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The claimant filed a complaint against the defendant on 26th May, 2011 claiming the following: 1. A declaration that the claimant’s employment is still valid and subsisting, thesamenothavingbeenterminatedwithoutnotice. 2. A declaration that the claimant is entitled to continue to receive all her salaries from January 2011 until judgment is delivered. 3. A declaration that the defendant/respondent pay the sum of N1,000,000 (One million) to the claimant as damages for the emotional torture and hardship suffered while out of job due to the respondent’s unlawful Act and breach. Accompanying the complaint is the statement of facts, list of witnesses and list of exhibits to be relied on. In reaction, the defendant entered appearance and filed a preliminary objection together with a supporting written address which are all dated 27th June 2006 and filed on the same day. The preliminary objection is challenging the jurisdiction of this court to hear and determine this matter on the following grounds: (i) That the claim as couched is one of master and servant and outside the purview of the jurisdiction of this Court as created by statute. (ii) The suit is incompetent. The objection is supported by a 5-paragraphed affidavit sworn to by Maliki Akpa a process clerk. Reacting to the preliminary objection, the claimant filed a 6-paragraphed counter-affidavit sworn to on the 20th July 2011 by Taofeek Jimoh, a para-legal, together with a written address dated 26th July 2011 in opposition to the preliminary objection. The defendant did not file a reply on points of law. The defendant framed three issues for determination as follows: (i) Whether the matters set out by the claimant in her complaint are matters within her competence to present before this Court having regard to the provisions of section 7 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 as well as the amendments thereto as set out in section 254C(1) together with all the subparagraphs thereof. (ii) Whether the court has the requisite jurisdiction to hear and determination the matter. (iii) Whether the issue as to the competence of the suit and the jurisdiction of the court can be properly raised without joining issues by way of pleadings. On the issue (i) learned counsel to the defendant submitted that for a court to determine the competence of a suit, it should only look at the writ of summons or the complaint and statement of claim, citing Sea Trucks (Nig.) Ltd v. Ayo Payne [1995] 6 NWLR (Pt. 400) 166 at 168. Counsel then went on to submit that Akpabio, JCA who read the lead judgment held that the case of the plaintiff was one of wrongful dismissal between a master and a servant based on their contract of employment and concluded as follows: It is my respectful view that if this case is treated as a trade dispute then it shall come to pass that all other cases of wrongful dismissal between a master and servant in this country will have to be referred to the National Industrial Court. She went on to state that this view of the learned Justice is the submission of the defendant and then prayed the court to adopt the thinking of the learned Justice and discountenance this suit. The defendant’s counsel also referred to the case of Oloruntoba-Oju & anor v. Dopamu [2008] 4 SCM 108 at 111 Ratio 2 and submitted that these two cases have helped “the makers of the law to extend the scope of the National Industrial Court to what it is today”. That in spite of the amendments, matters concerning private employment are completely outside the purview of the National Industrial Court as presently constituted. In respect of issue (ii) the defendant’s counsel reproduced section 7(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 and section 254C(1)(a) – (m) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, and stated that the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court has been enlarged while the Federal High Court, High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja and the State High Courts have been excluded from entertaining any of the matters set out in section 7 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 together with the amendments in section 254C(1)(a) – (m) of the 1999 Constitution. She submitted that the provisions contained in the aforementioned sections relate to matters concerning “labour and trade disputes, strikes, fundamental rights as it relates to employment labour, industrial relations, National Labour Law, human rights abuse, collective agreements, arbitral clauses converted with trade unions, public office holders judicial, civil or public servants in any part of the federation etc. or appeal concerning such matters.” Counsel to the defendant submitted further that an employer has a general power to dismiss an employee, citing Shena Security Company Ltd v. Afropak (Nig.) Ltd [2008] 9 SCM 169 at 171. She contended that a court may declare the dismissal of an employee null and void only in rare cases where the employment is protected by statute and referred to George Abomeli v. Nigerian Railway Corporation [1995] 1 NWLR (Pt. 372) 451 at 455. Counsel concluded this issue by submitting that having regard to the relevant section of the National Industrial Court Act and other authorities this court lacks the jurisdiction to determine this suit and it ought to be discountenanced on the ground that it is a nullity. On issue (iii) the defendant submitted that the issue of jurisdiction or competence of a court to entertain or deal with a matter before it is fundamental. She referred to Nasir v. Civil Service Commission & ors [2010] 2 SCM 105. She argued that the objection to jurisdiction can be raised at any time even where no pleadings are filed, citing Arjay Ltd v. AMS Ltd [2003] 7 NWLR (Pt. 820) 577 at 601. She finally urged the court to uphold the defendant’s objection and strike out the action in its entirety for being incompetent. The claimant raised one issue for determination as follows: Whether this court is vested with jurisdiction to entertain this action. Learned counsel to the claimant submitted that the jurisdiction of a court to entertain a suit is based on the plaintiff’s claim, citing Adeyemi v. Opeyori [1976] 9 – 10 SC reprint 18. He stated that the claimant’s claim before the court is whether or not her employment was rightly terminated. That by the provisions of section 254C(a) – (f) of the 1999 Constitution as amended and the claims of the claimant, this court has the jurisdiction to hear and determine this matter. Counsel to the claimant referred to section 2(2)(c) of the Labour Act (the year is not stated) and submitted that when the provisions are not complied with, it is the National Industrial Court that has jurisdiction to hear such complaints. He finally submitted that the jurisdiction of any court is a matter that must be jealously guarded and urged the court to guard its jurisdiction and dismiss the preliminary objection with substantial costs in favour of the claimant as it lacks merit. Having considered the processes filed and the written submissions of the parties, the issue to be determined is whether this court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the claims of the claimant. Before going into the question whether or not this court has jurisdiction to entertain the claims of the claimant, it may be necessary to make two quick preliminary points regarding the submissions of the counsel to the defendant. Firstly, counsel to the defendant referred this court to the case of Sea Trucks (Nig.) Ltd v. Ayo Payne supra and quoted Akpabio, JCA to the effect that if this ‘case is treated as a trade dispute then it shall come to pass that all other cases of wrongful dismissal between a master and servant in this country will have to be referred to the National Industrial Court’. To the defendant’s counsel, this is authority for the proposition that the National Industrial Court of Nigeria cannot today be seized of jurisdiction over issues of master and servant. Elementary learning in law shows that the legislature can by statutory provision, not to talk of constitutional provision, overrule the decision of a court. When His Lordship Akpabio, JCA decided the case of Sea Trucks (Nig.) Ltd v. Ayo Payne as reported in 1995, neither the National Industrial Court Act 2006 nor the Third Alteration to the 1999 Constitution were in existence. For counsel to, therefore, cite that case as authority for the proposition that section 254C(1) of the Third Alteration to the 1999 Constitution, a provision coming way after the case, cannot be read to confer jurisdiction on this court over master and servant issues smacks of a poor appreciation of the rules regarding the hierarchy and priority of laws under the subject, Nigeria Legal System. The second preliminary point is that counsel to the defendant argued that an employer has a general power to dismiss an employee, contending in the process that a court may declare the dismissal of an employee null and void only in rare cases where the employment is protected by statute. This to say the least is arguing the case at hand on merits. Counsel has thereby gone into the merit of the case. This court cannot allow this at this stage of the proceedings. These preliminary points made, I now turn to the merit of the preliminary objection. Jurisdiction of a court to entertain an action is determined by the law conferring jurisdiction at the time the suit is instituted and the court is entitled under section 6 of the 1999 Constitution to consider the claim before it in order to decide whether it has jurisdiction to entertain it. See Obiuweubi v. CBN [2011] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1247) 465 andMadukolu v. Nkemdilim [1962] 2 SCNLR 341. The jurisdiction of this court at the time this suit was instituted is in the main governed by section 254C(1) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended. For present purposes, the relevant portions of the said section provide as follows: Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 251, 257, 272 and anything contained in this constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters – (a) relating to or connected with any labour, employment, trade unions, industrial relations and matters arising from workplace, the conditions of service, including health, safety, welfare of labour, employee, worker and matters incidental thereto or connected therewith; (b) relating to, connected with or arising from Factories Act, Trade Disputes Act, Trade Unions Act, Labour Act, Employees’ Compensation Act or any other Act or Law relating to labour, employment, industrial relations, workplace or any other enactment replacing the Acts or Laws; (c) – (d) relating to or connected with any dispute over the interpretation and application of the provisions of Chapter IV of this constitution as it relates to any employment, labour, industrial relations, trade unionism, employer’s association or any other matter which the Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine; (e) – (f) relating to or connected with unfair labour practice or international best practices in labour, employment and industrial relation matters; (g) – (h) relating to, connected with or pertaining to the application or interpretation of international labour standards; (i) – (j) – (k) relating to or connected with disputes arising from payment or nonpayment of salaries, wages, pensions, gratuities, allowances, benefits and any other entitlement of any employee, worker, political or public office holder, judicial officer or any civil or public servant in any part of the Federation and matters incidental thereto; (l) relating to – (iii) such other jurisdiction, civil or criminal and whether to the exclusion of any other court or not, as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly; A close look at these provisions reveals that this court has been given exclusive jurisdiction over all employment/labour issues as well as matters incidental thereto. It is, therefore, surprising that the defendant’s counsel who has copiously reproduced the relevant sections in both the National Industrial Court Act 2006 and the 1999 Constitution, as amended, can still go on to argue that the “claim as couched, being one of master and servant, is outside the purview of the jurisdiction of this court”. The question here is whether the claimant’s claims are in relation to her employment; ortouse thedefendant’s counsel’s words, whether master and servant issues are not issues of employment.The claimant is praying for a declaration that her employment is still valid and subsisting having been terminated without notice and that she is entitled to continue to receive her salaries till judgment is delivered. Section 254C(1)(a), (b) and (k) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, gives this court jurisdiction over matters relating to employment, the Labour Act and disputes arising from non-payment of salaries of any employee or worker. See Olaleye v Afribank & ors (unreported) Suit No NIC/LA/24/2011 decided on July 29 2011. This court has held in several cases decided before the Third Alteration to the 1999 Constitution, that issues of dismissal/termination are matters of ‘labour’ or at worst are matters incidental to labour as provided in section 7(1)(a) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006; and that this position is reinforced by the fact that the jurisdiction of this court under section 7 of the National Industrial Court Act is subject based. See Godwin Tosanwunmi v. Gulf Agency & Shipping Nig. Ltd unreportedSuit No. NIC/18/2006 delivered on 14th June 2007 and Oyeleke & ors v. NICON Insurance Plc. & anor [2008] 11 NLLR (Pt. 30) 322. Therefore, the defendant’s counsel submission that section 7 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 has not given this court the jurisdiction to entertain this matter is not tenable and goes to no issue. Following from all of the above, I hold that the claims of the claimant come within the jurisdiction of this court. There is no merit whatsoever in this preliminary objection. It is brought to waste the time of the court and stall the quick determination of this case. The defendant’s preliminary objection is hereby dismissed. The case shall proceed to hearing. Cost of N20,000 is to be paid by the defendant to the claimant. Ruling is entered accordingly.