JUDGMENT. 1. The claimant took up a general form of complaint dated and filed on 6th day of September 2016, claiming against the defendants as follows:- 1. A DECLARATORY ORDER of this Honourable Court that the purported compulsory retirement of the Claimant from the services of the Nigerian Army by the Second Defendant vide its letter dated 9th June, 2016 constitutes/constituted an unfair and or wrongful dismissal and therefore wrongful, unlawful, illegal, unconstitutional, invalid and contrary to the Armed Forces of Nigeria Harmonized Terms and Conditions of Service for Officers 2012. 2. A DECLARATORY ORDER of this Honourable Court that the action of the Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Defendants herein jointly and severally in procuring the punishment of my compulsory retirement without any legal or factual basis in wanton breach of all principles of natural justice as well as relevant constitutional provisions with respect to fair hearing and due process and as shown on the facts of this case is malicious, arbitrary and constitutes abuse of office hiding under color of law and/or office. 3. A DECLARATORY ORDER of this Honourable Court that the actions of the Defendants in the purported compulsory retirement as presented in this case constitutes a most wanton and unconstitutional application of unfair practices to my direct detriment. 4. AN ORDER of the Honourable Court setting aside the purported letter of compulsory retirement dated 9th June, 2016 which was issued to the claimant by or on behalf of the Second Defendant for being unlawful, invalid, unconstitutional, void and of no effect whatsoever. 5. AN ORDER of the Honourable Court directing the immediate reinstatement of the to his statutory protected employment or service in the Nigerian Army and which re-instatement is to be made effective from 9th June, 2016 with all rights and entitlements of the claimant. 6. AN ORDER of the Honourable Court restraining the Defendants, their agents, privies however and howsoever described from harassing or subjecting the claimant to any form of arbitrariness on account of this action and or claim before this Honourable Court of competent jurisdiction in pursuance of the legal right conferred on the Claimant by paragraph 09.07 of the Harmonized Terms and Conditions of Service for Officers 2012 (revised) published by Fifth Defendant for benefit of Claimant and which also binds the First, Second and Third Defendants. 7. COMPENSATORY, AGGRAVATED AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES in the sum of N1,000,000,000.00 (One Billion Naira) only jointly and severally against the First, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Defendants. 8. OTHER RELIEF(S) in law or equity including but not limited to order for costs of this action on a full indemnity basis and injunctions as the Court is authorized to grant under the provisions of the Constitution, under the provisions of the National Industrial Court Act and under the stipulations of the National Industrial Court Rules as this Honourable Court deems just and proper in the circumstances. 2. THE CASE OF THE CLAIMANT. 3. The claimant testified in proof of his case on 13/6/18, as CW1. He tendered exhibits CW1A – CW1G. 4. The case of the claimant is that he was a Colonel in the Nigeria Army, until 9th day of June 2016, when he was compulsorily retired from the Army. CW1, testified that he was commissioned as a regular officer on 16th of September, 1995 and as a commissioned officer he was part of the Nigerian Army Forces subject to the executive decisions of the Nigerian Army Council, the Armed Forces Council and the Nigerian State represented in this suit by the 6th Defendant. The letters of commissioning dated 16/9/95, were tendered and admitted in evidence and marked exhibits CW1B and CW1C. CW1 continued with his testimony that since his commission on 16th September, 1995, as member of 42 Regular Course, he has been a very dedicated, disciplined and hardworking officer. He excelled in all his military courses and examinations in and outside the country. He severally had served as an instructor, and held several command and staff appointments in which he performed creditably. He also participated commendably in several peacekeeping and international security operations within and outside the country earning him chief of staff commendation award and National honour award of member of the order of the Federal Republic of (MFR). CW1, stated that his deployment and performance in the North East in various capacities within a span of 6 years in tasks and duties in counter terrorism and Boko Haram operations made him and his family constantly under threats of attack by Boko Haram and other terrorists. CW1 had to relocate his family from barrack to different locations and has kept on changing locations and now literally in hiding. 5. He equally served the Nigerian Army and by extension the nation in different capacities to wit: presidential guards, brigade intelligence officer, commander 33 intelligence (Group) Bauchi, Intelligence Officer, of the joint Task Force Operation Restore Order in 2001, involvement in tracking a globally and United States declared wanted terrorist Adam Kambar, 7 Division Intelligence Commander, headed the joint investigation cell in Borno State and Coordinated the activities of the Civilian JTF and Commander Operation flush out ii in Bauchi State. CW1 avers that his military records with the Nigerian Army have lauded his commitment, integrity, intelligence, competence and gallantry with attendant military appointments and awards. The letters of commendation and awards were tendered and admitted in evidence as exhibits CW1D – CW1L. 6. CW1 stated that the defendants instead of appreciating the laudable records of achievement was shocked to receive the defendants letter of 9th of June 2016 coded AHQ MS/G1/300/226 wherein he was purportedly retired compulsorily from the services of the Nigeria Army. The reason(s) for the purported compulsory retirement was on disciplinary grounds i.e. serious offences. CW1, stated that the reason(s) for his purported compulsory retirement is unfounded and a ruse as he has never at any time, since the date of his commission as an officer committed any act that could be viewed as amounting to indiscipline or serious offences that could warrant any disciplinary measures. 7. CW1, stated that in accordance with the laid down procedures and paragraph 09:02(e) of the Harmonised Terms and Conditions of Service for the Nigerian Armed Forces officers 2012 (Revised), written a letter of 23 June 2016, appealing to the President and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria for redress against his compulsory retirement from the service of the Army. The letter of redress was tendered and admitted in evidence as exhibit CW1M1-4, the acknowledgement is exhibit CW1N. 8. According to CW1, he has never been invited by any tribunal or body on account of any misconduct, indiscretion or any offence however and howsoever described. CW1 the disciplinary procedure for senior officer of his cadre was never followed by the defendants, he was never given or served with charges on the prescribed form AB 252, which is the means of reporting an offence against service personnel. 9. He was never tried in any court or tribunal of competent jurisdiction at all except that on 10th June 2016, he received a phone call from an officer from the Army Headquarters, Department of Military Secretary informing him of his compulsory. He further avers that he was never tried in any court or tribunal of competent jurisdiction at all. CW1 further avers no sentence or verdict has been passed on him and the of any proceedings for review or confirmation of any verdict passed on him, and the Army Council was never handed the records of any proceedings for review or confirmation of any verdict passed on him. 10. CW1, stated that the acts of the Defendants offends the statutory provisions of the Armed Forces Act and the Harmonized Terms and Conditions of Service for officers 2012 (Revised). The Defendants have no valid reason for his purported dismissal based on his capacity or conduct based on the operational requirements of the Nigeria Army. The Defendants have not met even the barest minimum procedure for any disciplinary action. He has never been given a chance to defend himself before he was punished by the purported compulsory retirement. The Defendants have deliberately stultified his appeal to the President as provided under the Harmonized Terms and Conditions of Service for Officers, 2012 (Revised) published by Chief of Defence Staff and made operation effective 10 July, 2012. The disciplinary process for an officer of his cadre in the Nigerian Army was never followed. According to CW1, his purported compulsory retirement is a punishment and is tantamount to a dismissal and I was punished and or being punished without any notice, query, trial, arraignment, court-martial, or even warning either oral or written. The Defendants have used their offices and they have exploited his vulnerability and acted to dress him in the dirty garb of a criminal since the news of my purported compulsory retirement was made public, and have been inundated with numerous telephone calls, text messages, emails, letters etc from home and abroad from people who were equally embarrassed by the publications, about his alleged conducts and subsequent compulsory retirement. 11. As a result of the unlawful acts of the Defendants, he has been greatly traumatized by the news of his compulsory retirement based on allegations of non-existent serious offences he never knew about or took part in. The Defendants jointly and severally owe a duty of good faith that requires them to deal with him fairly both to the manner of meting out punishment and in the manner of managing his appeal for redress, but they have acted to deny him right of appeal to the President in order to exploit his vulnerability. The Defendants have refused and or failed to treat him fairly and the failure to treat him fairly is not justified on the basis of any law or policy. 12. Under cross examination, CW1, testified to the effect that he served for 25 years 9 Months. I signed exhibit CW1. Serve for 18 years at he served army for 25 years 9 months. I was not the only officer retired. I don’t know any time without reason. He was 19 years when he joined army and he is now 47 years. He served army for 25 years 9 months as a senior officer. He cannot be retired he was employed in the Army on 16/9/199 had an eventful career in service. He agree with the content of the oath. As a regular officer by the Harmonized terms and conditions of service he is to serve for 35 years. The oath did not say I should apply for reengagement. I am not supposed to reapply for re-engagement. I don’t need to, it is automatic. CW1A1-3 is letter of retirement. 13. THE CASE OF THE DEFENDANTS: 14. The Claimant was a soldier under the aegis of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th, 8th and 9th Defendants subject to Armed Forces Act and Armed Forces of Nigeria Harmonised Terms & Conditions of Service for Officers 2012. The Claimant was served a letter dated 9th June 2016, which compulsorily retired the Claimant from Nigerian Army forthwith having served the Nigerian Army for 25 years, 8 months and 30 days. Consequent upon the compulsory retirement, the Claimant was entitled to retain his substantive rank of colonel, his gratuity, pension, certificate of military service and retired officer’s identity card. DW1 stated that the Army Council reserves the right, at all times, to hire and fire officers of the Nigerian Army, including the claimant, for action, conduct etc, bordering on indiscipline, unprofessionalism, threat to national security etc. the Army had no obligation or duty to even give reasons for compulsorily retiring the claimant. The Army no longer desire the services of the claimant, and latter should not attempt to force himself on the Nigeria Army. 15. Under cross examination DW1 testified that he served Nigerian army for six years. I am conversant with the facts of this case. The Harmonized terms and conditions of service governed the employment of officers. I am aware of the reason given for compulsorily retirement of the claimant. The reason is on disciplinary grounds it was stated serious misconduct. In the military we don’t condone indiscipline we give orders and expect it to be followed. In the Harmonized terms and conditions of service it was stated if an officer serve 18 years he should apply for extension he did not thus why he was retired on disciplinary ground. If an officer did not apply for re-engagement he has committed misconduct. Section 1, 2, 3 Armed forces Act. I don’t know if there is any charge against the claimant. I don’t know if they were made known to him by the Nigeria army. I don’t know whether claimant appeared before any court martial. I confirmed paragraph 5 of my statement of defence. I will not agree with you that the reason why he was terminated was not because he did not apply for reengagement. I did not state in my witness statement on oath that the reason for termination of appointment was because allegations serious offence. I cannot remember when claimant was commissioned in the Nigeria army. I don’t know when his 18 years expired. The Harmonized terms and conditions of service 2012 that is applicable to him. I am not aware the claimant was conferred with National Honour award. I am aware he was sent on assignment and remains in service till 2011 but do not know whether he is awarded any salary. On Exhibit CW1O it is not right to say claimant must serve for 35 years. You are right an officer cannot be tried summarily without going through procedure. I am privy to all disciplinary cases of Nigerian army including that of this case, so I know the case. You are right I have so many I don’t know I cannot know everything. 16. THE DEFENDANTS FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS 17. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION 1. Whether non-compliance with the requirement of the law by the claimant before instituting this suit does not rob this Honourable Court jurisdiction to entertain same.’’ 2. Whether the claimant has proved his case and is entitled to judgment in this suit.’’ 18. ISSUE 1: Whether non-compliance with the requirement of the law by the Claimant before instituting this suit does not rob this Honourable Court jurisdiction to entertain same. 19. In arguing this issue counsel contended that deals with issue of jurisdiction which can be raised at any time or stage of the proceedings. The failure of the Claimant to fulfil a condition precedent to the filing of his suit, (that is, complying with the provisions of section 178(1) of the Armed Forces Act), renders this suit incompetent. Sequel to this non-compliance with the provision of S. 178(1) of the Armed Forces Act, this Hon. Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate over an incompetent suit. ‘Where a statute provides for a method of doing a thing, only that method would be recognized’. On this contention counsel relied on the case of ABUBAKAR V. A.G. FEDERATION (2007)13 WRN 78. It is also the submission of counsel that section 178(3) of the Armed Forces Act also provides that an officer who thinks he has been wronged shall first exhaust the administrative remedies available to him under this section… before embarking on any other action. 20. It is the contention of counsel that the combined effect of section 187(1) and (3) is to allow the claimant to explore amicable settlement of his grievances by an application to his commanding officer. The claimant rushing to this court before filing complaint is fatal and has divested this court of jurisdiction. It is contended writing to appeal to the president was wrong as the president is not commanding officer of the claimant. 21. Counsel further contended that: a. The Claimant did not make any application to his Commanding Officer, b. The Claimant did not make any complaint to the Forces Council; and c. The Claimant did not first exhaust the internal administrative remedies or mechanisms for the resolution of his grievances before he instituted this suit on 6th September, 2016. 22. It is submitted that from the foregoing refusal or failure by the Claimant to exhaust or even explore the Defendant’s internal mechanism for the resolution of his grievances before going to court, has rendered his action incompetent. Counsel referred to the case of OGUNBAMIBI V. BADAGRY LOCAL GOVERNMENT (2009)9 WRN 156, the Court of Appeal held that: “It is trite that where a statute has given or conference jurisdiction on an administrative body or an authority or even a person the power or jurisdiction to decide on any matter, the jurisdiction of the court to grant a declaration on that matter has thereby been ousted. In other words, where a statute provides that administrative decision on a certain matter is to be made by a tribunal, body or authority or even a person, the court, even where its jurisdiction is not expressly ousted, is weary and reluctant to be seized of the matter or to assume jurisdiction unless and until such a body, authority or person has been approached and taken a decision on the matter. It is only when the authority exercises its power wrongly that an aggrieved party can approach the court to exercise its supervisory power or review the exercise of such an administrative power by the inferior body or authority. ” 23. According to counsel in another breath, the court held, in the same case that ‘an aggrieved party must exhaust all the remedies in that law before going to court,’ and that it is only after he is not satisfied with the enquiry or decision on the matter that he can approach the court for a review or remedy under its supervisory jurisdiction. 24. It is also submitted that the Claimant’s letter to the President and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces failed to meet the requirement of section 178(1) of the Armed Forces Act. The President was neither the Claimant’s Commanding Officer nor was he the Forces Council. Therefore, since the Claimant did not satisfy the requirement of the law in first exhausting the internal mechanism for a resolution of his grievances, this suit is incompetent. Consequently, non-compliance with the requirement of the law by the Claimant before instituting this suit has robbed this Honourable Court jurisdiction to entertain same. Counsel urged the court to son hold. 25. ISSUE 2. “Whether the Claimant has proved his case and is entitled to judgment in this suit.” 26. On issue two; counsel submitted that the Claimant has not proved his case to warrant this Hon. Court to enter judgment in his favour. The Claimant was compulsorily retired from the Nigerian Army on disciplinary ground. To support this contention counsel referred to Armed Forces Oath, which read: “I, 2/LT MOHAMMED AUWAL SULEIMAN, swear by Almighty God that I will bear true and faithful allegiance to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and that I will truly and faithfully serve the Federal Republic of Nigeria as by Law established as an Officer for 18 years and that I will as duty bound so serve for the period of my engagement or re-engagement as the case may be and go wherever ordered by land, sea or air and that I will observe and obey Commands of the Government of the Federation as by law established and of the Officers placed over me and will subject myself to all Acts, subsidiary legislation and service regulations which now are or shall from time to time be in force and applicable to the Arm in which I am to serve during the period of my engagement or re-engagement as the case may be.” 27. It is the contention of counsel that consequent upon the foregoing oath, the Claimant answered in affirmative under cross-examination that he did not apply for re-engagement after serving Nigerian Army for 18 years. This is a serious offence subject to paragraph c (4) of chapter 9 (09.02) of the Armed Forces of Nigeria Harmonized Terms & Conditions of Service for Officers 2012 (Revised). 28. It is the contention of counsel the Claimant has served Nigerian Army for 25 years, 8 months and 30 days (that is, extra 7 years illegally) without applying for re-engagement after serving 18 years in spite of his sworn oath of faithful allegiance as stated above. It is contended that a soldier is only bound to obey lawful orders. See: NIGERIAN AIR FORCE V. JAMES (2002)18 NWLR (Pt.798)295 Ratio 8. Counsel urged the court to so hold. 29. In concluding his submission counsel contended that from the totality of the submissions contained in this address, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th, 8th and 9th Defendants urged this Honourable Court to dismiss this suit in its entirety as it lacks merit. 30. THE SUBMISSION OF THE CLAIMANT 31. ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION 1. Whether this court is functus officio in deciding Issue 1 of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th and 9th Defendants’ Final Written Address as to whether the Claimant complied with Section 187 of the Armed Forces Act; having delivered its ruling on the issue on the 19th of April, 2018. 2. Whether the claimant has proved on the preponderance of evidence that he is entitled to the reliefs sought. 32. ARGUMENT ON ISSUES FORMULATED 33. ISSUE 1; WHETHER THIS COURT IS FUNCTUS OFFICIO IN DECIDING ISSUE 1 OF THE 1ST, 2ND, 3RD, 4TH, 5TH, 7TH AND 9TH DEFENDANTS’ FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS AS TO WHETHER THE CLAIMANT COMPLIED WITH SECTION 187 OF THE ARMED FORCES ACT; HAVING DELIVERED ITS RULING ON THE ISSUE ON THE 19TH OF APRIL, 2018. 34. In arguing this issue counsel contended that the 1st – 5th, 7th – 9th Defendants’ Counsel by a Motion dated 20th December, 2016 and filed on the 23rd December, 2016 appealed to this Honourable Court for an Order dismissing the suit of the Claimant for being incompetent in that the Claimant did not comply with Section 178 of the Armed Forces Act. The Claimant by a Counter-Affidavit dated 13th February, 2017 opened the Defendants’ motion. The motion and the Counter-Affidavit were argued on the 9th day of January, 2018 and the Honourable Court gave its well-considered ruling on the 19th day of April, 2018. The Ruling of the Honourable Court remains binding as same has not been appealed against or set aside. 35. Counsel urged the court to discountenance Issue 1 raised by the Defendants as same has been carefully and thoroughly considered on its merit and a ruling delivered thereto on the 19th day of April, 2018. 36. Counsel in further support for his contention commended to this court the Ruling of 19th April, 2018, and that of 9th day of April, 2018 in the sister case of COL. DANLADI RIBAH HASSAN (RTD) V. NIGERIAN ARMY & 8 ORS (NICN/ABJ/316/2016). In both cases, my lord rightfully cited and relied upon the decision of the Court of Appeal, Abuja Division in the case of ADHEKEGBA V. MINISTER OF DEFENCE (2013) 17 NWLR (PT 1382) 126 AT PAGE 150 PARAS A-D. 37. Counsel contended that there has been substantial compliance by the Claimant with both the Armed Forces Act and the HTACOS (Harmonised Terms and Condition of Service for Officers). Counsel urged the court to so hold. 38. ISSUE 2; WHETHER THE CLAIMANT HAS PROVED ON THE PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE THAT HE IS ENTITLED TO THE RELIEFS SOUGHT. 39. It is the evidence of DW1 that Claimant was compulsorily retired because the Claimant had overstayed his employment. DW1 testified that the parchment letter; Exhibit CWB was for a fixed period of 18 years and that the Claimant did not apply for re-engagement. Counsel contended that while placing reliance of the case of the Supreme Court in OFORISHE V. NIGERIAN GAS COMPANY LIMITED (2018) 2 NWLR (PT 1602) 36 AT 61; PARAS D-E, where the apex court settled the law that in an action for wrongful termination, the Claimant must put before the Court the following: a. The terms and conditions of his contract of employment and b. The manner in which the terms and conditions of the engagement was breached by his employers. 40. Counsel submitted that Exhibit DW1A titled Armed Forces of Nigeria Harmonised Terms and Conditions of Service for Officers 2012 and Exhibit CW1B and CW1C is the letter of commissioning and Armed Forces Oath of the Claimant. Also regulating the employment of the Claimant is the Armed Forces Act Cap A20 of the Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 41. Counsel submitted that the claimant has pleaded before the Court all that is required in assisting the Court in determining the wrongful termination of his employment. 42. According to counsel it is not in doubt that the employment of the Claimant is one with statutory flavour, this requires no proof thereof. 43. Counsel noted that the Defendants in their Final Written Address made a heavy weather of the Claimant exceeding the number of years on his parchment letter as supported by the evidence led by DW1. The law is trite that in an employment with statutory flavour, termination must be in strict adherence to the procedure laid down in the statute. The Supreme Court in COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF CUSTOMS V. GUSAU (2017) 18 NWLR (PT 1598) PG 353 @ 387-388, PARAS H-A held this: “It has become trite that employers that have statutory flavour can only be terminated in the manner allowed by the very statutes that provided for them.” 44. Counsel contended the question that arises therefrom is whether the termination/compulsory retirement of the Claimant was done in the manner prescribed by the Armed Forces of Nigeria Harmonized Terms and Conditions of Service for Officers 2012 and/or the Armed Forces Act? 45. Counsel contended Chapter 9 of the Armed Forces of Nigeria Harmonised Terms and Conditions of Service provides for Resignation, Retirement and Resettlement of Officers, particularly 09.02 makes provision for compulsory retirement or resignation. CONDITION 09.02 provides thus: “Compulsory retirement or resignation may be effected for any of the following reason(s) a. An Officer may, at any time be removed from the Service, be called upon to retire or resign his commission on disciplinary grounds. b. An Officer who on account of ill health is reported by an approved medical board as being unfit for any military service in accordance with the “Medical Standard” in the respective services shall be retired. c. An Officer may be compulsorily retired from service by the Army Council/Navy Board/Air Force Council for any of the following specific reasons: 1. Medical unfitness, disability, etc 2. Failed promotion examination or CAPEX three (3) times 3. Failed promotion Board three (3) times 4. On disciplinary grounds i.e. serious offence(s) 5. Undeployability arising from restructuring and/or lack of establishment 6. On attaining the age ceiling of his rank 7. Incompetence, indolence, etc 8. Disloyalty to constituted authority on written order both in peace time and in operation. 9. Failure at Staff Course, Post-Staff College Course, and their equivalent. d. Notwithstanding the foregoing, an Officer earmarked for compulsory retirement except in accordance with paragraph 09.02(c)(4), (7) or (8), shall be called upon to retire voluntarily, failure of which he would be compulsorily retired. Once compulsorily retired, such Officer shall no longer be considered for reversion to voluntary retirement. e. An Officer called upon to retire, resign or relinquish his Commission shall if so desires, appeal to Mr. President, the Commander-in-Chief through the Chief of Defence Staff within 30 days to have his case reconsidered.” 46. Under cross-examination, DW1 told this Honourable Court that the Claimant was meant to serve the Nigerian Army for 18 years. This is however contrary to the Harmonized Terms and Conditions of Service for Officers 2012 tendered and attached as Exhibit CW10. Exhibit CW10 particularly at Chapter 2, Condition 10(c) which provides thus: “An officer may only serve for a maximum of 35 years after commission, except as deemed fit by the C-in-C.” 47. It is further argued that the evidence adduced by the DW1 during cross-examination is not anchored on the pleading of the Defendants. Nowhere in the Statement of Defence or in the Witness Statement on Oath did the Defendant mention that the Claimant was compulsorily retired for having served beyond 18 years of his initial commission. The law is trite that un-pleaded facts go to no issue and evidence led not anchored on pleading must be discountenanced. On this argument counsel call the aid of the apex court decision on decision of the Supreme Court in PAN BISBILDER LTD v. FBN (2000) 1 NWLR (PT 642) 684 AT 695 PARA H “It is crystal clear and beyond peradventure that the parties unpleaded facts go to no issue; similarly, evidence led at trial not anchored on the parties’ pleadings must be discountenanced. 48. Counsel urged this Honourable Court to discountenance the evidence adduced by DW1 as same is not anchored on pleadings. 49. Counsel also commended to this court the ruling on the Preliminary Objection raised by the Defendant. The said paragraph 09.02(e) supports my lord’s erudite ruling on the fact that the Claimant substantially complied with the provision of the law in exhausting the options available to him before commencing this suit. Counsel urged the court to so hold. 50. On the compulsory retirement of the Claimant, counsel refers to Exhibit CW1A – A3 which is the Letter of Retirement. It states that the Claimant was compulsorily retired by the provisions of Paragraph 09.02(c)(4) of the Armed Forces of Nigeria Harmonised Terms and Conditions of Service for Officers 2012 (Revised). The above referred provision is based “on disciplinary grounds i.e. serious offences.” 51. What this court is called upon to pry into is what is the serious offence committed by the Claimant; what is the disciplinary procedure laid down by the Conditions of Service and was the laid down procedure followed? The law is trite that where an employee is dismissed or his appointment is terminated or there is a demotion on the grounds of misconduct, all that the employer needs to establish to justify his actions is to show that the allegation was disclosed to the employee and that he was given an opportunity to be heard in his defence; and that is to say that the requirements of fair hearing were met and that the disciplinary panel followed any laid down procedure. The Courts have held that where a statutory employment is not determined in line with the laid down conditions such termination would be ineffective and null and void. In support of this argument counsel cited and relied on the cases of OGBAJE V. ABUJA INVESTMENT AND PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LIMITED (2007) LPELR – 11855 (CA) P. 41, PARAS D—F, GOV. EKITI STATE V. OJO (2006) 17 NWLR (PT. 1007) PG 120 @ 121 PARAS D-F. 52. Counsel contended that it is inconsistent and an act of afterthought for the Defendants to compulsorily retire the Claimant on ground of serious offences and lead evidence that he was meant to serve only 18 years in the Army. The conditions of service governing the employment of all staff of the Armed Forces which became effective on the 12th day of July 2012 unequivocally provides that an officer’s maximum years of service is thirty-five (35) years. Chapter 2, Condition 10(c) and (d) of the Armed Forces of Nigeria Harmonised Terms and Conditions for Officers 2012. 53. It is the contention of counsel that the Defendants acted outside the Terms and Conditions of Service regulating the employment of the Claimant. Counsel argued that by virtue of the Claimant’s oath to be bound by the Armed Forces of Nigeria Harmonised Terms and Conditions of Service of Officers 2012 and by reason of such subsidiary legislation, his maximum years of service is no longer 18 (Eighteen) but 35 (Thirty-Five) years in the Nigerian Army. 54. Counsel contended that the defence that the Claimant’s employment is for 18 years does not hold water and same is bound to fall apart like a pack of cards. This is because the Supreme Court held in OLUFEAGBA V. ABDUL-RAHEEM (2009) 18 NWLR (PT 1173) 384 AT 463-464, PARAS H-A, that “In an employment with statutory flavour, the reason for the termination of the employment is very crucial to the case of both parties. The reason must be ascertainable and must be in accordance with the letter of appointment, governing regulation and statutory provisions.” 55. The apex Court went further and stated that where an employer flagrantly omitted to comply with the procedure for termination in the prescribed way and manner then that termination is absolutely null and void. Counsel based on this decision and in the light of the compelling evidence put forward by the Claimant, to declare the compulsory retirement of the Claimant null and void. 56. Counsel also referred to Sections 45 to 114 of the Armed Forces Act which provides a list of various offences for which an Officer is to appear before a Court-Martial. What is appalling is that there is no provision for “serious offences” as captured by the letter of compulsory retirement. One then begins to wonder how an Officer can be compulsorily terminated for an offence he does not know and unknown to law. This in its very nature portrays the wrongful and unlawful termination of the appointment of the Claimant. Counsel contended that the law is settled that Where legislation lays down a procedure for doing a thing there should be no other method of doing it. OKEREKE V. YAR’ADUA (2008) 12 NWLR (PT 1100) 95 AT 127 PARA E 57. The Military is known for its regimented lifestyle and for an Officer who has served for not less than 26 years to be compulsorily retired on disciplinary grounds without following the laid down procedure is tantamount to not granting the Claimant his right to fair hearing. Section 123 of the Armed Forces Act provides as follows: “Before an allegation against a person subject to service law under this Act (in this section referred to as the “accused”) that he has committed an offence under a provision of this Act is further proceeded with, the allegation shall be reported, in the form for a charge, to the commanding officer of the accused and the commanding officer shall investigate the charge in the prescribed manner.” 58. It is submitted by counsel that before the compulsory retirement of the Claimant there was no charge against him neither was he subjected to a trial by Court-Martial as provided for in the Armed Forces Act. 59. It is without a shadow of doubt that the Claimant did not commit any offence that warranted his compulsory retirement by the Defendant. There is no evidence before the Court of the commission of any offence whether petty or serious misconduct. Counsel urged the court to set aside the letter of compulsory retirement and declare same as wanton breach of the principles of natural justice. 60. Exhibit CW1A-3 conspicuously states that the reason/grounds for compulsory retirement is on “disciplinary grounds i.e. serious offences”. The Defendants by their pleadings state that the compulsory retirement was as a result of the Claimant exceeding the 18 years of service contained in his letter of commissioning, Exhibit CW3. With respect to Exhibit CW3, the said oath provides: “…I will truly and faithfully serve the Federal Republic of Nigeria as by law established as an officer for 18 years and that I will as duty bound so serve for the period of my engagement or re-engagement as the case may be… and will subject myself to all Acts, subsidiary legislation and service regulations which now are or shall from time to time be in force and applicable to the Arm in which I am to serve during the period of my engagement or re-engagement as the case may be.” 61. The above my lord speaks volume of the nature of the employment of the Claimant’s first. Assuming but not conceding that he on his part did not apply for re-engagement, does he cease to be an Officer of the Army? 62. By Mathematical calculation, the Claimant’s 18 years in service would be 5th day of September 2012 by virtue of his Oath of Office. The Claimant after the year 2012 was not disengaged from the Army, he continued to truly and faithfully serve the Federal Republic of Nigeria and received Commendation/Awards in 2014 and 2015. The question arising therefrom is does the Nigerian Army particularly the Office of the Chief of Army Staff give awards/commendation to individuals it does not consider to be staff? Would it not have been out of place to state on the letter of compulsory retirement that the Claimant was being retired simply because he had overstayed his employment with the Nigerian Army? There are plethora of judicial statements and authorities on the right of an employer to fire or terminate the employment of an employee for good or bad or no reason at all. The law however is that where an employer gives reasons for the termination he is bound to prove same satisfactorily. 63. It is the contention of counsel that the decision of the Supreme Court in INSTITUTE OF HEALTH AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT BOARD V MRS JUMMAI ANYIP (2011) 5 SC (PT 1) 54 AT 71 LINE 15-23 where it was stated thus: “Although it is trite that an employer is not obliged to give any reason for firing his servant all the same it is settled law that where he has proffered any reason at all it is obliged to satisfactorily prove the same as the onus is on him in that regard, otherwise the termination/dismissal may constitute a wrongful dismissal without more. The lower court has found that the Appellant has failed to justify the dismissal hence it has been found to be wrongful..’ 64. Throughout the case of the Defence, they claimed that the reason for termination was due to the fact that the Claimant overstayed the number of years to serve in the Nigerian Army, however Exhibit CW1B states the contrary. This shows that the Defendants have woefully failed to prove the reason for the compulsory retirement of the Claimant. What is more is the fact that the fact led and the evidence adduced is inconsistent. 65. It is trite that evidence adduced must be in line with pleadings. The Supreme Court in ACHONU V. OKUWOBI (2017) 14 NWLR (PART 1584) 142 AT 177 PARAS C-E held thus: “The law is settled that a party will not be allowed after pleading a particular set of material facts to turn around and base his case on a totally different set of facts without an amendment of his pleadings. In other words, parties are bound by their pleadings and evidence which is at variance with the averment in the pleadings go to no issue and should be disregarded by the Court.” 66. In concluding his submission counsel refers the court to the judgment of this court in Suit No. NICN/ABJ/316/16 between COL. HASSAN DANLADI V. NIGEIRAN ARMY & ORS delivered on the 8th day of July, 2018 and that of your learned brother, Hon. Justice E. Agbakoba in Suit No. NICN/ABJ/262/16 between Maj. Gen. Ijioma v. Nigerian Army & Ors delivered on the 3rd day of June, 2018 which two said cases are still on all fours with that of the Claimant in this suit. COURT’S DECISION. 67. I have carefully considered the all the court processes filed in respect of this suit, as well as the written and oral submissions of counsel for both sides. 68. Counsel for the claimants and defendants have formulated two issues each for determinations. The two issues are talking of the same thing but couched in different wordings. In the circumstance I shall marry the issues together as follows:- 1. Whether this court is not functus officio in respect of section 178 of the Armed Forced Act. 2. Whether the claimant has vide the evidence adduced before the court proved his entitlement to the reliefs sought. 69. RESOLUTION OF ISSUE ONE: 70. Counsel for the defendant has submitted that the claimant has failed or neglected to fulfil condition precedent in section 178 (2) and (3) of the Armed forces Act for not appealing to his commanding officer on the issue of his compulsory retirement. This omission according to counsel is fatal to the claimant’s action and divested this court of jurisdiction to entertain the suit. For the counsel for the claimant he contended that the issue regarding section 178 of the Armed forces Act had been settled by this court in a considered ruling delivered on 19/4/18. 71. It is surprising to me that counsel for the defendant is resurrecting issue of section 178 of the Armed Forces Act when this court had already decided on it and buried same long ago in an objection raised which was fully argued by counsel and ruling delivered accordingly. What counsel for the defendant is now doing is inviting this court to sit on appeal in respect of its own decision. This invitation is totally rejected as it defies all known principles of law governing determination of an issue by a court of law. See DINGYADI V INEC NO.2 2011 18 NWLR PT.1224 154, MOHAMMED V HUSSEN 1998 11-12 SCNJ 135. Therefore, issue one is resolved against the defendants for the simple reason that this court is functus officio in respect thereof as the issue has been determined and cannot be re-opened. And this court is not an appellate court. 72. RESOLUTION OF ISSUE TWO 73. The main grouse of the claimant in his statement of facts is that he is a Connell in the Nigerian Army until 9/6/2016 when he received a letter compulsorily retiring him from service on the ground of serious offences in accordance with regulation 9.02 of Harmonized Conditions of services 2012 (revised). According to the claimant he has never committed any offence throughout his service nor has he been queried or cautioned. Rather he has been performing his duty diligently. Which led to him being given commendations for meritorious service. He also stated that he was never tried nor was he notified of any offence or arraigned or invited to face any disciplinary proceeding to warrant his compulsory retirement on ground of serious offences. Claimant averred that he was not notified of his offence nor was he given fair hearing before being retired. 74. For the defendants they averred that the claimant contravened his oath of commissioning exhibit CW1B for serving more than 18 years without applying for reengagement. Therefore he has committed serious offence and thus why he was compulsorily retired on ground of discipline on serious offences as per exhibit CW1A1-2. 75. Counsel for both sides are at idem that the contract of employment of the claimant with the Nigerian Army has statutory flavour. I cannot fault this position considering that the enlistment of the claimant and the conditions of service in the Nigerian Army which are governed by the provisions of Armed Forces Act and Harmonized conditions of Service For Officers 2012 (Revised). This position is strengthened by the trite position of law that "An employment enjoys statutory flavour when the contract of service is governed by statute or where the conditions of service are contained in regulations derived from statutory provisions. In the circumstance they invest the employee with a legal status higher than the ordinary master/servant relationship. See: Imoloame Vs W.A.E.C. (1992) NWLR (Pt.265) 303; per Karibi Whyte, JSC, as he then was, Olaniyan vs University of Lagos (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt.9) 599; Shitta-Bey v. Public Service Commission (1981) 1 SC 40. It is not in dispute between the parties that the claimant’s employment was governed by the Armed Forces Act and the Harmonized Conditions of service for Officers 2012 (Revised). This means the claimant’s employment with the Nigerian Army enjoyed statutory flavour. Since the claimant contract of service has statutory flavour it is not at the behest of the defendants nor is his employment at the pleasure of the defendants. It has long been settled that employments that have statutory flavour can only be determined in the manner allowed by the very statutes that provided for them. See Kunle Osisanya v. AfriBank Nigeria Plc (2007) 6 NWLR (Pt.1031) 565 and Bamgboye v. University of Ilorin (1999) LPELR - 737 (SC), IDONIBOYE-OBU V NNPC (2003) 2 NWLR (Pt.805) 589, (2003) 1 Sc (Pt.1) 40, (2003) LPELR-1426(SC), OLORUNTOBA V ABDUL-RAHEEM (2009) 13 NWLR (Pt.1157) 83 SC, (2009) LPELR-2596(SC). 76. Where a statute clearly provided for the employment and discipline including an employee's retirement and even dismissal, the employment must be determined in the way and manner prescribed by the relevant statute and any other manner of determination inconsistent with what the statute prescribed is null and void. See E.P. Iderima v. Rivers State Civil Service Commission LPELR-1420 (SC). In Chief Tamunoemi Idoniboye-Obu V. Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (2003) LPELR - 1426 (SC). 77. I should emphasise that the law is settled that the only way to terminate a contract of service with statutory flavour is to adhere strictly to the procedure laid down in the statute. See: Bamgboye Vs University of Ilorin (1999) 10 NWLR (Pt.622) 290; Olatunbosun Vs N.I.S.E.R. Council (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt.80) 25; Longe v. F.B.N. (supra). 78. As can be gleaned from the evidence before the court oral and documentary, the claimant’s employment is governed by exhibit CW1B, the provisions of the Armed Forces Act and the Harmonized Terms and Conditions of Service for officers 2012 (Revised). 79. The claimant has vide exhibits CW1 B and CW1 C, proved that he is an employee of the defendants. The claimant has vide exhibit CW1 A 1-3, been compulsorily retired from service, which he is challenging by this action. The averments in paragraphs 11 to 30 of the statement of facts and the corresponding evidence adduced in the witness statement on oath adopted by CW1 have clearly shown that how the terms and conditions of service as contained in exhibit DW1A were breached, in that the clamant was compulsorily retired from service on ground of discipline i.e serious offences, without being tried for the alleged purported offences or being told of what those offences are or were, without any query or even afforded opportunity of depending himself. 80. In determining any employment that is protected by statute or what is termed as employment with statutory flavor, as in this case, compliance with laid down rules and regulation is mandatory any deviation or summersault in following the appropriate procedure by the authority or body charged with responsibility of taking the disciplinary action against the employee will vitiate and nullifies the entire process and any action or result emanating from such exercise will amount to nothing. There is no short cut, once the employment is protected by statutory provisions, appropriate procedure must be adopted in bringing the relationship to an end. See IDERIMA V RIVERS STATE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 2005 7 SC PT.III 135, SHITA-BAY V PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 1981 1 SC 26, UDO V CROSS RIVER STATE NEWSPAPER CORPORATION, UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS V OLANIYAN 1985 1 SC 199CBN & ANOR V IGWILLO 2007 4-5, SC 154. 81. The claimant has vide his pleading and evidence before the court stated that the provisions of the Harmonized Terms and Condition of Service for Officers 2012, (Revised), were not strictly complied with by the defendants before his compulsory retirement. 82. According to the provision of regulation 09.02 there are several grounds based on which an officer can be compulsorily retired from service they includes; on disciplinary grounds, on account of ill-health, on ground of medical unfitness, disability, failed promotions 3 times, disciplinary grounds on serious offences, un-deploy-ability as a result of restructuring and/or lack of establishment, on attaining the age ceiling of his rank, incompetence, indolence, disloyalty to constituted authority and failure at staff course. 83. From the content of exhibit CW1A 1-3, the claimant was compulsorily retired from service on ground of disciplinary i.e serious offences, regulation 09.02c(4). 84. The defendants, though not impugning exhibit CW1A 1-3, never the less argued that the compulsory retirement of the claimant was predicated on his overstay. According to the defendants the claimant vide exhibit CW1B has signed to serve for 18 years, but he has over served. DW1, who testified on behalf of the defendants under cross examination alluded to the claimant’s not following procedure in getting re-engagement as serious offence. 85. To my mind the position of the defendants is a clear departure from what the defendants have stated in exhibit CW1A 1-3 as the reasons for compulsorily retiring the claimant from service. The defendants have not referred the court to any of the provisions of the Armed Forces Act or the Harmonized Terms and Condition of Service for Officers 2012, (Revised), where overstaying or serving beyond 18 years in the military was made to be a disciplinary item i.e serious offences. If it is true that the claimant was compulsorily retired for overstaying, that reason should have been in exhibit CW1A 1-3, as the reason for compulsory retirement of the claimant and not ‘disciplinary i.e serious offences’. Alas that is not the case here. Exhibit CW1A 1-3, is very clear and unambiguous and left no one in doubt as to the reason for compulsorily retiring the claimant from service. 86. It is trite law that in determining contract of employment an employer is not bound to give reasons for determining the contract. But where reason has been given the onus of proving the reason lies squarely on the employer. The defendants having stated vide exhibit CW1A 1-3, that the claimant was compulsorily retired based on ground of disciplinary i.e serious offences are duty bound to adduced credible evidence in proof of that reason and not offer different reason contrary to what was stated in exhibit CW1A 1-3. The defendants have not pointed out to the court in exhibit CW1A 1-3, where ‘not following procedure for re-engagement’ is stated to be a serious offence in either the Armed Forces Act or in the Harmonized Terms and Conditions of Service for Officers 2012 (Revised) or in exhibit CW1B, the letter of commissioning. The defendants seems to be under the impression that the claimant having served for 25 years, the contract of service has elapsed as at the time the claimant served for 18 years and they are acting under the assumption that the claimant is no longer entitled to be in service. The defendants may have taken the position they have taken based on their own interpretation of section 30 of the Armed Forces Act. 87. A careful examination of the provisions of section 30 of the Armed forces and the content of exhibit CW1B, which the defendants heavily relied in taking their position, will revealed that though section 30 of the Armed Forces Act and exhibit CW1B, have pegged the tenure of claimant’s service to be 18 years, the said section and exhibit CW1B, have made ample provisions allowing the claimant who had served for 18 years to continue with his service uninterrupted for up to 22 years, this is however subject to approval by the appropriate authority. The claimant who served for 22 years after obtaining approval can still have his service re-engaged for another period as the approving authority may grant. It is to be noted the second re-engagement can be without limitation. 88. The defendants have argued that the claimant has not applied for extension of his service and there was no approval granting him re-engagement, therefore he cannot complain of wrongful retirement, as he has served his tenure of 18 years contained in exhibit CW1B and the provision of section 30 of the Armed Forces Act. 89. In interpreting statutory or constitutional provisions a court of law is enjoined to give the statutory provisions their plain meaning thereby using literal rule of interpretation to construe the provision. Except where it will lead to absurdity. In any event a court is duty bound to interpret statutory provision by construing the entire provisions holistically and interpreting them to be in accord with the intention of the makers of the provisions. If the provisions of section 30 of the Armed Forces Act and Regulation 02:12c of the Harmonized Terms and Conditions of Service for Officers 2012, (Revised), are holistically examined, it will be seen that there is no conflict between the provisions of section 30 of the Armed Forces Act and the provisions of the Harmonized Terms and Conditions of Service for officers 2012, (Revised). The regulation only makes provisions for voluntary retirement and the maximum number of years an officer can serve thus why the use of the word ‘may’, which connote non-compulsion. Therefore, the Harmonized Terms and Condition of Service for Offices 2012, (Revised), were never meant to make it mandatory for an officer to serve for 35 years. What the provision of regulation 02.12 c did was to peg the period of service, if there is re-engagement, the service shall not exceed 35 years period. Therefore, in my view there is no conflict between the provisions of the Armed forces Act and the Harmonized terms and Conditions of service. I so hold. 90. It will be appropriate at this juncture to determine the question of whether the claimant is in breach of the provision for applying for approval for re-engagement and whether if it is found that he has breached the provision for re-engagement that amounted to serious offence as stated by DW1 under cross examination. The claimant’s case is that he was compulsorily retired from service based on regulation 09.02c(4) of the Harmonized Terms and Conditions of Service for Officers, exhibit DW1A, without him being tried for any disciplinary action or tried before court martial. He was not given opportunity to depend himself as the serious offences based on which he was compulsorily retired were not made known to him. The defendants on their part insisted that the claimant was compulsorily retired because he did not apply for re-engagement after serving for 18 years in line with his commission as evidenced in exhibit CW1B and section 30 of the Armed Forces Act. 91. At a glance the argument of the defendants appears to be attractive, but, a careful and meticulous examination of the provision of section 30 of the Armed Forces Act and Exhibit CW1B will expose the fallacy of the argument canvassed by the defendant in respect of the claimant not applying for approval for re-engagement. 92. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case the defendants are estopped from claiming that the claimant has not applied for and was not granted approval for re-engagement in line with section 30 of the Armed Forces Act. This position is taken having regard to the position of law that a contract of employment can be oral or in writing, in fact it can be inferred or by conduct of parties. By exhibit CW1 B and the provisions of section 30 of the Armed Forces Act, the claimant’s 18 years of service with the defendants had elapsed. But, by the same provision of the law and exhibit CW1B, if he desired to continue in service he has the option of applying for re-engagement either before or after the expiry of the period of 18 years. It is to be noted that the reasons given by the defendants in the letter of compulsory retirement exhibit CW1A 1-3, was that of disciplinary i.e serious offences and not overstay or completing service of 18 years or not applying for re-engagement or absence of approval for re-engagement. The issue of claimant having served his period of commission and overstayed his commission came up as a defence. This clearly shows that the defendants are confused as to the actual reasons why the claimant should be compulsorily retired. 93. The defendants cannot be heard to dispute that the claimant was not re-engaged to continue his service. The reason being that the defendants knew that the 18 years terms of service had elapsed and still allowed the claimant to continue to serve the defendants and in the process earned laurel and commendations for his hard work, commitment, sincerity, resourceful and leadership. See exhibits CW1D, CW1E, CW1F, CW1G, CW1H, CW1I and CW1J. The conduct of the parties as depicted in the exhibits before the court clearly established beyond reproach that the claimant has been re-engaged in line with the provision of section 30 of the Armed Forces Act and exhibit CW1B. The defendants are in law deemed to have re-engaged the clamant by their conduct and are estopped from denying giving approval for his re-engagement. For the simple reason that they allowed the claimant to continue his service after the expiry of 18 years of service in year 2012 94. My position is fortified by the provisions of section 169 of the Evidence Act 2011, Section 169 of Evidence Act states that: ‘‘When one person has either by virtue of an existing court judgment, deed or agreement, or by his declaration, act or omission, intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief, neither he nor his representative in interest shall be allowed, in any proceedings between himself and such person or such person's representative in interest, to deny the truth of that thing’’. 95. In view of the clear provisions of the evidence Act, the defendants will not be allowed in the circumstances of this case having made the claimant believe that his re-engagement has been approved to approbate and reprobate without following due process in bringing the relationship to an end. See OYEROGBA V OLAOPA (1998) 13 NWLR (PT.583) 509. 96. The case of the defendants was made worst with the only witness hat testified for the defendant as DW1 stated that he is conversant with the facts of this case and he participated in the disciplinary action, under the fire of cross examination, displayed his ignorance of the facts when he could not say the time the 18 years of service of the claimant elapsed, he could also not know whether there was charge against the claimant or not and he could not know whether claimant has been informed of the offence he had committed. The appropriate officer that should have given such testimony is an officer serving in the relevant department of the defendants. In view of display of lack of knowledge of the facts of the case the evidence of DW1 lacked evidential value and same is hereby discountenance for purposes of this judgment. 97. The finding above means that the claimant’s compulsorily retired from service did not follow due process. The defendants having failed to convince the court of the disciplinary ground for compulsorily retiring the claimant i.e serious offences, as stated in exhibit CW1A 1-3, the said exhibit CW1A 1-3, is therefore null and void and of no effect. Exhibit CW1A 1-3 having been issued not in line with Harmonized Terms and Conditions of Service for Officers 2012, (Revised), is not capable of retiring the claimant as it was issued in violation of extant rules the letter is null and void and of no effect for having been issued without due process. It is hereby set aside. 98. With the finding that exhibit CW1A 1-3 is null and void of no effect whatsoever the claimant is entitled to an order for reinstatement. 99. In the circumstance I hereby ordered reinstatement of the claimant back to his post with all his rights and privileges. 100. In line with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of EX-CAPT CHARLES C. EGWU V THE NIGERIA ARY (supra), the relief on payment of damages become moot and academic, dissipating energy in considering it is not necessary, I hereby discountenanced it. 101. For avoidance of doubt the orders of the court are: 1. The compulsory retirement of the claimant vide exhibit CW1A 1-3, is hereby declared null and void and of no effect whatsoever, as it was not done in line with extant rules and regulations. 2. The letter of compulsory retirement exhibit CW1A 1-3 is hereby set aside for being null and void and of no effect whatsoever. 3. The claimant is hereby reinstated back to his post in the Nigeria Army with all his rights and privileges. 4. The claimant is equally entitled to all his salaries and emoluments from the date of his compulsory retirement i.e 9/6/16 to date and subsequently, until he is appropriately discharged from service. 102. Judgment entered accordingly. Sanusi Kado, Judge. REPRESENTATION: Olayinka Adedeji, Esq; for the claimant.