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JUDGMENT Introduction & Claims 1. On 29/6/17, the Claimant approached this Court via her General Form of Complaint, statemet of facts and other requisite frontloaded processes and sought the following reliefs against the Defendants - 1. Negligence for the failure of the defendants to keep the kitchen in safe condition to prevent it from being slippery =N=20,000,000 (Twenty Million Naira). 2. Cost of pains suffered, burns, serious bodily injuries =N=20,000,000 (Twenty Million Naira) c Loss of enjoyment of life amenities =N=10,000,000 (Ten Million Naira) TOTAL CLAIM = N50,000,000 (Fifty Million Naira) d And also an interest on such damages at such rate for such period as the court shall thinks just. e. Cost of Litigation as assessed by the Honourable court. 2. By their Amended Statement of Defence dated and filed on 5/9/18, the Defendants denied liability to the Claimant. Case of the Claimant 3. Claimant opened her case on 24/1/19, testified in chief by adopting her witness deposition dated 29/1/17 as her evidence and tendered 15 documents as exhibits. The documents were admitted in evidence and marked as Exh. CE1-Exh. CE15 respectively. The case of the Claimant as revealed by her witness deposition is that the Defendants were her former employers and carry on tertiary education that is, educational institutions at Km10, along Ota-Idiroko Expressway, Ota in the Ado-Odo/Ota Local Government Area, Ogun State; that she was employed sometimes in year 2011; that she was not given any instrument of employment by the Defendants; that she was employed as a casual worker for over a year; that she was on a monthly salary of Sixteen Thousand Naira (=N=16,000) payable when the voucher closes that her salary was always paid through (CMFB) Covenant Micro Finance Bank Teller 41112 – 411140 owned by Living Faith Ministry. (Parent company of Covenant University); that she was in the service of the University for more than one year before the incident happened on (Sunday October, 28th 2012) with groundnut oil of maximum temperature; that after frying about twelve (12) cartons of fish in the kitchen section of Cafeteria (1) whose floor was oily and slippery; that as she was setting down the big metal frying bowl from coal-pot (fire) one of her feet slipped off the floor while turning away from the fire and she fell badly with the frying bowl filled with extremely hot groundnut oil and it poured on various parts of her body and that she sustained various degrees of burns with excruciating pains; that her co-worker (Florence) was on another coal-pot when the accident happened. 4. Claimant added that cooking was done with coal-pots because of the large volume of meals they always prepared (cooked), Meals of less volume were cooked on gas-cooker; that when the incident happened, she started screaming and was later assisted by her co-workers who came and rescued her; that her clothes were removed and in the process her burnt skins were also getting removed along with the oily clothes; that she was taken to the Hospital; that on the next day Monday October 27th, 2012, Mrs. Agboola who happened to be her manager and coordinator came to see her and further directed that she should be taken to National Orthopaedic Hospital, Igbobi-Yaba, Lagos for further and better treatments; that she was in this hospital for three (3) months before she was discharged; that upon resumption, she was redeployed to Cafeteria (1) Hall; that she was later withdrawn from Cafeteria (1) Hall on the order of Bishop David Olaniyi Oyedepo (a.k..a. Papa) because her burnt skins and scars were irritating to Love Oyedepo (Bishop Oyedepo’s last child); that she was redeployed to the grocery department and being discriminated against because of her burns and scars; that she was redeployed to the Kitchen; that when she complained that her body could not stand hot temperature of kitchen duties, she was ordered to stay off the job; that before she left she sent key staff like Sister Nike and others to Mrs. Agboola to plead for her that with her health condition life shall become unbearable for her (Claimant) but she refused; that she met the University Registrar over this issue but he further affirmed that she could not be compensated because she was never a staff of the University; that she wrote to the University for compensation but the University did not compensate her; that her Lawyer, Ifeanyi M. Aneke Esq. wrote to the Registrar, Vice Chancellor, Chancellor and the Controller Federal Ministry of Labour and Employment; that she applied to the National Orthopedic Hospital for her Medical bills and was given National Orthopedic Hospital page information 097624505; that when she applied for her medical report, she was given a report by the Hospital dated 25th February, 2016; that the original of the Medical Report was sent to the Defendants and it is with the Defendants; that she was abandoned and left to suffer by the Defendants; that after resumed work she took photographs with her co-worker; that the Photographer who took the photographs has relocated to an unknown place; that she applied to the National Orthopedic Hospital for the photographs of her injuries and that the photographs were taken and given to her by the Hospital. 5. Under cross examination, CW1 stated that she was employed by the 1st Defendant; that on the day of the incident 4 of them were working; that 2 of them carried the pot of oil; that that was the first time she worked in that section; that before they started to fry the fish the environment was not clean; that the place has always been unclean; that she was taken to Covenant University Medical Centre; that 1st Defendant paid for the medical bill there; that Mrs. Agboola was her Manager; that her supervisor instructed that she be rushed to the Medical Centre; that she was at the Medical Centre for about 24 hours before she was taken to Igbobi Hospital; that she was unconscious and did not know how she was taken to Igbobi Hospital; that she was at Igbobi Hospital for 3 months; that she paid some of the bills while the 1st Defendant paid some; that she was abandoned there for about 2 months; that she was not given receipts for payments she made and that she sent her friend, Nkechi (now in the United States) to make payment to the hospital on her behalf. 6. Witness added that she underwent a major surgery at Igbobi; that the 1st Defendant paid for it; that she made demand for compensation after she was sacked; that the at time incident took place on 28/10/12 she heard that some people donated blood for her surgery; that the Defendants paid her salary for only 2 months while she was in the hospital; that the Defendants brought eggs in nylon for her treatment because Doctor said eggs are needed for her treatment; that she worked in the kitchen as well as in the Bar after returning from the Hospital; that she did not work in the Mini market; that Mrs. Funmi Wuraola of the Defendants gave order to the security not to allow her come to work again; that the Defendants did not write her any letter; that she met David Oyedepo Jnr in the course of her work; that she did not work under Love Oyedepo and that she is presently unemployed. Case of the Defendants 7. The Defendants entered into the defence of their case on 8/10/19. They called on Philomena Adie as their DW1. DW1 adopted her written deposition dated 21/6/19 as her evidence in chief and tendered 71 documents as exhibits. The documents were admitted without objection and marked as Exh. PA1-Exh. PA71 respectively. 8. The case of the Defendants is that Claimant was a casual labourer of the 1st Defendant; that the Defendant were not in any way negligent; that Claimant was negligent in the entire process leading to the event of 28/10/12 as a result of which Claimant suffered injuries; that floor of the Cafeteria One was never oily and slippery but always hygienically clean with rough surface; that Claimant was not supposed to be frying fish on that day but on her own volition and against advise and practice assigned herself to fish frying section; that the standard practice was for the fish frying assignees to clear the surroundings before bringing the frying pan down but the Claimant by reason of her stubborn nature bluntly refused to do so even though that was the first day she participated in fish frying; that 2 other staff of the 1st Defendant were assigned to bring down the pan but that the Claimant insisted on doing it; that in the process of bringing down the pan with another staff Claimant negligently dropped her side of the pan and attempted to flee but she tripped on the crate of drink she negligently left on the floor and fell with the oil spilling and that there had never been any accidents before and after the Claimant's unfortunate and avoidable accident. It was also the case of the Defendants that they took proper care of the Claimant and paid medical bills as well as paid for her medications. 9. Under cross examination, DW1 testified that the incident leading to this case happened on 28/10/2012; that Mrs. Akinade Toyin and Comfort witnessed the incident; that the official report of the incident was oral; that she also witnessed the incident; that she only works in the kitchen of 1st Defendant though she can work in any other department; that Claimant was investigated pursuant to allegation of gross mismanagement and remittance of funds and fraudulent dealings in minimart and that Claimant was thereafter moved to another section. Submissions of learned Counsel 10. At the close of trial and pursuant to the direction of the Court, learned Counsel on either side filed their final written addresses. The final written address of the Defendants was dated 24/10/19 and filed on 25/10/19. In it Counsel set down the following 4 issues for determination - 1. Whether, in view of the facts and circumstances of this case as set out above, this suit is liable to be struck out for being incompetent and for want of jurisdiction of this Honourable Court by reason of the Claimant's failure to fulfill the requisite condition precedent by failing to comply with the provisions of sections 4 and 6 of the Employees' Compensation Act, 2020 (formerly Workmen Compensation Act). 2. Whether the 2nd,3rd and 4th Defendants who are agents, officers and employees of a disclosed Principal (that is, the 1st Defendant) were wrongly sued and so ought to be struck out from this suit for not being necessary parties. 3. Whether, in view of sections 84, 87(a), 89(e), 102 and 105 of the Evidence Act, 2011, the photographs and the uncertified photocopy of the National Orthopaedic Hospital Medical Report dated 7th March, 2016 (being a public document) tendered in evidence by the Claimant on 24th January, 2019 are admissible. 4. Whether the Claimant has failed to prove her case on the balance of probability and/or on preponderance of evidence as required by law, and if yes, whether her claims are bound to fail and the suit dismissed in its entirety. 11. Arguing these issues, learned Counsel submitted that learned Counsel submitted that the suit is incompetent for Claimant's failure to comply with the condition precedent to the institution of the action; that there is no evidence that the letter dated 17/3/16 for compensation was served on the Defendants as claimed by the Claimant in her pleading but denied under cross examination; that in any event Claimant failed to comply with the provisions of sections 4 and 6 of Employees' Compensation Act which required Claimant to provide the Defendants with necessary information respecting the accident within 14 days of the accident and that this failure robbed the Court of its jurisdiction citing Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962)1 All NLR (Pt. 4) 587. Counsel also submitted that 2nd, 3rd and 4th Defendants were wrongly sued being agents of a disclosed principal citing Section 37, Companies and Allied Matters Act and 1st Defendant being their principal is liable for any acts carried out by them citing Salomon v. Salomon & Co Limited (1897)Ac 22 at 51.Learned Counsel further argued against admissibility of the photographs and the uncertified National Orthopaedic Hospital Medical Report dated 7/3/16 tendered and admitted on 24/1/19. It was the submission of Counsel that the exhibits did not comply with the provisions of sections 84, 87(a), 89(e) and 105, Evidence Act, 2011 citing Rosehill Limited v. GTB (2016)LPELR-41665 & Brila Energy Limited v. FRN (2018) LPELR-43926. Counsel prayed the Court to expunge the exhibits from its record. 12. Finally, Counsel submitted that Claimant has failed to prove her case; that negligence is a question of fact and that the burden of proof lies on he who alleges negligence citing Section 136, Evidence Act, 2011 & Adetoun v. Lafarge Africa Plc & Anor. (2018) LPELR-44733; that all the particulars of Claimant's negligence were never challenged or contradicted by the Claimant during cross examination and that the Court is obliged to act on the same against the Claimant citing Amayo v. Erinmwingbovo (2006) LPELR-458(SC); that there is no evidence to support the claim for =N=20,000,000.00 as cost of pains suffered; that the claim for =N=10,000,000.00 for loss of enjoyment of life amenities is a claim for special damages which must be specially pleaded and strictly proved citing Agugu v. Buhari & Anor (2016) LPELR-41617. Counsel urged the Court to dismiss the case of the Claimant in its entirety. 13. The final written address of the Claimant was dated 17/12/19 but filed on 13/1/2020. In it, learned Counsel set down the following issues down for determination - 1. Whether the Claimant is an employee of the 1st Defendant. 2. Whether or not the Claimant can institute an action against the Defendants without recourse to the Employee's Compensation Act. 3. Admissibility of photographs and National Orthopaedic Hospital Medical Report dated 7/3/16 tendered in evidence by the Claimant on 24/1/19. 4. Whether the Defendants has(sic) defence to the Claimant claim. 14. In arguing that Claimant is an employee of the Defendants, learned Counsel referred to evidence of Claimant's monthly salary by Covenant Micro Finace bank Tellers 41112-411140 owned by the proprietor of the 1st Defendant and the admission of the Defendants that Claimant worked at the grocery section, P.O.S department and the kitchen; that Claimant falls within the meaning of worker as defined in Section 91 of Labour Act Cap. L1 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. On issue 2, Counsel submitted that Claimant led evidence in support of her case; that the law is trite that a Claimant who sustains injury in work place can sue his employer citing Section 25, Employee's Compensation Act & Chaquary v. Yakubu (2006)3 NWLR (Pt. 966) 138. 15. Respecting the objection to the photographs and medical report tendered and admitted, Counsel submitted that in so far as the defence did not challenge the authenticity of the documents, section12(2) of the NIC Act, 2006 and Order 5 Rule 6(2)(b), National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017 allow this Court to depart from the provision of the Evidence Act . Counsel urged the Court in the spirit of equity and fairness to discountenance argument respecting admissibility of the documents. 16. On issue 4 set down for determination, learned Counsel submitted that the injury sustained by the Claimant was a product of her discharging the responsibility assigned to her by virtue of her employment with the Defendants; that the Defendants owe the Claimant a duty of care citing Kabo Air Limited v. Mohammed (2014) LPELR-236; that the medical report attested to the fact that Claimant sustained the injury in her line of duty and that the particulars of the Claimant's Negligence as contained in paragraphs 6,7 & 29 of the Defendants' witness statement on oath contravenes the provisions of Section 131(1) of the Evidence Act and are not credible and meritorious to extricate the claim of the Claimant that the floor was slippery. Learned Counsel further submitted that in personal injury cases, once there is evidence of injury, pains and permanent incapacitation, the victim or plaintiff is entitled to be awarded reasonable general damages which said award should be based on some circumstances since such injury cannot be quantified in monetary forms citing Taylor v. Ogheneovo (2012)All FWLR (Pt. 610) 1358 at 1378. Counsel prayed the Court to hold that the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought Claimant having done all that is required by law and enter Judgment in her favour. Decision 17. After due and diligent considerations of all the processes filed by learned Counsel on either side, the testimonies of the witnesses called at trial and patient evaluation of all the exhibits tendered and admitted, I set down the following issues for the just determination of this case - 1. Whether or not the Claimant can institute an action against the Defendants without recourse to the Employee's Compensation Act. 2. Whether, in view of sections 84, 87(a), 89(e), 102 and 105 of the Evidence Act, 2011, the photographs and the uncertified photocopy of the National Orthopaedic Hospital Medical Report dated 7th March, 2016 (being a public document) tendered in evidence by the Claimant on 24th January, 2019 are admissible. 3. Whether the Claimant has discharged the burden of proof placed on her to be successful in this case. 18. The first issue for consideration is whether or not the Claimant can institute an action against the Defendants without recourse to the Employee's Compensation Act. It was the argument of the Defendants that the Claimant having failed to comply with the provisions of sections 4 and 6 of the Employee's Compensation Act, 2010 the present action is incompetent. These sections deal with the need for an employee to provide necessary information to his employer within 14 days of sustaining injury at workplace to be qualified for compensation. On the other hand, section 6 of the Act deals with the requirement for an injured employee to file an application for compensation in the prescribed form by the Board within one year after the date of occurrence of the event as compensation will not be paid if the application is not filed within a year after death, injury or disability safe for where special circumstances exist. The argument of the learned Counsel is that the injury sustained by the Claimant occurred on 28/10/12 while the Claimant purportedly wrote for compensation by a letter dated 17/3/16 (Exh. CE5), a period of about 4 years interval. It was the submission of Counsel that the Court is thereby denied its jurisdiction by that singular act of the Claimant. Let me reiterate an obvious fact that the case of the Claimant before the Court is not one brought for compensation under the Employee's Compensation Act, 2010. Thus, the issue of non-compliance with any of the provisions of the Act should and is here discountenanced out-rightly as being of no moment. See section 12(1), Employee's Compensation Act, 2010. The claims against the Defendants are in ''Negligence for the failure of the defendants to keep the kitchen in safe condition to prevent it from being slippery ...'' In any event, judicial authorities are unanimously in support of the position of the statute. Obaseki-Osaghae J in Mr. Sunday Okechukwu v. Hongxing Steel Company Limited Suit No: NICN/LA/139/2011 Judgment of which was delivered on 28/5/14 did not hesitate in holding that a victim of workplace injuries is entitled to make a choice whether to pursue a claim under the applicable legislation or seek judicial redress as sought by the Claimant and that the limitation period under the Limitation Law, Laws of Lagos State did not apply to negatively affect the case. Confronted with similar argument but with respect to Employees' Compensation Act in Abel Abel v. Trevi Foundation Nigeria Limited Anuwe J took the same position. 19. The second issue is whether, in view of sections 84, 87(a), 89(e), 102 and 105 of the Evidence Act, 2011, the photographs and the uncertified photocopy of the National Orthopaedic Hospital Medical Report dated 7th March, 2016 (being a public document) tendered in evidence by the Claimant on 24th January, 2019 are admissible. The photographs were tendered and admitted as Exh. CE11 while the Medical Report was admitted and marked as Exh.CE4. The argument of the learned Counsel in attacking the admissibility of these documents were at 2 different levels. First, learned Counsel submitted that Exh. CE11, the photographs, failed admissibility test not having met the conditions as stipulated in sections 84(1),(2) and (4) of the Evidence Act and in particular as Counsel pointed out on page 16 of his final written address - ''There is no certificate of any sort identifying the photographs (being computer generated document) and describing the manner in which they were produced''. Counsel cited Brila Energy Limited v. FRN (2018) LPELR-43926. Respecting the Medical Report Exh. CE4 the position of the learned Counsel is that the exhibit being a photocopy offended the provisions of sections 89 and 102 of the Evidence Act, 2011 in that being a public document only a certified true copy of it is admissible citing Baban-Lungu & Anor. v. Zarewa & Ors. (2013) LPELR-20726. 20. Firstly, this Court, the National Industrial Court of Nigeria is a specialised Court and the legislature recognised its specialised nature and the need for it not to be weighed down by unnecessary technical rules of evidence. Hence, the Lawmaker by section 12(2), National Industrial Court Act, 2006 provides that the Court may regulate its procedure and proceedings as it thinks fit; and shall be bound by Evidence Act, but may depart from it in the interest of justice. I dare say that it is in the interest of justice that a Court of law be afforded opportunity of access to all documents and materials relevant to a case before it. For, it is then and then only that the Court will be able to do substantial justice between the parties appearing and seeking same before it. Exh. CE11 was pleaded and relevant to the case of the Claimant. It was admitted at trial after due consideration. I have not been confronted with any superior argument as to why I should expunge and discountenance the exhibit in the determination of this case. I thus hold that Exh. CE11 is admissible and properly admitted at trial. The argument against its admissibility is here discountenanced. 21. Now on Exh. CE4 (the Medical Report), that exhibit was pleaded and frontloaded. I found it admissible at trial and it was admitted in evidence. Learned Counsel to the Defendants had argued before me, and rightly too, that the fact that a public document is relevant does not make a photocopy of the public document admissible and that it must be certified citing Baban-Lungu & Anor. v. Zarewa & Ors. (2013)LPELR-20726 which had followed Orlu v. Gogo-Abite (2010)8 NWLR (Pt.1196) 307 & House of Representatives v. Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (2010)11 NWLR (Pt. 1205). Let me state for a start that all the Judgments that went on appeal culminating in those decisions of the Court of Appeal did not emanate from the National Industrial Court of Nigeria and the trial Courts were not confronted with legislation similar to the National Industrial Court Act, 2006 which permits this Court a departure from the provision of the Evidence Act but only in the interest of justice. Although Exh. CE4 is a public document and the Claimant did not comply with the provisions of Evidence Act mandating the tendering of only a certified true copy, Section 12(2)(b) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 however permits a departure in the interest of justice. That was the basis for the admission of that exhibit at trial. No superior argument has been canvassed before me to warrant the need to discountenance that exhibit even now. Secondly, and perhaps not in the least critical is the fact that certification of a public document is usually at the mercy of the person or authority who has custody of the document. Thus where the person or authority having custody refuses or neglects to do so the party who has the legal burden to produce a certified true copy may be rendered helpless. The usual practice and which is supported by judicial authorities is for the party in need of certification to serve a notice to produce on the party with custody of the document and power to certify same. Now, what is a notice to produce? What are its consequences, if any? 22. In Venn v. Access Bank Plc & Ors (2014) LPELR(CA) relying on Buhari v. Obasanjo (2005)13 NWLR (Pt. 941) 1, Ajagbe v. Babalola (2010) LPELR-3668, Adegbuji v. Mustapha (2010) LPELR-3600 & Union Bank of Nigeria Limited v. Idris (1999)7 NWLR (Pt. 609) the Court of Appeal said thus - ''.... a notice to produce is a formal demand on the adverse party to bring before the court for the use of the requesting party such document or documents listed in said notice. Where a notice to produce is served on a party who fails to produce same, then the law allows secondary evidence of such document to be adduced where available. In other words, the purpose of issuing notice to produce is to allow the person who gives the notice to tender secondary evidence of the required documents where the adverse party fails to produce them''. 23. It is thus apparent that a major consequence of service of notice to produce entitles the party serving the notice to adduce secondary evidence of the document in question by virtue of Section 98 of the Evidence Act. 24. The need for this exposition on notice to produce is premised on the pleadings and evidence in chief of the Claimant. For, Claimant pleaded the existence of the medical report as well as served a notice to produce on the Defendants. Specifically in paragraphs 31 & 32 of both the Statement of Facts and the Claimant's Statement on Oath dated 29/6/17, Claimant had stated as follows - ''31. That I state that when I applied for my medical report, a report was written by the Hospital dated 25th February, 2016. The said report shall be relied upon at the trial of this suit''. ''32. That I state that the Original of the medical report was sent to the defendants and it is with the defendants - NOTICE given to the defendants to produce the original''. 25. The Defendants did not deny being in custody of the original of the medical report of the Claimant. Defendants also did not deny the important fact of being served the notice to produce the original of the said medical report. The Defendants for reasons best known to them refused and/or neglected to produce the original of the medical report in their custody. In a circumstance as this, the law allows the Claimant utilise a copy available to her for the purpose of proving her case. That exactly is what the Claimant did. I hold that the objection raised respecting the admissibility of Exh. CE4 lacks merit. I overrule same. There is no reason for the Court to discountenance the exhibit in the just determination of this case. I so hold. This issue is therefore resolved in favour of the Claimant. 26. The final issue for determination is wether the Claimant has discharged the burden of proof placed on her to be successful in this case. The case of the Claimant against the Defendants is one in negligence for failure of the Defendants to keep the kitchen where worked in a safe condition to prevent it from being slippery. The brief facts of this case as put forward by the Claimant are that she worked in the Kitchen of the Defendants; that she was engaged in frying fish on the day of the incident; that there was need for her to carry the frying pan with hot oil in it and that in doing so because the floor of the Kitchen was slippery she fell with frying pan with hot oil in it; that the hot oil poured on her and sustained serious burns. It was also her case that she was rushed to the Hospital and treated and further referred to orthopaedic hospital for further treatment. 27. It is a trite law that the burden of proof rests always on he who asserts. Therefore the burden is on the Claimant in the instant case to prove that the Defendants were negligent in order for her to be entitled to the reliefs sought. In order for the Claimant to succeed in this case, she must adduce sufficiently cogent, credible and admissible evidence in support of the essential elements of negligence. What then are these essential elements? These ingredients were restated by the Supreme Court in Makwe v. Nwukor (2000) FWLR (Part 63) 1 at 16 wherein the apex Court expounded the law thus ''… the essential ingredients of actionable negligence are: i. the existence of a duty to take care owed to the complainant by the Defendant; ii. failure to attain that standard of care prescribed by the law; iii. damage suffered by the complainant, which must be connected with the breach of duty to take care. 28. To succeed, a Claimant must prove to the satisfaction of the Court the three ingredients as put forward by the Court. The first of this is the duty of care. This presupposes the existence of some form of relationship between the parties as the concept of duty of care can hardly arise between strangers in law. The existence of a duty of care is central to the success of a suit in negligence. That is the duty of care owed by the Defendant to the Claimant. Actually the concept of a duty of care has its origin in the concept of foreseeability. This principle was first enunciated in Heaven vs. Pender (1883) 11 QBD 503 at 509, where Brett M.R. said - Whenever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position with regard to another that everyone of ordinary sense who did think would at once recognize that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct with regard to those circumstances he would cause danger of injury to the person or property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger. See Stemco Limited v. Essien (2019)LPELR (CA). 29. In the absence of duty of care, a Defendant will not be held liable for workplace injuries sustained by his employee. The duty envisaged here may be imposed by common law. It may also have been imposed by the statute. For instance under the Factories Act, there are duties imposed on the employer respecting cleanliness, overcrowding, ventilation, lighting, drainage of floors and sanitary conveniences. There are also general provisions relating to safety and also general provisions on welfare of employees. 30. With respect to workplace injuries and liability of an employer in negligence, the Common Law recognises the existence of a duty of care by an employer to its workforce. The existence of employment relationship, even at Common Law, imposes a duty of care on the employer respecting his employees. The Court of Appeal in Kabo Air Limited v. Mohammed (2014)LPELR-23614(CA) reiterated the position thus - "...it is settled law that it is the duty of an employer, acting personally or through his servants or agents, to take reasonable care for the safety of his workmen and other employees in the course of their employment. This duty extends in particular to the safety of the place of work, the plant and machinery and the method and conduct of work''. 31. The Court, while noting that the duty of care of an employer to the employee is not restricted to the matters stated, further approved the Judgment of Lord Wright in Wilsons and Clyde Coal Co. Ltd v. English (1938) AC 57 at 84 that - "The whole course of authority consistently recognizes a duty which rests on the employer, and which is personal to the employer, to take reasonable care of the safety of his workmen, whether the employer be an individual, a firm or a company, and whether or not the employer takes any share in the conduct of the operations." 32. Thus, it is possible to have a common ground and agree that in an employer/employee or master/servant relationship the master/employer ordinarily owes a duty of care to his servant or workforce. That duty is however not subject to any demands made by an employee on the employer or how the duty should be performed. For in John O. Onwukanjo v. Zenith Securities Limited Suit No: NICN/OW/16/2015 Judgment of which was delivered on 28/4/16 an employee who sustained injuries in the hands of armed robbers while in the discharge of his duties had argued that he ought to be provided bullet proof security van and about 14 armed personnel. In refusing this line of argument, Anuwe J had this to say - ''The duty of safeguarding the cash and personnel on transit is that of the Police. The Defendants are not under any duty to provide a bullet proof bullion van for conveyance of the cash or security detail comprising 2 vans of not less than 14 armed police men. The Defendants duty is no more than provide adequate security for their personnel and cash and the 3rd Defendant performed this duty through the police and also provided the police with the necessary and requested tools in that regard. The Police has never requested for a bullet proof bullion van neither has the Claimant ever requested for a bullet proof bullion van throughout his service with the 3rd Defendant or a particular number of police escort''. 33. The second ingredient is the breach of the duty of care. To succeed, the Claimant has the burden to prove that the duty of care owed to him by the Defendant was breached by the Defendant. The ideas of duty of care and negligence are strictly correlative as there is no such thing as negligence in the abstract. It connotes simply the neglect of some care which are bound by law to exercise towards another. It is not sufficient that there exists a duty of care owed by the Defendant to the Claimant to be entitled to award of damages. The Claimant is under an obligation to prove that the Defendant breached that duty of care. The mere occurrence of an accident is not enough to make a claim for damages. The accident must be linked to the fault or failings of the Defendant. See Avon Crown Caps & Containers Nig. Limited v. Bamigboye (2005)17 NWLR (Pt. 954) 275. There must be a nexus established between the Defendant and the breach of the duty of care owed. The expected nexus must be apparent in both the pleadings of the Claimant and the evidence led by him at trial. Thus where there is a breach of a duty of care but the breach is not linked to the Defendant, the Defendant will not be held liable in damages for workplace injuries. Proof of breach of duty of care is central to success in case brought in negligence. In Mr. Ogunyemi Adeola v. Avanti Industries Limited Suit No: NICN/LA/630/2014 Judgment of which was delivered on 8/2/18 where the Defendant had argued that it provided its workforce with protective gadgets the Court in holding that the Defendant breached its duty of care to the Claimant said - ''Although the Defendant claimed to have provided the Claimant with protective gadgets, the evidence of DW1 to the effect that even with the hand gloves provided, the Claimant would have still sustained injury is instructive. This piece of evidence to me raises the question as to the quality of the hand gloves provided. it is the duty of an employer to make workplace safe , to provide gadgets for its workforce and to ensure that the protective gadgets are used. Failure to discharge this responsibility makes the Defendant liable in damages or compensation to the Claimant''. 34. In the instant case, this Court has found that by virtue of the employment relationship existing between the parties, the Defendants owe the Claimant a duty of care. Was the duty of care of breached? If yes, It is for the Claimant to establish how it was breached and by who. In paragraph 10b of her statement of facts which was repeated in same paragraph 10b of her witness deposition, Claimant had testified thus - ''That I say as I was setting down the big metal frying bowl from coal-pot (fire) one of my feet slipped off the floor while turning away from the fire and I fell badly with the frying bowl filled with hot groundnut oil and it poured on various parts of my body''. 35. This is the only averment in the pleading describing the injuries sustained by the Claimant. Claimant has not shown to the Court the role played by the Defendants in the events resulting in the injuries. How was the failure of the Defendants to exercise their duty of care owed to the Claimant in the circumstances of this case? I have no explanation to this. The law is trite that he who asserts must adduce evidence in proof of the same. Evidence in proof of the breach of duty in the instant case is not available. In its absence the Court cannot find in favor of the Claimant. I resolve this issue in favour of the Defendants and against the Claimant. The resolution of this issue has a negative implication and consequence to the case of the Claimant. It means that Claimant has failed to prove an essential element of her case. It is therefore sufficient for the court to dismiss her out-rightly on this point. I so do. 36. The third essential ingredient is the resultant injury or damage from the breach of the duty of care. The breach of the duty of care to the Claimant is essential for her to be entitled to award of damages in negligence for workplace injury. But that is not even sufficient. The breach of the duty of care must have resulted into some form of injury or damage to the Claimant. Thus, where there is a duty of care and a breach of same but without any resultant injury, the Court is not obliged to make a finding in favour of the Claimant. In Ngilari v. Mothercat Limited (1999)13 NWLR (Pt. 636) 628 the Court pointed out that - ''Mere occurrence of accident is not proof of negligence. Thus to succeed in a claim of negligence, it is not enough to prove that there was an accident. the Plaintiff must prove that the accident was a result of the negligence of the Defendant. Therefore, the circumstances, nature and extent of the accident must be pleaded and evidence adduced thereon ... ''. 37. The same position was reiterated by the Court in Up Bottling Company Plc v. Emmanuel (2013) LPELR-21104 (CA) in the following words ''The position of the law in the case of negligence is that the Claimant must be able to link the breach of the duty of care which occasioned the injury to the Defendant. This to my mind is to say that the cause of the injury has to be traced to the act or omission of the Defendant''. 38. Where there is also injury but without a corresponding breach of duty of care, the Court will not intervene positively in favour of the Claimant. The rationale being that what the Court sets out to compensate in award of damages is the injury to the Claimant from the breach by the Defendant of the duty of care it owes the Claimant. Here I have sufficient evidence before me respecting the injuries sustained by the Claimant. The testimonies of the Claimant along with both Exh. CE4 & Exh. CE11 attested to the injuries of the Claimant. Unfortunately, there is no nexus between the injuries of the Claimant and the breach of a duty of care by the Defendants. 39. Before I draw curtain on this Judgment, let me reiterate the imperative of Claimant in an action for damages in negligence as in the instant case to disclose and plead the particulars of negligence alleged against the Defendants. That was not done in this case. Negligence is a question of fact not law and facts are proved by oral or documentary or real evidence or a combination of all or any of these. See Section 131 of the Evidence Act 2011. See Ogan & Ors v. Ogan (2013) LPELR 2123 (CA) & Ofuani v. Emordi & Ors (2016) LPELR-42027. Therefore such case must be decided in the light of its own facts and circumstances. The facts of a case bordering on negligence must be proved by the person who asserts same. This is in tandem with the age long established principle of law that he who asserts must prove the assertion. See Okorie v. Unakalamba (2013) LPELR-22508 (CA). As a matter of law therefore, a plaintiff who intends to be victorious in negligence action must plead the particulars of negligence alleged and give cogent and credible evidence at the trial in line with the detailed pleadings. The requirement that a Claimant must give particulars of negligence in an action for negligence is one that case law authorities acknowledge. See for instance Diamond Bank Ltd v. Partnership Investment Co. Ltd & Anor (2009) LPELR-939 (SC); (2009) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1172) 67 SC, which held that - ''a plaintiff, as a matter of law is required, in an action on negligence, to state or give particulars of negligence alleged and to recover on the negligence pleaded in those particulars. Therefore failure to prove particulars of negligence pleaded is fatal to the plaintiff’s case''. 40. In this case, Claimant neither pleaded nor proved the particulars of negligence as required. This is fatal to the success of her case. 41. Finally, for the avoidance of doubt and for all the reasons as contained in this Judgment, I dismiss the case of the Claimant in its entirety. 42. I make no order as to cost. 43. Judgment is entered accordingly. ____________________ Hon. Justice J. D. Peters Presiding Judge