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INTRODUCTION 1. The claimant took out this action against the defendants on 1 March 2021 vide an originating summons. The claimant is praying the Court for the determination of the following questions: (1) Whether having regard to section 8(1) of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, 2019 which vests the 1st defendant with powers to register, regulate and supervise the formation of, incorporation, management, striking off and winding up of companies, the 1st defendant exceeded its powers when it proceeded to purportedly dissolve, regulate, supervise, inquire into, probe and interfere with the existence, running and investment activities of the claimant. (2) Whether having regard to section 6(5) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) which vests judicial powers on the courts prescribed in section 6(5) of the Constitution, and section 36 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) on fair hearing, the defendants can arbitrarily make any determination or reach any conclusion to dissolve the claimant, or in any other way whatsoever interfere with the existence, the running and lawful activities of the claimant, a registered trade union with perpetual succession and seal to sue and be sued in its name, contrary to the 2013 constitution of the claimant, and the Conditions of Service of Corporate Affairs Commission (2011). (3) Whether the defendants’ circular dated 11th January, 2021 purportedly issued pursuant to court judgments in Suit Nos. NICN/ABJ/125/2019 and NICN/ABJ/103/2019 dated 17th December, 2019 and 20th May, 2020 between SENIOR STAFF ASSOCIATION OF STATUTORY CORPORATIONS AND GOVERNMENT OWNED COMPANIES (SSASCGOC) vs. AMALGAMATED UNION OF PUBLIC CORPORATIONS CIVIL SERVICE TECHNICAL AND RECREATIONAL SERVICES EMPLOYEE (AUPCTRE) was issued in good faith, and has any binding legal effect on the claimant against whom no positive order of court was made in terms of the far reaching decisions made against the claimant and its members as contained in the circular. (4) Whether having regard to section 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), the defendants can unilaterally purport to inquire into, audit or probe the finances of the claimant and conclude that fraud had been committed by the claimant or its members, contrary to the constitutional rights to fair hearing and the presumption of innocence, and the separate legal entity of the claimant. (5) Whether having regard to the provisions of the Trade Unions Act, 2014 and Rules 5(B) and (c) and Rule 19 of the claimant’s constitution, the defendants acted within the limits of their statutory powers as an employer of labour when they arrogated to themselves the power of dissolving, regulating and or directing or controlling the labour union affairs of the claimant in total disregard of the powers of the National Headquarters of the claimant, and the other internal governing organs of the claimant. (6) Whether having regard to the claimant’s constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right to form, organize and coordinate the trade union activities of its members, the defendants acted beyond their powers to have initiated disciplinary measures tending to suspend and or dismiss members of the claimant based purely on the internal labour union affairs and activities of the claimant, and contrary to Article 4.04 - 4.09 of the Conditions of Service of Corporate Affairs Commission, June 2011. (7) Whether it does not amount to oppression, harassment, intimidation, suppression and usurpation of powers for the defendants to purportedly dissolve claimant’s trade union activities, issue queries to the members of the claimant and directing them to vacate their offices, based on issues which have no bearing on their conditions of service and the core mandate of the defendants. 2. Upon the determination of the questions posed above, the claimant is praying the Court for the following reliefs: (1) A declaration that, having regard to section 8(1) of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, 2019 which vests the defendants with powers to register, regulate and supervise the formation of, incorporation, management, striking off and winding up of companies, the 1st defendant exceeded its powers when it proceeded to purportedly dissolve, regulate, supervise, inquire into, probe, interfere with or undermine the existence, running and investment activities of the claimant. (2) A declaration that, having regard to section 6(5) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) which vests judicial powers on the courts prescribed in section 6(5) of the Constitution, and section 36 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), on fair hearing, the defendants cannot arbitrarily make any determination or reach any conclusion to dissolve the claimant, or in any other way whatsoever pass judgment on, or interfere with the existence, running, and lawful activities of the claimant, a registered trade union with perpetual succession and seal to sue and be sued in its name contrary to the 2013 constitution of the claimant, and the Condition of Service of Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC). (3) A declaration that the defendants’ circular dated 11th January, 2021 purportedly issued pursuant to court judgments in Suit Nos. NICN/ABJ/125/2019 and NICN/ABJ/103/2019 Dated 17th December, 2019 and 20th May, 2020 between SENIOR STAFF ASSOCIATION OF STATUTORY CORPORATIONS AND GOVERNMENT OWNED COMPANIES (SSASCGOC) vs. AMALGAMATED UNION OF PUBLTC CORPORATIONS CIVIL SERVICE TECHNICAL AND RECREATIONAL SERVICES EMPLOYEE (AUPCTRE) was issued in bad faith, and has no binding legal effect on the claimant against whom no positive, direct or restraining orders of court was made in terms of the far reaching decisions made against the claimant and its members as contained in the circular. (4) A declaration that having regard to section 36 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) the defendants cannot unilaterally purport to inquire into, audit or probe the finances of the claimant and conclude that fraud had been committed by the claimant or its members, contrary to their constitutional right to fair hearing and the presumption of innocence, and the separate legal entity of the claimant. (5) A declaration that having regard to the provisions of the Trade Unions Act, 2014 and Rules 5(B) & (c), and 19 of the claimant’s constitution, the defendants acted beyond the limits of their statutory powers as an employer of labour when they arrogated to themselves the power of dissolving, regulating and or directing or controlling the labour union affairs of the claimant in total disregard of the powers of the National Headquarters of the claimant and the other internal governing organs of the claimant. (6) A declaration that it amounts to intimidation, harassment, oppression and usurpation of powers for the defendants to purportedly dissolve claimant’s trade union activities, issue queries to the members of the claimant and directing them to vacate their offices, based on issues which have no bearing on their conditions of service and the core statutory mandate of the defendants. (7) A declaration that the decisions made or conclusions reached against the claimant in the circular of 11th January, 2021 are arbitrary, unwarranted, oppressive and violates the claimant’s right to fair hearing and freedom to freely associate and organize as a trade union. (8) A declaration that by virtue of section 36(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) the defendants have no power to carry out any action and or directives contained in the circular dated 11th January, 2021 without affording the claimant the right to fair hearing. (9) A declaration that the judgments of this Honourable Court in Suit Nos NICN/ABJ/125/2019 and NICN/ABJ/103/2019 dated 17th December, 2019 and 20th May, 2020 between SENIOR STAFF ASSOCIATION OF STATUTORY CORPORATIONS AND GOVERNMENT OWNED COMPANIES (SSASCGOC) v. AMALGAMATED UNION OF PUBLIC CORPORATIONS CIVIL SERVICE TECHNICAL AND RECREATIONAL SERVICES EMPLOYEE (AUPCTRE) were misconstrued and misapplied by the defendants to oppress and victimize the claimant and its members over extraneous matters which are not related to the defendants’ Conditions of Service (2011). (10) A declaration that the defendants cannot validly and lawfully exercise any power over issues bothering on the activities of the claimant as a trade union governed and regulated by its own internal governing organs. (11) An order of this Honourable court setting aside the purported directives contained in the circular dated 11th January, 2020 for violating the claimant’s right to fair hearing and presumption of innocence. (12) An order of this Honourable Court nullifying and quashing the circular dated 11th January, 2021 and the 3 Queries dated 11th January, 2020 but served on the claimant’s members on 11th January, 2021, as arbitrary, oppressive and unconstitutional. (13) The sum of N100,000,000,00 (one Hundred Million Naira) only as general damages against the defendants jointly and severally for breach of fundamental right to fair hearing, malicious disruption, usurpation and interference with the activities of the claimant and its members. (14) An order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants, their agents, privies, servants or whomsoever from usurping, disrupting, interfering with, or threatening to suspend, interfere in the activities of the claimant contrary to the provisions of the constitution, and the Conditions of Service of the 1st defendant, 2011 and the constitution of the claimant, April, 2015. 3. In reaction to the originating summons, the defendants first filed a preliminary objection, and then their counter-affidavit together with a written address to the originating summons. THE DEFENDANT’S NOTICE OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTION The Submissions of the Defendants in Support of the Preliminary Objection 4. The defendants’ preliminary objection seeks the dismissal or striking out of this suit; and is premised on the ground that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine this action as constituted for being incompetent. The grounds upon which the objection is brought are: (1) The claimant has no locus standi to commence and/or maintain this action. (2) That this action is improperly constituted as regards the parties. That the within named party sued as the 2nd defendant is a descriptive post, unknown to law and not a legal entity or a corporate body. (3) That the action has not disclosed any reasonable or cognizable cause of action, as the purported facts complained seeking remedy for is that of the employees of the 1st defendant. (4) The action was filed without giving the 2nd defendant the requisite statutory pre-action notice before filing of the action. (5) The facts of this case which are grossly hostile hence the case ought to have been brought by way of writ of summons. (6) That the action is an abuse of court process. 5. To the defendants, a challenge to competence of an action is a challenge to the jurisdiction of the court, citing Mosoba v. Abubakar [2005] 6 NWLR (Pt. 922) 460 at 470. Accordingly, the instant objection challenges the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the claimant’s action; and the challenge relies on all the documents filed by the claimant, particularly the averments in the affidavit in support, the reliefs being sought as per the originating summons and all the documents before the court, given that jurisdictional issues are garnered from pleadings, citing Adeyemi v. Opoyori [1976] 9 - 10 SC 31, UBN Plc v. Integrated Timber & Plywood Produces Ltd [2000] 12 NWLR (Pt. 680) 95 at 110, Inakoju v. Adeleke [2007] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1025) 423 at 602 and Orthopaedic Hospital Management Board v. Garba [2002] 14 NWLR (Pt. 788) 538. And whenever an issue as to jurisdiction is raised, it should be dealt with lest the court dissipate its energy and time in respect of a case it has no jurisdiction to deal with, citing Omeh v. Okoro [1999] 8 NWLR (Pt. 614) 356 at 367. To the defendant, a court is not only entitled but bound to put an end to proceedings if at any stage and by any means it becomes manifest that it is incompetent. It can do so of its own initiatives, even though the parties have consented to the irregularity because mere acquiescence does not give jurisdiction, citing AG Anambra State v. Okeke [2002] 12 NWLR (Pt. 782) 575 at 618 - 619. 6. The defendants then submitted what they termed as the main issue for determination i.e. whether this Honourable Court has the jurisdiction to hear and determine the claimant’s suit as presently constituted. To the defendants, jurisdiction is so fundamental; it is extrinsic to adjudication and proceedings, no matter how well conducted, once the court lacks jurisdiction, is to no avail, citing Madukolum v. Nkemdilim [1962] 2 SCNLR 341 and Zakhem Int. v. Ofoma [2000] 11 NWLR (Pt. 679) 605 at 615. 7. The defendants went on that a court will lack jurisdiction where: (a) It is improperly constituted as to the number or qualification of the members or when one or more of the members is disqualified for one reason or the other; (b) When the subject matter is not within its jurisdiction of the court; (c) Where there are features in the case which prevents the court from exercising jurisdiction; or (d) When the case was not initiated by due process of law or upon the non-fulfillment of a condition precedent. The defendants referred to Sokoto State Government v. Kamdex (Nig) Ltd [2007] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1034) 466 at 497. 8. That this preliminary objection is hinged on the 3rd and 4th points or conditions as laid above, to wit, that there are features in this suit which will prevent or deter this court from exercising her jurisdiction and secondly, that the case was not initiated by due process of law or upon the fulfillment of a condition precedent. That a court is said to lack the requisite jurisdiction and competence to hear and determine a matter if any of the above-mentioned instances is/are absent, citing Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (supra). 9. The defendants then proceeded to consider each ground of their objection. 10. The claimant Lacks Locus Standi to Institute this Action. To the defendants, it is the law that failure to disclose any locus standi is fatal to the case of the claimant. That the right to maintain an action is what locus standi is all about, citing Thomas v. Olufosoye [1986] 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 669. That in order to determine whether a claimant has locus standi or standing capacity to sue, it is resolved by perusing the claimant’s affidavit in support of the originating summons, which defines the extent of the claimant’s cause of action. That the Supreme Court in Momodu Olubodun & 4 ors v. Oba Adeyemi Lawal & anor [2008] 6 - 7 SC (Pt. 1) 1 held a party presenting an action would have locus standi where the reliefs claimed would confer some benefits on such a party. That in the instant case, the claimant has no right of action. The law is clear that a plaintiff must in the statement of claim (in this instance affidavit in support of the originating summons) disclose sufficient interest or threat of injury to enable him invoke the judicial process, citing Disu v. Ajilowura [2006] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1000) 783. 11. That in the instant case, the claimant disclosed facts of purported injuries against some senior employees of the 1st defendant as stated in paragraphs 7, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16 and 17 of the affidavit in support and also is seeking the following reliefs Nos. 11, 12 and 13 of the originating summons. Paragraphs 7, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16 and 17 of the affidavit in support of the originating summons provide as follows: [7] That the defendants arbitrary stopped all staff loans, denied 2019 promotion arrears to deserving workers and arbitrarily stopped salaries of workers even before queries were issued at the peak of COVID-l9 pandemic, among other high-handed unilateral decisions. [11] That the Defendants have continued to act in total disregard of the Claimant’s condition and the Defendants’ conditions of service, and have resorted to threatening, victimizing and maltreating of the Claimant’s members with queries and threatening to set up forensic panel to investigate the activities of the claimant based on false and unsubstantiated grounds of fraud. [12] That in a desperate bid to further oppress the claimant and its members, the defendants again on the 11th January, 2021 served query letters on three executives members of the Claimant (Comrades Buba Dauda Yusuf, Kirfi Ibrahim M. I. and Shehu Abubakar Sadiq) alleging and prejudicing that they committed fraud, in relation to the Union’s housing project. Copies of the query letters dated 11th January, 2020 (sic) are here shown to me and marked EXHIBITS ‘C’, ‘D’ & ‘E’. [13] That the Claimant, realizing the unwarranted intimidation of its members by the Defendants, wrote to the defendants, through its Director Human resources, informing her that the project for which queries were issued to the Claimant’s three executive members is under the full proprietorship and supervision of the Claimant, urging the Defendant to forward its complaints to the National Body of the Claimant for appropriate action. A copy of the letter dated 12th January, 202l (sic). [15] That the defendants on the 14th of January, 2021 issued another internal memo to the executive officers of the Claimant requesting them to personally respond to the queries issued to them. A copy of the internal memo dated 14th January, 2021 is here shown to me and marked Exhibit ‘H’. [16] That the Defendants hastily transferred the Claimant’s members and executive officers out of the 1st defendant by resorting to intimidation, harassment, coercion and oppression to force them back out on the strike action. [17] That the defendants in their determined effort to emasculate and victimize the Claimant’s members have proceeded just within 4 days (11th to 15th January, 2021) to allege wrong doing, pass judgment and hastily transferred members of the Claimant in their employment. A copy of the letter of transfer dated 15th January, 2021 (sic). 12. To the defendants, a look at these paragraphs of the claimant’s affidavit in support, and reliefs (11), (12) and (13) sought by the claimant, will show that the circumstance of facts are in relation to the communication, administrative act and action vide documents between the 1st defendant and its employees on the one part and the 1st defendant’s queries to three (3) of its employees who are senior staff and so not within the dragnet of membership of the claimant. 13. This Suit is Improperly Constituted as Regards the Parties. It is the defendants’ argument that the within named 2nd defendant, THE REGISTRAR GENRAL CORPORATE, AFFAIRS COMMISSION, is a non-juristic persons. That competence of an action can be determined ex-facie solely from its processes, citing Abduhamid v. Akar [2006] All FWLR (Pt. 321) 1191. That in the instant action, by a cursory look at court processes, the named 2nd defendant is a mere descriptive nominee, non-juristic. That it is a trite law that it is only a juristic person that can sue and be sued, citing FGN v. Shobu [2014] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1396) 45. That in Gani Fawehinmi v. NBA (No. 2) [1989] 2 NWLR (Pt. 105) 558, it was held that juristic person who may sue and be sued eo nomine have been recognized to include: (i) Natural Persons, that is to say, human beings; (ii) Companies incorporated under the Companies Act; (iii) Corporations aggregate and Corporations sole with perpetual succession (iv) Certain unincorporated associations granted the status of legal personae by law such as: (a) Registered Trade Union (b) Partnerships... 14. That the 2nd defendant is neither natural person, incorporated corporations nor granted legal status by any enabling law. That Iyke Medical Merchandise v. Pfizer Inc & anor [2001] 10 NWLR (Pt. 722) 540 SC held that “Non legal persons or entities, again as a general proposition of law, may neither sue nor be sued except, of course, where such right to sue and be sued is created and/or vested by or under a statute”. That the named 2nd defendant, the Registrar General Corporate Affairs Commission, is a descriptive post, not a partnership or a corporate; nor is it a creation of statute. That in Agbonmagbe Bank Ltd v. General Manager, GB Ollivant Ltd & anor [1961] All NLR 116, it was held that since “General Manager, G.B. Ollivant Ltd” was not a juristic person, that defendant could not be made party to the action and should be struck out from the proceedings. That in comparison, the phrases, “General Manager, G. B. Ollivant Ltd” and “Registrar General Corporate Affairs Commission”, are similarly descriptive posts, not legal persons. 15. The defendants continued that where a statute has defined the parties to an action, be it plaintiff, defendant, petitioner or respondent, in such a case, parties are said to be statutory and it is only such designated parties that can sue and/or be sued, citing Idris v. ANPP [2008] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1088) 1 at 109. That section 1(1) of the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA), 2020 in compliance with above cited authority has stipulated who can be made a party to action in matters involving the defendant. Section 1 of CAMA provides thus: (1) There is established the Corporate Affairs Commission (in this Act referred to as “the Commission”). (2) The Commission (b) may sue and be sued in its corporate name That from this provision, only the 1st defendant is statutorily conferred with legal personality capable of suing and being sued unlike the 2nd defendant who is descriptive post, an appointee. That Erokoro v. Govt of Cross Rivers State [1991] 4 NWLR (Pt. 185) 322 stated that “The Courts cannot merely by the exercise of their whims clothe a body with legal personality, when in law it has no such personality”. 16. To the defendants, this position has brought to the fore the fact that issue of jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties or the court; and that the competence of a suit vis-a-vis power of Court to adjudicate upon the matter is a legal and constitutional prerequisite. That it is of note to mention that where a court takes it upon itself to exercise a jurisdiction which it does not possess, its decision amounts to a nullity, citing Resident Electoral Commissioner & anor v. Nwocha & ors [1991] 2 NWLR (Pt. 176) 732 at 760. That if the law prescribes a method by which an act can be validly done, and such method is not followed, then that that act cannot be accomplished, citing Amaechi v. INEC [2008] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1080) 227 at 318. That the claimant having lacked the locus standi to institute this action and suing a non-juristic person as a party, this suit cannot be effectively and conveniently disposed of by the Court. 17. The defendants proceeded that the claimant’s action as constituted is an abuse of court process and should fail in its entirety in respect of the above stated principles. That the suit is grossly incompetent because the rules of court were not observed to its use bonafide and properly, citing CBN v. Ahmed & ors [2001] 7 SCM 85. That it is essential that persons who are made parties to an action be legal persons, citing Okechukwu & Sons v. Ndah [1976] NMLR 368 at 370. The defendants then urged the Court to strike out this suit in its entirety. 18. The Action was Commenced by a Wrong Mode of Commencement. To the defendants, the Rules are the basic laws of the Court. The Rules are not there for decoration and they must be obeyed; any disobedience of the Rules and every indulgence must be explained, citing Williams v. Hope Rising Voluntary Funds Society [1982] 13 NSCC 36. That Order 3 Rule 3 of the National Industrial Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017 provides the kind of proceedings which may be begun by originating summons in these words: Civil proceedings that may be commenced by way of Originating Summons include matters relating principally to the interpretation of any constitution, enactment, agreements or any other instruments relating to employment, labour and industrial relations in respect of which the Court has jurisdiction by virtue of the provision of the Section 254C of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) or by any Act or law in force in Nigeria. 19. That the Court of Appeal in interpreting a similar provision in Minister, Federal Ministry of Housing & Urban Devt. v. Bello [2009] 12 NWLR (Pt. 1155) 345 at 365 - 366 stated that originating summons is to be used in very limited situations and not suitable for hostile proceedings and/or proceedings that are likely to be contentious. Consequent upon this, the defendants urged the Court to view the case of the claimant globally and see that the claimant has presented its case as if it was asking the court to construe and interpret the provision of section 8(1) of CAMA, sections 6(5) and 36 of the 1999 Constitution and sections of the Trade Unions Act (TUA) 2014 (no section of the TUA was provided by the defendants), Conditions of Service of Corporate Affairs Commission, June 2011; but in actual fact, upon a careful perusal of the case in its totality, the Court would see that this is an action for damages for wrongs or injuries suffered by the three (3) employees of the 1st defendant. 20. The defendants then submitted that there is no how the ingredients of alleged injurious to the staff of the 1st defendant, which is the center point of the claim, can be proved in originating summons proceedings. That the claimant alleges high handedness, threatening, victimizing and maltreating of the staff of the 1st defendant, which must establish by credible evidence to establish that acts are injurious to them (1st defendant’s staff), personally, referring to Health Care Products (Nig) Ltd v. Bazza [2004] 3 NWLR (Pt. 861) 582. That these ingredients can only be proved by a complaint with the evidence of the reasonable members of the 1st defendant who will testify that in actual fact the injuries are caused by the defendants, and not by affidavit of the claimant as it is done in an originating summons proceedings. The defendants accordingly urged the Court to find and hold that this case is wrongly commenced by way of originating summons and this has operated to rob the court of jurisdiction, and strike out this case. 21. Non-Fulfillment of Condition Precedent. The defendants submitted that section 17(1) and (2) of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 2020 (“CAMA”) is clear and unambiguous to the effect that an action cannot be commenced against the 1st defendant except the 1st defendant had been given a 30-days’ notice of the impending action. The said section 17(1) and (2) provides thus: (l) A suit shall not be commenced against the Commission before the expiration of 30 days after a written notice of intention to commence the suit is served upon the Commission by the intending plaintiff or his agent. (2) The notice referred to in subsection (l) shall clearly state the — (a) cause of action; (b) particulars of claim; (c) name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff, and (d) relief sought. 22. To the defendants, these statutory provisions are clear and unequivocal, and in such a circumstance the court is not permitted to look further for any canon of interpretation but to apply the law as it is, referring to Ogbonna v. AG Imo State [1992] 1 NWLR (Pt. 220) 647 at 686. That the law is worded in the mandatory terms by the use of the word “shall”; and the law is well settled that the word “shall” when used in an enactment connotes that it is mandatory and that the rule must be obeyed. That it is a duty and there is no room for discretion, citing Katto v. CBN [1991] 9 NWLR (Pt. 214) 126 at 147 and Kallamu v. Gurin [2003] 16 NWLR (Pt. 847) 493 at 517. That all the court will look at in this case is the claim of the claimant to see if there is compliance with this mandatory requirement of the law; after all, issues of competence of an action should be found upon the claims of the claimant. 23. The defendants then submitted that the non-fulfillment of condition precedent such as failure to give a pre-action notice when statutorily required renders an action incompetence and robs a court of jurisdiction, citing NNPC v. Fawehinmi [1998] 7 NWLR (Pt. 559) 595 at 619 and OAU, Ile-Ife v. RA Oliyide [2001] 7 NWLR (Pt. 712) 456 at 476. That since this is a case where the statute requires the claimant to give a pre-action notice and that mandatory provision has not been complied with, the next thing the court ought to do is to strike out the case for want of jurisdiction, urging the Court to so do. 24. No Reasonable Cause of Action, Hence Abusive. To the defendants, the action of the claimant is baseless, academic, forensic and hypothetical. It has not disclosed any reasonable cause of action, hence abusive. That a court does not have the time neither does it have the jurisdiction for entertaining an academic, forensic and/or hypothetical case, citing Awojugbagbe Light Ind. Ltd v. Chinukwe [1995] 4 NWLR (Pt. 390) 379 at 410, Ejoh v. Wilcox [2003] 13 NWLR (Pt. 838) 488 at 509 and AG Federation v. ANPP [2003] 18 NWLR (Pt. 851) 182 at 215. That an academic or hypothetical suit has been defined as an action or an appeal that has no utilitarian value to the party (plaintiff/appellant). Any judgment given in the case will be merely academic. A suit is academic where it is merely theoretical, makes empty sound, and of no practical utilitarian value to the plaintiff even if judgment is given in his favour, citing Ugba v. Suswan [2014] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1427) 264 at 313. That looking at this case in its totality, the Court will see that it serves no utilitarian value to the claimant, urging the Court to so hold. That a defect in competence of an action snuffs out the life of adjudication from the court or a tribunal, citing Matari v. Dangaladima [1997] 3 NWLR (Pt. 281) 266. That where the plaintiff fails to show that he has locus to institute an action, no issue in the case can be gone into, not even the question whether or not the statement of claim discloses a cause of action. The only and proper order to make in the circumstances is that of striking out of the suit, citing Ogwu v. Umeh [2016] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1501) 120. And that the consequence of a finding that there is an abuse of court process by a party in litigation is to strike out or dismiss the offending process, citing Anyaduba v. NRTC Ltd [1990] I NWLR (Pt. 129) 397. 25. In conclusion, the defendants urged the Court to strike out the suit in its entirety. The Submissions of the Claimant in Opposition to the Preliminary Objection 26. In contending that the objection lacks merit and same should be dismissed or overruled, the claimant submitted one issue for determination i.e. whether this Honourable Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine this case. To the claimant, this Court has the requisite jurisdiction to hear and determine this case. That a court’s jurisdiction is determined by the claimant’s demand, and not by a defendant’s answer. In other words, it is the claim and not the defence which is to be looked at to determine the court’s jurisdiction. That in determining a preliminary objection as to the jurisdiction of the court, the court will only look at the affidavit in support of the claimant’s originating summons, referring to Governor of Kwara State v. Lafiagi [2005] 5 NWLR (Pt. 917) 139 at 151, NIMR v. NURTW [2010] 12 NWLR (Pt. 1208) 328 at 347 and Buhari v. Yusuf [2004] 9 NWLR (Pt. 877) 1. 27. On Locus Standi. The defendants had argued that the claimant has no right of action, as the affidavit in support of the originating summons does not disclose sufficient interest or threat of injury to enable him invoke the judicial process. To the claimant, this argument is misconceived, as the authority cited is not relevant to this case. That the subject matter of this case touches on the aims and objectives of the claimant, and the reliefs sought are equally beneficial to the claimant. Therefore, the claimant herein has the locus standi and sufficient interest to institute this action against the defendants. In other words, the claimant has the legal right or capacity to commence this action, to protect and advance the aims and objectives of the union as stipulated in Rule 2 of the Amalgamated Union of Public Corporations, Civil Service Technical and Recreational Services Employees (AUPCTRE) Constitution, 2013. The claimant relied on AG of the Federation v. AGs of 36 States [2001] NSCQR Vol. 1 at 544, which laid down the twin factors to be considered in determining locus standi as: (i) the plaintiff must be able to show that his civil rights and obligations have been or is in danger of being violated or infringed, and (ii) the plaintiff must have a justiciable dispute with the defendant. 28. That the undisputed facts from the affidavit in support of the originating summons and the further and better affidavit in support of originating summons before this Court are that the claimant had issued a strike notice to the defendants over the defendants’ arbitrariness and high-handedness towards the staff of the 1st defendant. The claimant whose members are also staff of the 1st defendant were being threatened, intimidated, victimized and maltreated by the 2nd defendant who is the alter ego/Chief Executive of the 1st defendant and who has prejudged that the Executive members of the claimant had committed fraud, in relation to the claimant’s housing project, even when the claimant had written to the 1st defendant requesting her to forward whatever complaints they have against the housing project to the national body of the claimant for appropriate action. The defendants in their sustained show of power against the claimant wrongfully dissolved the leadership of the claimant in the 1st defendant and stopped deductions of check-off dues to the claimant, all in an attempt to suppress, oppress and coerce the claimant to back out on the planned strike action. That from the totality of these facts, which are evinced in the supporting affidavits, there is no doubt that the claimant has the locus standi to institute this action against the defendants, urging the Court to hold so, and to resolve this issue in favour the claimant and against the defendants. 29. On Juristic Personality of the 2nd Defendant. The defendants had argued that the 2nd defendant is a non-juristic person and a mere descriptive nominee. To the claimant, this argument is misplaced and the case cited by the defendants does not apply to the facts of this case. That the 2nd defendant as a creation of the Companies and Allied Matters Act is the Chief Executive of the 1st defendant. That section 9(2)(a) of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 2020 provides that the Registrar-General is the Chief Executive of the Commission. That the facts above, it can be seen that the office of the Registrar General is a creation of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, and unless or until the office is abrogated, it will continue in perpetuity. And any suit by or against the Registrar General will be in law absorbed by the office, which never dies unless the statute (CAMA) abrogates it. That the law recognizes two categories of persons who can sue and be sued. They are natural persons with life, mind and brain, and other bodies or institutions having juristic personality. Accordingly, that the 2nd defendant is a legal person known to law. 30. In any event, that even if the Court agrees with the defendants’ argument that the 2nd defendant is not a juristic person, this proceedings cannot be defeated on that basis alone, and as such that does not vitiate the action of the claimant. That this Court has the inherent powers to strike out the name of the 2nd defendant from this suit if the Court holds that the party was improperly joined in the suit, citing Order 13 Rule 14(2) of the National Industrial Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017, which provides thus: A Judge may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Judge to be just, order that the names of any party or parties improperly joined be struck out. 31. On Mode of Originating Summons. The defendant had argued that the claimant wrongly commenced this action by way of originating summons instead of a complaint. To the claimant, this contention is misconceived. That originating summons can be used in matters that involve the interpretation of contract, document, Constitution and other statutes where matters or facts are not in dispute, citing Keyamo v. LSHA [2002] 18 NWLR (Pt. 799) 605 at 613, Pam v. Mohammed [2008] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1112) 1 at 51 and Ezeigwe v. Nwawulu & 2 ors [2010] NSCQR Vol. 41, 500 at 522. 32. Similarly, that the Rules of this Court provides for situation where an action can be commenced by originating summons. Order 3 Rule 3 of the National Industrial Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, (supra) thus provides: Civil proceedings that may be commenced by way of Originating Summons include matters relating principally to the interpretation of any constitution, enactment, agreements or any other instrument relating to employment, labour and industrial relations in respect of which the Court has jurisdiction by virtue of the provision of the Section 254C of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) or by any Act or law in force in Nigeria. 33. That this instant case is seeking the interpretation of some constitutional and statutory provisions, in relation to the rights of the claimant. The defendants have violated some provisions of the law in a manner affecting the interest of the claimant. The facts are not in dispute. The claimant is challenging the validity or otherwise of the directives contained in the circular dated 11 January 2021 purportedly issued by the defendants pursuant to the court judgment in Suit Nos. NICN/ABJ/125/2019 and NICN/ABJ/103/2019 dated 17 December 2019 and 20 May 2020 between Senior Staff Association of Statutory Corporations and Government Owned Companies (SSASCGOC) v. Amalgamated Union of Public Corporations Civil Service Technical and Recreational Services Employees (AUPCTRE). 34. That a critical examination of the facts and circumstances of this case would show that the defendants have not disputed issuing the said circular dated 11 January 2021 (Exhibit B) the content of which has no correlation with the terms of the judgments referred to in the said circular. Accordingly, there is no substantial dispute on the facts. 35. That if, however, this Court rules that the case is not properly commenced by way of originating summons, the Court has the inherent jurisdiction to order the conversion of this suit to a complaint and direct parties to file and exchange pleadings, citing Order 3 Rule 17(2) of the National Industrial Court (Civil Procedure) Rules (supra) which provides thus: Where in the opinion of the Court, a suit commenced by Originating Summons raises substantial issues and disputes of fact, the Court shall not strike out the matter, but may order its conversion to Complaint and direct parties to file and exchange pleadings and conduct the trial of the case in accordance with the Rules of the Court governing trial. 36. On Pre-Action Notice. The defendants had argued that the claimant failed to give the defendants the mandatory 30 days’ pre-action notice, which is a condition precedent, and urged the court to strike out this case. To the claimant, this argument is based on a false premise. That the claimant had on the 19th day of January 2021 issued and served the defendants with notice of intention to commence legal action pursuant to section 17 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 2020, which was duly received and acknowledged by the Registrar-General’s office. That this letter is sufficient notice as required by law. 37. On Reasonable Cause of Action. The defendants had argued that the claimant’s case is baseless, academic, forensic and hypothetical, and that it has not disclosed any reasonable cause of action, hence abusive and same serves no utilitarian value to the claimant. To the claimant, this argument is misconceived, and the authorities cited by the defendants have no relevance to this case at hand. That Julius Berger Nig. Plc v. RL Omoogul [2006] NSCQR Vol. 6. 1062 at 1076 held that the popular meaning of the expression “cause of action” is that particular act of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint. There may, however, be more than one good and effective cause of action arising out of the same transaction. The cause of action accrues upon the happening of the LATEST OF SUCH FACTS. And in Akilu v. Fawehinmi [1989] 2 NWLR (Pt. 02) 122 a cause of action was defined to mean every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed or all those things necessary to give a right to relief in law or equity. 38. That in the instant case, the claimant instituted this action challenging the arbitrariness, show of power and oppression and intimidation by the defendants against the union activities of the claimant in the 1st defendant (CAC) as they were being oppressed, victimized, intimidated and coerced to back out of a planned strike action, and wherein a circular dated 11 January 2021 issued by the defendants purportedly pursuant to the court judgments in Suit Nos. NICN/ABJ/125/2019 and NICN/ABJ/103/2019 dated 17 December 2019 and 20 May 2020 between Senior Staff Association of Statutory Corporations and Government Owned Companies (SSASCGOC) v. Amalgamated Union of Public Corporations Civil Service Technical and Recreational Services Employees (AUPCTRE). That even when no positive order of court was made in terms of the far reaching decisions made against the claimant and its members as contained in the said circular, the defendants had continued in their unwarranted acts of disrupting or dissolving the activities and the existence of the claimant. That the facts as contained in the affidavit in support of the originating summons constitute the aggregation of facts which donate the right of action to the claimant against the defendants, urging the Court to so hold and resolve the sole issue in favour of the claimant, and against the defendants. 39. In conclusion, the claimant urged the Court to overrule the preliminary objection for lacking in merits and proceed to hear the substantive suit on the merit. 40. The defendants did not file any reply on points of law regarding the response of the claimant to their preliminary objection. THE CLAIMANT’S ORIGINATING SUMMONS The Submissions of the Claimant in Support of the Originating Summons 41. The claimant started off with a statement of the facts of its case. That the claimant had issued the defendants a 21 days’ notice of her intention to commence strike action against the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) over the 2nd defendant’s anti-workers policies in the commission in unilaterally restricting staff vacancies, contrary to the recommendations of the committee on the commissions’ organogram and the unjustified barring of certain categories of staff from writing promotion examination. The defendants also stopped all staff loans, denied 2019 promotion arrears to deserving workers and stopped salaries of workers even before queries were issued at the peak of COVID-19 pandemic among other issues. In the face of the coming labour crises between the claimant and the defendants, coupled with the harsh economic and health crises arising from COVID-19 pandemic, the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Trade and Investment graciously intervened and urged both parties to maintain the status quo and pursue amicable resolution. 42. Due to the intervention of the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Trade and Investment, Dr Sani Gwarzo, the claimant al a meeting held on 11 January 2021 agreed to suspend the intended strike action for a further period of 14 days to allow for peaceful resolution of the issues surrounding the dispute with the defendants. In the course of the meeting, the Permanent Secretary directed both the claimant and the defendants to maintain peace and allow status quo remain. 43. While the claimant complied with this directive, the defendants, through the Director, Human Resources of the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) issued a circular dated 11 January 2021 falsely relying on the judgment between SSASCGOC and AUPCTRE to state that the claimant is not recognized as a senior staff union, dissolving the current leadership of the claimant and stopping all deductions from staff salaries as union dues to the claimant, even when the said judgments do not support his arbitrary actions. The defendants have continued unabated in their desperate bid to crush the claimant and its members by issuing queries to the claimant’s members based on false and extraneous matters, transferred members of the claimant out of the 1st defendant, and have threatened to suspend or dismiss members of the claimant as punishment for daring to raise their voice. 44. That the resultant effect of this radical and disruptive action of the defendants is that the defendants have constituted themselves as both the complainant and the respondent, and the judge at the same time, all in a bid to silence the claimant without affording her the right to fair hearing and the freedom to run their union activities as a lawfully registered and recognized trade union. The claimant accordingly filed this suit seeking the determination of the questions posed and the reliefs prayed for. 45. The claimant then submitted a lone issue for determination i.e. whether by virtue of sections 6(5) and 36(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, (as amended), Rules 5(B) and (C) of the claimant’s constitution, section 8 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, 2019, the defendants acted within the limits of their powers in purporting to dissolve the claimant, discipline and control the claimant’s members and executive officers, and initiating measures to suspend or terminate the employment of members of the claimant who are perceived to be questioning the defendants’ actions taken against the interest, welfare and wellbeing of the claimant and its members. 46. To the claimant, the defendants did not afford it a fair hearing before proceeding to issue and implement the directives of the circular dated 11 January 2021, thereby disrupting and interfering in the union activities of the claimant. That the claimant’s constitution of April 2013, the Trade Unions Act (TUA), the 1999 Constitution, the Companies and Allied Matters Act 2019, the conditions of service of the 1st defendant guarantee the claimant some rights. Secondly, the claimant as a corporate entity has the right to acquire and own immoveable property anywhere in Nigeria. That the action of the defendants in disrupting and interfering in the union activities of the claimant has no legal basis. It is, therefore, wrongful, illegal, oppressive and unconstitutional. That the facts averred in the claimant’s affidavit are sufficient materials for the Court to invoke its jurisdiction and exercise its powers to grant the reliefs sought in this action. That the claimant has shown in its affidavit in support of this originating summons, the state of affairs complained of, which entitles it to the reliefs sought against the defendants, referring to paragraphs 4 - 26 of the affidavit in support of the originating summons. 47. In particular, that the claimant averred that the circular dated 11 January 2021 issued by the defendants and the queries issued to the executive members of the claimant were unwarranted, unlawful, wrongful, illegal and oppressive and made in breach of section 36 of the 1999 Constitution, the claimant’s constitution, the 1st defendant’s conditions of service and section 8 of CAMA. This is so because the defendants had already adjudged that the claimant is no longer recognized as a senior staff union, dissolved the current leadership of the claimant, stopped deductions from staff salaries as union dues to the claimant, and found members of the claimant guilty of fraud over the union’s staff housing scheme. 48. That the cause of action in this case arose by virtue of the circular dated 11 January 2021 signed by the 1st defendant’s Director, Human Resources. The defendants in the said circular sought to purportedly implement the Court’s judgment in Suit No. NICN/ABJ/125/2019 (SSASCGOC v. AUPCTRE) and Suit No. NICN/ABJ/103/2019 (SSASCGOC v. FHA), while falsely stating that the claimant is no longer recognized as a senior staff union in the CAC, dissolving the current leadership of the claimant in CAC and stopping all deductions from staff salaries as union dues to the claimant amongst others. However, the judgments relied upon, and sought to be implemented do not support the position taken by the defendants and there is no where in the said judgments where the directives contained in the circular were made as positive orders of court. Also, the defendants in issuing queries to the Executive officers of the claimant in the 1st defendant (CAC) had already found them guilty of fraud while in the same breath requesting them to answer to the query relating to the claimant’s staff housing scheme with a view to applying sanctions against them. 49. However, that the defendants failed to realize that the claimant’s constitution allows the union to invest its funds. Rule 16(i) of the AUPCTRE constitution 2013 (as amended) provides thus: The funds of the Union which are not required for current expenses shall, on the directives of the NGC, be invested in the name of the Union by the Trustees in public stocks, government securities, landed properties or other businesses. 50. Similarly, Rule 19(ii) and (iv) of the AUPCTRE constitution provides that: (ii) All property acquired by the Union, in whosoever custody, and of what nature, shall belong to the Union. (iv) The funds and property of the Union shall be used for the purpose of attaining the aims and objectives of the Union as defined in the constitution. 51. Flowing from the above, that one of the claimant’s aims as stated in its constitution is to acquire land, own, lease, rent or mortgage moveable and immovable properties in the interest of the union. Therefore, the claimant’s investment in staff housing scheme falls within the objectives of the claimant, and the defendants have no right whatsoever to interfere with it. That this position was well canvassed by the claimant in its letter dated 12 January 2021 wherein it asked the defendants to channel its complaints to the National body of the union for appropriate action, especially as there was no complaint by members of the claimant in the 1st defendant. That it is noteworthy that the defendants neither complained to the National body of the claimant about any infraction on the part of its Executive officers in the 1st defendant nor heard the claimant on any complaint before it found the action of the Executive members of the claimant as tantamount to fraud. 52. The claimant went on that the facts of this case would show that within the short period of 4 days (11 to 15 January 2021), the defendants hastily found that the action of the claimant is tantamount to fraud without a hearing. That this is a total negation of one of the twin pillars of natural justice which dictates that a person must not be condemned without first hearing from him — audi alteram partem (hear both sides). That in the case at hand, the defendants denied the claimant the right to fair hearing. The claimant then submitted that a breach of fair hearing is a breach of section 36 of the 1999 Constitution, which renders any action thereby taken by the defendants as unconstitutional, null, void and of no legal effect. That being the case, that every subsequent action taken against the claimant by the 1st and 2nd defendants with respect to the circular dated 11 January 2021 and all the alleged roles played by the defendants are of no legal effect whatsoever, referring to Bode Thomas v. FJSC unreported Suit No. SC.228/2013, Mpama v. FBN Plc [2013] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1346) 176 SC and Dingyadi v. INEC (No. 1) [2010] 18 NWLR (Pt. 1224) 1. 53. To the claimant, both the circular and the subsequent steps lately taken by the defendants to give a semblance of fair hearing by requesting the claimant’s officers to respond to the queries issued to them though dated 11 January 2020 had already been tainted with the vice of denial of fair hearing. That the relevant pieces of evidence which go to establish breach of the claimant’s right to fair hearing can be found in paragraphs 4 - 26 of the claimant’s affidavit in support of the originating summons, which paragraphs demonstrate that the defendants had already passed judgment against the claimant before giving him 24 hours to explain. The claimant accordingly urged the Court to rely on the content of the circular dated 11 January 2021 to hold that the defendants had made a judicial determination that the claimant is not recognized as a senior staff union in CAC; and that by virtue of the letters of query dated 11 January 2020 issued to the claimant’s Executive members stating that their actions were tantamount to fraud without first hearing from them. The claimant also urged the Court to hold that the claimant’s right to fair hearing was breached by the defendants, and that the defendants usurped the judicial powers of the courts in reaching those far-reaching conclusions. Accordingly, that the Court should resolve this sole issue in favour of the claimant and against the defendants. 54. In conclusion, the claimant prayed the Court to enter judgment in its favour and grant all the reliefs sought in the originating summons. The Submissions of the Defendants in Opposition to the Originating Summons 55. The defendants case is that what the claimant termed as intimidation, harassment, etc of her members are not more than internal management process of issuing queries on officers of the Commission and also transferring them from one duty post to another. The defendants accordingly denied most of the operational parts of the affidavit in support of the originating summons. They denied that the staff on whose behalf the claimant is fighting this battle are members of the claimant as they are of senior staff cadre. The defendants also denied all the material assertion of facts that question the sincerity of their actions as regards their relationship with their staff. They denied that any of the actions taken against the staff are part of their management decisions which even the concerned staff have not complained against. The defendants also stated that their act of not making deductions and staff dues from senior staff is because they were just obeying the decision of this Court in the case of SSASCGOC v. AUPCTRE. Also, that there is a pending Suit No. Suit No. NICN/ABJ/45/2021 before this Court for the interpretation and application of the judgment in SSASCGOC v. AUPCTRE. The defendants also challenged the competence of the action of the claimant on the ground that it was premature and hence abusive among other grounds. 56. The defendants then submitted two issues for determination, namely: (1) Whether the claimant has established any credible case to be entitled to the reliefs sought in this case. (2) Whether the case of the claimant is not liable to be dismissed for being a gross abuse of judicial process. 57. The defendants, however, argued the two issues together; submitting that the claimant has not made any case for it to be entitled to the reliefs sought in this action. That apart from the fact that the case of the claimant is based on very hostile facts that have been disputed by the defendants, it is not only that the defendants denied the facts but deposed to facts in direct opposition and thereby making the facts of this case riotously hostile. However, that looking at this case on its merit, even if the defendants did not file any response to the case of the claimant, the claimant’s action cannot succeed. 58. To the defendants, the claimant conceded that the cause of action in its case is premised on the decision of this Court in SSASCGOC v. AUPCTRE Suit No. NICN/ABJ/125/2019. That the interpretation of that decision and its application is the subject of another suit, Suit No. NICN/ABJ/45/2021 pending between the claimant and the 1st defendant in this present case. That the question that will be relevant here is that will this case not be pre-emptive of the case pending before this Court in the case mentioned above? The defendants then submitted that this case is an abuse of judicial process as it is one case too many. That the apex court has admonished several times that what constitutes an abuse of court process are myriad. It goes beyond just filing multiplicity of suits. It includes both proper and improper use of judicial process in litigation to the irritation and/or annoyance of the opponent, referring to Arubo v. Ayeleru [1993] 3 NWLR (Pt. 280) 126 at 142, Saraki v. Kotoye [1992] 9 NWLR (Pt. 264) 156 at 188-189, Dingyadi v. INEC (No. 1) [2010] 18 NWLR (Pt. 1224) 1 at 74 and OSIEC & anor v. NCP & ors [2013] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1360) 451. 59. That the claimant here ought to have awaited the decision of this Court in the case under reference before embarking on this venture to nowhere. It is hence abusive as the defendants have deposed to the fact that they are embarrassed, irritated and annoyed. That the more reason why this action ought to have awaited the outcome of the other case pending before this Court is that in that case, the 1st defendant is claiming on one hand that the judgment of this Court in Suit No. NICN/ABJ/125/2019 defines a status and is applicable to the whole world while the claimant opined that it is peculiar to the persons in litigation before the court. That the danger apparent here is that if this Court agrees with the 1st defendant’s position in that case, then the basis of this action becomes illegal. This will not accord with the position of the law that a person cannot make illegality the basis of one’s action. This is captured in the maxim, ex turpi causa non oritur action, citing Nwosu v. APP [2020] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1749) 28 at 61 - 62 and Sodipo v. Lemminkainen OY [1936] 1 NWLR (Pt. 15) 220. 60. To the defendants, it may be argued that the parties in this case are different from the parties in the case under reference by the addition of the 2nd defendant to this suit but that argument will take a flee in the face of the position of the law to the effect that alteration of parties does not cure abuse, citing Jimoh v. Starco (Nig) Ltd [1998] 7 NWLR (Pt. 588) 523. That the implication of this is that the fact that a party adds one or more party to a case or removes one or more persons will not cure an abuse. It is not so much about the parties but the effect of the action. It is an action too many. That the consequence of an abuse is dismissal, referring to Arubo v. Aiyeleru (supra). That the implication of this is that abuse is a defence on the merit and on this ground alone the Court should dismiss this action. 61. The defendants continued that another interesting thing about the case of the claimant is that from the totality of the case, the complaints are not against any breach of rights, interest or relating to obligations of the defendants to the claimant. As a matter of fact, that the complaints of the claimant all relate to the alleged breach of named members of staff of the 1st defendant who the claimant claims to be its members. That it will be important to note that the defendants have asserted that these supposed members of the claimant are senior staff in its employ and by the decision of this Court under reference they are not members of the claimant. 62. That assuming without conceding that the claimant can maintain an action for personal rights of the members of the association, the fact whether these persons are members of the association is still being challenged and the answer may be dependent on the resolution of the case presently pending before this Court. In any event, whether these persons to whom the complaints are related are members of the claimant or not, that there is no law that supports the claimant in this case or any other person at that, to institute an action on behalf of parties who have not complained of any infraction to their rights. That section 6(6)(b) of the 1999 Constitution, which donated judicial powers to the Court, does not envisage a situation where a person will turn him/herself to a loose cannon litigating the interest of others, referring to Senator Abraham Adesanya v. President of FRN [1981] 5 SC 112 and Thomas v. Olufosoye [1986] 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 669. 63. That the said section 6(6)(b) has have been interpreted in Senator Abraham Adesanya v. President of FRN (supra and Thomas v. Olufosoye (supra) among many other cases and the position of the Supreme Court in all the cases is that a person can only litigate issues in his or her own interest, where his right and obligations are in issue and not for the interest of another person. As a matter of fact, the court called such persons “meddlesome interlopers” which a court should give no reckoning to. 64. The defendants went on that it may be relevant to mention the fact that in couching the reliefs before the Court, the learned senior counsel did not include any relief directly in respect of the supposed members of the claimant in respect of whom the action relates but upon a cursory look beyond the surface, the court will see that the gravamen of the action of the claimant is what transpired between the staff of the 1st defendant and the 1st defendant. That in commending this kind of careful examination beyond the surface to the Court, the defendants relied on the admonition of the Court of Appeal in Ochor v. Ojo [2008] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1105) 524 at 540 to the effect that the court should not allow dexterity or wisdom of counsel to blindfold it from seeing the real issue. That it is in the light of this admonition that the Court will see that all that the claimant referred to as infraction to her rights to freely associate, to fair hearing, etc are clearly allegations of infraction of rights of the staff of the 1st defendant to whom the facts relate and not that of the claimant as a person. 65. It is the defendants’ submission that the law is settled that it is an abuse where there is no iota of law backing a case or when such a case is premised on frivolity or recklessness, citing Ojo v. AG Oyo State [2008] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1110) 309 at 323. That considering the fact that there is no law backing this kind of action, the Court should see it as abusive of judicial process and dismiss same accordingly. 66. The defendants continued that this same argument is in favour of the legal position that a case which has no utilitarian purpose to serve for the plaintiff is academic and forensic as it is in this case. That if this case has any utilitarian value it will be to the members of staff of the 1st defendant in whose favour the case was brought by the claimant, citing Ugba v. Suswan [2014] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1427) 264 SC at 313. That it is also based on this ground of this suit not being of any value to the claimant that the Court should dismiss the action. 67. To the defendants, also closely linked with the above grounds, which are debilitating for the case of the claimant, is the fact that the case of the claimant is based solely on employment issues between the 1st defendant and members of her staff who the claimant claimed to be its members, a fact that is still being contended. That to show further that this is a case that has to do with the contract of employment between the 1st defendant and her staff, the claimant relied on Exhibit ‘K’, which is the conditions of service of the staff of the Commission, the 1st defendant. 68. The defendants then submitted that the law is well settled that a stranger to a contract, even if he is a beneficiary of the contract, cannot enforce it. A contract, including a contract of employment of this nature, only affect the parties to it and cannot be enforced by or against a person who is not a party to it even if the contract was made for his benefit, referring to UBA Plc v. BTL Ind. Ltd [2004] 18 NWLR (Pt. 904) 180 and Ironbar v. Federal Mortgage Finance [2009] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1165) 506 at 532. For the purpose of clarity, that all the issues that the claimant complained about, that it sees as oppressive, abusive, malicious, etc, are all steps taken in relation to the contract of employment between the 1st defendant and its staff and the claimant has no right of action over such, urging the Court to so hold. 69. The defendants went on that it pointed out that all the material facts in this case have been denied frontally and the natural consequence of when there are irreconcilable facts in the affidavit of parties in an action to be tried on affidavit evidence is to transfer such a case to the general cause list or in a case commenced by originating summons, to writ of summons, referring to Falobi v. Falobi [1976] 10 SC 1. That with the contradicting and irreconcilable affidavit evidence the Court ought to transfer the case to the writ of summons but in this case there are too many debilitating factors that will militate against the competence of the action and also make the action incurable even if transferred to writ. As such, transferring the case to writ for oral evidence will amount to acting in vain and this Court, being a court of equity will do nothing in vain. 70. In the final analysis, that the case of the claimant is a challenge to the enforcement of the order of this Court. That if there is a judgment of this Court (as both parties have admitted) to the effect that the claimant is a union for junior staff and some senior staff of the 1st defendant are parading themselves as members of such an association, then the 1st defendant cannot be wrong to call such senior members of staff acting in flagrance disobedience of the court judgment to order. 71. To the defendants, it has a duty imposed on her by section 287(3) of the 1999 Constitution to enforce any order of this Court. That section of the Constitution provides thus: The decision of the Federal High Court, the National Industrial Court, High Court and all other courts established by this Constitution shall be enforced in any part of the Federation by all authorities and persons, and by other courts of law with subordinate jurisdiction to that of the Federal High Court, a High Court and those other courts, respectively. 72. That this constitutional provision has been interpreted in a myriad of authorities by the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal and the position of the courts is that the judgment of the court is valid, subsisting and binding until set aside on appeal and it shall be enforced in all parts of the Federation by all authorities and persons, citing Ngere & anor v. Okuruket ‘XIV’ & ors [2014] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1417) 147 at 173 and Ojo v. INEC [2008] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1105) 524 at 628. That it is based on this constitutional provision that the action of the claimant is a way of attempting to restrain or constrain the exercise of a constitutional duty. That this, it cannot be done using the instrumentality of the Court, citing Gadi v. Male [2010] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1193) 225 at 275. 73. The defendants further submitted that though the claimant has painted the picture in this case as if the defendants were trying to interfere in its affairs and intervening with its freedom of association in what the claimant called dissolving the Executive of the union in the 1st defendant, the 1st defendant on the other hand has stated that the supposed members are senior staff and, therefore, cannot be paraded as members of the claimant by the operation of the decision of the Court in SSASCGOC v. AUPCTRE Suit No. NICN/ABJ/125/2021. That one of the reasons the 1st defendant took the step termed as interference with the freedom of association of the claimant (which is not conceded), was that the defendants actually gave effect to the decision of this Court as a duty imposed on them as “authorities and persons” under section 287(3) of the 1999 Constitution. 74. In conclusion, the defendants urged the Court to hold as follows: (a) That the case of the claimant is based on unproven injuries or wrongs allegedly suffered by staff of the 1st defendant and administrative measure it is based on internal affairs of the 1st defendant. (b) That the case is based on the contract of employment between the 1st defendant and her staff, which is personal and to which the claimant is not a party and cannot institute an action on. (c) That the case of the claimant is premature considering the fact that it pre-empts the decision of the Court in Suit No. NICN/ABJ/45/2020, which seeks interpretation and application of the case on which they claimed their case is premised and hence an abuse of judicial process. (d) That the claimant’s case, not being for the interest or protection of rights and obligations of the claimant but other persons who are not parties to the litigation, is strange to our jurisprudence, it is not supported by an iota of law and hence abusive of judicial process. (e) Uphold the defendants’ arguments in opposition to the claimant’s suit and dismiss the case. The Claimant’s Reply on Points of Law in Opposition to the Defendants’ Submission 75. The claimant in its reply on points of law addressed the issues raised by the defendants. 76. On whether the Facts of this Case are Hostile. The defendants had argued that the claimant’s case is based on hostile facts, which the defendants have denied thereby making the facts of this case riotously hostile, and that the defendants need not file any response to the claimant’s case. To the claimant, this argument is misconceived. That the facts of this case have not been controverted by the defendants. That in law, oral evidence cannot alter a documentary evidence. The the claimant proved her case not just by mere averments but also by credible documentary evidence. The onus, therefore, is shifted to the defendants to rebut the evidence of the claimant. That the defendants only supported their case with the judgment of this Court in Suit No. NICN/ABJ/125/2019 delivered by Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe which has no bearing with the actions complained of in this case. That the failure of the defendants to adduce credible documentary evidence to controvert the claimant’s documentary evidence, and support their own case, amounts to admission of the claimant’s case. Additionally, that failure of the defendants to controvert the claimant’s case means that the claimant’s case remains uncontroverted, and the reliefs flowing from the uncontroverted facts ought to be granted, urging the Court to so hold; and referring to Ogbiri v. NAOC Ltd [2010] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1213) 208 CA at 224. 77. On Whether this Claimant’s Case is an Abuse of Judicial Process. The defendants had argued that the claimant has conceded that the cause of this action is premised on the decision of this Court in SSASCGOC v. AUPCTRE Suit No. NICN/ABJ/125/2019, which is subject of another suit (NICN/ABJ/45/2021) pending in this Court, and that this case will be pre-emptive of the case pending before this Court. Therefore, that this matter is an abuse of judicial process. The defendants then cited Arubo v. Ayeleru [1993] 3 NWLR (Pt. 280) 126 and OSIEC & anor v. NCP & ors [2013] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1360) 451. 78. To the claimant, this argument is misconceived. First, that the claimant’s case is predicated on the legality or otherwise of the circular dated 11 January 2021 wherein the 1st defendant arrogated undue powers to itself stating that the claimant is no longer recognized as a senior staff union in the CAC, dissolving the current leadership of the claimant in CAC and stopping all deductions from staff salaries as union dues to the claimant amongst others. However, that the judgments relied upon, and sought to be implemented, do not support the position taken by the defendants and there is nowhere in the said judgments where the directives contained in the circular were made as positive orders of court. 79. Secondly, that the subject matter of this case is not a subject of the suit pending in this Court in Suit No NICN/ABJ/45/2021. That this mentioned suit was instituted by the 1st defendant in this case against the claimant wherein the 1st defendant sought the orders of this court to interpret and apply the decision of this Court in Suit Nos. NICN/ABJ/125/2019 and NICN/ABJ/103/2019 dated 17 December 2019 and 20 May 2020 between Senior Staff Association of Statutory Corp[orations and Government Owned Companies (SSASCCOC) v. Amalgamated Union of Public Corporations Civil Service Technical and Recreational Services Employees (AUPCTRE). That this Court on 27 May 2021 delivered its judgment dismissing the 1st defendant’s case as waste of judicial time. That as it stands now, there is no pending suit anywhere as regards the subject matter of this suit, and as such, this case is not an abuse of judicial process. 80. On Whether this Case is a Breach of the Rights of the Claimant. The defendants had argued that the claimant’s complaints are not against any breach of rights, interest or relating to obligations of the defendants, but on members of staff of the 1st defendant. And that there is no law that supports the claimant’s case to institute this action on behalf of parties who have not complained of any infraction. To the claimant, this argument is misconceived. That the claimant’s complaint is manifestly stated on the face of the originating summons wherein the claimant is challenging the powers of the 1st defendant in purporting to dissolve, regulate, supervise, inquire into, probe, interfere with or undermine the existence, running and investment activities of the claimant. These reliefs relate to rights which accrue directly to the claimant as a registered trade union under the laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and also as enshrined under the constitution of the claimant. That sections 16 and 19 of the Amalgamated Union of Public Corporations, Civil Service Technical And Recreational Services Employees Constitution 2013 (as amended) allow the claimant to invest its funds in properties, and the defendants ought to know that such properties do not belong to the 1st defendant, and for it to purport to set up a forensic audit committee to audit the accounts of the project, it is tantamount to interference with the legitimate activities of the union. 81. Moreover, that the complaint bordering on the maltreatment, intimidation, harassment, coercion and oppression of the Executive members of the claimant by the defendants is also an injury done to the claimant which entitles the claimant to maintain this action against the defendants before this Court. In this case, the actions of the defendants constitute a serious breach on the rights of the claimant to carry on its activities as a trade union. Accordingly, these entitle the claimant to a remedy from this Court because it is settled law that where there is a right there is a remedy, citing Promasidor (Nig) Ltd & anor v. Asikhia [2019] LPELR-46443(CA). 82. Whether this Case Bothers (sic) on Employment Issues. The defendants had argued that the claimant’s case is based on employment issues between the 1st defendant and members of her staff, and that a stranger to a contract cannot enforce the contract. To the claimant, this argument is misconceived. That the directives contained in the 1st defendant’s circular of 11 January 2021, which gave rise to this action, is not an issue of contract of employment. However, that the defendants erroneously relied on the judgments of this Court, which have no bearing with the directives, to purportedly dissolve the current Executive of the claimant in the 1st defendant, stopping the deduction of staff salaries as dues to the union and most outrageously, the setting up of forensic audit to investigate the project of the claimant. That a critical examination of these facts would reveal that the issue in contention in this case is not about the contract of employment between the 1st defendant and her staff, but the illegal and unlawful interference, intimidation, oppression and suppression of the union activities of the claimant in the 1st defendant. 83. On Whether the Claimant’s Case was Successfully Controverted by the Defendants. The defendants had argued that the material facts in this case have been denied frontally and the natural consequence of where there are irreconcilable facts in the affidavit of parties is to transfer the case to the general cause list. To the claimant, this argument is misconceived. That from the facts before the Court, the defendants have not denied issuing the directives contained in the circular of 11 January 2021 wherein they made far reaching decisions, unsupported by the judgment of this Court they seek to rely on. That the defendants have not denied setting up a forensic audit committee to investigate the project of the claimant. The above set of facts which constitutes the claimant’s cause of action against the defendants stands uncontroverted and unchallenged by the defendants. Therefore, the claimant has discharged the burden placed on it. That the claimant sufficiently discharged this burden of proof by giving an overwhelming evidence before this Court, which stands uncontroverted, referring to Gbin v. Oriare [2009] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1158) 370 SC at 395. 84. That courts have held that the most reliable, if not the best evidence, is documentary evidence; and it is more reliable than oral evidence, citing Akinbisade v. State [2006] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1007) 184. That the defendants merely denied the claimant’s claim, but failed to state material facts on which its defence is based. The law is trite that for a traverse to amount to a denial, it must be explicit, unequivocal and should not leave anyone in doubt as to the intention sought to portray. Objectivity should override subjectivity, citing CBN v. Dinneh [2010] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1221) 125 at 159 and UNIC Insurance Plc v. Fadayi & ors [2018] LPELR-45571(CA). The claimant then urged the Court to discountenance paragraphs 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 39, 40 and 41 of the defendants' counter-affidavit in defence to this originating summons, as same constitutes general traverse in law and, therefore, an admission. 85. On Whether the Defendants’ Circular Dated 11 January 2021 can be Enforced Pursuant to the Orders of this Court. The defendants had argued that they have an imposed duty to enforce the order of this Court, relying on section 287(3) of the 1999 Constitution and some case law authorities. To the claimant, this argument is misconceived. That the claimant’s case is challenging the unlawful interference in the activities of the claimant by the defendants, in dissolving the current leadership of the claimant in the 1st defendant, stopping deductions from staff salaries as union dues and setting up forensic audit committee to investigate the claimant’s project. That none of these acts were ordered by the Court in the judgment sought to be implemented by the defendants. It is thus the claimant’s submission that the defendants cannot hide under the implementation of court orders to perpetuate illegality. 86. In conclusion, the claimant urged the Court to discountenance all the issues and points of law as misconceived by the defendants. COURT’S DECISION 87. I have given due consideration to all the processes and submissions of the parties. Two issues are before the Court: the defendants’ preliminary objection, and the claimant’s originating summons. I shall treat the defendants’ preliminary objection first before looking into the claimant’s originating summons. And this will be so even if the defendants’ preliminary objection succeeds since courts below the Supreme Court are enjoined to resolve all issues brought before them. See Mr Henry Ihebereme v. Hartland Nigeria Limited unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/172/2018, the judgment of which was delivered on 23 January 2020 and Edem v. Canon Balls Ltd [2005] 6 SC (Pt. II) 16; [2005] 12 NWLR (Pt. 938) 27. Decision on the Preliminary Objection 88. The defendants’ first ground of objection is that the claimant has no locus standi to institute this action. That a look at paragraphs 7, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16 and 17 of the affidavit in support of the originating summons, and reliefs (11), (12) and (13) sought by the claimant, will show that the circumstance of facts are in relation to the communication, administrative act and action vide documents between the 1st defendant and its employees on the one part and the 1st defendant’s queries to three (3) of its employees who are senior staff and so not within the dragnet of membership of the claimant. The thrust of the defendants’ argument here is twofold: what the claimant is complaining of are administrative acts of especially the 1st defendant to its employees; and even at that, the acts relate to senior staff of the 1st defendant who are not within the jurisdictional scope of the claimant. The said administrative acts are the queries issued on, the transfers of, the Executive members of the claimant, and the threatened forensic investigation of the claimant's project. All of this, including the act of the staff being señor staff and so outside of the jurisdictional scope of the claimant, feature prominently in terms of the merit of the originating summons and were canvassed as such by the defendants. The defendants would have been well-advised to restrict their argument here to the merit of the case since they are more of issues of defence requiring proof than locus standi. 89. A look at the paragraphs of the affidavit in support of the originating summons the defendants referred to will show the claimant’s complaint is that the defendants stopped staff loans, denied 2019 promotion arrears, stopped salaries, issued queries to and even transferred Executive members of the claimant, threatened to set up a forensic panel to probe the claimant’s project for fraud, etc. As a trade union, does the claimant have the locus to complain to this Court about these things? My answer is a very big YES. But the defendants’ argument is that all of this relates to persons who are senior staff of the 1st defendant and so are outside the jurisdictional scope of the claimant. The problem here is one of proof of the fact that the staff in issue are actually senior staff of the 1st defendants. In paragraph 12 of the affidavit in support of the originating summons, the claimant gave the names of its three Executive members that were queried. In reaction, the defendants in paragraphs 16 and 30 of their counter-affidavit averred that the persons queried were senior staff and so not members of the claimant union. There is no proof beyond this ipse dixit showing that the named staff are senior staff (except for Exhibit G dealing with the transfer of Abimiku Labaran Sunday from Head Office to Damaturu, to which I shall more appropriately remark on when addressing the merit of the originating summons). Their ranks (to show whether they are senior staff or not) in the 1st defendant were not disclosed. Even Exhibits C, D and E attached to the affidavit in support of the originating summons (the queries to the Executive members of the claimant union) did not disclose their respective ranks. As it is, there is no proof before the Court that all those the defendants claim are senior staff and so not members of the claimant union are actually senior staff. 90. There is no doubt about the claimant being a trade union for junior staff. This Court has held so in countless decisions. Recently in CAC v. AUPCTRE unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/45/2021, the judgment of which was delivered on 27 May 2021 at paragraph 83, this Court acknowledged that AUPCTRE is a trade union for junior staff in these words: It is based on this provision that Hon. Justice Anuwe held that the defendant union can only unionise junior staff. From this decision, the straight answer to both questions is that the defendant cannot unionise the senior staff in the service of the claimant. In countless decisions (see, for instance, CAC v. AUPCTRE [2004] 1 NLLR (Pt. 1) 1 and Bethel Ezego & ors v. NUFBTE & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/221/2017, the judgment of which was delivered on 16 July 2017, which reviewed some of the cases), this Court has restated the law to the effect that unionization of junior staff is assumed given that the yardstick is eligibility; although the junior staff has the right to opt out of the trade union. This assumption of course does not apply to senior staff who by law must individually and in writing opt to join the applicable trade union. So, in respect of the claimant in the instant case, all junior staff of the 1st defendant are assumed, based on eligibility, to be members of the claimant union. Since it is the defendants who assert the fact of senior staff, the onus is on them, not the claimant, to show that those they queried, or transferred, etc are actually senior staff. This the defendants have failed to do. So, it is not open to the defendants to talk of the claimant not having the locus standi to bring this suit. I am accordingly satisfied that the claimant has the locus standi to bring this action. I so hold. 91. The second ground of the defendants’ objection is that this suit is improperly constituted as regards the parties. The thrust of the defendants’ argument here is that the named 2nd defendant (“The Registrar General Corporate Affairs Commission”) is a mere descriptive nominee, and so is not a juristic person that can sue and be sued. This argument appears misconceived. In citing Iyke Medical Merchandise v. Pfizer Inc & anor in support, the defendants ought to have placed premium on the fact that the Supreme Court acknowledged the point as one of “a general proposition” (and so would admit of exception), and that the “right to sue and be sued [can be] created and/or vested by or under a statute”. This later bit was even acknowledged by the defendants when they stated that “certain unincorporated associations [are] granted the status of legal personae by law…”. 92. So, while the general rule is that only juristic persons (natural or artificial) can sue or be sued, an exception is that a body or office which is not a juristic person or entity per se but which is given functions or duties to perform, which affects the rights or privileges of others, is by implication of law vested with “juridical personality” that enables such a body or office to sue and be sued eo nominee. See Carlen v. University of Jos [1994] 1 NWLR (Pt. 323) 631, Nigerian Football Coaches Association v. Laloko [2003] FWLR (Pt. 144) 482, Chief Andrew Thomas v. Local Government Service Board [1965] NMLR 310 at 312, William Kpebimo v. The Board of Governors, Western Ijaw Teachers Training College [1966] NMLR 130 at 133) and Onamusi v. Ibrahim [1971] ANLR 361. The rationale is to prevent injustice that might otherwise ensue; but what must be noted is that the existence of a right to sue or be sued eo nominee is always dependent on whether the statute creating the body or office expressly or by implication gives it such a power. See Carlen v. University of Jos (supra). It is not in doubt that the 2nd defendant in the instant case is a creation of CAMA with functions/duties assigned to him, which are capable of affecting the rights and privileges of others. 93. Additionally, in Ogunbayo Oluwole Michael v. Fidelity Bank Plc & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/350/2013, the judgment of which was delivered on 13 December 2017, the attempt to have the Managing Director of the defendant struck off the suit on the ground that he is not a juristic person was rejected by this Court in these words at paragraph 33: …In labour relations, the definition of an employer has an expansive meaning as to include officers of the employer himself. For instance, section 91(1) of the Labour Act Cap. L1 LFN 2004 defines the “employer” to mean “any person who has entered into a contract of employment to employ any other person as a worker either for himself or for the service of any other person, and includes the agent, manager or factor of that first-mentioned person and the personal representative of a deceased employer”. Of course, by section 18(1) of the Interpretation Act 2004, “person” includes any body of persons corporate or unincorporated. Since the definition of an employer includes the agent, manager or factor of an employer, the 2nd defendant in the instant suit is a juristic person properly sued in this case… 94. In like manner, the 2nd defendant in the instant case, as Head of the 1st defendant, must qualify as its agent, manager or factor as to come within the definition of “employer” and so is a juristic person capable of suing and being sued in a labour court such as the NICN. I so hold. The fact that an employer includes “the agent, manager or factor of” the employer means that the Labour Act itself has bestowed juristic personality on “the agent, manager or factor” for the purposes of the Act. And this Court has always recognized them as juristic persons as held in the just cited Ogunbayo Oluwole Michael v. Fidelity Bank Plc & anor. The reference to Agbonmagbe Bank Ltd v. General Manager, GB Ollivant Ltd & anor [1961] All NLR 116 by the defendants is ill-conceived and so is inapplicable here since that case did not factor the definition of “employer’ under section 91(1) of the Labour Act. I so hold. 95. So, whether on grounds of “juridical personality” or the expanded definition of an employer for labour law purposes, the 2nd defendant qualifies as a person capable of being sued as has been done in the instant case. Accordingly, the argument of the defendants that this suit is improperly constituted as regards the parties must fail and so is hereby rejected. In any event, even if the defendants’ argument were to have succeeded (I reiterate that it did not succeed), it is not capable of rendering the whole suit incompetent since the 1st defendant is a proper defendant appropriately sued. I hold, therefore, that this suit is properly constituted as regards the parties. 96. The third ground of objection is that this action was commenced by a wrong mode of commencement. The defendants prayed the Court to strike out this case because the claimant commenced it by way of an originating summons instead of a complaint. In other words, that what the claimant has brought before this Court require pleadings and proof of the pleadings, not affidavit evidence as there are hostile facts calling for proof vide pleadings. Even if the defendants were right, the answer is not one to strike out the case but to call for pleadings to be filed. In Mr. Henry Adoh v. EMC Communications Infrastructure Limited [2015] 55 NLLR (Pt. 189) 546 NIC, the point was made in these words: True the rule is that a matter that ought to be commenced by way of a complaint, if commenced by way of an originating summons, may not be permitted by the Court; but even at this, the Court is enjoined not to strike out the originating summons but to simply order the more appropriate complaint or writ of summons to be filed. See, for instance, NEPA v. Ugbaja [1998] 5 NWLR (Pt. 548) 106. The defendants prayer to have the instant action struck cannot, therefore, be granted. 97. This aside, I must make the point that a claimant commencing an action vide the originating summons procedure takes the risk that he can appropriately prove his case. Where the averments in the affidavit in support are not supported with authenticating evidence in the nature of documents, this may prove fatal to the claimant as was the case in Oladapo Olatunji & anor v. Uber Technologies System Nigeria Limited & 2 ors unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/546/2017, the judgment of which was delivered on 4 December 2018. Over time, I have had cause to deprecate the thinking by claimants’ counsel that the originating summons procedure is necessarily a short cut to justice. See, for instance, Dr Olusola Adeyelu v. Lagos University Teaching Hospital (LUTH) & 2 ors unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/94/2017, the judgment of which was delivered on 25 April 2017, First Bank of Nigeria Limited v. Nigeria Union of Pensioners & 3 ors unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/48/2016, the judgment of which was delivered on 12 July 2016, Bethel Ezego & ors v. NUFBTE & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/221/2017, the judgment of which was delivered on 16 July 2018 and Oladapo Olatunji & anor v. Uber Technologies System Nigeria Limited & 2 ors (supra). 98. I shall, therefore, deal with the merit of the reliefs claimed by the claimant when considering the merit of the originating summons. I so hold. 99. The fourth ground of objection is non-fulfillment of condition precedent — the condition precedent being the service of pre-action notice. The argument of the defendants is that the claimant did not give the pre-action notice enjoined by section 17(1) of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 2020 (CAMA), which provides that a suit shall not be commenced against the 1st defendant before the expiration of 30 days after a written notice of intention to commence the suit is served upon the 1st defendant by the intending plaintiff or his agent. In answer, the claimant attached as Exhibit A to its affidavit in opposition to the preliminary objection a letter titled “Notice of Intention to Commence Legal Action Against the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) Pursuant to Section 17 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, 2020”. The letter is dated 19 January 2021 and was endorsed as received by the 1st defendant on 20 January 2021. 100. The instant suit was filed by the claimant on 1 March 2021. So clearly the claimant served a pre-action notice on the 1st defendant after the 30 days enjoined by section 17(1) of CAMA. The defendants are aware of this as they made no issue of this in paragraph 43 of their affidavit in opposition to the originating summons. Yet, their counsel chose to make an issue of it as per the preliminary objection. When counsel to the defendants adopted the arguments of the defendants regarding both the preliminary objection and the originating summons, he had the opportunity, having seen the pre-action notice the claimant served on the 1st defendant, to withdraw his argument on the issue of pre-action. But he did not. This is professional indiscretion on the part of the defendants’ counsel that must be strongly denounced. And I so do. 101. The fifth ground of objection is that there is no reasonable cause of action, hence the suit is abusive. To the defendants, the action of the claimant is baseless, academic, forensic and hypothetical; it has not disclosed any reasonable cause of action, hence it is abusive. That looking at this case in its totality, the Court will see that it serves no utilitarian value to the claimant, urging the Court to so hold and strike out or dismiss the suit. The defendants even brought the issue of locus into the fray in addressing this ground of objection. The defendants would also raise the issue of the suit being abusive and so incompetent in its defence against the originating summons. Beyond saying that the suit has no utilitarian value to the claimant, and that the claimant has no locus (a point I have already rejected), the defendants did not show to this Court how this suit is abusive, baseless, academic, forensic and hypothetical. What is the utilitarian value that is lacking in this suit? The defendants did not tell the Court. As it is, it is the argument of the defendants that is baseless, hypothetical, etc. The fifth ground of objection must accordingly be rejected. And I so do. 102. In all, the defendants’ preliminary objection is baseless. It fails and is hereby dismissed. Decision on the Originating Summons 103. I now proceed to the merit of the originating summons. In arguing against the originating summons, the defendants once again raised issues of the competence of this suit. To them, the claimant lacked the locus to bring this suit, which suit in any event is abusive. They reiterated arguments on this issue that they earlier raised in their preliminary objection, arguments that I rejected. The only addition here is that there is a pending suit (Suit No. NICN/ABJ/45/2021) before this Court that makes the instant suit unnecessary. 104. The defendants’ assertion that “there is a pending Suit No. NICN/ABJ/45/2021 before this Court for the interpretation and application of the judgment in SSASCGOC v. AUPCTRE” can be misleading as that case was concluded and judgment delivered on 27 May 2021. The defendants’ counter-affidavit in opposition to the originating summons was filed on 15 June 2021 i.e. over two weeks after the judgment in NICN/ABJ/45/2021 on 27 May 2021. In paragraph 43(d) of the defendants’ counter-affidavit, the defendants deposed that the “interpretation and application of the judgments in Suits No. NICN/ABJ/125/2019 and NICN/ABJ/103/2019 is a subject before this Honourable Court in Suit No. NICN/ABJ/45/2021 in which he Claimant herein and the Respondents are parties”. That on 15 June 2021 the defendants would talk of Suit No. NICN/ABJ/45/2021 as still before this Court is certainly a blatant falsehood. 105. Given the falsehood peddled in paragraph 43(d) of their counter-affidavit, the defendants proceeded to argue that the claimant in the instant suit ought to have awaited the outcome of Suit No. NICN/ABJ/45/2021 since the danger apparent is that if this Court agrees with the 1st defendant’s position in that case, then the basis of this action becomes illegal. The defendants had even in paragraph 43(e) of their counter-affidavit deposed that “this case is litigating [note that the defendants did not use the word ‘re-litigating’] the same issues involved in Suit No. NICN/ABJ/45/2021 through the back door and hence abusive”. As both parties are aware, this Court found no basis for the filing of Suit No. NICN/ABJ/45/2021 in the judgment of 27 May 2021. In the words of this Court: [91] So, is there any basis for filing this case? None at all, I will say. The case is utterly baseless. There is no iota of any evidence before the Court showing that the defendant is attempting any unionization of senior staff in the service of the claimant contrary to the dictates of the judgment of 17 December 2019. The claimant is on a wild goose chase. And has only succeeded in wasting the precious time of this Court. Nothing else! [92] I find no merit in this suit. It fails and so is hereby dismissed. 106. That the defendants would depose to, and their counsel would pursue an argument on, the pendency of Suit No. NICN/ABJ/45/2021 without even orally drawing the Court’s attention to the fact that judgment has been delivered in it only shows how low legal practice and its etiquette have sunk in this country. I must strongly make the point that in pursuing the argument on the pendency of Suit No. NICN/ABJ/45/2021 even when judgment had been delivered, the counsel to the defendants intentionally and positively sanctioned the false deposition of the defendants in that regard. Even when the claimant in paragraph 25 of its further affidavit of 12 July 2021 deposed that Suit No. NICN/ABJ/45/2021 “has been determined by this Honourable Court on the 27th of May 2021 and judgment delivered in favor of the Claimant in this case wherein this court dismissed the case of the defendants as being frivolous and a waste of judicial time”, the counsel to the defendants, when he was adopting the arguments of the defendants, did not even deem it wise to acknowledge this fact and withdraw his arguments regarding the pendency of Suit No. NICN/ABJ/45/2021. Counsel owes a duty to the Court in that regard — and I say it with all sense of seriousness and due respect. That counsel did not do this only shows how destitute and degenerate in courtesies and etiquette legal practice is becoming. This Court is duty bound to discourage this degeneration. 107. A look at the seven questions raised by the claimant in the originating summons will reveal a measured verbosity and repetition on the part of the claimant. All the seven questions can collapse into one simple question: can the defendants dissolve, regulate, supervise, inquire into, probe and interfere with the existence, running, finances and investment activities of the claimant? The talk about the defendants not giving the claimant fair hearing; or arrogating to themselves the power of dissolving, regulating and or directing or controlling the labour union affairs of the claimant in total disregard of the powers of the National Headquarters of the claimant, and the other internal governing organs of the claimant (question 5); or the defendants initiating disciplinary measures tending to suspend and or dismiss members of the claimant based purely on the internal labour union affairs and activities of the claimant, and contrary to Article 4.04 - 4.09 of the Conditions of Service of Corporate Affairs Commission, June 2011 (question 6); or the defendants’ purported dissolution of the claimant’s trade union activities, issuing queries to members of the claimant and directing them to vacate their offices amounting to oppression, harassment, intimidation, suppression and usurpation of powers (question 7), are all embellishments. It is the verbosity and repetition in the questions posed that yielded to the equally verbose and repetitive 14 reliefs claimed by the claimants. I shall accordingly proceed to consider the key question just discerned i.e. whether the defendants can dissolve, regulate, supervise, inquire into, probe and interfere with the existence, running, finances and investment activities of the claimant. 108. Central to determining this question and hence the merit of the originating summons is the claimant’s Exhibit B attached to the affidavit in support. Exhibit B is a circular issued to all staff by the “Director, Human Resources” of the 1st defendant. It is dated 11 January 2021, and titled “Full Implementation of the National Industrial Court Judgement Between SSASCGOC And AUPCTRE”; and it was copied to the 2nd defendant, all Directors, Heads of Departments/Units and all Heads of Nodal and State Offices. I will need to quote it in full just so as to dissect it in determining whether the defendants acted rightly in issuing it as it is. It provides thus: In compliance with the National Industrial Court Judgment in suit nos. NICN/ABJ/125/2019 and NICN/ABJ/103/2019 dated 17th December, 2019 and 20th May, 2020 between SENIOR STAFF ASSOCIATION OF STATUTORY CORPORATIONS AND GOVERNMENT OWNED COMPANIES (SSASCGOC) AND AMALGAMATED UNION OF PUBLIC CORPORATIONS CIVIL SERVICE TECHNICAL AND RECREATIONAL SERVICES EMPLOYEE (AUPCTRE), which ruled that AUPCTRE cannot unionize Senior Staff from the rank of a Senior Supervisor and above. Staff are therefore to note that: (i) AUPCTRE is no longer recognized as a Senior Staff Union in the Commission. (ii) Senior Staff are free to join other recognized union for Senior Staff. (iii) The current leadership of AUPCTRE in the Commission is hereby declared dissolved. (iv) All deductions from staff salaries as union dues to AUPCTRE is hereby stopped. (v) Junior Staff are free to organize themselves into AUPCTRE or any recognized union of their choice. Please be guided accordingly. 109. When the claimant argued that the defendants purportedly dissolved, regulated, supervised, inquired into, probed and interfered with its existence, running, finances and investment activities, the claimant meant the issuing of Exhibit B by the defendants. In further proof of its case, the claimant complained of the defendants stopping the deduction of check-off dues, and interference by the defendants in the running of the claimant union. The defendants denied all the allegations of the claimant. To be able to determine the import of Exhibit B and hence whether the defendants denial is grounded, it may be necessary to take a closer look at the averments of the defendants itself relative to what Exhibit B stated. 110. The claimant had complained that the defendants stopped the deduction of check-off dues of its members and dissolved the claimant union. Of course, Exhibit B is the supporting evidence. In answer, the defendants in paragraph 29 of their affidavit in opposition to the originating summons averred that “…the 1st Defendant only stopped the deductions of staff who are not members of the Claimant and not all staff…” In paragraph 37, the defendants went on to aver that “the 1st Defendant only stopped the deductions of union dues of the staff who are not junior staff…” And in paragraph 36 of same affidavit, the defendants averred thus: “…the defendants did not dissolve the leadership of the Claimant as alleged…” 111. As can be seen, the defendants are not denying stopping the deduction of check-off dues — only that it is in relation to staff who are not members of the claimant union. But even in the averments as per paragraphs 29, 37 and 36 of the counter-affidavit, it will be seen that they are blatant falsehoods on the part of the defendants, which their counsel ought not to have allowed to be filed. Take a second look at Exhibit B, which was issued by the defendants, and what we find are clear falsehoods peddled by the defendants. Sub-paragraph (iv) in the second paragraph of Exhibit B states thus: “All deductions from staff salaries as union dues to AUPCTRE is hereby stopped”. And in sub-paragraph (iii) of same Exhibit B, what we have is: “The current leadership of AUPCTRE in the Commission is hereby declared dissolved”. 112. Now, where in sub-paragraph (iv) did the defendants exempt some of its staff in terms of the deductions? And in respect of sub-paragraph (iii), did the defendants not say that the current leadership of AUPCTRE in the Commission is hereby dissolved? Did these words admit of any exception? The answer of course is a capital NO. Counsel to the defendants saw Exhibit B and yet allowed the defendants to file their counter-affidavit with the falsehoods they peddled. Counsel is first and foremost a minister in the temple of justice and hence an officer of the Court. See Dr (Rev) Olapade Agoro v. Oba Adekunle Aromolaran & anor [2011] LPELR-8906(CA) and Oseni & ors v. Oyetoro & ors [2018] LPELR-44326(CA). 113. Documents speak for themselves. And the best evidence, as it is often notoriously said, is documentary evidence. See Skye Bank Plc v. Akinpelu [2010] LPELR-3073(SC); [2010] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1198) 179, The Attorney-General, Bendel State & 2 ors. v. United Bank for Africa Ltd [1986] 4 NWLR (Pt. 337) 547 at 563 and Chief S. O. Agbareh & anor v. Dr Anthony Mimra & ors [2008] LPELR-235(SC); [2008] NWLR (Pt. 1071) 378 SC; [2008] 1 SC (Pt. III) 88. In fact, the document being the best proof of its contents, no oral evidence, will be allowed to discredit the said contents except in cases where fraud is pleaded. See B. Stabilini & Co. Ltd v. Nwabueze Obasi [1997] 9 NWLR (Pt. 520) 293 at 305. With all this in mind, as far as the instant case is concerned, I am at a loss how the defendants, and as allowed by their counsel, are this reprehensible in the lies they peddle. 114. The defendants had argued that if there is a judgment of this Court (as both parties have admitted) to the effect that the claimant is a union for junior staff and some senior staff of the 1st defendant are parading themselves as members of such an association, then the 1st defendant cannot be wrong to call such senior members of staff acting in flagrant disobedience of the court judgment to order. By advancing this argument the defendants imply that they have some kind of policing duty over the trade unionism of the claimant. In Errand Express Limited v. Maritime Workers Union of Nigeria unreported Suit No. NIC/LA/39/2011, the judgment of which was delivered on 26 March 2014, this Court made it clear that “…a union has not been bequeathed the right or appointed to police the world of work” and that “a union, consequently, is not and cannot act as the policeman of labour practices in the world of work”. In like manner, I must say that an employer is not and cannot act as the policeman of trade unionism in its workplace. This will be tantamount to interference on the part of the employer. 115. The defendants cannot even rely on section 287(3) of the 1999 Constitution (in the manner they did) as justification for assuming the said role of a policeman. And so it is not open to the defendants to say who the members of the claimant should be. That is the function of this Court. The rule against non-interference by an employer in trade union activities of the union(s) in its workplace dictates that the defendants must keep off the running of the claimant. It is not the duty of the defendants, and hence it is certainly wrong for the defendants, “to call such senior members of staff acting in flagrance disobedience of the court judgment to order”. No one appointed the defendants as the policeman to ensure compliance with this Court’s order as they did. The defendants setting up a forensic audit committee to audit the accounts of the claimant’s project is tantamount to interference with the legitimate activities of the union. The function to check the accounts of a trade union is that of the Registrar of Trade Unions, not the defendants’. See sections 38 and 39 of the Trade Unions Act (TUA) 2004. 116. Exhibits C, D and E attached to the affidavit in support of the originating summons (the three queries issued to the three officers of the claimant union each dated 11 January 2020) also depict the interference of the defendants in the affairs of the claimant union. The third and fourth paragraphs of these exhibits state as follows: Also recall the recent decision of Management to set up a Committee to carry out Forensic Audit of the project, particularly in view of the fact that no independent Audit was carried out since the commencement of the project and your recusant or failure to cooperate with the Committee. This action is tantamount to Fraud. You are to explain within 24 hours why disciplinary action should not be taken against you for the act which is a gross misconduct under the Commission’s Conditions of Service. 117. Exhibit C relates to Kirfi, Ibrahim M. I. (1962) and in the first paragraph states thus: “While you were serving as the Secretary AUPCTRE, CAC chapter, you initiated the staff housing scheme whereby some members of staff and outsiders were made to deposit money for the houses with total turnover of over N600million”. The first paragraph of Exhibits D and E are similarly worded — the only difference being in the opening words. In Exhibit D, which relates to Shehu Abubakar Sadiq (1804), the opening words are: “The AUPCTRE, CAC chapter of which you are currently the Secretary initiated the staff housing scheme…” And in Exhibit E relating to Buba, Dauda Yusuf (1138), the opening words are: “While you were serving as the Chairman AUPCTRE, CAC chapter, you initiated the staff housing scheme…” 118. What can we glean from all of this? First, the actions for which the three queries were issued were acts done for and on behalf of the claimant union by its officers. Secondly, the money in issue is trade union money, not the defendants’. Thirdly, the project in issue is a trade union project, not the defendants’. Fourthly, when the defendants asserted in the queries that what the three officers did amounted to “a gross misconduct under the Commission’s Conditions of Service”, the defendants did not indicate which provision(s) of the conditions of service was/were breached by the officers. Lastly, I note that Exhibits C, D and E did not disclose the ranks of the queried staff (and hence we do not know whether they are senior or junior staff). All of this amount to a simple truth: a blatant interference in the affairs of the claimant union by the defendants. Nothing more, nothing less! Pure and simple! The defendants have no business in the affairs and finances of the claimant union. If there is fraud in the claimant union the Registrar of Trade Unions is available to activate the provisions of the Trade Unions Act and deal with it accordingly. The defendants have no business whatsoever to do what it did. 119. In Premier Lotto Limited v. National Union of Lottery Agents and Employees & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/218/2016, the ruling of which was delivered on 9 November 2016, this Court stressed that an employer cannot arrogate to itself the right to determine who can be a member of a union. This Court has held that when it comes to the activities of a trade union, the employer is in the main expected to remain passive. That is why the employer can be a defendant but not a claimant. See Panya Anigboro v. Sea Trucks Nigeria Ltd [1995] 6 NWLR (Pt. 299) 35, ASCSN v. INEC and 2 ors [2006] 5 NLLR (Pt. 11) 75 at 89, Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) v. Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria and anor [2007] LPELR-8882(CA) and ACSN v. National Orientation Agency and ors unreported Suit No. NIC/9M/2003 delivered on 27 September 2007. In fact, in Beloxxi Industries Limited v. National Union of Food, Beverage and Tobacco Employees (NUFBTE) & 2 ors unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/437/2016, the ruling of which was delivered on 30 March 2017, the NICN held that an employer has no right to ask whether deductions can be made from the wages of the workers (junior staff) without their permission or prior indication of their membership; and that to come to this Court as a claimant over such an issue is nothing but interference in union matters. This is because the obligation to make such deductions is already laid down by law; as such there is no need for the employer coming to Court to ask that question. 120. The claimant union reacted to Exhibits C, D and E by writing Exhibit F dated 12 January 2021 and forwarding same to the Director Human Resources of the 1st defendant. In Exhibit F, the claimant pointed out to the defendants that any complaint about the project in issue should be directed to it. The defendants did not heed this advice. Instead Exhibit H dated 14 January 2021 was issued telling Ibrahim Musa Kirfi that his response to the query has not been received and that he must note that he is an employee of the Commission and not that of AUPCTRE. Exhibit J dated 13 January 2021 and addressed to the Chairman, AUPCTRE (CAC Branch) was issued by the defendants. In it, the AUPCTRE CAC Branch was asked to vacate its existing office and all parking lots allocated to its Executive Officers. The reason the defendants gave was “recent re-organization in the Commission”. 121. What do I gather from all of this? The defendants do not want the claimant union in their premises. As such the union and its officers must be harassed out of the defendants’ premises. This is no doubt harassment and intimidation. I find the defendants’ actions to be arbitrary, unwarranted and oppressive. 122. The argument of the defendants that the three staff queried vide Exhibits C, D and E are their staff who are senior staff and so not members of the claimant union has already been rejected by me in dealing with the preliminary objection. That the argument was also raised in the merit of the originating summons must also be rejected on the ground of absence of any proof of them being senior staff. 123. However, Exhibit G presents an altogether different consideration. In paragraph 17 of the affidavit in support of the originating summons, the claimant averred that the defendants in their determined effort to emasculate and victimize the claimant’s members have proceeded just within 4 days (11 to 15 January 2021) to allege wrongdoing, pass judgment and hastily transferred members of the claimant in their employment. As evidence, the claimant referred to a letter of transfer, what it called Exhibit J but which is actually Exhibit G. Exhibit G is a letter dated 15 January 2021 transferring Abimiku Labaran Sunday (1311) from Head Office To Damaturu as Senior Manager Finance and Accounts. No other proof of transfer of any other staff was presented to the Court. So, if Abimiku Labaran Sunday is the person the claimant is referring to in paragraph 17 of its supporting affidavit as its member who was transferred, then the claimant must have a rethink. I indicated earlier that this Court in CAC v. AUPCTRE unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/45/2021, the judgment of which was delivered on 27 May 2021 acknowledged that AUPCTRE is a trade union for junior staff. So, as Senior Manager, Abimiku Labaran Sunday is a senior staff and so cannot be a member of the claimant union, a union that is reservedly only for junior staff. As a senior staff, the claimant cannot fight the cause of Abimiku Labaran Sunday. So, the transfer of Abimiku Labaran Sunday to Damaturu cannot be a cause of action to be fought for by the claimant. I so find and hold. 124. So, aside from the case of Abimiku Labaran Sunday over which I just ruled that the claimant cannot make a case, there is no proof before this Court to show that the other named staff as per Exhibits C, D and E are senior staff as to take them off the claimant’s remit as the defendants would want. The named staff were Executive officers of the claimant union. The actions of the defendants against them were accordingly actions against the claimant union. And so I am satisfied that the defendants acted arbitrarily and oppressively against the claimant union in that regard. And I so hold. So, to the question whether the defendants can dissolve, regulate, supervise, inquire into, probe and interfere with the existence, running, finances and investment activities of the claimant, my answer is a capital NO. In this regard, I am satisfied that the claimant has proved its case. 125. What reliefs is the claimant entitled to then? This is the question I turn to. I indicated earlier that following the verbose and repetitive questions posed by the claimant, the 14 reliefs prayed for were equally verbose and repetitive. Since I answered the question posed in the negative, the claimant is accordingly entitled to a declaration in like terms and the corresponding order(s). 126. However, relief (13) prayed for the sum of N100 Million as general damages against the defendants for breach of fundamental right to fair hearing, malicious disruption, usurpation and interference with the activities of the claimant and its members. Beyond Exhibits B, C, D and E, which I held as evidencing interference by the defendants on the activities of the claimant, which interference was arbitrary and oppressive, there is not much advanced by the claimant to support the grant of a whooping N100 Million as general damages especially as the claimant came by way of an originating summons, not by way of a complaint. While the claimant is entitled to some amount for general damages, it certainly is not to the whooping sum it prays for. 127. In Okpala & ors v. Okeke [2014] LPELR-24637(CA), HIs Lordship Emmanuel Agim, JCA (as he then was) stated the law thus: Where a person who claims for general damages for the breach of his legal right, establishes the said breach of his legal right the Court can award him general damages for the breach of his legal right and for any injury to him resulting from such breach if the monetary value of the injury is incapable of exact calculation. Additionally, the Supreme Court in Yalaju-Amaye v. Associated Registered Engineering Contractors Ltd & anor [1990] NWLR (Pt. 145) 422; [1990] 6 SC 157 held that it is well settled law that general damages is the kind of damage which the law presumes to now flow from the wrong complained of. They are such as the Court will award in the circumstances of a case, in the absence of any yardstick with which to assess the award except by presuming the ordinary expectations of a reasonable man. See also Cameroon Airlines v. Otutuizu [2011] LPELR 827 (SC) and Atanda v. Afolabi [2018] LPELR-45961(CA). 128. The interference in the activities of the claimant in the manner that the defendants did is not only wrong but is an infringement of the right of the claimant, for which the claimant is entitled to recompense. This recompense I assess at N1 Million only representing the general damages suffered by the claimant. I so hold. 129. I cannot end this judgment without expressing the displeasure of this Court to the actions of the defendants, who over the years have shown a marked displeasure and hence disapproval to having trade unionism take place and flourish in especially the 1st defendant. Since CAC v. AUPCTRE [2004] 1 NLLR (Pt. 1) 1, the defendants have never hidden their dislike of trade unionism in their premises. Even when this Court ruled against them, they have managed to come up with something new and different. This is uncalled for. The defendants must come to terms with the reality that trade unionism has come to stay. And it is in their own interest to come to terms with and respect the laws governing it. The dislike they have for trade unions must cease. This Court will not sit by and allow them do as they wish. A word, it is said, is enough for the wise. 130. In all, the claimant’s case succeeds to the extent indicated in this judgment. Accordingly, I declare and order as follows: (a) It is declared that the defendants cannot dissolve, regulate, supervise, inquire into, probe and interfere with the existence, running, finances and investment activities of the claimant union. (b) It is declared that Exhibit B, the circular dated 11 January 2021 issued by the defendants was issued in bad faith, and has no binding legal effect on the claimant. (c) It is declared that the decisions made or conclusions reached against the claimant in the circular of 11 January 2021 are arbitrary, unwarranted, oppressive and amount to interference and so violates the claimant’s right to freely associate and organize as a trade union. (d) Exhibit B, the circular dated 11 January 2020, and Exhibits C, D and E, the three queries also dated 11 January 2021 are hereby declared null and void and are accordingly quashed. (e) The defendants, their agents, privies, servants or whomsoever are hereby restrained from usurping, disrupting, interfering with, or threatening to suspend, interfere in the activities of the claimant contrary to the provisions of the Constitution, and the Conditions of Service of the 1st defendant 2011 and the constitution of the claimant April 2015. (f) The defendants shall pay to the claimant the sum of One Million Naira (N1,000,000.00) only as general damages against the defendants jointly and severally. (g) Cost is assessed at Three Hundred Thousand Naira (N300,000.00) only payable by the defendants to the claimant. (h) The payments ordered in orders (f) and (g) to be paid under this judgment are to be paid within 30 days of this judgment, failing which they shall attract 10% simple interest per annum until fully paid. 131. Judgment is entered accordingly.