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JUDGMENT On November 11, 2009, the claimant commenced this action by way of complaint under Order 3 Rule 1 of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Rules 2009. Also filed with the complaint are the statement of facts, list of witnesses, list and copies of his frontloaded documents and affidavit of verification.In the course of theseproceedings, the claimant filedamended statement of facts and list, together with copies, of additional documents to be relied on in this case. The processes are dated January 28, 2011 and filed on February 1, 2011. The claimant claims against the respondent as follows:- a. A declaration that the purported termination of the claimant’s employment with the defendant vide a letter dated 9th September 2009 and headed ‘SERVICES NO LONGER REQUIRED’ is invalid, wrongful same being contrary to his contract of employment. b. The total sum of N1,366,335.64 (One Million Three Hundred and Sixty-Six Thousand, Three Hundred and Thirty-Five Naira, Sixty-Four Kobo) only as special damages being claimant’s outstanding entitlement remaining unpaid by the defendant. Particulars of special damages i. 2009 September net salary…………………………….N478,305.64 ii. 2009 unpaid 13th month salary………………………..N366,152.00 iii. 2009 Leave Allowance………………………………...N521,878.00 Total……………………………………………….N1,366,335.64 c. An order for the payment of the claimant’s monthly net salary from October 2009 till date of judgment, the purported termination being invalid, wrongful and contrary to the contract of employment. d. The sum of N100,000,000.00 (One Hundred Million Naira) for general damages being losses suffered by the claimant for the wrongful termination of his employment. In clearing preliminary issues, this court granted the claimant leave to amend his statement of facts and file additional documents. On March 2, 2011 the court gave the defendant permission to react to the amendment and adjourned the case to April 13, 2011 for hearing. On April 13, the defendant’s counsel, Mr. Ogo Uwajeh who was in court on March 2 when that date was taken and indicated that the date was convenient, did not come to court neither did he file any process in reaction to the amendment nor even explain his absence. The court, therefore, proceeded with the case in his absence in line with the provisions of Order 19 Rule 2 and Order 8 Rule 5(1) of the NIC Rules 2007. The claimant informed the courtthrough his counsel Mr. Asemudara that he will be dispensing with oral testimony and simply rely on the documents he had earlier frontloaded. As a result, the court gave him 14days, as requested, to file his written address and also ordered that upon service, the respondent should file its written address within 21 days in line with the Rules of the court and that the claimant should file his reply on points of law if any upon service of the respondent’s written address.The case was then adjourned to May 4, 2011 for adoption. On May 4, counsel to both parties were in court and the court informed the parties that it inadvertently adjourned the case to that day when the period within which parties are to file their written addresses still subsist and then adjourned the case to June 28, 2011 for adoption of written addresses. However, on June 28, 2011 the respondent informed the court of its application to file its statement of defense under Order 11 Rule 1 of the NIC Rules and under the inherent power of this court. The claimant objected vehemently and this court upheld his objection because the defendant did not file its application under any appropriate Rule of court or under any Law since Order 11 Rule 1 of the NIC Rules is the Rule that provides that a motion should be in writing and that it must state under the Rule of court or Law the motion is brought. That it is when this is done that the motion becomes competent to be heard by the court. Besides, the respondent had ample opportunity since 2009 to file its statement of defense but failed to make use of the opportunity and also that the order of court to file and adopt written addresses had not been vacated. The court, therefore, held that the motion was incompetent and dismissed it. Parties filed their written addresses. The claimant’s written address dated May 16, 2011 was filed on May 18, 2011. The respondent’s written address is dated July 4, 2011 but filed on July 6, 2011. The claimant’s reply on points of law is dated and filed July 20, 2011. Counsel to both parties adopted their written addresses as their arguments on this dispute. We have gone through the processes filed including the initiating ones and the final written addresses together with the authorities cited, both statutory and judicial. Briefly put, the facts of this case from the record is that the claimant was employed by the respondent on the 11th of March, 2004 and remained in the said employment until the respondent terminated his employment on the 9th of September, 2009 as a result of which he filed this action inter alia challenging the validity of the respondent’s action. The respondent challenged the jurisdiction of the court which the court dismissed and held that it has jurisdiction. In the claimant’s written address, his counsel raised and argued only one issue for determination, which is: Whether the claimant’s employment was invalidly determined and therefore entitled claimant to the relief sought. The respondent framed and argued three issues for determination, which are: 1. Whether this Court can properly determine this suit in the absence of any oral evidence from the claimant in view of the fact that the head claim of the claimant is for a declaratory relief. 2. Whether the termination of the claimant’s employment by the defendant was wrongful. 3. If the answer to 2 above is in the affirmative, whether the claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought vide his writ of summons and statement of facts. The issue framed by the claimant is subsumed in issues 2 and 3 of the respondent. For expedience, the court will, therefore, adopt the issues for determination framed by the respondent. Arguing its first issue,learned counsel to the respondent referred to the Supreme Court decision in Ogolov. Ogolo [2006] All FWLR (Pt. 313) 1 at 13 – 14 H – A and submitted that the nature of a declaratory relief is such that it cannot be granted as a matter of course but the claimant must make a very strong case and show cogent reasons vide his pleadings and evidence led in support of same before such reliefs can be granted. Counsel further referred to Makajuolav. Ajilore[2000] FWLR (Pt. 8) 1235 – 1424 at 1343 F – H. Counsel argued in consequence that the other reliefs which are ancillary to the declaratory relief must fail. Hecontinued that while the respondent is appreciative of the desire of this court to have this matter concluded expeditiously it urged the court to set the matter down for trial as this court cannot fully determine this suit without taking the oral evidence of the claimant. He submitted that justice must not only be done but must be seen to be done. The claimant’s reaction to this argument is in his reply on points of law. Mr. Asemudara submitted that the authorities cited by the respondent in support of its argument on this issue are inapplicable as both cases commenced at the High Courts of Rivers State and Ilesha respectfully and that both cases are chieftaincy matters.Counsel continued that both suits were commenced by Writs of Summons and Statement of Claims and, therefore, oral evidence was mandatory by law as the various High Court Rules apply. Learned counsel went on that if the cases were commenced by Originating Summon, Originating Motion or even by petition, the calling of oral evidence would still not be necessary even in the conventional courts on declaratory reliefs. Counsel continued that as an example, several provisions in the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) require a litigant to seek declaratory reliefs by originating summons (section 2 of the CompaniesProceedings Rules) and petition (sections 300 – 312 of CAMA); that these suits are settled by affidavit evidence without any oral testimony called. Mr. Asemudara submitted that the claimant did not commence this action by a writ of summons as the respondent wrongfully conceived and displayedin its address but rather by a Complaint and a Statement of Facts. It follows that a different rule applies just like the Court held in Amgbare v. Sylva[2009] 1 NWLR (Pt. 1121) 1 at 58 that, “proceedings in election petitions are sui generis and not identical with civil proceedings’. Counsel submitted that the statement of facts, the documents frontloaded and the verifying affidavit filed are all evidence before the court. A look at the two cases cited by the respondent in support of its argument concerning this issue reveals that respectivelythey are cases on chieftaincy and the grant of right of occupancy over land matters. We, therefore, agree with the claimant’s counsel that the two cases are not on all fours with the case at hand. Under the NIC Rules, a party may call oral evidence at trial as listed in its initiating documents or dispense with same and simply rely on its documents that would have been frontloaded. In Chief A.A.Adeogun & anor v. Hon. John O. Fasogbon & 2 ors [2011] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1250) 427 at 455 C – G, the Supreme Court held that: It is settled law that the declaratory relief is now granted solely on admission…I agree with the reasons and reasoning in Amaechi’scase supra, as in this case, that the fact that no viva voce evidence has been called at the trial court on the pleadings on the issue of declaratory reliefs as claimed here, does not ipso facto render the proceedings before the trial court void. The parties, having accepted the uncontroverted documentary evidence as per the affidavit and other processes filed in this matter, have acted and used them in their written addresses – in all, thus bearing forth their acquiescence in the irregular procedure. Clearly, the fact that the decision of the lower court is based on these affidavits and documentary evidence before the trial court will not for those reasons only [be] tantamount to a decision based on admissions, as admission in Law is much more than relying as here on the affidavit evidence and the facts contained in the processes filed in this case – even then they cannot without more be taken as having been established or admitted. We, therefore, on these authorities, hold that this Court can properly determine this suit in the absence of any oral evidence from the claimant even though the head relief is a declaratory one. In respect of the second and third issues i.e. whether the termination of the claimant’s employment by the defendant was wrongful and whether the claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought for vide his Writ of Summons and Statement of Facts,the claimant argued the two issues together andsubmitted that his employment was invalidly determined; hence, he is entitled to the reliefs sought. He maintained that his contract of employment is contained in the defendant’s letter dated 11th March 2004; his employment was confirmed by a letter dated 29th December 2004; he was promoted to the level of Assistant Manager, Band O by a letter of 12thJuly 2007 and that his remuneration was reviewed upward and communicated to him by a letter dated 20thDecember 2007.Copies of all documents referred to were frontloaded and are before the court. Counsel to the claimant went on to argue that the claimant did not breach any term or condition of his employment and that he did not infringe any internal regulation for therespondent’s staff;yet, he was given a letter dated 9th September 2009 terminating his employment effective from the said date. To the claimant, this is contrary to his contract of employmentsince there was no prior notice of termination to him and no salary in lieu was paid to him by the respondent before the termination; thus making the claimant’s employment invalidly determined, and so entitling him to the reliefs sought. The claimant’ counsel submitted that parties are bound by the terms and conditions of the contract, referring to Julius Berger (Nig.) Plc.[2008] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1084) 582 at 609 andAgbareh v. Mimra[2008] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1071) 378 at 412. Counsel urged the court to hold that therespondent is bound by the terms of the employment. Mr. Asemudara went on to contend that based on the confirmation of the claimant’s employment he became entitled to one month’s notice or one month’s salary in lieu of notice before his employment could be determined.He, therefore, submitted that the letter dated 9th September 2009 determining the claimant’s employment with immediate effect is invalid thereby making the said employment still subsisting. Counsel cited in supportChukwumah v. S.P.D.C. Ltd[1993] 4 NWLR (Pt. 289) 512 at 536. Learned counsel maintained that the claimant was not paid salary in lieu of notice at the time he was given the letter of termination. He submitted, therefore, that theclaimant’s employment subsists until the terms of employment are complied with and that the claimant is entitled to be paid his employment benefits until the date of determination by this court. Learned counsel maintained that the claimant has put forward his claim by the various documents pleaded and verified by a verifying affidavit. He argued that the facts and averments are not disputed by the respondent who did not constructively file a defense to the Complaint and the Amended Statement of Facts. He contended that it is trite law that facts not disputed are deemed admitted, citingHilary Farms Ltd & 2 ors. v.M.V. Mahira & 2 ors [2007] 6 SC (Pt. II) 85. Counsel submitted that in Oloruntoba-Oju v. Abdul-Raheem[2009] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1157) 100, the Supreme Court held that the onus on a plaintiff alleging unlawful termination of his appointment is discharged if he proves (i) that he is an employee of the defendant; (ii) the terms and conditions of his employment by placing before the court the terms of the contract; (iii) who can appoint and remove him; and (vi) in what circumstances the appointment can be determined by the employer and the breach of the terms. He went on to argue that the claimant has established all the above facts by the documents placed before this Court, which were not controverted by the respondent. Mr. Asemudara continued that in a successful claim for wrongful termination, where the contract provides for the length of notice, the claimant is entitled to terminal benefits by way of that period’s salary in lieu of notice and any other legitimate entitlements to which he may be entitled at the time the employment was put to an end, referring toMobil Oil (Nig) Ltd. v. Assan[2003] 6 NWLR (Pt. 816) 311. To the learned counsel, these other legitimate entitlements include all monetary losses consequent upon the wrongful termination of the employment, commission where payable under the contract, leave allowance where leave is already earned, house or quarter allowance, and even tips where receivable by an express or implied term of the contract, citingECN v. Nicol[1968] 1 All NLR 201, Bold v. Borough, Nicholson & Hall Ltd.[1964] 1 WLR 201 &Mandridas v. Tangalakis[1932] 11 NLR 62. Counsel continued that the documentary evidence before this court show that the claimant was entitled to a monthly salary of N478,305.64 and was due for annual leave as at the time of the purported termination. The claimant would also have been entitled to 13th month salary for the year 2009 if his appointment had not been wrongfully terminated in September 2009. From the foregoing that the claimant is entitled to relief (b) to wit: 2009 September net salary in the sum of N478,305.64, unpaid 13th Month salary in the sum of N366,152.00 and Leave Allowance in the sum of N521,878.00, amounting to a total of N1,366.335.64. He, therefore, urged the court to grant claimant’s relief (b). The respondent’s counsel contended that it is trite that an employer can terminate the employment of its employee for any reason or no reason whatsoever, referring to Garubav. Kwara Investment Co. Ltd[2005] All FWLR (Pt. 252) 404 – 603. To counsel, therefore, the respondent is at liberty to terminate the employment of the claimant if it no longer required his services, citing NNPC v. Olagbaju[2006] All FWLR (Pt. 334) 1813 – 2017 at 1871 D – F andTaduggorono v. Gotom[2002] 4 NWLR (Pt. 757) 453. Mr. Uwajeh submitted that the claimant has failed to establish either by his pleading or any credible evidence whatsoever that the defendant lacked the authority to terminate his contract of employment, as the respondenthas authority to terminate the employment of the claimant at anytime and for any reason and no reason whatsoever. Mr. Uwajeh submitted on its issue three that if the court finds in favour of the claimant as per his first relief seeking a declaration that the termination of his contract by the respondent is wrongful the only relief the claimant will be entitled to is his terminal benefits and no more, citingAtiviev. Kabel Metal (Nig.) Ltd[2008] All FWLR (Pt. 430) 626 – 842 at 677 C – E andGarubav. Kwara Investment Co. Ltd,supra, at p. 481. Learned counsel, therefore, submitted that the claimant is only entitled to his terminal benefits and salary in lieu of notice which will be paid to him once he completes his exit clearance from the respondent bank. He, in conclusion, urged the court to dismiss this action as it is frivolous and mischievous with costs awarded against the claimant. Both parties agreed that the contents of theletter of employment given to the claimant by the respondent forms the terms of the contract of employment between them and that the claimant’s employment has been confirmed. The letter of employment of the claimant in paragraph viii states that “the bank reserves the right to terminate with no reason the appointment of any staff on probation absent from work for three or more consecutive days.” By this provision, the respondent can terminate without giving any reason only an employee that is on probation. Employees that have been confirmed seem to be outside the purview of this term. This means that for confirmed employees, the respondent is under a duty to state a reason for the termination of the employment of the confirmed staff. The claimant in this case as shown to this court a letter of confirmation issued to him by the respondent. In the letter terminating the claimant’s employment, no reason was given by the respondent for the said termination. This we think goes contrary to the contract of employment. That the claimant’s employment, an employment in a sensitive sector like the banking sector, was terminated with immediate effect suggests that he must have done something wrong. In Industrial Cartons Ltd v. NUPAPPW [2006] 6 NLLR (Pt. 15) 258 this court held that where the reason given for the termination of en employment is incorrect, the payment of one month’s salary in lieu of notice will be grossly inadequate as compensation. In that case this court on that ground went on to award six month’s salary as due compensation. Section 19(d) of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Act 2006 empowers this court to make an award of compensation or damages in any circumstance contemplated under the Act or any other Act of the National Assembly dealing with any matter that this court has jurisdiction to hear. On the strength of these authorities we hold that the termination of the claimant’s employment by the respondent was wrongful and contrary to the contract of employment. Since payment of one month’s salary in lieu of notice will be grossly inadequate and going by the authority of Industrial Cartons Ltd v. MUPAPPW and section 19(d) of the NIC Act 2006 we hereby award six months’ gross pay as compensation to the claimant for wrongful termination of employment. The claimant is equally entitled to be paid all his severance benefits in accordance with his contract of employment less any indebtedness to his employer. All sums due to the claimant as presently are to be paid within 30 days from the date of this judgment. Judgment is entered accordingly. Cost is put at 50,000 Naira payable by the respondent to the claimant.