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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA IN THE LAGOS JUDICIAL DIVISION HOLDEN AT LAGOS BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE B. B. KANYIP DATE: MAY 24, 2012 SUIT NO. NICN/LA/158/2012 BETWEEN 1. Dr O. Odusote 2. Dr I. O. Durojaiye (Suing for themselves and behalf of the MEDICAL GUILD) - Claimants AND 1. Lagos State Government 2. Commissioner for Health, Lagos State 3. Lagos State Health service Commission 4. Lagos State University Teaching Hospital - Defendants REPRESENTATION Bamidele Aturu, and with him are Chukwuyem Atewe and Ode Abah, for the claimants. Ade Ipaye, Attorney General of Lagos State, and with him are Mr. Kola Awodein, SAN, Mrs. Kemi Olugbode, Deputy Director in the Lagos State Ministry of Justice, Mr. B. A. Olowojaye, Principal State Counsel in the Lagos State Ministry of Justice, Mr. Lanre Ajinsola and Miss Feyi Oladeji, for all the defendants. RULING The claimants took up a complaint dated 23rd April 2012 but filed on 24th April 2012 against the defendants praying for – 1. A declaration that the refusal of the defendants to completely implement the Consolidated Medical Salary Scale in favour of the members of the claimants’ association (the Medical Guild) constitute a violent breach of the Agreement reached between the defendants and claimants on the full implementation of Consolidated Medical Salary Scale and is, therefore, unlawful, unconstitutional, null and void and constitute unfair labour practice. 2. A declaration that the planned disciplinary action against the members of the claimants’ association (the Medical Guild) by the personnel management board of the defendants in respect of the three days warning strike embarked upon by the claimants in pursuit of the full implementation of the Consolidated Medical Salary Scale Agreement between the defendants and the claimants is wrongful, arbitrary, ultra vires the powers [of] the defendants’ Personnel Management Board, illegal, unlawful and constitute an abuse and violation of the claimants’ legal rights. 3. An order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from taking any disciplinary action against any member of the claimant for taking part in the three days warning strike organized by the claimants’ association in pursuit of the full implementation of the Consolidated Medical Salary Scale Agreement between the claimants and the defendants. Accompanying the complaint is the statement of facts, the list of witness and the list documents together with copies of the documents to be relied upon. The defendants reacted by filing their memorandum of appearance together with the statement of defence, the defendants’ list of witness and the defendants’ list of documents which the defendants stated to be those frontloaded by the claimants. In addition, the defendants filed on 21st May 2012 a preliminary objection dated 18th May 2012 and brought pursuant to Order 11 Rule 1 of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Rules 2007, section 6(6)(a) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, and under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. By the preliminary object, the defendants prayed for the following orders – 1. An order declaring that this Court has no jurisdiction and/or should not exercise any jurisdiction to entertain this suit. 2. An order striking out the suit as constituted against the defendants. 3. And for such further or other orders as this Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances. The grounds upon which the objection is brought are – 1. The suit is improperly constituted as the Medical Guild is not a person known to law. 2. The suit in its entirety does not disclose a reasonable cause of action. 3. The suit is otherwise wholly incompetent. 4. The Court in all the circumstances does not have jurisdiction to entertain this suit. In moving the said preliminary objection, the learned Attorney General (AG) of Lagos State framed two issues for determination, namely – a) Whether this Court should not decline jurisdiction and strike out this suit in limine on the ground that it was brought on behalf of the Medical Guild, an entity which has no legal capacity. b) Whether the claimants’ action discloses a reasonable cause of action thereby allowing the Court the jurisdiction to entertain it. Regarding issue a), the learned AG submitted that it cannot be sustained by the claimants because the 1st and 2nd claimants purport to sue for themselves and on behalf of the Medical Guild. That the Medical Guild is not a registered trade union; it is in fact not a person known to law. Yet, the claimants’ suit is wholly predicated on an agreement purportedly entered into between the said Medical Guild and the defendants. To the AG, the law is that the Medical Guild does not have the locus standi either to maintain this action or to enter into a contract as alleged. That the applicable law is clear that no action can be maintained by any entity except where a Statute or common law confers legal personality on that entity, referring to Ataguba & Co. v. Gura Nig. Ltd [2005] 8 NWLR (Pt. 927) 429 at 445 SC. The learned AG continued that the Medical Guild is not a legal person and is, therefore, incompetent to maintain this suit. It has no capacity in law to authorize a named person to represent it, referring to Lion of Africa Insurance v. Esan [1999] 8 NWLR (Pt. 614) 197 at 201 CA. That the claimants cannot competently maintain this suit on behalf of an entity which is non-existent in law. To the learned AG, once the Medical Guild is struck off, the claimants cannot maintain this action in their personal right. That the declarations sought in the main action rests on an alleged collective agreement. The parties are not an employers’ association nor a trade union, referring to section 2(2) of the Trade Unions Act (TUA) 2004 and Madu v. NUP [2001] 16 NWLR (Pt. 739) 346 at 362 CA. That if there was any collective agreement, which is denied, the first two claimants are strangers to it and cannot seek to enforce it in their personal capacities, citing New Nigeria Bank Plc v. Egun [2001[ 7 NWLR (Pt. 711) 1 at 19 CA. The learned AG continued that section 254C(1)(j)(i) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, can only be invoked by registered trade unions. He then referred the Court to UBN v. Chinyere [2010] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1203) 453 at 472 CA. Continuing, the learned AG submitted that, even if there was breach of a collective agreement, which is denied, the procedure for resolving the dispute is as laid down in the Trade Disputes Act and none of the legal procedures have been followed. The learned AG then urged the Court to strike out the case on this score. On issue b), the learned AG contended that an allegation that a statement of claims discloses no cause of action or no reasonable cause of action amounts to a challenge to the locus standi of the plaintiff to institute the action, referring to Bamgbade v. Balogun [1994] 1 NWLR (Pt. 232) 718 at 739D CA, which relied on Lahan v. Lajoyetan & ors [1972] SC 190. That where the plaintiff’s claim discloses no reasonable cause of action, the Court will have no jurisdiction to entertain same, referring to Adetona v. Edet [2001] 3 NWLR (Pt. 699) 186 at 190 CA, per Oguntade, JCA (as he then was). To the learned AG, the two declarations sought by the claimants are predicated upon an agreement purportedly reached between the defendants and the claimants on the full implementation of the Consolidated Medical Salary Scale (CONMESS). The learned AG then referred the Court to Ibrahim v. Osim [1988] 3 NWLR (Pt. 82) 257 at 269 SC. That for the claimants to sustain this action, it is necessary that they disclose the agreement that they rely upon. The learned AG then referred the Court to Document 1 frontloaded by the claimants, which is applicable only to the medical officers mentioned therein in the Federal Public Service. The learned AG went on to submit that the claimants are not employees of the Federal Public Service and that all the parties herein are also total strangers to the said Document 1. Referring to Document 4 frontloaded by the claimants, the learned AG submitted that nothing in that document could in any way be reasonably construed as constituting an agreement to implement CONMESS. That there is absolutely no agreement before the Court upon which to base the reliefs sought by the claimants. The learned AG concluded by submitting that it is settled law that where a party has no locus standi to institute an action, the Court will have no jurisdiction to entertain it. He then urged the Court to summarily strike out the action on the basis of the arguments proffered. The learned counsel to the claimants opposed the preliminary objection. To counsel, the objection is brought as a technical motion to defeat the ends of justice, referring to SDN v. Kyentu [1998] 2 NWLR (Pt. 539) 41 at 59 – 61 CA. Learned counsel continued by submitting that the preliminary objection is fundamentally defective in that it was signed for the AG without disclosing whether the person who signed it is duly admitted to practice law in Nigeria, referring to PMB Ltd v. NDIC [2011] 12 NWLR (Pt. 1261) 253 at 261 – 262 CA. That the signatory to the objection is not known, urging the Court to strike out the objection on that ground. Regarding the issue of the Medical Guild not being a juristic person, learned counsel submitted that this is far from being the law, referring to Fawehinmi v. NBA (No. 2) [1989] 2 NWLR (Pt. 105) 558 at 629 CA. That there is no doubt that the Medical Guild is an unincorporated association. That the Court of Appeal in Fawehinmi relying on the Taff Vale case (Taff Vale Railway Co. v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants [1901] AC 426; [1901] UKHL 1) held that unincorporated associations can only sue in a representative capacity. Learned counsel continued that by the practice and jurisprudence of this Court and in the interest of justice, this Court has always permitted non-juristic persons in this Court, referring to Oyo State Government v. Alhaji Apapa & ors [2008] 11 NLLR (Pt. 29) 228 at 243. That each case would depend on the particular circumstances. Learned counsel further submitted that where there has been a course of dealings between an unincorporated association and a party on employment issues, wage related matters, a party cannot resile from recognizing such an unincorporated body for the purposes of claims before a court of competent jurisdiction, referring to paras 7 – 22 of the statement of facts and the cases of ACB Plc v. Emostrade Ltd [1998] 2 NWLR (Pt. 536) 19 at 35 CA and Agbaisi v. Ebikorefe [1997] 4 NWLR (Pt. 502) 630 at 635 SC. Learned counsel then urged the Court to look at the record and take a decision whether the defendants can deny knowing the Medical Guild. On the issue whether this case discloses a reasonable cause of action, learned counsel referred the Court to the claimants’ claims before the Court and then submitted that the planned disciplinary action against the members of the Medical Guild constitutes a substantive labour claim for which this court has undoubted jurisdiction, referring to Ege Shipping and Trading Industries v. Tigiris International Corp. [1999] 14 NWLR (Pt. 637) 70 at 90 – 92 SC. That on the basis of this authority, the application of the defendants is not grantable and ought not to be granted, referring to Document 4 frontloaded by the claimants. That Document 4 constitutes terms of settlement between the claimants and the defendants. Learned counsel then submitted that there is a document before the Court to look at that is fitting for trial in order to reach a decision one way or the other. Learned counsel went on to submit that the claims of the claimant can be founded not just under section 254C(1)(j)(i) but also under section 254C(1)(j)(iv – v) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended. That the 1999 Constitution and the Rules of this Court have not stipulated how memorandum of settlement or terms of settlement of a trade dispute should be executed, urging the Court to hear the matter on its merits. That the Court should rely on section 254C(1)(a) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, and hold that this is a matter fit for trial. Learned counsel continued that in the unlikely event that this Court finds that the Medical Guild is a non-juristic body and that there is no course of dealing between the parties to warrant the recognition that the Medical Guild is a body that can sue before this Court, this Court should hold that the facts disclosed in paras 7 – 22 of the statement of facts relates to labour, employment and conditions of service. Learned counsel concluded by urging the Court to dismiss the preliminary objection. In his reply on points of law, the learned AG submitted that his objection is not a technicality, referring to Oloba v. Akereja [1988] 2 NSCC 120 at 129. Furthermore, that Fawehinmi, cited by the claimants, is inapplicable in this case at hand as even the NBA was not allowed to maintain the action. And for the ACB case, that it was decided within the context of pre-incorporation contracts in company law, which makes the case inapplicable in the context of this case, referring to Administrators/Executors of the Estate of Abacha v. Eke-Spiff [2009] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1139) 97 at 127 C – D SC and Rinco Construction Co. v. Veepee Industries Ltd [2005] 9 NWLR (Pt. 929) 85 at 96 SC. The learned AG then asked that the two grounds of the objection be upheld and this suit struck out for disclosing no reasonable cause of action and, therefore, not qualifying for the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court; and that the claimants have no legal capacity to maintain this action. In resolving the preliminary objection raised by the defendants, I shall adopt the two issues framed by the learned AG, to wit: whether the claimants have the capacity to sue in the manner they did; and whether there is disclosed in the instant case a reasonable cause of action that can sustain the suit. I shall, therefore, consider these issues in the order presented. Before addressing these two issues, it is necessary to start with the objection of learned counsel to the claimants that the preliminary objection of the defendants is incompetent because it was signed not by the learned AG himself, but for him by an unknown person. A look at the process will reveal this fact. Yet I must dismiss the argument for the simple reason that an objection as to jurisdiction is one that is of law and which can even be raised orally. So even if I were to strike out the objection, the learned AG can still raise same orally. I do not, therefore, think that we must make an issue out of this point here, more so when it is recognized that this court is generally enjoined to be flexible and less formal. See sections 36 and 37 of the Trade Disputes Act 2004 and section 12 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006. I now turn to the two issues framed by the learned AG. The first issue, dealing with the capacity of the claimants to sue, had quite an argument on the legal personality of the claimants to sue in the manner that they did. One argument in that regard is that having to sue on behalf of the Medical Guild is unsustainable because the Medical Guild is not a juristic person. The second argument in that regard is that even if the fact of suing for the Medical Guild is done away with, Dr Odusote and Dr Durojaiye cannot sustain the action as the action is hinged on an agreement that is not disclosed or frontloaded. In this sense, this sub-issue ties in with the second issue framed by the defendants. I shall first consider the issue of the juristic personality of the Medical Guild, and in doing that I must preface this ruling with what is generally required of a Court such as the National Industrial Court of Nigeria when faced with disputes between workers and employers. I am here guided by the instructive and incisive holding of the Supreme Court of India in NTF Mills Ltd v. The 2nd Punjab Tribunal, AIR 1957 SC 329, to the effect that – The Industrial Courts are to adjudicate on the disputes between employers and their workmen, etc. and in the course of such adjudication they must determine the ‘rights’ and ‘wrong’ of the claim made, and in so doing they are undoubtedly free to apply the principles of justice, equity and good conscience, keeping in view the further principle that their jurisdiction is invoked not for the enforcement of mere contractual rights but for preventing labour practices regarded as unfair and for restoring industrial peace on the basis of collective bargaining. The process does not cease to be judicial by reason of that elasticity or by reason of the application of the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. I just at once note that this admonition applies in equal force to both employees and employers. For instance, the requirement to “prevent labour practices regarded as unfair” applies not just in favour of employees but also can in appropriate cases inure to the benefit of employers. Of course the requirement to restore industrial peace inures to the benefit of both employers and employees. This digression aside, I now turn to the issue of the juristic personality of the Medical Guild. Here I am not unmindful of the fact that this Court during the hearing of Senior Staff Association of University Teaching Hospitals, Research Institutions and Associated Institutions (SSAUTHRIAI) and ors v. Federal Ministry of Health and anor [2008] 10 NLLR (Pt. 26) 222, had cause to stop professional associations in the health sector that were not registered as trade unions from further participation in the matter before the court; but this was within the context of that case. As learned counsel for the claimants contended, citing Oyo State Government v. Alhaji Apapa & ors (supra), this Court has always permitted non-juristic persons in this Court, but I must state only within the context of trade union branches of chapters. This point was made more succinct in Senior Staff Association of Nigerian Universities v. Federal Government of Nigeria [2008] 12 NLLR (Pt. 33) 407, where this court held as follows – …the respondent’s contention is that the appellant is not a registered trade union and so should not be recognised by this court and given a hearing. We must at once reject this contention. By item 17 of Part C of the Third Schedule to the TUA, as amended, the Senior Staff Association of Universities, Teaching Hospitals, Research Institutes and Associated Institutions is recognised as a senior staff association and hence is a trade union. The appellant in this matter is a variant of that association. Since inception, this court has recognised the right of branch/unit unions to access this court in order to have their peculiar grievances redressed without the necessity of the parent unions dragged to court. A collective agreement was duly signed between the appellant and the respondent. That agreement is not being disputed. It is late in the day for the respondent to call to question the status of the appellant when it was with the same appellant that it signed an agreement, Exhibit 1, with in 2001. The learned counsel to the claimants, however, called on this Court to stretch the rule beyond the context already done especially where the course of dealings between the parties indicated that they have accepted a particular capacity. He referred this Court to communications from the defendants to the claimants in their capacity as representatives of the Medical Guild. The answer from the learned AG is that the issue of capacity cannot be waived, it being a matter of law. For ages, the issue of capacity of bodies to sue for and on behalf of workers has engaged the courts. The first known authority that paved the way was the Taff Vale case [1901] AC 426 HL. Of note is the lead judgment of Lord MacNaughten and the concurring judgment of Lord Lindley. Their Lordships were called to decide inter alia whether, the trade respondent, a trade union, could sue and be sued in its name even when it was not an incorporated entity. I must state that it was not in doubt that the respondent was a registered trade union, but this was at a time when registered trade unions did not have the kind of legal recognition as to legal personality that incorporated companies have. The discussion of their Lordships in that regard is instructive and provides guidance for the issue at hand. To Lord MacNaughten at page 438 – …persons should be liable for concerted as well as for individual action; and for this purpose it seems to me that it cannot matter in the least whether the person acting in concert be combined together in a trade union, or collected and united under any other form of association. …I have no doubt whatever that a trade union, whether registered or unregistered, may be sued in a representative action if the persons selected as defendants be persons who, from their position, may be taken fairly to represent the body. Lord Lindley was more forceful when he said at pages 443 and 445 – I have myself no doubt whatever that if a trade union could not be sued in this case in its registered name, some of its members (namely, its executive committee) could be sued on behalf of themselves and other members of the society, and an injunction and judgment for damages could be obtained in a proper case in an action so framed. …the registered name is one which may be used to denote the union as an unincorporated society in legal proceedings as well as for business and other purposes. The use of the name in legal proceedings imposes no duties and alters no rights: it is only a more convenient mode of proceeding than that which would have to be adopted if the name could not be used. I do not say that the use of the name is compulsory, but it is at least permissive. In the recent case of The Hon. Attorney-General of Enugu State v. National Association of Government General Medical and Dental Practitioners (NAGGMDP) & Dr. J. N. Chukwuani (Chairman, NAGGMDP, Enugu State Branch), the 2nd defendant being sued for himself and as representing all the members of the NAGGMDP, Enugu State Branch and NAGGMDP Enugu Branch, unreported Suit No. NIC/EN/16/2010 delivered on June 20, 2011, although the capacity of the defendants to be sued as such was not raised, this Court accepted that fact and decided the case on merit holding in the process inter alia that: “The 1st defendant is not a trade union recognizable as such under the Trade Unions Act. Not being a trade union, the 2nd defendant cannot represent it in the capacity of a trade union”. In all of this, the general tenor of the Trade Unions Act may also be useful. For instance, bodies seeking to be registered as trade unions are permitted by section 2(1) of the Trade Unions Act to do such things as are necessary to have them registered as trade unions. While they do not thereby become trade unions, I think that they nonetheless can contest in their assumed name the fact of non-registration in court. In the instant case, therefore, I am of the opinion that the action as couched is sustainable. In any event, it must not be lost sight of that the action was filed by the two claimants for themselves and on behalf of the Medical Guild. This, of course, leads to the second sub-issue i.e. whether the two claimants in their personal capacities can sustain this action. Take away the Medical Guild and what we have are two individuals who are natural/human beings. The law is pretty clear that natural persons have capacity to sue and be sued in their names (Ataguba & Co. v. Gura Nig. Ltd, supra). Whether they will succeed in the action of course remains the question; incidentally the merit of the case is not before me at the moment. The learned AG argued that even at this, the two claimants cannot sustain this action because the claims as per the complaint make it impossible for them to sustain the case in their name. To me a consideration of that question must necessarily go into the merit of the case, a thing one cannot do now. Applying, therefore, the analogy of all the authorities so far considered, I am of the view that according the claimants recognition for purposes of this suit accords with the law and the exigency of the moment. In any event, the legal recognition is not so much as saying that thereby Medical Guild is a legal personality as understood in law, but it is meant to serve the sole purpose of affording the Court the opportunity of holding the parties answerable to their actions, legal or otherwise. In this sense, I will recognize the claimants as capable of suing for the convenience of determining, in the words of the Supreme Court of India in NTF Mills Ltd v. The 2nd Punjab Tribunal (supra), “the ‘rights’ and ‘wrong’ of the claim made” and as thrust before this Court in this matter. The second issue framed by the learned AG is that the case itself does not disclose a reasonable cause of action. The Supreme Court case of Oloruntoba-Oju v. Dopamu [2008] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1085) 1 is clear that it is the originating processes that one must look when determining the jurisdiction of a court. And in Nigerian Union of Pharmacists, Medical Technologists and Professions Allied to Medicine (NUMPTAM) v. Obafemi Awolowo University Teaching Hospital Complex Management Board (OAUTHCMB) unreported Suit No. NIC/8/2006 delivered on May 22, 2007, this Court held that the jurisdiction of the Court is subject based, which means that any legal entity that can sue and be sued can approach this court if the grievance in question falls within any of the subject matters over which the Court has jurisdiction. At the moment, the jurisdiction of this Court is governed by section 7 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 and section 254C of the 1999 Constitution, as amended. For the purposes of this ruling, I shall restrict myself to only the constitutional provisions as to jurisdiction. Section 254C, which deals with the jurisdiction of the NICN, is, therefore, the most pertinent for present purposes. Its relevant provisions are as follows – (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 251, 257, 272 and anything contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters:– (a) relating to or connected with any labour, employment, trade unions, industrial relations and matters arising from workplace, the conditions of service, including health, safety, welfare of labour, employee, worker and matter incidental thereto or connected therewith; (b) relating to, connected with or arising from Factories Act, Trade Disputes Act, Trade Unions Act, Workmen’s Compensation Act or any other Act or Law relating to labour, employment, industrial relations, workplace or any other enactment replacing the Acts or Laws; (c) relating to or connected with the grant of any order restraining any person or body from taking part in any strike, lock-out or any industrial action, or any conduct in contemplation or in furtherance of a strike, lock-out or an industrial action and matter connected therewith or related thereto; (d) relating to or connected with any dispute over the interpretation and application of the provisions of Chapter IV of the Constitution as it relates to any employment, labour, industrial relations, trade unionism, employer’s association or any other matter which the Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine; (e) relating to or connected with any dispute arising from national minimum wage for the Federation or any part thereof and matters connected therewith or arising there from; (f) relating to or connected with unfair labour practice…; (g)………….. (h)………….. (i)…………… (j) relating to the determination of question as to the interpretation and application of any: (i) collective agreement; (ii)…………. (iii)…………. (iv) terms of settlement of any trade dispute; (v) trade union dispute or employment dispute as may be recorded in a memorandum of settlement; (vi)………….. (vii)…………. (k) relating to or connected with disputes arising from payment or non-payment of salaries, wages, pensions, gratuities, allowances, benefits and any other entitlement of any employee, worker, political or public office holder, a judicial officer or any civil or public servant in any part of the Federation and matters incidental thereto; (l) relating to – (i)…………. (ii) ………… (iii)………… (m)………………….. (2)…………………………... I have chosen to reproduce in large measure the pertinent provisions of the Constitution that grant jurisdiction to this Court; and in all of the items so produced, it will be discerned that they all deal with subject matters. The question that arises, therefore, is whether the claims of the claimants fall within any or some of these subject matters. Regarding claim 1, three issues are discernible: the refusal to implement CONMESS; breach of an agreement reached; and unfair labour practice. Regarding claim 2, four issues are discernible: the planned disciplinary action; the three days warning strike action; implementation of CONMESS as per agreement; and violation of legal rights of the claimants. As for claim 3, three issues present themselves: disciplinary action against the claimants or those they represent; three days warning strike; and full implementation of CONMESS between the parties to this suit. The averments in paragraphs 7 – 11 and 14 – 23 of the statement of facts all attest to these claims. The veracity or otherwise of the facts pleaded in the statement of facts is not what is in issue here but whether they fall within the purview of the subject matters of section 254C of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, so as to give jurisdiction to this Court. I think so. A global look at the claims of the claimants reveals, therefore, that what this Court will have to decide at the trial of this case include – 1. Whether or not the claimants as a Medical Guild were right to have embarked on the strike action that claims 2 and 3 and paragraphs 20 and 21 of the statement of facts referred to. 2. Whether the claimants have an enforceable entitlement in relation to CONMESS given the contention of the defendants that the circular from the National Salaries and Wages Commission is directed at medical/dental officers employed in the Federal public Service. 3. Whether the letter from the Lagos state Head of Service to the Chairman of Medical Guild dated 19th November 2010 can be said to qualify as terms of settlement as argued by learned counsel to the claimants. I think the justice of this case requires that parties be given the opportunity to address these issues in a trial on merit and not just to shut out all enquiry in that regard at this preliminary stage of an objection as the defendants would want this Court to do. For all the reasons I gave, I hold that this Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the case at hand and that the suit is competent. The matter shall accordingly proceed to trial. I make no order as to cost. Ruling is entered accordingly. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip