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JUDGMENT The claimant commenced this action in this court by complaint under Order 3 Rule 1 of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007 on September 30, 2009 claiming against the defendant as follows:- a. A declaration that the summary dismissal of the claimant vide the letter dated 11/5/09 is wrongful and unlawful whatsoever. b. The sum of N4,821,047.73k (Four million, eight hundred and twenty-one thousand, forty-seven Naira and seventy-three kobo only) being the full and final entitlements of the claimant as a result of the purported termination of his employment vide the letter of dismissal dated 11/5/09 by the defendant company. On October 23, 2009 Mr. Michael Akhigbe entered a conditional appearance on behalf of the defendant. He also filed the defendant’s statement of defense and a preliminary objection, which the Court in a considered ruling dismissed on May 7, 2010. Thereafter, the matter went to trial. The claimant testified on behalf of himself and his testimony was essentially the same with the facts as contained in his statement of claims (facts) and in the claimant’s answer to the query issued to him by the defendant on the alleged misconduct. The defendant rested its case on that of the claimant. Then parties filed written addresses on this case. The claimant’s written address was filed on his behalf by Mr. Samuel Etaifo on November 4, 2011 while the defendant’s written address was filed by Qudus Mumuney Esq. on November 23, 2011. The claimant’s reply on points of Law was filed by Mr. Samuel Etaifo on November 29, 2011. The facts of this case are that the claimant was employed by the defendant company as a technician grade 3 (Rewinder) vide a letter of appointment dated 28/1/94 (item 1 on the list of the claimant’s documents). The claimant’s employment was subsequently confirmed by the defendant vide a letter dated 31/03/95 (item 2) and he was promoted at various times vide letters of promotion dated 6/12/95; 25/04/01; 2/12/04; 1/11/06 and 16/2/07 respectively (items 4). However, on April 29, 2009 he was confronted with issuing out “two sets of seals’ vide a letter of query (items 6). The claimant’s defense is that he gave out these items with the knowledge and consent of his superior officers. He was eventually summarily dismissed from the defendant’s employment vide a letter dated May 11, 2009 (item 8).The claimant tried to seek redress through his solicitors but when this failed he filed this suit and claims against the defendant. As a preamble in his written address on behalf of the claimant, Mr. Samuel Etaifo submitted that the election of the defendant to rest its case on that of the claimant is an admission by the defendant company of the facts and evidence adduced by the claimant at the trial of this case, referring to Toriola v. Williams [1982] 7 SC 27 particularly at 37. Counsel continued that where the evidence of a party is unchallenged and unrebutted that party is entitled to judgment because the unrebutted facts are taken to have been admitted and, therefore, need no proof. He referred to Oikherhe v. Inwanfero [1997] 7 NWLR (Pt. 512) at 226, Ratio 10. Then learned counsel raised a sole issue for determination thus: The defendant company having admitted the sufficient facts and evidence adduced at the trial of this case by virtue of resting her case on the claimant’s case, whether the claimant is entitled to the claims/reliefs sought by him against the defendant company. Mr. Etaifo submitted that although it is trite law that an employer can terminate the employment of a worker with or without any reason, referring to Ziideeh v. Rivers State Civil Service Commission [2007] All FWLR (Pt. 354) 243 at 246, Ratio 3, such exercise of power must be in accordance with the terms of the contract of service or else the employer will be liable to damages. Counsel then cited Odeh v. Asaba Textile Mill Plc [2004] All FWLR (Pt. 224) at 2163, Ratio 4. He continued that for an employee who is wrongfully terminated nay dismissed (from his employment), he must put before the court the contract of service (item 3) and plead facts to show that he was wrongfully dismissed. To the counsel, the claimant has satisfied these conditions by frontloading the 1st to 3rd documents before the court and also by testifying that he worked with the defendant for 15 years before he was dismissed. Counsel went on that the claimant was unequivocal in his testimony before the court that he released two seals to a supplier with the knowledge of his superiors in the defendant’s company to enable the supplier procure the correct size of seals needed and that he has been giving out samples to suppliers like that in the past since there was no laid down procedure to that effect. The two seals given out to the supplier were in fact rejected by the claimant because they were not the actual size needed. These assertions of the claimant remain unchallenged and it is necessary to note that the defendant company did not adduce any evidence to prove their assertion that there is a laid down procedure to follow before samples can be given out to suppliers in such circumstance. Counsel to the claimant submitted that even if there is a laid down procedure for the release of samples to suppliers by employees in the defendant company (which the claimant did not concede), it is trite law that a single act of disobedience by the claimant is not enough to warrant his dismissal from the employment of the defendant company, commending to the court Express Insurance Company Limited v. National Union of Banks, Insurance and Financial Institutions Employees (NUBIFIE) DJNIC at 228, Ratio 2 and Nigerian Breweries Limited v. National Union of Food, Beverages and Tobacco Employees DJNIC at 264, Ratio 4. Counsel also referred to Bramwell J’S comment in the old case of Horton v. M’Murtry 157 ER 1347 at 1350. Continuing, that the claimant was not given a warning, if at all he erred. That this Court stated that the rule of good industrial relations practice requires that warnings be given before dismissal, referring to Management of Express Insurance Company Limited v. National Union of Banks, Insurance and Financial Union Employees DJNIC at 193, Ratio 2. Mr. Etaifo, therefore, submitted that the failure of the defendant company to follow the prudent step of issuing a warning to the claimant, if at all he erred, confirmed the ulterior motive of the defendant as pleaded in paragraph 19 of the statement of claim (facts) which remains uncontroverted or unchallenged, as a general denial contained in paragraph 2 of the statement of defense is not a denial in law. He further submitted that having proved that he was wrongfully dismissed from the employment of the defendant company, this court has unfettered power to convert his summary dismissal to termination of appointment and that the claimant be paid his terminal benefits and entitlements, commending to the court Management of Express Insurance Company Limited v. National Union of Banks, Insurance and Financial Institutions Employees (NUBIFIE) DJNIC at 228, Ratio 3 and Metal Products Senior Staff Association of Nigeria v. Management of Metal Construction (W. A.) Ltd DJNIC 237, Ratio 3. Counsel again submitted that since the claimant was dismissed wrongfully by the defendant, he is entitled to his legitimate emoluments/entitlements such as one month salary in lieu of termination, half a salary for the month of May 2009 and gratuity due to him at the time his employment was brought to an end, referring to Angel Spinning & Dyeing Ltd v. Ajah [2002] FWLR (Pt. 23) at 1332, Ratio 7 and Cooperative & Commerce Bank v. Okonkwo [2002] FWLR (Pt. 97) at 639, Ratios 1 and 2. The claimant’s position is that his testimony during trial and his documentary evidence (especially item 5, which is his April 2009 pay slip) have proved his entitlements to the sum of N4,821,047.73k as claimed because they remained unrebutted or uncontroverted. This indicates that the claimant’s salary is N78,391.02 per month and the terminal entitlements, which is his gratuity is N4,703,461.02, totaling N4,821,047.73k in all. That this was pleaded in paragraphs 21 and 22 of his statement of claim and that it is contained in the employee’s hand book (item 3) at paragraph 23. In addition to the above, learned counsel to the claimant submitted that the law abhors a situation where a party will approbate and reprobate on an issue. He argued that the letter of meritorious service (item 10) given to the claimant and the attached gift (item 11) show clearly that the defendant acknowledged the meritorious service of the claimant even though his dismissal was orchestrated by few individuals in the defendant company with an ulterior motive of depriving the claimant his entitlements. He, therefore, urged the court to give judgment to the claimant as prayed as his evidence before the court remains unchallenged and uncontroverted. Mr. Qudus Mumuney filed a written address on behalf of the defendant and raised four issues for determination as follows: I. Whether or not the claimant has succeeded in proving his case. II. Whether or not the dismissal of the claimant was wrong and unlawful. III. Whether or not the claimant is entitled to the sum of N4,821,047.73k (Four Million, Eight Hundred and Twenty-One Thousand, Forty-Seven Naira and Seventy-Three Kobo) as the full and final entitlement of the claimant. IV. Whether or not the option of the defendant to rest his case on the case of the claimant amount to an admission of the claim of the claimant by the defendant. Arguing the 1st issue of whether or not the claimant has succeeded in proving his case, Mr. Mumuney maintained that our superior courts have overtime reiterated the elements a claimant must prove to get a declaration of court that his dismissal was wrongful and resultantly a nullity. That the claimant must plead and prove, inter alia, that he is an employee of the defendant; that he was appointed under certain terms and conditions and that he is only terminable under the stipulated terms and conditions. Counsel referred to A. I. Ibekwe v. Imo State Education Management Board [2009] All FWLR (Pt. 488) 297 at 309 C – D in support of the argument. He submitted that where the appointment and terms of the employment are in writing, the necessary elements can only be proved through documentary evidence. Mr. Mumuney reproduced the provisions of sections 131 to 133 of the Evidence Act 2011 on the party that has burden of proof in civil matters, which lies with the claimant who asserts. He also referred to Ebeani Nwavu & ors v. Chief Patrick Okoye & ors [2009] All FWLR (Pt. 451) 815 at 843 – 844 E – H. Learned counsel contended that while the claimant gave his oral testimony in this case, he did not tender any documents to prove the existence of the facts alleged in his statement of claim because none of the documents pleaded by the claimant were tendered in evidence. With respect to how contents of documents are proved, counsel reproduced sections 85, 86(1) and 87 of the Evidence Act and argued that the Rules of this court support the provisions of these sections by providing for rules governing tendering of documentary evidence before this court in Order 19 Rule 9(ii) of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007 thus: The order of proceeding at the trial of a cause shall be as prescribed hereunder: (ii) Documentary evidence shall be put in and may be read or taken as read by consent. Counsel also cited Order 19 Rule 12, which is: (1) The Registrar shall take charge of every document or object put in as an exhibit during the trial of an action and shall mark every exhibit with a letter or letters indicating the party by whom the exhibit is tendered (or where more convenient the witness by whom the exhibit is proved) and with a number, so that all the exhibits put in by a party (proved by a witness) are numbered in one consecutive series. (2) The Registrar shall cause a list of all the exhibits in the action to be made…. Mr. Mumuney’s position is that the combined reading of Order 19 Rules 9(ii) and 12 of the NIC Rules 2007 show that in the course of trial, documents intended to be relied upon as exhibits are mandatorily required to be tendered, admitted in evidence and marked as exhibits. Failure to so do presupposes that there is no exhibit (documentary or real) before the court and urged the court to so hold. He submitted that the oral testimony of the content of the documents the claimant sought to rely on is inadmissible, referring to Kamaldeen Toyin Fagbenro v. Ganyiyewhe Arobadi & ors [2006] All FWLR (Pt. 310) 1575 at 1598 C – D; Benedict Nnanyelugo & anor v. Mrs. Ngozika Nnanyelugo & anor [2008] All FWLR (Pt. 401) 897 at 915 B – C and section 128 of the Evidence Act. Learned counsel submitted that on the strength of the authorities cited above, the claimant has failed to prove his 1st claim for a declaration that his summary dismissal was wrongful and unlawful because he failed to tender documentary evidence to prove: i. his employment, ii. his dismissal, and iii. the contract of service between him and the defendant. With respect to the second claim which is for the sum of N4,821,047.73k (Four Million, Eight Hundred and Twenty-One Thousand, Forty-Seven Naira and Seventy-Three kobo) being the full and final entitlements of the claimant, Mr. Mumuney contended that since the claimant failed to tender any exhibit to prove his salary at the point of dismissal, there is nothing before the court to enable the court calculate the entitlement of the claimant. He urged the court to so hold. Arguing issue two of whether or not the dismissal of the claimant was wrongful and unlawful, the defendant’s counsel maintained that there are basically three types of employer/employee relationships with associated consequences as stated in A. R. Momoh v. Central Bank of Nigeria [2007] All FWLR (Pt. 395) 420 at 441 C – F thus: a. Under the common law, where in the absence of a written contract, each party could abrogate the contract on a week’s or month’s notice or whatever the agreed period for payment of wages. b. Where there is a written contract of employment between an employer and employee, in such a case, the court has a duty to determine the rights of the parties under the written contract. c. Public servants, where their employment is provided for in a statute and/or conditions of service or agreement. Counsel submitted that the employer/employee relationship that existed between the claimant and the defendant is such that was governed by a written contract of employment. As such, the claimant is required to plead and prove, inter alia, that he is an employee of the defendant; that he was appointed under certain terms and conditions and only terminable under the stipulated terms and conditions. He contended that there is no such proof before the court, relying on their arguments on issue one. Mr. Mumuney went on that assuming, but not conceding, that the documents contained in the claimant’s list of Exhibits were rightly tendered and admitted in evidence before this court, he submitted that the dismissal of the claimant by the defendant is fair, valid and lawful. Counsel stated that in this case, there was an incident of some missing flygt pump repair kit belonging to the defendant. The claimant gave an oral testimony stating that on April 9, 2009, he was given an opportunity by the Security Department of the defendant to explain all he knew about the missing flygt pump repair kit. In the course of its investigation, the defendant found the claimant responsible for the missing flygt pump repair kit. The findings of the investigation carried out by the Security Department were highlighted in the Query dated April 29, 2009 that was issued to the claimant, which the claimant responded to in item 7 of his list of Exhibits. Counsel continued that in O. Eno Osagie v. New Nigeria Bank Plc [2005] All FWLR (Pt. 257) 1485 at 1508 D – E, the court stated various acts that may give rise to dismissal in this way: …where an employer pleads that an employee had been removed or dismissed for a specific misconduct, the dismissal cannot be justified in the absence of adequate opportunity offered to the employee to explain, justify or else defend the alleged misconduct. Mr. Mumuney maintained that from the oral testimony of the claimant, the query dated April 29, 2009 and item 7 of the claimant’s List of Exhibits, it is apparent that the dismissal of the claimant was hinged on gross misconduct and he was given opportunity to defend himself. Counsel reproduced Item (Article) 20 of the Employee’s Handbook of the defendant company as follows: Any employee guilty of serious misconduct or in breach of any rules and regulations of the company or other terms and conditions of employment may be summarily dismissed without notice or payment in lieu. The defendant submitted that the company has not contravened the provisions of the Employee’s Handbook with respect to the claimant’s dismissal. Counsel further submitted that the defendant has strictly abided by the principle of audi alteram partem governing dismissal as laid down in Momoh’s case (supra). The defendant’s counsel continued that the claimant may argue that the allegation leveled against him by the defendant is criminal and so he ought to have been tried in a competent court and found guilty of the allegation before his dismissal. Counsel contended that it is a settled law that an employer is at liberty to dismiss his employee where there is an allegation of crime provided that the employer has not violated the principles of natural justice. That in explaining the decision in Garuba v. University of Maiduguri [1986] 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 550, the court held in Lawrence Jirgbagh v. Union Bank of Nigeria Plc [2000] All FWLR (Pt. 26) 1790 at 744 – 745 H – B that: The Supreme Court did not lay down in Garuba v. University of Maiduguri [1986] 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 550 as an immutable principle that once there is a criminal allegation in the act or conduct of an employee, the employer will have no power to exercise disciplinary measure on him unless his guilt or otherwise is determined in a criminal court. Far from it, all that the case lays is the necessity to preserve the constitutional right of fair hearing. It is by no means an authority which seeks to gag the power of the employer to sanitise its work force by removing undesirable elements in order to enhance the efficiency of its organization by putting in difficult if not impossible conditions; by employing criminal jurisprudence in order to present the employer with a fait accompli. The concern of the Supreme Court is the practicalisation of the principle of fair hearing before any action is taken against a person accused of a criminal act. The defendant stated that during cross-examination, the claimant testified that when he gave out the missing flygt repair kit he did not know if the Head of Procurement (Mr. Lawrence) was aware. He also testified that the Head of General Store Department (Mr. David) was not aware. The Head of Ship Repair Department (Mr. Usoro) became aware that he gave out the samples when they got missing and the incident was being investigated. The only person that knew that he gave out the missing flygt repair kit was Mr. Sheidu whom he claimed did not give him any written authorization to give out the missing flygt repair kit. Counsel contended that the totality of the claimant’s testimony points to the fact that he is incompetent and dishonest. This was further substantiated when he testified that he got a Letter of Recognition and 15 years Long Service Award. This letter was mistakenly issued to the claimant by the defendant after he had been dismissed from its services. (This bit of information is evidence from the Bar which must be discountenance for present purposes.) By the letter, he was to be given a double door fridge. He failed to report the mistake to the defendant; instead he went to the company to collect the double door fridge, and so, this shows that the claimant is a dishonest individual according to the defendant’s counsel. Issue three is whether or not the claimant is entitled to the sum of N4,821,047.73k (Four Million, Eight Hundred and Twenty-One Thousand, Forty-Seven Naira and Seventy-Three Kobo) being the full and final entitlement of the claimant. The defendant stated that it relied on its argument on issues 1 and 2 and submitted that the claimant is not entitled to the sum claimed because the contract of employment between the claimant and the defendant which would identify the entitlement of the claimant in the event of a wrongful dismissal was not tendered as exhibit during trial. However, assuming without conceding that the Employee’s Handbook is before the court, counsel submitted that by item 20 of the Employee Handbook, the claimant is not entitled to any benefit. Counsel further submitted that the claimant’s claim for the sum of N4,821,047.73k (Four Million, Eight Hundred and Twenty-One Thousand, Forty-Seven Naira and Seventy-Three Kobo) is a special claim which ought to be particularized, specially pleaded and proved. He contended that there is no evidence before this court, either oral or written, detailing the particulars of the claim for this sum as claimed. He referred to Savannah Bank of Nigeria Plc v. Central Bank of Nigeria & ors [2009] All FWLR (Pt. 481) 939 at 1006 A – B in which the court held: It is trite that special damages must be pleaded with particulars and proved strictly. Strict proof in relation to special damages means, no more than proof that will easily lend itself to quantification or assessment and no more. In the instant case, the appellant led no evidence to establish its claim for special damages. Mr. Mumuney also cited in support Arisons Trading & Engineering Company Limited v. The Military Governor of Ogun State and ors [2009] All FWLR (Pt. 496) 1819 at 1854F and submitted that the said claim is not as a result of the “purported termination” as argued by the claimant but that the claimant was dismissed; hence he is not entitled to any sum. He urged the court to hold as such. Issue four is whether or not the option of the defendant to rest his case on the case of the claimant amounts to an admission of the claim of the claimant by the defendant. The defendant’s counsel submitted that learned counsel to the claimant misconstrued the principle of law with respect to resting case of defense on the claimant’s. He went on that where a defendant rests its case on the claimant’s, he is, in effect, submitting that the claimant has failed to make a prima facie case and elects, in consequence, not to call evidence in support of his own case. In the instant case, the claimant admitted under cross-examination that his Head of Department did not give him a written authorization to release the missing flygt pumps. He also gave evidence that he was given the opportunity to defend himself. Assuming all the evidence given by the claimant himself is true and correct, the counsel’s position is that the claimant has not made out a prima facie case against the defendant. He referred the court to Hammed Toriola v. Olushola Williams [1982] 7 SC 27. Counsel, in consequence, submitted that the option of the defendant in this suit to rest his case on the case of the claimant does not amount to an admission of the claims of the claimant. It only establishes the fact that the claimant has not made out any case for the defendant to answer. He urged the court to so hold. He urged the court to also hold that the claimant has failed to proof his case and consequently, the court should dismiss the suit in its entirety. In his reply on points of law to the argument of the defendant’s counsel that the claimant did not put his documents in evidence as exhibits, the claimant’s counsel stated that it is necessary first to recall to mind what actually transpired in court in the course of the trial against which the issues involved here can best be appreciated. Counsel went on that in compliance with the requirements of the law, the claimant filed along with the originating summons (sic) (complaint), list of documents to be relied on at the trial and the documents themselves. That on February 3, 2011 when the claimant testified, his counsel was about to pass the documents sought to be relied on to the claimant for identification as a prelude to tendering them formally in evidence when the Honourable Presiding Judge asked claimant’s counsel if these documents were not all already included in the bundle of documents filed along with the originating process. Upon the claimant’s counsel answering in the affirmative, the court indicated that it was in the circumstance no longer necessary for the documents to be formally tendered as the documents were deemed admitted. The defense counsel was in court that day and he did not raise any objection to that position of the court. To the claimant’s counsel, it is, therefore, surprising and bad practice for learned counsel to the defendant to now argue that the claimant made no effort to tender his documents in evidence in support of his case. Mr. Etaifo stated that in support of his position, the defense counsel cited and relied on several sections of the Evidence Act. He contended that section 12(1)(b) of the NIC Act 2006 allows this court to depart from the provision of the Evidence Act in the interest of justice. Also that by Order 5 Rule 3 of the NIC Rules 2007, the Court may direct a departure from its Rules in the interest of justice. Learned counsel again referred to section 15 of the NIC Act 2006, which enjoins the court to allow the Rules of Equity to prevail wherever there is conflict between the Rules of Equity and the Common Law on the same matter that are cognizable by this court. To Mr. Etaifo, a very important and well settled Rule of Equity is that a party cannot approbate and reprobate at the same time. Counsel to the defendant in his address (see paragraphs 5.6, 5.8, 5.10, 5.15, 6.2 and 6.3) referred and relied on the documents in question, which Mr. Etaifo saw as approbation, hence, the defense counsel should not be allowed to reprobate that with his argument that these documents should not be used by the court because they were not properly admitted and tendered in evidence. The claimant’s counsel, therefore, urged the court to exercise its powers as cited above and rely on the documents frontloaded by the claimant as being properly before the court for this case. Finally on the contention of the defendant that the special claims of the claimants are not particularized, the claimant referred the court to paragraph 21 of the statements of claim and urged the Court to grant his prayers. After a careful consideration of this case we are of the view that the following issues are to be resolved in order to properly determine this case: 1. When the defendant rests its case on that of the claimant, does that amount to admission of the claimant’s case? 2. Must the claimant tender copies of the documents he frontloaded in evidence and must they be marked as exhibits before he can rely on them in this court? 3. Is the dismissal of the claimant wrongful and unlawful or not? 4. Whether or not the claimant is entitled to the sum of N4,821,047.73k (Four Million, Eight Hundred and Twenty-One Thousand, Forty-Seven Naira and Seventy-Three Kobo) as his full and final entitlement. On the first issue of when the defendant rests its case on that of the claimant, whether this amounts to an admission of the claimant’s case by the defendant, the claimant’s position is that by resting its case on the case of the claimant, the defendant has accepted and admitted the facts and evidence of the claimant; therefore, the claimant is entitled to judgment. He cited several authorities to support his position as shown above. The defendant’s argument on the other hand is that where a defendant rests its case on the claimant’s, he is, in effect, submitting that the claimant has failed to make a prima facie case and elects, in consequence, not to call evidence in support of his own case. In our considered view, it does not necessarily amount to an admission when a defendant rests its case on that of the claimant as it is in the case at hand; but in doing that the defendant assumes the risk that if it fails in puncturing the case of the claimant, it stands no further chance in its defence. In Hammed Toriola v. Olushola Williams (supra) cited by the defendant, the Supreme Court held that: A defense counsel who announces that he is resting his case on that of the plaintiff must be understood to be saying either that the claimant has not made out any case for the Defendant to answer or that the Defendant has a complete answer in law to the claimant’s case. We are bound by the above referred decision. Therefore, we hold that it is not correct to say that because the defendant in this case informed the court at the trial that he rested its case on that of the claimant, the defendant has accepted and admitted the facts and evidence of the claimant raw as presented. We agree with the defendant and hold that what the defendant meant by resting its case on that of the claimant was that, in its own opinion, it has a sound and substantial defense to the claimant’s case which is strong enough to turn the justice of the case in its favour. Regarding the second issue raised by the Court, we must state that we agree with the claimant that this Court explained to both counsel its procedure regarding the deeming as admitted of documents frontloaded in cases before the Court. The counsel to the defendant did not make an issue of it when the Court so explained. For counsel to turn round now and make an issue of it, having not earlier objected, is most unprofessional of him. But even that aside, the general practice in this Court and for which we have severally ruled is that frontloaded documents are deemed to be admitted unless specifically objected to by opposing counsel at the point of joining issues by parties. The informality, speed and flexibility required of this Court when adjudicating can only be defeated if the cause of justice will be affected. This Court, strictly speaking, is not bound to be formal or technical. It can depart from the rules of evidence if the interest of justice warrants. It is, therefore, not mandatory in this Court for a claimant to formally tender his frontloaded documents in evidence as exhibits before he can rely on them. Only recently, on a similar argument, this Court, in the unreported case of Abdul Shaibu v. Noble Drilling Nig. Ltd Suit No: NIC/LA/09/2009 the judgment of which was delivered on 25th January, 2012, held that – The point to note is that this Court, given its specialized nature, is enjoined to be flexible, fast and less technical or formal in the dispensation of justice. See, for instance, section 36(1)(g) of the Trade Disputes Act 2004. So long as the interest of justice is not sacrificed or put in jeopardy, the technical rules of procedure and evidence may be dispensed with when adjudicating in this Court…When the claimant frontloaded his documents in this case, the defendant, when joining issues with the claimant, did not object to any of the documents. The defendant’s argument is not that the documents are not genuine either. Once documents are frontloaded, as has been done in this case, if they are not objected to, they become admissible as such. All that is left for the parties is to argue on their interpretation and the weight to be attached to them i.e. the probative or evidential value to be placed on them. It is, therefore, too late in the day for the defendant to turn round now and argue as it has done that the documents in issue are not primary but secondary evidence. The adherence to this sort of technicality has no place in this Court. We have not been shown why we should depart from our position on this issue as stated above. We, therefore, hold that the combined effect of the provisions of section 36(1)(g) of the TDA 2004, sections 85, 125 and 218 of the Evidence Act 2011 together with section 12(2) of the NIC Act 2006 is that it is not mandatory in this court that parties tender in evidence as exhibits, documents that they earlier frontloaded before such documents can be relied on to argue their cases. The third issue raised by the court is whether or not the dismissal of the claimant was wrong and unlawful. The grouse of the defendant on this issue is that when the claimant gave the undersized seals as sample to Mr. Ogbonna whom the company contracted to supply the specified kits, even though it was with the knowledge of his HOD, Mr. Sheidu, the claimant could not show any written instruction/approval from the said HOD to that effect. Neither was the claimant able to establish that he documented the giving of the aforesaid sample to the supplier. In our considered view, this grievance of the defendant is not sound and justifiable enough to warrant the summary dismissal of the claimant. The reason being that the claimant explained that giving of such approval in writing was not the practice in the company throughout the fifteen years he served with the defendant. The defendant could not rebut this testimony either by showing the company’s written Rules to that effect or by giving the court an example of similar practice in the company. We, therefore, believe the testimony of the claimant on this issue. This is because he was consistent in stating how the incident happened, in his answer to the query, his statement of facts and during his testimony before the court. We watched the claimant’s demeanor and we are satisfied that the claimant has unswervingly stated in detail, how the incident actually happened and we accept his testimony as the truth on this issue. Our view above is more strengthened with the fact that, after three months from the time the defendant summarily dismissed the claimant, the defendant gave the claimant a letter titled “letter of recognition & 15 years Long service Award” in recognition and appreciation of the claimant’s contribution to the growth and development of the defendant. An award gift of double door fridge was also given to him for this purpose and the letter is dated 11th August 2009 and signed by one Emmanuel Cole, the defendant’s HR/Admin. Manager. To us, the argument of the defendant’s counsel that this letter was issued to the claimant in error is not tenable at all, that piece of information coming from the Bar as it were. The account of the claimant on how this incident happened is more logical and reasonable, which we accept. We, therefore, hold that the claimant actually qualified and deserved the award. We, also hold that, since the letter of meritorious service was given to the claimant three months after his purported summary dismissal for giving out the defendant’s undersized seal without a written instruction to that effect, it was not the intention of the defendant to dismiss the claimant from its employment. We, in effect, hold that the summary dismissal of the claimant is wrongful, unjustifiable and so, it is unlawful. As the claimant was wrongfully and unlawfully dismissed from the defendant’s employment since May, 2009, is he then entitled to any gratuity? We are of the humble view that the claimant is entitled to gratuity for prematurely losing his employment in this circumstance because even the defendant attested to it vide the letter of recognition after his dismissal that the claimant served the company meritoriously for fifteen years during the period which the claimant contributed to the growth and development of the defendant. For this reason, the defendant gave the claimant a letter of commendation and an award gift of a double door fridge. We, in consequence, hold that the claimant is entitled to gratuity at the end of his working career with the defendant. However, determining the amount of money the claimant is entitled to as gratuity remains the issue. On this the claimant is claiming the sum of N4,821,047.73k (Four Million, Eight Hundred and Twenty-One Thousand Forty-Seven Naira and Seventy-Three Kobo) as his full and final entitlement. The defendant’s position is that the claimant is not entitled to this claim because he did not particularize the claim which is a special damage in his statement of facts. In our considered view, the claimant particularized this claim in paragraph 21 of his statement of facts as reproduced thus: 21. The claimant’s entitlements are:- a monthly salary in lieu of termination - 78,391.02 b. half salary for May 2009 - 39,195.51 c. terminal entitlement 78,391.02k x 4 Month’s x 15years - 4,703,461.02 Total - 4,821,047.73 Is the claimant entitled to the amount stated as his full and final claim? Article 23 of the Nigerdock Nigeria PLC Hand book, referred to by the claimant’s counsel, is on “gratuity” of staff of the defendant. The Article provides that: …Employees who leave the company service after five (5) years and above shall be paid gratuity at the following rate: …10 – 15 years: 12weeks gross pay for each completed year of service. The April 2009 pay slip of the claimant as frontloaded shows his gross pay as N78,391.02. The sum of N4,821,047.73k is not indicated on the document as the amount of gratuity of the claimant as submitted by his counsel. However, going by the provision of Article 23 as reproduced above, the terminal benefit of the claimant will be arrived at by following this calculation: The claimant’s last gross pay of N78,391.02 for April 2009 will be divided by 4, which is equal to N19,597.755 as the claimant’s entitlement for one week. What the claimant is entitled to for 12weeks will be 19,597.755 x 12, which gives us N235,173.06. Therefore, the claimant’s gratuity according to Article 23 of the Hand book is 235,173.06 x 15years that he served in the defendant’s employment and this will be N3, 527,595.90 Kobo. Thus, we hold that the claimant’s terminal benefit for his wrongful dismissal and his gratuity is a total sum of three million, five hundred and twenty-seven thousand, five hundred ninety-five naira and nine kobo (N3, 527,595.90 Kobo). As regards the claimant’s claims (a) and (b) itemized in paragraph 21 of his statement of facts, which claims are for monthly salary in lieu of termination: N78,391.02 and for half salary for May 2009, which is N39,195.51, Article 16.1.2 of the Employee Handbook (Junior Staff) provides that “If at the Company’s discretion, the employee is not required to work out his/her notice, he/she will be paid the appropriate amount of his/her pay in lieu of notice”. Nowhere in the Employee Handbook is provision made for payment in lieu of notice; neither is there any provision in that regard in the claimant’s contract of employment. However, the Labour Act Cap. L1 LFN 2004 in section 11(2)(d) provides that either party to a contract of employment may terminate the contract on the expiration of one month’s notice where the contract of employment had continued for five years or more. We held earlier that there is evidence that the claimant spend 15 years in the employment of the defendant. This means that the claimant is entitled to one month’s notice before his employment can be terminated or one month’s pay in lieu of notice. By section 11(9) of the Labour Act, the one month’s pay in lieu of notice is the basic salary minus all allowances. Since the basic salary of the claimant is N30,678.00, going by the claimant’s salary review communicated to him by a letter dated 16th February 2007 and signed by the HR/Admin Manager, it means that the claimant is entitled to the payment of this basic salary in lieu of notice.. The claimant was supposedly dismissed on May 11, 2009. This means that he worked for 11 days in the month of May 2009 before he was relieved of his employment. His entitlement for the said 11 days when his gross salary of N78,391.02 is divided by 31 days and then multiplied by 11 days comes to N27,816.17. For all the reasons given above, we hereby hold and order as follows: 1. What the defendant meant by resting its case on that of the claimant was that, in its own opinion, it has a sound and substantial defense to the claimant’s case which is strong enough to turn the justice of the case in its favour. 2. The combined effect of the provisions of section 36(1)(g) of the TDA 2004, sections 85, 125 and 218 of the Evidence Act 2011 together with section 12(2) of the NIC Act 2006 is that it is not mandatory in this court that parties tender in evidence as exhibits, documents that they earlier frontloaded before such documents could be relied on to argue their cases. 3. The summary dismissal of the claimant is wrongful, unjustifiable and so, it is unlawful. 4. The claimant’s terminal benefit for his wrongful dismissal and his gratuity is a total sum of Three Million, Five Hundred and Twenty-Seven Thousand, Five Hundred and Ninety-Five Naira, Ninety Kobo (N3,527,595.90k). 5. The claimant’s salary for 11 days in the month of May 2009 is N27,816.17. 6. The claimant’s claims for a month’s salary in lieu of notice is N30,678.00. 7. The total of 4, 5 and 6 above is, therefore, Three Million, Five Hundred and Eighty-Six Thousand and Ninety Naira, Seven Kobo (N3,586,090.07) only, which the defendant shall pay as the judgment sum in this case to the claimant within thirty (30) days from the date of this judgment. Cost is put at Fifty Thousand Naira (N50,000) only payable by the defendant to the claimant. Judgment is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip Presiding Judge Hon. Justice F. I. Kola-Olalere Hon. Justice J. T. Agbadu-Fishim Judge Judge