the same. The claimant then submitted that the institution of this matter is not an abuse of court process and so urged the court to so hold. In conclusion, the claimant submitted that considering the facts and position of law highlighted above, this Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine this suit; the claimant herein has locus standi to institute the suit; the Labour Minister is a proper party; there is a reasonable cause of action; and there is no abuse of court process herein, urging the Court to so hold. The 1st defendant did not reply on points of law. Counsel to the 2nd defendant did not file any written reaction but aligned himself with processes and submissions of the 1st defendant. He then urged the Court to dismiss the action. I have considered the processes and submissions of the parties including the originating processes in Chevron Nigeria Limited v. National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) and Logistics and Facilities Affairs (LFA) Limited Suit No. NIC/LA/37/2010. Three issues are discernible for the determination of this Court. The first is whether there is similarity of parties and issues in the instant case and that of Suit No. NIC/LA/37/2010 to warrant the instant case being an abuse of court process. The second is whether, assuming the instant case is not an abuse of court process, this Court has original jurisdiction over the matter. The third issue relates to the competence of the suit in terms of the locus standi of the claimant over the issues articulated, the propriety or otherwise of the 2nd defendant being sued even when there is no relief or claim sought against him. In considering the merit of the arguments in this matter, I must remark on a point or two. In the first place, I must express my disappointment at the errors in grammar and syntax exhibited in the written addresses of both counsel. This Court has over time urged all counsel to take care when writing and appropriately proofread their written materials so as not to turn the Court to a proofreader. It is not in doubt that grammar and syntax, both in oral and written expressions, are hallmarks of good advocacy. Counsel may do well to take note of this. In the second place, I must state that paragraphs 5 and 8 of the 1st defendant’s affidavit in support and paragraphs 10, 12, the latter part of 15 and 16 of the claimant’s counter-affidavit all offend section 115(2) of the Evidence Act 2011 and so would be discountenanced for purposes of this ruling. Thirdly, I do not know what the reference by counsel to the 1st defendant to section 21 of the Trade Disputes Act seeks to serve given that it is a repealed section. Indeed, throughout the submission of counsel to the 1st defendant, this Court was not shown the purpose for which reference was made to the said repealed section. In fact, I do not know whether counsel to the 1st defendant even knows that that section is repealed. Fourthly, the counsel to the claimant had argued that “if [this] Court has jurisdiction to interpret the Minister's policy statement, a memorandum of settlement of an earlier organizational dispute by virtue of section 7(1)(c)(iii) of the [NIC] Act, then the Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine this matter”. By this argument, the counsel to the claimant effectively equated a ministerial policy statement to a memorandum for the settlement of a trade or labour dispute. The myth in this proposition of counsel must be denounced for the fallacy that it represents and seeks to project. A ministerial policy statement remains what it is, a policy statement. It does not amount to a memorandum for the settlement of a trade or labour dispute under section 7(1)(c)(iii) of the NIC Act 2006 given that the law envisages that the disputants, for purposes of the memorandum, are the appropriate authors of it to warrant the interpretation jurisdiction of this Court to be activated, contrary to the submission of the counsel to the claimant in that regard. I now turn to the issues framed by the Court. Regarding the first issue i.e. whether there is similarity of parties and issues in the instant case and that of Suit No. NIC/LA/37/2010 to warrant the instant case being an abuse of court process, it is necessary to consider the originating claims in Suit No. NIC/LA/37/2010. In terms of parties to the suit, the key parties in the instant case LFA Ltd, the claimant, and NUPENG, the 1st defendant, are the two defendants in Suit No. NIC/LA/37/2010. As I will explain shortly, it appears strategic (in order to sidetrack the charge of abuse of court process) that the Minister of Labour was brought in and Chevron Nig. Ltd was left out in the instant case, while NUPENG and LFA Ltd were couched as such in both suits. Meanwhile, the claims of the claimant in Suit No. NIC/LA/37/2010 are as follows – 1. A declaration that the 1st defendant and its branches…have no right to embark on picketing or demonstrations inside or within the precincts of the claimant’s properties, premises or locations in furtherance of the dispute between the 1st defendant, its aforesaid branches and the 2nd defendant. 2. A declaration that the disruption of the claimant’s business operations by picketing and demonstrations embarked upon by the 1st defendant and/or its branches…inside and within the precincts of the claimant’s premises, properties and locations in furtherance of the dispute between the 1st defendant, its aforesaid branches and the 2nd defendant is unwarranted and illegal. 3. A declaration that the disruption of the claimant’s operations by picketing and demonstrations embarked upon by the 1st defendant and.\/or its branches…inside and within the claimant’s premises, properties and locations and in furtherance of the dispute between the 1st defendant, its aforesaid branches and the 2nd defendant is a violation of the claimant’s constitutional right to its properties, premises and locations. 4. An order of perpetual injunction restraining the 1st defendant and its branches…from any further form of picketing or demonstration within and inside the claimant’s properties, locations and premises either in furtherance of the dispute between the 1st defendant, its aforesaid branches and the 2nd defendant or at all. From these claims, and going by paragraphs 3 – 9 and 11 – 13 of the statement of facts in Suit No. NIC/LA/37/2010, the points that come out clear are: that there is a trade dispute between NUPENG and LFA Ltd (the 1st and 2nd defendants in that suit respectively); it is the trade dispute between the two defendants that gave rise or at least contributed to the declaratory and injunctive claims of Chevron Nigeria Ltd, the claimant, against the industrial action of NUPENG; Chevron does not seem to have any claim against LFA Ltd in that suit yielding to the conclusion that LFA Ltd was merely made the 2nd defendant for strategic reasons, same strategic reasons that founded the filing of the instant case). The Court needed to only to compare the originating claims/processes in both suits to come to this conclusion. At the risk of repetition, the originating claims of the claimant in the instant case are for – 1. A declaratory order that the drivers which the claimant posted to Chevron Nigeria Limited are employees of the claimant and contract staff to Chevron Nigeria Limited by virtue of a Contractor Services Contract dated 28th December 2009, thereby making the contract staff subject to the internal working policies of the claimant. 2. A court declaration that the claimant being an Employer/Service Provider reserves the right to post, transfer and or second any member of its staff to or from any of its contracting clients, including Chevron Nigeria Limited, according to the internal working policies of the claimant. 3. An order of perpetual injunction restraining the 2nd defendant from foisting membership recognition of the 1st defendant on the claimant’s staff attached to Chevron Nigeria Limited without considering or to the detriment of the operational working exigencies and continuity of the claimant. 4. An order of perpetual injunction restraining the 1st defendant, its branches and or members working with, or attached as contract staff with Chevron Nigeria Limited from embarking on industrial action, picketing or strike action within the premises of Chevron Nigeria Limited or any of its facilities in Lagos or anywhere within Nigerian territory. 5. An order of perpetual injunction restraining the “defendant”, its national, zonal or local executives, agents, servants or members from mobilizing support in whatever manner in order to embark on industrial action, picketing or strike action in the premises of Chevron Nigeria Limited or any of its facilities in Lagos or anywhere within Nigerian territory. Having, therefore, compared the originating processes of both actions, I hold that the issues in dispute are similar and were couched separately for strategic reasons best known to the claimant. I, therefore, hold that the instant case is an abuse of court process. The second issue is whether, assuming the instant case is not an abuse of court process, this Court has original jurisdiction over the matter. I agree with the submission of the 1st defendant that a dispute which qualifies as a trade dispute falls within the appellate, nor original, jurisdiction of this Court. Reliefs 1 – 3 claimed by the claimant are matters that qualify as trade dispute. Relief 1 deals with the question whether the employees in question are employees of Chevron Nig. Ltd or those of LFA Ltd. In PENGASSAN v. Mobil Producing Nig. Unlimited unreported Suit No. NIC/LA/47/2010 the judgment of which was delivered on March 21, 2012, a similar issue was entered by this Court but only in its appellate jurisdiction, the matter having been first entertained and determined by the Industrial Arbitration Panel (IAP). Relief 2 deals with the right of an employer to post, transfer and/or second any member of its staff to or from any of its contracting clients. This relief bears relationship with the issue in relief 1. And relief 3 deals with recognition. Recognition disputes have held by this Court to be trade dispute suited for the dispute resolution processes of Part I of the Trade Disputes Act. See the cases cited by the 1st defendant at paragraph 3.1.7 of its written address and listed earlier in this judgment. Moreover, as argued by counsel to the 1st defendant, there does not seem to be any locus present in an employer to worry himself or to want to determine which union his workers should or must belong to. It is the workers themselves who have such right to complain one way or the other, urging the Court to so hold. As held by this Court, an employer has no right or interest in asking an employee to either join a particular union or not to join a union. In other words, an employer has no right whatsoever to interfere in union matters. See the cases of Nestoil Ltd v. NUPENG unreported Suit No. NIC/LA/08/2010 the judgment of which was delivered on March 8, 2012, NASU v. Vice Chancellor, University of Agriculture, Abeokuta unreported Suit No. NIC/LA/15/2011 the judgment of which was delivered on February 21, 2012 and Panya Anigboro v. Sea Trucks Nigeria Ltd [1995] 6 NWLR (Pt. 299) 35. Reliefs 4 and 5 deal with the issue of industrial action and so come squarely within the purview of the original jurisdiction of this Court going by section 7(1)(b) of the NIC Act 2006 and section 254C(1)(c) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended. However, having held earlier that the issues in the instant case with those in Suit No. NIC/LA/37/2010 are similar, it means that the issue in reliefs 4 and 5 are so caught up as an abuse of court process; and I so hold. The last issue is the competence of the suit in terms of the locus standi of the claimant over the issues articulated and the propriety or otherwise of the 2nd defendant being sued even when there is no relief or claim sought against him. Here I must reiterate that as an employer has no right or interest in determining the union an employee should belong to, it means that the claimant in the instant case has no locus standi in that regard. Having to sue the Minister of Labour to determine that question is, therefore, inappropriate. I have already indicated that to even couch this issue in the context of interpretation of a ministerial policy statement is wrong of the claimant. The same is true of praying for an order of perpetual injunction restraining the 2nd defendant from foisting membership recognition of the 1st defendant on the claimant’s staff attached to Chevron Nigeria Limited. For all the reasons adduced, I uphold the objection of the defendants. This instant case is an abuse of court process; it is incompetent and so is hereby dismissed. Cost is put at Fifty Thousand Naira (N50,000) only. Ruling is entered accordingly. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip