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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION HOLDEN AT ABUJA BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE B. B. KANYIP, PHD PRESIDENT, NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA DATE: 5 October 2021 SUIT NO. NICN/ABJ/304M/2020 BETWEEN Captain Benedict Olusoji - Judgment Creditor AND 1. The Nigerian Army 2. The Nigerian Army Council 3. Chief of Army Staff 4. Attorney General of the Federation & Minister of Justice - Judgment Debtors AND Central Bank of Nigeria - Garnishee REPRESENTATION Ayotunde Ogunleye, with Oluwafaseye Afolabi, for the judgment creditor. O. C. Ali, with Caleb Echoga for the 1st - 3rd judgment debtors. A. M. A. Adejunmobi, with F. M. Akinyeye, for the garnishee. No legal representation for the 4th judgment debtor. JUDGMENT INTRODUCTION 1. This Court on 27 May 2020 had delivered judgment in favor of the present judgment creditor in Suit No. NICN/ABJ/125/2018. In the said judgment, after declaring that the compulsory retirement of the judgment creditor by the 1st defendant is illegal, null and void, the 1st defendant was ordered to pay to the judgment creditor within 30 days of the judgment the sum of N75 Million only as general damages. The judgment creditor was not so paid, hence the instant garnishee proceeding, which, on the authority of Heritage Bank Ltd v. Inyerlagos Oil Ltd [2018] LPELR-44801(CA) and Polaris Bank v. Gumau & ors [2019] LPELR-47066(CA), I note is separate and distinct from the main action that yielded the judgment sought to be enforced. 2. On 27 October 2020, the judgment creditor accordingly filed a motion ex parte pursuant to section 83(1) and (2) of the Sheriffs and Civil Processes Act Cap S6 LFN 2004, Order II Rule 10, and Order VIII Rule 3 of the Judgment (Enforcement) Rules, Order 51 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017, Section 287(3) of the 1999 Constitution and under the inherent powers of this Court. 3. The judgment creditor prayed for the following orders: (1) A garnishee order nisi of this Honourable Court attaching the monies due to or lying to the credit of the 1st judgment debtor/respondent in the accounts of the garnishee, for the satisfaction of the sum of Seventy-Five Million Naira (75,000,000.00) only judgment debt due from the 1st judgment debtor/respondent to the judgment creditor/applicant; being an award of general damages which the National industrial Court of Nigeria, coram Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip, Ph.D; the President of the National industrial Court of Nigeria ordered in favour of the judgment creditor on 27th May, 2020 in Suit No: NICN/ABJ/125/2018; Captain Benedict Otusoji Akanni (Rtd.) v. The Nigerian Army &. 3 ors. (2) A garnishee order nisi of this Honourable Court attaching the monies due to or lying to the credit of the 1st judgment Debtor/Respondent in the accounts of the garnishee, for the satisfaction of the sum of Seven Million, Five Hundred Thousand Naira (N7,500,000.00) only judgment debt due from the 1st judgment debtor/respondent to the judgment creditor/applicant, being a simple interest rate of 10% per annum for the first year on the awarded general damages of Seventy-Five Million Naira (N75,000,000.00) in Suit No: NICN/ABJ/125/2018; Captain Benedict Otusoji Akanni (Rtd.) v. The Nigerian Army & 3 ors, which is for the failure of the 1st judgment debtor/respondent to liquidate the judgment sum of Seventy-Five Million Naira (N75,000,000.00) within 30 days from 27th May, 2020 when the judgment was delivered by the Honourable Court. (3) An order of this Honourable Court that the garnishee appear before this Honourable Court on a named date to show cause why the Order should not be made absolute upon them for the payment of the total sum of Eighty-Two Million, Five Hundred Thousand Naira only (N82,500,000.00) to the judgment creditor/applicant, being the debt due, owed or accruing from the garnishee to the 1st judgment debtor/respondent or so much thereof as will satisfy the sum of Seventy-Five Million Naira (N75,000,000.00) only and Seven Million, Five Hundred Thousand Naira (N75,000,000.00), being the outstanding general damages/judgment debt and the simple interest rate of 10% per annum for the first year on the awarded general damages due under the judgment entered for the judgment creditor/applicant on the 27th May, 2020 in Suit No: NICN/ABJ /125/2018; Captain Benedict Otusoji Akanni (Rtd.) v. The Nigerian Army & 3 ors. (4) An order of this Honourable Court consequent upon the above that the garnishee pay to the judgment creditor/applicant’s Account No: 6567231014 with Account Name: Akanni Benedict Otusoji which is domiciled with First City Monument Bank (FCMB), such money in the account of the 1st judgment debtor/respondent or so much thereof as will satisfy the debt due under the judgment debt with interest accrued thereof. (5) And for such further or other order(s) as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances. 4. Satisfied that the ex parte application had merit, this Court on 2 December 2020 granted the order nisi against the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) as the garnishee asking it to at the next adjourned date show cause vide an affidavit sworn to by a senior staff of the garnishee bank why the order nisi should not be made absolute. The garnishee on 7 January 2021 filed an affidavit of cause, which the Court adjudged incompetent, and hence struck it out, as it did not keep to the terms of the order nisi. Another affidavit of cause filed on 15 February 2021 was equally struck out. It was on 5 March 2021, that the garnishee filed an affidavit of cause that met the terms of the order nisi. To the affidavit of cause of 5 March 2021, the judgment creditor filed on 21 June 2021 his reaction affidavit. 5. Reacting to the order nisi, the 1st to 3rd judgment debtors and the garnishee bank respectively filed processes that oppose the order nisi. In both processes, they asked that the order nisi be set aside. The 1st to 3rd judgment debtors’ motion was filed on 8 February 2021, while the garnishee bank’s preliminary objection was filed on 5 March 2021. The judgment creditor opposed both processes. I shall accordingly take the arguments of the parties in respect of these two processes one after the other. THE 1ST TO 3RD JUDGMENT DEBTORS’ MOTION ON NOTICE The Submissions of the 1st to 3rd Judgment Debtors 6. The 1st to 3rd judgment debtors’ motion on notice is brought pursuant to sections 6(6)(b) and 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution and the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. In the main, the 1st to 3rd judgment debtors are praying this Court for: (1) An order setting aside the order nisi made by this Honourable Court on the 2nd of December, 2020, against the judgement debtors/applicants for want of jurisdiction. (2) And for such further or other order(s) as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances. 7. The grounds of the application are: (1) This Honourable Court delivered judgment on the 27th May, 2020, against the judgment debtors/applicants in Suit No: NICN/ABJ/125/2018 between Captain Benedict Olusoji Akanni v. Nigerian Army & ors. (2) Dissatisfied with the judgment of the Court, the judgement debtors/applicants filed a notice of appeal before the Court of Appeal on the 26th June, 2020, challenging the said judgment of the Honourable Court delivered on the 27th May, 2020, against the judgment debtors/applicants and the said notice of appeal was served on the judgement creditor/respondent. (3) The judgment debtors/applicants have complied and transmitted record of appeal on the 3rd of September, 2020. The said record of appeal was served on the judgment creditor/respondent. (4) Appeal has been entered and Appeal No has been given as Appeal No: CA/ABJ/CV/768/2020. (5) The judgment debtor/applicant filed an application for stay of execution of the judgment of this Honourable Court delivered on the 27th May, 2020 at the Court of Appeal on the 19th day of January, 2021. (6) The judgment creditor/respondent through a motion on notice applied to the National Industrial Court for an order nisi. Same was granted by this Court on the 2nd December, 2020 and the Court made an order nisi against the judgment debtor/applicant and the garnishee for the judgment sum. (7) The judgment creditor/respondent concealed facts and failed to inform this Honourable Court that there is a pending appeal against the judgment of this Honourable Court at the Court of Appeal. (8) The said order granting the garnishee order nisi is a nullity as this Honourable Court has been seized of jurisdiction to entertain the matter, since there is a pending appeal at the Court of Appeal. (9) The filing of the motion ex-parte for an order nisi is an abuse of court process. (10) This Honourable Court has the inherent power and jurisdiction to set aside its order of 2nd day of December, 2020. (11) It is in the overriding interest of justice that this application be granted. 8. The 1st to 3rd judgment debtors submitted a sole issue for determination i.e. whether this Honourable Court has the power to grant the reliefs sought in this application in the circumstance. 9. To the 1st to 3rd judgment debtors, the principle has been laid down in a plethora of cases in respect of this type of application to set aside an order, ruling or judgment of a court. That in Tomtec (Nig) Ltd v. FHA [2009] 18 NWLR (Pt. 116) 382 the Supreme Court stated thus: Court of record have (sic) the inherent jurisdiction to set aside their judgments/decisions/orders, in appropriate cases, or under certain circumstances, which include when: (a) The judgment is obtained by fraud or deceit either in the court or of one or more of the parties. (b) The judgment is a nullity. (c) It is obvious that the court was misled into giving the judgment under a mistaken belief that the parties consented to it. (d) The Judgment was given in the absence of jurisdiction. (e) The proceedings adopted was such as to deprive the decision or judgment of the character of a legitimate adjudication. (f) Where there is fundamental irregularity. (Emphasis is the 1st to 3rd judgment debtors’.) Also referred to the Court are: Igwe v. Kalu [2002] 14 NWLR (Pt. 787) 435, Odofin v. Otugbanji [1996] 3 NWLR (Pt. 435) 126 and Alawiye v. Ogunsanya [2003] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1348) 520. 10. That in the light of the above, this Court has the powers to set aside its order nisi. That the order nisi was given in the absence of jurisdiction. This is because the judgement debtors/applicants have already filed an appeal at the Court of Appeal. Furthermore, the appeal filed by the judgment debtors/applicants is also backed by filing of an application for stay of execution of the judgment of this Honourable Court as deposed to in the affidavit in support of this application. The 1st to 3rd judgment debtors referred to Nigerian Breweries Plc v. Dumuje & anor [2015] LPELR-25583(CA), which, relying on Denton-West v. Muoma [2007] LPELR-8172(CA), agreed with the general view that where there is a pending application for stay of execution, especially in a superior Court, it will be absurd for a party to execute the same judgment by way of a garnishee proceeding on the premise that it is an independent proceeding. 11. To the 1st to 3rd judgment debtors, the purpose and/or the principle behind stay of execution of a judgment lies in recognition of the court’s duty to preserve the subject matter (res) of the action and thereby ensure that the appeal is not otherwise rendered nugatory if it is successful. It is thus their submission that if this Court should make the order nisi granted absolute, it will totally render the appeal futile, ineffectual, and destitute of constraining force and vitality. 12. On the issue of when an appeal is deemed filed and entered, they referred to Nigerian Navy v. Labinjo [2012] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1328) 56 SC at 78, where the Supreme Court held: appeal shall be deemed to have been brought when the Notice of Appeal has been filed in the registry of the lower court. Thus an appeal is deemed brought before the appellate court when the Notice of appeal is filed and before the record of appeal is compiled and transmitted to the Appellate court. on the other hand, an appeal is said to be entered when the record of Appeal is transmitted to the appellate Court and received by it and entered in the cause list of the court, to be dealt with accordingly to the rules of the Court. 13. That there is a pending appeal at the Court of Appeal, Abuja Division, wherein the judgment creditor/respondent in this matter is aware and was served with all the court processes, referring to the supporting affidavit. That the motion ex-parte used by the judgment creditor/respondent was brought in bad faith as he did not bring before the notice of this Court the fact that there is a pending appeal at the Court of Appeal. That an appeal is a constitutional right, and its prosecution must not be stultified by the trial court or by any of the litigants to render the appellate court with a fait accompli, citing Julius Berger (Nig) Plc v. T. R. Comm. Bank [2007] 1 NWLR (Pt. 1016) 540 at 550. That Nigerian Breweries Plc v. Dumuje [2016] I NWLR (Pt. 1515) 536 at 601 held that a judgment debtor is free to challenge an order made before the court that made the order by filing an affidavit supported by exhibits that an appeal have been lodged by the judgment debtor against the said judgment or ruling. 14. The 1st to 3rd judgment debtors then submitted that the garnishee proceeding is a nullity and an abuse of court process, which touches on the jurisdiction of this Court, citing Abubakar v. Unipetrol Plc [2002] 8 NWLR (Pt. 769) 233 and Ene v. Asikpo [2010] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1203) 513. Accordingly, they submitted that the Court should uphold their submission and set aside the order made on 2 December 2020 so that the proceedings at the Court of Appeal will not be stultified and the appellate court left with a fait accompli. 15. Furthermore, that once a notice of appeal is filed and served on the other party, especially where the applicant is challenging a money judgment, the appellate court will then be in total control of the matter and the other party and the lower court are prohibited from tempering with the res, referring to Julius Berger (Nig.) Plc v. T. R. Comm. Bank (supra). That in the instant case, an appeal has been entered and all the processes filed at the Court of Appeal were served on the judgment creditors/respondents before they filed this application for the order nisi, which was granted by this Court on 2 December 2020. That the order made being a nullity is not only fundamentally defective, it is an abuse of court process, citing Labour Party v. INEC [2009] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1137) 337. That it will be safer for this Court not to proceed in granting the order absolute; for doing so will amount to a nullity or a void act. Rather, the appropriate thing to do is for the Court to set aside the order and not to involve in a voyage of discovery. 16. The 1st to 3rd judgment debtors proceeded to define what an abuse of court process is and then itemized the circumstances that give rise to an abuse of court process as laid down in Saraki v. Kotoye [1992] 9 NWLR (Pt. 264) at 188 - 189. Their argument is that an abuse of court process consists of an improper use of the judicial process or processes already issued to the irritation or annoyance of the opponent. As such, the intention of the judgment creditor in the circumstances of this application is to harass, irritate and annoy the judgment debtor and to interfere with the administration of justice, relying on G. S. & D. Ind. Ltd v. NAFDAC [2012] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1294) - the page is not supplied. That this Court has the duty to stop such abuse by the judgment creditor when there is a pending appeal at the Court of Appeal, which involves the same parties on the same subject matter. That the fact that there is already a notice of appeal and the appeal has been entered at the Court of Appeal means that this Court lacks the jurisdiction to have made any order or entertain any proceeding in this matter, referring to Madukolu v. Nkemdili [1962] 1 SCNL 341. 17. They concluded by urging the Court to set aside the order nisi for being an abuse of court process and fundamentally defective. The Submissions of the Judgment Creditor 18. The judgment creditor/respondent, in opposition to the motion of the 1st to 3rd judgment debtors, filed a 9-paragraph counter-affidavit with an accompanying written address. He also raised a sole issue for determination i.e. whether the reliefs sought by the judgment debtors/applicants in this application ought to be granted by this Honourable Court. He answered in the negative. 19. To the judgment creditor, Tomtec (Nig.) Ltd v. FHA [2009] 18 NWLR (Pt. 1173) 358, cited by the applicants, is not applicable to this garnishee proceedings. That the exceptional circumstances as held by the Court in the said case does not arise in this circumstance. That in the case referred to above, it was held that the Court is empowered to set aside their own judgments or orders when such judgment or orders are either obtained by fraud, deceit, or if the judgment or order was given without jurisdiction. That as at 2 December 2020, when the garnishee order nisi was made, this Court was not mislead into giving the garnishee order nisi, and the Court had the requisite jurisdiction to give the garnishee order nisi. Furthermore, that there was no fundamental irregularity as regards the garnishee order nisi. 20. Additionally, that the garnishee order nisi was obtained after the judgment creditor filed an ex-parte application in compliance with the provisions of Order 51(2) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017. In similar vein, the garnishee order nisi cannot be a nullity, as there is no judgment of the Court of Appeal or Supreme Court setting it aside. Similarly, that this Court was not misled into giving the garnishee order nisi, neither was the proceedings adopted an illegal one. 21. Furthermore, that the Court was with jurisdiction as at the time the order nisi was obtained. That garnishee proceedings is one of the means by which the judgment of a court (as in this case, the judgment of 27 May 2020) may be enforced in accordance with the provisions of the 1999 Constitution, and it may be instituted where judgment has been given for the payment of a sum of money by the 1st judgment debtor/respondent and such judgment debtor’s money is in the possession, or under the control of, or owing by another. In such circumstances such money may be attached in satisfaction of the judgment debt, referring to UBA Plc v. Magama & anor [2013] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1379) at 56 and Governor of Oyo State v. Akinyemi [2003] 1 NWLR (Pt. 800) 1 at 9. Therefore, that the judgment debtors/applicants misapplied the case of Tomtec (Nig.) Ltd v. FHA (supra), which case cannot be applied to this garnishee proceedings, urging the Court to so hold. 22. The judgment creditor urged the Court to note that the judgment debtors/applicants filed before the Court of Appeal a motion on 5 October 2020, (6 months after this Court delivered judgment in Suit No: NICN/ABJ/125/2018) wherein they prayed the Court of Appeal for an extension of time to appeal the judgment of this Court delivered on 27 May 2020. The said motion has neither been heard by the Court of Appeal nor has it been ruled upon. That even though a notice of appeal has been filed, the law is also clear that a mere filing of an appeal or a notice of appeal does not operate as a stay of execution. That the notice of appeal has been filed since 26 June 2020 and till this very moment, the appellants have not taken any further step(s) in the appeal to ensure that the appeal is heard. The judgment creditor referred to section 47 of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Act 2006, which provides that an appeal shall not operate as a stay of execution of the judgment of this Court. That it has also been held in a plethora of cases that filing an appeal or a notice of appeal does not operate as a stay of execution, citing Josiah Cornelius Ltd v. Ezenwa [1996] 4 NWLR (Pt. 443) 391 SC at 410, National Insurance Commission v. Oyefesobi & ors [2013] LPELR-20660(CA) and Mohammed v. Otawunmi & ors [1993] LPELR-1898(SC). 23. The judgement creditor went on that the Rules of this Court are in tandem with his submission as well as the judicial pronouncements referred to this Court. That even the Rules of this Court forbid the action of the judgment debtors as regards the notice of appeal, referring to Order 64 (14) (3) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017 (NICN Rules 2017), which provides that: “An appeal to the Court of Appeal from the decision of the Court shall not operate as a stay of execution of the judgment order, rulings or proceedings of the Court… Based on the foregoing, the judgment creditor submitted and urged the Court to hold that Nigerian Breweries Plc v. Dumuje & anor [2015] LPELR-25583(CA) cited by the judgment debtors/applicants cannot be applicable to this garnishee proceedings as constituted. 24. In another vein, the judgment creditor informed the Court that the judgment debtors/applicants have before the Court of Appeal a motion seeking the leave of the Court of Appeal to file an appeal against the judgment of 27 May 2020, which motion was merely filed and dumped at the Court of Appeal, as the judgment debtors/applicants have not taken any step to ensure the motion is heard. That it is when the Court of Appeal has given the leave to appeal the judgment of this Court delivered on 27 May 2020 that the judgment debtors/applicants have a valid appeal to start with. 25. The judgment creditor then submitted that the Court should take judicial notice of the fact that the judgment debtors/applicants filed a motion for stay of execution more than a month after this Court made the garnishee order nisi, and it is very unthinkable for them to expect this Court to set aside the garnishee order nisi because they were not diligent in their duties as counsel to their client. 26. Te judgment creditor proceeded to draw the Court’s attention to Exhibit A3 attached to the judgment debtors/applicants’ affidavit in support of their application. That it was alleged that Exhibit A3 is a letter with which the Record of Appeal was forwarded to the judgment creditor/respondent. That an observation of what Exhibit A3 is will reveal that it is indeed a letter addressed to the Chief Registrar of the Court of Appeal and not the judgment creditor/respondent and neither was the judgment creditor/respondent copied in the said letter. That this action of the judgment debtors/applicants is unfortunate. The judgment creditor then admonished them to honour the oath administered and desist from presenting false information to the Court. That what this means is that had the judgment debtors/applicants not been served with the garnishee order nisi, they will not have woken from their slumber and do the needful. That the law is that equity aids the vigilant and not the indolent. 27. The judgment creditor urged the Court to note that the operative word in the above-quoted provision of the Rules of this Court and the NIC Act 2006 ‘shall’, which Corporate Ideal Ins. Ltd. v. Ajaokuta Steel Co. Ltd [2014] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1405) 165 SC at 193 held to connote imperativeness, mandatory, duty and command. 28. In conclusion, the judgment creditor urged the Court to discountenance the motion of the judgment debtors filed on 8 February 2021 in its entirety. The 1st to 3rd Judgment Debtors’ Reply on Points of Law 29. In replying on points of law, the 1st to 3rd judgment debtors adopted the sole issue for determination to wit: whether this Honourable Court has the power to grant this application. The 1st to 3rd respondents then proceeded to rehash the arguments they already advanced on the issue. It will be idle/pointless repeating them here. 30. The garnishee did not react to the 1st to 3rd defendants’ motion given that as garnishee, it has no say regarding the motion. THE GARNISHEE’S PRELIMINARY OBJECTION The Submissions of the Garnishee 31. The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), the garnishee bank, filed a notice of preliminary objection pursuant to section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act Cap S6 LFN 2004, section 251 of the 1999 Constitution, Order VIII Rule 2 (A and B) of the Judgments (Enforcement) Rules and under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. The garnishee prays the Court for the following reliefs: (a) An order setting aside the garnishee order nisi dated 2nd December, 2020 issued by this Honourable Court against the garnishee/applicant. (b) An order discharging the garnishee order nisi issued against the garnishee/applicant (Central Bank of Nigeria) on the 2nd December, 2020. (c) And for such further order or orders as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstance. 32. The grounds upon which the objection is made ore as follows: (i) The garnishee/applicant is an agency of the Federal Government of Nigeria and the condition precedent to instituting garnishee proceedings against a Federal Government agency was not complied with by the judgment creditor/respondent. (ii) The judgment creditor/respondent did not obtain the consent of the Honourable Attorney-General of the Federation as required by section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act 2004 before commencing the garnishee proceedings against the garnishee/applicant. (iii) The Judgment creditor/respondent having failed to comply with the condition precedent by obtaining the consent of the Honourable Attorney-General of the Federation before instituting the garnishee proceeding against the garnishee/applicant, this Honourable Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain same. (iv) Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal High Court on matters that relate to the Federal Government and its agencies. (v) The garnishee/applicant being an agency of the Federal Government of Nigeria, the Federal High Court ought to assume jurisdiction in the subject of this suit. (vi) This Honourable Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings that led to the orders made on the 2nd December, 2020 against the garnishee/applicant. (vii) Order VIII Rule 2 (a & b) of the Judgments (Enforcement) Rules which relates to the appropriate venue for instituting garnishee proceedings specifically provides that garnishee proceedings should be instituted by the judgment creditor in the Court where the judgment debtor can sue the garnishee for the recovery of the judgment sum attached from its account. (viii) In the instant case, the garnishee/applicant being an agency of the Federal Government of Nigeria, the proper court where the judgment debtor/respondent can sue the garnishee/applicant for the recovery of the sum attached from its account is a Federal High Court and not this Honourable Court. (x) The court proceedings which led to the garnishee order nisi made by this Honourable Court on 2nd December, 2020 offends the provisions of section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, Cap S6, LFN, 2004 and section 251 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) and Order VIII Rule 2 (A and B) of the Judgments (Enforcement) Rules. (ix) Order of court made without jurisdiction is a nullity. (x) This Honourable Court has powers to set aside its judgment given without jurisdiction. 33. The garnishee submitted two issues for the determination of this Court, namely: (1) Whether given the fact that the garnishee/applicant being on agency of the Federal Government of Nigeria and the fact that leave or consent of the Honourable Attorney-General of the Federation was not obtained by the judgment creditor/respondent before instituting the garnishee proceedings rob this Honourable Court jurisdiction to entertain the garnishee proceeding against the garnishee/applicant. (2) Whether given the fact that the garnishee order nisi issued on the 2nd December, 2020 was without jurisdiction, this Honourable Court has power to set aside same. 34. In arguing issue (1), the garnishee/applicant relied on the 9-paragraphed affidavit in support of its application. The garnishee then submitted that given section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act 2004, section 251 of the 1999 Constitution, Order VIII Rule 2 (a and b) of the Judgments (Enforcement) Rules and judicial pronouncements in respect of same, this Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain the present garnishee proceeding against the garnishee/applicant (CBN). 35. To the garnishee, the issue of jurisdiction is very fundamental, a threshold issue and a life line for continuing any proceedings, citing Util & ors v. Onoyivwe & ors [1991] l NWLR (Pt. 166) 166; [1991] 1 SCNJ 25, Cotecna Int’l v. IMB Ltd [2006] 9 NWLR (Pt. 985) 275 at 297, SPDCN Ltd v. Goodluck [2008] 14 NWLR (Pt. I107) 294 at 309, Inakoju v. Adeleke [2007] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1025) 423 at 588, Okorocha v. UBA Plc [2019] All FWLR (Pt. 999) 419 at 435 and Madukolu v. Nkemdilim [1962] 2 All NLR 581 at 589. 36. That in this instant case, the judgment creditor/respondent failed abysmally to obtain leave or consent of the Honourable Attorney General of the Federation before commencing the garnishee proceedings against the garnishee/applicant as required by section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act Cap S6 LFN 2004, which provides thus: (l) Where money liable to be attached by garnishee proceedings is in the custody or under the control of a public officer in his official capacity or in custodial legis, the order nisi shall not be mode under the provisions of the last proceeding section unless consent to such attachment is first obtained from the appropriate officer in the case of money in the custody or control of a public officer or of the court in the case of money in custodial legis, as the case may be. (2) In such cases the order of notice must be served on such public officer or the registrar of the court, as the case may be. (3) In this section, ‘appropriate officer’ means — (a) In relation to money which is in the custody of a public officer who holds a public office in the public service of the Federation, the Attorney General of the Federation. (b) In relation to money which is in the custody of a public officer who holds a public office in the public service of the State, the Attorney General of the State. 37. Thus, the judgement creditor/respondent having failed to fulfill the condition precedent before commencing the garnishee proceedings against the garnishee/applicant, this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the garnishee proceeding against the garnishee/applicant BECAUSE: (i) there is a feature in the garnishee proceeding initiated by the judgment creditor/respondent which prevents this Court from exercising jurisdiction in the matter. (ii) the garnishee proceeding was initiated by the judgment creditor/respondent without regard to due process of law and fulfillment of condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court, referring to Bronik Motors Ltd v. Wema Bank Ltd [1983] I SCNLR 296 and Okoya v. Santilli [1990] 2 NWLR (Pt. 131) 172 where it was held that when a court does not have jurisdiction to hear a matter, the entire proceedings, no matter how well conducted and decided, would amount to a nullity. The garnishee also place reliance on paragraphs 5 of the affidavit in support of this application where it was copiously stated that the judgment creditor/respondent did not obtain the consent/leave of the Attorney-General of the Federation before commencing the garnishee proceedings against the garnishee/applicant which is a public institutional manned by public servants. 38. The garnishee went on that section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act has been subjected to judicial interpretation in a plethora of cases such as CBN v. J. I. Nwanyanwu & Sons Enterprises Nig. Ltd [2014] LPELR-227(CA), which held that garnishee proceedings conducted by the court without obtaining leave of the Federal Attorney General against the appellant, a public body manned by public servants, was a nullity. 39. The garnishee continued that its legal status as to whether it is a public institution manned by public officers is not in doubt, citing section 18 of the Interpretation Act 2004, section 318(l)(c, e & g) of the 1999 Constitution, and FGN v. Zebra Energy Ltd [2002] 18 NWLR (Pt. 798) l62 where the apex court held that the word “public officer” or “any person” in public office not only refers to natural person sued in their personal names but that they extend to public bodies, artificial persons, institutions or persons sued by their official names or titles. The garnishee then submitted that, being a Federal establishment created by an Act of parliament to perform public duties as provided for by the Central Bank Act 2007 and the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act Cap B3 LFN 2004 (BOFIA), it is a public officer requiring the leave or consent of the Attorney General of the Federation before garnishee proceedings con be commenced against it, praying the Court to so hold. 40. The garnishee then stressed that there is nothing to show that the judgment creditor/respondent did obtain leave or consent of the Attorney General of the Federation before the garnishee order nisi of 2 December 2020 was made by this Court against the garnishee/applicant. That failure of the judgment creditor/respondent to obtain the statutory consent or leave of the Attorney General of the Federation as required by section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act Cap S6 LFN 2004 (SCPA) before the garnishee order nisi dated 2 December 2020 was made by this Court against the garnishee/applicant which is a public service body manned by public officers goes to the competence of this suit as it has been held that proceedings conducted by court without jurisdiction is a nullity, praying the Court to so hold. The garnishee referred to Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (supra), CBN v. James Ejembi Okefe [2015] LPELR-24825(CA), CBN v. Amao [2010] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1219) 271, CBN v. Hydro Air Pyt Ltd [2014] I6 NWLR (Pt. 1434) 482 and CBN v. Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria & 10 ors [2017] All FWLR (Pt. 900) at 422. 41. The garnishee then submitted that in line with the above judicial authorities, the judgment creditor/respondent having foiled to obtain leave or consent of the Attorney-General of the Federation before commencing the garnishee proceeding, the entire proceeding is incurably contaminated since you cannot put something on nothing and expect it to stand. It will surely collapse, praying the Court to so hold; and relying on UAC v. Macfoy [1961] 3 WLR (PC) 1405 at 1409 and CBN v. Alhaji Mohammed Kakuri [2016] LPELR-41468(CA). 42. The garnishee said it is not unmindful of the decision of the Supreme Court on the issue of consent vis-a-vis issuance of garnishee order nisi in CBN v. Interstella Communications Ltd [2018] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1618) 294. That the decision must be understood within its context. The garnishee proceeded to state the facts and holding of the case. To it, judgment was on 6/11/2017 entered against the Federal Government of Nigeria and Attorney General of the Federation who were sued as 1st and 2nd defendants of the Federal High Court, Umuahia Division. The plaintiff’s claims were in respect of breach of contract and damages of breach. The judgment sums were for the sums of N23 Billion and US $48 Million respectively. The parties later negotiated the judgment sum and arrived at the sum of N12 Billion Naira and this was reduced into a consent judgment in 2009. The said amount was partially liquidated by 30% by the 1st and 2nd defendants and upon their default in repaying the balance of the judgment debt; the plaintiff commenced a garnishee proceeding against the defendants of the trial court. The CBN was the garnishee in the proceedings. Upon being served with Form 26, CBN did not file on affidavit showing cause. Rather several grounds of objection were raised by it against the garnishee order nisi, one of which was that the consent of the Attorney-General of the Federation was not obtained under section 84 of SCPA. The trial judge dismissed the objection and same was upheld by the Court of Appeal. 43. On further appeal to the apex court, one of the issues for determination was whether Central Bank of Nigeria is a public officer and hence the consent of the Attorney-General of the Federation was required under section 84 of SCPA for the attachment of funds in CBN custody in a garnishee proceeding. In resolving this particular issue, the apex court, per Ogunbiyi JSC in a well-reasoned judgment considered the provisions of section 318 of the 1999 Constitution dealing with the definition of a ‘public officer’, section 84 of SCPA, sections 2(e) and 36 of the CBN Act as well as the cases like Onjewu v. KSMCI [2003] 10 NWLR (Pt. 827), CBN v. Adedeji (supra), Ibrahim v. JSC (supra), Purification Technique (Nig) Ltd v. AG Lagos State, among others and held inter alia at pages 344 - 346: The crux of issue 4 is whether the lower court was right when if held that the appellant herein is not a public officer and hence the AGF’s consent as required under section 84(l) of SCPA does not apply to the case herein. ……………………… It should be noted clearly that the principle underlying securing the AGF’s consent as prescribed in section 84 SCPA is to avoid embarrassment on him of not having the prior knowledge that funds earmarked for some purposes have been diverted in satisfaction of a judgment debt which the government may not know anything about. See the persuasive authority of the case of Onjewu v. KSMCI (2003) 10 NWI.R (Pt. 827) 40 @ 89. The learned counsel for the appellant made reference exhaustively to section 84(l) of SCPA and submitted emphatically that the Attorney-General of the Federation is the appropriate officer from whom consent must be obtained in respect of money in the custody of a public officer in the public service of the Federation. Counsel submits further that the appellant as well as its officials have been held to be public officers and relied on the case of CBN v. Adedeji (supra) wherein the lower court followed the decision in Ibrahim v. JSC under reference. For purpose of understanding, it is expedient that the provision of section 84(l) of the SCPA is hereby reproduced as follows; - ……….. I have indicated earlier in the course of this judgment that the case under consideration herein is very peculiar and the circumstance cannot be filled within the general interpretation of section 84 of SCPA. Again the case of Onjewu Vs KSMCI (supra) is well under reference. Furthermore, and as rightly submitted on behalf of the 1st and 2nd Respondents, certain qualifying conditions must be met for a case to come under the purview of section 84 of SCPA. In other words, justice would demand that the AGF must be a neutral/nominal party in the transactions and proceedings giving rise to the application for order nisi and not him being the debtor. It is well and explicit on the facts of this case that the AGF has all along held out himself to be an active participant in the several stages of negotiations, transactions and even part payment of the debt owed. Paragraph 13 of the affidavit in support of the AGF’s application of page 76 of the record is under reference as admission against interest. In the circumstance, the AGF cannot be a neutral/nominal party in this case. It is right to say that by implication section 84 of the SCPA which stipulates ‘consent’ had already been fully complied with as the government itself negotiated the terms, and took steps to settle the debts, before it later reneged on full satisfaction thereof. The most potent factor which makes section 84(1) of the SCPA inapplicable herein is because the Attorney-General is the debtor and has been sued in that capacity. With the AGF being the judgment debtor therefore, will it not be absurd to require that his consent should be sought especially having admitted that he had taken the move by paying part of the debt in questions? The appellant’s contention, understanding and interpretation of section 84(1) of SCPA is a total misconception, I hold. The interpretation in my view would not run against the application of natural justice, which could not have been the intendment of the legislature. In the present transaction, and as rightly submitted by the 1st and 2nd respondents’ counsel, the appellant is only a banker to the 3rd and 4th respondents based on the consent of the 4th respondents… ………………… Again and contrary to the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant, the consent of the AGF had all along been obtained. Consequently the garnishee proceedings against the Appellant was rightly commenced and I so hold. The other leg of the argument is where the appellant’s counsel holds out the CBN as a public officer and relied on the case of Ibrahim v. JSC (supra) in particular. In the case under consideration, I have ruled that the relationship between the appellant and the 3rd and 4th respondents is that of banker and customer relationship. In other words as rightly argued by the 1st and 2nd respondents’ counsel, the appellant is not a public officer in the context of section 84 SCPA, when regard is had to the history of this appeal… (Emphasis is the garnishee’s). 44. In the light of the above, the garnishee submitted that the above decision must be situated against its own peculiar facts. That the apex court made it clear that the ratio in the case is not of a general application but peculiar to the facts of the case. In other words, the apex court did not hold that the consent of the Attorney-General is no longer required under section 84 of SCPA where the CBN is the garnishee, praying the Court to so hold. 45. That in the instant case and as deposed to in paragraph 5 of the affidavit in support of the application, there is nothing to show that the judgment creditor/respondent sought and obtained leave of the Attorney-General of the Federation before instituting garnishee proceedings against the garnishee/applicant, which is clearly a public service body manned by public servants. This makes the garnishee proceedings a nullity in law. That it is trite law that the court does not, and ought not to, give judgment to an incompetent action if the condition precedent to assuming jurisdiction has not been complied with, citing Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (supra). That failure to obtain the consent of the Attorney-General of the Federation by the judgment creditor/respondent makes the whole garnishee proceedings a nullity, praying the Court to so hold. The garnishee referred to Dr Peter Ayodele Fayose v. EFCC & anor [2018] LPELR-46474(CA) delivered by the Court of Appeal, Ibadan Division on 20 June 2018 after the decision of the Supreme court in CBN v. Interstella Communications Ltd & ors (supra); and also Kogi LGC v. Qumecs (Nig) Ltd [2019] All FWLR (Pt. 990) 1370 and UBA Plc v. Access Bank & anor [2018] LPELR-44058(CA) where the Court of Appeal again held that the consent of the Honourable Attorney-General of the Federation or State is required before the commencement of garnishee proceeding against the garnishee when the money sought to be attached is in custody of a public officer. 46. The garnishee went on that the Court of Appeal, Abuja Division, also held in recent decisions delivered after Interstella, specifically in the unreported cases of CBN v. James Boko Appeal No. CA/A/18012017 delivered on 12 February 2021, CBN v. Gabriel Oodo & anor Appeal No. CA/A/1185/2018 delivered on 15 July 2020 Unity Bank Plc v. Igolo Construction Co. Ltd & CBN Appeal No.CA/A/311/2019 delivered on 21 May 2020 and CBN v. Umar Sajo & 2 ors Appeal No. CA/YL/149/2019 delivered on 17 July 2020, that the instant garnishee/applicant (CBN) is a public officer, which makes obtaining the consent of the Honourable Attorney General of the Federation mandatory before funds in its custody can be attached via garnishee proceeding. The garnishee then prayed the Court to set aside the garnishee order nisi dated 2 December 2020 for lack of jurisdiction because the judgment creditor/respondent failed to obtain the consent of the Honourable Attorney-General of the Federation as required by section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act 2004 before the commencement of the garnishee proceedings against the garnishee/applicant. 47. As a corollary to the above, the garnishee submitted that under our legal system a combination of factors confer jurisdiction on the Court. These include the enabling law, parties, subject matter and the territory where the cause of action arose. That it is not in contention that although garnishee proceedings is a mode of judgment enforcement, it is a suit distinct in all entirety from the suit in which the judgment to be enforced was delivered. That the judgment creditor/respondent knows without any modicum of doubt that the garnishee/applicant (CBN) is on agency of the Federal Government of Nigeria. Thus, by virtue of section 251(1)(d) of the 1999 Constitution and Order VIII Rule 2(a) and (b) of the Judgments (Enforcement) Rules any action against the garnishee/applicant relating to banking must be commenced at the Federal High Court and not before this Court, citing CBN v. Auto Import Export [2013] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1337) 80 at 133 - 134. 48. That in the instant case, the only reason why the judgment creditor/respondent seeks to enforce the judgment against the garnishee/applicant via garnishee proceeding is on the presumption that being the apex Bank the garnishee/applicant must be a banker to the judgment debtor/respondent. That on this basis, by virtue of section 251(1)(d) of the 1999 Constitution, the Federal High Court ought to assume jurisdiction in respect of this suit. 49. Furthermore, that in Sunday Gbagbarigha v. Adikumo Toruemi & anor [2012] LPELR-15535(SC), the Supreme Court in determining the capacity of a court to assume jurisdiction over a matter put the law this way: All courts and their jurisdiction are provided by the Constitution, and/or relevant State legislation. Jurisdiction is a question of law. It is fundamental in all proceedings. Where a court does not have jurisdiction over a matter before it and it proceeds to hear and determine the matter, the entire proceedings no matter how well conducted would amount to a nullity. This is so since judgment given without jurisdiction creates no legal obligation and any rights on any of the parties. 50 Positing further, and in line with the above, the garnishee submitted that there is no conflict whatsoever in the provision of section 251(1)(d) of the 1999 Constitution and Order VIII Rule 2 (a) and (b) of the Judgments (Enforcement) Rules, which relates to the appropriate venue for institution of garnishee proceedings. That deducing from this, it is clear and unambiguous that the right venue for instituting any garnishee proceedings against the instant garnishee/applicant is the court where the garnishee/applicant can be sued for any matter relating to it in the course of discharging its statutorily conferred banking duties as provided for in section 251(l)(d) of the 1999 Constitution. That the garnishee/applicant being an agency of the Federal Government, it flows naturally by the provision of section 251(l)(d) of the 1999 Constitution that only the Federal High Court to the exclusion of any other court has the jurisdiction to entertain this garnishee proceeding against the garnishee/applicant. In the light of the above, does this Court have jurisdiction to entertain this garnishee proceeding against the garnishee/applicant, which is on agency of the Federal Government of Nigeria as captured under the provision of section 251(l)(d) of the l999 Constitution? The garnisheed answered in negative; and then submitted that by the combined effect of section 251(l)(d) of the 1999 Constitution and Order VIII Rule 2(a( and (b) of the Judgments (Enforcement) Rules, the proper court to assume jurisdiction in this matter is a Federal High Court, praying the Court to so hold. 51. Advancing further, the garnishee submitted that section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act Cap S6 LFN 2004, section 251(1)(d) of the 1999 Constitution and Order VIII Rule 2(a) and (b) of the Judgments (Enforcement) Rules are clear and unambiguous. That it has been held that when words used in a statute are clear and unambiguous, the word must be interpreted in its literal, grammatical or ordinary meaning without any sentiment, decoration or quibble. That a court should not and must not read into any enactment words which are not to be found there, citing UBA Plc v. Akparabong Community Bank Nig Ltd [2005] 35 WRN 98, Ogunade v. Fadayiro [l972] 8 - 9 SC 1, NURM v. NRC [1996] 6 NWLR (Pt. 473) 490 at 503, Osho v. Phillips [1972] 4 SC 252 and Ibrahim v. Bardo [1996] 9 NWLR (Pt. 474) 513 at 577. The garnishee then urged the Court to give section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act 2004, section 251(1)(d) of the 1999 Constitution and Order VIII Rule 2(a) and (b) of the Judgments (Enforcement) Rules their literal, grammatical or ordinary meaning in grunting the reliefs sought by the garnishee/applicant in this matter. 52. On issue (2), the garnishee adopted its argument reading issue (1) and then submitted that this Court has power to set aside its judgment given without jurisdiction, citing CBN v. Alhaji Mohammed Kakuri (supra), which is in all fours with the present case. That in that case the garnishee brought on application before the lower court to set aside the order made absolute on the ground that it was given without jurisdiction because the judgment creditor did not obtain consent of the Attorney-General of the Federation before commencing the garnishee proceedings. The lower court refused to entertain the application on the ground that it had become functus officio the garnishee order having been made absolute. The Court of Appeal held that the lower court has not become functus officio since the order was made without jurisdiction; it ought to have over ruled itself by setting aside the order as judgment given without jurisdiction is a nullity. The garnishee also referred to the unreported case of CBN v. Umar Sajo & 2 ors Appeal No: CA/YL/I4912019 (supra), Mark v. Eke [2004] LPELR-1841(SC) and Eke v Ogbonda [2006] 18 NWLR (Pt. 1912) 506. The garnishee then prayed the Court to set aside the garnishee order nisi made on 2 December 2020 on the basis of lack of jurisdiction. 53. In conclusion, the garnishee urged the Court to hold that the garnishee proceedings against it was conducted without jurisdiction having found same to be in contravention of section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act Cap S6 LFN 2004, section 251(1)(d) of the 1999 Constitution and Order VIII Rule 2 (a and b) of the Judgments (Enforcement) Rules; and also to set aside the garnishee order nisi dated 2 December 2020 and strike out the garnishee proceeding against the garnishee/applicant. The Submissions of the Judgment Creditor 54. In rejecting the notice of preliminary objection, the judgment creditor submitted a sole issue for determination i.e. whether this Honourable Court had jurisdiction to entertain this garnishee proceeding and make garnishee order nisi made on 2nd December, 2020. The judgment creditor agreed with the garnishee/applicant that the CBN is an agency of the Federal Government of Nigeria. But that the law has been misapplied or misunderstood, urging the Court to discountenance the garnishee’s arguments in that regard. 55. The judgment creditor went on that the law is clear that in deciding whether or not the court has jurisdiction over a matter, it is the originating process that the court looks at. That this is to avail the court the opportunity to examine the subject matter of the case and apply the law accordingly, referring to Sun Insurance Nigeria Plc v. Umez Engineering Construction Company Ltd [2015] LPELR-24737(SC). That the subject matter in this garnishee proceeding is the enforcement of the judgment of this Court delivered on 27 May 2020. That the contention of the garnishee/applicant as to the CBN being an agency of the Federal Government of Nigeria does not apply. This is because the subject matter is not cantered on, nor does it pertain to the activities or otherwise of the Bank, neither is the subject matter of this suit about the functions of the Bank. 56. To the judgment creditor, the essence of a garnishee proceeding is that it is a method auxiliary to that of execution for the enforcement of a judgment or order for the payment of money into court enabling the judgment creditor/applicant to attach money due to the 1st judgment debtor/respondent from a third person called a garnishee, who must be within the jurisdiction of the court, referring to Contract Resources Nigeria Limited v. Standard Trust Bank Ltd [2000] FHCNLR Vol. 1 at page 479. That it, therefore, means that after a court has given a monetary judgment in favour of a party in a case, such party is empowered by law to apply to the court for the enforcement of the judgment, regardless of whether or not the garnishee is an agency of the Federal Government or not. 57. The judgment creditor proceeded to submit that upon a careful observation and perusal of the reliefs upon which the garnishee order nisi was made, it is unthinkable to say that this garnishee proceeding ought to have been instituted at the Federal High Court because judgment is being enforced against an agency of government which was the judgment creditor’s employer. That the garnishee/applicant by its notice of preliminary objection failed woefully to consider the constitutional provisions establishing the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court (NIC), which are sections 254C, 254D, 287(3) of the 1999 Constitution and section 10 of the NIC Act 2006. That if these sections were to have been considered thoroughly, the submissions of the garnishee/applicant would have been different. 58. That by section 287(3) of the 1999 Constitution, a party who judgment was given in his favour (the judgment creditor in this case) has the liberty to apply to all courts of subordinate jurisdiction for the enforcement of such judgment and equates the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court with the High Court (Federal High Court inclusive). The law provides as follows: The decisions of the Federal High Court, a High Court and of all other courts established by this Constitution shall be enforced in any part of the Federation by all authorities and persons, and by other courts of law with subordinate jurisdiction to that of the Federal High Court, a High Court and those other courts, respectively (emphasis is the judgment creditor’s). This provision was wrongly quoted by the judgment creditor given the omission of the NIC from it. 59. Furthermore, the judgment creditor commended section 254C(4) of the 1999 Constitution to this Court in establishing the jurisdiction of this Court in this garnishee proceeding. It provides as follows: The National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction and powers to entertain any application for the enforcement of the award, decision, ruling or order made by any arbitral tribunal or commission, administrative body or board of inquiry relating to, connected with, arising from or pertaining to any matter of which the National Industrial Court has the jurisdiction to entertain (emphasis is the judgment creditor’s). 60. In similar vein, that the Constitution further extended the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court and stated that the NIC shall have the powers of a High Court. By this provision, all jurisdictional issues had been laid to rest totally. Section 254D(1) of the 1999 Constitution, for instance, provides as follows: For the purpose of exercising any jurisdiction conferred upon it by this Constitution or as may be conferred by an Act of the National Assembly, the National Industrial Court shall have all the powers of a High Court (emphasis is the judgment creditor’s). 61. Furthermore, that the best forum for enforcing a judgment is the court which gave the judgment in the first place, despite taking into consideration section 254C(4) of the 1999 Constitution. Section 10 of the NIC Act 2006 provides thus: The Court shall have the power to enforce its judgment and accordingly, may commit for contempt any person or a representative of a trade union or employers' organization who commits any act or an omission which in the opinion of the Court constitutes a contempt of the Court (emphasis is the judgment creditor’s). 62. To the judgment creditor, based on the above constitutional provisions, it is clear beyond doubt that the NIC has the requisite jurisdiction to enforce an award, a decision or judgment. Thus, this garnishee proceeding commenced before the same Court seized of the initial res and was righty instituted before the NIC, Abuja as it leaves no room for foul play, And so the garnishee order nisi of 2 December 2020 ought not to be set aside nor discharged as it was made with jurisdiction. 63. That the only obligation imposed on the judgment creditor by the Supreme Court in the case of CBN v. Interstella Comm. Ltd [2018] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1618) 294 is that garnishee proceeding should be commenced in a court having territorial jurisdiction where the garnishee resides for convenience and effective enforcement by the Court. Applying this principle to the case at hand, the garnishee proceeding is commenced before the Abuja Judicial Division of the NIC, which is the same territorial jurisdiction with the CBN, whose central place of business and headquarters is at Abuja. 64. The judgment judgment stressed that a look at the provisions he cited will show that the operative word is SHALL, and Corporate Ideal Ins. Ltd v. Ajaokuta Steel Co. Ltd [2014] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1405) 165 SC at 193 per Okoro JSC held the word “shall” to connote command i.e. that it is imperative, mandatory, a duty for the provision to be obeyed. 65. Furthermore, that the law is clear that when the wordings of a statute are simple and clear, they should be given their natural, simple and ordinary meaning, referring to Nwankwo v. Yar’adua [2010] 12 NWLR (Pt. 1209) 518 at 589 and Ogbonna v. AG Imo State [1992] 1 NWLR (Pt. 220) 647. The judgment creditor then urged the Court, as regards the jurisdiction of the Court on this garnishee proceedings and the garnishee order nisi of 2 December 2020, to give the natural meanings to the above captioned constitutional provisions of the Constitution and the NIC Act. 66. The garnishee/applicant had argued painstakingly that the judgment creditor/respondent, having failed to obtain the consent of the 4th defendant/respondent (the Attorney-General of the Federation and Minister of Justice), the condition precedent has not been met. To the judgment creditor, the law as stated by the Supreme Court in CBN v. Interstella Comm. Ltd (supra) is that except the Attorney General of the Federation and Minister of Justice was a neutral/nominal party, his consent need not be sought. That Ogunbiyi JSC at pages 344 to 345, held as follows: It should be noted clearly that the principle underlying securing the AGF’s consent as prescribed in section 84 SCPA is to avoid embarrassment on him of not having the prior knowledge that funds earmarked for some purposes have been diverted in satisfaction of a judgment debt, which the government may not know anything about…In other words, justice would demand that the AGF must be a neutral/nominal party in the transactions and proceedings giving rise to the application for order nisi and not him being the debtor. It is well and explicit on the facts of this case that the AGF has all along held out himself to be an active participant in the several stages of negotiations, transactions and even part payment of the debt owed. 67. The judgment creditor then placed heavy reliance on paragraphs 4, Exhibits 1 and 2, as well as the record of this Court in Suit No: NICN/ABJ/125/2018; Captain Benedict Otusoji Akanni (Rtd) v. The Nigerian Army & 3 ors. That the record of this Court will reveal that the Office of the Attorney General of the Federation and Minister of Justice took part actively in the said proceedings, and thus, the Attorney General of the Federation and Minister of Justice was neither a neutral nor nominal party in the proceedings leading to this garnishee proceedings. That the 4th respondent is very aware of the judgment awarded in favour of the judgment creditor. 68. The judgment creditor went on that abundanti cautella he also sought the consent of the 4th respondent to avoid any ambiguity. That it is, however, not shocking that the 4th respondent has refused to act on the application for consent. That a party cannot be forced to act against itself and it will be injustice to compel a judgment creditor to possess the consent of the 4th respondent where it is clear that the 4th respondent is unwillingly to give such consent against itself. 69. The judgment creditor went on that it is on the record of this Court that the Attorney General of the Federation and Minister of Justice, at the proceedings of 30 April 2019, during the trial, cross-examined the claimant himself. Further to this, a memorandum of conditional appearance and a statement of defence was filed on behalf of the Attorney General of the Federation and Minister of Justice. That what is more is that the counsel who appeared for the Attorney General of the Federation and Minister of Justice is not an external counsel, but a counsel from the chambers of the Attorney General of the Federation and Minister of Justice. The judgment creditor then asked whether it can now be said that with these facts, the Attorney General of the Federation and Minister of Justice did not take part actively in the said proceedings. Or can it be said that the Attorney General of the Federation and Minister of Justice who filed a memorandum of conditional appearance (Exhibit 1) and a statement of defence (Exhibit 2) was a neutral or nominal party? Can it also be denied that Exhibit 3 is not valid enough to bring to the attention of the Attorney General and Minister of Justice that there is a pending garnishee proceedings? Can it also be said that the Attorney General of the Federation and Minister of Justice was not aware of the proceedings and judgment delivered by the Court? The judgment creditor answered all these questions in the negative and urged the Court to so hold. 70. Additionally, that the law is that it is not the duty of the garnishee to make out a case for the judgment debtor, as it is being done in this proceedings as presently constituted. That the garnishee/applicant has by itself become the advocate and protector of the judgment debtor, who was also served with the garnishee order nisi of the Court, by filing applications sought to protect the judgment sum standing to the credit of the judgment debtor, which is clearly outside the duties of the garnishee. That this is illegal and does not comply with our laws and ought to be cautioned, citing CBN v. Interstella Comm. Ltd (supra) at 350 wherein Ogunbiyi JSC held in the following words: I must say that the garnishee [CBN] has taken so much interest in this case and appear to have forgotten its role as a banker to the Federal Government. The role of a garnishee [CBN] in any garnishee proceeding is delimited. As rightly argued by the counsel for the 1st and 2nd respondents, it is not envisaged that after a judgment creditor [Captain Benedict Otusoji Akanni Rtd] has gone through the rigours to establish his rights through the legal system, that the garnishee [CBN], who is asked to surrender the judgement debtor’s [The Nigerian Army] money in its possession should engage the judgment creditor in another bout of legal battle (words in bracket and emphasis are the judgment creditor’s). 71. In conclusion, the judgment creditor submitted that this Court has jurisdiction over this matter, the garnishee order nisi was validly made, the Attorney General of the Federation is not a neutral and nominal party, the consent of the Attorney General of the Federation is not required, and the garnishee has acted in a manner not contemplated by law. The Garnishee’s Reply on Points of Law 72. To the garnishee, the judgment creditor/respondent had rightly admitted that the garnishee/applicant is an agency of the Federal Government of Nigeria but proceeded to argue that what confers jurisdiction on the court is the originating process. That while this may be true, it is not entirely correct as there are other factors that confer jurisdiction on the court. These are, the statute, the parties, the claims and territorial factors, citing Ebohon v. AG, Edo State [2016] LPELR–41269(CA), Nnadi v. Oji & ors [2010] LPELR–4627(CA) and Home Glass Ltd v. Linkage Assurance Plc [2016] LPELR–41562(CA). 73. That in the instant case, since the only service the garnishee/applicant can render to the judgment debtor/respondent, where it has an account with the garnishee/applicant is that of banking. It, therefore, follows that by the community reading of section 251 of the 1999 Constitution and Order VIII Rule 2(a) and (b) of the Judgments (Enforcement) Rules, which relates to the appropriate venue for instituting garnishee proceeding, the Federal High Court is the appropriate court to assume jurisdiction in the garnishee proceeding and not this Court. 74. Again, the judgment creditor/respondent had also argued that by virtue of section 254D(1) of the 1999 Constitution, the NIC can enforce its judgment. To the garnishee, this is very correct. However, that it must be pointed out that garnishee proceeding is a special form of enforcement of judgment distinct from the suit where the garnishee proceeding emanated from. The procedure for instituting garnishee proceeding is regulated by statute, the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act 2004 and by virtue of Order VIII Rule 2 (a) and (b) of the Judgments (Enforcement Rules) the appropriate venue for instituting garnishee proceeding is the court where the judgment debtor can sue the garnishee for the recovery of the money garnisheed from his account in the event that its account was improperly garnisheed. 75. Furthermore, the judgment creditor/respondent, in relying on CBN v. Interstella Comm. Ltd & ors (supra), had argued that the Supreme Court held in the case that the consent of the Honourable Attorney General of the Federation is not required where the Attorney-General is the debtor. To the garnishee, this argument is puerile, mischievous and a total misapplication of the holding of the apex Court in CBN v. Interstella Communications Ltd & ors (supra). 76. Also, the judgment creditor/respondent stated in his counter-affidavit and in the written address that he had applied for the consent of the Honourable Attorney General of the Federation but without any response from the office of the Honourable Attorney General. To the garnishee, this is an admission on the part of the judgment creditor/respondent that he knows at all times that the consent of the Attorney General is vital before attaching funds in custody of the garnishee/applicant. That it is an abecedarian principle of law that facts admitted need no further proof. That this scenario played out before the Court of Appeal, Calabar Division, in the unreported Suit No: CA/C/178/2020 between CBN v. Engr Cliff Ezeobika & 8 ors wherein judgment was delivered on 5 May 2021 where the court held as follows: What played out in the present case was that the 1st and 2nd Respondents, through their counsel wrote a letter intimating the Attorney-General of the Federation of the indebtedness of the judgment debtors which letter was subsequently acknowledged by the Attorney-General as shown elsewhere in this judgment. An acknowledgment which is merely an acceptance of the existence of the said letter cannot in my respectful view be an implied consent as erroneously argued and subscribed to by the lower court. It is therefore pertinent to stress that the consequence of non-compliance with the mandatory statutory provisions such as Section 84(1) of the Sheriffs and Civil process Act is far reaching in the sense that the purported act or thing done is marooned in a nullity. 77. That in view of the decision of the appellate court referred to above, mere application for consent without obtaining same does not satisfy the requirement of the law which makes it mandatory for the judgment creditor seeking to garnishee funds in custody of a public officer like the garnishee/applicant to first obtain the consent of the Attorney General of the Federation before the commencement of the garnishee proceedings. 78. Furthermore, the judgment creditor/respondent had stated in his counter-affidavit and in the written address that “it is not the duty of the Garnishee to make a case out for the Judgment Debtor”. That while this position is rightly so, the judgment creditor/respondent is oblivious of the provision of section 83 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act 2004 and the order nisi dated 2 December 2020 served on the garnishee/applicant, which ORDERED thus: At the next adjourned date, the garnishee Bank, Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) is to show cause why the garnishee order nisi just granted should not be made absolute in respect of the judgment sum of N75 Million granted the judgment creditor in the judgment of 27 May 2020 in this matter. 79. That as a law-abiding institution, the garnishee/applicant complied with the order of this Court by showing cause as to why the order nisi should not be made absolute. Being very well aware of the court’s lack of jurisdiction in line with the provisions of section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act 2004, Order VIII Rule 2 (a) and (b) of the Judgments Enforcement Rules, section 251(1)(D) of the 1999 Constitution and well settled judicial decisions of the Court, the garnishee/applicant cannot and should not be expected to fold its hand and watch this Court expend its time and resources in futility, as it is trite under our jurisprudence that questions of jurisdiction are fundamental and proceedings of court conducted without jurisdiction no matter how beautifully and dutifully conducted remains a nullity, praying the Court to discountenance the argument of the judgment creditor/respondent that “the Garnishee/Applicant has by itself become the advocate and protector of the Judgment Debtor”. This position is more so in the light of the recent decision of the appellate court in the unreported Appeal No. CA/A/180/2017 between CBN v. James Bako & anor delivered on 12 February 2021 wherein the appellate Court held inter alia that the issue of consent is a statutory matter, the law is firm on it and it can only be waived if there is any amendment to the law suggesting such. 80. The judgment debtors orally informed the Court that they do not oppose the garnishee’s preliminary objection although they did not file any process in that regard. COURT’S DECISION 81. I have given due consideration to all the processes and submissions of the parties. I will consider the judgment debtor’s motion on notice first before considering the garnishee’s preliminary objection; and then conclude with the application for garnishee order absolute. Decision of the Court on the 1st to 3rd Judgment Debtors’ Motion on Notice 81. Some preliminary points are necessary before addressing the merit of 1st to 3rd defendants’ motion and the garnishee’s preliminary objection. 82. A look at ground (6) of the 1st to 3rd judgment debtors’ motion on notice will show that it states that the order nisi granted by this Court was a product of the judgment creditor’s motion on notice. I must state here that the said order nisi was a product of an ex parte motion, not a motion on notice. 83. I indicated earlier that the 1st to 3rd defendants’ reply on points of law regarding their motion on notice filed on 8 February 2021 is a rehash of arguments they already advanced. The law is that a reply on points of law is meant to be just what it is, a reply on points of law. It should be limited to answering only new points arising from the opposing brief. It is not meant for the party replying on points of law to reargue its case or bring in points it forgot to advance when it filed its final written address. It is not a form to engage in arguments at large. Alternatively put, a reply on points of law is not meant to improve on the quality of a written address; a reply brief is not a repair kit to correct or put right an error or lacuna in the initial brief of argument. See Dr Augustine N. Mozie & ors v. Chike Mbamalu [2006] 12 SCM (Pt. I) 306; [2006] 27 NSCQR 425, Basinco Motors Limited v. Woermann Line & anor [2009] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1157) 149; [2009] 8 SCM 103, Ecobank (Nig) Ltd v. Anchorage Leisures Ltd & ors [2016] LPELR-40220(CA), UBA Plc v. Ubokolo [2009] LPELR-8923(CA), Musaconi Ltd v. Aspinall [2013] LPELR-20745(SC), Ojo v. Okitipupa Oil Palm Plc [2001] 9 NWLR (Pt. 719) 679 at 693, Ogboru v. Ibori [2005] 13 NWLR (Pt. 942) 319 and Cameroon Airlines v. Mike Otutuizu [2005] 9 NWLR (Pt. 929) 202. The effect of non compliance is that the Court will discountenance such a reply brief. See Onuaguluchi v. Ndu [2000] 11 NWLR (Pt. 590) 204, ACB Ltd v. Apugo [1995] 6 NWLR (Pt. 399) 65 and Arulogun & ors v. Aboloyinjo & anor [2018] LPELR-44076(CA). The 1st to 3rd defendants’ reply on points of law is accordingly held to be idle/pointless. 84. The 1st to 3rd judgment debtors’ motion is in the main premised on the following grounds: they filed an appeal (Appeal No: CA/ABJ/CV/768/2020) against the judgment of this Court, which appeal the judgment creditor failed to inform this Court about when the order nisi was sought for and granted; they filed an application for stay of the judgment at the Court of Appeal; the said order nisi is accordingly a nullity as this Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the matter when it issued it; and the filing of the motion ex parte for an order nisi is thus an abuse of court process. 85. The filing of an appeal does not act as a stay. So says section 47 of the National Industrial Court Act (NIC) Act 2006. There is nothing stopping this Court from granting an order nisi, and making absolute on conditions that allow the successful party at the Court of Appeal to access the judgment sum after the appeal. So this point raised by the 1st to 3rd judgment debtors is a non-issue. 86. The 1st to 3rd judgment debtors had argued that because the appeal they filed is also backed by filing of an application for stay of execution of the judgment of this Court, this Court had no jurisdiction to make the order nisi. This argument too is a non-issue since no application for stay was first filed in this Court and rejected as to warrant the 1st to 3rd judgment debtors going to the Court of Appeal with a stay of execution application. The NIC Act 2006 and the NICN Rules 2017 provide for the application of stay. The 1st to 3rd judgment debtors did not make use of these provisions. Instead they went straight to the Court of Appeal. No special circumstances have been shown to warrant this. And I do not think that the 1st to 3rd judgment debtors have the right to elect to go straight to the Court of Appeal as they just did without first exhausting the option provided for in this Court. See Kalu v. Odili & ors [1992] LPELR-1653(SC) and Hon. Commissioner for Education & ors v. Amadi [2013] LPELR-19907(SC). 87. In support of their argument, the 1st to 3rd judgment debtors cited Nigerian Breweries Plc v. Dumuje & anor [2015] LPELR-25583(CA), which, relying on Denton-West v. Muoma [2007] LPELR-8172(CA), agreed with the general view that where there is a pending application for stay of execution, especially in a superior Court, it will be absurd for a party to execute the same judgment by way of a garnishee proceeding on the premise that it is an independent proceeding. I must make the point that these case law authorities acknowledge that the rule enunciated is one that is a general view. This means that it admits of exception(s). If this Court stipulates conditions upon which the order nisi is made absolute e.g. that the judgment sum be kept in a separate account pending the outcome of the decision of the Court of Appeal, there would be no fait accompli as to the decision of the Court of Appeal when the matter is ultimately decided. How the ex parte motion for an order nisi is an abuse of court process is accordingly not discernible. I so hold. 88. I do not, therefore, see any merit in the application of the 1st to 3rd defendants. It lacks merit and so is hereby dismissed. I so rule. The Decision of the Court on the Garnishee’s Preliminary Objection 89. Some preliminary points are necessary here. 90. The grounds upon which the garnishee’s preliminary objection was based have abnormal numbering of some of the grounds. After ground (viii), the next numbered ground is ground (x), then ground (ix) before ending with another ground (x). This same abnormal numbering is repeated when in paragraph 1.3 of the garnishee’s accompanying written address the grounds of objection are laid out. I do not why a counsel will not proofread his work before filing same in court. 91. The garnishee in both its written address and reply on points of law referred to a number of unreported decisions of especially the Court of Appeal without supplying the Court with their Certified True Copies (CTCs). Order 45 Rule 3(1) of the National Industrial Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017 (NICN Rules 2017) provides that where any unreported judgment is relied upon, the CTC shall be submitted along with the written address. Rule 3(2) of same Order then provides that failure to comply with this may render the written address incompetent. 92. Her Ladyship Augie, JSC in Major General Kayode Oni (Rtd) & 4 ors v. Governor of Ekiti State & anor [2019] LPELR-46413(SC) strongly put the law thus: It is an elementary principle, very elementary, that Counsel who want the Court to make use of authorities cited in Court must provide the name of Parties, the year the case was decided, and where the case is reported, name of the Law Report, the year, volume and page must be cited. But if the said case is unreported, Counsel must provide the Court with a certified true copy of the Judgment sought to be relied upon - see Chidoka & anor v. First City Finance Co. Ltd [2013] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1344) 144 and Ugo-Ngadi v. FRN [2018] LPELR-43903(SC)… In this case, the Appellants did not provide this Court with copies of its Judgment in Governor, Ekiti State v. Chief George Ojo & ors and Governor of Ekiti State & anor v. Chief Femi Akinyemi & ors. They merely quoted what the Court of Appeal said in those cases and there is nothing to indicate what principle this Court affirmed. In line with the NICN Rules 2017 and on the authority of Major General Kayode Oni (Rtd) & 4 ors v. Governor of Ekiti State & anor, I shall discountenance all the unreported decisions cited by the garnishee given that no CTC of any of the decisions was submitted. I so do. 93. On his part, in paragraphing his written address in opposition to the garnishee’s preliminary objection, the judgment creditor has repeated numbers of paragraphs: • There are two paragraphs 3.0. The first is at page 6, the second at page 14, of the written address. • There are three paragraphs 3.1. The first is at page 6, the second at page 11, and the third at page 14, of the written address. The second paragraph 3.1 comes between paragraphs 3.14 and 3.15. • There are two paragraphs 3.2. The first is at page 6, the second at page 14, of the written address. 94. In paragraph 4(c) and (h) of his counter-affidavit against the garnishee’s preliminary objection, the judgment creditor indicated that Exhibits 1 and 2 — paragraph 4(c) — and Exhibit 3 — paragraph 4(h) — are attached to the counter-affidavit. Exhibits 1 and 2 are said to be Memorandum of Conditional Appearance and Statement of Defence. And Exhibit 3 is said to be the letter written by the judgment creditor seeking for consent. These three exhibits (Exhibits 1, 2 and 3) are not so attached to the counter-affidavit against the garnishee’s preliminary objection. Instead, the application for consent of the Honourable Attorney General of the Federation (HAGF) is attached as Exhibit 2 to the affidavit in support of the motion ex parte for the garnishee order filed on 27 October 2020. 95. Section 87 of the SCPA permits a garnishee to contest the liability imposed by a garnishee order. It provides thus: If the garnishee appears and disputes his liability, the court, instead of making an order that execution shall issue, may order that any issue or question necessary for determining his liability be tried or determined in any manner in which any issue or question in any proceedings may be tried or determined, or may refer the matter to a referee. The garnishee’s preliminary objection must be seen as disputing liability imposed by the garnishee order nisi of 2 December 2020 and the possible garnishee order absolute. 96. The garnishee’s preliminary objection is premised on two main grounds, both stemming from the fact that it is an agency of the Federal Government: as an agency of government, only the Federal High Court can entertain actions against it given section 251(1)(d) of the 1999 Constitution and Order VIII Rule 2(a) and (b) of the Judgment (Enforcement) Rules; and as an agency of government, CBN is a public officer within the meaning of section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act (SCPA) Cap S6 LFN 2004 and so requires the consent of the HAGF. The issue whether this Court can set aside the order nisi it made is simply an ancillary one. It can if it acted outside of its remit. 97. I take the issue of the Federal High Court, not this Court, being the court with jurisdiction over this matter. Section 251(1)(d) of the 1999 Constitution relied upon by the garnishee provides thus: …the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters…connected with or pertaining to banking, banks, other financial institutions, including any action between one bank and another, any action by or against the Central Bank of Nigeria arising from banking, foreign exchange, coinage, legal tender, bills of exchange, letters of credit, promissory notes and other fiscal measures: Provided that this paragraph shall not apply to any dispute between an individual customer and his bank in respect of transactions between the individual customer and the bank. 98. All through its argument, the garnishee kept talking of it being a Federal Government agency and so only the Federal High Court, not this Court, has jurisdiction over this matter, relying in particular on section 251(1)(d) of the 1999 Constitution. The garnishee, however, did rely generally on section 251 of the 1999 Constitution even when it advanced this argument. So, I take it that the emphasis on the garnishee being a Federal Government agency could only mean that what the garnishee really relied on was section 251(1)(r) of the 1999 Constitution, in addition to section 251(1)(d). Section 251(1)(r) provides that the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in respect of “any action or proceeding for a declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decision by the Federal Government or any of its agencies”. I shall accordingly consider the garnishee’s argument on the assumption that it relied on the provisions of section 251(1)(d) and (r) of the 1999 Constitution. 99. The garnishee, like I pointed out, had argued that because it is a Federal Government agency, this Court has no jurisdiction over this matter. That it is the Federal High Court that has jurisdiction given section 251 of the 1999 Constitution and Order VIII Rule 2(a) and (b) of the Judgment (Enforcement) Rules. The garnishee then gave CBN v. Auto Import Export [2013] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1337) 80 CA at 133 - 134 as its case law authority. In this Court of Appeal decision, the garnishee quoted His Lordship Saulawa, JCA (as he then was) as saying: By virtue of the provision of section 251(1)(d) of the 1999 Constitution (supra) there’s every valid reason for me to hold that the intention of the legislature therein was to confer jurisdiction upon the Federal High Court to the exclusion of all other courts, including State High Courts, in actions, mutters and causes in which the Federal Government or any of the agencies thereof is a party. Thus, the State High Court shall no longer have jurisdiction in such matters, notwithstanding the nature of the claim in the action, matter and cause. 100. I need to stress a number of points here. • First, what is before this Court is the enforcement of its judgment, not the judgment of the Federal High Court. • Secondly, both this Court and the Federal High Court are courts of coordinate status and power (often held out as courts of coordinate jurisdiction). • Thirdly, this Court has all the powers of a High Court — see section 254D(1) of the 1999 Constitution and Skye Bank v. Iwu [2017] LPELR-42595(SC) — just as the Federal High Court too has (section 252 of the 1999 Constitution). • Fourthly, section 251(1) of the 1999 Constitution is subject to section 245C(1) of the same 1999 Constitution. And Hon, Justice Saulawa, JCA did not make the statement in the context of the relationship between section 251(1) and section 254C(1), both of the 1999 Constitution. • Fifthly, the Judgment (Enforcement) Rules is made pursuant to the Sheriff and Civil Process Act Cap. S6 LRN 2004. Both the Rules and the Act cannot supersede section 254C(1) of 1999 Constitution. • Sixthly, the proviso to section 251(1)(d) of the 1999 Constitution is very specific “that this paragraph shall not apply to any dispute between an individual customer and his bank in respect of transactions between the individual customer and the bank”. The Supreme Court in CBN v. Interstella Communications Ltd & 3 ors [2017] LPELR-43940(SC); [2018] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1618) 294 was very specific that in garnishee proceedings the CBN is sued because of its relationship as banker to the judgment debtor. As such its relationship is one of banker-customer. The garnishee in the instant case itself acknowledged it is being sued because as the apex Bank it must be a banker to the judgment debtor. What this signifies is that section 251(1)(d) is automatically inapplicable in the manner canvassed by the garnishee here. • Lastly, by section 287(3) of the 1999 Constitution, this Court is amongst the courts (including the Federal High Court) whose decisions can be enforced in any part of the country by all authorities and persons, and by other courts with subordinate jurisdiction. The garnishee itself admits that it is an agency of government. 101. The garnishee’s further argument that it is clear and unambiguous that the right venue for instituting any garnishee proceedings against the instant garnishee/applicant is the court where the garnishee/applicant can be sued for any matter relating to it in the course of discharging its statutorily conferred banking duties as provided for in section 251(l)(d) of the 1999 Constitution leaves a lot to be discerned. Is the garnishee saying that this Court has no jurisdiction over the garnishee if the cause of action were to be an employment or labour matter? The fact that the garnishee is an agency of government, does that mean that this Court lacks jurisdiction over it if the cause of action is an employment or labour matter? Did the garnishee read section 254C(1) of the 1999 Constitution? 102. The garnishee itself quoted Order VIII Rule 2(a) and (b) of the Judgment (Enforcement) Rules as, in terms of the venue of instituting garnishee proceedings, providing thus: (a) In any court in which the judgment debtor could, under the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules or under the appropriate section or rule governing civil procedure in magistrates’ courts, as the case may be, sue the garnishee in respect of the debt. (b) Where the debt is not yet payable, or is for an amount exceeding the jurisdiction of such court, in any court in which the judgment debtor could have sued the garnishee as aforesaid if the debt had been immediately payable or had not exceeded the jurisdiction. A careful reading of this Order does not by any stretch of imagination suggest that the enforcement of a judgment of this Court (NICN) cannot be made in this Court. If Rules of Magistrate Courts are accommodated, how can the Rules of this Court not be accommodated? 103. Accordingly, arguments by the garnishee that this Court’s decision can only be enforced at the Federal High Court (a court of coordinate jurisdiction with this Court), when the subject matter has nothing to do with the Federal High Court, is to say the very least wishful thinking. By section 254D(1) of the 1999 Constitution, “for the purpose of exercising any jurisdiction conferred upon it by this Constitution or as may be conferred by an Act of the National Assembly, the National Industrial Court shall have all the powers of a High Court”. By section 318(1) of the 1999 Constitution, “power” includes function and duty. The Supreme Court in Skye Bank v. Iwu (supra) relied heavily on section 254D(1) and the powers of the High Court it granted the NIC to justify doing away with the limited right of appeal that the decisions of the NIC enjoyed prior to Skye Bank v. Iwu (supra). To the Supreme Court, since the NIC now had all the powers of the High Court, and appeals lie to the Court of Appeal from the decisions of the High Courts, then at least appeal with leave of the Court of Appeal must lie from the decisions of the NIC to the Court of Appeal. If the Supreme Court could rationalise in this manner, is it enforcement of the judgments of the NIC that must now be done in the Federal High Court simply because the garnishee is an agency of the Federal Government? 104. In any event, section 54(2) of the NIC Act 2006 provides as follows: (2) For enabling full effect to be given to the provisions of this Act - (a) any reference (whether express or by necessary implication) in any enactment (other than the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999) to “the Federal High Court” “High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja” “High Court”, “court of law” or a “court of record” - (i) in so far as the reference relates to or is connected with the jurisdiction, powers practice and procedure of a High Court, and (ii) except in so far as it is inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, shall include a reference to the Court established by this Act; and (b) all references (whether express or by necessary implication) in any enactment (other than the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria) to the High Court of a State in so far as the enactment - (i) is of general application throughout the Federation, and (ii) relates to a matter as respects which jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court by or under this Act, shall be construed as references to the Court, notwithstanding that in an appropriate case, the enactment is, or has become, by operation of law, a law of a State. 105. My understanding of the import of section 54(2) of the NIC Act 2006 is, therefore, that in any enactment other than the Constitution, references to the High Court in terms of jurisdiction, powers, practice and procedure must be read as including the NICN. This being so, any argument by the garnishee that the Judgment (Enforcement) Rules does not contemplate this Court must be wishful thinking. Accordingly, I reject the argument of the garnishee in that regard. 106. Additionally, section 10 of the NIC Act 2006 (an Act of equivalent status with, but later in time to, the Sheriff and Civil Process Act Cap S6 LRN 2004 pursuant to which the Judgment (Enforcement) Rules were made) grants the NIC the power to enforce its judgment. So, where did the garnishee get the idea that the judgment(s) of this Court can only be enforced by the Federal High Court simply because the CBN is an agency of the Federal Government? Once again, it must be wishful thinking on the part of the garnishee. 107. The very recent decision of the Court of Appeal Abuja Division in CBN v. Mr Jerome A. Eze & ors unreported Appeal No. CA/A/344/2015, the judgment of which was delivered on 15 September 2021, Hon. Justice Olabode Abimbola Adegbehingbe, JCA delivering the lead judgment, supports the position I have taken. CBN, which was the appellant in that case, as in the instant case, raised the same argument as to section 251(1) of the 1999 Constitution, arguing that it is the Federal High Court, not this Court (NICN), that has the jurisdiction over garnishee proceedings involving the CBN. In rejecting this argument, the Court of Appeal first acknowledged that “while Rule 2(a) and (b) of Order VIII…[of the Judgment (Enforcement) Rules] mentioned, specifically Magistrate’s Court Civil Procedure Rules and the High Court Procedure Rules, which suggest that the Rules is only applicable in those named courts, such understanding will be denying itself the benefit of specific provisions of the statute, which established the National Industrial Court of Nigeria, which provides for powers of that court, from its inception”. The Court of Appeal then referred to and applied sections 10, 12, 19 and 54(2) of the NIC Act 2006. In particular, that section 54(2) of the NIC Act 2006 provides that in any statute where the “High Court” is mentioned, such reference shall be interpreted to mean that the NICN is mentioned. Accordingly, where High Court is mentioned in Rule 2 of Order VIII of the Judgment (Enforcement) Rules, the NICN must be read to be included. 108. Relying on section 10(2) of the Interpretation Act, the Court of Appeal proceeded to uphold section 10 of the NIC Act 2006, which gives this Court the power to enforce its judgment; holding also that, after considering all the cases cited by CBN in its arguments, “the NICN has power and jurisdiction to enforce monetary judgment, through the process of garnishee proceedings”. 109. The Court of Appeal, on section 251 of the 1999 Constitution, went on to hold thus: “Contrary to the contention of the appellant’s counsel, with due respect, section 251 of the 1999 Constitution is not applicable to this case, such as to take jurisdiction, over the garnishee proceedings before the lower court, in direction of the Federal High Court. The proceedings, which led to the appeal before this court, is not a claim for debt in the strict sense of it, but only a means to enforce money judgment”. 110. The Court of Appeal further held thus: Assuming that the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court to entertain the Garnishee proceeding is properly challenged, I have no doubt that on a proper interpretation of Section 251(1)(d) and Section 254C(1) - (6) of the Constitution of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), the National Industrial Court (the lower Court) is the proper Court vested with jurisdiction to entertain the action instituted by the Respondent/Judgement Creditor against the Judgement/Debtor (the Police Service Commission and Inspector General of Police). This is because this suit falls within the employer-employee relationship, and therefore falls within the purview of Section 254C(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended)… 111. On the question whether the NICN can adjudicate over garnishee proceedings where the CBN is a party, the Court of Appeal, relying on CBN v. Odoo [2020] LPELR-50290(CA), held that it can. The argument of the garnishee as to the Federal High Court, and not this Court, being the court with jurisdiction over garnishee proceedings involving CBN must accordingly be totally rejected. And I so do. 112. In any event, the argument of the garnishee that the only reason why the judgment creditor seeks to enforce the judgment against the garnishee via garnishee proceeding is on the presumption that being the apex bank the garnishee must be a banker to the judgment debtor is doublespeak. The garnishee cannot be saying this and yet argue that it is the Federal High Court that should assume jurisdiction under section 251(1)(d) of the 1999 Constitution. Is it at the Federal High Court that the garnishee will not be sued “on the presumption that being the apex Bank the garnishee/applicant must be a banker to the judgment debtor/respondent”? 113. But I must point out that the reliance of the judgment creditor on section 254C(4) of the 1999 Constitution is, however, wrong. That section relates to enforcement of decisions of arbitral tribunals, commissions, administrative bodies boards of inquiry, not those of this Court. 114. On the whole, I do not see any merit in the argument of the garnishee that it is the Federal High Court, not this Court, that has jurisdiction over the matter at hand. I rule that this Court has the jurisdiction to hear the instant matter and issue garnishee order(s) against the garnishee as the case may warrant. 115. I now turn to the second issue i.e. whether the consent of the HAGF is needed before any garnishee order can issue against the CBN. I note that the question whether the CBN is a public officer within the meaning of section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act (SCPA) Cap S6 LFN 2004 as to require the consent of the Honourable Attorney General of the Federation (HAGF) is one that especially the Court of Appeal has answered differently even after the Supreme Court decision in CBN v. Interstella Communications Ltd & 3 ors (supra). The garnishee in its submissions in the instant case chose to refer this Court to only the Court of Appeal decisions that held that the CBN is a public officer and so consent of the HAGF is needed before any garnishee order can issue, leaving out those cases that did not go its way. 116. I acknowledge that while cases like Unity Bank Plc v. Igala Construction Co. Ltd [2018] LPELR-49878(CA) and CBN v. Aminu Lawal Atana [2019] LPELR-49194(CA) held that CBN is a public officer, and so the consent of the HAGF is needed before any garnishee order can issue, CBN v. Zenith Bank Plc & anor [2019] LPELR-48383(CA) 1, CBN v. Kimi Appah Esq [2020] LPELR-51214(CA) and CBN v. Lidan Engineering Ltd & ors [2021] LPELR-52622(CA) held that CBN is not a public officer, and so the consent of the HAGF is not needed. 117. To the extent that the Supreme Court in Interstella decided that the CBN is not a public officer in the context of section 84 of the SCPA when regard is had to the history of this appeal; and that it is apparent on the facts of the case that the requisite consent of the Attorney-General of the Federation was obtained, the garnishee’s argument is that Interstella was decided on the facts of its case and so cannot be binding precedent in the instant case. The garnishee proceeded to quote from pages 344 - 346 of Interstellar [2018] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1618) 294 leaving out the rest of the decision of the Supreme Court. 118. In thus answering the question whether CBN is a public officer for which the consent of the HAGF is needed, we may need to take a closer look at section 84 of the SCPA. It provides thus: (1) Where money liable to be attached by garnishee proceedings is in the custody or under the control of a public officer in his official capacity or in custodia legis, the order nisi shall not be made under the provisions of the last preceding section unless consent to such attachment is first obtained from the appropriate officer in the case of money in the custody or control of a public officer or of the court in the case of money in custodia legis, as the case may be. (2) In such cases the order of notice must be served on such public officer or on the registrar of the court, as the case may be. (3) In this section, “appropriate officer” means — (a) in relation to money which is in the custody of a public officer who holds a public office in the public service of the Federation, the Attorney-General of the Federation; (b) in relation to money which is in the custody of a public officer who holds a public office in the public service of the State, the Attorney-General of the State. 119. The talk of “money…in the custody or under the control of a public officer in his official capacity” is a reference to a human male. But because section 14(a) of the Interpretation Act Cap. I23 LFN 2004 states that in an enactment words importing the masculine gender include females, we must read the “his” in section 84(1) of the SCPA as including “her” i.e. the human female. Section 14(a) of the Interpretation Act did not include the neuter gender in stating that words importing the masculine gender include females. (Section 14(a) is accordingly not gender neutral.) And since the word “person” is not even used in section 84 of the SCPA, we cannot import the definition of the word “person” under section 18(1) of the Interpretation Act as to include artificial persons. This means that artificial persons cannot by any stretch of imagination be said to have been referred to in, or contemplated under, section 84(1) of the SCPA. The CBN, being an artificial person, cannot thus be “a public officer” as to have the custody of money “in his official capacity”. We must note that by Major General Kayode Oni (Rtd) & 4 ors v. Governor of Ekiti State & anor, “it is settled that for artificial entities, including governmental offices (and the Governor in this case), the rule is that all acts are prohibited except specifically permitted”. The CBN cannot lay claim to what has not been specifically provided for it in section 84(1) of the SCPA. 120. We see a similar scenario playing out in section 46(1) of the 1999 Constitution, which provides that “any person who alleges that any of the provisions of this Chapter has been, is being or likely to be contravened in any State in relation to him, may apply to a High Court in that State for redress”. The use of the phrase, “in relation to him”, clearly excludes a corporate/artificial entity from filing for a fundamental right infringement under section 46 of the Constitution and the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009. Secondly, to come under section 46 and the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, the victim of the fundamental right infringement must be human; otherwise, the talk of the infringement being “in relation to him” will be meaningless. 121. My humble position that artificial entities are not envisaged under section 84(1) of the SCPA is reinforced by the definition of “public officer” in the Interpretation Act. Section 18(1) of the Interpretation Act also defines the term “public officer” in these words: “public officer” means a member of the public service of the Federation within the meaning of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria or of the public service of a State. The phrases, “public service of the Federation” and “public service of a State” are both defined by section 318(1) of the 1999 Constitution. Since we are dealing with CBN, a Federal Government agency, I shall take only the definition of “public service of the Federation”. 122. By section 318(1) of the 1999 Constitution: “public service of the Federation” means the service of the Federation in any capacity in respect of the Government of the Federation and includes service as: (a) Clerk or other staff of the National Assembly or of each House of the National Assembly; (b) member of staff of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal, the Federal High Court, the National Industrial Court, the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, Sharia Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, the Customary Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja or other courts established for the Federation by this Constitution and by an Act of National Assembly; (c) member or staff of any commission or authority established for the Federation by this Constitution or by an Act of the National Assembly; (d) staff of any area council; (e) staff of any statutory corporation established by an Act of the National Assembly; (f) staff of any educational institution established or financed principally by a Government of the Federation; (g) staff of any company or enterprise in which the Government of the Federation or its agency owns controlling shares or interest; and (h) members or officers of the armed forces of the Federation or the Nigeria Police Force or other government security agencies established by law. 123. So being a member of the public service of the Federation can only mean being a staff in the service of the Federation in any capacity including being a staff of any of the bodies enumerated above. The CBN is an agency of the Federal Government established by an Act of the National Assembly, the CBN Act. It is its staff that qualify as members of the public service of the Federation, not the CBN itself as an institution or agency. So, it is perfectly understandable when the Supreme Court in Interstella emphatically held that the CBN is not a public officer within the meaning of section 84(1) of the SCPA. 124. The argument of the garnishee that Interstella is inapplicable on its facts is met by the Court of Appeal decision in CBN v. Aminu Umar & ors unreported Appeal No. CA/J/158/2020, the judgment of which was delivered on 19 July 2021. His Lordship B. M. Ugo, JCA held thus: I am not unaware of the argument in some quarters that the decision of the apex court in C.B.N. v. Inter Stella Communications Ltd (2018) 7 NWLR (PT 1618) 294 (S.C) was rather based on the fact that the Attorney General was in that case held to have given his consent by implication to the garnishee proceedings, he having earlier instructed some payment of the judgment debt in issue before the commencement of the garnishee proceedings. It is thus argued that that fact is the real basis or ratio decidendi of C.B.N. v. Inter Stella Communications Ltd (2018) 7 NWLR (PT 1618) 294 (S.C) and not its pronouncement distinguishing Ibrahim v. JSC (supra) and affirming emphatically that “The appellant [same Central Bank of Nigeria] does not stand as a public officer in this situation. Therefore, it follows that the need to seek the consent of the Attorney-General of the Federation does not arise.” I am not by any means persuaded by that argument given the very clear pronouncement of Ogunbiyi, JSC, in her lead judgment…directly distinguishing its earlier Limitation statute/Public Officers Protection Law case of Ibrahim v. JSC (supra) where public officer was defined as including an artificial public person or office as shown in the passage of her judgment earlier reproduced. It has to be noted too that her Lordship even went further to say that this court’s decision in Purification Tech (Nig.) Ltd v. A.G. Lagos State & Ors (2004) 9 NWLR (PT 879) 665 is ‘on all fours’ with C.B.N. v. Inter Stella Communications Ltd (2018) 7 NWLR (PT 1618) 294 (S.C). Incidentally, Purification Tech (Nig.) Ltd v. A.G. Lagos State & Ors (supra) did not involve any issue of the Attorney General giving a prior instruction for payment of judgment debt. It was rather simply about the instant issue of whether prior consent of Attorney General is a condition precedent under Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act to commence garnishee proceedings to attach debts of a judgment debtor customer of the Central Bank of Nigeria which funds it holds as a banker to the judgment debtor. It is thus my humble opinion, still, that the decision of the apex court in C.B.N. v. Inter Stella Communications Ltd (2018) 7 NWLR (PT 1618) 294 was simply to the effect that prior consent of Attorney General is not a condition precedent under Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act for commencement of garnishee proceedings to attach debts of a judgment debtor/customer of the Central Bank of Nigeria. In any case, even if the finding of the apex court in C.B.N. v. Inter Stella Communications Ltd, to the effect that the Attorney General by his actions in that case by directing payment of the debt prior to the commencement of the garnishee proceeding had given his consent to the attachment, that would only be one of two rationes decidendi for the decision, and not that it in any way reduces to a mere obiter dictum its clear decision that Attorney General’s consent is not needed to commence garnishee proceedings against the Central Bank of Nigeria to attach debts due to its judgment debtor/customer, for as it was said by Karibi-Whyte, JSC, in lead judgment in Aeroflot Soviet Airlines v. United Bank For Africa Ltd (1986) 3 NWLR (PT 27) 188 @ 199 Para. D-E: It is well settled that where two reasons are given for a judgment they may both constitute the ratio decidendi for such judgment. Jacobs v. L.C.C. (1950) 1 ALL E.R. 737, London Jewellers Ltd v. Stentorough (1934) 2 K.B. 206. A reason given by a judge is not to be regarded as obiter dictum merely because another reason equally valid was also given. 125. I need say no more. In all of this, however, there is an issue that is often downplayed. And it relates to section 287 of the 1999 Constitution. It provides thus: (1) The decisions of the Supreme Court shall be enforced in any part of the Federation by all authorities and persons, and by courts with subordinate jurisdiction to that of the Supreme Court. (2) The decisions of the Court of Appeal shall be enforced in any part of the Federation by all authorities and persons, and by courts with subordinate jurisdiction to that of the Court of Appeal. (3) The decisions of the Federal High Court, the National Industrial Court, a High Court and of all other courts established by this Constitution shall be enforced in any part of the Federation by all authorities and persons, and by other courts of law with subordinate jurisdiction to that of the Federal High Court, the National Industrial Court, a High Court and those other courts, respectively. 126. Section 287 is a constitutional provision. It provides that the decisions of the courts (including the NICN) “shall be enforced in any part of the Federation by all authorities and persons”. “All authorities and persons” of course includes the CBN. Section 287 did not impose any condition before the said enforcement can be made by “all authorities and persons”. Why should the SCPA, an Act inferior to the Constitution, impose the condition it did in section 84? Section 1 of the 1999 Constitution is very clear as to the supremacy of the Constitution over all authorities and persons, and over all other laws. See Mr Selekowei Robert Yelebe & ors v. AG of Bayelsa State & anor [2020] LPELR-51039(CA). It cannot accordingly be that section 84 of the SCPA would impose a condition that would render section 287 of the 1999 Constitution sterile. 127. On the whole I go with the Supreme Court decision in Interstella as well as its rationalisation by the Court of Appeal in CBN v. Aminu Umar & ors; and of course the recent decision in CBN v. Mr Jerome A. Eze & ors. I accordingly hold that the CBN, the garnishee in the instant case, is not a public officer within the context of section 84 of the SCPA. As such, the consent of the HAGF is not needed before a garnishee order can issue against the CBN. The preliminary objection of the garnishee accordingly fails and so is hereby dismissed. Decision of the Court on Whether to Make the Garnishee Order Nisi Absolute 128. I now proceed to the question whether this Court can make absolute the garnishee order nisi it made on 2 December 2020 given that both the 1st to 3rd judgment debtors’ motion and the garnishee’s preliminary objection have been dismissed. I pointed out earlier that the garnishee on 5 March 2021 filed an affidavit of cause that met the terms of the order nisi. Incidentally, the garnishee in its affidavit of cause merely reiterated the arguments it advanced in its preliminary objection that has just been dismissed. This means that effectively, the garnishee has not succeeded in showing any cause why the garnishee order nisi should not be made absolute. 129. In the three cases of Polaris Bank v. Gumau & ors [2019] LPELR-47066(CA)1 at 34-37, Sterling Bank Plc v. Gumau & ors [2019] LPELR-47067(CA) 1 at 19-35 and Fidelity Bank Plc v. Gumau & anor [2019] LPELR-47068(CA), His Lordship, Abiru JCA provided when a garnishee order nisi can be made absolute. In his words: …where a judgment creditor gives specific and clear facts in an affidavit showing that monies of a judgment debtor are in the hands of a garnishee, and the affidavit to show cause of the garnishee denying liability fails to condescend on material particulars and does not conflict with the facts deposed by the judgment creditor, the trial Court can proceed to make an order of garnishee absolute, notwithstanding the affidavit to show cause - Skye Bank Plc v. Colombara & anor [2014] LPELR-22641(CA), Governor of Imo State v. Ogoh [2015] LPELR-25949(CA), Access Bank Plc v. Adewusi [2017] LPELR-43495(CA), First Bank of Nigeria Plc v. Okon [2017] LPELR-43530(CA), Heritage Bank Ltd v. Interlagos Oil Ltd [2018] LPELR-44801(CA), First Bank of Nigeria Plc v. Yegwa [2018] LPELR-45997(CA). 130. The judgment creditor's affidavit is clear in asserting that the garnishee holds the judgment debtors’ money. In his “Affidavit to Garnishee’s Further and Better Affidavit to Show Cause Filed on 5th March 2021”, the judgment creditor averred that the garnishee is the banker of the Federal Government and the judgment debtors particularly the 1st judgment debtor. And in paragraph 6, the judgment creditor even gave the account number and name of the 1st judgment debtor with the garnishee as follows: Name: The Nigerian Army Account Number: 0150459961048 Bank: Central bank of Nigeria (CBN) The garnishee did not contest these facts. There is no countering affidavit or statement from the garnishee showing that this account number is either non-existent or wrong. I take it, and so hold, that the account exists in that number and is true of the 1st judgment debtor’s banking relationship with the garnishee. There is accordingly no impediment to making the garnishee order nisi of 2 December 2020 absolute. The only issue is whether to make it conditional or not. 131. The judgment debtor drew this Court’s attention to the fact that they are before the Court of Appeal regarding the judgment of 27 May 2020 of this Court. I indicated that by section 47 of the NIC Act 2006, an appeal does not act as a stay but that does not prelude this Court from granting a stay on terms. In praying for the garnishee order, the judgment creditor had prayed in relief (3) for the sum of Eighty-Two Million, Five Hundred Thousand Naira only (N82,500,000.00) as the judgment debt being the N75 Million judgment debt plus simple interest at 10%. This is the sum that the garnishee order nisi was issued in respect of. 132. The judgment creditor also in relief (4) prayed for an order of this Court that the garnishee pay to the judgment creditor’s Account No: 6567231014 with Account Name: Akanni Benedict Otusoji which is domiciled with First City Monument Bank (FCMB) the said sum of Eighty-Two Million, Five Hundred Thousand Naira only (N82,500,000.00). 133. I find the application of the judgment creditor for the order nisi of 2 December 2020 to be made absolute meritorious. I hereby grant it and so make the following orders: (a) The garnishee order nisi of 2 December 2020 made by this Court in this matter in respect of the sum of Eighty-Two Million, Five Hundred Thousand Naira only (N82,500,000.00) to be paid by the garnishee to the judgment creditor is hereby made absolute but on terms. (b) The garnishee shall forthwith pay to the Chief Registrar of this Court (National Industrial Court of Nigeria) the said sum of Eighty-Two Million, Five Hundred Thousand Naira only (N82,500,000.00) being the judgment sum plus interest in satisfaction of the judgment of this Court delivered on 27 May 2020 in favor of the judgment creditor. (c) The Chief Registrar of this Court shall deposit the said Eighty-Two Million, Five Hundred Thousand Naira only (N82,500,000.00) in an interest yielding account in a reputable commercial bank awaiting the outcome of the Court of Appeal decision over this matter. (d) The successful party at the Court of Appeal shall then be paid the said Eighty-Two Million, Five Hundred Thousand Naira only (N82,500,000.00) so deposited plus accrued interest at the conclusion of the appeal before the Court of Appeal. 134. Judgment is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip, PhD