JUDGMENT 1. This judgment was initially fixed to be delivered on 2/4/2020, however, due the lockdown as a result of the outbreak of coronavirus COVID -19 the judgment could not be delivered on that date till today. 2. The claimant approached this Court via complaint dated 22/12/2017 and filed 27/12/2017. The complaint was accompanied with Statement of facts, witness statement on oath, list of witnesses, list of documents and photocopies of documents to be relied on at trial. The claimant vide this action is seeking for the following reliefs;- a. DECLARATION that the purported termination of appointment of the claimant by the Defendant is premature, wrongful at law and contrary to the condition of service of the Defendant. b. A DECLARATION that the purported termination of the Claimant’s appointment negates all agreement reached between the Claimant’s Union and Defendant and therefor wrongful, null and void. c. A DECLARATION that the purported termination amounts to a breach of agreement. d. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court compelling the Defendant with immediate effect to pay the Claimant all his annual leave allowances which has been due from the time of employment till the purported termination of appointment. e. AN ORDER of this Honourable court directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant all his entitlements, gratuity, severance package, all benefits flowing from such termination and all pension funds deducted from the Claimant’s salary from the time of his employment till December 2016 and when his appointment was purportedly terminated. f. AN ORDER of this Honourable court directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of N15, 000,000.00 (Fifteen Million Naira) only for the severe hardship and serious psychological trauma which the action of the Defendant has plunged them into. g. AND FOR ANY FURTHER ORDERS as this Honourable court may deem fit to make in the circumstances. 3. The Defendant entered appearance on 03/01/2018 and with leave of court granted on 22/02/2018, the defendant’s statement of defence dated 26/01/2018 was filed on the 27/01/2018. The statement of defence was accompanied by a written statement on Oath, Defendant’s list of witnesses, Defendant’s list of documents, photocopies of document to be relied on at the trial. CASE OF THE CLAIMANT 4. The Claimant opened his case on 28/06/2018, wherein he testified as CW1. After adopting his witness statement on oath, CW1, tendered in the course of giving evidence in chief 7 documents which were admitted in evidence and marked as exhibits CW1A1-2, CW1B1-12, CW1C1-3, CW1D, CW1E1-2, CW1F and CWG. Another document was tendered in evidence in course of cross-examination; the document was admitted in evidence as exhibit CWH. The claimant also adopted his witness statement on Oath as his testimony before the Court in proof of his case. 5. From the statement of facts, witness statement on Oath and the oral testimony, the case of the Claimant was that he was employed by the Defendant on 5th of January 2009 as a trainee dealer. That there has been an on-going tussle between the defendant and workers of the defendant, one of such dispute which arose was mediated upon by the Federal Ministry of Labour and Employment in which a communiqué was reached between the parties. CW testified that the Defendant had made frequent deductions and meant for remittance to Pension Funds Managers, but the said deductions were not reflected in the pension Managers account and were never remitted. The claimant stated that he had reported to work as usual on the 22nd of December 2016 but was denied access to his duty post without explanation. Claimant testified that the Defendant has a written disciplinary guide which was never complied with by the Defendant and that he was never given any opportunity whatsoever to defend himself. The claimant further stated that when the Defendants came up with the idea of laying off staff, the Union representing the employees of the Defendant had come up with some conditions in line with the labour laws, however despite the agreement between all parties to enforce a 5% cut in salaries in place of mass lay off, defendant breached the agreement and still laid off the claimant in December 2016. The claimant stated that in line with the Defendant’s handbook, he had never been issued any form of warning in the past to warrant his termination and that no reason was ever stated for the said termination. The claimant believes that his termination was merely done out of malice as his termination is against the rules and laws of Nigeria and repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience and that the action of the Defendant has plunged him into severe hardship and psychological trauma. The Claimant prays the Court to grant his reliefs as stated on his complaint. 6. Under cross-examination, CW1 testified that he signed exhibit CW1B1-12 on 1/7/14, and that his relationship with the Defendant is regulated by this document. CW1 testified that he was never paid any leave allowance and he did not acknowledge any payments and the signature on the document shown to him was his signature. CW1 testified that indeed it was true that his salary was paid through his GTB; it is through his GT BANK account number 0024523278. He stated that his passport photograph was pasted by the defendants. CW1 further testified that it is not correct that they had several meetings with defendant before the payment of redundancy and that he cannot remember paragraphs 24, 25, 26 and 27. He testified that he did not work for the Defendant from December 2016 to date. THE CASE OF THE DEFENDANTS 7. The Defendant opened its case on 05/03/2019 wherein Hafis Olayinka Adenekan the General Manager of the Defendant company testified as DW1, He tendered 7 documents in evidence before the Court and the said documents admitted in evidence were marked as exhibits DWA1-2, DWB1-2, DWC1-3, DWD, DWE, CWF and DW1G. While Bloosan Renigan testified as DW2 on 23/9/2019 upon the subpoena issued by the Court, she was a staff of ARM pension. The witness tendered two documents in evidence they were admitted as exhibits DW21-6. 8. In the evidence of DW1 it was stated that the claimant was affected by redundancy due to the in ability of the Defendant to meet its obligations based on lack of patronage of its Casino business and also, for lack of patronage the Defendant was forced to shut down 4 (Four) out of its 9 (Nine) Business Tables at the Abuja office and the Claimant was aware of the challenges faced by the Defendant occasioned by lack of patronage of its business and that based on the circumstances the Defendant was unable to meet its obligation to its Landlord as rent was constantly in arrears for lack of patronage. DW1, further testified that the Defendant proposed a 10% (Ten Percent) salary cut because of the Economic challenges being encountered by the Defendant but the proposal was rejected by the Claimant. The Claimant insisted on a 5% (Five Percent) deduction which was not sustainable by the Defendant. The Claimant was invited by the Defendant but the claimant refused to accept his letter of redundancy. However, the Claimant’s entitlements were paid to him through his usual Bankers, Guaranty Trust Bank being a total sum of N193.168 (One Hundred and Ninety-Three Thousand One Hundred and Sixty-Eighty Naira) only. The above sum covers N150,000.00 (One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira) only being the Claimant’s 3 Months Gross Salary and N43,168.00 (Forty-Three Thousand One Hundred and Sixty-Eight Naira) only being the Claimant’s entitlement 17 Public holidays 2 PH Days payment. DW1, testified that the claimant does not deserve any of the reliefs sought as its redundancy policy was not borne out of malice and was carried out in good faith. DW1, urged the court to reject the claimant’s suit as it is malicious and vexatious. 9. Under cross examination DW1 testified that he joined the Defendant in October, 2008 and that he was posted to Lagos. He stated that the claimant was entitled to leave and that the Defendant Company gives annual leave. He testified that the claimant joined the company between 2008 and 2009. He testified that after redundancy they pasted claimant’s passport on the wall of the premises. He further testified that they indeed took their grievances to Ministry of Labour. A document was shown to DW1 and he acknowledged same, the said document was tendered in evidence and admitted as exhibit DWE- LETTER OF REDUNDANCY DATED 22/12/16. 10. Under re-examination DW1, testified that redundancy is not termination. THE SUBMISSION OF THE DEFENDANT. 11. John Abah Augustine, Esq; counsel for the defendant filed his final written address dated 12/11/19 and adopted same on 21/1/2020, in the said address counsel outlined 2 issues for determination by the court. The said issues were; 1. Whether the Claimant has successfully proved his claim against the Defendant which will entitle the Claimant to the reliefs sought? 2. The effect of a party who fail to adduce reliable and credible evidence to prove his case in Court. 12. In arguing issue 1; Whether the Claimant has successfully proved his claim against the Defendant which will entitle the Claimant to the reliefs sought? Counsel contended that none of the documents tendered by the claimant supports, let alone establishes, the case of the Claimant and that the Claimant’s allegation that his appointment was terminated by the Defendant as reflected in the claims before this Court particularly paragraph A, B, C, D and F are spurious, specious, misleading and unfounded. In support of this contention counsel relied on the cases of FEDERAL COLLEGE OF EDUCATION V AKINYEMI (2009) ALL FWLR (PT. 465) PG 1791 PARAG. 9 and ENECHUKWU V NNAMANI (2009) ALL FWLR (PT 492) PG 1093 PARAG. 12. Counsel further argued that the Claimant himself under cross examination admitted knowing that the exercise carried out by the Defendant was a Redundancy and not Termination as contained in his claims. Counsel argued that the position of the Law is that, where a fact or facts are pleaded and no evidence is led to prove them, no onus shifts to the other party to disprove the fact or facts that have not been established. In support of this contention counsel relied on the case of SMITHKLI NE BEECHAM PLC V. FARMEX LIMITED (2009) ALL FWLR (PT 477) PG 568 PARAG. 9. 13. Furthermore, counsel argued that the Claimant at paragraphs 5, 6, 11, and 17 of his Statement of Facts and paragraphs 5, 6, and 11 of his Witness Statement on Oath, placed heavy reliance on Exhibit CW1A1-2 (Letter of employment dated 5th January, 2009) and Exhibit CWIB 1-12 (Contract of employment dated 1st July, 2014) in a futile attempt to prove his claims, however a perusal of the two documents (i.e. Letter of employment dated 5th January, 2009; Contract of employment dated 1st July, 2014) reveals that they are mere pieces of papers of no evidential and probative value to the case of the Claimant as same are not signed by the parties, particularly by the Claimant. Counsel placed reliance on Clause 16 paragraph 3 of the Exhibits CW1B 1-12 (Contract of employment dated 1st July, 2014) and clause 4 of Exhibit CW1A1-2 (Letter of employment dated 5th January, 2009). Counsel submitted that the consequence of not signing said documents is that the relationship between the parties is merely parole and not regulated by any written agreement and hence the court should not place any value on same. Counsel relied on the principle that an unsigned document is worthless. On this contention reliancewas placed on the case of EDILCO (NIG) LTD V. U. B. A. PLC (2000) FWLR (PT 21) 792 ratio 3 and Section 251 of the Evidence Act 2011; ACN V. NYAKO (2012) 52 (PT 2) NSCOQ 560 at 618; ANYANWU V. MBARA (1919) 5 NWLR (Pt. 242) 386 SC. 14. Counsel urged the Court to look at Exhibit CW1F (Communiqué dated 22nd day of March 2016) which revealed that all the grievances of the Claimant were captured. The only issue in contention on leave allowance was that henceforth the Claimant’s leave allowance be paid in bulk rather than the practice of payment in piece-meal along with the Claimant’s Monthly salary. Counsel submitted that EXHIBIT CW1H contained acknowledgment by the claimant of payment of his leave days on 12th September, 2016 by the Defendant. 15. Counsel argued that claimant’s failure to object to the evidence adduced by the subpoenaed witness makes it clear that said EXHIBIT DW2, 1-6 should be relied and acted upon by the court. On this contention counsel relied on the case of CHIEF SUNDAY OGUNYADE V. SOLOMON OLUYEMI OSHUNKEYE & ANOR. (2018)LPELR44344 SC. 16. Counsel further submitted that the Claimant having been affected by the redundancy policy of the Defendant in the month of December, 2016 and further admitted under cross examination that from the Month of December till date he has not worked for the Defendant is not entitled to any salary from the month of December 2016. And that It is a settled Law that an Employee cannot claim for salary for periods no longer in employment. on this contention counsel relied on the case of SPRING BANK V. BABATUNDE (2012) ALL FWLR (PT. 609) 1191 at 1205. 17. Counsel further argued that on the issue of payment of the alleged Claimant’s redundancy benefits, there is nothing before this Honourable court stating the actual benefits of the Claimant as the claim is vague. The Supreme Court has cautioned that a claim for salary, allowances and the like without any particularization as to show how the sum was earned and arrived at makes such a claim as vague and that in this case claimant has failed in particularization of his alleged redundancy benefit. On this submission reliance was plaved on the case of UNIVERSITYOF JOS V.DR. M. C. IKEGWUOHA (2013) 9 NWLR (PT. 1360) 478. 18. Counsel submits that the Claimant Exhibits before this Honourable Court are at variance with the oral testimony of the Claimant. This is because there is no evidence before this court proving that the Defendant terminated the Claimant’s appointment. It is submitted that where there is oral evidence as well as documentary evidence, documentary evidence should be used as hanger on which to assess oral testimony. On this counsel relied on the decision in the case of INTERCONTINENTAL BANK FOR WEST AFRICA LTD V. JOHNSON ELUE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY LIMITED & 1 OR (2004) 7 NWLR (PT. 873) PG 601 AT 604. 19. Counsel further submitted that the Defendant in paragraphs 2, 4 and 8 of its Statement of Defence informed the Claimant of its resolved to carry out redundancy based on lack of patronage of her business. The above fact was not countered by the Claimant. Thus, an admitted fact need no further proof as held in JOSEPH MANGTUP DIN V AFRICAN NEWSPAPER OF NIG. LTD (1990) 5 SC (PT 11); (1990) 3 NWLR (PT139) 392 and NARINDEX TRUST LTD V NICMB LTD (2001) ALL FWLR (PT 49) 1546. And that the above act of the Defendant is the fundamental requirement prior to any redundancy as contained in section 20 (1) (a) of the Labour Act, which states that the employer shall inform the trade union or workers’ representative concerned of the reasons for and the extend of the anticipated redundancy. The defendant in carrying out its redundancy policy that affected the Claimant took into consideration among other factors as contained in its statement of defence Last in, first out, merit, skill, ability and reliability. 20. Counsel argued that in the instant case, there is nowhere both from documentary and oral evidence where the Claimant has proved that the Defendant’s action caused severe hardship and psychological trauma to warrant claims for general and punitive damages. 21. Counsel submitted that from the totality of the evidence by the Claimant in this Court, there is exaggeration, unreasonableness, oppressive, unconscionable in his demand for damages. 22. Counsel urged the court to dismiss the claim of the Claimant because the evidence in support of the claims is unreliable and incredible. More so, the Claimant has failed to prove his claims against the Defendant. 23. In arguing issue 2; the effect of a party who failed to adduce reliable and credible evidence to prove his case in Court. Counsel argued that the claimant having failed to adduce evidence of termination by the Defendant cannot claim that his appointment was wrongfully terminated by the Defendant. Counsel relied on the principle; that a party who desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependant on the existence of fact, which he asserts, must prove that those facts actually exist. Refer to Section 131 (1) of the Evidence Act Cap E14 (2011). IYERE V. BFFM LTD (2001) FWLR (Pt. 37) 1166 CA; G. & T. INVEST. LTD V WITT & BUSH LTD (2011)8 NWLR (Pt. 1250)500 SC. 24. Counsel submitted that the claimant also failed to specifically prove his entitlement by particularizing them and proving same. This is because a claim that is vague and lack certainty is no claim at all. See the case of UNIJOS v DR. M.C. IKEGWUOHA (2013) 9 NWLR PT 1360, OG 478 AT 483 RATIO 3: The Court held that “For a party to be awarded any relief by a court of Law, that party must not only plead with particularity but must also prove by credible and convincing evidence that he is indeed entitled to the relief he seeks.” 25. Counsel submitted that claims number a, b and c are all declaratory reliefs which are not granted as a matter of course but proved by credible evidence which is non-existence in the evidence of the Claimant before the Court. Counsel urged the court to dismiss the claim of the Claimant THE SUBMISSION OF THE CLAIMANT. 26. Emmanuel Bisong, Esq. counsel that appeared for the claimant on 21/1/2020, adfopted the claimant’s final written address dated and filed 4/12/19. In the written address two issues were outlined for determination by the Honourable Court, to wit: 1. Whether the Defendant did not follow due procedures at the time it determined the Claimant’s employment through the redundancy exercise of 22nd December, 2016. 2. Whether the Claimant having been affected by redundancy is entitled to all benefits that accrue to her as defendant’s employee, who has been affected by the redundancy exercise of 22nd December, 2016. 27. The two issues formulated by counsel for the claimant in the written address were argued together. It is contended that the claimant brought this suit for sundry claims arising from the fact that he was thrown out of service and barred from entering the defendant’s premises without being issued with a termination or letter of redundancy. The Defendant confirmed the fact that the claimant was never given a letter of disengagement or granted access to defendant office premises and in this contest. 28. Counsel refers to section 20 of the Labour Act and submitted that "redundancy" means an involuntary and permanent loss of employment caused by an excess of manpower. 29. Counsel argued that In line with sub paragraphs 1, 2 & 3 of section 20 of the Labour Act, it follows that, if the defendant has place the claimant on redundancy the law and procedure relating to same ought to be followed. This law is to the effect that the defendant shall inform the claimant’s trade union or workers' representative concerned of the reasons for and the extent of the anticipated redundancy 2. That the defendant is mandatorily required to follow the principle of "last in, first out" in the discharge of the particular category of workers affected and 3. That the defendant shall use his best endeavours to negotiate redundancy payments with the claimant in that the claimant employment is not one with statutory flavor. 30. Counsel argued that It has already been established in evidence that the claimant was prevented from resuming work from the 22nd December, 2016 till date and his passport photograph was pasted at the defendant’s premises barring the claimant from ever accessing the defendant’s premises on alleged account of threat to life on its expatriate staff, Counsel further argued that the defendant did not place before the court any evidence on how the alleged payment was communicated to the claimant, although it tendered in evidence exhibit DW2 being some computer generated documents with a GT bank logo on them. The computer generated documents were meant to show that it paid the claimant the sum of N150,000 plus N43,168 through it’s bank account with GT bank. And the bank official alleged to have attempted to confirm the payment was a vital witness and as vital as he is the defendant refused to call him as a witness, therefore the Court ought not to place any evidential value on those documents. 31. Counsel submitted that DW1 is not a competent witness to tender a GT Bank Bankers book by the provision of section 89(h) of the Evidence Act, 2011. DW1 is not being a Banker with GT Bank is not a competent witness to tender or testify on a bankers book and therefore the court is urged to expunge the said documents from its record as it was wrongly admitted. 32. Counsel further submitted that the Claimant was disengaged in a way not contemplated by the contract of employment between parties. Under the Law where an employee is affected by redundancy he shall be entitled to full redundancy benefits but this was never the case here and to arrive at the redundancy benefit the law says the employer shall use his best endeavours amongst other factors negotiate redundancy payments with the discharged claimant since her employment has no statutory flavor. The claimant was not paid any redundancy benefits 33. Counsel argued that the defendant contended that it invited the claimant but claimant refused to come and accept its letter of redundancy. The said invitation is not before the court and no attempt was made to tender it or lead evidence on it. It is in evidence that the claimant came to work on the 22nd December, 2016 but was refused entry to resume work from the said day. The defendant admitted this at paragraph 15 of its statement of defence. 34. Counsel argued that the effect of the admittance at paragraph 15 of the statement of defence is that with the pasting of that claimant’s photograph, claimant was never allowed entry into defendant’s premises till date. There is however, nothing before the court to show that the claimant threatened the defendant’s expatriate staff. There is nothing before the court to show that the defendant has ever invited the claimant either by a written letter, text message, email, phone call, orally or any mode of any other mode of communication known in our era to come and collect her redundancy letter or benefits. 35. On pension remittance counsel contended that the documents relied by the defendant exhibits DW2, 1-6 contradicts itself on the quantum of remitted claimant’s pension contribution. Counsel urged the court not to rely on these two documents or place any probative value on them. The defendant should remit to Arm Pensions all the claimant’s pension contributions from 2009 till the date his employment was determined. The document titled Re: Urgent Request and Exhibits CWA as well the document tendered through the subpoena witness are computer generated documents 36. As computer generated documents it is counsel’s contention that the said documents did not comply with the provisions of the law at the time there were wrongly admitted. See KUBOR & ANOR V. DICKSON & 2 ORS (2012) LPELR-15364(CA) and Section 84(2) provides for the conditions to be satisfied in relation to the statement and computer from which the documents sought to be admitted were produced, however In the instant case the said documents being computer generated documents ought to meet the above requirements and failure to meet same is fatal. Counsel relied on Olukade v. Alade (1976) 2 SC 183, where the apex court summarised the general rule on the effect of the admission of inadmissible evidence thus:- A court is expected in all proceedings before it to admit and act only on evidence which is admissible in law. (i.e. under the Evidence Act or any other law or enactment relevant in any particular case or matter) and so if the court should inadvertently admit inadmissible evidence it has the duty not to act upon it.? This rule is very strict. Thus where a court wrongfully admits inadmissible evidence, it ought as a duty, to disregard the inadmissible evidence in the consideration of the judgment in the matter. Where such evidence has been wrongfully admitted and acted upon and whether or not the opposing party objects or not, an appellate court has the duty to exclude such evidence and decide the case only on the legally admissible evidence. See Timitimi v. Amabebe (1953) 14 WACA 374, Ajayi v. Fisher (1956) I FSC 90; (1956) SCNLR 279." PER MUSDAPHER, J.S.C. (P.19, Paras.B-F). 37. Counsel urged the court to visit these documents with the vice that accompanies such defects in admissibility of documentary evidence. 38. It is the contention of cunsel tha the claimant has not been adequately paid benefits that flows from the determination of her employment. Counsel submitted that assuming, without conceding that the court finds that the alleged bank transactions were indeed confirmed, verified and have passed through necessary fraud checks as contained at the bottom of the exhibit and properly tendered in evidence, it is claimant’s contention that the alleged payment was not adequate on the face of it. The defendant has contended that the claimant was affected by redundancy on the 22nd December, 2016. And tendered exhibits DW2 in evidence. In its written address the defendant contended that it paid the claimant the sum of N50,000 multiply by 3 months plus another N43,168.00 as leave days. The exhibit shows that the defendant made an alleged online transfer of N150,000 as 3 months gross salary of the claimant and It is however not in evidence that the alleged payment was ever confirmed, verified or passed through necessary fraud checks by a known GT bank official or that such alleged payment was ever communicated to the claimant or that the alleged payment ever reached the claimant 39. Counsel further argued that on cross examination, the DW1 the defendant’s general manager Mr. Hafis Olayinka Adenekan, informed this court that he did not know the balance of the defendant’s account at the time he DW1 made this transfers. He equally, did not know the balance of its account after he made said transfers. Worse still the defendant did not put in evidence its statement of account showing its account opening balance and the closing balance before and after the alleged transfers were made. On this score alone the claimant’s defence that it paid the sum N150,000 to the Claimant should failed. This all the issues which the defendant conceded to and should be held unto it. 40. Counsel submitted that if the claimant was affected by redundancy as the defendant has averred and pleaded and gave evidence of the document exhibit DWE then the claimant ought be paid full redundancy benefits that flows from the terms and conditions pleaded in that document exhibit DWE. 41. Counsel argued that though the defendant listed exhibit DWE, in its list of documents, pleaded it at paragraph 14 of its pleadings and gave evidence on it at paragraph 16 of the written statement on oath of DW1, it nevertheless refused to tender same in evidence. It was tendered and admitted in evidence by the claimant in the course of cross examination through their witness DW1. Counsel therefore submitted that the failure of the defendant who pleaded and relied on the said document, but later refused to produce it in the course of the proceedings is fatal. On this contention counsel relied on W.A.C.C. Ltd. v. Caroline Poultry Farm Ltd. (2000) 2 NWLR (Pt.644), pg. 197, where the court held thus: "The respondent carefully avoided tendering that document and the presumption in law is that evidence which could be, and is not produced would, if produced, be unfavourable to the person who withholds it. See Section 149(d) of the Evidence Act."Per OGEBE, J.C.A.(P. 12, paras. A-B) 42. Counsel urged the court to construe the content of the document that the exhibit DWE against the defendant. 43. Counsel submitted that once the claimant succeed in its claims in whole or in part for any wrong done by defendant, then she is deemed at law to be entitled to damages for the wrong. Such damages need not be proof or proved to have been suffered. See MRS. T.C. CHUKWUMA V. MR. BABAWALE IFELOYE (2008) 12 SC (Pt. II) 291; (2008) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1118) 204 44. Counsel urged the court to hold that the claimant rightly relied on defendant’s evidence which supports his claims. And that the claimant is entitled to succeed in its reliefs and the court has the powers to make consequential orders where necessary. See Compt. Comm. & Ind. Ltd. v. OG.S.W.C. (2002) 9 NWLR (Pt.773) 629; (2002) 4 S.C (Pt.II) 86 this is what the supreme court said. "The power of the court to make consequential orders as the justice of a case demands on its own motion though to be exercised with circumspection, also exists." Per AYOOLA, J.S.C. (Pp. 12-13, paras. G-A). 45. Counsel urged the court to grant all the claimant’s reliefs as prayed. REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW TO THE CLAIMANT’S FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS 46. The Defendant’s counsel in his reply on points of law filed 19/12/19 to the claimant’s final written address replied on the following; 1. Whether Exhibit DW2 is a “Bankers Book” to warrant the invocation of sections 89(h) & 90(1)(e) of the Evidence Act 2011 as pontificated by the Claimant in paragraphs 2.07 to 2.17 of the Claimant’s Final Written Address. 2. Whether the document titled Re: Urgent Request and Exhibit CWA together with other documents tendered by the Subpoenaed have not satisfied the requirements of section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011as contended by the Claimant at paragraphs 2.28 to 2.35 of the Claimant’s Final Written Address. 47. In arguing the said outlined issue; Whether Exhibit DW2 is a “Bankers Book” to warrant the invocation of sections 89(h) & 90(1)(e) of the Evidence Act 2011 as pontificated by the Claimant in paragraphs 2.12 to 2.14 of the Claimant’s Final Written Address. Counsel argued that the Claimant in paragraph 2.14 of the Claimant Final Written Address contended among others that “DW1 is not a competent witness to tender a GTBank banker’s book showing the alleged transaction in exhibit DW1E-1-3”. He cited sections 89(h) & 90(1)(e) of the Evidence Act 2011 in support of his contention. 48. Counsel argued that this line of argument by the claimant is alarming and sheer misrepresentation of the position on computer generated documents and it is the Defendant’s contention that Exhibit DW2 is not secondary evidence as misconstrued by the Claimant. Secondary evidence by the provisions of section 87 of the Evidence Act includes, among others; (c) copies made from or compared with the original…” See AJA V. ODIN (2011) 5 NWLR (PT. 1242) 509. 49. Counsel further contended that Exhibit DW2 is not a Banker’s Book as contended by the Claimant. Section 258 of the Evidence Act defines Bankers Book thus; “banker’s book (and other related expression) includes ledgers, day book, cash book, account book books and all other books used in banking business”. See FRN V. FANI KAYODE (2011) ALL FWLR (PT.534)181. In U.B.N. PLC v. AGBONTAEN & ANOR (2018) LPELR-44160(CA) and that It is clear from the above that Exhibit DW2 being evidence of payment (i.e. receipt of online payment) cannot be classified as a banker’s book as recognized by the Evidence Act. Thus, the Claimant’s contention is specious and misguided. Counsel urged the court to disregard same. 50. Whether the document titled Re: Urgent Request and Exhibit DWA together with other documents tendered by the Subpoenaed Witness have not satisfied the requirements of section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011as contended by the Claimant at paragraphs 2.28 to 2.35 of the Claimant’s Final Written Address. 51. Counsel submitted that contrary to the contention of the Claimant, the document titled Re: Urgent Request and DWA together with other documents tendered by the Subpoenaed Witness have not satisfied the requirements of section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011 and that they said documents were admitted in error, the provisions of section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011 are plain on the admissibility of computer-generated evidence. 52. Counsel submitted that In any proceedings where it is desired to give a statement in evidence by virtue of this section, a certificate doing any of the following things, that is to say - (a) identifying the document containing the statement and describing the manner in which it was produced; (b) giving such particulars of any device involved in the production of that document as may be appropriate for the purpose of showing that the document was produced by a computer; (c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in Subsection (2) above relate, and purporting to be signed by a person occupying a responsible position in relation to the operation of the relevant device or the management of the relevant activities, as the case may be, shall be evidence of the matter stated in the certificate; and for the purpose of this subsection it shall be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person stating it. 53. Counsel submitted that from the above statutory provisions, all that that the law require is a certificate stating to the effect that the conditions set out in subsection 2 of section 84 have been complied with. See KUBOR VS. DICKSON (2013) 4 NWLR (PT. 1345) 534; 577 – 578; OMISORE VS. AREGBESOLA (2015) LPELR 24803 (SC); DICKSON VS. SYLVA (2016) LPELR 41257 (SC); U.B.N. PLC v. AGBONTAEN & ANOR (2018) LPELR-44160(CA) and that It is also important to note that Exhibits DW1-D and CWA (Certified true documents of ARM Pension urgent request of Accounts) were also tendered by DW 1 as a Certified public document having paid the requisite fees, along with other requirements. Counsel urged the Court to disregard the contention of the Claimant. Counsel argued that In response to paragraph 1.12, 1.13, 2.07, 2.08, 2.09, 2.10, 2.11, 2.12, 2.13 and 2.14 of the claimant’s final address, they referred the court to the case of Agagu v Mimiko (2009) ALL FWLR PT 462 page 1133 paragraph 3, where it was held thus: “Where inadmissible evidence is produced in evidence, it is the duty of the opponent or his counsel to object immediately to its admissibility. But, where such other party fails or neglected to raise any objection to its admissibility at the trial, he cannot thereafter object to its admissibility. Moreover, where the evidence complained of is admissible under certain conditions and the opposing party failed to object to its admissibility at trial court or tribunal or, by implication consented to its admissibility…..” 54. And also in response to the Claimant paragraph 1.14, 1.15, 1.16, 1.18, 1.19, 1.20, 2.04, 2.05, 2.06, 2.36, 2.37, 2.38, 2.39, 2.40, 2.43, 2.44 and 2.50 of the claimant’s final written address, Counsel referred the Court to the case of EMEJE v POSITIVE (2009) ALL FWLR PT 452 Page 1061 paragraph 1, where it was held thus: “A party must be consistent in stating his case and consistent in proving it. He will not be permitted to take one stance during the trial and turn round from that on appeal. For this will be tantamount to a volte-face in the claims of parties” 55. And in response to paragraph 2.45, 2.46, 2.47, 2.48 and 2.49 of the Claimant’s final address, the supreme court held in OYEDIRAN v ALI BIOSU 11 (1992) 6 NWLR (PT 249) 550 at 556 that a document that is pleaded but not tendered is deemed to have been abandoned. 56. Counsel submitted that in view of the aforesaid, the court ought to dismiss the claim of the Claimant because the evidence to support the claims of the Claimant is unreliable and incredible. More so, the Claimant has failed to prove his claims against the Defendant. COURT’S DECISION. 57. I have considered the processes filed in this suit as well as listened to oral submission of counsel for both parties canvassing in favour of their respective clients. 58. Both the claimant and the defendant in their respective final written addresses have each formulated twin issues for determination. However, after a careful perusal of the entire case file and all the processes filed, I am of the firm view that a sole issue can resolve the dispute between the parties, to wit: Whether the evidence adduced by the claimant will entitled the claiant to any of the reliefs sought. 59. Before delving into the merit of the case I shall dispose of certain preliminary issues that arose from the submissions of counsel in this case. 60. I shall begin by the issue of lack of reply to the statement of defence raised by counsel for the defendant in concluding part of his final written address. It is the contention of counsel for the defendant that the claimant did not file reply to the statement of defence within the time stipulated by the rules of court for doing so. Counsel contended that the reply to the statement of defence filed seven days after the expiry of the 14 days provided by the rules of court in Order 30 Rule 2(3) of the rules of this court has rendered the said reply incompetent before the court which means there is no competent reply to answer to the defence of the defendant. Counsel urged the court to hold that the failure of the claimant to ask for extension of time to file the reply out of time has made the reply not to be properly before the court and it should be discountenanced. 61. In reply counsel for the claimant calls in the aid of the record of proceedings of the court. It was submitted that the defendant filed its statement of defence on 5/2/2018 along with motion on notice for extension of time. The defendant’s motion on notice for extension of time was taken and granted on 22/2/2018. The time for the claimant to file its reply, began to count after the court deemed the defendant’s processes as being properly filed and served on 22/2/2018. 62. The record of proceedings of the court on 22/2/2018, bears witness to the fact that the defendant moved its application for extension of time to file statement of defence out of tme and deeming the said defence properly filed and served. The application was granted due to lack of opposition from the counsel for the defendant. This means that by law the defendant filed statement of defence on 22/2/2018 and same was served on the claimant on that date. This means time for fling of reply to the statement of defence started counting on 23/2/2018. Therefore the filing of reply by the claimant on 26/2/2018 four days after the grant of extension of time and deeming order was on time. The claimant was not out of time to necessitate seeking for extension of time to file defence out of time. In the circumstance I hold that the claimant has not breached the rules of court as being canvassed by the counsel for the defendant. The objection of the defendant is misconceived same is hereby overruled. 63. Another issue that has generated much heated argument by counsel is the issue of admissibility of exhibits DWB1-2, according to counsel for the claimant exhibit CWB1-2, was wrongly admitted in evidence and it should be expunged or discountenanced. Counsel contended that the exhibit is made up of computer generated receipts of GT Bank and did not comply with section 84 of the evidence Act. Counsel further argued that there is a disclaimer on the online generated document and most unfortunately it has not been subjected to GT Bank verification or fraud checks as the bank officer who attempted doing so refused to state his name on the document to indicate he in fact confirmed or verified the transaction alleged in the payment counsel concluded that the signature was an afterthought. As a transaction cannot be said to have been confirmed or verified by an unknown officer who refused to disclose his identity. 64. Another angle of counsel’s argument was that DW1 is not a competent witness to tender exhibit DWB1-2, in evidence which is a GT Bankers Book showing alleged transaction. According to counsel section 89(h) of the Evidence Act provides that secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition or content of a document when the document is an entry in a Banker’s book. Exhibit DWB1-2, being a computer generated document is secondary document in the the soft copy is of the transaction therein is with GT Bank who keeps and maintain custody of the defendant’s account from when these transactions were alleged. By virtue of section 90(1) of the Evidence Act, copies of an entry in banker’s book cannot be received in evidence unless it be first proved that the book in which entries were copied from was at the time of the making one of the ordinary books of the bank; and that the entry was made in the usual and ordinary course of business; and that the book is in the custody and control of the bank which proof may be given orally or by affidavit by an officer of the bank and that the copy was examined with the original and is correct, which proof must be given by some person who has examined the copy with the original entry and may be given orally or by affidavit. Counsel urged the court to expunged exhibit DWB1-2, from the record of the court as the witness that tendered it is not a competent witness. 65. In his response counsel for the defendant contended that exhibit DWB1-2, is not a secondary, rather it is original being evidence of online transaction showing payment of money. Hence provisions of sections 89 and 90 of the Evidence Act are not applicable. Counsel contended there is no classification of primary or secondary with respect to computer generated documents. The law does not recognize such classification provided conditions of admissibility are satisfied except such computer generated evidence is reproduced e.g photocopy. To buttress his contention counsel relied on the decisions in the cases of FRN V Fani koyode (2011) AL FWLR (Pt.534) 181, UBN Plc V Agbontaen & Anr. (2018) LPELR-44160(CA). Counsel also contended that exhibit DWB1-2, is not a Banker’s Book. 66. I have deeply considered the submission of counsel for both sides on the admissibility of exhibit DWB1-2, which is a receipt evidencing transfer of funds from one Bank Account to another Bank account, made online. It is common ground among counsel that exhibit DWB1-2 is a computer generated document. With this concordance it is baffling that counsel for the claimant will at the same time argue that the same document which he has agreed to be a computer generated document is a Banker’s Book. 67. I have no reason not to agree with both counsel that exhibit DWB1-2, is a computer generated document having been evidence of online payment which is internet based. 68. It is now well settled beyond any reproach that the admissibility of computer generated document or document downloaded via internet is governed by the provisions of section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011. By provision of section 84(1) of the Evidence Act, in any proceeding, a statement contained in a document produced by a computer shall be admissible as evidence of any fact stated in it of which direct oral evidence would be admissible if it is shown that the following conditions are satisfied in relation to the statement and the computer in question; that is: (a) That the document containing the statement was produced by the computer during a period over which the computer was used regularly to store or process information for the purposes of any activities regularly carried on over that period, whether for profit or not, by anybody, whether corporate or not or by any individual; and (b) That over that period there was regularly supplied to the computer in the ordinary course of those activities information of the kind contained in the statement or of the kind from which the information so contained is derived; and (c) That throughout the material part of that period, the computer was operating properly or, if not, that in any respect in which it was not operating properly or was out of operation during that part of that period was not such as to affect the production of the document or the accuracy of its content; and (d) That the information contained in the statement reproduces or is derived from information supplied to the computer in the ordinary course of those activities. 69. A party that seeks to tender in evidence a computer generated document needs to satisfy the court of fulfilement of the above stated conditions. The defendant has tendered exhibit DW1A1-2, certificate of compliance with section 84 of the evidence Act, I have perused the certificate in my view it has substantially complied with the conditions containec in the provisions of section 84 of the evidence act 2011. 70. Having found exhibit DWB1-2 to have been admitted in evidence on due fulfilement of the conditions stipulated in section 84 of the Evidence Act I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that exhibit DWB1-2, is properly before the court and there is no justification for expunging or discountenancing it. 71. In the recent case of Kubor v. Dickson (2013) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1345) P. 534 @ 579, the Supreme Court had the occasion to pronounce on the provisions of Section 84 of the Evidence Act, 2011 wherein Onnoghen JSC, (as he then was), lucidly expressed the position of the admissibility of computer-generated evidence especially documentary, under Section 84 of the Evidence Act, 2011. 72. Having dealt with the two preliminary issues I shall proceed to determine the merit of the claimant’s suit. 73. From the pleading, witness statement on oaths and the reliefs being sought by the claimant, the claimant is praying for declarations that the termination of his employment by the defendant was premature, wrongful and contrary to agreement reached by the defendant and the claimant’s union. He is also praying for compelling the defendant to pay him his entitlement, leave allowances, pension and damages. 74. The law has been settled by plethora of case law that a claim is circumscribed by the reliefs claimed; and the duty of a claimant, therefore, is to plead only such facts and materials as are necessary to sustain the reliefs and adduce evidence to prove same. See Gabriel Ativie v. Kabelmetal (Nig.) Ltd  LPELR-591(SC);  10 NWLR (Pt. 1095) 399;  5 - 6 SC (Pt. II) 47. The law is as well settled that when an employee complains that his employment has been wrongfully terminated, that employee has the onus:- (a) to place before the court terms and conditions of the contract of employment; and (b) to prove in what manner the said terms were breached by the employer. 75. The term of contract of service is the bedrock of any case where the issue of wrongful termination of employment is for determination. See Amodu v. Amode (1990) 5 NWLR (Pt.150) 356; Iwuchukwu v. Nwizu (1994) 7 NWLR (Pt.357) 379 at 412. In Amodu v. Amode (supra) Agbaje. JSC who read the leading judgment observed at page 370 as follows:- "It appears clear to me that since it is the plaintiff's case that his dismissal by the defendants is not in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract of service between them it is for the plaintiff to plead and prove the conditions of service regulating the contract of service in question." Wali, JSC (of blessed memory) added his voice at page 373, when he said: "The term of the contract of service is the bedrock of the appellant's case." 76. As the contract of service is the bedrock upon which an aggrieved employee must found his case, he succeeds or fails upon the terms thereof. Therefore, in a written or documented contract of service, like in the case at hand the court will not and should not look outside the terms stipulated or agreed therein in deciding the rights and obligations of the parties:- See Western Nigerian Development Corporation v. Abimbola (1966) 4 NSCC 172 at 188. (1966) 1 ALL NLR 159. In that case, the Supreme Court held at page 194 of the report inter alia as follows:- "That the provisions of a written contract of service bind the parties thereto and it was outside the province of the learned Judge to look at anywhere for terms of termination of the contract other than in the contract agreement." 77. The claimant in this case in an effort to prove his case tendered his letters of employment dated 5/1/2009, exhibit CW1A1-2, contract on employment dated 1/7/2014, exhibit CW1B1-12, three salary pay slips exhibit CW1C1-3, Photocopy of communiqué of 17/12/2013, exhibit CW1D, photocopy of letter dated 9/5/16, exhibit CW1E1-2, employee Handbook, exhibit CW1F, Disciplinary guidelines exhibit CW1G, letter of acknowledgement of payment of leave exhibit CW1H. 78. From the pleadings and evidence of the parties, the claimant’s case is built on alleged premature and wrongful termination of the contract of employment of the claimant. The defendant on its part denied ever terminating the claimant’s employment. The position of the defendant is that the claimant was affected by declaration of the claimant’s employment redundant. The defendant also argued that the claimant has not adduced any evidence to prove his case of termination of employment as there was no letter of termination tendered to that effect. 79. The law has cloth employer with a legal right to terminate or dismiss an employee without giving reasons for doing so. To dismiss or terminate employee without stating reasons can only be wrongful or contrary to the condition of service when the written contract of service is produced and examined by the court and found to have been breached. See TEXACO NIGERIA PLC V KEHINDE 2002 FWLR PT.94 143. 80. The parties in this case seem to have divergent view on how the employment of the claimant was abruptly brought to an end. The claimant insisted that the termination of his employment did not follow due process of law and the agreement governing the relationship between the parties. The defendant maintained that the employment of the claimant was properly brought to an end and his entitlement paid. 81. I have considered the content of exhibits CW1A1-2, CW1B1-2 and CW1F, these are the agreements and terms and conditions of service that governed the contract of service between the claimant and the defendant. There is no provision in these exhibits made for determination of the contract of service through redundancy, which the defendant averred to have affected the employment of the claimant. 82. This mode of determination of employment relationship is statutorily regulated in this country by labour Act. In this respect, section 20 of Labour Act provides as follows - ''(1). In the event of redundancy - (a). the employer shall inform the trade union or workers' representative concerned of the reasons for and the extent of the anticipated redundancy; (b). the principle of ''last in, first out'' shall be adopted in the discharge of the particular category of workers affected, subject to all factors of relative merit, including skill, ability and reliability; and (c). the employer shall use his best endeavours to negotiate redundancy payments to any discharged workers who are not protected by regulations made under sub-section (2) of this section. (2). The Minister may make regulations providing, generally or in particular cases, for the compulsory payment of redundancy allowances on the termination of a worker's employment because of his redundancy. (3). In this section, ''redundancy'' means an involuntary and permanent loss of employment caused by an excess manpower''. 83. The provisions of section 20 of Labour Act quoted above is very and unambiguous enough to warrant no controversies as to when there is redundancy in an organisation. It is however not unusual for employers of labour to not declare redundancy even when the situation is not controverted. 84. The evidence before the court is to the effect that on 22/12/2016, the claimant reported for duty but he was denied access to his duty post and all entreaties to get explanation as to why he could not resume his duty met stiff resistance. He stated that the explanation he got was his photograph was pasted on the notice board declaring him persona non grata. The defendant admitted denying claimant access to his duty post. It also admitted pasting claimant’s passport photograph on the notice board. The response of the defendant was to the effect that claimant post was declared redundant and his employment was no longer required due to the financial difficulty being faced by the defendant and the insistence of the claimant on 5% reduction of his salary instead of 10% proposed by the defendant in order to avoid redundancy. The defendant also argued that the claimant has been paid his redundancy benefit as per exhibit DWB1-2. 85. The claimant maintained that his position was never declared redundant nor was he informed of any redundancy. The claimant also denied receipt of any payment of his entitlement. It was also contended that if the court agreed that he had been paid as per exhibit DWB1-2, then the payment was not adequate. To support this position counsel relied on exhibit DWE letter of redundancy issued to one of the staff of the defendant on 22/12/2016. 86. The law is that where an employer relied on either redundancy, retrenchment, reorganization or unproductivity to end contractual relationship, the employer would be expected to have facts or the law in support. The burden is on him to satisfy the court on this. To place the burden on the claimant will lead to miscarriage of justice. See Psychiatric Hospitam Management board V Ejitagha (2000) 11 NWLR (pt.677) 154, (2000) 6 SC (pt.ii) 1, (2000) LPELR-2930(SC), Onobruchere V Esegine (1986) 1 NWLR (pt.19) 779; (1986) 2 SC 385. The defendant maintained that the claimant was affected by declaration of redundancy. While the claimant insists there was no redundancy. The defendant claimed that the claimant position or post was declared redundant to his knowledge. However, there was no such declaration tendered by the defendant for the court’s inspection. The only document relied on by the defendant is exhibit CW1E1-2, a document dated 9/5/2016, with the subject retrenchment. A careful perusal of this document will show that it is a document issued to the generality of the members of staff of the defendant to intimate them of the agreement the defendant reached with the representatives of workers on issue of retrenchment. The claimant denied knowing of the redundancy. According to the claimant the evidence as led in this case is that there has been a long standing tussle between the defendant as employer and its employees. The dispute relates to condition of service and general staff welfare. One of such dispute between the claimant and defendant was even mediated upon by the Federal Ministry of Labour and Employment in which a communiqué was reached between the parties. Another communiqué mediate by ministry of labour was in 2016 with a communiqué issued. Sometime in December 2016 the defendant notified the claimant and invited its union members for a collective bargain. At the meeting the issue of redundancy was raised by the defendant and the reason it gave was that there is a shortfall of profit from casino. The claimant instantly objected to the issue of redundancy in that claimant. At the meeting in 2016, the representatives of the workers gave the claimant conditions for effective redundancy. 87. The claimant stated that he had reported to work as usual on the 22nd of December 2016 but was denied access to his duty post without explanation. Claimant testified that in view of the abrupt redundancy he reported to the Federal Ministry of Labour and productivity that invited parties for a collective bargain. Claimant testified that the result of the said meeting between the Defendants, the Federal Ministry of Labour and the Union was an agreement by the Defendant to suspend the intended retrenchment. The claimant testified that the Defendant’s sudden decision to retrench the claimant came as a surprise. The claimant stated that in line with the Defendant’s handbook, he had never been issued any form of warning in the past to warrant his termination and that no reason was ever stated for the said termination. The claimant believes that his termination was merely done out of malice as his termination are against the rules and laws of Nigeria and repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience and that the action of the Defendant has plunged him into severe hardship and psychological trauma. 88. For the defendant the claimant was affected by redundancy because the Defendant was unable to meet its obligations based on lack of patronage of its Casino business and also, for lack of patronage the Defendant was forced to shut down 4 (Four) out of its 9 (Nine) Business Tables at the Abuja office and the Claimant was aware of the challenges faced by the Defendant occasioned by lack of patronage of its business and that based on the circumstances the Defendant was unable to meet its obligation to its Landlord as rent was constantly in arrears for lack of patronage. Furthermore, the Defendant proposed a 10% (Ten Per cent) salary cut because of the Economic challenges being encountered by the Defendant but the proposal was rejected by the Claimant. The Claimant insisted on a 5% (Five per cent) deduction which was not sustainable by the Defendant. The Claimant was invited by the Defendant but the claimant refused to accept his letter of redundancy. However, the Claimant’s entitlements were paid to him through his usual Bankers, Guaranty Trust Bank in the sum of N165, 000.00 (One Hundred and Sixty-Five Thousand Naira) only being 3 Months Gross Salary. The sum of N45, 000.00 (Forty-Five Thousand Naira) only being for Public holiday payment. 89. Going by the pleadings and testimonies of the parties before the court, there is no doubt that the case of the claimant before the court is that of wrongful termination of employment. While the defence of the defendant was built around redundancy. In section 20(3) of the Labour Act provides: (3). In this section, ''redundancy'' means an involuntary and permanent loss of employment caused by an excess manpower''. In Black’s Law Dictionary Tenth Edition at page 1469, the word ‘redundancy’ was defined to mean: ‘A situation in which an employee is laid off from work because the employer no longer need the employee’’. 90. In Peugeot Automobile Nigeria Ltd V Oje & Ors. (1997) LPELR-6331(CA), redundancy was defined as follows:- "Redundancy in service in my view, is a mode of removing off an employee from service when his post is declared "redundant" by his employee. It is not a voluntary or forced retirement. It is not a dismissal from service. It is not a voluntary or forced resignation. It is not a termination of appointment as is known in public service. It is a form unique only to its procedure where an employee is quietly and lawfully relieved of his post. Such type of removal from office does not, in my view, carry along with it any other benefit except those benefits enumerated by the terms of contract to be payable to an employee declared "redundant." Per MOHAMMED, J.C.A. (P. 15, paras. A-D) 91. From the above definitions of redundancy, it is a special mode of disengagement of worker from employment of his employer. However, this mode or procedure for it to be effective it has to conform to the procedure provided in the terms and conditions of service where the contrant of service is evidenced in writing. See Peugeot auto Mobile V Oje (supra) or as provided by Labour Act where the employee Handbook does not make provisions for redundancy like in the case at hand. 92. Section 20(1) of the Labour Act requires employer to inform the trade union or workers' representative concerned of the reasons for and the extent of the anticipated redundancy; the employer should also ensure that the principle of ''last in, first out'' shall be adopted in the discharge of the particular category of workers affected, subject to all factors of relative merit, including skill, ability and reliability; and the employer shall use his best endeavours to negotiate redundancy payments to any discharged workers who are not protected by regulations made minister of labour. 93. Since the claimant has denied declaration of redundancy, the defendant that relied on redundancy must convinced the court of his compliance with the laid down procedure of redundancy in section 20(1) of the Labour act. From the content the averment of the claimant in paragraphs 14, 15 and16 of the statement of facts, it will be right to conclude that the claimant was duly informed of the looming redundancy that may affect employees of the defendant which is as a result of financial difficulty being faced by the defendant. However, the content of exhibit CW1E1-2, seems to have whittle down the danger. Since, the defendant has agreed to shelve the idea of embarking on redundancy with all the staff agreeing to 5% salary cut. 94. What is clear from the pleadings of the parties and the evidence adduced by them is that there was no negotiation of the payment to be made to each worker to be affected by the redundancy. The defendant has tendered exhibit DWB1-2, as evidence of payment of redundancy to claimant. The claimant has denied this assertion. I agree with the claimant that exhibit DWB1-2, cannot be payment of redundancy when there was no negotiation to that effect as required by section 20 of Labour Act. The claimant attempted under cross-examition to show that there was meetings before the payment as contained in exhibit DWB1-2, but the claimant denied holding any meeting to that effect. The case of the defendant was made worst with its admitting not to have served the claimant with the letter of redundancy and failure to tender such letter if it ever existed. In the circumstance, it is my view that the defendant has failed to prove that it determined the claimant’s employment as a result of redundancy. 95. Coming to the merit of the claim of the claimant. The law is well settled that in a contract of employment where such contract has been reduced into writing the relationship of the parties must be governed by the written agreement. The parties would not be allowed to deviate from the terms and conditions agreed. The court cannot also re-write the agreement for the parties. See U.B.N. Ltd V Ogboh (1991) 1 NWLR (pt.167) 369; Amodu V Amode (1990) 5 NWLR (pt.150) 356; U.B.N. Ltd V Ozigi (1994) 3 NWLR (Pt.133) 385, (1994) 3 NACR 1. 96. Let me take the liberty to state that the law is certain that a party must be consistence in pursuit of his case before the court. This means that the case put forward by the party must be prosecuted to its logical conclusion. A party will not be allowed to deviate from his own claim before the court. The case of a party is circumscribed by the claim. See Ativie V Kabel Metal Nigeria ltd (supra).Ajide V Kelani (1985) 3 NWR (Pt.12) 248, Olatunji V Adisa (1985) 2 SCNJ 90,, PDP V Onwe (2011) 4 NWLR (Pt.1236) 166, Okadigbo V Emeka & Ors (2012) LPELR-7839(SC). The duty imposed on a party to be consistence in the presentation of his case in court is onerous, as no reasonable court can do anything to assist such a slippery claimant. See Daniel v INEC (2015) LPELR-24566(SC). 97. As pointed out earlier the claimant case was built on premature wrongful termination of employment based on negation of agreement of the parties and the laid down terms and conditions of service. The claimant instead of pursuing his case of wrongful termination deviated in the final written address, when he argued that the claimant brought this suit for sundry claims arising from the fact that he was thrown out of service and barred from entering the defendant’s premises without being issued with a termination letter of redundancy. Counsel as per paragraph 2.03 that the procedure adopted for redundancy was fraudulent because there was no negotiation for redundancy benefit. The claimant based on exhibit DWE is alleging that the redundancy payment as per exhibit DWB1-2, is inadequate. It was also argued that the claimant was affected by redundancy. In his reaction the defendant has contended while placing reliance on the case of Emeje v positive (2009) ALL FWLR (pt.452) 1061, that a party must be consistence in stating his case and consistent in proving it. He will not be permitted to take one stance during trial and turn round from that on address, to allow such deviation will tantamount to volt face in the claims of the parties. It is also contended that address of counsel no matter how brilliant should not substitute for evidence. On this the case of Chime V Ezea (2009) ALL FWLR (Pt.470) 678.tied to the declaration of wrongful termination of the claimant’s employment. The claimant seems to be jetitioning his claim by submitting that he is entitled to be paid redundancy benefit. This is not allowed a party must stick to his case he cannot midstream change his claim. A litigant must maintain consisistency he is not allowed to approbate and reprobate. To allow changing of claim at address stage will result in confusion. 98. Reliefs a, b, and c, are for declarations that the claimant’s termination of appointment was premature, wrongful, and contrary to agreement of the parties and therefore null and void. 99. In a claim for wrongful termination, the claimant is to prove his employment and the terms and conditions of employment and how the terms and conditions were breached. See Amodu v. Amode (1990) 5 NWLR (Pt.150) 356; Iwuchukwu V. Nwizu (1994) 7 NWLR (Pt.357) 379 at 412. As the contract of service is the bedrock upon which an aggrieved employee must found his case, he succeeds or fails upon the terms thereof. Therefore, in a written or documented contract of service, the court will not and should not look outside the terms stipulated or agreed therein in deciding the rights and obligations of the parties:- See Western Nigerian Development Corporation v. Abimbola (1966) 4 NSCC 172 at 188. (1966) 1 aLL NLR 159. In that case, the Supreme Court held at page 194 of the report inter alia as follows:- "That the provisions of a written contract of service bind the parties thereto and it was outside the province of the learned Judge to look at any where for terms of termination of the contract other than in the contract agreement." 100. In a contract of employment, parties are bound by the terms of the contract particularly where the terms of the contract are clear and unambiguous. See U.B.N. PLC V Emmanuel Aderewaju Soares (2012)29 N.L.L.R. (pt.84) 329. 101. The claimant tendered exhibit CW1A1-2, CWB1-12 and CWF, these are the letters of employment and staff handbook. The defendant has admitted employing the claimant on 5/1/2009 as a trainee and on 1/7/2014 he was made dealer/inspector. The defendant has argued that exhibit CW1B1-12 is a worthless document as it was not signed by the defendant. The response of the claimant is that the original signed copy is with the defendant. However, it is noticeable that exhibits CWB1-12 is a replica of exhibit CWF, the only difference is that exhibit CWF is titled staff handbook i.e it is the terms and conditions governing the service of the claimant with the defendant and they are bound by the provisions contained therein. In the circumstance the existence or non-existence of exhibit CWB1-12, will make no difference to the determination of the rights and duties of the parties, since the bedrock of the relationship is before the court i.e exhibit CWF. In the circumstances the submission of counsel for the defendant to the effect that the contract of service is parole has no base to stand and is hereby rejected. The contract is governed by exhibit CW1A1-2 and the staff handbook exhibit CWF. 102. Vide paragraph 4.9 and 4.11 of exhibit CWF, either of the parties may terminate the contract of service by giving the other one month notice. The defendant has admitted not giving the claimant termination letter. From the pleading it can be gathered that the claimant’s termination of appointment was by conduct. This means as from 22/12/2016, when the claimant was denied access to his duty post his employment was terminated this is because in a contract of employment without statutory flavour the employer has unfettered right to determine the employment of his employee at any time with or without any reason. This is what happened on 22/12/2016, the claimant’s employment was determined without any reason. 103. The contention by the claimant that his contract was terminated prematurely has no basis in law. The reason being that an employment not having statutory flavour the employee cannot treat his contract of employment subsidising more particularly when it was not a tenure employment for fixed period of time. The position of the law therefore is that where there has been a purported termination of a contract of service, a declaration to the effect that the contract of service still subsists will rarely be made. See Bankole v. N.B.C. (1968) 2 All NLR 372 and Olaniyan v. University of Lagos (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 9) 599 at 612 where Oputa JSC had this to say on the subject of termination of master and servant relationship under a contract of service. "The law regarding master and servant is not in doubt. There is also no doubt that the contract of master and servant is subject of both statutory and common law rules. By and large, the master can terminate the contract with his servant at anytime and for any reason or for no reason at all. But if he does so in a manner not warranted by the particular contract under review, he must pay damages for breach." 104. On breach of agreement the claimant placed reliance on exhibit CW1D and exhibit CW1D, these exhibits were products of negotiation there is no where the claimant executed the agreement. There is also no where the claimant agreed with the defendant not to determine his contract of employment. At best these exhibits are extraneous, because they are not part of the terms and conditions of service. The law is that an extraneous agreement not entered into by the parties to a contract of service, cannot be made basis of an action by an employee unless incorporated into the contract of service agreement of such an employee. See UBN Plc V Soares (2013) 29 NLLR(pt.84) 329, Per Okoro (JCA as he then was now JSC). See also Abalogu V Shell Petroleum Development (Nig.) Ltd (1999) 8 NWLR (Pt.613) 12, ACB V Nwodika (1996) 4 NWLR (Pt.443) 470, Union Bank Ltd V Edet (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt.287) 288. Since these exhibits are not incorporated into the contract of service there cannot be breach in respect of them. 105. From the foregoing, the claimant can only succeed in respect of wrongful termination, but not in respect of prematureness or breach of agreement in exhibits CW1E1-2 and CW1D, respectively. 106. Relief d is claim for leave allowance at 10% of his basic salary which was due from from time of employment till purported termination of employment. In proof of this head of claim vide paragraph 11 of the statement of facts the claimant averred that by his employment status he is entitled to annual leave with 10% leave allowance of his annual basic salary. But, the defendant has at all time refused to pay the claimant the said annual leave allowance right from the commencement of his employment. He stated that although he had been embarking on the said annual leave, but the defendant always deferred payment of the said allowance. Till this time the claimant has not been paid his leave allowance. The defendant has refuted the claim of the claimant that he has never been paid his leave allowance. The defendant averred that the claimant has always been paid his leave allowance along with his monthly salary. 107. The defendant has not adduced any evidence to establish the assertion that claimant has ben getting his leave allowance along with his salary. Exhibit CW1C1-3, shows the claimant’s three months pay slips showing evidence of payment of claimant’s salary for those months for which the pay slips bears. I have scrutinized exhibit CW1C1-3 there is no evidence in it to show that the claimant has been getting his leave allowance together with his salary. The exhibit was tendered without objection. In the circumstance, I accept the claim of the clamant that he has not been paid his leave allowances. The defendant who alleged that the claimant had been paid has refused to tender evidence of the payment. Exhibit CW1H tendered by the defendant can only establish payment of 7 leave days paid to the claimant on 12/9/2016. The defendant has not disputed the entitlement of the claimant to leave allowance. 108. From January 2009, when the claimant started work with the defendant to 1/7/2014, when the claimantwas given permanent appoint his monthly basic salary was the N20,800.00 (Twenty thousand Eight Hundred Naira). This means he warked for the defendant from January 2009 to 1/7/2014, for a period of Sixty Six (66) Months, which translate to five (5) Years and Six Months or in otherwords five and half years. The total basic salary per annum will be N20,800 multiplied by 12, which will amount to the sum of N249,600.00 (Two Hundred and forty nine thousand Six Hundred Naira) only. The 10% of the annual basic salary will be the sum of N24,960 for five and half years will be the sum of N137,280.00. 109. From 1/7/2014 to December 2016, is a period of two and half years. The monthly basic salary of the claimant for the two years and half is N36,800.00 (thirty Six thousand Eight Hundred Naira) only, If the sum of N36,800 is multiplied by 12, we will have the sum of 441,600.00 as the annual basic salary per annum, 10% of it will be the sum of N44,160.00 (Forty four thousand One Hundred and Sixty Naira as the leave allowance entitlement of the claimant per annum for two and half years we will have the sum of N110, 400.00 (One hundred and Ten thousand Naira Four hundred naira) only. 110. The claimant for the period he served the defendant from January 2009 to December 2016, will be entitled to the sum of N247,680.00 (Two Hundred and Forty Seven Thousand Naira Six Hundred and Eighty Naira) only as his leave allowance for the period he served the defendant. I find and so hold. 111. Relief e, is for an order t direct the defendant to pay the claimant all his entitlements, gratuity, severance packages, all benefits flowing from such termination and all pension funds deducted from the claimant’s salary from the time of his employment till December 2016 and when his appointment was purportedly terminated. In law claim for entitlement, gratuity, severance package, and pension are classified as special damages, which must be specally claimed and strictly proved by cogent, credible and compelling evidence. Being claim for special damages the claimant must particularised and proves the claim. This relief as it is is vaguen nebulous and wild. I agree with the submission of counsel for the claimant that this reliefis is not grantable in the way and manner it was cauched. See University of Jos V Ikegwoha (supra). This head of claim failed and is hereby dismissed. 112. Relief f, is for an order directing the defendant to pay the claimant the sum of N15,000,000.00 (Fifteen Million Naira) for hardship and serious psychological trauma which the action of the defendant has plunged them into (sic). 113. It has long been settled that except a breach flows from damages contemplated by the parties at the time of entering the contract, no other damages should be awarded. Thus, there can be no room for claims which are merely speculative or sentimental unless these claims are provided for by the terms of the contract. The position of the law is that general damages are not awarded in actions of this nature. The Court of Appeal per Galadima JCA was succinct in Wilbros Nig. Ltd. & Anor. v. Macaulay  LPELR-8507, when it held on this as follows: "...a plaintiff in an action for wrongful or unlawful dismissal is not entitled to general damages because such general damages belong to the realm of claims in tort, while actions for damages for wrongful or unlawful dismissal are based on contract…In CO-OPERATIVE DEV. BANK ESSIEN (2001) 4 NWLR (Pt.704) 479 at 492, a matter in which the plaintiff brought a claim for wrongful dismissal, the Court held that in the consideration of an award in consequence of a breach of contract of employment the measure of damages is the loss flowing naturally from the breach and is incurred in direct consequence of the violation. It held further that the damages recoverable are the losses reasonably foreseeable by the parties and foreseen by them at the time of the contract as inevitably arising if one of them broke faith with the other. That in the contemplation of such a loss, there can be no room for claims which are merely speculative or sentimental unless these are specially provided for by the terms of contract.’’ 114. Similarly, in UBN Plc v. Toyinbo  LPELR-5056, the Court of Appeal held as follows: “I agree therefore with the authorities of COOPERATIVE BANK PLC V. ESSIEN (2001) 4 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 704) 4079 at 492 paras. E. F; 493 B - C that the Plaintiff/Respondent would not have been entitled to general damages since an employee who successfully established wrongful termination of his employment would only be entitled to what would have been due to him for the period of notice. Thus, the Court below exceeded its bounds when it went ahead to award both special and general damages for breach of contract of employment as in this case. Again in line with the dictum of Karibi- Whyte in CHUKWUMAH V. SHELL PETROLEUM CO. LTD (1993) 4 N.W.L.R. (pt 285) 512 the Court awarded damages upon the assumption that the Respondent's appointment was terminated wrongfully and if at all that was the case, the damages should not have exceeded his salary and perquisite of office as at the time notice was not given to him. In other words, the principle of "restitution integrum" would have applied in the computation of damages." 115. In the case at hand the court having found the termination of claimant’s employment to have been wrongful and appropriate remedy to be granted to the claimant is damages for the period of notice and not entitled to any other claim, granting such relief will amount to double compensation which the law frowns at. 116. Relief f, for payment of the sum of N15,000,000.00 (Fifteen Million Naira), for severe hardship and serious psychological trauma which the action of the defendant has plunged him into, is refused for lack of proof as there was no iota of evidence adduced to support this claim. Relief f is hereby refused and same dismissed. 117. I am being compelled to observe that there is need for counsel to always exhibit circumspection in drafting of pleading. The reason being that pleadings is the backbone and foundation of any action instituted before the court. It is what circumscribes the reliefs to be granted or not to be granted by the court. The counsel of the claimant in this suit was not elegant in drafting the pleading of his client this has greatly impacted negatively on the claim sought before the court. Counsel must always be cautious in making claim before the court. I say no more. 118. In view of all I have been saying above it is hereby ordered as follows:- a) A declaration is hereby granted declaring the termination of the claimant’s employment wrongful. b) The Defendant is entitled to be paid one month salary in lieu of notice of termination of his employment. c) The Defendant is hereby ordered to pay the claimant the sum of N41,390.48 (Forty One Thousand Three Hundred and Ninety Naira Forty Eight Kobo) only, as one Moth salary in lieu of notice of termination. d) The claimant is entitled to be paid his leave allowances for the period he served the defendant in the sum of N247,680.00 (Two Hundred and Forty Seven Thousand Naira Six Hundred and Eighty Naira) e) The defendant is hereby directed to pay to the claimant the sum of N247,680.00 (Two Hundred and Forty Seven Thousand Naira Six Hundred and Eighty Naira), as the claimant’s leave allowances. f) The defendant shall pay to the claimant the sum of N300,000.00 (Three Hundred thousand Naira) cost. g) All judgment sums payable as per this judgment shall be paid within 30 days failing which 10% interest per annum shall apply, till liquidation. 119. Judgment entered accordingly. Sanusi Kado, Judge. REPRESENTATION: Ofem Obeta, Esq; for the Claimant.