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BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS Hon. Justice B. A. Adejumo - President Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip - Judge Hon. Justice J. T. Agbadu-Fishim - Judge DATE: OCTOBER 12, 2009 SUIT NO. NIC/6M/2000 BETWEEN: Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria Applicant AND 1. Government of Anambra State 2. Secretary to Anambra State 3. Head of Service, Anambra State 4. Attorney-General, Anambra State 5. Accountant-General, Anambra State 6 Nigeria Civil Service Union Respondents IN THE MATTER OF ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENT OF THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT [SUIT NO. NIC/5/93] DELIVERED ON 27 JUNE 1995. IN THE MATTER OF THE JURISDICTIONAL SCOPE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF SENIOR CIVIL SERVANTS OF NIGERIA AND THE NIGERIA CIVIL SERVICE UNION. REPRESENTATION Enobong Ftteh, for the applicant Mrs. V. O. Onwuka, Chief State Counsel, for the 1st to 5th respondents B. E. Mbagwu, for the 6th respondent JUDGMENT This is an application brought pursuant to Order 25 Rule 3 of the National Industrial Court Rules Cap. 432 LEN 1990 seeking an order of this Court for the enforcement of its judgment in Suit No. NIC/5/93 which judgment was delivered on the 27 June 1995. The application is in the main seeking for, among other things, an order of this Court compelling the respondents to forthwith pay to the applicant i.e. the Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria, union dues deducted from eligible members of the applicant in the service of the 1st respondent on grade level 07 and above in accordance with the terms and tenor of the said judgment. The application further seeks an order of the Court compelling the respondents to produce before this Court, for the purpose of inspection, the payment vouchers, computer print out or other accounting records/documents showing the check-off deductions made from the salaries of senior civil servants in the 1st respondent’s service on grade level 07 and above from the date of the judgment in NIC/5/93 till the determination of this application and the person(s) or organisation(s) to whom such deductions are remitted. MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENT OF THE APPLICANT The applicant commenced its submissions by summarizing the antecedents of the case. To the applicant, the original application was filed against the 1st to the 5th respondents on 16th October 2000. That the lst—5th respondents responded by filing a preliminary application dated 20th day of November 2000 for interpretation of the judgment sought to be enforced. In the Motion on Notice, the respondents sought for, inter alia, the following: (i) The effect of the provisions of the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 4 1996 and Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 1 1999 on the aforementioned judgment of the Court. (ii) Whether the said judgment of the court can be enforced without more as sought by the applicant/respondent herein outside or independent of the provisions of section 5 of the Labour Act Cap. 198 LFN 1990. The applicant continued that the application was struck out on the 1st day of February 2001 for want of diligent prosecution. in that same ruling this Court ordered the 1st — 5th respondents, upon the application of the applicant, to pay into a suspense account all check-off dues deducted from salaries of officers on GL 07 and above from the 1st day of February 2000 pending the final determination of the substantive application. To the applicant, the 1st to 5th respondents subsequently filed an application on the 1st of March 2001 praying the Court to vacate the order made on the 1st of February 2001. The application was refused and further appeal to the Court of Appeal was struck out. That the Court of Appeal decision is reported as Government of Anambra State & ors v. Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria [2003] NWLR (Pt 800) — incomplete citation as supplied by the applicant. On 27 November 2001, the 6th respondent i.e. the Nigeria Civil Service Union was joined by the order of this Court. The judgment on 27th June 1995 in Suit No. NIC/5/95, which the applicant wants this court to enforce, is to the effect that - (i) The Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria is entitled to unionise civil servants on grade level 07 and above including those of them in the Personal Assistant cadre (formerly Executive Officer cadre) except those who are typists/stenographers, nurses and midwives, pharmacists and medical technologists. (ii) The Nigeria Civil Service Union is entitled to unionise civil servants on grade level 01 — 06 excluding customs, immigration, technical, typists and stenographic staff. (iii) As from the date of this judgment i.e. 27 June, 1995 union dues deducted from (sic) civil servants on grade level 07 and above should be paid to the Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria. Monies already paid contrary to the present ruling of this court should not he disturbed. The enforcement proceeding was taken out on 6th October 2000 against the 1st — 5th respondent. In the application, the applicant deposed to the following salient facts (i) That the 1st respondent is the employer of the members of the applicant and the 6th respondent. Consequently, it is the statutory duty of the 1st respondent acting through the 2nd—5th respondents to deduct union dues from the salaries of the eligible members of both unions and remit same to the appropriate unions in line with the judgment of this Court. (ii) That since the date of the said judgment (i.e. 27th June 1995), the 1st — respondents have been regularly and consistently making monthly deductions of union dues from the salaries of eligible members of the applicant and the deducted sum are being misappropriated. (iii) That the directive and circulars of the Executive Governor of the 1st respondent to the 2nd, 3rd and 4th respondents to the effect that the judgment of the Court be complied with are not being implemented and complied with and would, therefore, require an order of court to ensure implementation and compliance. That the respondents variously filed applications for interpretation of the judgment, which were, however, later withdrawn. To the applicant, all the respondents filed counter-affidavits in response to the application. The 1st-5th respondents admitted issuing Exhibit C, a circular ref: AG/AN/S/99 dated 19th May, 1999, a legal opinion by the lion. Attorney-General/Commissioner of Justice consequent upon which the Executive Governor directed that all check-off dues deducted from salaries of civil servants on GL 07 and above should henceforth be paid in to the account of the applicant. The directive is referenced SSG/HAG/CJ/KOS. That this directive was not implemented according to paragraph 16 of the counter-affidavit of the 1st to 5th respondents because since the coming into force of Decree No. 1 of 1999, no worker of GL 07 and above in the respondent’s service has given any written authorization for the deduction and payment of any sum from his/her salaries or wages to the applicant union. That the 6th respondent on its part contented that Decree No. 4 of 1996 proscribed the applicant before it was amended by Decree No. 1 of 1999. As a result, all check-off dues deducted from officers on GL 07 and above during this period automatically belonged to the 6th respondent. Furthermore, that the award of the IAP was made subject to section 5 of the Labour Act and, therefore, the enforcement of the judgment of this Court should be made subject to the terms of the IAP award. The applicant then proceeded to frame three issues for the determination of the court. They are — (1) Whether the judgment of this Court in Suit No. NIC/5/93 delivered on 27th June 1995 is valid, subsisting and enforceable. (2) Whether the said judgment is subject to the award of the Industrial Arbitration Panel regarding section 5 of the Labour Act, or, in the alternative, (3) Whether section 5(4) of the Labour Act Cap. 198 LFN 1990 has not been impliedly repeated in view of section 16A of the Trade Unions Act Cap. 437 LFN 1990, as amended by the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 4 of 1996 and the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 1 of 1999. ISSUE 1 To the applicant, the issue whether the judgment of this court in Suit No. NIC/5/93 delivered on 27th June 1995 is valid, subsisting and enforceable is the gravamen of this application; and then submitted that the judgment is valid, subsisting and enforceable. That it is trite law that a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction remains valid and binding until it is set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction, referring to Chuks v. Cremor 47 ER 884; Hadkinson v. Hadkinson [1952] 2 All ER 567; Babatunde v. Olatunji [2000] FWLR (Pt. 5) 874 883 para. G. The applicant continued that unless and until the judgment is set aside, it subsists and must he obeyed. It cannot for any reason under our law be ignored, referring to Babatunde’s case, supra, at page 884 para. E and Oba Aladegbemi v. Oba Fasanmade [1988] 3 NWLR (Pt. 81) 129. To the applicant, the Supreme Court has stated in many cases that a party who knows of an order or judgment, whether null or valid, regular or irregular, given by a court of competent jurisdiction, cannot he permitted to disobey it. That his unqualified obligation is to obey the order or judgment unless and until that order or judgment has been discharged or set aside, referring to J. C. Ltd and ors v. Ezenwa [1996] 4 NWLR (Pt. 443) 391. Continuing, the applicant submitted that the contention of the respondents is that the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 4 of 1996 and Decree No. 1 of 1999 had the effect of first, abolishing the applicant and second, vitiating the judgment. That this position or contention cannot be correct both in law and common sense. in the first place, that there was no provision in the 1996 amendment of the Trade Unions Act where the senior staff and the employers associations were abolished, proscribed or their certificates cancelled or withdrawn. That the Trade Unions Act has carefully stipulated the process by which a trade union can “cease to exist” as a trade union. This is provided for in sections 7, 8 and 9 of the Trade Unions Act Cap. 437 LFN 1990. That the respondents have a very heavy burden or onus to prove that any of these provisions had been complied with in order to establish that the applicant was abolished by Decree 4 of 1996. Furthermore, that for a recognised and registered trade union to be proscribed, such proscription must be published in the Federal Gazette and the original Certificate of Registration of the union withdrawn by the Registrar of Trade Unions, referring the court to the Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette No. 8 Vol. 81 of 24, August 1994 at pages A155 — Al37 on the proscription of the National Executive Council of the NLC, NUPENG and PENGASSAN; and also the Federal Gazette No. 41 Vol. 83 of 21st August 1996 on the proscription of the National Executive and Branch Executives of NASU, ASUU and SSAUTHRAI. The applicant then challenged the respondents to produce similar publications if they are to be taken seriously by this Court. The applicant continued that the 6 respondents’ contention seems to be that the deletion of Part B of the Third Schedule to the Trade Unions Act by Decree No.4 of 1996 meant the proscription or abolition of the applicant union; and then submitted that this contention is not only erroneous hut also fallacious and repugnant to the restructuring exercise carried out by Decree No. 4 of 1996. First, that the illogical purport of the contention of the 6 respondent is that all the senior stall associations and the employers associations who were listed in Part B of the Third Schedule were all proscribed in one fell swoop. The applicant then asked how far this can be from the truth. Very far, it answered. That this can only happen as a figment of the imagination of the respondents. The applicant then submitted that the whole exercise of restructuring of trade unions under the Trade Unions (Amendment, Decree No. 4 of 1996 was limited to trade unions affiliated to the Nigeria Labour Congress (the emphasis is the applicant’s). That this is eloquently captured in the preamble to Decree No. 4 of 1996, which preamble has given us sufficient peep into the intention of the lawmakers should there he any ambiguity for which the applicant does not concede. Secondly, the applicant further submitted that no trade union owes its existence to the listing in the list of trade unions in the Third Schedule to the Trade Unions Act. Rather, that the purposes of the said list of trade unions are two fold: (i) it contains names of trade unions entitled to automatic registration and recognition without more. These trade unions are exempted from fulfilling the preconditions for registration as enshrined in the Act. (ii) The list operates to compartmentalize trade unions into two categories, that is, workers unions or junior staff unions otherwise called the NLC affiliated unions on the one hand and the senior staff and employers association on the other hand. The applicant then submitted that the deletion of the list from the Third Schedule to the Act has nothing to do with the existence of the trade unions listed therein as their existence is premised or dependent upon the certificate of registration issued them at the time of registration. Thirdly, that the restructuring exercise of 1996 was limited to the NLC affiliated unions only. Therefore, the amendment in the Third Schedule was intended to capture the restructured unions affiliated to the NLC; and that is all the list of trade unions in Third Schedule to Decree No. 4 of 1996 achieved. To the applicant, having thoroughly dealt with the foregoing issue, the consequence which the respondents have placed on Decree 4 of 1996, flowing from the argument that the senior staff associations had been abolished, is totally unfounded and misleading. It cannot, therefore, be correct that the 6 respondent inherited the membership of the applicant since the applicant had never died or “ceased to exist” for the issue of inheritance to arise at all. The applicant urged the court to so hold. The applicant went on to submit that the ruling of this Court made on 7th March, 1996 and sentimentally relied upon by the respondents does not support or assist their contention in any way whatsoever. That the ruling is attached to the respondent’s affidavit as Exhibit RA2. That the phrase which caught the fancy of the 6th respondent with frenzy is “substantial changes to the law”. To the applicant, the question that naturally arises from the ruling is: what were the substantial changes which Decree No. 4 of 1996 introduced? That the Court fell short of’ stating those substantial changes simply because there was no application before the Court in that regard. To date, that there has not been any application which has sought the review of that judgment pursuant to the applicable Rule 26 of the 1979 National Industrial Court Rules. That if the respondents felt strongly that the substantial changes was in their favour, by now the 4th respondent would have applied for the review of the judgment. But they have failed to do so to their own peril. To the applicant, the truth of the matter is that it was the respondent that had a judgment hanging over its head. That the applicant union was opposed to the granting of the application. If the application was struck out, by whatever means, it was to the advantage o the applicant union. In that application, the court was not disposed to granting it. Same was struck out because of “substantial changes in the law”. That the 6th respondent’s motion was a hurdle to the applicant union’s enjoyment of the fruit of its victory/judgment. That the ruling cleared the way for the implementation and for enforcement of the judgment to the benefit of the applicant union. The applicant continued that it has immensely taken advantage of the judgment since then through “administrative dialogue”. This explains why it did not lie in the mouth of the applicant union to attack the striking out of the 6th respondent’s application then. That the Federal Government and most States of the Federation have implemented the judgment. That it is only the states and some few Federal Ministries that did not embrace dialogue that were brought to Court. The applicant continued that whatever wrong impression/interpretation which may have arisen from the language of Decree No. 4 of 1996 (which is not conceded), such was cured with the promulgation of Decree No. 1 of 1999. From the language of the provisions of the 1978 and the 1999 enactments, the applicant submitted that the jurisdictional scope of the Nigeria Civil Service Union (the 6th respondent) is presented or worded in two parts, to wit, the “operative part” and the “exclusionary part”. The operative part stipulates who are eligible to belong to the union and the exclusionary part stipulates those excluded from the membership of the union irrespective of whether or not they meet the qualification as stipulated in the operative part. To the applicant, the “operative part” stipulates “All junior employees of the Federal and State Civil Service...” and then submitted that the language of both enactments is clear, simple and unambiguous. In other words, it means nothing other than “all junior employees”. This court has defined “all junior employees” to mean “civil servants on salary grade level 01 - 06”. Again this calls for no controversy. The phrase “all junior employees” as used in the 1978 enactment is in pari materia with the phrase used in the 1999 enactment. In other words, that the meaning assigned to the phrase in the 1978 enactment applies mutatis rnutandis to the 1999 enactment, pure and simple. Consequently, that the operative part of both enactments confer jurisdiction on the respondent to unionize only junior employees and only these group of workers are eligible to belong to the 6th respondent. The applicant continued that all the depositions in the 6th respondent’s counter—affidavit on Reports and Recommendations of the Nigeria Labour Advisory Council, the address of the head of the Civil Service of the Federation and that of the Federal Ministry of Labour and Productivity are irrelevant for the purpose of this interpretation for two reasons. First, that there is no ambiguity to warrant the court to resort to the history of the legislation. That under the jurisdictional scope of the 4th respondent, the statute (Decree No. 1 of 1999) used the language of both the 1978 enactment and the judgment of this Court now sought to be enforced. On the meaning of enactment which includes Government Notice, the applicant referred the court to Egbo v. Laguna [1988] 3 NWLR (Pt. 80) 109 at 119. For a better appreciation of this point, the applicant reproduced the provisions of both enactments in the following manner — The 1999 enactment states: NIGERIA CIVIL SERVICE UNION “All junior employees of the Federal and State Governments but excluding enforcement employees in the Nigeria Customs and immigration Services, Technical Typist, Stenographic, Medical, Nurses and Midwives and recognized professional and administrative cadres”. The 1978 enactment states: 22. NIGERIA CIVIL SERVICE UNION “All junior employees of the Federal and State Governments excluding Customs and Immigration, Technical, Typist and Stenographic”. For emphasis, the applicant reiterated that if any ambiguity was created by the non- inclusion of the word “junior” for Nigeria Civil Service Union in the 1996 enactment, that ambiguity was eliminated by Decree No. 1 of 1999. To the applicant, it used the word ‘ambiguity’ because Decree No. 4 of 1996 did not alter the status quo on the jurisdictional scope of the respondent and any ruling to the contrary as appears in the portion of the decision in Association of Senior Civil Servant of Nigeria v. Government of Akwa Ibom State (unreported) Suit No. NIC/9M/2000 which states that “the 1st Respondent shall forthwith pay to the Nigeria Civil Service Union [6th respondent] union dues deducted from Civil servants on grade levels 07 and above for period January, 1996 to 31th August, 1998” was, with respect, given per incuriam. The applicant then urged the court to depart from it. That what is, however, important is that the provisions of Decree No.4 (in the Third Schedule thereto) on the jurisdictional scope of the 4 respondent has been repealed by Decree No. 1 of 1999. Consequently, belabouring the issue will only amount to an academic exercise which we do not want to waste the time of this Court on, urging the Court to so hold. Continuing, the applicant submitted that three things are crucial in law for the determination of this application. They are: (i) The date of the commencement of the enforcement; (ii) The law in force as at that date; and (iii) Whether the law in force has derogated from the judgment sought to be enforcement. To the applicant, one very important fact, which the respondents have overlooked to their detriment, is that the applicant commenced the enforcement proceedings after the coming Into force of the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 1 of 1999. That Decree came into force in September 1998. That these enforcement proceedings were commenced simultaneously on the 16th October, 2000. As to whether the judgment is enforceable, that the court is only required to examine the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 1 of 1999. As stated earlier, that Decree No. 4 of 1996 is irrelevant for this purpose because: 1. The provision of Part B of the Third Schedule of the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 4 of 1996 dealing with the jurisdictional scope of the 4 respondent was amended by Decree No. 1 of 1999. 2. The law in force on the jurisdictional scope of the 4 respondent as at the time of the enforcement of the judgment is Decree No. 1 of 1999 and not Decree No. 4 of 1996. 3. The court is to consider whether the judex of the judgment is affected by any existing law at the date of enforcement or when the enforcement proceeding was commenced and not otherwise. In other words, that the judgment sought to he enforced can only be read in the light of any existing law and not otherwise, urging the Court to so hold. Consequently, that the question is whether the provisions of Part B of the Third Schedule to the Trade Unions Act as amended by the Trade Union (Amendment) Decree No. 1 of 1999 prescribe a jurisdictional scope for the applicant and the 6th respondent different from the terms of the judgment of this Court delivered 27 June, 1995? The applicant answered in the negative and then submitted that the operative words or orders on the jurisdictional scope as prescribed in the judgment are “All junior employees”. That these were the same operative words in Gazette No. 6 of 1978 and in Decree No. 1 of 1999. In other words, the jurisdictional scope of the 6th respondent covers all junior employees in the Federal and State Civil Services. That this is, however, not without some exception or exclusion, which can be found in the judgment as well as in Decree No. 1 of 1999. Similarly, that the jurisdictional scope of the applicant has always remained “All senior staff in the Federal and State Civil Service. The applicant continued that it is emboldened in its submission by the fact that the jurisdiction of the applicant, which it is seeking to enforce, is prescribed in the 1978 enactment. Besides the 1978 enactment, there is no other enactment, which prescribes the jurisdiction of the applicant, or any other senior staff association for that matter. That was the basis of the judgment in 1995 and remains the basis till date. In effect, that both under the 1978 enactment and under the subsequent Decree No. 1 of 1999, the jurisdiction of the applicant and the 6th respondent respectively is as pronounced upon in the 1995 judgment, urging the Court to so hold. To the applicant, in the unlikely event that the Court refuses to depart from its earlier decision in Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria v. Government of Akwa Ibom State (unreported) Suit No: NIC/9M/2000, it will urge the court to hold that if the provisions of Decree No. 4 of 1996 had any effect at all, which is not conceded, the judex was restored by the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 1 of 1999 as was held by this Court in the ruling in Association of Senior Civil Servant of Nigeria v. Government of Akwa Ibom Suite (supra). In concluding this part of the submissions, the applicant contended that the Supreme Court has stated in many cases that a party who knows of an order or judgment, whether null or valid, regular or irregular given by a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be permitted to disobey it. He has an unqualified obligation to obey the order or judgment unless and until that order or judgment has been discharged or set aside, referring to J.C. Ltd and ors vs. Ezenwa [ 4 NWLR (Pt. 443) 391. Furthermore, that His Lordship Achike, JSC in Babatunde’s case at page 887, paras. H — A sounded the following priceless warning, which should be of immense benefit to the respondents — I would only wish to add one word or so. Matters appertaining to judicial orders or judgments, for that matter, are not generally treated with arrogance or levity. Speaking for myself, it is rather officious and treading on perilous path for one to arrogate to oneself the right to choose and pick between court orders in terms of whether they are valid or null and void in fact. Since there is a strong presumption in favour of the validity of a court’s order, it behoves everyone to keep faith with the order of the court. it makes no different that ex facie it appears that the court that made the order is without jurisdiction because at the end of the day an order of the court subsists and must he obeyed until set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction. To, therefore, disobey an order of the court on the fancied belief that the said order is null for any reason whatsoever — even if it subsequently turns out that the order in fact is proved to he null — is a risky and inadvisable decision because until the said order is finally determined to be null and void by the court, it subsists with the string attaching to it unmitigated. Therefore, that sheer common sense as well as prudence demands that every order of the court should he accorded due respect and no attempt made to flout the order on the flimsy reason that it is null and void. ISSUES 2 AND 3 The applicant argued the second and third alternative issues together. Regarding the second issue i.e. whether the judgment of this Court delivered on 27th June 1995 is subject to the award of the Industrial Arbitration Panel regarding section 5 of the Labour Act, the applicant submitted that the respondents’ contention relating to the IAP award on section 5(4) of the Labour Act is misplaced and cannot be correct. That it is elementary that the judgment of the National Industrial Court overrides or replaces the IAP award except the National Industrial Court expressly incorporates the IAP award as part of its judgment, referring, for example, to Order No. 2 at page 11 in the case of Aihaji Shamusideen Adelaja & ors v. Chief Sunday Ogunyade & 6 ors (unreported) Suit No. NIC/12/95, delivered on Friday 29th June 2001, where the court expressly confirmed the IAP award and yet made it subject to its judgment. That this was not the case in the judgment sought to be enforced in which this Court gave a conclusive judgment without subjecting it to the IAP award or vice versa; urging the Court to so hold. The applicant then asked whether alternatively, section 5(4) of the Labour Act Cap. 198 LFN 1990 has not been impliedly repealed by section 16A of the Trade Unions Act Cap. 437 LFN 1990 as amended by the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 4 of 1996 and the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. I of 1999; and then answered the question in the affirmative. To the applicant, to hold the view that members of the applicant must signify in writing their intention to contribute check-off deductions to the applicant does not represent the law as at the time of enforcement of the judgment. That the relevant law imposes a statutory duty on the lst-5th respondents to deduct check-off dues from the wages of its employees and to pay same to the appropriate trade unions. This dates back to 1986 with the promulgation of the Trade Unions (Miscellaneous Provisions) Decree No. 17 of 1986 wherein section 5 of the Labour Act was amended to introduce the issue of statutory check-off deductions from the wages of employees. That section 5(3) of the Labour Act dealt with deductions in favour of trade unions specified in Part A of Schedule 3 to the Trade Unions Act, that is, the trade unions affiliated to the Nigeria Labour Congress while section 5(4) of the Labour Act dealt with deductions in favour of trade unions specified in Part B of the said Schedule 3 to the Trade Unions Act, that is, Senior Staff Associations. The applicant conceded that under the 1986 Amendment, there was a clear distinction between unions, which were entitled to automatic check-off deductions (the unions specified in Part A of Schedule 3 to the Trade Unions Act) and unions, which were entitled to voluntary check-off deductions (the unions specified in Part B of Schedule 3 to the Trade Unions Act), referring to section 5(3) and (4) of the Labour Act as amended by the Trade Unions (Misc. Provisions) Decree No. 17 of 1986. But that even as at this, the employer was still saddled with the responsibility of making deductions from the wages of workers eligible to he members of a registered and recognised union for the purpose of paying contributions to the trade union so recognised. That the distinction between unions in Part A and Part B of Schedule 3 to the Trade Unions Act for the purpose of check-oft deductions was, however, eliminated in 1996 when the then Federal Military Government decided to codify the laws relating to trade unions by transferring the provisions on check-off deductions from the Labour Act to the Principal legislation, the Trade Unions Act, referring to section 3 of the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 4 of 1996 where a new section 16A was immediately after the existing section 16 of the Principal Act. The said section 16A provides: Upon the registration and recognition of any of the unions specified in the Third Schedule to this Act, the employer shall — (a) make deduction from the wages of every worker who is eligible to be a member of any of the trade unions for the purpose of paying contributions to the trade union so registered; and (b) pay any sum so deducted directly to the registered office of the trade union after deducting what is due and payable to the Central Labour Organisation. The applicant continued that reading section 16A(b), a prima facie impression is erroneously created that every deduction made whether for the benefit of junior staff unions or senior staff associations must he subjected to a further deduction in favour of the Central Labour Organisation. That this erroneous impression was corrected by the 1999 amendment to the Principal Act. The subsection now reads: (a) pay any sum so deducted directly to the registered office of the trade union. To the applicant, these amendments underscore the very important point that section 16A was intended to apply to all the registered and recognized trade unions irrespective of whether or not it is a trade union affiliated to the Nigeria Labour Congress. Having made the point that section 16A is applicable to all trade unions, the applicant further contended that should there he any doubt as to the intention of the lawmaker, such doubt was cleared when the lawmakers’ carefully excluded the following phrases in the Trade Unions Act, “any of the trade unions specified in Part A of Schedule 3 to the Trade Unions Act...” hitherto found in section 5(3) of the Labour Act; and “any of the trade unions specified in Part B of Schedule 3 to the Trade Unions Act...” hitherto found in section 5(4) of the Labour Act. That what we now have is and all embracing phrase covering all registered and recognised trade unions in Nigeria, which reads: “any of the trade unions specified in the Third Schedule to this Act....” The applicant then submitted that the intention of the Lawmakers to abrogate the dichotomy between trade unions for the purposes o automatic check-off deductions and voluntary check-off deductions has been expressed in very lucid, clear and unambiguous language. All trade unions specified in the Third Schedule are entitled to automatic check-off deductions. That effect must be given to clear and unambiguous words in a statute, referring to Union Bank Plc v. Ozigi [19994] 3 NWLR (Pt. 333) 385 and Awolowo v. Shagari [1979] 6-9 SC 51. To the applicant, this leaves us with the legal status of section 5 of the Labour Act. That the question is whether that sub-section been impliedly repealed. That the answer will be found in the interpretative principle of repeal by implication. For this, the applicant relied on the celebrated pronouncement of the respected authors of the Halsbury Laws of England 4th Edition at paragraph 1290 where it is stated thus: Where a later enactment does not expressly amend an earlier enactment, but the provisions of the later enactment are inconsistent with those of the earlier, the later by implication amends the earlier so far as is necessary to remove the inconsistency between them. On the strength of this principle of interpretation, the applicant submitted that section 5(4) of the Labour Act has been impliedly repealed, urging the Court to so hold. Having made the point that the dichotomy between automatic/voluntary check-off deductions has been legally abrogated, the applicant then asked what the statutory duty of the employer (1 — 3 sets of respondents) is as regards deductions from wages of employees eligible to be members of the applicant (a Senior Staff Association). That the only relevant and extant legislation governing the issue of the duty of an employer to make deductions from wages of employees for trade union purposes is the Trade Unions Act Cap. 437 LFN 1990 as amended by Decree No.4 of 1996 and Decree No. 1 of 1999. That by the provisions of section 16A of the Principal Act, the 3 sets of respondents have the statutory duty to make automatic deduction from the wages of every worker who is eligible to he a member of the applicant union for the purpose of paying contributions to the applicant being a registered and recognised trade union in Nigeria. That this statutory duty is mandatory given that the said section 1 6A has the phrase, “the employer shall make deductions....” The applicant went on to give a brief background even though it was repetitive. That prior to 1986, there was no legal regime for the deduction or collection of check-off dues. It was voluntary for all the unions. With the promulgation of the Trade Unions (Miscellaneous Provisions) Decree No. 17 of 1986, the deduction and collection of check-off dues became regulated by statute. That what the law did at that time was to introduce two methods of check-off deduction one automatic and the other voluntary. That this system was greeted with much protest by the Senior Staff Associations because the Senior Staff Associations had very weak financial base to carry out their statutory functions, which in any case, are similar to those of the junior staff or NLC affiliated unions. That this state of affairs continued until the 1996 amendment with further clarification in 1999. That now all unions in the Third Schedule are entitled to automatic check-off deductions. In fact, that the 1996 and 1999 amendments clearly state that all trade unions shall have the same powers. Consequently, the statutory duty of an employer as the law stands today is mandatory and for the benefit of all unions without discrimination. Furthermore, the applicant submitted that it is the statutory duty of the employer to apply the provisions of the relevant enactments on the jurisdictional scope of trade unions in order to ascertain which of its employees are eligible to belong to any particular trade union. This statutory duty is also enshrined in section 16A (a) of the Trade Unions Act, which states, inter alia — …the employer shall — (a) Make deductions from the wages of every worker who is eligible to be a member of any of the Trade Unions... (the emphasis is the applicant’s). The applicant then urged the court to so hold. In conclusion, the applicant summarized its submissions as follows — (1) The jurisdictional scope of all Senior Staff Associations, including the Associations of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria is expressly stated in the Federal Government of Nigeria Legal Notice No. 92 published in the Extra Ordinary Gazette No. 6 vol. 65 of 8 February 1978. (2) The jurisdictional scope of the Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria is spelt out in item No. 23 at page 154 of the said Legal Notice as “All employees, other than junior staff of Federal and State Government.” (3) That as at the time the judgment of this court was delivered in this suit, the jurisdictional scope of the Nigeria Civil Service Union was stipulated in the said Legal Notice at item No. 23 as “all junior employees of Federal and State Government excluding Customs, Immigration, Technical Typist and Stenographic stall.’’ 12(4) That this Court in its judgment sought to be enforced clearly defined what constitutes “junior employees” as staff on salary grade level 01 — 06 and “senior staff’ as staff on salary grade level 07 and above with certain exceptions stated therein. (5) That at all material times to the commencement of the present enforcement proceedings I 6 October 2000 the existing law on trade unions i.e. the Trade Unions Act Cap. 437 LFN as amended by the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 1 of 1999 clearly retains the jurisdictional scope of the Nigeria Civil Service Union as prescribed in the 1978 Legal Notice No. 92 as a trade union for “all junior employees” subject, however, to a specified class of ineligible junior employees, which class has been enlarged by the addition of junior employees in the professional arid administrative cadres under Decree I of 1999. (6) That the jurisdictional scope of the applicant as prescribed in the said Legal Notice and the judgment sought to be enforced remains sacrosanct as per the judgment of this court. (7) That Decree No. 4 of 1 996 did not proscribe the applicant or have the effect of proscribing the applicant as a registered trade union. (8) That it is an academic exercise to pronounce on the provisions of Decree No. 4 of 1996 on the jurisdictional scope of the 4th respondents having been repealed by Decree No. 1 of 1999. (9) That the judgment of this Court supersedes the award of the IAP except otherwise stated by the National Industrial Court in its judgment. (10) That section 5(4) of the Labour Act has been impliedly repealed by the subsequent legislation, that is, section 16A of Trade Unions Act as amended by Decree No. 1 of 1999. (ii) That by the cumulative effect of section 16A of the Trade Unions Act as amended and the Third Schedule thereto, the dichotomy between unions entitled to automatic check-off systems and those entitled to voluntary check-off systems stood abrogated from the date of commencement of Decree No. 1 of 1999. (12) That every employer including the 1st-5th respondents herein have a mandatory duty to deduct check-off dues from the eligible members of each union and pay same to the appropriate trade union; and (13) That, in the light of the foregoing, the judgment sought to be enforced is valid, subsisting and enforceable thereby making the applicant entitled to the orders sought. The applicant then urged the Court to grant its application for enforcement. MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENT OF THE 1ST TO 5TH RESPONDENTS The 1st — 5th respondents in their written address introduced the facts of the case and then adopted paragraph 2.04 in the applicant’s Brief of Argument as to salient facts raised in its affidavit. The 1st to 5th respondents on the 28th March 2001 filed a counter-affidavit of 22 paragraphs with Exhibit GA 1 attached thereto. To 1st — 5th respondents, their position in relation to the judgment sought to be enforced are as stated in paragraphs 7, 10, ii, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 21 of their counter-affidavit, which they relied on in their argument. 13Having regard to the reliefs sought by the applicant and the subsequent legislation made after the judgment sought to be enforced, the 1st — 5th respondents formulated the following two issues for the determination of this court — 1. Whether the judgment of this Court in Suit No. NIC/5/95 delivered on 27th June 1995 is still enforceable as sought by the applicant notwithstanding the provisions of the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 4, 1996 and the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 1 of 1999. 2. Whether the said judgment of the court can be enforced without more as sought by the applicant outside or independent of the provisions of section 5(4) of the Labour Act Cap. 198 LFN, section 12(4) of the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act, 2005 and without contravening the provision of section 40 of the 1999 Constitution of’ the Federal Republic of Nigeria. ISSUE 1 To the 1st — 5th respondents, they rephrased issue 1 as articulated by the applicant because the crucial issue in the application as sought by the applicant is not whether the judgment of this Court delivered on 27th June 1995 is still valid and subsisting but whether in view of the subsequent legislation made after the delivery of the said judgment, the applicant can enforce the judgment against the 1st — 5th respondents. They then submitted that by virtue of the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 4 of 1996 the judgment of this Court delivered on 27th June 1995 became unenforceable because under Part B of the Third Schedule of Decree No. 4 of 1996, the jurisdictional scope of the 6th respondent was defined as follows — NIGERIA CIVIL SERVICE UNION All workers of the Federal and State Government but excluding enforcement employees in Customs and Immigration Services, Technical, Typist, Stenographic, Medical, Nurses and Midwives and recognised professional and administrative cadres. That the effect of this amendment on the jurisdictional scope of the respondent, which is clear and unambiguous is that the 6th respondent is entitled to check-off dues of ALL workers of the Federal and State Government excluding enforcement employees and recognised professional and administrative cadres. Thus that the said amendment made substantial changes to the judgment sought to be enforced as was acknowledged by this Court in its subsequent order in the same suit in an application made by the Nigerian Civil Service Union for stay of execution of’ that judgment, referring to Exhibit “GAl” annexed to paragraph 12 of the lst-5th respondents’ counter-affidavit. To the 1st-5th respondents, it will be absurd for the applicant to seek to have the judgment, which had been repealed by legislation to be enforced after a long period of five years as if Decree No. 4 of 1996 was never promulgated, referring to paragraph 17 of their counter-affidavit. That the absurdity of the applicant’s Motion can further be seen when one considers the main relief of the application, which is for — AN ORDER of enforcement of the judgment of this Court in Suit No. NIC/5/93 delivered on 27 June 1995 by compelling the Respondents to forthwith pay to the Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria Union dues deducted from 14 eligible members of the Association in the Civil Service of Anambra State on grade levels 07 and above as from the date of the said judgment. The lst-5th respondents continued that the question that has arisen from this relief is whether if Decree No. 4 of 1996 validly reversed the judgment now sought to be enforced (which the applicant admitted in paragraph 3. 27 of its argument as irrelevant) and union dues deducted from ALL workers of the Anambra State Government excluding enforcement employees were paid to the 6 respondent from the 5th of January 1996, would it be proper for the court to direct the said Government to pay the same dues all over again to the applicant union as per the above relief claimed in the motion dated 19th September 2000? They then submitted that it will be improper for this Court to make such order. That it will also be in breach of sections 120 and 121 of the 1999 constitution to order the Anambra State Government to pay all over again moneys which had been appropriated in its Appropriation Law in the past five years wherein check-off dues were deducted from salaries of Civil Servants and paid to 6 respondent pursuant to Decree No.4 of 1996. To be noted also, according to the 1st — 5th respondents, is that the amendment of Decree No. 4 of 1996 by Decree No. I of 1999 cannot resuscitate the judgment this Court delivered on 27th June 1995 — the issue being that the said judgment was not in force when Decree No. 1 of 1999 came into being, referring to section 6(1)(a) of the Interpretation Act which provides that the repeal of an enactment shall not revive anything not in force or existing at the time when the repeal takes effects. They then submitted that the provisions of Decree No. 1 cannot be used to resuscitate the applicant’s right under the said judgment of 27th June 1995, which had been repealed by the operation of Decree No. 4 of 1996. That in the case of Okechukwu v. Alagba [1991] 8 NWLR (Pt. 207) 54 at 67 C — D, his Lordship Oguntade, JCA (as he then was) put it this way — The true legal position in my humble view is that the right of access of the Plaintiff to the Court to press this particular case had been fully and effectively destroyed by Decree No. 90 of 1979. The 1979 Constitution of Nigeria could not and did not revive it.... The 1st-5th respondents continued that, assuming but not conceding, that Decree No. 1 of 1999 in providing for the jurisdictional scope of the respondent used the language of both the Federal Government Gazette No. 6 Vol. 65 of 1978 and the judgment of this Court now sought to be enforced, then what the applicant should have resorted to is to institute a fresh action for the interpretation and implementation of Decree No. 1 of 1999 and not for enforcement of a judgment which had been dead by the operation of the law. Furthermore, that the Supreme Court in the case of FRN v. Anache [2004] 17 NSCQR 140 at 169 per His Lordship Niki Tobi, JSC stated that — It is wrong to refer to a repealed law in the way learned SAN did. A repealed law no more has legal life as it does not exist any longer; it cannot be cited as it still exists. If it must be cited at all, it must be cited as a repealed law, which has no life to infuence an argument. A repealed law cannot be the basis for any comparison with existing law. It cannot be quoted side by side with existing law as learned SAN did. The 1st-5th respondents, therefore, disagreed with the argument of applicant to the effect that under the jurisdictional scope of the 6 respondent, Decree No. 1 of 1999 used the language of the 1978 instrument. That the applicant did not at all refer to the exclusionary part of Decree No. 4 of 1996 and Decree No. 1 of 1999, which relate to the recognised professional and administrative cadres. To the 1st-5th respondents then, the exclusionary part of both Decrees i.e. Decree No. 4 and Decrees No. 1 as it relates to the recognised professional and administrative cadres are also changes introduced by these legislation which are not in the 1978 instrument and the judgment sought to be enforced. Finally on this issue, the 1st — 5th respondents submitted that unless and until the Court makes a pronouncement on the effect of Decree No. 4 of 1996 and Decree No. 1 of 1999 on the judgment delivered by this court in Suit No. NIC/5/93 on 27th June 1995, the applicant cannot enforce that judgment against the lst — 5th respondents. ISSUE 2 The second issue as formulated by the 1st — 5th respondents is whether the judgment of this Court delivered on 27th June 1995 can be enforced without more as sought by the applicant outside or independent of the provisions of section 5(4) of the Labour Act Cap. 198 LFN; section 12(4) of the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act 2005 and without contravening the provisions of section 40 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The portion of the judgment which, according to the 1st — 5th respondents, is relevant to this issue is Order (iii) of the said judgment which stipulates the deduction and payment of dues from Civil Servants on grade level 07 and above to the Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria. In arguing this issue, the lst — 5th respondents placed reliance on paragraphs 16, 18 and 21 of their counter-affidavit and then contended that the deduction and payment of check-off dues to the applicant is not automatic hut should be governed by section 5(4) of the Labour Act Cap. 198 LFN 1990, section 40 of the 1999 Constitution and section 12(4) of the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act 2005. To the 1st-5th respondents, it is first of all important to note that this enforcement proceeding was commenced on the 16th of October 2000 when the 1999 Constitution had come into effect. That both sections 5(4) of the Labour Act 1990 and section 16A of the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 1 of 1999 are by virtue of section 315 of the 1999 Constitution existing laws. On the other hand, that section 3(3) of the same 1999 Constitution provides that if any law is inconsistent with the provisions of this Constitution, the Constitution shall prevail and that other law shall to the extent of the inconsistency be void, referring to the case of Attorney-General of Abia State v. Attorney- General of Federation [2001] FWLR (Pt. 101) 1419. The lst-5th respondents then submitted that section 16A of Decree No. 1 of 1999 is inconsistent with section 40 of the 1999 Constitution which guaranteed freedom of association of every person to form or belong to any political party, trade union or any other association. We submit further, that even if section 16A of Decree No. 1 impliedly repealed section 5(4) of the Labour Act, which is not conceded, the coming into effect of section 40 of the 1999 Constitution reinforces the provision of section 5(4) of the Labour Act, which was the law applicable to the cause of action of the applicant when the judgment sought to be enforced was delivered. That it, therefore, follows that the said provision of section 5(4) of the labour Act in essence safeguards and guarantees the employee’s fundamental right to freedom of association under section 40 of the 1999 by giving such person the right to decide whether or not to become a member of any trade union. That the legal position of the law is that this Court being a court of law is bound to uphold the provisions of the Constitution and other statutes in force. That once the court finds that the claims of the applicant are unconstitutional, the court is duty bound to uphold the provisions of the Constitution. In the same vein, the 1st – 5th respondents agreed with the applicant in its argument that the judgment sought to be enforced can only be read in the light of any existing law and not otherwise; and that what is the existing law guiding the deduction of check-off dues by employers of labour in Nigeria today is the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act 2005. To the 1st – 5th respondents, the section of the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act 2005 relevant to the issue at hand is section 12(4) which provides that — Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act, membership of a trade union by employees shall be voluntary and no employee shall be forced to join any trade union or be victimized for refusing to join or remain a member. That this section goes to support the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Agbai v. Okogbue [1991] 7 NWLR (Pt. 204) 391, which was also applied in the case of Nkpa v. Nkume (2001) 6 NWLR (Pt. 710) 543 at page 564 where Pats-Acholonu, JCA (as he then was) stated that - No one can force or coerce anyone to join a club, society or group that he does not intend or wish to be a member of. It is an affront and infraction of his constitutional right to make one acquiesce or become a member of a body that he or she despises. It is atrophy. In any event, that section 16A of Decree No. 1 of 1999, which was heavily relied upon by the applicant, has been amended and substituted with a new section 16A under section 3 of the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act 2005. The new section 16A provides that — Upon the registration and recognition of any of the trade unions specified in the Third Schedule to this Act, an employer shall — (a) Make deduction from the wages of every worker who is a member of any of the trade unions for the purpose of paying contributions to the trade union so registered….(the emphasis is the 1st – 5th respondents). That from the provision of the new section 16A of the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act 2005, it is obvious that deduction of check-off dues by employers of labour are not from those who are eligible members but from those who are members, who have consented or agreed to be members of such trade union, That it is for this reason that the enforcement of the judgment of this Court outside the provisions of section 5(4) of the Labour Act and section 12(4) of the 2005 Act will be unconstitutional, illegal, null and void. In the conclusion, the 1st – 5th respondents submitted that it is in the light of the above that they are urging the Court to consider the purpose and objective of the legislators in the 2005 amendment, which is to grant freedom to employees to decide which union they wish to belong and to give definitive and clear clarification on this issue of automatic check-off dues from workers as the 1st-5th respondents do not wish to incur any liability hw or otherwise by taking any action which is likely to be found unconstitutional. MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENT OF THE 6TH RESPONDENT The 6th respondent in its written address introduced the matter at hand by reiterating the facts of the matter. To the 6 respondent, sometime in 1978, the Federal Government of Nigeria issued the Extra-Ordinary Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette No. Vol. 65 of 8 February, 1978 titled RESTRUCTURING OF TRADE UNIONS wherein the existing trade unions were restructured to 71 industrial unions, and the jurisdiction of each union spelt out in the gazette. The Nigeria Civil Service Union, the 4 respondent herein, was listed at page 154 as No. 22 among the 71 industrial unions listed in the gazette, and under it the membership was defined as– All junior employees of Federal and State Governments excluding Customs, Immigration, Typists and Stenographic staff. The Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria, the applicant herein, was listed as No. 23 at page 155 and it the membership was defined as — All employees, other than junior staff of Federal and State Governments. That following an inter-union dispute, which arose between the applicant in Suit No.IAP/HB/3468/5, the Industrial Arbitration Panel determined the issue of jurisdictional scope of the two unions mainly on the interpretation of the terms “junior employee/staff’ and “senior employee/staff’ as used in the gazette, on the basis of salary grade levels i.e. “junior staff’ to mean employees on grade levels 01 to 06 and “senior staff’ to mean employees on grade level 07 and above. Consequently, the tribunal came to the following decision, inter alia – In the inter-union dispute between the Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria (First Party) and the Nigeria Civil Service Union (Second Party) the Tribunal awards as follows: (i) The Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria is a registered and recognised trade union as per No. 23 page 155 of Federal Gazette No. 6 Volume 65 of 8th February, 1978, and as per Schedule 3 to the Trade Unions Decree No. 22 of 1978 and the fact of its being a full and recognised member of the Public Service Negotiating Council and the Joint Public Service Negotiating Council. (ii) The Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria is entitled to unionize Civil Servants on Grade Level 07 and above, including those of them in the Personnel Assistant Cadre (formerly Executive Officer Cadre), except those who are Typists, Stenographers, Nurses and Midwives and Pharmacists, Medical Technologists. (iii) The Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria is entitled to union dues deducted from Civil Servants on GL 07 and above, who are members of the Association subject to the provisions of section 5(4) of the Act Cap. 198 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990. is to take effect from the date of its confirmation. The Tribunal therefore makes no Award in respect of union dues already deducted from Civil in GL 07 and above and paid over to the Second Party in the suit. That the said decision was on 27th June 1995 upheld by this Court in Suit No. NIC/5/93 upon an appeal thereon by the Nigeria Civil Service Union, the 6th respondent herein. That this Court in its judgment held as follows — The summary of the findings of this Court is as follows: (i) The Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria is entitled to unionise Civil Servants on grade levels 07 and above, including those of them in the Personnel Assistant Cadre (formerly Executive Officer Cadre), except those who are typists/stenographers, nurses and midwives, pharmacists and medical technologists. (ii) The Nigeria Civil Service Union is entitled to unionise civil servants on grade levels 01-06 excluding Customs, Immigrations, Technical, Typists, and Stenographic staff. (iii,) As from the (late of this judgment i.e. 27th June 1995 union dues deducted from civil servants on grade levels 07 and above should be paid to the Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria. Monies already paid contrary to the present ruling of this Court should not be disturbed. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. Judgment is entered accordingly. Thereafter, the 6th respondent, by a Motion on Notice, applied to the National Industrial Court, inter alia, tor an interpretation of its judgment and an order granting the union a period of time from February to 31st March, 1996, or any such period of time as the Court considered reasonable, to arrange for effective disengagement at the National and State levels of officers affected by the said judgment. That while the aforesaid Motion was still pending before the National Industrial Court, the Federal Government promulgated the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 4 of 1996, which completely altered the position of the Law under which the afore-mentioned judgments were given. That the main effect of Decree No. 4 of 1996 was that by virtue of sections 6(a) and 10 thereof, as well as Part B of the Third Schedule, the membership of trade unions in the Civil Service was not based on salary grade levels as contained in the said judgments, but was rather based on the “cadre” of the workers. Consequently, by the said Decree No. 4 of 1996, the membership of the Nigeria Civil Service Union include civil servants in the Personnel Assistant Cadre (formerly Executive Officer Cadre) irrespective of whether they are on salary grade level 07 and above. Part B of the Third Schedule to the Decree defined the jurisdictional scope of the Nigeria Civil Service Union as follows: NIGERIA CIVIL SERVICE UNION All workers of the Federal and State Governments but excluding enforcement employees in Customs and Immigration Services, Technical, Typists, Stenographic, Medical, Nurses and Midwives and recognised Professional and Administrative cadres. To the 6th respondent, the effect of the substantial changes made by Decree No. 4 of 1996 on the law as it affects the court judgment was acknowledged by the National Industrial Court when the said Motion came up before it on 7th March 1996. In the circumstance, that the Court viewed the Motion as an academic exercise and decided that — in view of Decree 4 of 1996, Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree, which has made very substantial changes in the law, the Court hereby strikes out this application. Thereafter, nothing was heard or done in respect of the said Suit No. NIC/5/93 or the judgment therein for over five years until sometime in April 2002, when the applicant tiled the respective substantive applications herein against the 1st set of respondents in Suit No. NIC/5/2002, namely, Government of Yobe State and others, the 2nd set of respondents in Suit No. NIC/6/2002, namely, Government of Bauchi State and others and the 2nd set of respondents in Suit No. NIC/7/2002, namely, Government of Niger State and others, praying for the reliefs stated in the applicant’s application. Meanwhile, that the Nigeria Civil Service Union became aware of the various suits and immediately applied to the Court by way of different Motions on Notice for orders to be joined as the a respondent in the suits. The said Motions were heard and granted by the Court on 25th June 2002; whereupon the Nigeria Civil Service Union was joined as a respondent in the respective suits. Thereafter, the Court ordered a consolidation of the three suits on the said 25th June 2002. The 6th respondent then filed its counter-affidavit to the applicant’s substantive application on 22nd October 2002. That when the matter came up on lst April 2003, the Court directed counsel to file written memoranda regarding the substantive suit. The 6th respondents then framed two issues for the determination of the court, which are as follows - 1. Whether the judgment of this Court delivered on 27th June 1995 in Suit No. NIC/5/93 is still enforceable as sought by the applicant despite the promulgation of the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 4 of 1996. 2. Whether the suit as formulated by the applicant is competent and maintainable as such against the respondents. To the 6th respondent, though the applicant raised three different issues in its memorandum of argument, the 6th respondent will endeavour to answer the issues so raised in the course of argument herein. ISSUE 1: EFFECT OF THE TRADE UNIONS (AMENDMENT) DECREE NO. 1 OF 1996 ON THE 1995 JUDGMENT IN SUIT NO. NIC/5/93 The first issue framed by the 6th respondent for the determination of this court is whether the judgment of this Court delivered on 27th June 1995 in Suit No. NIC/5/93 is still enforceable as sought by the applicant despite the promulgation of the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 4 of 1996. To the 6th respondent, both the applicant union and the 6th respondent union herein derive their membership from the workers in the Federal and State Civil Service. Thus, the dispute in Suit No. NIC/5/93 before the National Industrial Court was over the categories of workers in the Civil Service which each of the two unions was entitled to unionise. As such, in reaching the decision in the judgment of 27th June 1995, that this Court determined the membership or jurisdictional scope of the unions strictly on the basis of the salary grade levels of the workers concerned. The 6th respondent continued that the said decision was no doubt based on the interpretation and implementation of the provisions of the Extra Ordinary Federal Republic of Nigeria Gazette No. 6 Vol. 65 of 8th February 1978 on the Restructuring of Trade Unions. This is quite evident from the said judgment at pages 59 to 60 thereof where the court stated — This Court has always held that the basis for the jurisdiction and eligibility of membership of each union is as contained in the Legal Notice No. 92 Re-Structuring of Trade Unions in the Official Gazette of the Federal Republic of Nigeria No. 6 of 8th February 1978. ..The Court considers semantic the attempt by both parties to define a worker. As far as the Court is concerned ‘worker’ is a generic term for all who work at any level. The definition of worker in the opinion of this Court is not much help in this instant case because the basic division of unions is on the basis of Junior and Senior Staff hence the classification of unions in the Third Schedule to the Trade Unions Act Cap. 437 LFN 1990 into Parts ‘A’ and ‘B’ as Part ‘A’ Workers’ Unions and Part ‘B’ Senior Staff Associations. There may be exceptions where there may be no senior association like the case of the National Union of Nurses and Midwives of Nigeria but generally in accordance with the spirit of the 1978 Trade Unions Restructuring exercise, workers’ unions are for junior employees or junior staff who in the civil service categorization are on grade levels 01 to 06. Though the appellants claimed that there is no definition of senior staff in the Trade Unions Act. Cap. 437, the Court is of the view that the body of circulars, civil service rules and regulations which ensure the smooth day- to-day administration of the Civil Service has clearly