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RULING The Complaint by which this action was commenced by the Claimant was filed on the 7th of April, 2011. The Complaint was accompanied with Claimant’s Statement of Claims, List of Witnesses and Sworn Statement on Oath among others. On the other hand, the 1st – 7th Respondents filed a Memorandum of Appearance on the 24th of May, 2011. Also, the 1st & 3rd Respondents filed their joint Statement of Defence July 11, 2011. There are two sets of Preliminary Objections filed in this case. The first is dated the 24th day of June, 2011 and filed the same date. It is accompanied with a written address. It is filed on behalf of the 4th Defendant by Alih O.Z. of Counsel. The second one is dated the 28th day of June, 2011 and filed the 30th day of June, 2011 on behalf of the 1st & 3rd Defendants by their Counsel. It is also accompanied with a written address. The Claimant filed two sets of Replies to the 1st & 3nd defendants’ and 4th Defendant’s Written Addresses on the two sets of Preliminary Objections. The two sets of Replies are both dated the 7th of July, 2011 and both filed on the 8th of July 2011. The 1st & 3rd Defendants’ Reply on Points of Law to the Claimant’s Reply is dated the 14th of July, 2011 and filed on their behalf by their Counsel on the 20th of July, 2011. The 4th Defendant however did not file any reply on points of law to the Claimant’s Reply. When the matter came up on the 21st of October, 2011 Counsel to the Claimant applied that the names of the 5th – 7th Defendants be struck out the suit and their manes were accordingly struck out. Thereafter, Counsel to the 1st & 3rd Defendants adopted their joint Written Address on the Preliminary Objection earlier referred to. The Written Address of the 4th Defendant in respect of its Preliminary Objection was also adopted by its Counsel. Counsel to the Claimant also adopted the Replies to the Written Addresses of the 1st & 3rd Defendants and the 4th Defendant. Counsel to the 1st & 3rd Defendants thereafter adopted his Reply on Points of Law to the Claimant’s Reply. Thereafter, the case was adjourned to 18th of November for ruling. The main ground of objection of the 4th Defendant is that the 4th Defendant is not a juristic personality and therefore the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit. Counsel to the 4th Defendant argued that the 4th Defendant is merely a position without legal capacity or personality. That such ministerial office is created at the whims and caprices of the President by virtue of section 147(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (1999 Constitution). He submitted further that the position of a Minister of the Federation as provided for under sections 147 – 148 of the 1999 Constitution is the same thing with the position of a Commissioner in the State as provided for under sections 192 -193 of the 1999 Constitution. He submitted that the Court had held in PGSS Ikachi v. Igbudu (2005) 12 NWLR (Pt. 940) 543 C.A. at 566 para. A. that the Commissioner of Education of Benue State is not a juristic personality. He urged the Court to dismiss this case since the 4th Defendant is not a juristic personality or in the alternative strike out the name of the 4th Defendant. He also argued that the non-juristic personality of the 4th Defendant affects the jurisdiction of the Court. He cited Fawehinmi v. NBA NO. 2 (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt. 105) 558 para. A, 640 -641 paras. F – A., Agbonmagbe Bank v. GM GB Olivant Ltd & Anor (1961) All NLR 116, and Carlen Nig. Ltd v. Unijos & Anor (1994) 1 NWLR (Pt. 323) at 63. The main grounds of the Preliminary Objection of the 1st & 3rd Defendant are that: (1) the case is caught by section 2(a) of the Public Officer’s Protection Act, CAP. P41, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 (Public Officers Protection Act) a statute of limitation; and (2) that the Court also lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit as the Claimant did not annex the proceedings of the tribunal that dismissed him as required by law. He submitted that the cause of action in this case arose on the 29th of September, 2009 when the Claimant was dismissed from the service of the Nigerian Army. He claimed that this suit was filed on the 8th of April, 2011, well over the 3 months limitation period contained in the Public Officers Protection Act and that as such the action is statute-barred and that therefore the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain it. He referred to paragraph 1 of the Claimant’s Statement of Claim wherein the date of dismissal is contained. He submitted that the Court only needs to look at the Statement of Claim and the Complaint to decide the issue of limitation period. He submitted that the 1st & 3rd Defendants are public officers by virtue of section 318 (1)(x) of the 1999 Constitution where the public officers and service of the Federation are listed to include the 1st & 3rd defendants. He cited Ibrahim v. JSC (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt. 584) SC 1 and a host of other authorities. He argued that the effect of finding that an action is statute-barred is that of order dismissing the action. He cited Unity Bank PLC v. Nwadike (2009) (Pt. 1131) 325 at 381 and Yakubu v. NITEL Ltd (2006) 9 NWLR (Pt.985) 367 at 375. Counsel to the 1st & 3rd Defendants however, did not say anything in respect of the second leg of his grounds of objection; that is, on the failure of the Claimant to annex proceedings of the tribunal that dismissed him from the service. This ground is therefore deemed to have been abandoned by Counsel. In the Claimant’s Reply to the 4th Defendant’s Preliminary Objection, Counsel to the Claimant submitted that contrary to the submission of the Counsel to the 4th Defendant to the contrary that the 4th Defendant is a juristic personality that can sue and be sued. He argued that the 4th Defendant is a position created by the Constitution whose duty included the supervision of the 1st Defendant, as such he is answerable for the actions and omissions of the 1st Defendant. He cited Ataguba & Co. v. Grura Ltd (2005) 2KLR (Pt. 191 -193 p. 411 at 413. He finally submitted that by virtue of section 254C- (1)(a) – (k) of the 1999 Constitution, this Court has jurisdiction to hear this suit. He finally urged the Court to dismiss the objection. In his reply to 1st & 3rd Defendants’ Preliminary Objection, the Claimant’s Counsel submitted that contrary to their Counsel’s submission, the suit of the Claimant is not statute-barred. He said a cause of action is said to arise when the entire factual situation, not just some, giving rise to the case has arisen. He relied on NPA v. Abu Airadion Ajobi (2006) 7SCNJ 168; (2006) 13 NWLR (Pt. 998) 447 and Adekoya v. Federal Housing Authority (2008) 4 KLR (Pt. 252 at 1425. He argued further that while it is true that the Claimant was dismissed on the 29th of September, 2009, that there were however series of correspondence between the Claimant and the Defendants which culminated in the response from the Defendants confirming the Claimant’s dismissal. He said this response was dated the 10th May, 2010 and was received by the Claimant on the 2nd of March, 2011. He said the 2nd of March, 2011 is therefore the effective date of the cause of action. And that therefore the case which was filed on 8th day of April 2011 was not caught by the statute of limitation. He submitted that by virtue of section 254C-(1)(a) & (k) that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit. He finally urged the Court to dismiss the objection. In the 1st & 3rd Defendants Reply on Points of Law, their Counsel contended that all the authorities cited by the Claimant were either not relevant or did not support the Claimant’s case. He also argued that the facts of the authorities are not in consonance with the case at hand. He maintained that this Court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain this suit and that the action is statute-barred thereof. He also argued that the Claimant did not satisfy the requirement of Order 3 Rule 5 of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007 (NIC Rules 2007) by failing to attach the the decision of the lower tribunal being complained against. He finally urged the Court to discountenance the submissions of the Claimant’s Counsel and sustain his Preliminary Objection. I have most painstakingly read the Briefs of all the parties concerned and have also checked the authorities cited by all the parties through their respective Counsel. I would like to take the Preliminary Objection of the 1st & 3rd Defendants first as it has the tendency of finally determining the action one way or the order. The crux of the arguments of the two parties on the Preliminary Objections of the 1st & 3rd Defendants seemed to me to centre on when it could be said that the cause of action arose from which the effective date of the statute of limitation could be reckoned. In humble view, all other issues or arguments are ancillary to this. Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act provides that any action against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution of any Act, Law or public duty or authority or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such Act or Law, duty or authority shall be brought within three months of the act, neglect or default complained of. The contention is, which of the two dates: the 29th of September, 2009 and the 2nd of March, 2011, is the effective date on which the cause of action, in this case, arose for the purpose of the Public Officers Protection Act. The Counsel to the 1st & 3rd Defendants submitted that the date from which the cause of action arose is the 29th of September, 2009 when the Claimant was dismissed from the Nigerian Army. On the other hand, the Counsel to the Claimant posited that the 2nd of March, 2011 is the date on which the cause of action arose. The two sides are in agreement that the Claimant was dismissed from the service on the 29th of September, 2009. However, the Counsel to the Claimant argued that there were series of correspondence between the Claimant and the Defendants on the issue of the dismissal of the Claimant. And that eventually on the 2nd of March, 2011 the Claimant received a letter from the Defendants which was dated the 10th of May, 2010 confirming the Claimant’s dismissal. He therefore posited that because of the receipt of this letter on the 2nd of March, 2011, the cause of action therefore arose on the 2nd of March on which the Claimant received the letter confirming his dismissal. When does a cause of action arise? In Adekoya v. FHA (2008) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1099) 539 at 557 – 558 the Supreme Court held that: A cause action accrues the moment a wrong is done to the plaintiff by the defendant. And when there is a contractual agreement, a cause action accrues when there is a breach of the agreement, and not from the date the agreement was entered into by the parties. Then the question is, what is the wrong in issue here; and when was the wrong committed against the Claimant? In my humble view, the wrong in issue and which is committed against the Claimant is his dismissal from the Nigerian Army. And when was this wrong committed? The simple answer is that it was committed on the 29th of September, 2009 and not on the 2nd of March, 2011 when the Claimant received a letter from the defendants confirming the dismissal of the Claimant. After all, from that 29th of September, 2009 the Claimant vacated his office and ceased to be an officer of the Nigerian Army. If anything, the effect of the letter of confirmation is an affirmation of the act of dismissal of the Claimant on the 29th of September, 2009. When an action is statute-barred it cannot be revived by either admission or correspondence or negotiation from the defendant. This is evident in the Supreme Court’s decision in Owners of the MV “Arabella” v. Nig. Agricultural Insurance Corporation (2008) 11NWLR (Pt. 1097) 183 SC at 218 paras. F – H where it was held that: With the greatest respect, having held that the cause of action arose either about September, 1991 or in May, 1993, the action having been brought in January, 1996 i.e. more than the (12) twelve months period specified in the Decree, the learned trial Judge, was in gross error in relying on an alleged admission which in any case, was made, after the action had already been statute-barred. The said admissions, were made in the said exhibits in 1995. The question I or one may ask is, did the so-called admission retrospectively, revive the the suit that was already “dead” having been caught by the limitation period? I think not. In fact, the learned Judge “imported” the doctrine of admission which is a common law principle, into a statutory provision. This is not right. The said admission, was about twenty-two (22) months after the action was statute-barred. As in the above case, the correspondence in question was written on 10th May, 2010 and received by the Claimant on the 2nd of March, 2011, which in either case was outside the limitation period of three months. What is more, in this instance, there was no admission but rather a confirmation and affirmation of the dismissal of the Claimant which relates to and revalidates the 29th of September, 2009 as the date the cause of action arose. The 1st – 3rd Defendants Counsel has cited Unity Bank Plc v. Nwadike (2009) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1131) 352 C.A. at 376 para. H to the effect that: Negotiation does not stop the period of limitation of action from running. This view is undoubtedly correct. In a case caught by of statute of limitation, a court is not concerned with the merit of the case, but simply with whether the case falls outside the limitation period. This is why the Supreme Court said in Egbe v. Adefarasin (No. 2) (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 47) 1 that: ... if an action was barred by statute, no amount of resort to the merit of the of appellant’s contention will serve to keep the action in being. Once a court comes to the conclusion that an action is statute-barred, it goes to the very nerve of the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the action and the court is thus robbed of its jurisdiction – see Owners of the MV “Arabella” v. N.A.I.C. supra 210 paras. C – D., see also Emiator v. Nigerian Army (1999) 12 NWLR (Pt. 631) 362. Therefore, the contention of the Claimant’s Counsel that the Court has jurisdiction over this case is grossly misconceived. In sum total, I therefore agree entirely with the Counsel to the 1st & 3rd Defendants that the action of the Claimant commenced on the 8th of April, 2011 is statute-barred having been commenced more than 18 months after the cause of action arose on the 29th of September, 2009: that is, more than 15 months outside the three months limitation period provided for by section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act. In the circumstance, I entertain no hesitation in holding that the action is statute barred. Consequently, I hereby strike out the suit as being statute-barred- see Owners of the MV “Arabella” v. N.A.I.C. supra at 219 paras. C- F, Alhaji Ajibona v. Alhaji Kolawole & Anor (1996) 10 NWLR (Pt. 476) 22. Having held that the case is statute-barred and that the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain it thereby, the issue of whether or not the 4th Defendant is a juristic personality becomes merely academic or dead as the Court now lacks jurisdiction to look into any further issue. I make no order as to cost. ……………………………………………. Hon. Justice B.A. Adejumo, OFR President, National Industrial Court of Nigeria