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This matter was referred to this court on October 18, 2011 by the Honourable Minister of Labour and Productivity in the exercise of his powers under section 14 of the Trade Disputes Act Cap. T8 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN) 2004 with the following term of reference; To enquire into the trade dispute now existing between the Senior Staff Association of Universities Teaching Hospitals Research Institute and Associated Institutions (SSAUTHRIAI) and the Management of Rubber Research Institute of Nigeria, Iyanowo, Benin City over: The wrongful dismissal of Mr. Eugene Okoduwa. The letter forwarding the Instrument of Reference is dated 1st November 2011 with Ref. No: MLHE/971/CON/I/29. The matter was first mentioned on January 31, 2012 and adjourned to March 7, 2012 when parties adopted their written addresses since the matter is an appeal on the award of the Industrial Arbitration Panel (IAP). In brief, the facts of this case are that the appellant is a Research Institute set up by law under section 1 of the Nigerian Research Institute Act Cap. N132 LFN 2004. The appellant is situated in Iyanowo, Benin City, Edo State. The respondent is a registered trade union and its registered office is at No. 80 Oyo Road, opposite University of Ibadan Second gate, Ibadan, Oyo State. The appellant’s case is that in the course of a routine reconciliation of the nominal roll with payroll, a ghost worker (Mr. Junny Umar) was identified in the Human Resources Management Division of the appellant Institute and so its Management set up an administrative panel of inquiry into the matter. The panel was headed by Dr. Okwu (the Okwu Panel) and it identified four persons as having a case to answer including the said Mr. Eugene Okoduwa, Principal Executive Officer (Accounts). Pursuant to the recommendations, another panel called the Administrative Panel of Enquiry headed by Dr. Omokhafe (the Dr. Omokhafe Panel) was constituted to try the four persons indicted by the Dr. Okwu Panel, including Mr. Eugene Okoduwa for misconduct which include performing unauthorized duties, unauthorized use of the appellant’s letterheads, forgery of his Head of Department’s signature and impersonation. Dr. Omokhafe Panel found Mr. Eugene Okoduwa liable and recommended him for sanctions ranging from warning to denial of salary increment for one year but not dismissal, despite the overwhelming fact that there was nothing linking him to the alleged crime according to the respondent’s case. These recommendations were reviewed by a Ministerial Panel which recommended Mr. Okoduwa’s dismissal to the Minister of Agriculture in lieu of the Governing Board for the appellant, which at the material time had not been constituted as stated by the appellant. The Minister of Agriculture approved the dismissal, thus making it a ministerial act. It is against these facts that the respondent herein declared a ‘trade dispute’ and notified the Minister of Labour accordingly. The Hon. Minister of Labour referred the trade dispute to the IAP for arbitration. At the IAP, both parties filed and exchanged their written memoranda on 22nd March 2011. Both parties were given time to react to the memoranda filed and to file, exchange and adopt their written addresses. Within the period, the appellant herein filed and served an additional memorandum and then parties’ written addresses were exchanged. It was at that point that counsel to the appellant discovered to his surprise that the respondent annexed fresh documents (Annexure Z1 – Z8) to its written address. Both parties adopted their written addresses and counsel to the appellant challenged the admissibility of the fresh documents. However, the IAP relied on these disputed Annexure in making its award. While recommending its award to the Honourable Minister of Labour and Productivity, which the Minister approved, the IAP found that: Having carefully considered all the evidence before it, both written and oral submissions applicable to the laws of the land, public policy on employee and the employer, makes the following Award: 1. That Mr. Eugene Okoduwa’s dismissal is wrongful and therefore null and void. 2. Mr. Eugene Okoduwa be reinstated forthwith to his duty post. 3. Mr. Eugene Okoduwa’s arrears of salaries and allowances since his dismissal be paid to him forthwith. (See page 13 of the IAP award). It is against this award that the appellant has approached this court for relief. To the appellant, the totality of the respondent’s case is that the dismissal of Mr. Eugene Okoduwa was malicious and amounted to victimization, borne out the activities of the respondent as the secretary of the respondent’s branch union. And so, the said dismissal was not based on any real misconduct. The appellant then framed the following issues for determination: i. Whether the ‘wrongful dismissal’ of Mr. Eugene Okoduwa is a ground for declaring a ‘trade dispute’ which the Minister of Labour and Productivity can refer to the Industrial Arbitration Panel within the contemplation of the Trade Disputes Act Cap. T8 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 for which the IAP is competent to handle. ii. Whether the first party/respondent can complain against the dismissal of a member of the association, Mr. Eugene Okoduwa, when its representative actively participated in the process leading to the said dismissal. iii. Whether the allegations of malice and victimization against Mr. Eugene Okoduwa, which are particulars of motive, are relevant factors in the determination of the employment of Mr. Eugene Okoduwa. iv. Whether the appellant followed the due process in disciplining Mr. Eugene Okoduwa, and if it did whether Mr. Okoduwa’s dismissal can be declared wrongful in the light of the totality of the evidence adduced. v. Whether the procedure adopted by the Industrial Arbitration Panel (IAP) by relying on Annexure Z1 – Z8 annexed to the respondent’s address, in making its award in favour of the respondent without giving any notice or adequate notice of the said annexure to the appellant is not against the provisions of section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, and the Rules/Guidelines of the IAP, in spite of the objection to such reliance by the appellant, and as such, unconstitutional, null and void. The appellant’s counsel, arguing the first issue of whether the ‘wrongful dismissal’ of Mr. Eugene Okoduwa is a ground for declaring ‘trade dispute’ which the Minister can refer to the Industrial Arbitration Panel within the contemplation of the Trade Disputes Act Cap. T8 LFN 2004 for which the IAP is competent to handle, submitted that an employment relationship is a species of law of contract. It is one regulated by law; consequently, it is the documents that constitute the contract that must be examined and construed in the determination of the employment relationship. The examination and construction of these documents is the exclusive preserve of the courts and not that of an arbitral body, referring to Daodu v. United Bank for Africa [2004] 29 WRN 53 (CA). Learned counsel continued that a court has no jurisdiction to interpret or construe contractual documents more favourably to a party outside the terms and conditions provided in the documents. In construing whether the dismissal of Mr. Eugene Okoduwa is ‘wrongful’ or not, counsel argued that it is these documents constituting the contract of employment that the court must look at to determine whether the parties have complied with the terms. In this wise, such documents will include the terms of the offer, acceptance, conditions of service, collective agreements, and public service rules. The issue of ‘wrongful dismissal’ involves a resolution of questions of law as to whether there has been a breach of contract, and fact. He submitted further that an arbitral body such as the IAP is not competent to resolve issues of law. Issues of law as they pertain to employment law are within the domain of this court under section 254C of the 1999 Constitution, as amended. What the IAP has done by hearing the matter is to determine the nature of the contract of employment. Therefore, the position of the IAP that it can entertain the matter because the Minister of Labour and Productivity referred the matter to it is misconceived. Added to this issue is whether the dismissal of Mr. Eugene Okoduwa is a ‘trade dispute’ capable of being referred to the IAP by the Minister of Labour and Productivity as was done in this case. Learned counsel again submitted that the dismissal of Mr. Okoduwa cannot and ought not to have transmuted to a trade dispute within the intendment of section 48(1) of the Trade Disputes Act Cap. T8 LFN 2004. The section defines a ‘trade dispute’ as ‘any dispute between employers and workers or between workers and workers, which is connected with the employment or non-employment, or the terms of employment and physical conditions of work of any person’. The appellant’s position is that the dismissal does not constitute the phrase ‘which is connected with the employment or non-employment, or the terms of employment and physical conditions of work of any person’. Therefore, it is not a matter that ought to have been referred to the IAP by the Honourable Minister of Labour and Productivity. In the case of Kalango & ors v. Dokubo & ors [2003] 15 WRN 32 (CA) (Head note 14), the Court of Appeal gave a judicial construction to the meaning of the phrase ‘connected with’ used in the definition of ‘trade dispute’ under section 48(1) of the TDA per Ikongbeh, JCA’s lead judgment thus: As I understand the term ‘connected with’ as used in the context with which we are concerned, it implies that the dispute has a bearing on employment or non-employment of the workers or the terms of their employment or their conditions of work…The dispute must have emanated from matters relating to the way they have been employed or how they are being used for the job they have been employed to do…With all due respect to the appellants, I do not see what bearing any of these complaints and the reliefs sought in regard to them had on the employment or non-employment of any of the parties or the terms of their employment or conditions of work. None of the plaintiffs/respondents has complained that any of the respondents/appellants has in any way interfered with the nature and terms of his employment or his conditions of work. Had any of the complaints been that the respondents/appellants were forcing the plaintiff/respondents to do things outside the scope of things normally done by road transport workers, then, clearly, that would have involved a dispute connected with their employment or non-employment. Similarly, if they had complained of being prevented from functioning as road transport workers the result would have been the same. Again, had they complained that the respondents/appellants were trying to dictate to them how they were to negotiate with or relate to their employers or customers, i.e. the passengers, then that might be a dispute in connection with the terms of their employment. Finally, had any of the complaints been that the respondent’s improperly altered their conditions of work by, say, making them work longer hours for less pay, the dispute would have qualified as being connected with their conditions of work. The learned counsel continued that the Supreme Court reiterated the point in National Union of Electricity Employees & anor v. Bureau of Public Enterprises [2010] AFWLR (Pt. 525) 201 (SC) (Head note 2) when it held that the expression ‘connected with’ in relation to dispute means that the dispute must be connected with employment or non-employment and not a dispute about some entirely different subject-matter, non settlement of which may result in employment or non-employment. To the appellant, in this suit Mr. Okoduwa’s complaint is not that he was forced to do things outside the scope of his employment (employment or non-employment), neither is his complaint on the specific terms of his employment, nor that his conditions of work had been altered. The position of the IAP that this was indeed a trade dispute, therefore, amounts to a miss-direction in law. Learned counsel urged this court to resolve this issue in favour of the appellant. On issue two i.e. whether the respondent can complain against the dismissal of a member of the association, Mr. Eugene Okoduwa, when its representative actively participated in the process leading to the said dismissal, learned counsel submitted that the respondent cannot so complain since it was actively represented by the Chairman of its local branch in person of Mr. Jimoh Omoruyi as this will amount to approbating and reprobating, referring to Amori v. Iyanda [2008] All FWLR (Pt. 416) 1864. He went on that the respondent knew that Mr. Jimoh Omoruyi was in the Dr. Omokhafe Panel. For all purposes, Mr. Omoruyi represented the interest of the union in that Committee being its Chairman. Hence, the union cannot now complain against the findings of that Committee having been part of it or else it will amount to approbating and reprobating. Counsel urged this court to resolve this issue in favour of the appellant. Issue three is whether the allegations of malice and victimization against Mr. Eugene Okoduwa, which are particulars of motive, are relevant factors in the determination of the employment of Mr. Eugene Okoduwa. Dr. Inegbedion submitted that allegations of malice or victimization, which are all indices of motive, are completely irrelevant for the purpose of determining whether an employee’s employment has been properly, or rightly or lawfully terminated, referring to Adebayo v. O.A.U.T.H. C.M.B. [2001] 2 WRN 80 at 99 and Rivers Vegetable Oil Co. Ltd v. Egbakole [2010] ALL FWLR (Pt. 544) 111 at 124 – 125. Learned counsel argued that the respondent at the IAP made heavy weather of the improper motives of the appellant in terminating the employment of Mr. Eugene Okoduwa, which the IAP essentially based its award upon. He reproduced the pronouncement of the IAP from page 11 of the award thus: ‘…therefore, the entire proceedings of the so-called domestic panels of inquiry were a kangaroo arrangement of affairs as it was entirely a sham. In cases of this nature, the employee who had been dismissed for gross misconduct (which was never proved) need not prove that the proceeding of the domestic panel (as 3 were set consecutively to achieve a purpose) were indeed prejudicial to him, it is sufficient that it might.’ Consequently, counsel maintained that the IAP completely misdirected itself in point of fact by failing to construe the contract of employment documents, particularly the conditions of service to see whether the appellant complied with it in dismissing the employment of Mr. Eugene Okoduwa. Issue four is whether the appellant followed the due process in disciplining Mr. Eugene Okoduwa, and if it did whether Mr. Okoduwa’s dismissal can be declared wrongful in the light of the totality of the evidence adduced. On this the counsel submitted that the dismissal of Mr. Eugene Okoduwa was done after following the due process and as such it is not one that can be reversed. To the counsel, the cumulative effect of the Public Service Rules 2008 (Rules 030301 to 030406) is to empower the appellant to discipline its staff. For instance, the indictment of Mr. Okoduwa on the allegation of performing unauthorized duties is a violation of Rule 030402(w) and that it amounts to a serious misconduct as defined by that Rule and for which a public officer could be dismissed. He urged the court to hold that Rule 030402(f), which is a ground for dismissal, covers cases of impersonation for which a public officer (Mr. Okoduwa) could be dismissed. Counsel invited the court to note that Mr. Okoduwa was dismissed on proven allegations of misconduct each of which is independent of the other. These allegations include impersonation, performing unauthorized duties and forgery. The appellant further contended that even where this court holds that any of the allegations borders on the commission of a crime, it is an established principle of law, flowing from a long line of judicial pronouncements that cases of misconduct, which amount to a breach of the terms of employment of an employee, can be dealt with by the employer as such whether or not it borders on the allegation of the commission of a crime. That in Maliki v. Michael Imoudu Institute of Labour Studies [2009] All FWLR (Pt. 491) 979 (CA) (Head note 11), the Court of Appeal held that an employer does not have to wait for an employee against whom there is an allegation of misconduct bordering on crime to be prosecuted and convicted by a court before he can exercise his power to dismiss such an employee summarily. It is enough if he is given such notice as would make the nature of the allegation(s) against him clear to him so as to enable him put in a defense. Counsel referred also to Olanrewaju v. Afribank [2001] 37 WRN 41 (SC) and Esiaga v. University of Calabar [2004] 21 WRN 28 (SC) where the Supreme Court held that if the act of a student amounts to a crime, this will not preclude the university from exercising its power under its statute to punish the misconduct by any student. Learned counsel referred the Court to Chapter 10, paragraph 10.13(a) of the Conditions of Service which further empowers the appellant to dismiss a staff who has been found culpable or guilty of a charge of serious misconduct. He reiterated that Mr. Okoduwa appeared before Dr. Omokhafe Panel which tried him after giving him a fair hearing, found him liable and recommended punitive action against him. He continued that the grounds which formed the basis of the dismissal of Mr. Okoduwa are all independent of each other and individually constitute sufficient ground for dismissal under the Public Service Rules 2008 (which is similar with the Public Service Rules 2006) and under the Conditions of Service. Dr. Inegbedion referred the Court to the appellant’s argument on this issue in its additional memorandum dated 25th March, 2011 at pages 5 and 6 thereof and its written address at pages 3 – 5. The appellant again contended that having complied with due process in the dismissal of Mr. Okoduwa, the said dismissal is not wrongful and cannot be the subject of a trade dispute. Counsel urged the court to examine the Dr. Okwu Panel and Dr. Omokhafe Panel Reports, which clearly indicted Mr. Okoduwa. The position of the appellant is that the Director of Accounts and Finance stated that his signature on Annexure M of the respondent’s memorandum of 14th March 2011 purporting to be his signature was not his signature. Furthermore, that the flimsy copy of that letter was in possession of Mr. Okoduwa and not in the official file of the Institute. For this, Mr. Okoduwa was issued a query to explain how he came about the letter. Counsel continued that Mr. Okoduwa appeared before the Omokhafe Panel, made representation and defended himself before that Panel, albeit unsuccessfully. That the third Panel (the Ministerial Panel) which was composed of officers from the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and others merely reviewed the Omokhafe Panel Report in the absence of a Board at that material time. Hence, it was no longer necessary for all the indicted officers to appear again before the Ministerial Panel. The appellant’s counsel stated that he drew the attention of the IAP to the failure of Mr. Eugene Okoduwa to exhaust the local remedies provided in the Conditions of Service, Chapter 10, paragraph 10.16(b) thereof. However, in its award, the IAP was completely silent on this. That, if the IAP had adverted its mind to the said conditions of service in Chapter 10, it would have discovered that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Therefore, the position of the IAP that Mr. Eugene Okoduwa’s dismissal is wrongful is null and void, and a misdirection in the light of the prevailing facts. The appellant gave the particulars of misdirection of the IAP that at page 11 of the award, the IAP found that Mr. Okoduwa was never there to cross-examine the accuser/witnesses. There were three different Panels and the appellant did not know which of the Panels was being referred to here. The appellant explained that the first Panel (the Dr. Okwu Panel) was purely an investigation panel where no accusations had been laid before anybody and so couldn’t have breached the rules of natural justice. The second Panel (Dr. Omokhafe Panel) was the one that tried Mr. Okoduwa. To the appellant, the evidence used against Mr. Okoduwa was purely documentary and he was given ample opportunity to react to them. Counsel, therefore, urged this court to resolve this issue in favour of the appellant. The learned counsel maintained that the IAP found that Mr. J. A. Ehiwere and Mrs. Iwuala signed the letter of appointment of the ghost worker and the letter of deployment and also that of assumption of duty of the ghost worker when there was no basis for those findings. According to the proceedings before Dr. Okwu Panel, the letters were not signed by Mr. Ehiwere and Mrs. C. F. Iwualah, though the letters were endorsed by Mr. I. I. Ohiokpehai, the Director of Finance. Dr. Okwu Panel found that he was misled to doing so. The appellant, therefore, urged the court to so hold and resolve this issue in its favour. Issue five is whether the procedure adopted by the IAP by relying on Annexure Z1 – Z8 annexed to the respondent’s address while making its award without giving adequate notice of the said annexure to the appellant is not against the provisions of section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, and the Rules/Guidelines of the IAP in spite of the objection to such reliance by the appellant. Learned counsel submitted that such reliance is against section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, in the circumstance as this denied the appellant adequate opportunity to answer the case against it as envisaged by the said Constitution because the appellant was given only four days to so react. By the IAP guidelines, documentary evidence should be annexed to statements of claim/defense and not memoranda as directed by the IAP. Therefore, the IAP subverted its own rules of procedure. Learned counsel maintained that judicial pronouncements have held that ‘fair hearing’ which embodies the twin pillars of natural justice means giving adequate opportunity to a person to answer the case against him and once that is not done, the decision reached is liable to be set aside. He referred to Udo v. Cross River State Newspaper Corporation & anor [2001] 22 WRN 53(CA), Omotoso v. National Universities Commission & anor [2001] 50 WRN 102 (CA) (Head note 6), Ogundoyin v. Adeyemi [2001] 33 WRN 1 (SC) (Head note 1) and Victino Fixed Odds Limited v. Joseph Ojo & ors [2010] All FWLR (Pt. 524) 25 (Head note 2). Counsel further submitted that in Pan African International Corporation & ors v. Shoreline Liftboats Ltd [2010] All FWLR (Pt. 524) 56 (Head note 5), the Supreme Court held that the appropriate consequential order to make where there has been a breach of the right to fair hearing is that of re-trial before another judge or court, and urged the court to so hold. In its brief of argument, the respondent adopted the five issues as framed by the appellant and replied them serially. On the first issue of whether the ‘wrongful dismissal’ of Mr. Eugene Okoduwa constitutes a ‘trade dispute’ within the contemplation of the Trade Disputes Act, learned counsel to the respondent answered this in the affirmative and argued that the IAP can handle it and that the interpretation of what constitutes ‘trade dispute’ by the appellant’s counsel is patiently flawed and also a mere academic exercise. The learned counsel continued that in order to situate this matter properly it is appropriate to state the genesis of this matter, which is that Mr. Eugene Okoduwa, a member of the respondent’s union and the Secretary of the branch had through his union activities offended the management as evident from the following facts: (1) He contested for the position of Secretary of the union against a preferred candidate of the Management. (2) He was the only non-management supported staff that won the election. (3) The head of the appellant Dr. (Mrs.) M. U. B. Mokwuny caused a number of workers to be arrested by the police and Mr. Okoduwa secured bail for the detained workers. (4) The Director General now got in touch with the Inspector General of Police’s office Abuja that Mr. Okoduwa and the National Secretary of the respondent, Mr. Akinade, were threatening her life. The two were invited to Abuja. (5) Mr. Okoduwa was detained by the Police in Abuja for investigation and while the investigation was going on the Director General stopped Mr. Okoduwa’s salary. The Police had to write the Director General that they were still investigating her complaint and that it was wrong to stop Okoduwa’s salary since he had not been found guilty. (6) Neither Mr. Okoduwa nor Mr. Akinade, nor indeed any of the workers, was found culpable by the police on the allegation made against them by the Director General. (7) On return from Abuja, the Director General planned a coup for Okoduwa. She allegedly called Okoduwa at about 2.30pm to her office. Okoduwa had taken his wife to hospital on a distress call. He sought permission to leave office from his immediate boss and he was granted permission. The Director General queried him for alleged insubordination for not ‘honouring’ her invitation. Mr. Okoduwa’s boss confirmed granting him permission at about 2.30pm to take his sick wife to the hospital. There was evidence from a State Hospital that the wife was actually treated at the hospital and yet a WARNING LETTER was issued to Okoduwa. (8) Still not satisfied, the Director General initiated a DAMAGER. Mr. Okoduwa was alleged to have recruited a ghost worker. A panel was set up (Okwu) which found 4 (four) persons including Okoduwa culpable. Okoduwa was not made to appear before the Okwu panel. Okwu’s findings were sent for review by another panel. The Panel did not find Okoduwa culpable on the employment of ghost worker which they quarried him for and which he answered; rather they manufactured new charges to get him convicted. Unfortunately the new charges flew in their faces because an unbiased examination of the new charges show that Mr. Okoduwa was being accused of doing what he was officially and administratively ordered to do. (9) While Mr. Okoduwa was dismissed for doing nothing, those found culpable on the ‘ghost worker’ issue were left to go. (10) The union smelt a rat and they declared a trade dispute – they alleged that Mr. Okoduwa was being victimized for his role in the union; he was the elected sector secretary of the union. They sent their complaint to the Minister to ask him to intervene otherwise an industrial action would follow. (11) The Minister saw a fire on the mountain and by the power conferred on him referred the matter to the IAP; otherwise by now a full blown industrial action would have taken place. Sadly, the Director General has left the appellant’s job. The respondent reiterated that the facts stated in paragraphs 1 – 11 above were the findings of the IAP. Counsel to the respondent argued that section 48(1) of the Trade Disputes Act cited by the learned counsel to the appellant describes ‘trade dispute’ as any ‘dispute between employer and workers…’ To the counsel, the respondent is the amalgam of the workers in the appellant’s institution. It declared a dispute on the unwholesome treatment of one of their members by the management (the employer) which is the appellant. Before the matter could degenerate, the Minister-in-charge statutorily referred the matter to the IAP. Learned counsel, therefore, submitted that the case of Kalango v. Dokubo and other cases cited by the appellant’s counsel are not apposite as they are not on all fours with this present case. The respondent maintained that a trade dispute has arisen from the dismissal of Mr. Okoduwa and it has to be addressed accordingly. Its counsel, as a result, submitted that the award delivered on 15th June 2010 is valid and that the IAP has jurisdiction to make the award. He continued that to determine whether the IAP has exceeded its jurisdiction in making an award, the court has to look at the terms of reference as conferred by the Minister of Labour in the enabling instrument, referring to Grizi (Nigeria) Limited v. Grizi (Nigeria) Limited and Group of Companies Workers Union page 4 of the Digest of Judgments of NIC (1978 – 2006). Counsel continued that the said instrument reads: ‘To inquire into the trade dispute existing between the Senior Staff Association of Universities Teaching Hospital Research Institute and Associated Institutions (SSAUTHRIAI) and the Management of Rubber Research Institute of Nigeria, Benin City over: wrongful dismissal of Mr. Eugene Okoduwa’. The respondent’s counsel submitted that there was a trade dispute between the SSAUTHRIAI and the management of RRIN over the wrongful dismissal of a union member, Mr. Okoduwa. It has also been held that trade dispute should be defined in relation to section 1(2) of the Trade Disputes Act, which states that unless the context otherwise requires ‘the dispute’ means the trade dispute in question, and ‘party’ means a party to the dispute. In other words, a trade dispute means any disagreement as to an occupation or employment in relation to the procurement of likelihood. Counsel referred this court to the case of Corporate Affairs Commission v. Amalgamated Union of Public Corporations, Civil Service Technical and Recreational Service Employees page 454 of the Digest of Judgments of NIC (1978 – 2006) especially at page 460 paragraph 4. Counsel further submitted that for a dispute to be declared a trade dispute within the meaning of section 48 of the Trade Disputes Act, all the ingredients in the section need not be present, referring to C.A.C v. Amalgamated Union of Public Corporations (supra) at page 460 paragraph 5. He urged the court to resolve this issue in favour of the respondent. On issue two, which is whether the respondent can complain against the dismissal of a member of the association, Mr. Eugene Okoduwa, when its representative actively participated in the process leading to the said dismissal, learned counsel argued that the reasoning of the appellant on this issue is hollow because it is incongruous just like the IAP queried: ‘can a judge represent the accused in his Court…?’; for which the Panel answered that it is capital No. Counsel continued that the IAP ruled further that Mr. Omoniyi who was on the panel as a judge or investigator cannot be said to be representing Mr. Okoduwa, the accused person. He, therefore, urged the court to uphold the well considered decision of the IAP on this issue; otherwise, it can also be assumed that while Mr. Omoniyi was for the accused, other members who were in majority were for the accusers. If so, then the accused has been condemned even before trial by virtue of his supposed representation having been outnumbered. Issue three is whether the allegations of malice and victimization against Mr. Eugene Okoduwa, which are particulars of motive, are relevant factors in the determination of the employment of Mr. Eugene Okoduwa. To the respondent, this issue is not germane to deciding this suit. The main issue is that in determining the employment of Mr. Okoduwa was the law compiled with? Who has the power to sack Mr. Okoduwa? Is it the Management, the Minister or the Board? He submitted that it is the Board and not the Minister or the Management that has such power. Consequently, in law, the dismissal is unlawful, illegal and unconstitutional because he never appeared before any Board before he was summarily dismissed meaning that he was not given a hearing at all to defend himself. In the face of this, the malice becomes secondary even though it was apparent. To the respondent, the malice played out from allegation of: (1) Threatening the life of the Director General and reporting same to the Police. (2) Seizures of salary of Mr. Okoduwa whilst still under police interrogation. (3) Alleged refusal to honour Director General’s call when actually he took permission from his superior to take his wife to the hospital. (4) And finally accused of engaging a ghost worker he was freed of this allegation and yet he was convicted on another allegation which he was not made to answer and yet the allegation was within his official duties. According to the learned counsel, the IAP rightly observed malice in the following words: In cases of this nature, the employee who had been dismissed for gross misconduct (which was never proved) need not prove that the proceeding of the domestic panel (as 3 were set consecutively to achieve a purpose) were indeed prejudicial to him, it is sufficient that it might. The risk of any prejudice is enough, as reiterated in Olatunbosun v. NER Council [1988] 3 NWLR (Pt. 80) 25. Learned counsel commended the IAP’s finding above to the court and urged the Court to so hold. Issue four is whether the appellant followed due process in disciplining Mr. Eugene Okoduwa, and if it did whether Mr. Okoduwa’s dismissal can be declared wrongful in the light of the evidence adduced. Counsel argued that it is trite that one cannot put something on nothing. Once the methodology is unlawful, illegal and unconstitutional the defect cannot be cured. The respondent’s position is that the judgment of the panels and that of the Minister cannot hold because it is only the Board of the appellant that is empowered to discipline the accused. He referred to Macfoy v. UAC Ltd [1962] AC 152 at 160 and urged the court to hold in favour of the respondent. In respect of issue five, which is whether the procedure adopted by the IAP by relying on Annexure Z1 – Z8 annexed to the respondent’s address in making its award without giving adequate notice of the said annexure to the appellant is not against the provisions of section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, and the Rules/Guidelines of the IAP and as such unconstitutional, null and void. Counsel to the respondent maintained that this issue was raised by the appellant at the IAP and the IAP ruled that Annexure Z1 – Z8 complained off by the appellant were documents referred to by both parties in their memorandum. He continued that the IAP furthermore found that the documents were relevant and that they were annexed to allow the IAP to see the truth of the matter. Counsel submitted that with or without the annexure, there was no way the IAP or this Court would have upheld the decision of the Minister. The appellant did not deny that it was the Minister that dismissed Mr. Okoduwa. The truth is that in the circumstances of this case the Minister could not dismiss the employee; it is ultra vires his power and this court should so hold. Furthermore, counsel contended that the appellant hangs on section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution that his client was denied fair hearing. Learned counsel argued that this cannot be because when he saw the annexure he had the opportunity to ask for an adjournment at the IAP if need be to enable him join issues with the respondent but counsel to the appellant did not; coupled with the fact that the annexure were already mentioned in the memorandum of both parties. In addition the annexure were relevant documents and that it has been held by the Supreme Court (the name of the case or authority is not supplied) that the Court shall not close its eyes to relevant documents no matter its source. The respondent’s counsel commended the findings and award of the IAP to this Court because they are lucid and bereft of technicalities, well considered and sound in logic, law and equity, and urged the court to uphold the award of the IAP. Finally learned counsel submitted that the case of the appellant is statute-barred, referring to sections 6, 9, 13 and 14 of the Trade Disputes Act 2004 LFN under which the time and conditions are stipulated in which the appellant could file this type of suit and they failed to keep to the time limit. Counsel maintained that the IAP award was given on 15th day of June 2010 and the appellant complained to the Minister in August 2011. The Minister’s directive dated 18th October 2011 was sent by a covering letter dated 1st November 2011 to the National Industrial Court. Therefore, both the appellant and the Minister acted outside the time limit stipulated by the statute thus making this suit to be statute-barred. Counsel submitted that when a matter is statute-barred the complainant, as in this case, has lost his legal right, referring to Oyetoki v. Nigeria Postal Service [2010] All FWLR (Pt. 504) 1572 at 1586 A – B and P. N. Uddoh Trading Company Limited v. Sunday Abere & 1 or [2001] FWLR (Pt. 57) 900 at 918. Counsel urged the Court to dismiss the appellant’s case with heavy cost. The appellant did not reply to the respondent’s written brief on points of law. We have carefully considered the record of proceedings at the IAP in this appeal, the written briefs of counsel to both parties together with their cited authorities. In deciding this appeal we adopt the five issues framed by the appellant and agreed to by the respondent. On the first issue of competency of the Minister’s referral of a declared trade dispute to the IAP under the TDA based on ‘wrongful dismissal’ of Mr. Eugene Okoduwa, the position of the appellant is that the issue of whether or not the dismissal of Mr. Okoduwa was wrongful is a question of employment law which the IAP has no power to handle and that the said dismissal is not a trade dispute under section 48(1) of the Trade Disputes Act. To the respondent, the referral is competent under the TDA and that the IAP rightly made its award on this dispute within its power. We do not agree with the appellant that the dismissal of an employee where, the fact of the dismissal is taken up by the employee’s trade union, is not a trade dispute under the purview of section 48(1) of the Trade Disputes act 2004. Even the cases of Kalango & ors v. Dokubo and National Union of Electricity Employees & anor v. Bureau of Public Enterprises (all supra) cited by the appellant, on a proper interpretation, do not support the case of the appellant in this regard. Kalango, for instance, held that for it to be a trade dispute, the dispute must have a bearing on employment or non-employment of the workers or the terms of their employment or their conditions of work; while National Union of Electricity Employees & anor v. Bureau of Public Enterprises also held that the dispute must be connected with employment or non-employment and not a dispute about some entirely different subject-matter. In all of this, the appellant cannot argue that the dismissal of an employee is not an issue connected with employment or terms of employment. To think otherwise is certainly to misinterpret the law. The Minister of Labour was consequently right to have treated the dispute as a trade dispute and referred the matter to the IAP; and because the jurisdiction of the IAP is derivable from the referral by the Minister of Labour, there is no doubt that the IAP appropriately heard the matter. The argument of counsel to the appellant that the IAP cannot construe or interpret a contract of employment is inapplicable in the instant case as what the IAP did was not construing or interpreting the contract of employment but applying it to the fact situation of the case before it. Issue two is whether the respondent can complain against the dismissal of Mr. Eugene Okoduwa, when its representative actively participated in the process of the said dismissal. The appellant maintained that with such complaint, the respondent is approbating and reprobating at the same time. Whereas, the respondent’s argument is that the chairman of the branch union who was a member of the Panel that found Mr. Okoduwa culpable was a judge in that capacity and could not be expected to defend the accused, Mr. Okoduwa. We agree with the IAP here and hold that the fact that the union was represented in the Panel that found Mr. Okoduwa culpable cannot be a bar to the challenging the outcome of the Panel. The primary purpose of trade unions is the protection and defence of the interests of their members; and this they must do in all respects. The argument of the appellant regarding this issue is, therefore, not tenable. On the third issue of whether the allegations of malice and victimization against Mr. Eugene Okoduwa, which are particulars of motive, are relevant factors in the determination of his employment, the appellant maintained that the issue of motive is not relevant in determining the employment of an employee, while the respondent asserted that it is relevant. Under the labour law, motive may sometimes be relevant in ascertaining proper determination of an employment. For instance, if the employment of a union member is terminated or dismissed for union activities, such employee is entitled to reinstatement. See section 9 of the Labour Act and section 43 of the Trade Disputes Act 2004. We, hold on this issue that in appropriate cases particulars of motive may be relevant in the determination of employment. We take issue five before issue four, which is whether the procedure adopted by the IAP by relying on Annexure Z1 – Z8 annexed to the respondent’s address without giving adequate notice of the said annexure to the appellant is not against the provisions of section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, and the Rules/Guidelines of the IAP and as such, unconstitutional, null and void. From the record, the Annexure in question are contained in pages 230 to 239 of the court’s file. Annexure Z2 and Z3 are not found in the file. Annexure Z1 is the additional responsibilities given to Mr. Okoduwa by the appellant and signed by the Chief Accountant of the appellant, Mr. Ohiokpehai on 03-12-2004. Annexure Z4 and Z5 are copies of the provisions of chapters 3 & 16 of the Federal Public Service Rules. Annexure Z6 is the notification of trade dispute between the appellant and the respondent to the Minister for Labour and Productivity by the respondent dated 21st July 2010. Annexure Z7 and Z8 are documents from the office of the Minister of Labour and Productivity titled “Invitation to Conciliation Meeting” and “Appointment of Conciliator” respectively dated 6th September 2010. The appellant is not denying the existence of any of these documents but all it is saying is that it was not given adequate time to react to them. Annexure Z1 emanated from the appellant. Annexure Z4 and Z5 are copies of statutory provisions which the Chairman of the IAP, who is a Legal Practitioner, is presumed or expected to know about. Even parties to this action are required to know about the content of the Federal Public Service Rules, especially the aspect on discipline. See section 1 paragraph 030101of the Federal Government Public Service Rules 2008 Edition. As a matter of fact, the appellant attached a copy of chapter 10 of the same Rules to its brief of argument at the IAP (see the appellant’s Annexure IX and pages 186 to 192 of the court’s file). While Annexure Z7 and Z8 are documents showing that the Hon. Minster took steps to reconcile the parties on the declared trade dispute before referring them to IAP for arbitration. We, therefore, hold that the IAP, did not breach the principle of fair hearing under section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution by relying on the Annexure in making its award on this matter as it did. Moreover, the bulk of these documents are documents that any judicial or quasi-judicial body may take judicial notice of under the Evidence Act 2011. Secondly, the appellant’s counsel himself, in his argument, admitted that he was given four days within which to react to the said documents. That he did not take up this opportunity cannot be the fault of the IAP. On record, he was given the opportunity and so cannot claim to have been denied the right of fair hearing. In this regard, it must be noted that essentially, by section 13(1)(a) of the Trade Disputes Act 2004, the IAP has only 21 days within which to make an award. Lastly, it must be noted that the IAP is not bound to act in any formal manner; neither is it bound by the rules of evidence. See sections 36 and 37 of the Trade Disputes Act 2004. All that is required of the IAP is to advance the cause of justice. In all we think it did in the instant case. On the last issue of whether the appellant followed due process in disciplining Mr. Eugene Okoduwa, whereas the appellant supported its position that it did by attaching copy of chapter 10 of the Federal Public Service Rules to its brief of argument, the respondent gave copies of chapters 3 and 16 of the Rules contending that the appellant did not follow due process in dismissing Mr. Okoduwa from his employment. Contrary to the submission of the appellant, Mr. Okoduwa was dismissed not on proven allegations of misconduct but on weak bases. For instance in Dr Okwu’s report this officer was linked with the issue of Ghost Worker because the letter ‘J’ in the letter that recommended the ghost worker to the Bank and signed by another officer of the appellant who denied signing the letter, was similar to letter ‘J’ written by Mr. Okoduwa. Mr. Okoduwa denied the similarity and the Panel admitted that this is a technical point that requires a Handwriting Expert to decide. However, the Panel did not invite the Handwriting Expert. Yet, the Panel acted on this point and found Mr. Okoduwa culpable of impersonation and Forgery. From the record, we agree with the IAP that the conclusions of the three different Panels set up in respect of this dispute are not enough to lead to the dismissal of Mr. Okoduwa. The respondent had then argued that because the dismissal was taken and sanctioned by the Minister of Agriculture, this must necessarily be unlawful as it is the Board of the appellant that ought to take that decision. Except for a THISDAY newspaper cutting of page 10 of June 30, 2009, there is no evidence to show that the appellant had a functional Board whose power was usurped by the Minister of Agriculture. The rule is that once there is no functional Board of a government parastatal, the Minister in charge of that parastatal automatically assumes the position of the Board. So the fact that the Minister of Agriculture took and sanctioned the decision to dismiss Mr. Okoduwa, without more, is not enough to reach the conclusion that the respondent reached. This fact aside, we still hold based on reasons adduced earlier that the dismissal of Mr Okoduwa was wrongful. The argument of the respondent that the appellant and the Minister of Labour acted out of time is unfounded and so is untenable and as such is discountenanced for present purposes. On the whole and in agreement with the award of the IAP, we hold that the dismissal of Mr. Okoduwa is wrongful, null and void. We hereby order that Mr. Okoduwa be re-instated to his employment and his salary arrears be paid to him right from when he was wrongfully dismissed till date without any loss of seniority. Judgment is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip Presiding Judge Hon. Justice F. I. Kola-Olalere Hon. Justice J. T. Agbadu-Fishim Judge