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The claimants in an amended claim filed on the 8th day of March 2011 seek the following reliefs: 1. A declaration that the 1st and 2nd defendants have been duly and validly removed as Chairman and Secretary of the Executive Committee (EXCO) Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), University of Benin in accordance with the Academic Staff Union of Universities constitution of 2006, as amended. 2. A declaration that the recognition of the 1st and 2nd defendants by the 4th defendant vide its resolution of 5th and 6th December 2009 as legitimate officers of the EXCO in University of Benin is illegal, unlawful and contrary to the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) constitution of 2006, as amended. 3. An order of this court setting aside the 4th defendant’s resolution of the 5th and 6th December 2009 recognizing the 1st and 2nd defendants as legitimate officers of the EXCO of University of Benin. 4. An order of perpetual injunction restraining the 1st and 2nd defendants from parading themselves as Chairman and Secretary of the Academic Staff Union of Universities, University of Benin. 5. An order of perpetual injunction restraining the 3rd and 4th defendants from recognizing the 1st and 2nd defendants as legitimate officers of the EXCO in the University of Benin. 6. An order declaring null and void the election conducted by the 1st defendant on the 16th December 2010 which purportedly ushered in a new Executive Council in University of Benin Branch of ASUU. 7. A mandatory order compelling the 1st defendant to refund all the monies expended by him after he was validly removed as Chairman of ASUU, University of Benin. The claimants filed their amended claim in compliance with the rules of this court along with a list of witnesses and front loaded the following documents. • Notice of Motion and the motion for the removal of DR. K. O. ILAVBARHE from office of the Chairman, ASUU, University of Benin (UNIBEN) Branch dated 16th September 2009. • Resolution of ASUU-UNIBEN congress at it’s meeting of Thursday 17th September, 2009. • Minutes/Resolutions of ASUU-UNIBEN congress meeting held on Thursday 24th September 2009. • Letter to the Honourable Minister of Education by the 1st defendant dated 28th September 2009. • Letter to congress members by the 1st and 2nd defendants dated 6th October 2009. • Extract of minutes/resolution of ASUU-UNIBEN congress held on Thursday 8th October 2009. • Report of the investigation committee on the allegations against the 1st defendant dated 5th November 2009. • Extract of minutes and resolution of ASUU-UNIBEN congress meeting held on Thursday 5th November 2009. • Pre-action notice dated 12th November 2009. • Letter to the President of ASUU jointly signed by the 1st and 3rd claimants dated 20th November 2009. • Report of ASUU-UNIBEN congress to the 4th defendant dated 20th November 2009. • Waybill of postage dated 25th November 2009. • Resolution of the 4th defendant of its meeting held on 5th and 6th December 2009. • The constitution and code of practice of ASUU (2006), as amended. • ASUU-UNIBEN Union Summary of Account of 1st April – 30th June 2010. • ASUU-UNIBEN call for nomination/guidelines for ASUU election 2010. • Press release by Independent Television (I.T.V) Station, Benin City on 16th December 2010. The case of the claimant is that the 1st defendant as Chairman of the Academic Staff Union of University of Benin Branch was alleged to have committed certain misconducts in breach of the code of conduct provisions of the constitution of the union for which a notice of removal was served on him. That the 1st defendant in a plenary congress session entertained the motion for his removal as chairman which was duly moved before the congress and sustained by the votes of 82 members against 69 votes as contained in congress resolution of 17th September 2009. That a seven man committee was thereafter set up by congress to look into the allegations contained in the motion for removal while the chairman was requested to continue to preside over congress pending the outcome of investigation by the seven man committee. That the seven man committee invited persons to appear before it. That the 2nd defendant appeared before the committee while the 1st defendant did not in spite of numerous invitations extended to him. That at a congress meeting of the union, the 1st and 2nd defendants in apprehension of the consequences of a resolution of the issue against them, stage-managed a walkout on the congress on the 8th October 2009. That the 1st and 2nd defendants were removed by a unanimous resolution of congress as chairman and secretary for acts of serious misconduct committed in the face of the congress. That the seven man committee considered and submitted its report and recommendations to congress. That the congress deliberated and accepted the recommendations and adopted the removal of the 1st defendant as chairman vide a congress resolution of 5th November 2009. That the 1st and 2nd defendant in defiance to the congress resolution continued holding parallel congress for which the 3rd and 4th defendants accorded them recognition in breach of the ASUU 2006 constitution, as amended; hence the claimants filed this suit for the interpretation of the provisions of the said ASUU constitution. The case of the defendant is that the 1st and 2nd respondents were the elected Chairman and Secretary respectively of ASUU-UNIBEN Chapter whilst the 1st claimant was the elected Vice-chairman of ASUU-UNIBEN Branch. That at the branch congress of 17th of September 2009 the 2nd claimant submitted a motion for the removal of the 1st defendant only as chairman contrary to the provision of rules 9(viii) and 10(viii) and rule of the constitution and rule 5 of the Code of Practice found in appendix 1 to the constitution. That since the motion was against the chairman the 1st defendant was asked to step aside to allow for a fair deliberation of the motion. A counter-motion was subsequently moved to nullify the 2nd claimant’s motion. The congress then voted to deliberate on the motion for removal and thereafter setup a seven man investigate committee headed by Prof. Obika to look into the infraction alleged in the motion against the 1st defendant only. That the 1st defendant thereafter resumed his sit as the chairman of the union and continued to act in that capacity. That the chairman told the congress that the motion for his removal by the 2nd claimant was brought contrary to the provisions of rule 5 of the grievance procedure of the Code of Practice and that all that was done was unconstitutional. That on the 8th of October 2009, a congress meeting was held and presided over by the 1st defendant. On completing deliberation on all the items on the Agenda, the 1st claimant on point of information informed the congress that his attention was drawn to a letter written by the 1st and 2nd defendants on behalf of the Exco to the Minister of Education but was cut short by members who began to shout him down and he in turn continued to shout back at members banging his hand on the table, causing a pandemonium on the floor of the house, and was thereafter asked by the chairman to sit down. That the 1st defendant on observing the unconducive atmosphere on the floor of the house that was generated by the 1st claimant’s information, decided to calm down the situation and advised that the sensitive matter be deferred to another day for deliberation as the atmosphere was not conducive to entertain any discussion on the point raised by the 1st claimant. That Dr. E. Aigbokahan thereafter moved a motion for adjournment and was seconded by Dr. C. Issheikwe. However, the 1st claimant in an attempt to destabilize the union started parading himself as the chairman, insisting in his widest imagination that the 1st and 2nd defendants were removed from office on the 8th of October 2009 after the congress had adjourned. At the congress of Tuesday 27th of October 2009, the Congress upon a motion moved by Mr. R. N. Chicogu and seconded by E. B. Adeleke dissolved the Investigative Committee headed by Prof. Obika on ground that the constitution of the union was not followed in setting up the Committee. That by a letter dated 29th of October 2009, the chairman of the investigative committee was formally informed of the dissolution of the committee by the congress that set it up on ground of unconstitutionality. That query letters dated 3rd November 2009 were however issued against the claimants for anti-union activities to explain their ignominious conduct on the floor of congress of the 8th of October 2009 considering the way and manner they conducted themselves. At the trial, the claimants indicated that they will not be calling any witness. But the defendants called two witnesses. In his evidence, respondent’s first witness, Mr. Idaevbor Bello, informed the court that he is the current secretary of ASUU, Uniben Branch. That he was elected unopposed on 4th December 2008 after the National Exco of the union had given due clearance for the biennial General Meeting of the Branch. That on 10th September 2009 at a meeting of the congress of ASUU, Uniben Branch, there was this general rowdiness at the meeting triggered off by certain developments that had happened before then. This was at a time when the University was trying to appoint a Vice-chancellor. That at the congress, opinions were divided as to whether the branch union should take a position on a coffin that was dropped at the main entrance into the University of Benin by some youths and whether the Council of the University was also correct to have postponed the interview for the appointment into the office of the Vice-Chancellor that was slated for the same period. That the meeting ended without a resolution as it ended in a rowdy manner. That at the next meeting held on 17th September 2009, the then Treasurer, Dr. Patrick Okolo, gave the chairman Dr. K. O. Ilavbarhe a typed document. When he opened it, he found it was a motion seeking for the removal of Dr. Ilavbarhe. The chairman drew his attention to the document and said he was going to present the document to the meeting even though it was not slated for discussion in the agenda. As the chairman put it, his hands were clear and he had nothing to fear. The chairman then presented the document for discussion and then stepped aside so that he will not be a judge in his own cause. That the congress considered the notice of impeachment. A committee was set up headed by Prof. L. F. O. Obika and thereafter the chairman resumed in presiding over the meeting. The witness continued that immediately after the congress, he wrote a letter to the chairman and other members of the committee to formally inform them of the responsibility that the congress had given them. That the investigative committee was set up by congress on 17th September 2009 or thereabout. But that by 14th October 2009 congress dissolved the committee. The Minister of Education had invited the leadership of ASUU Uniben for discussion over the letter the chairman wrote to the Minister. That this letter was written because of the tension that had built up on campus. When the investigation committee was set up, it invited him. That he went and informed the committee that because of the issues the chairman had raised e.g. (the letter of the chairman to him that congress did not follow due process) the committee needed to exercise patience so that congress can meet to review the issues. That in spite of that the committee continued to meet. That the principal issue raised by the chairman was that the constitutional provisions relating to petitions against a chairman of a branch of a union were not followed. The witness continued his testimony that before the congress met on 14th October 2009, they heard that they were removed from office. That before the congress of 14th October 2009, there was a congress on 8th October 2009. At the said congress of 8th October 2009 the congress met to look at the directive from the National leadership of the union as to whether the terms of agreement between the union and the Federal Government in respect of the strike that was ongoing at the time were satisfactory. Thereafter a motion was moved for adjournment. Before the motion was seconded, the then vice chairman who is the 1st claimant, stood up and said he had an issue to raise, upon which he was given the go ahead. He got up and said that there was a letter to the Minister of Education which had been circulated at the campus and that he was not a party to it. When the 1st claimant made the statement, there was a general uproar with people shouting, the chairman stood up and pleaded with members to calm down and that whatever the issues were, they would be taken at the following meeting of congress as the atmosphere at the moment was not conducive for any reasoned discussion. It was at this point that Dr. Ishiekwene moved a motion for adjournment of the meeting and was seconded by Dr. Emmanuel Aigbokhan. People got up and left the meeting. That the following day they saw a purported resolution signed by the 1st claimant that Dr. K. O. Ilavbarhe and himself were removed from office the previous day. That on 14th October 2009 congress then met and dissolved the Obika committee and passed a vote of confidence on the leadership of Dr. K. O. Ilavbarhe with the exclusion of the 1st and 2nd claimants. That up to 14th December 2010 when the tenure of the Exco ended, the 1st claimant continued to parade himself as chairman of the branch, an office he was never elected into. That the Branch Exco under the directive of the congress issued queries to the 1st and 2nd claimants for anti-union activities. That it was before congress could take any decision on the queries that the claimants came to court. Under cross examination, the first defendants’ witness responded that the letter he wrote was on the strength of the decision of congress to disband the committee. That he wrote the said letter after congress had taken a decision and the letter was written sometime around October or November 2009. That it is true that a notice of removal against the 1st defendant by the 2nd claimant was moved on 17th September 2009. That an investigation committee was set on 17th September 2009 to investigate the allegations contained in the petition i.e. the notice of removal by the 2nd claimant against the 1st defendant. That the 1st claimant did not constitute any investigation committee, instead it was the congress that did. That at the time the congress constituted the investigation committee, it was the 1st claimant that chaired that part of the congress meeting. That the allegations in the notice of removal were against the 1st defendant, and so the 1st defendant had to step aside. He agreed that he appeared before the investigative panel chaired by Prof. L. F. O. Obika and this was on the 9th October 2009. He denied that the 1st defendant and himself wrote any letter to the Minister of Education on 6th October 2009. That the 1st defendant and himself wrote a letter to the Uniben ASUU congress on 6th October 2009. That the letter the 1st defendant and himself wrote on 6th October 2009 was to call on members to attend the congress meeting of 8th October 2009. That one of the issues to be determined at this congress meeting was who was right or wrong in writing the letter to the Minister of Education and this issue was raised under AOB at the said congress meeting. That he knew one pharmacist Okehi who was the Assistant Secretary to ASUU Uniben. The witness denied that the 1st claimant told the entire congress about what transpired at the meeting they held with the Minister of Education at Abuja. He also denied that pharmacist Okehi confirmed anything to congress as there was nothing said to congress. That the issue of the meeting with the Minister was never discussed at the congress. That he did not take any public address system out neither did he stage-manage a walkout from the meeting that he called. He denied that Prof. Obika submitted any report to congress because congress had disbanded the committee. That he knew one Mr. R. I. Ohikhokhan. That he did not quite know Mr. E. O. Aiyohuyin. That he knows the 2nd claimant, Dr. Okolo. That all these three persons are members of ASUU Uniben. That to the best of his knowledge, Ohikhokhai and Aiyohuyin are both from Edo State going by their names. That Dr. Okolo is from the East. That Ohikhokhan is from one of the Owan Local Governments in Edo State. That no letter was sent to him indicating that he was removed from office. Under re-examination, the witness answered that the issue of the meeting with the Minister was never discussed at the congress because the meeting became rowdy when the issue was raised, and the chairman then directed that the issue be taken at another meeting in order to allow tempers to cool. That the chairman of the congress meeting of 8 October 2009 was the 1st defendant, Dr. K. O. Ilavbarhe. The second defendant’s witness was Dr. Kashetu Ohiokhuaobo Ilavbarhe. He told the court that he is a lecturer with the University of Benin. That he knows the claimants. That the 1st claimant was his Vice Chairman. He told the court that he was the immediate past Chairman of ASUU, Uniben Branch. That his tenure ended on 16th December 2010. That the 2nd claimant was the Treasurer and the 3rd claimant was a member of congress. He told the court that on 17th September 2009, there was a congress meeting which he presided over. That during the said meeting, Dr. P. O. Okolo, the 2nd claimant, brought a petition against him as the chairman of the meeting. That he did not want to preside over his matter so he voluntarily stepped down for the matter to be taken. That during the meeting, it was argued that he be investigated and some members of congress argued that he should not be investigated as the petition was a mere allegation with no truth in it. That the 1st claimant who presided at that point called for a division or vote of those who support that he be investigated and those not in support. That when the vote was taken, those who wanted him to be investigated won as they were in the majority. A committee was then set up headed by Prof. L. F. O. Obika. He thereafter resumed as chairman of the meeting. The meeting thereafter ended and everybody left. That they continued to have their normal congress meetings. For instance, there was a meeting of 8th October 2009 which he chaired, and at the end of the meeting of 8th October 2009, on the item of AOB, the 1st claimant sought his permission to tell congress what transpired at the meeting with the Hon. Minister of Education. That he granted the 1st claimant’s permission and he addressed the congress. At the mention of the meeting with the Hon. Minister, the congress shouted him down. That he then calmed down congress pleading that he be allowed to finish with the information he wanted to give. Even at this, congress still shouted him down and asked that he sits down. The witness told the court that he then ruled that the matter be taken at the next meeting. Dr. Aigbokhian then moved a motion for adjournment. Dr. Ashekwene seconded the motion for adjournment and the meeting ended on that note. That as regards Prof. Obika’s committee, the witness told the court that he wrote to congress that the procedure adopted in that regard was wrong. That any allegation against the chairman ought to go to the president of the union. Congress in its wisdom agreed with him and dissolved the committee. Four members of the committee including Prof. Obika were at that meeting. The members of the disbanded committee were thanked for accepting to serve in that capacity. Under cross examination, Dr. K. O. Ilavbarhe responded that at the time the Prof. Obika’s committee was set up, it was Mr. Irabor, the 1st claimant, who presided, he having stepped down. He told the court that Prof. Obika’s committee wrote to him to state his own side of the story. That the committee wrote to him twice but he responded that he did not know the charges against him. That he wrote to congress and copied the committee that the grievance procedure was not followed. That the grievance procedure is as per the ASUU constitution. That he is not aware that the Obika’s committee sat and submitted report to congress. That he presided over the congress that disbanded the Obika’s committee. That he is not aware that congress met on 5th November 2009 and received the Obika’s committee report. That he is not aware that the Obika’s report indicted him. He denied that he was removed by congress. That he handed over on the 16th December 2010. That he convened the congress meeting of 8th October 2009 and the meeting had over 300 members in attendance. That the meeting of 8th October 2009 did not have the outcome of the meeting with the Minister as part of the agenda. That he knew pharmacist Okehi. He was the Assistant Secretary. That it is not correct to say that the 1st claimant successfully raised the issue of the meeting with the Minister of Education at the meeting of 8th October 2009. That it is equally not correct that pharmacist Okehi corroborated all that the 1st claimant said at the meeting or 8th October 2009. He denied that he staged a walkout of the meeting of 8th October 2009. There was no re-examination of the witness. At the conclusion of trial, parties were ordered to file written addresses as per Order 19 Rule 13 of the NIC Rules 2007. In its written address dated 6th October 2011 but filed on the 1st November 2011, the defendant framed one issue for determination of this court, that is: Whether having regard to the grievance procedure of the union in rule 5 of the code of practice and rules 10(xiii) and 9(xiii) of the constitution of the union, the 1st and 2nd defendants were removed from office on the 8th of October 2009 as chairman and secretary of ASUU/UNIBEN by the Congress. The defendant submitted that having regard to the provision of rule 5 of the code of practice and rules 10(xiii) and 9(xiii) of the constitution of the union, the 1st and 2nd defendants were not removed from office on the 8th of October 2009 as chairman and secretary of ASUU/UNIBEN by the Congress. That Rule 5(ii) of the constitution of the union provides that the constitution shall be deemed to be the basis of the contract between the members to establish and operate the union. In other words, the constitution is the ground norm over which the activities of the union is operated or guided and any act that does not conform with the provision of the constitution or is inconsistent with the express provision of the constitution shall to the extent of its inconsistency be null and void and of no effect whatsoever or howsoever, referring the count to Amaechi v. INEC [2007] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1040), A.G. Abia State v. A.G. Federation [2002] 6 NWLR (Pt. 763) 204 and A.G. Ondo State v. A.G. Federation [2002] 9 NWLR (Pt. 772) 222. That the removal of an elective or appointed branch officer of the union is regulated by the grievances procedure as provided in Rule 5 of the Code of Practice, Rule 9(xiii) and Rule 10(xiii) of the constitution of the union. The Grievance Procedure of the Code of Practice of the union is that where any member has a grievance against any officer of the union or member the grievance procedure as provided in Rule 5 of the code of practice shall be employed by such an aggrieved member. That the said Rule of 5 of the code of practice provides that – The aggrieved member shall write to the branch executive in the first instance, stating clearly his or her grievances. The branch executive shall respond within two weeks of the receipt of the letter. Where the conduct of an officer of the branch is involved, the branch executive committee shall send the case to the appropriate committee of the congress. If things do not change, the aggrieved person may write to the National Secretariat through the President and ask that the branch executive be directed to do the proper thing. A copy of the letter shall be sent to the branch chairperson. The national secretariat shall respond within one month of the receipt of the letter. If the grievances are not addressed, the aggrieved member should write to the branch officer (chairperson or secretary) asking for a congress meeting to be convened and attach original signatures of one third of the membership of the branch. The branch executive shall convene a congress for this purpose within 14 days of the receipt of the letter. If the conduct of any officer other than the chairperson is involved, the letter should be addressed to the chairperson. Complaint against the chairperson should be addressed to the President. If the branch executive does not respond, the president shall respond within one month of the receipt of the letter. Where the conduct of officers is the subject of grievances, congress may set up a committee to examine the grievances and impose disciplinary measures on any erring officer. However, that a close examination of the facts of this case will reveal that the foregoing provision of the grievance procedure as contained in Rule 5 of the Code of Practice was never used by the 1st and 2nd claimants who were the aggrieved members as could be deduced from the document dated 16th of September 2009 and the information to the congress by the 1st claimant on the 8th of October 2009. That contrary to the express provisions of Rule 5(iv) of the grievance procedure, the 2nd claimant did not write a complaint against the chairman to the president of the union neither did the 1st claimant write a complaint to the president against the 1st and 2nd defendants before their purported removal from office on the 8th of October 2009. Similarly that the events of the 17th of September 2009 leading to the setting up of the disciplinary committee headed by Prof Obika and that of the 8th of October 2009 purporting to remove the 1st and 2nd defendants from office was a clear breach of the provision of Rule 5 of the grievance procedure as provide in the Code of Practice. Rule 5(iv) of the Code of Practice specifically provides that complaints against the chairperson should be addressed to the President. However, that the motion for removal of the chairman was addressed to the chairman and not to the president as provided for in the grievance procedure found in Rule 5 of the Code of Practice. That consequently the chairman drew the attention of the congress to this illegality which made the Congress on the 27th of October 2009 as seen in the document dated 27th of October 2009, to dissolve the Prof Obika Committee and same was communicated to Professor Obika via a letter dated 29th of October 2009. The defendants further submitted that the unchallenged evidence of DW1 and DW2 shows that the Prof Obika committee at the Congress of 27th October 2009 was set up based on the illegal procedure erroneously adopted by the congress in setting up the committee. That the letter dated 29th of October 2009 indicated clearly that the dissolution of the committee was communicated to Prof Obika committee. It is also the defendants’ submission that having dissolved the committee and same communicated to it, it lacked the capacity and authority to prepare and submit a report to congress; hence no report whatsoever was submitted to the legitimate congress. Furthermore, that unlike the 2nd claimant who brought his complaint to the chairman, the 1st claimant did not even border to inform the 1st and 2nd defendants of the allegation against them neither did he deem it necessary to even bring a complaint against the 1st and 2nd defendants to the president in line with the provision of the constitution of the union before declaring their removal. The claimants’ action of the 8th of October 2009 was indeed a brazen and brutal rape on the democratic principles enshrine in the constitution of the union. It is a flagrant breach of the provision of Rule 5 of the Code of Practice. That on the 8th of October 2009, the claimants purported to have removed the chairman and the secretary of the branch in their absence on an allegation made by the 1st claimant that they wrote a letter to the Honourable Minister without affording the 1st and 2nd defendants the opportunity to defend themselves. Even though the claimants claimed that the removal of the 1st and 2nd defendants was by Congress, that it may interest the Court to note that up till this present moment the members that constituted the so called congress are still shrouded in secrecy. No evidence was place before the court to ascertain those who constituted themselves into such illegal congress after the legitimate congress had adjourned. That in purporting to remove the 1st and 2nd defendants from office the claimants breached all forms of democratic principles adopted by the union. The claimant failed to follow the basic principle of fair hearing as enshrined in the constitution of the union. It was indeed the most brazen challenge to the constitution of the union. To the defendants, the fact as presented by parties and supported by the 1st resolution of ASUU UNIBEN CONGRESS MEETING held on the 8th October 2009 and the evidence of DW1 and DW2 shows clearly that the meeting which was presided over by the 1st defendant and the 2nd defendant as the secretary was adjourned upon a motion moved by Dr. Aigbokhan and seconded by Dr. Ishiekwene and the meeting thereafter ended at 12.35 pm without any removal from office. The unchallenged evidence of DW1 and DW2 show clearly that the rowdiness and rising tempers of members was brought about by the issue introduced to the house for discussion by the 1st claimant. The chairman who is the 1st defendant advised members to defer discussion on the point raised by the 1st defendant to another time as it was not conducive at that time to discuss the matter; and the meeting was subsequently adjourned. To the defendants, these pieces of evidence remain unchallenged and uncontroverted as the claimant did not give evidence to controvert or challenged the evidence on oath as proffered by the 1st and 2nd defendants. The counsel to the defendants then submitted that where the evidence before the court is neither challenged nor contradicted and not rendered inadmissible by the provisions of any enactment the court would be right and justified in relying on such evidence in arriving at its decision, citing PTF v. I.F.M.S. Ltd [2002] 16 NWLR (Pt. 794) 586 and Aprofim Eng. Cont Ltd v. Sidov Ltd [2006] 13 NWLR (Pt. 996) 73. The defendants, therefore, urged the court to rely on the oral evidence on oath of DW1 and DW2 and the document dated 8th of October 2009 frontloaded by the defendants to come to the conclusion that the 1st and 2nd defendants were never removed from office by either the congress or any person at all. That although the claimants at paragraph 23 and 24 of the statement of facts plead that the 1st and 2nd defendants at the congress meeting of 8th of October 2009 stage-managed a walkout from congress and were subsequently removed from office by the said congress on the 8th of October 2009 without affording them the opportunity to defend themselves of any allegation, and having regard to the provision of Rule 9(xiii) and 10(xiii), could it be said that the purported removal of the 1st and 2nd defendants was legal? Counsel answered in the negative. That Rule 10(xiii) of the constitution provides that a branch shall have the power to remove any officer elected or appointed by it, subject to confirmation by the National Executive Council, whilst Rule 9(xiii) provides that a branch shall have the power to remove any officer for just cause after due process, subject to the right of appeal to the National Executive Council in the first instance and if need be to the National Delegates Conference. The defendants submitted that from the combined provisions of Rules 9 and 10 even though congress has the power to remove any elected branch officer from office, such removal is subject to confirmation by the National Executive Council of the union, and the removal must be on just cause after due process. Further, the purpose of taking disciplinary action against any person by virtue of the provision of Rule 23(iii) means giving the member concern notice of the charges against him or her and affording him or her a reasonable opportunity to defend himself or herself against such charges. That a cursory examination of the facts of this case will reveal that the above provision of the union constitution was not complied with in the purported removal of 1st and 2nd defendants from office. That contrary to the provision of Rules 9(xiii) and 10(xiii) of the constitution the 1st and 2nd defendants were not given notice of charge and neither were they given the opportunity to defend themselves before their purported removal from office on the 8th of October 2009. That more importantly, the purported removal which is by the provisions of Rule 10(xiii) subject to confirmation by the National Executive Council was not confirmed by the National Executive Council. That the National Executive Council by its letter dated the 5th of November refused to confirm the purported removal but restated the position of the National Executive Council that the 1st defendant remains the substantive chairman of the union in Uniben and that any other person purporting or claiming to be so is an imposter. That the event of 8th of October 2009, after the meeting presided over by the chairman was adjourned upon the motion of Dr Aigbovan and seconded by Dr Ishiekwene at 12.35 pm as captured by the claimants in paragraphs 23 and 24 of the statement of facts, clearly shows that the 1st and 2nd defendants were not giving notice of the charges against them neither were they afforded the opportunity to defend themselves in line with the provisions of Rule 9(xiii), 10(xiii) and 23 of the constitution. That the 1st claimant was indeed a judge in his own case. He was the accuser as well as the judge in his complaint. Even the accused persons were not informed of any allegation made out against them before the purported removal. That in the case of R v. Cambridge University (1723) 1 Str. 557, it was held that the right to fair hearing is a very essential right for a person to secure justice. It is embodied as a requirement of natural justice as found in twin principles of nemo judex in causa sua and Audi Alter am Par tem which means one should not be a judge in his own case and that both parties to a dispute must be heard. The two principles put together means that the aggrieved party or person must be given a fair hearing. That section 36 of the 1999 Constitution, as amended provides that a person must be given the opportunity to be heard before the determination of his rights. Also in Adeniyi v. Governing Council of Yaba College of Technology [1993] 6 NWLR (Pt. 300) 526 Karibi – Whyte, JSC attested to the universality of the right to fair hearing when he said that fair hearing is a universal principle of ancient origin and common to mankind. It is recognized by ancient Greeks and Romans, enshrined in the Holy Bible and recognize as part of our indigenous and other African culture and philosophy of justice. It is indeed as asserted by Coke a principle of divine justice. That in Kaunda v. Govt of Malaya [1962] AC 322 it was held that if the right to be heard must be a real right worth any thing it must carry with it a right in the accused man to know the case which is made against him. The defendants further submitted that the purported removal of the 1st and 2nd defendants from office was nothing but an attempted coup against the constitution of the union depriving the 1st and 2nd defendants the right to know the allegation made out against them before they were found guilty and subsequently sanctioned was to say the least barbaric uncivilized and undemocratic. Also that the conduct of the claimants purporting to remove the 1st and 2nd defendants from office is unconstitutional, illegal, null and void and of no effect whatsoever and howsoever. That is indeed why the machinery and control of the union continued to be in the hands of the legitimate leadership headed by the 1st respondent. That the illegality of the claimants was never condoned by the union; it elicited the issuance and service of a query letter dated 3rd November 2009 to all the claimants on ground of anti-union activities. The defendants, therefore, urged the court to hold that the purported removal of the 1st and 2nd defendants from office on the 8th of October is unconstitutional, illegal, null and void and of no effect whatsoever or howsoever and resolve this issue in favour of the defendants and dismiss the claim of the claimants for being vexatious, frivolous, lacking in merit and waste of judicial time. The claimants on their part formulated the following issues for the determination of this court. 1. Whether the Academic Staff Union of Universities, University of Benin Branch can remove its elected officers for misconduct or violation of its rules or code of conduct under its constitution of 2006, as amended. 2. Whether the removal of the 1st and 2nd defendants as officers of the branch is in compliance with the union constitution of 2006, as amended. 3. Whether the 3rd and 4th defendants can unilaterally recognize the 1st and 2nd defendants as legitimate officers of the branch after they have been removed. 4. Whether the 1st and 2nd defendants by their conduct are not estopped from denying their removal as officers of the branch. On issue one, the claimants submitted that, the constitution of the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) 2006, as amended (Exhibit 14) which is applicable to the branch provide copiously for the removal of any elected officer of the branch by the branch. For ease of reference the relevant provision for the determination of this issue are reproduced as follows: Rule 9(xiii) of the extant constitution states thus: A branch shall have the power to remove any branch officer for just cause after due process subject to the right of appeal to the National Executive Council in the first instance, and if need be, to the National Delegates Conference. Rule 10(xiii) A branch shall have power to remove any officer elected or appointed by it, subject to confirmation by the National Executive Council That by parity of the construction of the above quoted rules in the constitution of the Academic Staff Union of Universities, the branch is empowered to remove any branch officer as a remedy for a breach of the right and obligation created by the constitution. That the union operates within the guideline, power and duties set out in the constitution. That all members are bound by the provisions set out in the union’s constitution. On issue two, the claimants submitted that in determining this issue, it must be considered which of the rule applies to the set of circumstance underlining the removal of the branch officer. That the provisions of Rule 9(xiii) and Rule 10(xiii) are relevant provisions contained in the constitution of the union for the removal of any erring officer being the subject of this action. That being so, it was submitted that when there are two provisions of the law in a constitution on the same subject, one general and one special, the special provision will govern the situation, referring to Dapialong v. Dariye [2007] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1036) 332 at 414 – 415 F – G, Ratio 22. Evidently, that the provision of Rule 9(xiii) of the Academic Staff Union of Universities constitution of 2006, as amended, is the applicable provision that was applied in the circumstance, same being the specific provision relating to the removal of branch officers as against the provisions of Rule 10(xiii) that relates to officers generally. That in line with the provisions of the rule, i. A notice for removal (Exhibit 1) dated 16th September 2009 was issued and sent by the 2nd claimant as an aggrieved member to the 1st defendant who acknowledged same. The said notice clearly stated under what provision of the constitution of the union it was brought and the various codes of the union brazenly breached for which the notice became necessary. ii. By a resolution of ASSU-UNIBEN branch congress made on the 17th of September 2009 (Exhibit 2), the 1st defendant while presiding as Chairman acknowledged the receipt of a notice for his removal and thereafter entertained a motion for his removal (Exhibit 1), which catalogued allegations of breach of the code of conduct in the constitution of the union against him as an officer and participated in the vote taken to determine his removal. iii. A seven man committee was set up to investigate the allegations leveled against him and submit findings and appropriate recommendations to determine his removal. iv. By a report of the investigation committee presented to the congress on 5th November 2009 (Exhibit 7), the committee sat for more than 5 weeks had 8 sittings and extended invitation a number of times to the 1st defendant who bluntly refused to honour the invitation to appear before it or submit memorandum while every other person and witness appeared and submitted memorandum. v. Congress by its resolution of the 5th November 2009 deliberated on the report of the investigation committee, accepted all its findings and recommendations and the 1st defendant stood removed as an officer of the branch by the congress resolution (Exhibit 8). The claimants submitted that the twin element of due process and just cause defined in rule 23(iii) and (iv) of the union’s constitution which are preconditions for the exercise of power in rule 9(xiii) of the constitution was fully complied with. However, that the right of removal is made subject to a right of appeal to be exercised by the removed branch officer. The removed officer’s neglect or refusal to appeal against the decision meant an acceptance of the verdict and the right of the National Executive Council or National Delegates Conference to act under the said provision is thereby not activated. That the 1st and 2nd defendants in exercise of their constitutional rights convened a meeting of the branch congress among other reasons to discuss issues bordering on an unauthorized letter to the Honourable Minister of Education. That in the course of congress deliberation on the 8th of October 2009, the 1st and 2nd defendants staged a walkout on the house which was considered a serious misconduct. A unanimous motion was taken on the floor of the house to remove them as officers and appoint the 1st claimant as chairperson and this was confirmed by resolution of the 8th day of October 2009 (Exhibit 6). That a decision taken by the majority for a misconduct committed in the face of congress for which rights and liabilities ensued to members is binding, referring the court to the case of Foss v. Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461. That the principle in the above English case has been adopted locally in quite a number of cases in Nigeria e.g. PDP v. Abubakar [2007] 3 NWLR 515 at 552 G – H, Ratio 19, where the Court of Appeal put it poignantly as follows: The rule in Foss v. Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461 applied to associations, companies, clubs, trade unions and political parties. The rule also known as the majority rule is that disputes between members of the association must be resolved by a majority decision of the members. This can only be known by hearing evidence. On issue three, the claimants submitted that to discuss this issue in the light of the facts and circumstances of this case and having regard to the relevant provisions of the constitution of the union 2006, as amended, the pertinent question to be asked is, can the 3rd and 4th defendants recognize the 1st and 2nd defendants who have been validly removed as legitimate officers of the branch? That the answer can be found in the provision of Rule 9(xiii) of the union’s constitution which is the relevant provisions underlining the exercise of that right. The said provision subjects every disciplinary measure taken against a branch officer to confirmation by the 4th defendant or if need be, to the National Delegate Conference. That gleaned from this clear provision, the right of confirmation can only be exercised where a right of appeal has been exercised by such affected branch officer to the 4th defendant or if need be to the National Delegates Conference. That a right of appeal having not been exercised by the 1st and 2nd defendants to the 4th defendant against the decision of the congress removing them as officers of the branch, the 3rd and 4th defendants cannot under the constitution pretend to exercise any right not conferred on them by any provision of the constitution to recognize the 1st and 2nd defendants as legitimate officers of the branch as they did by Exhibit 13. The relevant provision is clear and unambiguous and must be given its clear and ordinary meaning, there being no addition thereto, citing Obasanjo v. Yusuf [2004] 9 NWLR (Pt. 877) 144 at 192 H – A, Ratio 26. Also that in Obi v. INEC [2007] 11 (Pt. 1046) 565 at 643 E – F, Ratio 24, Aderemi, JSC had this to say – The power of interpretation must be lodged somewhere and the custom of the constitution has lodged it in the judges. If they are to fulfill their functions as judges that power could hardly be lodged elsewhere. But justice according to law which any good judge must ensure he dispenses at times demands that even when he (the judge) is seen to be free by the enormity of the power conferred on him, he is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not knight-errant roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or goodness or what colouration a piece of law should take. The judge must always draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. The next question that follows is what are these principles? Judges, in exercise of their interpretative jurisdiction, must only interpret the words of a statute or constitutional provision where they are clear as crystal, according to their ordinary and grammatical meanings without colouration. It is true that courts are always enjoined, in the course of interpreting the provisions, to find out the intention of legislature, but there is no magical wand in this counseling. The limitation of legislature, or put bluntly, the intention of National Assembly at the Federal level or State House of Assembly at the State level, is not to be judged by what is in its mind but by its expression of that mind couched in the words of the statute. If at the end of the interpretative exercise carried out on the provisions of statute or constitution, a judex personal conviction as to where the justice and rightness of the matter lies is returned, that would make the judiciary lose its credibility, authority and its legitimacy. That will not be healthy for the development of law and its administration. On issue 4, the claimants submitted that it is evident that in the entire circumstances of this matter, certain facts stand out undisputed. i. That the 1st defendant received a notice of removal served on him by the 2nd claimant. ii. That the 1st defendant while presiding over branch congress session on 17th September 2009 entertained a motion for his removal as Chairman and vote was taken in which he participated. iii. That an investigation committee was set up to look into the allegation of misconduct leveled against him. iv. That the investigation committee sat and extended invitations to the 1st defendant to appear and to submit memorandum. v. That the 1st defendant turned down the invitations of the Investigation Committee on an untenable reason that the National President of the union advised him that due process was not followed in the procedure for his removal. vi. That the 1st and 2nd defendant convened a branch congress meeting on 8th October 2009 and staged a walk out while the session was still on. To the claimants, in the face of these undisputed facts, can the 1st and 2nd defendants who have acquiesced to an irregular procedure (though not conceded) subsequently complain that the procedure is irregular? That a party who acquiesced to an irregular procedure cannot subsequently complain that the procedure adopted is irregular. The court was referred to Duke v. Akpabuyo L.G [2006] Monthly Judgments of the Supreme Court of Nigeria Vol. 2 page 94 at 116 – 118 B – C, Ratio 4 where the court said – The appropriate time at which a party to a proceeding, should raise an objection based on procedural irregularity is at the commencement of the proceedings or at the time when the irregularity arises. If the party “sleeps” on that right and allows the proceedings to continue on the irregularity to finality (as happened in the case leading to this appeal), then the party cannot be heard to complain, at the concluding or concluded stage of the proceedings or appeal thereafter, that there was procedural irregularity which vitiated the proceedings. Also in Governor, Ekiti State v. Ojo [2006] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1007) 95 at 118 C – E, Ratios 4 and 5 the Court of Appeal (Ilorin Division) stated the position clearly thus: By virtue of section 151 of the Evidence Act, when one person by his declaration, act or omission intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act on such belief, neither he nor his representative in interest shall be allowed in any proceedings between himself and such representative in interest to deny the truth of that thing. In what they termed “argument on defences raised,” the claimants submitted that the defendants did not file a counterclaim; therefore, the address and consideration of same must orbit within the canvass and universe of the claimants’ reliefs adumbrated on the initiating process. That worthy of consideration are some shadow defences raised by the defendants in their statement of defence, namely – i. That the grievances procedure in the code of conduct was not complied with. ii. That the seven man committee set up by the branch congress was disbanded by the 2nd defendant on 27th October 2009. iii. That the 1st and 2nd defendants have been holding parallel congress sessions even after institution of this action. On the argument that grievance procedure was not complied with, the claimant submitted that the Investigation Committee in its report made a mince meat of this defence as is evident in the 5th November 2009 Report (Exhibit 7). That there was compliance with the grievance procedure. That the code of practice cannot be applied to conflict with any provision of the constitution of the union 2006, as amended. That the constitution clearly provides for the procedure for the removal of a branch officer. Any derogation from the constitutional procedure by the code of conduct provision will be null and void and no effect having regard to Rule 5(vii) of the same constitution. That the 1st and 2nd defendants to obfuscate issues deliberately doctored a resolution to misrepresent facts that the congress session of the 8th day of October 2009 ended duly without the necessity of a stage-managed walk out. That the claimants on their part relied on a resolution of the 8th day of October 2009 to show that the 1st and 2nd defendant’s stage-managed a walk out. To determine the version of the resolution to believe and rely on, the court will look at facts outside the resolutions. Curiously, why was it necessary for the 1st and 2nd defendants to deny the existence of a report of the seven man investigation committee in the face of Exhibit 7 when there was no contrary report? Why was there desperation on the part of the 1st and 2nd defendants to cut short the life of an investigation committee duly set up by congress? That the oral evidence of the 1st and 2nd defendants as DW1 and DW2 clearly brought out their culture of impunity and made their evidence unbelievable and unreliable as can be gleaned from facts elicited from them under cross-examination. That it is evident on record that the 1st defendant purportedly presided over a parallel congress and initiated the purported disbandment of a committee validly set up by a congress presided over by 1st claimant to look into allegations leveled against the 1st defendant. This desperation is made apparent in paragraphs 16, 33 and 37 of the defendant’s extant statement of defence where there exist a violent variance on the date the parallel congress purportedly disbanded the seven man investigative committee. That there is a leap between 14th October 2009 and 27th October 2009 and so urged the Court to believe and place reliance on the resolution of the claimants (Exhibit 6) of the 8th day of October 2009 as the probable version of what transpired and disbelieve the parallel resolution of the defendants. Also, that documentary evidence is the hanger on which oral evidence is assessed. The 2nd defendant who appeared before the seven man investigation committee on the 9th of October 2009 cannot purport to issue a letter on behalf of a parallel congress presided over by the 1st defendant to disband a committee set up validly by congress to look into allegation leveled against the 1st defendant. That it will amount to the 1st and 2nd defendants being judges in their own cause. More so, the law should not allow the 2nd defendant to approbate and reprobate at the same time, citing Skye Bank Plc v. Akinpelu [2010] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1198) 178 at 198 E, Ratio 12. That the admission that the 1st and 2nd defendants have been holding parallel congress sessions even after the institution of the claimant’s suit is contemptuous and a crude resort to self help. Also cited is Gov, Lagos State v. Ojukwu 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 621 at 636 B – E, Ratio 27 (citation is incomplete), where Obaseki, JSC had this to say – In the area where rule of law operates, the rule of self help by force is abandoned. Nigeria being one of the countries in the world which proclaim loudly to follow the rule of law, there is no room for the rule of self help by force to operate. Once a dispute has arisen between a person and the government or authority and the dispute has been brought before the court, thereby invoking judicial powers of the state, it is the duty of the government to allow the law take its course or allow the legal and judicial process to run its full course. The action the Lagos State Government took can have no other interpretation than the show of intention to pre-empt the decision of the court. The courts expect the utmost respect of the law from the government itself which rules by the law. The claimants further submitted that facts occurring after the institution of a suit which was not there at the time of accrual of the cause of action cannot be relied on to defend an action or enforce a counterclaim, citing the case of Gowon v. Ike-Okongwu [2003] Vol. 4 Monthly Judgments of the Supreme Court of Nigeria page 120 at 127 G. Ratio 3. That the very overreaching step taken after the institution of this suit is caught by the legal doctrine of lis pendens, citing Haruna v. KSHA [2010] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1194) 604 at 657 E – H, Ratio 2. That this court has inherent powers to reverse every adverse step taken whilst the suit was already pending. That this court can also make such consequential orders to give effect to the judgment should judgment be delivered in favour of the claimants. Also that in Obi v. INEC (supra) at 645 E – G, Ratio 35 the Supreme Court speaking through Chukwuma-Enah, JSC said – I must say that the court does not allow litigant parties pending litigation to foist on the court a fait accompli and thus render the decision of the court utterly nugatory. In this regard the 1st and 5th respondents should in the overall interest of the rule of law have averted the untoward consequences of having proceeded unabashedly with the conduct of the Governorship election in Anambra State and the subsequent swearing-in of the 5th respondent as Governor of Anambra State. The electoral process relating to this office should have awaited the outcome of this matter and save everybody. If I may so put it, the unnecessary embarrassment. [This sentence appears incomplete.] The 1st respondent should have known better with a team of lawyers assisting it. The claimants submitted finally that they have proved their case on the preponderance of evidence as required by law and are, therefore, entitled to judgment as per their reliefs. In reply on points of law the defendants submitted that the applicable provision to the case at hand is the provision of Rule 10(xiii) of the ASUU constitution and not Rule 9(xiii) of the ASUU constitution as postulated by the claimant. That both provisions are reproduced hereunder for ease of reference: Rule 9 (xiii) of the extant constitution states thus: A Branch shall have the power to remove any branch officer for just cause after due process subject to the right of appeal of the National Executive Council in the first instance, and if need be, to the National Delegates Conference. Rule 10 (xiii) of the extant constitution states thus: A Branch shall have the power to remove any officer elected or appointed by it, subject to confirmation by the National Executive Council. That a careful and critical analysis of the two provisions of the law puts it beyond doubt that the applicable provision is Rule 10(xiii) on the legal principle expressed in latin thus, generalia specialibus non derogant i.e. when there are two provisions of law governing a particular subject matter the specific provision takes precedence, referring to the Supreme Court case of Schroder v. Major & Co. (Nig) Ltd (Pt. 101) 1 at 21 (citation not supplied). That it is trite law that facts admitted need no further proof and it is evident from the pleadings of both parties that both the 1st and 2nd defendants are principal officers of the Executive Committee of the University of Benin, precisely branch Chairman and Secretary of ASUU, University of Benin. Rule 9(ix) of the ASUU constitution provides thus: There shall be a Branch Executive Committee comprising the Chairperson, the Secretary, the Assistant Secretary, the Financial Secretary, the Treasurer, the Internal Auditor and the immediate past Chairperson. That Rule 9(x) of the extant constitution provides thus: To be elected a member of the Branch Executive Committee a candidate must obtain a majority of votes of members present and voting at Biennial General Meeting in a secret ballot. That a community reading of the above provisions shows clearly that the ASUU constitution creates the office of the 1st defendant who is the Chairman of the Executive Committee and the 2nd defendant who is the Secretary of the Executive Committee; and to assume those offices such members must be elected. That the submission of the claimants that Rule 9(xiii) and not Rule 10(xiii) is wholly and totally misconceived as same is not supported by the facts of this case and the clear and unambiguous provisions of the ASUU constitution. That in Wilson v. A.G. Bendel State & ors [1995] 1 NWLR (Pt. 4) (incorrect Part) 572 the Supreme Court held that where words used in a document are clear and unambiguous their ordinary meaning should prevail. The defendants, therefore, urged the court to discountenance the said submission as it is trite that where the provision of a statute is clear and unambiguous the Court has no other duty than to apply same, referring to Udoh-Osho v. CBN [2010] Vol. 52 WRN (no page number provided). The defendants also urged the court to hold that Rule 10(xiii) is the applicable provision in the instant case in view of the arguments canvassed on this issue. That Rule 10(xiii) made provision for the removal of elected executive members of the branch. That having specifically provided for removal of elected members of the branch, the provision of Rule 10(xiii) shall apply in the removal of the 1st and 2nd defendants who are elected executive members of the branch and not Rule 9(xiii) as posited by the claimant. That, assuming the Court is even minded of applying Rule 9(xiii), it is submitted that Rule 9 cannot give effect to the illegality of the claimant. That Rule 9 specifically provides that an executive member can only be removed for just cause after due process. That just cause has been defined in Rule 23(iv) of the ASUU constitution as follows: Just cause for the purpose of taking disciplinary action against any member include a breach of any union rules and regulations in force, or breach of any union rules and regulations in force, or a breach of any rule of code of conduct or any other misconduct declared to be Biennial delegates conference, provided that a decision of the Biennial delegates conference in such matter shall be final. That the claimants have failed to refer this court to the specific rule of the union or any specific regulation of the union in force which the 1st and 2nd defendants could be said to have breached, neither have the claimants referred the court to any decision of the Biennial Delegates’ Conference of the union that was breached by any of the defendants. The defendants, therefore, submitted that in the absence of any reference to the breach of any written rule or regulation of the union in force the provision of Rule 9(xiii) cannot be invoked against the 1st and 2nd defendants by the claimants. The defendants then urged the court to dismiss the claimant’s action as same is frivolous, wholly and totally misconceived, lacking in merit, an abuse of court process and deserving a dismissal. After a careful consideration of the processes and submissions of the parties including the exhibits frontloaded by the parties, the issue to be determined in this suit is whether the 1st and 2nd defendants were removed from office on the 8th of October 2009. The claimants had argued that the 1st and 2nd defendants were validly removed from office on the 8th October 2009. That the said removal was in compliance with Rule 9(xiii) of the ASUU constitution. The claimants, therefore, argued that the said removal was in accordance with the constitution of ASUU which binds all its members including the 1st and 2nd defendants. The defendants on the other hand argued that having regard to the provisions of rule 5 of the code of practice and rules 10(xiii) and 9(xiii) of the ASUU constitution, the 1st and 2nd defendnats were not removed from office as Chairman and Secretary because the grievance procedure of the code of practice of the union was not followed. The claimants apart from relying on their pleadings and frontloaded documents did not call in any witness to prove how the said congress meeting of 8th October 2009 which purportedly removed the 1st and 2nd defendant was conducted so as to be cross-examined; more so as the defendants have argued that the grievance procedure and due process were not followed as it is trite law that pleadings alone do not amount to evidence. This court has not been told how many people were at the said meeting and how many for instance voted to remove the 1st and 2nd defendants. The evidence on oath of the 1st and 2nd defendants is to the effect that the 1st defendant stepped aside at the meeting on his own volition after which he resumed as the chairman of the meeting after the Prof. Obika’s committee was constituted. We believe the oral testimony of the 1st and 2nd that they were not validly removed from their respective positions in the union. This is principally because there is no evidence from the claimants to contradict their testimony. We, therefore, hold that the 1st and 2nd defendants were not validly removed from office. Rule 9(viii) of the ASUU constitution, in our view, is to the effect that the powers of the congress to remove any Branch Executive Member is not absolute. That it has to follow due process, for a just cause and subject to the confirmation of same by the National Executive Council or the National Delegates Conference. This much is emphasized by the provisions of Rule 10(xiii) of the ASUU constitution. The question is, was the said removal of the 1st and 2nd defendants confirmed by the National Executive Council of ASUU? We do not think so as the National President of the 3rd defendant in a letter to the authorities of the University of Benin i.e. Exhibit B stated without any equivocation, that the purported removal of the 1st defendant did not have the blessings of the National Executive Council and is, therefore, illegal. That is to say any action taken against the 1st and 2nd defendants by the Uniben Branch of ASUU must have the confirmation of the National Executive Council of ASUU and in this case that was not so. This suit, therefore, fails and is hereby dismissed. The claimants shall pay cost of N30,000 to the respondents. Judgment is entered accordingly. …………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip Presiding Judge ……………………………………… …...……………………………… Hon. Justice O. A. Obaseki-Osaghae Hon. Justice J. T. Agbadu-Fishim Judge