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JUDGMENT 1. The claimants approached this Court via general form of complaint dated 15/05/2018 and filed 16/05/2018. The complaint was accompanied with Statement of facts, witness statement on oath, list of witnesses, list of documents and photocopies of documents to be relied on at trial. The claimants vide this action are seeking for the following reliefs;- I. A DECLARATION that the termination of appointments of the claimants via letters dated July 17, 2017 and issued by the Defendant is irregular, illegal, null and void and of no effect whatsoever. II. A DECLARATION that the termination of the appointment of the claimants in the Defendant organization without due adherence to the provisions of the PUBLIC SERVICE RULES 2009 and other extant Public Service Guidelines as applicable in the Federal Public Service is irregular, illegal, null and void and of no effect whatsoever. III. A DECLARATION that the termination of appointment the Claimants in the Defendant Organization without affording them the opportunity to make any form of representation before any duly constituted Board or Panel of inquiry is unconstitutional, illegal, null and void and of no consequential effect. IV. A DECLARATION that the termination of appointment of the Claimants in the Defendant Organization without any approval by the BOARD OF DIRECTORS of the Defendant is illegal, null and void as same is against international best practices in corporate Governance. V. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court by way of mandatory injunction compelling the Defendant, its agents, servants, privies and by whatsoever name called to immediately re-instate the claimants herein to their position at the Nigeria Incentive Based Risk Sharing System for Agricultural Lending. VI. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court compelling the Defendant, its agents, servants, privies and by whatsoever name called to immediately pay over to the claimants their monthly salaries and other benefits as accrued from the date of termination of appointment up to date judgment is delivered. VII. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court compelling the Defendant, its agents, servants, privies and by whatsoever name called to immediately pay over to the claimants as general damages the sum of N70,000,000.00 (Seventy Million Naira) only for terminating the appointment of the claimants without recourse to due process. VIII. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court compelling the Defendant to pay over to the claimants the sum of N35, 000,000.00 (Thirty Five Million Naira) only as punitive and aggravated damages for being subjected to psychological trauma, physical and dehumanizing condition following the termination of their appointment. 2. The Defendant entered conditional appearance on 13/07/2018 and with leave of court granted on 22/11/2018, filed statement of defence dated 12/07/2018 and filed on the 13/08/2018 which was accompanied by a written statement on Oath, Defendant’s list of witnesses, Defendant’s list of documents, photocopies of document to be relied on at the trial. CASE OF THE CLAIMANTS. 3. The claimants opened their case on 8/01/2019, wherein Mrs. Abiodun Omotokunbo Daria testified as CW1. CW1, after adopting her witness statement on oath tendered documents in evidence. The documents were admitted in evidence and marked accordingly. The 3rd Claimant, Mrs. Mercy Gambo Mayaki, testified as CW 2 on the 6th day of March 2019, she adopted her Witness Statement on Oath dated the 16th day of May, 2018 and an Additional Statement on Oath dated the 21st day of November, 2018. No document was tendered through her. 4. From the statement of facts, witness statement on Oath and the oral testimony of the witnesses that testified, the case of the Claimants is that they were all employees of the defendant, till their employment were unceremonious terminated by the defendant. At the time their appointments were terminated they were on probation. The termination of their appointments was at the instance of the Managing Director of the Defendant without any justifiable reason and without affording them the opportunity to make any form of representation before any duly constituted Board or Panel of Inquiry. They contended that the said termination is illegal, null and void. 5. The Claimants contends that the Defendant is wholly owned and controlled by the Federal Government of Nigeria and that the Directors of the Defendant are highly placed Federal Government Executives such as the Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, some Executive Directors in the Central Bank of Nigeria, captains of industries among others. 6. The claimants further stated that following their appointments into different positions in the Defendant’s Organization; they discharged their respective official assignments diligently and responsibly they also stated that upon official resumption at the Defendant’s Organization, they observed that there was no structured and well outlined pattern of discharging official responsibilities expected in a Corporate Organization. As experienced professionals in different fields of human endeavors, claimants made their individual observations known to the Defendants herein at various meetings held at the Defendants Office and that the Defendants failed to hearken to the claimants’ professional and administrative advice. 7. Finally, the Claimants contend that as at the 11th day of October 2017 when a search was conducted at the Corporate Affairs Commission Abuja, there was no filed Resolution by the defendant stating or confirming that their appointments into various positions in her Organization have been terminated. The Claimants are praying the Court to grant their reliefs as stated on the complaint. CROSS EXAMINATION 8. Under cross examination CW1 testified that she was trying to set up her chambers because she has been unable to get another job. She further stated that she was aware of the importance of oath and that she deposed to her witness statement on oath at the Industrial Court Registry. she further testified that she served with Midas Bank and was retained when FCMB acquired by Midas Bank and that she worked with FCMB from 2006 to 2013 and that she resigned from her appointment in another Bank in February, 2017 to join the defendant company. She further testified that she responded to the advert in the newspaper in August 2016 and applied for employment from the defendant and she was offered the employment in January, 2017 which she accepted and resumed on 6/3/17. She stated that she was invited to Lagos for interview and she was interviewed by the MD and ED and the consultant from the recruitment firm. She testified that when they were employed they were told that there was no process because the company was new and they were to set up processes. However she sought audience with the MD for further clarification but did not get the appointment with him, so she just requested for job description from Human Resources Department and they informed her that her role as the Head of Legal and Board Matters included drafting of legal documents, advising the company and its subsidiaries. She further testified that the claimants were not given notice prior to the termination of their employment but they were paid one month’s salary in lieu of notice. She stated that the claimant’s case was that the defendant failed to give them 2 weeks’ notice and it is a public service institution which is required under 1999 constitution section 318 to abide by the provisions of the Public service Rules and the defendant ought to have complied with the Public Service Rules in terminating their appointment. CW1 testified that she agreed that they were indeed on probation. 9. Under cross examination CW2 testified that her designation was Assistant General Manger when she was with the Defendant. AGM Agric value chain and technical Assistance and that her function was basically to liaise with stakeholders. She further testified that she possesses a Master’s degree and her first degree was in Mathematics and computer sciences and that considering her educational qualification she was well read. When shown EXHIBIT CWI11-3 she admitted that it was her letter of employment and that she read and accepted the content of the letter that was why she accepted. She stated that she signed the acceptance on 6/03/2017. She also testified that she had worked both with CBN and also as a civil servant before and she was aware of the procedure for employment of civil servants but she does not know if the procedure for employment for civil service was used in this case. She further stated that she never threatened the MD, rather she sent an internal memo asking for the reason for her demotion and the next thing she saw was her letter of termination. THE CASE OF THE DEFENDANTS. 10. The defendant opened its case on 13/05/2019 by calling only one witness, Mr. Khalil Mohammed Kabir who testified as DW1. He adopted his Witness Statement on Oath dated the 13/07/2018. The letters of appointments of the claimants were tendered through this witness, as well as a Letter with a letter head of Federal Ministry of Justice dated 16/1/2018, addressed to Managing Director of the Defendant, marked as Exhibit DG 1-2. 11. The Defendant’s case is that it is a self-governing legal entity, registered with the Corporate Affairs Commission as a Private Limited Liability Company and as such prayed this Honourable Court to dismiss the Claimants’ claims. It was stated that recruitment of staff is not and has never been carried out by the Federal Civil Service Commission. That employment in the defendant is not being regulated by the PUBLIC SERVICE RULES, 2009 and that based on its policy on recruitment, a staff is not employed unconditionally; rather he/she is employed on probation usually for a period of Six (6) months within which the Defendant or the staff may decide to terminate the contract at will. It is also the Defendant’s defence that the Claimants were offered employment in the Defendant Company on the condition that their employments were probationary for a clearly stated period of six (6) months, before or upon which either of the parties has the right to terminate the appointment upon giving two (2) weeks’ notice or payment of two (2) weeks wages in lieu of notice and that the Terms and Conditions contained in the Offer of Employment Letters signed by the Claimants, the Defendant Company is not duty bound to give reasons for the termination of the contractual relationship, finally the Defendant further states that the Claimants’ employments were terminated during the probationary period, and the Defendant Company paid the Claimants 2 weeks salaries in lieu of the two (2) weeks’ notice contained in Terms and Conditions of Employment signed by the Claimants. CROSS-EXAMINATION 12. Under cross examination DW testified that he was the manager Legal Services of the Defendant and his job was to advise the defendant and that the CBN has 2.495 billion shares , Mercy SS Ltd -500 million shares. Mercy SS is a subsidiary of CBN. He further testified that he was not aware of the defendant’s account with CBN, like every other public entity. He testified that the claimants were on probation and that was why they were not issued staff manual. He stated that they were paid salary in lieu of notice and that they were not issued query and he was not aware if there were allegations against them before their employment was terminated. WRITTEN ADDRESS OF DEFENDANTS. 13. The counsel for the Defendants, H.A Lasisi; Esq. filed his final written address dated 19/06/2019, and with leave of court granted on 21/11/19 adopted same on the 20/02/2020 as his argument in the matter. In the final written address counsel outlined 3 issues for determination by the court; 14. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION: 1. Whether the Defendant being a corporate entity has a separate personality distinct form its subscribers and/or promoters? 2. Whether the employment of the Claimants with the Defendant was an employment with a statutory flavour and guided by the Public Service Rules, 2009? 3. Whether based on the evidence adduced before this Honourable Court, the Claimants are entitled to the reliefs being sought? 15. ISSUE ONE: ‘’Whether the Defendant being a corporate entity has a separate legal personality distinct from its subscribers and/or promoters? 16. In arguing issue one; counsel for the Defendant contended that the Defendant being a corporate entity has a separate legal personality distinct from its subscribers and/or promoters. While relying on Section 37 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, 1990 (CAMA) and that upon the incorporation of the Defendant as a company under the law, the Defendant is a different person altogether from the subscribers to its memorandum and is neither an agent nor trustee for them. In support of this contention counsel placed reliance on the case of BULET INT'L (NIG) LTD & ANOR v. OLANIYI & ANOR (2017) LPELR-42475(SC) pp. 39-40 paras. F-D wherein the Supreme Court per Kudirat Kekere-Ekun JSC held as follows: “The concept of corporate personality was established a long time ago in the case of Salomon Vs Salomon & Company Ltd. (1897) AC 22 to the effect that a company is a legal entity distinct from its members. It has a distinct legal personality and is capable of suing and being sued in its corporate name. A company is a different person altogether from the subscribers to the memorandum and is neither an agent nor trustee for them. It also has the capacity to enter into any agreement in its corporate name. 17. Counsel submitted that from the above dictum, the fact that Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) is one of the subscribers of the Defendant (notwithstanding the amount of the shares subscribed thereto) does not make the CBN and the Defendant one and the same. 18. ISSUE TWO: Whether the employment of the Claimants with the Defendant was an employment with a statutory flavour and guided by the Public Service Rules, 2009? 19. In arguing issue two: counsel for the defendant submitted that the employment of the Claimants with the Defendant was not an employment with a statutory flavour and not guided by the Public Service Rules, 2009, therefore the employment of the Claimants with the Defendant was at best a master-servant relationship. In support of this argument counsel relied on the decision of the Supreme Court per Sunday Akinola Akintan JSC expounding the categories of contract employment in the case of CBN v. IGWILLO (2007) LPELR-835(SC) p. 20 paras. B-D held as follows: "The law is settled that there are now roughly three categories of contracts of employment viz: (a) those regarded as purely master and servant; (b) those where a servant is said to hold an office at the pleasure of the employer; and (c) those where the employment is regulated or governed by statute, often referred to as having statutory flavour. See Olaniyan v. University of Lagos (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 9) 599." 20. Counsel submitted that the Defendant being a duly incorporated company is not a statutory body and the employment relationship between the Claimants and the Defendant was not protected by any statute or laid down regulations made pursuant to statute to govern the procedure for the employment and discipline of an employee. To buttress the point being made counsel relied on the decision in the case of FAKUADE v. O.A.U.T.H. COMPLEX MANAGEMENT BOARD (1993) LPELR-1233(SC) pp. 24-25 paras. F-C 21. Furthermore, Counsel argued that where the contract of employment is in writing, the parties are bound by the express terms and conditions so stipulated, on this submission counsel cited and relied on the case of OLANIYAN & ORS V. UNILAG & ANOR (1985) LPELR-2565(SC) p. 133 paras. B-C. Counsel urged the court to look at the Employment Offer Letters of the Claimants as exhibited in Exhibits D1 1-3, DA 1-3, D3 1-3, DC 1-3, DD 1-3, DE 1-3 and DG 1-3. Paragraph 4 of the Terms and Conditions of the Employment which provides for PROBATIONARY PERIOD states as follows: “Your appointment will be on probation for a period of six (6) months, which may be extended at the Management’s discretion if your performance is below the required standard in the first six months. If your conduct and performance are found satisfactory, your appointment may be confirmed at the end of the probationary period after you have fulfilled all confirmation requirements. However, if your performance is below benchmark, you will be appropriately regraded (redesignated) based on your performance. Note that during the probationary period, either party shall be at liberty to determine or terminate this employment by giving two (2) weeks’ notice.” (Underlining ours for emphasis). 22. Counsel urged the Court to confine itself to the terms of contract service between the parties which provide for their rights and obligations. In concluding his submission counsel contended that no matter how this matter is viewed, the Public Service Rules, 2009 would still not apply to the Claimants and the conditions of their employment, particularly its termination are still guided by the Terms and Conditions agreed by the parties as contained in the Employment Offer letters signed by the Claimants which are all before this Honourable Court for the kind perusal of the Court. Counsel urged the Court to resolve this issue in favour of the defendant. 23. ISSUE THREE: ‘’Whether based on the evidence adduced before this Honourable Court, the Claimants are entitled to the reliefs being sought? 24. In arguing issue 3: Counsel submitted that the Claimants are not entitled to the reliefs being sought based on the evidence adduced before the Honourable Court, and that the adopted Witness Statement on Oath of PW1 being undated, unsigned and unstamped is a just a worthless piece of paper, incompetent, and bereft of any evidential value that this noble Court can rely upon. See EROKWU & ANOR v. EROKWU (2016) LPELR-41515(CA) p. 19 paras. A-E & p. 21 para. E-G. 25. Counsel further argued that all the 29 Exhibits admitted in evidence pursuant to the Witness Statement on Oath of PW1 amount to nullity and goes to no issue, the Court cannot rely on any of Exhibits in the determination of this matter, to support his contention counsel relied on the case of MACFOY v. UNITED AFRICAN COMPANY LTD. (1961) 3 W.L.R. (P.C.) 1405 at 1409, to the effect that: “You cannot put something on nothing and expect it to stay there. It will collapse.” 26. Counsel for the defendant, submitted that the Claimants’ Statement of Facts dated the 15th day May 2018 and their Reply dated the 19th day of November, 2018 are deemed abandoned as they are not supported by evidence. It is further argued that the 3rd claimant’s Witness Statement on Oath dated the 16th day of May, 2018 and her Additional Statement on Oath dated the 21st day of November, 2018 cannot in any way whatsoever support the claims of the Claimants, the Witness Statement on Oath of CW1 which constitute the entire gamut of the evidence adduced by the Claimants is incompetent due to lack of signature is liable to be expunged from the record of this noble Court. 27. Counsel finally submitted that the employment of the Claimants with the Defendant has been validly and effectively terminated and they are not entitled to any of their claim while urging the court to so hold and dismiss in its entirety the claims of the Claimants. THE SUBMISSION OF THE CLAIMANTS. 28. On 20/02/2020, the counsel for the Claimants, Ubong Udoh; Esq. in oral adumbration adopted the claimants’ final written address dated 6/12/2019, as his argument in this action. In the written address counsel formulated 3 issues for determination by the Honourable Court, to wit: 1. Whether the procedure adopted by the defendant in terminating the employments of the claimants during probation was not irregular, wrongful and inconsistent with the contract of service between the claimants and the defendants. 2. Whether the defendant was not bound to afford or avail the claimants an opportunity to make representation before a duly constituted Board or Panel of Inquiry before determining claimants’ employments. 3. Whether based on the evidence adduced before this Honorable Court, the claimants are not entitled to be paid their monthly salaries and other benefits as accrued from the date of the termination of their appointments up to the date of judgment as damages for wrongful termination of employment. 29. ISSUE ONE; ‘’Whether the procedure adopted by the defendant in terminating the employments of the claimants during probation was not irregular, wrongful and inconsistent with the contract of service between the claimants and the defendants. 30. In arguing issue one, counsel for the claimants submitted that the procedure adopted by the defendant in the termination of the employments of the claimants during probation was irregular, wrongful and inconsistent with the contract of service between the claimants and the defendants. The contracts of employment signed between the claimants and the defendant were tendered in evidence at trial and respectively marked Exhibits CW1 A1-3; CW1 B1-3; CW1 C1-3; CW1 D1-3; CW1 E1-3; CW1 F1-3 and CW1 G1-3. Paragraph 4 of the Terms and Conditions of the employment, Counsel argued that from the provisions of the contract of employment, the defendant was expected to issue the claimants with a 2 weeks’ notice which they failed to adhere to. On this contention counsel placed reliance on the cases of UBN V. OZIGI (1994) 3 NWLR (333) 385; KOIKI V. MAGNUSSON (1999) 8 NWLR (615) 492; OJOH V. KAMALU (2006) ALL FWLR (297) 988; BINGE V. GOVT. OF RIVERS STATE (2006) ALL FWLR (325) 1 and OLUBODUN V. LAWAL (2008) 9 MJSC 1. 31. Counsel further argued that In the instant case, the defendant went against and outside the contract of service it entered into with the claimants by failing to issue a 2 weeks’ notice. In IBAMA V. S.P.D.C (NIG) LTD (2005) 17 NWLR PART 954 PAGE 364, Onnoghen J.S.C., expressed that in cases governed only by agreement of parties, removal by way of termination of appointment or dismissal will be in the form agreed to; any other form connotes wrongful termination. 32. Counsel submitted that it is most apposite to state at this juncture that the payments made in lieu of notice by the defendant to the 1st-7th claimants respectively were returned to the defendant by the claimants. The defendant refused to accept the cheques issued in its favour by the claimants as representing the refund of payments made by the defendant to the claimants respectively in lieu of notice. Counsel argued that hard evidence was led at trial in this regard to establish that the claimants returned the said payments vide Exhibits CW IS, CW IT, CW IU, CW IV, CW IW, CW IX and CW IY respectively. The defendant did not controvert this evidence. Counsel urged the court to consider the unchallenged, credible evidence led by the 1stand 2ndclaimants who testified as PW1and PW2 and equate same with Exhibits CW1 A1-3; CW1 B1-3; CW1 C1-3; CW1 D1-3; CW1 E1-3; CW1 F1-3 and CW1 G1-3, tendered by the 1stclaimant. 33. ISSUE TWO; ‘’Whether the defendant was not bound to afford or avail the claimants an opportunity to make representation before a duly constituted Board or Panel of Inquiry before determining claimants’ employments. 34. In arguing issue two: Counsel argued that following the appointments of the claimants by the defendant into different positions, the claimants discharged their respective assignments diligently and responsibly. Counsel submitted that the claimants’ employments were terminated arbitrarily by the defendant. Counsel also argued that fair hearing in the instant context would entail the defendant informing the claimants of the case or allegations against them warranting the determination of claimants’ employments and particularly, be availed the opportunity to be heard in their own defense as the principle of eternal justice prescribe. On this contention reliance was placed on the case of FUTA V. OSEMENAM (2011) 31 WRN 148 at 157. 35. Counsel argued that as held by the Honourable Court in SAIBU V. KWARA POLYTECHNIC, ILORIN (supra), to satisfy the principles of natural justice and fair hearing, the claimants ought to be given adequate notice of the allegations against them to enable them make representation in their own defense. This, the defendant failed to do. Counsel further urged the court to look at the case of DR. TAIWO OLORUNTOBA-OJU & ORS V. PROF. SHUAIB O. ABDUL-RAHEEM & ORS (2009) LPELR-2596(SC), the apex court, per Adekeye, JSC (as he then was) enthused on what an employer must prove to justify the dismissal of an employee: “In order to justify the dismissal or termination of appointment of an employee, the employer must be in a position to prove to the courts satisfaction (a) That the allegation was disclosed to the employee; (b) That he was given fair hearing; (c) That the council believed that the appellants committed the offence after hearing witnesses. Bamigboye v. University of Ilorin (1990) 10 NWLR Pt. 622, pg. 290 SC.” 36. Counsel submitted that in the instant case, not only did the defendant fail to adduce any reason whatsoever for terminating or determining the employments of the claimants, the claimants were never heard in their defense. This is against the principle of natural justice and fair hearing. 37. ISSUE THREE; ‘’Whether based on the evidence adduced before this Honorable Court, the claimants are not entitled to be paid their monthly salaries and other benefits as accrued from the date of the termination of their appointments up to the date of judgment as damages for wrongful termination of employment. 38. In arguing issue three: Counsel argued that as a prologue, the defendant had argued in paragraphs 5.42-5.46 of its Final Written Address that the adopted Witness Statement on Oath of PW1 was undated, unsigned and unstamped and for that reason, worthless, incompetent and bereft of any evidential value that this Honourable can rely on. The defendant cited in its aid the authorities of ERONKWU & ANOR V. EROKWU (2016) LPELR-4151(CA); AKPENE V. BARCLAYS BANK (1977) 1 SC 47 at 59 and ADEGBITE V. OGUNFOLU (1990) 4 NWLR (Pt. 146) P. 578. Counsel submitted that nothing could be further from the truth. Defendant’s contention here is erroneous and fictional having regard to the fact that the Witness Statement on Oath of PW1 was dated, signed by the 1st claimant who testified as PW1 and stamped by the Commissioner for Oaths at the Registry of the Honourable Court. It is the law that in order to do substantial justice between the parties, the Court is entitled to look at its file or record and make use of the contents. Counsel urged the Court to look at the file or record of the Honourable Court in resolving this contention. See PDP & ORS V. EZEONWUKA & ANOR (2017) LPELR-42563(SC); FUMUDOH V. ABORO (1991) 9 NWLR (Pt. 214) 210 at 229 E; AGBAREH V. MIMRA (2008) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1071) 378 at 411-412 H-C and WOMILOJU V. ANIBIRE (2010) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1203) 545 at 561 G. 39. Counsel further argued that where an employer terminates a contract of employment by summarily dismissing the employee in violation of their terms of contract, the termination is said to be wrongful. In such situations, the remedy lies in claim for damages for breach of contract. In the instant case, counsel submitted that the claimants are entitled to be paid their monthly salaries and other benefits as accrued from the date of the termination of their appointments up to the date of judgment as damages for wrongful termination of employment. on this contention counsel relied on the case of PROF. DUPE OLATUNBOSUN V. NISER COUNCIL (1988) LPELR-2574 (SC), where the apex court, per Oputa, JSC (of blessed memory). Counsel further submitted that in the instant case, the claimants have established vide concrete evidence that the requisite two weeks’ notice was not given to them as a pre-condition to determining their respective employments. The contract of service signed between the claimants and defendant does not contemplate payment in lieu of notice. The defendant sidestepped the contract of service it entered into with the claimants by failing to issue the mandatory 2 weeks’ notice. In its stead, the defendant opted for payment in lieu of notice. This, we firmly submit, is outlandish to the contract of service. Counsel urged the Honourable court to resolve the instant Issue Three in claimants’ favour. 40. In concluding his submission counsel urged the court to grant the claim of the claimants as prayed. DEFENDANT’S REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW 41. In Paragraph 4.8 – 4.16 (pages 11-19) of the Claimants’ Address, the Claimants’ Counsel has vehemently submitted that; where a contract of service has provided for a certain period of time notice to terminate the contract, the contract cannot be terminated by payment in lieu of such notice to be given. The Counsel further submitted that any termination of the contract by payment in lieu of the notice to be given would amount to a wrongful termination. The Counsel misleadingly cited the case of IBAMA v. S.P.D.C (NIG) LTD (2005) 17 NWLR PART 954 PAGE 364 and a host of others to support this erroneous position. 42. Defendant’s counsel argued that from the Claimants’ submission above, it is their humble submission that it is settled by plethora of authorities that the master/employer reserves the right to hire and fire a servant at any time provided that the servant is given the requisite notice or paid salary in lieu of notice. See: UBN PLC v. TOYINBO (2008) LPELR-5056(CA) p. 65 paras. C – D. 43. Furthermore, it is contended that the law is trite that where payment in lieu of the requisite notice has been offered to the servant, the contract has been effectively and validly terminated notwithstanding the fact that the servant did not accept the payment offered. To buttress this point counsel relied on the case of OLUDARE v. WAEC (2006) LPELR-11580(CA) pp. 20 – 21, paras. D – A wherein the Court of Appeal inter alia held thus: “The Appellant in this case cannot therefore be granted a declaration that he is still in the employment of the Respondent, and the Respondent cannot be directed to reinstate him in its employment. In the circumstances of this case, the Appellant is only entitled to one month’s salary in lieu of notice, which is what he was offered in Exhibit A0W8. Even if, as he argued, he did not accept it, the fact still remains that he was offered the one month’s salary in lieu of notice, which effectively and validly terminated his appointment with the Respondent.” (Underlining ours for emphasis). 44. In Paragraphs 5.2 – 5.10 (pages 14 – 17) of the Claimants’ Address, the Claimants’ Counsel has submitted that the Defendant denied the Claimants fair hearing before terminating their employments. In reaction to the submission, counsel contended that all the cases cited are inapplicable to the facts of this case and therefore of no moment – all the cases are distinguishable. 45. In paragraphs 6.3 – 6.4 (page 18) of the Claimants’ Address, the Claimant’s Counsel has submitted that a document or process is deemed duly filed when it is taken to the court registry, assessed by the officer assigned the responsibility and paid for. Counsel further submitted that pursuant to Section 12 (2) (b) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006 this Honourable Court is empowered to depart from the Evidence Act and recognise the undated, unsigned and unstamped Witness Statement on Oath of PW1 as constituting evidence before the Court and In reaction to the above submission, Defendant’s counsel argued that an incompetent process can be duly filed and filing cannot cure an incompetent process. Submit that ‘Oath taking’ is not provided for by the provisions of the Evidence Act but by the Oaths Act. See: Section 5 (1) (a) & (b) of the Oaths Act. Further submit that departure from the Evidence Act pursuant to Section 12 (2) (b) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006 cannot revive a fundamentally defective process – the undated, unsigned, unstamped and unsworn witness statement on Oath of PW1. See ALIYU V. BULAKI (2019) LPELR-46513(CA). 46. Counsel stated that In the light of the foregoing submissions, the court ought to discountenance the erroneous submissions of the learned Counsel to the Claimants on the ground that same is not valid in law and thereby lacking any legal effect whatsoever. COURT’S DECISION: 47. I have considered the processes filed before this court in respect of this suit and the written and oral submission of counsel for both parties. 48. The gist of the facts giving rise to this action is that the claimants were employed by the defendant on different positions, at different dates in January 2017. The letters of employment were tendered and admitted in evidence as exhibits, CW1A1-3, CW1B1-3, CW1C1-3, CW1D1-3, CW1E1-3, CW1F1-3, CW1G1-3. The defendants on their part tendered the duplicate copies of the letters of employment in their possession; they were admitted in evidence and marked as exhibits DD1-3, DC1-3, DA1-3DF1-3D1-3DB1-3, AND DE1-3. The defendant terminated the claimants’ employment with immediate effect on 17/7/2017, on the ground that their services are no longer required. The letters of termination of claimants’ employment were tendered and admitted in evidence and marked as exhibits, CW1H, CW1I, CW1K, CW1J, CW1L, CW1M and CW1N. The claimants were also paid 2 weeks’ salary in lieu of notice. However, they rejected the payment of salary in lieu of notice by returning the payment in lieu of notice with Bank drafts of various Banks. The return was done with Bank drafts sent to the defendant through courier. But, the defendant refused to accept the said Bank drafts. The Bank drafts were tendered and admitted in evidence as exhibits CW1S, CW1T, CW1U, CW1V, CW1W, and CW1X. 49. The claimant asserted that their employments with the defendant were unceremoniously terminated by the defendant despite their immense contribution to the milestone recorded by the defendant. The claimants stated that they perform their duties diligently and responsibly. The claimants further stated upon resumption of duty they discovered there is no structured and well outlined pattern of discharging official responsibility expected in a corporate organization. As professionals from different fields of human endeavour they made their observations known to the defendant at different meetings. 50. The claimants stated that while on probation their appointments were terminated at the instance of the Managing Director of the Defendant without justifiable reason and without affording them opportunity to make any form of representation before any duly constituted board or panel of inquiry. They state that termination of their appointment was without any approval by the board of directors of the defendant and is against international best practices in corporate governance. They also stated search conducted at corporate Affairs Commission as at 11/10/2017 shows that there was resolution by the defendant stating or confirming that their appointment into the various positions in the defendant have been terminated. They stated that the defendant did not comply with the provision of federal public service rules and other extent regulations applicable in the federal public service before terminating the appointments of all the claimants in this suit. 51. The defendant in its defence stated that the defendant is self-governing entity duly registered with the corporate Affairs commission as a public limited company, and independent of its promoters. The claimants were employed by the defendant after they were recommended by the recruiting agent engaged to conduct interview for that purpose. The claimants were in accordance with the policy of the defendant employed on probation for a period of six months within which either party may decide to end or discontinue with the relationship at will. The employment of the claimants was on probation as contained in the various letters of their appointments already before the court. The defendant stated that the termination of the claimants’ employment was in accordance with the terms and conditions of service attached to the employment letters. The claimants not employed under public service/civil service cannot claim any relief under same. 52. On 20/2/2020, H. A. Lasisi, Esq; counsel for the defendant adopted the final written address of the defendant dated 19/6/2019 and filed on 20/6/2019 and the reply on points of law dated 31/1/2019 and filed on the same day as his argument in this matter. Counsel urged the court to dismiss the claimants’ action for lacking in merit. 53. Ubang Odoh, Esq; counsel for the claimant adopted the claimants’ final written address dated 6/12/2019 and filed on 11/12/2019, as his argument. Counsel urged the court to grant the reliefs of the claimants’ as claimed. 54. In the final written address of the defendant three issues were formulated for determination. In the final written address of the claimants’ also distilled three issues for resolution by the court. The parties have only one issue common to both of them, which they formulated as third issue but worded differently. 55. I feel the issue that can resolve the dispute between the parties is ‘’whether the claimants have made out a case to make them entitled to the reliefs sought.’’ 56. I find it necessary at this point to state that the claimants’ have made heavy whether in their pleadings and the witnesses statement on oath to the effect that the termination of their employments by the defendant negates the provisions of the Federal Public Service Rules. However, surprisingly, counsel for the claimants’ did not formulate any issue on whether or not Public Service Rules are applicable to their employment or whether or not termination did not comply with said rules. Counsel did not also advance any argument on the applicability of the Public Service Rules despite making fuss over it. The absence of argument by the claimants on the applicability of public Service Rules to their employment with the defendants, has depicted the claimants as not being serious about such issue and have decided to abandon same. 57. The defendant’s issue two is on whether the claimants’ employment has statutory flavour to bring it within the Public Service Rules. After careful perusal of argument of counsel for the defendant on the issue of statutory flavour and public service rules, which has not been countered by the claimants, I will agree no more that the claimants’ employment is not clothe with statutory flavour nor was it guided by the Public Service Rules. 58. There was nothing in the evidence before me to show that claimants were employed by the Federal Civil Service Commission, the body constitutionally empowered to make employment into the Federal Public Service of the Federation. Since the claimants were not employed into the Federal Civil Service they cannot call in the aid of the Public Service in an action seeking to contest validity of termination of their employment. From the evidence on the record under cross-examination both DW1 and DW2, testify to the effect that their employment was not done by the Federal Civil Service commission rather they were employed by the defendant in this suit. The letters of appointments of the claimants tendered and admitted in evidence marked as exhibits CW1A1-3, – CW1G1-3, buttress the point that the claimants employment as per these exhibits was by the defendant. The defendant as an entity duly incorporated under the Companies and Allied Matters Act, by section 37 of CAMA is duly invested with legal personality to conduct its affairs including appointment of suitable persons into its service. 59. The mere facts that the defendant is wholly owned by the Central Bank of Nigeria or the Government of the Federation, does not make employment of its officers to be governed by the Public Service Rules. See Okomu Oil Palm Co. Ltd V Iserhenrhien (2001) 6 NWLR (Pt.710) 660 Bulet Int’l (Nig.) Ltd & Anor V Olaniyi & Anor (2017) L_ELR-42475(SC); Fakuade V OAUTH (supra). Therefore, I hold that the claimants’ employment having not been made under the Public Service Rules, they cannot not be heard to argue that the defendant did not comply with the provisions of the Public Service Rules in terminating their employment. it is my finding based on the evidence before me that the Public Service Rules are not applicable to the claimants case, as the employment of the Claimants is not governed by the Public Service Rules. The claimants employment I that of Master and servant or employer and employee. 60. Coming to the main issue for determination ‘whether the claimant have made out a case to entitle them to the reliefs sought.’’ To the defendants the claimants are not entitled to the reliefs sought based on the evidence before the court. According to counsel the adopted Witness Statement on Oath of PW1 being undated, unsigned and unstamped is a just a worthless piece of paper, incompetent, and bereft of any evidential value that this noble Court can rely upon. Having failed the statutory test of authenticity and admissibility is a nullity and should be expunged from the record of this noble Court. Likewise, the all the 29 Exhibits admitted in evidence pursuant to the Witness Statement on Oath of PW1 amount to nullity and goes to no issue. Counsel argued that PW2’s Witness Statement on Oath dated the 16th day of May, 2018 and her Additional Statement on Oath dated the 21st day of November, 2018, cannot in any way whatsoever support the claims of the Claimants, the Witness Statement on Oath of PW1 which constitute the entire gamut of the evidence adduced by the Claimants having being incompetent and liable to be expunged from the record of this noble Court. 61. Counsel maintain that where pleadings are not supported by evidence, such pleadings are deemed abandoned since pleadings do not constitute evidence on oath. The statement of Fact and Reply are not admissible and cannot be considered as evidence until such averments are sworn on record before a Court of competent jurisdiction. Assuming without conceding that the Witness Statement on Oath of PW1 is competent and constitute evidence before it is argued by counsel that the Claimants’ claims have not been established based on the arguments already canvassed on issues 1 & 2 above. Counsel insisted that an employer has an undisputed right to dismiss or discharge his servant and the Court will not compel an unwilling master to keep in his employment a willing servant. 62. For the counsel for the claimants, the claimants have proved their case with the evidence adduced before the court and they are entitled to the reliefs sought and be paid their salaries from the date of termination to date. 63. In response to the submission of counsel for the defendant on the witness statement on oath of CW1 not having evidential value for lack of signature and date, counsel contended that nothing could be further from the truth. According to counsel the Defendant’s contention here is erroneous and fictional having regard to the fact that the Witness Statement on Oath of PW1 was dated, signed by the 1st claimant who testified as PW1 and stamped by the Commissioner for Oaths at the Registry of this Honorable Court. It is the law that in order to do substantial justice between the parties, the Court is entitled to look at its file or record and make use of the contents. Counsel urged the court to look at the file or record of the Honorable Court in resolving this contention. 64. It is further contended that assuming but not conceding that the adopted Witness Statement on Oath of PW1 was undated, unsigned and unstamped by the Commissioner for Oath, we submit that it is the law that a document or process is deemed duly filed when it is taken to the court registry, assessed by the officer assigned the responsibility and paid for. The claimants cannot therefore be made to suffer for any shortfall. The position of the law has been stated in a long line of decided cases that the sin of the Court’s registry will not be visited on the litigant, unless it was shown that the litigant and/or his counsel, was a party thereto or had full knowledge of the sin or mistake and encouraged/instigated/condoned/approved the said action/act. 65. Further assuming but not conceding that the adopted Witness Statement on Oath of PW1 was undated, unsigned and unstamped by the Commissioner for Oath as erroneously contended by the defendant, it is submitted that by the express provision of Section 12 (2) (b) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006, this Honorable Court, as a specialized court, is empowered to depart from the Evidence Act in the interest of justice, fairness, equity and fair play. See also Order 5, Rule 6 (2) (b) of the Civil Procedure Rules of the National Industrial Court Rules, 2017. Similarly, by Order 5, Rule 6 (3) of the Civil Procedure Rules of the National Industrial Court Rules, 2017, enjoined this court to apply fair and flexible procedure in any matter before it and to resist and jettison any invitation to give prominence to mere technicalities. 66. It is the contention of counsel that based on the evidence adduced before this Honorable Court; the claimants are entitled to be paid their monthly salaries and other benefits as accrued from the date of the termination of their appointments up to the date of judgment as damages for wrongful termination of employment. The procedure adopted by the defendant in the termination of the employments of the claimants was clearly irregular, wrongful and inconsistent with the contract of service between the claimants and the defendants. The contracts of employment signed between the claimants and the defendant were tendered in evidence at trial and respectively marked Exhibits CW1 A1-3; CW1 B1-3; CW1 C1-3; CW1 D1-3; CW1 E1-3; CW1 F1-3 and CW1 G1-3. From these exhibits, it is undoubtedly clear that in the event that the defendant wishes to determine the employments of the claimants, the defendant was expected to issue the claimants with a 2 weeks’ notice. The contract of service signed between the claimants and defendant does not contemplate payment in lieu of notice. In the instant case, the defendant sidestepped the contract of service it entered into with the claimants by failing to issue the mandatory 2 weeks’ notice. 67. The defendant seems to be relying heaving on the assumed lack of evidential value of the witness statement on oath of the 1st claimant who testifies as CW1 to contend that the claimant has not adduced sufficient evidence to establish their reliefs. While the counsel for the claimant is concern with doing justice between the parties. 68. I quite agree with counsel for the defendant that unsigned and undated document is a worthless piece of paper that has no evidential value in law. See Global Soap& Detergent Ind. Ltd V NAFDAC 2011 ALL FWLR PT.599 1025 @ 1047, Garuba V K. I. C. Ltd 2005 5 NWLR Pt.917 160, Omega Bank Nig. Ltd O. B. cC. Ltd 2005 8 NWLR PT.928 547, Jinadu V Esuromobi-aro 2009 9 NWLR Pt.1145 55, Amaizu V Nzerube 1989 4 NWLR PT.118 755, Salibawa V Habilat 1991 7 NWLR PT.174 461. 69. However, the facts of the case at hand are quite different from the facts in the cases relied on by counsel for the defendant in objecting to the witness statement on oath of the 1st claimant who testified as CW1. The cases relied by counsel for the defendant were on witness not signing his witness statement on oath at the registry of court before commissioner for oaths, as required by law. I have looked at the witness statement on oath it is clear to me that the deponent i.e CW1 had signed the column for the deponent and the unsigned column is that of the Commissioner for oath. It should be remembered that the witness statement on oaths is not a process standing on its own it is one of the processes that accompanied the complaint and the statement of facts in this case. See Order 3 Rules 8, 9 and 10 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017. Vide rule 21 of Order 3 of the rules of this court any objection to such document must be made within 21 days. This suit was commenced on 16/5/2017 and the claimant is raising objection in a written address filed in 2019. In view of inordinate delay in raising objection to the witness statement of CW1, I hereby overruled the objection. Even if the objection is to be upheld, not much will change because the defendant has tendered most of the document tendered by the claimants. In any event it is my view that this objection is belated. 70. The claimant hinged his relief on the defendant not following due process in termination of their employments. The claimants are very upset that the defendant has decided to adopt a procedure in termination of their appointment which according to them is not in consonance with the agreement of the parties as encapsulated in the Terms and Conditions of the contract of services attached to their letters of employment, exhibits CW1A1-3 – CW1G1-3. The grouse of the claimants as can be gathered from their evidence is that the Terms and conditions of service did not make provision for payment in lieu of notice of termination. 71. For the defendant by the Terms and conditions of service either party can decide to terminate the contractual relationship with or without reason. That the agreement has given parties liberty to terminate. 72. In law the concern of court when it comes to the issue of determining appropriateness or otherwise of termination of appointment is the service agreement i.e to say the letter of appointment and the terms and conditions of service. The service agreement or letter of employment is one of the most vital documents the court construe in determining the rights and obligations of the parties under the contract of service. See Anaja V UBA Plc (2014) 4 ACELR 78 @ 90 – 91. This means every contract of service is regulated by agreed terms and the conditions of service or what is termed Employee/staff Handbook or Human Resources Policy. Therefore, the intention of the parties is gathered from the letter of employment and conditions of service. The court is only obliged to examine the words used since the words express the intentions of the parties. See Longe V FBN Plc (2010) 6 NWLR (Pt.1189) 1. This principle is routed in the trite position of the law that parties are bound by the terms agreed in a contract of service. If the conditions for the performance of a contract are fulfilled by the parties thereto, they will be bound. It is not the function of the court to make contract for the parties or rewrite the one which they have made. Court has no power to alter or tamper with agreed terms by the parties. The duty of court is to construe the agreement to discern the intention of the parties and effect to same. See UBN V Ozigi (1994) 3 NWLR (Pt.333) 385 404. 73. The claimants’ case is built on their belief that the terms and conditions of service governing their contract of service with the defendant did not make provision for payment in lieu of notice. The defendant on the other hand had insists that the defendant has unfettered right to terminate claimants’ appointment with or without reason since the claimants’ employment was on probation for a period of (6) Six Months. To determine whether the claimants’ appointment was rightly or wrongly terminated will depend on the proper construction of the terms and conditions of service as contained and attached to their various letters of employment. 74. It is apt to now to reproduce the relevant portion of the service agreement, exhibits CW1A1-3 – CW1G1-3, as follows:- “PROBATIONARY PERIOD: Your appointment will be on probation for a period of six (6) months, which may be extended at the Management’s discretion if your performance is below the required standard in the first six months. If your conduct and performance are found satisfactory, your appointment may be confirmed at the end of the probationary period after you have fulfilled all confirmation requirements. However, if your performance is below benchmark. You will be appropriately regarded (redesigned) based on your performance. Note that during probationary period, either party shall be at liberty to determine or terminate this employment by giving two (2) weeks’ notice.” (Underlining ours for emphasis) 75. Under the heading ‘TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT’ it was provided, thus:- ‘’You shall be required to give a written/formal notice of minimum period of three (3) Months stating Your intention to terminate your employment. note further that except termination is at the instance of the company, leave in lieu of notice will not be acceptable in view of the sensitivity of office occupied. A probationer found to be unsuitable can be dismissed without notice.’’ 76. It is trite law that parties are bound by their agreements, the court saddled with the duty of construing the agreement of parties is to discover the intention of the parties, which is done by construing the words used and the court will not engage in ascribing to parties what they did not intend. The court is not allowed to in construing documents or agreements by importing into the document what was not there so as to give interpretation to suit the case of any of the parties. This is because parties to an agreement are presumed to intend what they have in fact. The court must confine itself to the plain and ordinary meaning derivable from the provisions containing the rights, obligations and entitlements of the claimants as provided therein. See Adegbite V College of Medicine of University of Lagos (1973) 5 SC 149; Sule V Nigerian Cotton Board (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt.5) 17.; William V Bassey (2015) 5 ACELR 88 96. The words written down should be given their ordinary, plain. Unless that will lead to absurdity or the circumstances dictate that a particular construction ought to be applied in order to give effect to that particular intention envisaged by the parties. Any construction that will negate or import extraneous matters to distort the intention of the parties must be avoided, unless it is impossible to understand the document or agreement to be construed without such additional words. See UBN Plc V Nwaokolo (1995) 6 NWLR (Pt.400) 127; UNB Ltd V Ozigi (1994) 3 NWLR (pt.333) 385. Thus, where document or agreement is clear and unambiguous, a court has only one duty to construe the plain words used. Thereby avoiding interpretation that is convenient to it or to one of the parties to the agreement. See Anason Farms ltd v Nal Merchant Bank ltd (1994) 3 NWLR (Pt.331) 241; Adiele Ihunwo V Johnson Ihunwo & Ors. (2013) LPELR-20084(SC). All that the court is required to do is to construe agreement of parties to discover the contemplation of the parties and not to import into the contract what was not there. The court must give effect to the wishes of the parties as expressed by words used in the agreement under consideration by the court. The main concern is the meaning of the words used in the agreement. See Amadi v Thomas Aplin co ltd (1972) 7 NSCC 262; Oduye V Nigerian Airways Limited (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt.55) 126; Amizu V Dr. Nzeribe (1989), 4 NWLR (PT.118) 755. However, where the words are not clear the court will fall back on the intention behind the words. See Fidelity Bank Plc V Monye (2012) 10 NWLR (Pt.1301) 1; A.G. Nasarawa State V A.G. Plateau State (2012) 10 NWLR (PT.1309) 419. Where the written agreement of the parties is embodied in several documents, all the documents should be read together in order to discover the intention of the parties. Royal Exchange Assurance Nig. Ltd V Aswani Textile Industries Ltd (1991) 2 NWLR (PT.176) 639; Udeaga V Benue Cement Company Plc (2006) 2 NWLR (Pt.965) 600, A.G. Kaduna State V Atta (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt.38) 785; Alh. M. K. V F.B.N. Plc (2011) LPELR-8971(CA). 77. I have had a hard look at exhibits CW1A1-3 – CW1G1-3, which is the contract agreement between the parties in this suit, I am of the clear view that the provisions of the clauses in each of the exhibits evidencing agreement of the parties are clear and unambiguous. When documents under construction by the court are clear, the operative words in the documents should be given their simple and ordinary grammatical meaning. Further, the general rule is that when the words of any instrument are free from ambiguity in themselves and when the circumstances of the case have not created any doubt or difficulty as to the proper application of the words to claimant under the instruments or the subject matter to which the instruments relates, such an instruments are always to be construed according to the strict, plain and common meaning of the words themselves. The reason is that if the conditions necessary for the formation of a contract are fulfilled by the parties thereto they will be bound by it. It is not the business of a court to make a contract for the parties or re-write the one which they have made. See Oyenuga v. Provisional Council of the University of lfe (1965) NMLR 9; UBN PLC V Ozigi (supra); Fakorede & Ors v. A.G. of Western State (1972) 1 All NLR (Pt. 1) 178 at 189. 78. It is clear to me that exhibit CW1A1-3 – CW1G, (Letters of appointment and terms and conditions of service), which contained the agreement of the parties in plain and lucid terms provided that during probation either parties to the agreement is at liberty to end the relationship by giving the other 2 weeks’ notice of intention to terminate. It is instructive to note that under the heading TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT’ a party under probation found to be unsuitable can be dismissed without notice. The intention of the parties is clear that at any time before the expiration of probation, the contract of service between the parties herein can be brought to an end by giving the other two weeks’ notice. 79. It is trite that an officer on probation does not enjoy the same condition of service with an officer whose appointment has been confirmed. His status in the establishment is more or less temporary during the period of probation hence the process of his removal is not subjected to strict adherence to Rules as is the case with a confirmed officer. That is why the terms and conditions of service provided for two weeks’ notice of termination of the appointment on both sides. Thus, in the case of IGWILO VS C.B.N (2000) 9 NWLR (Pt.672) 302 80. It was held that:- "In the termination of the appointment of an officer on probation, no procedure need be followed provided there is satisfaction that there is a good cause for termination. But in the termination of a confirmed officer, the procedure of termination must be followed, otherwise the termination is invalid. See also ALHASSAN VS ABU, ZARIA (2011) 11 NWLR (PT.1259) 417. In ZUKWU VS UNIVERSITY OF JOS (1990) 7 SC (PT.1) PAGE 18. It was held by the Supreme Court that the sole purpose of putting an employee on probation is to give the employer an assurance that the employee is a fit and proper person to be placed on permanent appointment and probationary period is a period of observation. 81. Therefore once the condition laid down for the termination of appointment during the probationary period is satisfied or complied with, an employee cannot justifiably complain. 82. Also in ALHAJI BABA VS NIGERIAN CIVIL AVIATION TRAINING CENTRE (1991) 5 NWLR (PT.192) 388 it was held that in the termination of the appointment of an officer on probation, no procedure is provided for that need to be followed once the employer is satisfied that there is good cause for the termination. See also NITEL PLC VS AKWA (2006) 2 NWLR (PT.964) 391 AND SIMEON VS COLLEGE OF EDUCATION EKIADOLOR-BENIN (2014) LPELR (23320) CA. 83. It is well settled law that a probationary employee can have his contract of employment terminated during the probation period by giving him requisite notice. The employer is not under an obligation to wait till the expiration of the probation period. See Ihezukwu V INIJOS; Baba NCATC (supra), where employee was terminated during probation court held it was lawful. 84. Graciously enough, the claimants have admitted being on probation. It was pointed out that termination of employment of the claimants shall be by two weeks’ notice. There is no dispute that the claimants at the time of termination were on probation. There is nowhere in the agreements exhibits CW1A1-3 – CW1G1-3, where payment in lieu of notice was provided. Therefore, the claimants’ termination of appointment with immediate effect was wrongful. The act of the defendant, in this regard constitutes a breach of the terms of the contract of employment which provides for two weeks’ notice. 85. From the foregoing it can rightly be said that employment of employee on probation can be terminated at any time while probation period is still pending or at expiration. Where there is provision in the contract for length of notice to be given before termination, this must be adhered to or the employer would be liable in damages. The evidence before the court unequivocally shows that the claimants’ employment is on probation, this situation present a different scenario from the case of confirmed employees. The law is now trite that in cases of employment on probation, the employer has unfettered right to do away with services of his employees on probation, like in the case at hand without much ado, strict adherence to procedure is not mandatory in cases of termination of appointment on probation. 86. The termination in master-servant relationship, where it is not carried out or effected in accordance with the terms and conditions of the employment as spelt out in the parties agreement, would only be wrongful because it is not done in accordance with the terms and conditions specifically agreed to by the employer and the employee, but would not be unlawful, illegal, null and void. The remedy available to an aggrieved employee in such cases lies in damages for wrongful termination of his employment contrary to the agreed terms and condition. See Ekpeogu V Ashaka Cement Company ltd (1997) 6 NWLR (Pt.5608) 280; WRA DC Ltd V Onwo (1999) 12 NWLR (Pt.630) 312; Isievwore V NEPA (2002) 7 SCNJ 323; Obianya V Afribank Nigeria Plc (2007) 6 NWLR (Pt.1031) 565. 87. Once it is established that a relationship is of master servant exists, then it carries with it all its attendant consequences, one of which is the right of a master to terminate the services of his servant according to the terms and conditions of the contract between them. See Amodu V Amode (1990) 5 NWLR (Pt150) 356. Where the termination was done not in conformity with the terms and conditions of service, or in breach of fair hearing, the court cannot order specific performance or payment of salaries from the date of termination, all that the employee will be entitled to is payment of salary in lieu of notice for the period of notice and any other earned entitlement. Thus, a clamant cannot be heard to complain of lack of fair hearing in case of termination of employment on probation. 88. Where a court found termination of contract of service to be wrongful, the claimant will be entitled to damages for the wrongful termination. Once contract of employment stipulates expressly that it is terminated by the giving of a stipulated period of notice, the damages recoverable for wrongful termination will be the amount of wages or salary the employee would have earned during the stipulated period. For instance, in the case at hand the contract of employment provides for two weeks’ notice, damages will then be two weeks’ salary or wage. See OBOT VS C.B.N (1993) 9 SCNJ 368 AND WESTERN NIGERIA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS ABIMBOLA (1966) 1 ALL NLR 159; SPRING BANK PLC VS BABATUNDE (2012) 5 NWLR (PT.1292) 83; ONALAJA VS AFRICAN PETROLEUM LTD (1991) 7 NWLR (PT.206) 691; OLATUNBOSUN VS NISER (1988) 3 NWLR (PT.145) 506 AND OLARENWAJU VS AFRIBANK PLC (2001) FWLR (PT.72) 2008. To further buttress the point being made here I shall refer to two cases referred to by the claimants which the counsel for the defendants reproduced part of submission of the claimant as follows: 89. In FRANK GBOBOH V. BRITISH AIRWAYS PLC (2016) LPELR-40099(CA), the Court of Appeal, per Nimpar, JCA, relied on this principle when it succinctly held on the measure of damages recoverable for wrongful termination of employment, thus: “The measure of damages awarded when an employment is wrongfully terminated is also settled in law, the apex court in the case of OSISANYA V. AFRIBANK (NIG) PLC (SUPRA) held as follows: “There is, in my view, no doubt that the Court below correctly stated and applied the applicable principle of law in master/servant relationship. In INTERNATIONAL DRILLING COMPANY (NIG) LTD V. MOSES EYEIMOFE AJIJALA (1979) 2 S.C. 64 at 773-74, this Court PER OBASEKI AG J.S.C, said on the point: The principles of law governing the award of damages were stated recently by this Court in: i. WESTERN NIGERIA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION V. JIMOH ABIMBOLA (1966) NMLR 381 at 382; and ii. NIGERIA PRODUCE MARKETING BOARD V. A.I. ADEWUMI (1972) 1 ALL NLR (PT2) 433 at 437. In the latter case, we stated the law as follows at page 437:-“in a claim for unlawful dismissal, the measure of damages is prima facie the amount that the plaintiff would have earned had the employment continued according to contract. Where, however, the defendant, on giving the prescribed notice, has a right to terminate the contract before the end of the term, the damages awarded apart from other entitlements, should be limited to the amount which would have been earned by the plaintiff over the period of Notice, bearing in mind that it is the duty of the plaintiff to minimize the damage which he sustains by the wrongful dismissal.” Similarly, the Court of Appeal, per Mbaba, JCA in the case of AGBARAKWE V. UNIVERSITY PRESS PLC (2015) LPELR-25613 (CA), held as follows, on how damages is measured in a claim for wrongful dismissal: “It should also be appreciated that in employment matters and claims for wrongful dismissal, the measurement of damages is, prima facie, the amount that the plaintiff would have earned, had the employment continued according to contract. See NMB Vs. Adewumni (1972) 11 SC N1; Beckham Vs. Darke (1849) 2 HCC 579. Where however, the defendant, on giving the prescribed notice, has a right to terminate the contract, before the end of the term (in respect of term contract), the damages awardable (apart from the entitlements earlier stated) should be limited to the amount which would have been earned by the plaintiff over the period of notice, bearing in mind that it is the duty of the plaintiff to minimize the damage which he sustains by the wrongful dismissal. See Denmark Production Ltd Vs. Boscobel Productions Ltd (1968) 1ALL ER 513 at 524. See also SELCON Tannery Ltd Vs. Abubakar & Ors. (2013) LPELR – 21412. In the case of New Nigeria News-papers Ltd Vs. Atoyebi (2013) LPELR – 21489 (CA), it was held: ‘That award of general damages for wrongful dismissal (or wrongful termination) is strange. This is because what is computed for a successful party in such circumstances cannot be general damages, but proven special damages, which actually are the salaries and other entitlements of the plaintiff during the period of the purported termination or dismissal, or what would have accrued to him, had the dismissal or termination complied with the due process envisaged in the condition of service, that is, the entitlement payable to the plaintiff in lieu of notice (where re-instatement cannot be ordered). See AdeniranVs. NEPA (2002) 14 NWLR (Pt. 786) 30; Kwara State Polytechnic Vs. Sahu (supra); SPDC Ltd Vs. Olarewaju (2008) 123 SC (pt. 111) 27.” 90. From the foregoing, exposition, the law is that, generally, the length of notice required for termination of contracts of employment depends on the intention of the parties as can or may be gathered from their contract and in the absence of any express provision, the courts will always imply a term that the employment may be terminated by a reasonable notice (from either of the parties ); and even where (as clearly provided in the agreement for persons still under probation) the employer has power to terminate the contract in his absolute discretion. The law enjoins the employer to give reasonable notice to the employee. 91. All I have been saying above the claimants in this case are only entitled to payment of two weeks’ salaries in lieu of notice which was not given to them by the defendant at the time of determination of their employment. The mere fact that the claimants were not given notice has no effect on the termination. The termination has ended the relationship notwithstanding the rejection of the payment in lieu which the claimants rejected. 92. The claimants having admitted being paid salary in lieu, but rejected and which in turn the defendant refused to accept, this means the claimants are still in possession of the payment of salary in lieu of notice. In the circumstances I hereby ordered the claimant to retain the payment of the salary in lieu of notice as what they are entitled to as damages for termination of their employment. 93. The claimants’ employment being that of master and servant, they are not entitled to declaration that the termination of the employment is unlawful, illegal null and void. They are also not entitled to declaration that the termination of employment of the claimants’ without due adherence to the provisions of the PUBLIC SERVICE RULES 2009 and other extant Public Service Guidelines as applicable in the Federal Public Service is irregular, illegal, null and void and of no effect whatsoever. This is because their employment was not made by the Federal Civil Service Rules. Likewise termination of employment of the claimants can be determined without any formality of hearing. The termination does not also require and approval of the Board or filing of resolution at Corporate Affairs Commission. 94. For the orders sought by the claimants, they are not entitled to any order for mandatory injunction compelling the Defendant, its agents, servants, privies and by whatsoever name called to immediately re-instate the claimants herein to their position. The reason being that in contract of service without statutory flavour court is not allowed to grant specific performance. The claimants’ remedy for wrongful termination lies in claim for danages and not payment of salary for work not done or punitive damages. 95. I make no order as to cost. 96. Judgment entered accordingly. Sanusi Kado, Judge. Ubong Udoh, Esq; counsel for the claimants; Dr. Kayode Ajulo, Esq; for the defendant appearing with H. A. Lasisi, Esq;