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BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip Presiding Judge Hon. Justice V. N. Okobi Judge Hon. Justice M. B. Dadda Judge DATE: JULY 15, 2008 SUIT NO. NIC/7/2008 BETWEEN 1. Anthony Adekunle Oyekanmi 2. B. Onoh 3. D. J. Kuzhinmi 4. B. A. Azuike 5. I.D.Ekeh 6. E. G. Kaye (For themselves and on behalf of all other members of the National Association of Telecommunication Employees)………………………………………….. Claimants AND 1. Nigerian Telecommunications Ltd 2. Bureau of Public Enterprises……………………………………… Respondents REPRESENTATION O. K Salawu, for the claimants. Udeme Abia, with him is Olaniran Obele, for the 1st respondent. Miss Sophia Abiri, with her is Charles 0. Okwumabua, for the 2nd respondent RULING The claimants filed a complaint against the respondents dated February 7, 2008 and filed on same date. Accompanying the complaint is a 19- paragraphed Statement of Facts, the List of Witnesses to be called and the List of two Documents (the Staff Conditions of Service and Disengagement Letters were equally attached) to be relied on. By the complaint, the claimants are claiming for the following declarations and orders — 1. A declaration that the claimants are entitled to the payment of three months’ salary in lieu of notice, redundancy benefits, repatriation and compensation for premature retirement in accordance with the 1st respondent’s conditions of service following their disengagement from service. 2. A declaration that the claimants are entitled to refund of the contribution made to the National Housing Fund and the NITEL Cooperative Society following their disengagement from service and the payment of pension in accordance with the Pension Reform Act 2004. 3. A declaration that the claimants are entitled to 10% of the shares of the 1st respondent by virtue of the Privatization and Commercialization Regulation 2004 made pursuant to the Privatization and Commercialization Act. 4. An order directing the 1st respondent to pay to the claimants three months’ salary in lieu of notice, redundancy wages, repatriation and compensation for premature retirement in accordance with the 1st respondent’s conditions of service. 5. An order directing the 1st respondent to refund the contributions made by the claimants to the National Housing Fund and NITEL Cooperative Society and payment of monthly pension to the claimants for life. 6. An order directing the 2nd respondent to allocate 10% of the shares of the 1St respondent to the claimants and other members of the National Association of Telecommunication Employees (NATE). Both the respondents separately entered appearance (that of the 2nd respondent being conditional appearance) and also separately filed notice of preliminary objection. That of the 1st respondent is brought pursuant to sections 2(1) and 24 of the Legal Practitioners Act Cap. L11 LFN 2004, section 2(1) of the Trade Unions Act (TUA) Cap. T14 LFN 2004, Order 11 Rule 1 of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007 and the inherent jurisdiction of the court in its preliminary objection the 1st respondent is praying for an order dismissing or striking out this, suit and for such further order(s) as the court may seem fit. The preliminary objection is based on the following grounds — 1. The claimants lack locus standi to constitute this action on behalf of the members of NATE. 2. NATE and/or the claimants cannot on behalf of their members exercise the powers of a trade union. 3. The commencement and maintenance of this suit by the claimants and/or NATE is an attempt to disguise from the court the performance of an illegal act. 4. This court lacks jurisdiction to entertain an improperly constituted action. Accompanying the 1st respondent’s preliminary objection is an 8- paragraphed affidavit deposed to by Kehinde Ladipo, a litigation clerk in the firm of counsel to the 1st respondent. The 2 respondent simply prayed that the claimants’ suit be dismissed and/or struck out on the grounds that — 1. The complaint which was issued and meant for service out of jurisdiction of this court and same was not marked for service out of jurisdiction of this court. 2. The complaint is caught by the provision of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act as the purported cause of action from the tenor of the complaint arose on September 30, 2006 and a fortiori same is statute barred as against the 2nd respondent, a public authority. 3. The suit does not disclose a reasonable cause of action. 4. The claimants lack the locus standi to institute and/or maintain this action against the respondents. 5. The claimants’ purported association is not registered under the relevant laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. By agreement of the parties, written addresses were filed regarding the preliminary objections. The l respondent in its written address first reiterated the facts of the case as alleged by the claimants in the following words - 1. The claimants alleged that they and all the members of NATE were employed by NITEL were for various terms ranging between 15 and 30 years under terms of employment regulated by NITEL conditions of service (the “Conditions of Service). 2. The claimants also alleged: that their respective employment and the employment of other members of NATE were terminated by NITEL without the requisite three months notice of disengagement or three months salary in lieu of notice, as stipulated in the Conditions of Service. 3. The claimants further alleged that U termination of their appointment, NITEL and BPE decided to pay them arbitrary wages, contrary to the Conditions of Service and the Pension Reform Act No. 2 of 2004. 4. The claimants also alleged that they were denied the following — a) 10% shares of NITEL’s equity to which they are entitled. b) Contributions they made to the National Housing Fund and the N1TEL Cooperative Society. c) Their monthly pension under the Pension Reform Act. d) Other benefits stipulated in the Conditions of Service, including redundancy benefits, repatriation and compensation for premature retirement. That it is on the basis of these facts that the claimants are aggrieved, hence the present action and the prayers and reliefs sought for in the complaint Objecting to the action, therefore, the respondent framed the following issues for the determination of the court: I. Whether the claimants can validly institute this suit on behalf of the members of NATE in a representative capacity; 2. Whether NATE and/or the claimants can, on behalf of their members, exercise the powers of a trade union; and 3. Whether the commencement and maintenance of this suit by the claimants and/or NATE, is not an attempt to disguise from the court, the performance of an illegal act. On the first issue, i.e. whether the claimants can validly institute this suit on behalf of the members of NATE in a representative capacity, the 1st respondent submitted that unincorporated non- bodies, associations, clubs, etc are not legal persons and can only sue and be sued by representative members citing Ifekwe v. Madu [2000] 14 NWLR (Pt. 688) 459. That where several persons belonging to a class have common interest in a matter, they may authorise one or more of their members to bring an action on behalf of all the members of the class, referring to Olasa v.Ezimuo [2003] 17 NWLR (Pt. 848) 129. The 1st respondent continued that for a plaintiff to validly commence representative action on behalf of members of a class, the plaintiff must show that it has the consent of the other parties to bring the suit, referring to Olasa v. Ezimuo, supra. That the issue whether the plaintiff has authority of the other interested persons to bring an action in a representative capacity is a matter of fact to he established by evidence, citing UBN Plc v. Ntuk [2003] 16 NWLR (Pt. 845) 183 and Osho v. Ape [1998] 8 NWLR (Pt. 562) 492. That the burden of proof rests on the plaintiff(s) in such cases, referring to Olasa v. Ezirnuo, supra. Furthermore, that where, upon the facts, it is established that a plaintiff who claims to sue in a representative capacity lacks the consent or authority of the members of the class represented to bring the action, the plaintiff lacks locus standi to bring the action, citing Olasa v. Ezimuo, supra, and Adesanya v. President, Federal Republic of Nigeria [1981] NCLR 358. The 1st respondent then went on to submit that in the present case, the claimants claim to have instituted the suit on behalf of all the members of NATE. That to sustain the suit in the capacity which it is instituted, the claimants ought to tender before this court, authority in the form of a resolution by other members of NATE, establishing that they had authorized the claimants to sue and represent their common interest. That the claimants have not exhibited any document evidencing consent or authority of members of the class purportedly represented, in order to enable them bring the action in a representative capacity. That in the absence of evidence showing consent or authority of all the members of NATE to bring this action in a representative capacity, it follows that the claimants lack the locus standi to bring this action. The 1st respondent then urged the court to dismiss and/or strike out this suit for lack of locus standi in the claimants to institute this action in a representative capacity. Regarding the second issue i.e. whether NATE or the claimants can on behalf of their members, exercise the powers of a trade union, the respondent referred to section 1(1) of the TUA, which provides that a “trade union” means ‘any combination of workers or employers, whether temporary or permanent, the purpose of which is to regulate the terms and conditions of employment of workers....’ That from the claimants’ pleadings, NATE would, if validly constituted, certainly fall within this definition. The 1st respondent went on to state that by section 5(6) of the ‘TDA, the certificate of registration issued by the Registrar of Trade Unions upon registering a trade union, is conclusive evidence of registration of a trade union. To the 1st respondent, section 2 of the TUA prohibits unregistered trade unions from functioning. That while section 2(1) provides that a trade union shall not perform any act in furtherance of the purposes for which it has been formed unless it has been registered under the Act, section 2(3) provides that the union, each official thereof and any of its members who participates in the performance of any such act, shall be guilty of a criminal offence punishable under section 50 by a fine of N50 upon summary conviction. To the respondent, in the present case, the claimants claim to have brought an action on behalf of NATE. That they have not tendered any document evidencing registration of NATE as a registered trade union. That NATE is not, and has never been, a registered trade union. In consequence, that this suit represents the “performance of an act in furtherance of the purposes for which” NATE is formed within the contemplation of section 2(l) of the TUA. The 1st respondent then urged the court to hold that NATE, or the claimants, cannot, on behalf of their members, perform an illegal act by exercising the powers of a trade union. On the third issue, i.e. whether the commencement and maintenance of this suit by the claimants and/or NATE, is not an attempt to disguise from the court, the performance of an illegal act, the 1st respondent argued that section 2(11) of the TUA prohibits a trade union from performing any act in furtherance of the purposes for which it has been formed unless it has been registered under the Act. To the 1st respondent, the claimants are merely seeking to get around the restriction in section 2(1) of the TUA by instituting the action in their respective names “for themselves and on behalf of all the members” of NATE. That this is an attempt to get around an express provision of the law criminalizing such actions. In effect, that the claimants are asking the court to assume jurisdiction over an action which, as filed, is illegal. That it has been decided that a court will not assist a party to perpetrate an illegality, referring to FMBN Ltd v. Desire Gallery Ltd [2004] 113 NWLR (Pt. 89!) 522 and SDC Cementation (Wig.) Ltd. v. Nagei & Co. Ltd [2003] 4 NWLR (Pt. 811) 611. The 1st respondent then urged the court to hold that the commencement and maintenance of this suit by the claimants and/or NATE is an attempt to disguise from the court, the performance of an illegal act. That the court, a temple of justice, cannot uphold the maintenance of an illegal action. Concluding, the 1st respondent submitted that from the foregoing, it is clear that this suit as commenced by the claimants is incompetent and an attempt to disguise from the court, the performance of an illegal act, and then urged the court to decline jurisdiction to adjudicate on this matter and accordingly dismiss and/or strike out this suit. The 2nd respondent argued its grounds of objection in the order presented. On the issue of service out of jurisdiction, the 2 respondent argued that the complaint was served on the respondents in Abuja outside the jurisdiction of this court. That no leave of this court was sought and obtained before the issuance of the complaint. The court was then referred to Order 7 of the Rules of this Court dealing with ‘Service of Originating Process’ and which in Rule 10 provides as follows: Where any person out of jurisdiction of the Court is a necessary or proper party in a matter before the Court and it is necessary to serve that person with the originating process or other document relating to the matter, the court may allow service of the process or such other document out of jurisdiction (emphasis is the 2nd respondent’s). To the respondent, the word “allow” as used in Order 7 Rule 10 is for leave of the court to issue the originating process outside its jurisdiction because the court can only allow a process when leave is sought and obtained by the party who desires same. That the complaint is, therefore, a nullity having not been issued with due process since the court did not allow it, referring to Skenconsult (Nig.) Ltd & anor v. Ukey [1981] 1 SC 4 at 25 (published by Lawbreed Ltd) Reprint Editions where Eso, JSC held as follows: The words of Lord Denning in Macfoy v. UAC Ltd [1962] AC 152 a Privy Council Case, which went on appeal from the West African Court of Appeal, readily, comes to mind. There the learned Law Lord delivering the judgment of the Board in which Lord Denning and the Rt. Hon L.M.D de Silva were also present said, and I approve: If an act is void, then it is in law a nullity. It is not only bad, but incurably bad. There is no need for an order of the Court to set it aside. It is automatically null and void without much ado, though it is sometimes convenient to have the Court declare it to be so. And every proceeding which is founded on it is also bad and incurably bad. You cannot put something on nothing and expect it to stay there. It will collapse. The court was further referred to Madukolu & ors v. Nkemdilim & ors [1962]1 ALL NLR 587 at 594 where Bairamian, FJ (as he then was) held as follows: A Court is competent when, (1) It is properly constituted as regards numbers and qualifications of the members of the bench, and no member is disqualified for one reason or another; and (2) The subject-matter of the case is within its jurisdiction, and there is no feature in the case which prevents the Court from exercising its Jurisdiction; and (3) The case comes before the court initiated by the due process of law, and upon judgment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction. Any defect in competence is fatal, for the proceedings are a nullity however well conducted and decided: the defect is extrinsic to the adjudication” (emphasis is the 2 respondent’s). The 2nd respondent then submitted that the complaint or process is a nullity as same did not fulfill the condition precedent to the issuance having regard to non-compliance with the provisions of Order 7 Rule 10 of the National industrial Court (NIC) Rules, 2007, urging the court to strike out the complaint or process. On the application of the provisions of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, the 2 respondent referred the court to the disengagement from service of the claimants and urged that the following facts are not in dispute from the processes filed before this court — (i) The 2nd respondent is a creation of statute and it is a public authority of the Federal Government. (ii) The purported cause of action arose according to the claimants plaintiffs on the 30th of September, 2006. That from the declarations sought by the claimants, the bone of contention according to the claimants is the purported document issued on the, 30 of September, 2006. The court was then referred to section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act 1990, which provides as follows: Where any action, prosecution, or other proceedings is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any law or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such Law, duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect: (a) the action, prosecution, or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three months next alter the ceasing thereof. The 2nd respondent then submitted that under and by virtue of section 18 of the Interpretation Act, “person” includes anybody or persons, corporate or unincorporated, referring the court to Ibrahim v. Judicial Service Commission [1998]14 NWLR (Pt. 584) 1 at 35 where Iguh, JSC, held as follows: It is beyond dispute that the word person” when used in a legal parlance, such as in a legislation or statute, connotes both a “natural person” that is to say, a “human being” and an “artificial person” such as a corporation sole or public bodies corporate or incorporate. See Royal Mail Steam Packet Co. v .Braham (1877) 2 AC 381 at 386 PC. To the 2nd respondent, it was held by the Supreme Court in the above case that the provisions of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law of Northern Nigeria which is in pari materia with the provisions of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, Laws of the Federation, 1990 applies to “natural persons”, corporate and incorporate bodies. Similarly, that in Awokunle v. National Electric Power Authority [2007] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1057) 340 at 358, the Court of Appeal held as follows: The words “public officer” as found in section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act Cap. 379, Laws of the Federation, 1990, not only refers to natural persons but also extends to public bodies, artificial persons, institutions or persons sued in their official names or titles, Central Bank of Nigeria v. Adedeji [2004] 13 NWLR (Pt. 890) l1 226; NEPA v. Olagunju [2005] 3 NWLR. (Pt. 913) 602. The 2nd respondent then urged the court to strike out the complaint for being incompetent On the twin issues of the disclosure of reasonable cause of action and locus standi of the claimants, the 2 respondent submitted that the suit does not disclose any reasonable cause of action and that the claimants have no locus standi to institute this action against the respondents, particularly the 2 respondent. That this is because — 1. The claimants who were purported employees of 1st defendant were never the employees of the 2nd respondent. 2. The 2nd respondent was never the custodian of any contribution to the National Housing Fund and there was no payment of any contribution to any Housing Fund to the 2nd respondent. 3. The claimants have not shown before this court their entitlement to 10% shares of the 1st respondent. 4. More importantly, the claimants who claimed to represent other 7,000 employees have not shown before the court the identities of these 7,000 purported employees of the 1st respondent. 5. The claimants did not seek the leave of this court to sue the respondents in representative capacity. The 2nd respondent then submitted that the issue whether the claimants have the authority of the other interested persons to bring an action in a representative capacity must be established by the claimants through leave of this court, referring to UBN v. Ntuk [2003] 16 NWLR (Pt. 845) 183. The 2nd respondent also submitted that the claimants have no locus standi to institute this action against the respondents, arguing that the claimants admitted in their statement of claims that they have been paid their severance package. That vide paragraph 11 of the Statement of Facts, the claimants averred as follows: …despite their protest the 1 defendant unilaterally imposed its meager severance package on them. That from the above, the claimants have no locus standi to institute this action against the respondents having been paid their severance packages. That they are, therefore, estopped from laying further claim to any other severance packages. The 2nd respondent submitted further that a person who makes a claim which in actual fact belongs to someone also has no locus standi before the court, referring to Oloriode v. Oyebi [1984] 1 SCNLR 390. To the 2nd respondent, the claimants are suing for 7,000 employees of NATE who are not known to the court. That the claimants, therefore, do not have the locus standi to sue for and on behalf of persons whose identities are unknown to the court. The 2nd respondent then urged the court to strike out the complaint as being incompetent. On the issue of the claimants’ association not registered, the 2 respondent contended that the claimants claim to sue for and on behalf of NATE. That NATE is not a registered trade union under and by virtue of the TUA. The court was then referred to section 5(6) of the said Act, which provides that “The certificate of registration issued by the Registrar of Trade Unions upon registering a trade union is conclusive evidence of registration of a trade union.” To the 2nd respondent, there is no such certificate exhibited by the claimants to show that NATE is a registered trade union. Also, that section 2 of the TUA prohibits an unregistered trade union from functioning. That section 2(1) provides that a trade union shall not perform any act in furtherance of the purposes for which it has been formed unless it has been registered under the Act, while section 2(3) provides for penalty for an offence punishable under the Act for the non-registration of a trade union. The 2nd respondent then submitted that it has been held by the Supreme Court in Fawehinmi v. NBA No. 2 [1989] 2 NWLR (Pt. 105) 558 SC that an unregistered association like the Nigerian Bar Association cannot sue and be sued in its unregistered name. The 2nd respondent continued by asserting that the claimants claimed that NATE is an affiliate member of the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC). To the 2nd respondent, even under the TUA, the NLC is not a registered union. That there is no where under any Law or Act where the NLC is a registered body. That it follows, therefore, that whether as an affiliate body or otherwise, NATE is not a registered Union. The 2nd respondent concluded by urging the court to strike out the complaint based on the reasons canvassed above. We must at once remark that we cannot allow counsel to turn principle on its head. The submission of counsel to the 2nd respondent that the NLC is not a registered union is most unfortunate and betrays a poor appreciation of the law regulating trade unions in Nigeria. Prior to the passing of the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act 2005, the NLC was the only Central Labour Organisation permitted by the TUA to exist. At the passing of the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act 2005, the idea of a sole Central Labour Organisation was jettisoned in preference to Federations of Trade Unions. The NLC was then statutorily deemed to be registered under the TUA (see section 8(3) of the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act ‘2005) with its membership not permitted to join any new Federation that may be subsequently registered by the registrar of trade Unions (section 8(1) of the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act 2005). It is strange then to read of the submission of the counsel to the 2nd respondent in this regard. The claimants reacted to respondents’ written addresses jointly. By way of introduction, the claimants reiterated that vide a complaint dated 7th of February 2008, they commenced an action against the respondents in a representative capacity. That this capacity was clearly endorsed on the face of the complaint, showing clearly that the claimants sue ‘in their names and on behalf of the 7000 members of the Nigeria Association of Telecommunication workers’. The claimants then went on to frame the following five issues for the determination of the court — 1. Whether the complaint was issued for service outside the jurisdiction of this court. 2. Whether the complaint satisfies the requirement of the law in respect of a representative action. 3. Whether a party being represented in a representative capacity need be a legal person. 4. Whether the provision of section 2(1) of the Public Officer Protection Act 1990 is applicable to labour related issue. 5. Whether the claimants have established any cause of action against the 2nd respondent. Regarding the first issue they framed i.e. whether the complaint was issued for service outside the jurisdiction of the court, the claimants submitted that the complaint was issued to be served within the jurisdiction of this court. To the claimants, the jurisdiction of this court as conferred by the provision of section 21 of the NIC Act covers the entire States of the Federation of Nigeria. That the opening paragraph of section 21 of the NIC Act clearly states that this court shall have and exercise jurisdiction throughout the Federation .In other words any complaint issued for service within the Federation or any State of the Federation is deemed to be service within the jurisdiction of the court. There is thus only one jurisdiction of the court which is the entire Federation of Nigeria. To the claimants, the complaint was issued in Lagos to be served in Abuja all within the Federation of Nigeria as contained in Part I and Part II of the First Schedule to the 1999 Constitution. The claimants continued that the one jurisdictional nature of the court could easily be depicted by the rotational policy of this court in moving the court round the entire States of the Federation. They then urged the court to take judicial notice, of the policy of this court which allows matters filed in Lagos to be adjourned for hearing in Abuja or any other part of the Federation subject to the convenience of parties and the court. In view of above, the claimants submitted that the argument of learned counsel to the 2nd respondent that this complaint was issued outside the jurisdiction of this court and, therefore, requires the leave of court for it to be served pursuant to Order 7 Rule 10 of the Rules of this court is totally misconceived and erroneous in law and urged the court to discountenance same and hold that the provision of Order 7 Rule 10 is not applicable to the instant case as the complaint was issued for service within the Federation of Nigeria, which makes up the jurisdiction of the court. On the second issue i.e. whether the complaint dated satisfies the requirement of the law in respect of a representative action, the claimants submitted that it does. To the claimants, the provision of Order 4 Rule 2 of the Rules of this court states that where a claimant or a defendant is sued in a representative capacity, the originating process shall state that capacity. The claimants then drew the attention of the court to the l page of the complaint where it is clearly endorsed that the claimants are suing not only for themselves but also in a representative capacity. That this endorsement clearly satisfies the only requirement of the law as provided in Order 4 Rule 2 of the Rules of this court in respect of an action brought in a representative capacity, referring to Busari v. Oseni [1992] 4 NWLR (Pt. 237) 557 at 583B. The 1st respondent had argued that for the claimants to sustain the suit in the capacity in which it is instituted, the claimants ought to tender before this court authority in the form of a resolution by other members of NATE establishing that they had authorized the claimants to sue and represent their common interest. On this, the claimants submitted that the argument is not only misconceived but erroneous in law. That the issue of proving one’s authority to sue in a representative capacity will only arise or be necessary were the other party joined issue with the claimant in its pleading or defence challenging the authority of the claimant to bring the suit in a representative capacity. That in the instant case, the respondents have failed to file a defence and have not joined issues with the claimants in respect of the authority of the claimant to sue in a representative capacity. The court was then referred to the case of lfekwe v. Madu [2000] 14 NWLR (Pt. 688) 459 at 478 where the Court of Appeal per Edozie, JCA stated that: Where there is a challenge to the capacity or authority ‘of the plaintiff to sue in a representative capacity and the parties have joined issues on it in the pleadings, it is mater to be resolved by the trial court after hearing evidence. In other words, that the issue of the authority to sue in a representative capacity is a matter of evidence that can only be resolved at the trial after parties have joined issues in their pleadings, not an issue to be resolved at the preliminary stage. The claimants further submitted that where the court’s jurisdiction is being challenged as in this case, it is the claim brought to the court that is to be examined to ascertained whether a particular case is within the jurisdiction conferred on the court and not the interpretation placed before the court by the parties to the case in their affidavits or written submissions, referring to the cases of Int. Niger Build, Const,. Co. Ltd v. Giwa [2003] 13 NWLR (Pt. 836) at 8 9 — 90 and Owena Bank Plc v. Adeojo [2003] 17 NWLR (Pt 84) 174 at 195. The claimants then called on the court to discountenance the affidavit in support of the notice of preliminary objection and the arguments proffered in respect of issues 2 and 3 as they are irrelevant to the issue before this court at this stage of the proceeding and place reliance only on the claimants’ claim before it by examining same to ascertain the competency of this court to entertained the suit brought before it by the claimants. That a cursory look at the complaint will show that the endorsement on the face of the complaint clearly indicates the capacity in which the stilt is brought by the claimants as being representative capacity, and it, therefore, met the only requirement stipulated by the law as provided in Order 4 Rule 2 of the Rules of this court and thus conferred jurisdiction and competency in this court to determined the proprietary of the claim of the claimant. The claimants then urged the court to dismiss the preliminary objection of the respondents. Regarding the third issue i.e. whether a party being represented in a representative capacity need be a legal person, the claimants submitted that it is the person invoking the jurisdiction of the court, that is, the named parties that must be a juristic person and not the party being represented, referring to the case of Ifekwe v. Madu, supra, which is in pari materia with the present case, where the Court of Appeal stated that — A registered association or trade union can sue in its registered name if registered. If unregistered it can sue or be sued by representative members. in the instant case, the suit was instituted by respondent, a legal person on his behalf und on behalf of the Association of Master Bakers and Caterers of Nigeria, Cross River State branch; This is proper in law. The claimants then submitted that the argument of the defendants to the effect that since NATE is not a registered trade union it cannot be represented in an action is misconceived and erroneous in law, urging the court to discountenance same and dismiss the objection. That the claimants in this case are juristic persons who are members of NATE formed pursuant to the provision of section 40 of the 1999 Constitution and had filed the suit on behalf of themselves arid the other members of NATE and, therefore, satisfied the requirement of law. The claimants then urged the court to hold that the suit is properly instituted before the court and that NATE is properly and validly represented by the claimants who are themselves juristic persons and also members of NATE. On the fourth issue i.e. whether the provision of section 2(1) of the Public Officers Protection Act 1990 is applicable to labour related issue, the claimants submitted that the provision of section 2(1) Public Officers Protection Act 1990 which places a. bar against a claim not brought before the court within three months from the time the cause of action arose is not applicable to a claim relating to labour including nonpayment of pension, unpaid salaries, unpaid severance package and contract of employment. The court was then referred to the case of CBN v. Adedeji [2005] 26 WRN 38 where the Court of Appeal held that the privilege provided by the Public Officers Protection Act does not apply to contract cases, recovery of land, claims for work and labour. In that case, Justice M. D. Muhammad, JCA adopted the words of His Lordship De Commarmond SPJ as he then was in the case of Salaico v. LEDB 20 ALL NLR 169 where His Lordship construed the provision of section 2 of the Public Officer Protection Ordinance which is identical with section 2 of the Public Officer Protection Act in the following words: I am of the opinion that section 2 of the Public Officer Protection Ordinance does not apply in cases of recovery of land, breach of contract, claims for work and labour done. Also, that in the unreported case of John Ovoh v. Nigeria Westminster Dredging and Marine Suit No NIC/9/2002, the ruling of which was delivered on the 1St of April 2008, this court stated that: The rights of workers are not caught up by the limitation laws, for to think otherwise would mean that even rights as to salaries and entitlement of an office would be time-barred. In other words, that the privilege conferred by the Act does not apply to the kind of labour related issues as the one before the court in this case. The claimants then urged the court to discountenance the submission of learned counsel to the 2nd respondent that. this action is caught up by the provision of section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act as same is highly misconceived and erroneous in law since the claim of the claimants as per the complaint and paragraph 19 of the statement of facts clearly fall within the exception allowed by the law in the circumstance, the claimants urged the court to hold that the action is not statute-barred and that the provision of section 2(l) of the Public Officers Protection Act 1990 is not applicable to the claim before the court. On the last issue i.e. whether the claimant has established any cause of action against the 2nd respondent, the claimants submitted that perusing the all processes before the court, the complaint and the statement of facts, the claimant has established a cause of action and, therefore, has the locus to bring the action against the 2nd respondent. That the 2nd respondent is a body corporate, a governmental agency which is responsible for the privatization of the 1st respondent company and it is its responsibility to ensure that 10% of the 1st respondent’s shares are allocated to the claimants. That para. 19(6) of the of the statement of facts is praying this court to direct the 2nd respondent to allocate 10% of the 1st respondent company’s shares to the claimants while paragraph 17 of the statement of facts alleges that the respondents including the 2nd respondent have denied the claimants of the said the 10% shares of the 1st respondent equity to which they are entitled as of right. The claimants continued that flowing from the above, it will be very impossible for the claimants to have their claims as endorsed on the complaint and indicated by paragraph 19(6) of the statement of facts granted without making the 2nd respondent a party to the suit as it is the 2nd respondent that is responsible for the privatization of the 1st respondent company and determine how the equities of the 1st respondent shares are allotted. The claimants then urged the court to discountenance the argument of counsel on this ground and hold that the claimants have the locus standi to bring the action against the 2nd respondent. In conclusion, the claimants urged the court to dismiss the preliminary objections of both respondents as same are frivolous, erroneous in law, mischievous and a time wasting devise to further delay the hearing of the suit and thus subvert the cause of justice. There was no reply on points of law on the part of either of the respondents. We must make this preliminary remark. The respondent hinged its preliminary objection, among others, on sections 2(1) and 24 of the Legal Practitioners Act Cap. L 11 LFN 2004. However, throughout it submissions, no reference whatsoever was made to these provisions by counsel to the 1st respondent. Indeed, we do not see the relevance of these provisions to the issue of the preliminary objection at hand and so wonder why counsel should refer to them. This preliminary remark made, it remains to turn to the more substantive issues raised by the parties in their submissions. in the first place, arguments were raised that service of processes were made outside of the jurisdiction of the court without leave of court being sought. We are in agreement with the claimants on this score that the jurisdiction of this court is national. Section 21 of the NIC is very specific when it says that the court shall have and exercise jurisdiction throughout the Federation. Since the whole country is the jurisdiction of the court, and the court is one, we do not see why leave of court is needed to serve processes within the said jurisdiction of the court. By our reckoning then, the arguments of the respondents in that regard go to no issue. The second issue raised relates to the application of the Public Officers Protection Act. Once again, we agree with the submissions of the claimants that regarding labour rights, this piece of legislation is inapplicable. The cases cited by the claimants on this point remain valid for present purposes. We note the ruling of this court in John Ovoh v. Nigeria Westminster Dredging and Marine Ltd, supra, cited by the claimants and only wish to state that nothing has been shown to us to warrant altering the stance we took in that case. Several issues were raised regarding the fact that the claimants sued in a representative capacity. This court has severally permitted parties to sue in representative capacities without even the necessity of seeking leave of court. It is in recognition of this fact that the new 2007 Rules of this court in Order 4 Rule 2 simply require the endorsement of the fact of suing in a representative capacity on the originating summons. This the claimants have done. Nothing more is required of them in this regard. The other issue relating to suing in a representative capacity relates to the fact that the claimants sued as representatives of an unregistered association. While the respondents argue that by this act the claimants should be non-suited in this action, the claimants argue that because the claimants are juristic persons, they can sue on behalf of an unregistered association citing Ifekwe v. Madu supra. The problem with the claimants’ submission is that they seem to think of their proposition in absolute terms. No doubt, there are instances when a person (s) can sue on behalf of an unregistered association or union especially when the issue at hand relates to the fact of the non- registration of the association in issue. It is certainly not for all purposes that that an unregistered association will be accommodated in court; otherwise, the very essence of the laws that require registration will be defeated. In the case at band, the TUA in section 2 generally frowns at the performance of union activities by bodies that are not registered as trade unions. it is not in doubt that NAPE whom the claimants also represent is not a registered trade union. Aside from this, there is also the fallacy of the claim of the claimants in paragraph 1 of the Statement of Facts that NAPE is an affiliate of the NLC. The TUA is very clear that only registered unions can be affiliates of the NLC. Should we simply close our eyes to all of this and grant audience to the claimants in the capacity in which they sue? We do not think so. Our stance not grant audience to the claimants in the manner in which they came to court is grounded on a more fundamental issue. The Supreme Court in Oloruntoba-Oju & ors v. Dopamu & ors [2008] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1085) 1 at 23 has held that . . . it is the claim brought by [ claimants] and not the capacity in which the claims were brought that should he the relevant consideration in determining the question which court has jurisdiction in the matter. What then are the claims of the claimants in the matter at hand? The claims of the claimants relate to the following: the payment of three months’ salary in lieu of notice, redundancy benefits, repatriation and compensation for premature retirement; the refund of the contribution made to the National Housing Fund and the NITEL Cooperative Society following the disengagement of the claimants from service and the payment of pension in accordance with the Pension Reform Act 2004; and the allocation to the claimants of 10% of the shares of the 1st respondent by virtue of the Privatization and Commercialization Regulation 2004 made pursuant to the Privatization and Commercialization Act. Are these claims issues that fall within the ambit of section 7 of the NIC Act 2006 in order for the court to assume jurisdiction? Issues of salary in lieu of notice, redundancy benefits, compensation for premature retirement and pension are no doubt issues that relate to labour, conditions of work and welfare of labour to warrant this court assuming jurisdiction. But is this the case with the issue of being allotted 10% shares of the 1st respondent’s company? We do not think so. We note, however that the argument may be stretched that the question of 10% shares is an issue incidental to conditions of work so as to grant jurisdiction to this court. Even at all of this, the crux of the issue is whether the claims of the claimants do not amount to a trade dispute for which this court given section 7(3) of the NIC Act does not have original jurisdiction to entertain. Section 47(1) of the Trade Disputes Act (TDA) Cap. 432 LFN 1999 defines the term ‘trade dispute’ to mean — any dispute between employers and workers or between workers and workers, which is connected with the employment or non- employment, or the terms of employment and physical conditions of work of any person. This definition is reinforced in section 54(1) of the NIC Act 2006 in the following words: “trade dispute” means any dispute between employers and employees, including disputes between their respective organizations and federations which is connected with— (a) the employment or non-employment of any person, (b) terms of employment and physical conditions of work of any person., (c) the conclusion or variation of a collective agreement, and (d) an alleged dispute. Given the definition of the term trade dispute, we believe that the claims of the claimants fall squarely into that definition. This being the case, it is wrong for the claimants to have approached this court as a court of first instance without recourse to the processes of mediation conciliation and arbitration enjoined by Part I of the TDA and sanctioned by section 7(3) of the NIC Act. We are not unmindful of the fact that we have previously held that individuals, because they not have access to the processes of Part I of the TDA, can come directly to this court See the ruling of this court in Godwin Tosanwuni v. Chief Agency and Shipping Nig. Ltd unreported Suit No. NIC/18/2006 delivered on June 14, 2007. But in Chibuzor Nanwu & ors v, Willbros (Nig.) Ltd & ors unreported Suit No. NIC/l 6/2006 delivered on March 11 2008, this court rejected the argument of the claimants that 1 are suing as individuals when the processes reveal that they were suing not just for themselves but on behalf of the entire members of their trade union. This court then went on to hold that because the issue at hand was a trade dispute, the court lacked original jurisdiction to entertain it. The same is the case in the present action. An otherwise individual dispute has transmuted into a collective dispute (trade dispute) for which the processes of Part I of the TDA are prerequisites if the jurisdiction of this court is to be activated. Since the real claims of the claimants involve a dispute which qualifies as a trade dispute, a dispute involving over 7,000 members of the unregistered NAPE (see paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Statement of Facts of the claimants), the claimants are prematurely before this court. They ought to have exhausted the processes of mediation, conciliation and arbitration under Part I the TDA before coming to this court. For the avoidance of doubt our ruling is that the claimants are not properly before this court. Not only are they representing an unregistered association that claims to be affiliated to the NLC, but the issues involved amount to a trade dispute for which this court does not have original jurisdiction to entertain. For all the reasons given, we hereby decline original jurisdiction to hear this matter. Ruling is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip Presiding Judge Hon. Justice V. N. Okobi Hon. Justice M. B. Dadda Judge Judge