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JUDGMENT This suit was first filed in the Federal High Court on 29th July 2008 but it was transferred to this court by an order of the Federal High Court made on 17th November 2014. Upon this court having become seized of the suit, the claimant filed a new Complaint on 24th October 2016 wherein she sought the following reliefs: 1. A declaration that the purported retirement of the claimant by the Ministry of Defence in 1995 vide the letter dated 20/12/95 is ultra vires, arbitrary and contrary to the civil service rules and therefore null and void. 2. A declaration that the purported dismissal of the claimant from the federal civil service by the defendants vide letter dated 24/6/97 is in bad faith and amounted to abuse of public office. 3. A declaration that the purported dismissal of the claimant from the federal civil service in 1997 is wrongful, contrary to civil service rules and of no effect whatsoever. 4. An order reinstating the claimant to the federal civil service or alternatively an order commuting the claimant’s purported dismissal to retirement from with effect from June 1997 to enable the claimant collect her retirement benefits. Hearing commenced denovo on the 16th day of July 2018. The Claimant testified for herself as CW1. One Mr. Ikiriko Memedho Okpara a Principal Admin Officer with the 1st Defendant testified as DW1. One Salami Ejibade Simon, a staff of the 2nd Defendant testified as DW2. Hearing ended on the 15th day of March 2019 and parties were ordered to file Final Addresses in accordance with the Rules of Court. This were duly filed. Parties adopted their respective addresses on the 17th day of July 2019. CLAIMANT’S CASE During the trial of the case, the Claimant testified in proof of her claims. The Claimant told the court that she was employed by the 1st defendant as a typist grade II with effect from 1st May 1980 and she was deployed to the Ministry of Defence. Her employment was later gazetted and confirmed vide the 1st Defendant’s letter dated 18th August 1988. Her employment was upgraded to the post of Senior Secretariat Assistant with effect from 1/1/93 in a letter dated 23/9/94. She did not attend work on 23/11/95 and a query was issued to her which she answered on 24/11/95. In a letter dated 13/12/95, the Ministry of Defence informed her that a case of absenteeism, closing before time and insubordination was being considered by a Special Committee in the Ministry of Defence against her. By another letter dated 20/12/95, the Ministry of Defence informed the claimant that the Special Committee, after deliberations, decided to retire the claimant with effect from 31/12/95. The Claimant said she was not invited to appear before the Special Committee or to call witnesses or to put questions to persons who might have testified against her in accordance with the Public Service Rules of 1998. The Claimant said she appealed against her premature retirement through the Nigeria Army Headquarters, 82 Division, Enugu. By a letter dated 3/4/96, the 82 Division recommended to the 2nd defendant that her case be reviewed and a lesser punishment be meted to her. While awaiting the outcome of her appeal against her retirement, the Claimant received a letter dated 24/6/97 from the 1st Defendant that it has approved the recommendation of the Special Committee of the Ministry of Defence to dismiss the claimant from service with effect from 24/6/97. The Claimant stated that her dismissal was wrongful because it was not done in compliance with disciplinary procedure in the Public Service Rules. She said further that both the Public Complaints Commission and the Army Headquarters Enugu intervened by requesting the Defendants to convert the dismissal to retirement to enable her collect her retirement benefits. According to the Claimant, her earlier retirement and subsequent dismissal arose from the same allegation of absenteeism from work for one day. As explained in her answer to query, her absence from work on that day was a result of the ill health of her daughter. The rules of natural justice and fair hearing were not observed in her dismissal from public service when the 2nd defendant acted as the accuser, investigator and the judge. Both Defendants filed their respective statements of defence and called one witness each in defence of the suit. The witness for the 1st Defendant is one Ikiriko Memedho Okpara, a staff of the 1st Defendant. He told the court that the Claimant was a junior employee and everything with regard to her employment was sub-delegated to the 2nd Defendant. The Claimant’s employment, promotions and discipline was done by the 2nd Defendant without recourse to the 1st Defendant. The witness mentioned that the 2nd Defendant is not a necessary party to the suit and that the suit is statute barred. The witness urged the court to dismiss the suit. The witness for the 2nd Defendant is E. S. Salami, a Chief Executive Officer, Human Resources Management Department, Ministry of Defence Headquarters. He explained that the Claimant was a civil servant with the Ministry of Defence and attached to the Army Headquarters, 82 Division, Enugu. The Claimant was dismissed from public service by the 1st Defendant with effect from 24th June 1997 in line with the provisions of extant circulars and regulations. The dismissal was based on proven allegation of absenteeism, closing before time and insubordination levelled against her. The Claimant was given fair hearing as she was queried and her response was not sufficient to exculpate her. The Claimant was not wrongly retired from service and her appeal was considered but found unmeritorious. The witness too said the Claimant’s suit is statute barred and urged the court to dismiss the suit. 1ST DEFENDANT’S FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS The 1st Defendant in his final written address formulated the following issues for determination to wit; 1. Whether or not this action is statute barred viz-a-viz Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act, Cap P.41, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. 2. Whether from the facts, law and evidence in this case, the Claimant was properly dismissed. On Issue One, learned counsel for the 1st Defendant Submitted that this suit was instituted more than Nine (9) years after the cause of action arose, a violation of Section 2 (a) of the Public officers Protection Act; hence this suit is statute barred having been commenced three (3) months after the cause of action arose. Counsel argued that negotiation between the parties will not stop the time from running. See the case of VICTOR EKEOCHA vs. CUSTOMS, IMMIGRATION & PRISONS SERVICE BOARD (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 392) Pg. 1977-1979. Counsel urged the court to dismiss the suit and hold that the action is statute barred as exemplified in the case of BANK OF THE NORTH LIMITED vs. ALHAJI HARUNA GARBA GANA (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 296) 869 Para 9. On Issue Two, counsel submitted that by Rule 030307 of the PSR an officer may be dismissed by the 1st Defendant in line with the procedure stated therein. Counsel submitted that going by the authority of AIYETAN vs. NIFOR (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 59) Pg. 50, the requirement of fair hearing has been satisfied. Placing reliance on a plethora of judicial authorities and Rule 030307 (v) of the PSR, counsel submitted that the Claimant did not need to be summoned for an oral hearing or investigation before being dismissed by the 1st Defendant. Counsel urged the court to so hold. 2ND DEFENDANT’S FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS The 2nd Defendant in their final written address, formulated the following issues for determination to wit; 1. Whether this Honourable Court can exercise its jurisdiction to hear or adjudicate on this matter that is statue barred. 2. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs sought considering the offence committed by the Plaintiff in this suit. On Issue One, learned counsel for the 2nd Defendant towing a similar line with the argument of the 1st Defendant submitted that the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to hear or adjudicate on a matter that is statue barred per Section 2(A) of the Public Officers Protection Act, 2004. On Issue Two, counsel answered the question posed by the issue in the negative and submitted that the dismissal of the Claimant was done based on proven allegation of absenteeism, closing before time and insubordination leveled against her. Counsel argued that the Plaintiff was given fair hearing as she was queried and her response was not sufficient to exculpate her. Counsel urged the court to hold that the Plaintiff’s appeal was considered unmeritorious and to Court to dismiss the suit of as being frivolous and baseless. CLAIMANT’S FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS The Claimant in their final written address formulated the following issues for determination to wit: 1. Whether or not this action is statute barred viz-a-viz Section 2a of the Public Officers (Protection) Act Cap P. 41 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. 2. Whether by the circumstances the purported dismissal of the case, the Claimant was not unlawful bearing in mind that her employment was clothed with statutory flavor. 3. Whether the Claimant was given fair hearing before she was unlawfully dismissed. 4. Whether the Claimant has proved her case on preponderance of Evidence hence entitled to the reliefs sought. On Issue One, learned counsel for the Claimant submitted that the Claimant was not given fair hearing before she was purportedly and prematurely dismissed from the civil service. Counsel argued that the allegations upon which she was dismissed from work were unknown to her and that at no time material throughout the charade was she asked or tried for those allegations. See ALHASSAN vs. A.B.U. ZARIA (2011) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1259) p.417 @ p. 465 paras B-C. Counsel urged the court to hold that the Defendants acted outside the color of their office and ultra vires their statutory powers to discipline or terminate the services of the Claimant; and consequently, cannot be shielded by the Public Officers’ Protection Act. Counsel urged the court to hold that the suit is not statute barred. On Issue Two, counsel submitted that Exhibit EU3, having not emanated from the person authorized to do so, is a nullity and of no effect. Counsel argued that the Claimant was not invited by the special committee nor given opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses called by the panel (Special Committee) purportedly investigating. Counsel further submitted that the reason that the Claimant was absent on the 23rd of November 1995 was for a reasonable cause and justifiable. Counsel urged the court to so hold. On Issue Three, counsel reiterated that neither the Claimant's averments nor testimonies was contradicted, discredited or challenged by any of the Defendants during trial, and that at no point was the Claimant confronted with the allegations of absenteeism, insubordination and closing before time as contained in Exhibit EU4 which according to counsel is fatal to their case and invalidates the purported Retirement/Dismissal of the Claimant from service. Counsel urged the court to nullify the purported dismissal of the Claimant for contravening the sacrosanct Guidelines for Appointments, Promotion and Disciplining of Public Servants. On Issue Four, it was the submission of the Claimant’s counsel that the Claimant has satisfied all the ingredients to establish her case. Counsel urged the court to grant all the reliefs sought by the Claimant and discountenance all the arguments of the Defendants. Further arguments proffered by counsel on both sides were duly reviewed and evaluated. Necessary reference will be made to them in the course of this judgment. COURT’S DECISION In paragraph 6 of the amended statement of defence of the 1st Defendant, the 1st Defendant raised the issue that it is not a necessary party to this case. It was averred in the said paragraph that the 1st Defendant shall apply that its name be struck out from the suit because it is not a necessary party to the suit by virtue of the facts averred in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the amended statement of defence. The averments referred to in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of 1st Defendant’s amended statement of defence are that the 1st Defendant was not the employer of the Claimant and was wrongly joined as a Defendant in the suit. It was averred that the Claimant was a junior employee and everything with regard to her employment was sub-delegated to the 2nd Defendant. Thus, the Claimant’s employment, promotions and discipline was done by the 2nd Defendant without recourse to the 1st Defendant. DW1 gave evidence in line with these facts. From the averments and evidence of the 1st Defendant, the reasons it gave for not being a necessary party to the suit is that it was not the Claimant’s employer and did not have anything to do with the disciplinary action and punishment taken against the Claimant. According to the 1st Defendant, the Claimant was employed by the 2nd Defendant and disciplinary action against the Claimant was taken by the 2nd Defendant. Although the Claimant did not file a reply to the 1st Defendant’s statement of defence, her averments in the statement of facts and evidence adduced by her contain facts with which to consider whether the 1st Defendant is a necessary party to this case. In paragraph 2 of the Claimant’s statement of facts, she described the 1st Defendant as the agency responsible for regulating employment in the Federal Civil Service. In paragraphs 4, 5 and 6, the Claimant averred that she was employed by the 1st Defendant in 1980 and deployed to the Ministry of Defence. Her employment was later gazetted and her deployment to the Ministry of Defence was subsequently confirmed by the 1st Defendant in a letter dated 18th August 1988 to the 2nd Defendant. Then in a letter written on 4th November 1988 by the 1st Defendant to the 2nd Defendant, her position was upgraded to the post of typist Grade 1 with effect from 1/1/82. In paragraph 15 of her statement of facts, the Claimant further averred that while she was awaiting for the outcome of her appeal against her retirement by the 2nd Defendant, the 1st Defendant wrote her a letter dated 24/6/97 where she was informed that the 1st Defendant had approved the recommendation of the Special Committee of the Ministry of Defence to dismiss the Claimant from service with effect from 24/6/97. Among the documents tendered in evidence by the Claimant are Exhibits EU1 and EU7. Exhibit EU1 is a letter from the 1st Defendant to the 2nd Defendant dated 18th August 1988. The 1st Defendant directed the 2nd Defendant on the effective date of the Claimant’s appointment and on the placement of the Claimant on salary and grade level. Exhibit EU7 is a letter from the 1st Defendant to the Claimant dated 24th June 1997. The 1st Defendant informed the Claimant that the 1st Defendant considered the allegation against the Claimant, her representation thereto and has approved the recommendation of the special committee of the ministry of defence to dismiss the Claimant from the Federal Civil Service with effect from 24th June 1997. The averments of the Claimant and the content of Exhibits EU1 and EU7 show that the 1st Defendant played a key role in the appointment and dismissal of the Claimant from service. In fact, it was the 1st Defendant who gave approval for the Claimant’s dismissal from service. Reliefs 2, 3 and 4 sought by the Claimant directly concern the 1st Defendant and are meant to challenge her dismissal from service. Let me also examine what the 2nd Defendant said about the issue of who employed the Claimant. In paragraph 2 of 2nd Defendant’s statement of defence, it admitted the Claimant’s averments in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6, among others, of the statement of facts. It is in these admitted paragraphs the Claimant stated that she was employed by the 1st Defendant and deployed to the Ministry of Defence and that the 1st Defendant gazetted her employment and confirmed her deployment to the Ministry of Defence in a letter dated 18th August 1988 to the 2nd Defendant. I find from the averments of the Claimant and the 2nd Defendant that the 1st Defendant was the employer of the Claimant. The Claimant was only deployed to work in the Ministry of Defence. Of course, that was why the 1st Defendant could direct the 2nd Defendant in Exhibit EU1 on where to place the Claimant in terms of salary and grade level. The Claimant’s dismissal from service was also done upon the approval of the 1st Defendant. A necessary party to a proceeding has been held to be “the party whose presence is essential for the effectual and complete determination of the claim before the court. It is a party in the absence of whom the claim cannot be effectually and completely determined.” See AKUNWATA OGBOGU MBANEFO vs. NWAKIBIE HENRY MOLOKU (2014) 6 NWLR (Pt.1403) 377 at 410. In DAAR COMMUNICATIONS (NIG.) LTD. vs. WASA DELMA NIG. LTD. (2012) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1287) 370 the Court of Appeal observed that: “It is only a necessary party, that is, a person in whose absence as a party a question in the action cannot be effectively and completely settled that can be joined. The person to be joined must be somebody whose presence is necessary as a party, and the only reason which makes him a necessary party to an action is that he should be bound by the result of the action and the question to be settled. There must be a question in the action which cannot be effectively and completely settled unless he is a party.” See also IGE vs. FARINDE (1994) 7 NWLR (Pt.354) 42; EFFIOM vs. IRONBAR (2001) FWLR (Pt. 53)137. Without any doubt, the 1st Defendant is a necessary party to this suit. The 1st and 2nd Defendants pleaded that the Claimant’s suit is statute barred. See paragraphs 5 of the respective statements of defence of the 1st and 2nd Defendants. While arguing the first issues of the respective final written addresses of the Defendants, learned counsels for the Defendants cited Section 2 [a] of POPA and submitted that the cause of action of the Claimant’s suit, being her dismissal from service, arose on 24th June 1997 but she instituted this suit on 24th October 2016 which was a period of more than 9 years from the time her cause of action arose. It was submitted that the Claimant’s suit is statute barred having not been commenced within 3 months after the cause of action arose. In response to the arguments of learned counsels for the Defendants, the Claimant’s counsel submitted that Section 2 [a] of POPA is not applicable to the Claimant’s case. The Claimant filed this suit in 2008 and not in 2016 as believed by the Defendants. The suit was transferred from the Federal High Court to the NICN in 2014. Although the cause of action of the Claimant arose in 1997, the Defendants acted in contravention of constitutional provisions and outside the colour of their office in the discipline of the Claimant. They cannot be protected by POPA. Counsels for the Defendants appear to be mistaken as to the date this suit was instituted. They claim it was in 2016. I mentioned at the beginning of this judgment that this suit was transferred from the Federal High Court to this court. The transfer was done in November 2014. The suit itself was filed in the Federal High Court on 29th July 2008. The Claimant merely filed a new originating process in compliance with the rules of this court on 24th October 2016 pursuant to the directive given by this court on 10/10/2016. The date the Claimant filed the fresh originating process was not the date she instituted this suit. The Claimant filed this suit on 29th July 2008 meanwhile her cause of action, which is the dismissal from service, arose on 24th June 1997. This is the basis for which the Defendants contend that the Claimant’s suit is statute barred by the effect of Section 2 [a] of POPA. The Claimant’s suit arose from contract of service. The Supreme Court has recently settled the controversy as to the applicability of POPA to employment matters. In NATIONAL REVENUE MOBILISATION ALLOCATION AND FISCAL COMMISSION vs. AJIBOLA JOHNSON [2019] 2 NWLR [Pt. 1656] 247 at 270-271, the Supreme Court held that POPA does not apply to contract of service. Therefore, I hold that POPA does not apply to this suit as to bar the Claimant’s action. Having dealt with the objections of the Defendants, I will now determine the case of the Claimant. In determining the case, I consider the issue whether the claimant has proved her case and entitled to the reliefs she sought. The claims sought by the Claimant are founded on her retirement and subsequent dismissal from service by the Defendants. In her evidence, the Claimant said she did not attend work on 23/11/95 and a query was issued to her which she answered on 24/11/95. On 13/12/95 she was given a letter by the Ministry of Defence wherein she was informed that a case of absenteeism, closing before time and insubordination was being considered against her by a special committee in the Ministry of Defence. In a letter dated 20/12/95, the Ministry of Defence informed her that the Special Committee decided to retire her with effect from 31/12/95. The Claimant said she appealed against the premature retirement but while she was awaiting the outcome of her appeal, she received a letter dated 24/6/97 from the 1st Defendant that it had approved the recommendation of the Special Committee of the Ministry of Defence to dismiss the Claimant from service with effect from 24/6/97. The Claimant alleged that her retirement and subsequent dismissal arose from the same allegation of absenteeism from work for one day which she explained in her answer to query to have been occasioned by the ill health of her daughter. Before she was compulsorily retired, the Claimant said she was not invited to appear before the special committee or to call witnesses or to put questions to persons who might have testified against her. For the dismissal, the Claimant said it was wrongful because it was not done in compliance with disciplinary procedure in the public service rules and the rules of natural justice and fair hearing were not observed. From the evidence of the Claimant, on 23/11/1995, she was given a query by the Nigerian Army, 82 Division, Enugu to explain why disciplinary action should not be taken against her for absenting from place of work on that same day without clearance. The Claimant answered the query on 24/11/1995. The query and answer are Exhibits EU3 and EU3A. The Claimant’s explanation for her absence from work on 23/11/1995 was that she took her sick daughter to hospital on that day but she tried to get permission without success from the Chief Clerk. Then on 13/12/1995, vide Exhibit EU4, the Ministry of Defence informed the Claimant that a Special Committee is considering a case of absenteeism, closing before time and insubordination against the Claimant. The Claimant was merely informed in the letter that the final decision of the committee will be conveyed to her after conclusion of deliberations. The Claimant was not invited to appear before the committee and she did not attend the committee proceedings. The Claimant did not know what was discussed against her or what evidence or witnesses where used against her. The Claimant also did not have the opportunity to make any defence before the Special Committee. The outcome of the deliberations of the special committee was communicated to the Claimant in the letter dated 20/12/1995 which is Exhibit EU5. The Claimant was informed that the special committee decided that the Claimant be retired from service and the Claimant was accordingly retired from service in the public interest with effect from 31/12/95. From the content of Exhibit EU5, it was the special committee who recommended the Claimant’s retirement upon conclusion of its deliberations on the allegations against the claimant. The query was only in respect of the allegation of absence from duty on 23/11/1995. This was the allegation she responded to in her answer to query. However, the allegations considered against her by the special committee as contained in Exhibit EU4 are allegations of absenteeism, closing before time and insubordination. That is to say the Claimant was tried by the special committee for allegations she was never queried about or given opportunity to defend. The special committee did not hear from the Claimant and did not allow the Claimant appear before its proceedings to defend herself of the allegations made against her. Without any doubt, the Claimant was not given fair hearing before it was concluded that she was guilty of the allegations of absenteeism, closing before time and insubordination for which she was retired compulsorily from service. The retirement of the Claimant was done by the Ministry of Defence. I have examined the defence of the 2nd Defendant and all that was averred in defence of the allegation of wrongful retirement of the Claimant is that the Claimant was rightly retired in accordance with extant rules. No fact or evidence was given by the 2nd Defendant as to the extant rules or the procedure which entitles the Ministry of Defence to conduct the disciplinary proceeding in the manner it was done or to retire the Claimant in the manner the Claimant was retired. The 2nd Defendant has not adduced any evidence which will convince this court that the Claimant’s retirement on 20/12/1995 was lawfully done. From the evidence before me, I find that the Claimant was not given fair hearing when she was retired from service on allegations of absenteeism, closing before time and insubordination. There is also no evidence from the Defendants to show that the procedure for compulsory retirement in the applicable PSR was followed when the Claimant was retired from service on disciplinary grounds. Her appointment having been terminated by the retirement, the Claimant appealed the punishment and made attempts to have it reviewed to a lesser punishment. As if the premature retirement was not enough punishment for being absent from work for only a day, she was, in addition, dismissed from service. I have observed a controversy between the 1st and 2nd Defendants as to which of them dismissed the Claimant from service. The 1st Defendant averred that the Claimant, being a junior employee, everything with regards to her employment was sub-delegated to the 2nd Defendant. The Claimant’s employment, promotions and discipline was done by the 2nd Defendant without recourse to the 1st Defendant. On the other hand, the 2nd Defendant asserted that the Claimant was dismissed from service by the 1st Defendant. The dismissal letter is Exhibit EU7. The content of the 1st paragraph of the letter reads as follows: REMOVAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE The Commission at its recent meeting carefully considered the allegations levelled against you, your representation thereon and has approved the recommendation of your Ministry’s Special Committee to dismiss you from the Federal Civil Service with effect from 24th June 1997 in accordance with the provision of Circular No. FC/4054/S.1/V/768 of 6th November 1995. From this content of Exhibit EU7, the Special Committee of the Ministry of Defence recommended to the 1st Defendant that the Claimant be dismissed from service. The 1st Defendant approved and informed the Claimant that her dismissal was with effect from 24/6/1997. From Exhibit EU7, the dismissal of the Claimant was done by 1st Defendant. In Exhibit EU7, the 1st Defendant purported to have approved the Claimant’s dismissal upon the recommendation of the Special Committee of the Ministry of Defence. The dismissal was also on the basis of allegations levelled against the Claimant. Now, the allegations which the special committee considered against the Claimant were absenteeism, closing before time and insubordination. These were the same allegations forwarded to the 1st Defendant for its approval to dismiss the Claimant. The Claimant’s only representation which was available to the 1st Defendant to consider was her response to query. I have said earlier that the response was only in respect of the allegation of absence from duty for one day stated in the query. Therefore, the allegations of closing before time and insubordination were not alleged against the Claimant. Her response to the query cannot be said to be a response to all the allegations levelled against her. It was wrong for the 1st Defendant to have relied on the Claimant’s response to query to conclude that the Claimant was guilty of the allegations against her. The special committee did not give the Claimant the opportunity to defend all the allegations against her. It was the same unconstitutional process that was forwarded to the 1st Defendant for its approval to dismiss the Claimant. The 1st Defendant too did not conduct any fresh inquiry or give the Claimant a chance to defend the allegations against her but simply followed the unlawful recommendation of the special committee and approved the Claimant’s dismissal from service. Clearly, the approval given by the 1st Defendant for the dismissal of the Claimant was done without affording the Claimant fair hearing. It is even strange that the special committee having recommended the retirement of the Claimant from service on the same allegations and the Claimant was actually retired with effect from 31/12/1995, will proceed to recommend to the 1st Defendant to impose a higher punishment of dismissal on the Claimant. The Claimant having been punished by retirement for the same allegation cannot be given another higher punishment. There was no fresh inquiry conducted into the case to warrant a higher punishment being imposed on her. It was wrong and unjustified to give the Claimant two different punishments in respect of the same allegation. The law frowns at double punishment. Having already been punished by compulsory retirement, the subsequent dismissal was unwarranted and unjustified. Learned Counsel for the 1st Defendant referred to some provisions of the PSR 2008 in the 1st Defendant’s final written address and submitted that the Claimant’s dismissal by the 1st Defendant followed the laid down procedure. The dismissal of the Claimant was done in 1997. I wonder how the PSR issued in 2008 will apply to an act done in 1997. The relevant PSR to be examined in consideration of the validity or otherwise of the Claimant’s dismissal should be the one operating at the time of the Claimant’s dismissal in 1997. The 1st Defendant’s counsel cannot rely on the 2008 PSR. Accordingly, all the arguments of the counsel for the 1st Defendant on the provisions of the 2008 PSR are irrelevant to the determination of the lawfulness of the Claimant’s dismissal. The Claimant alleged that her dismissal was wrongful because it was not done in compliance with disciplinary procedure in the public service rules. She referred to the PSR in several instances. In addition, the Claimant in paragraph 20 of her evidence mentioned the PSR and the Guidelines for Appointments, Promotion and Discipline. The Claimant tendered the Guidelines for Appointments, Promotion and Discipline. It is Exhibit EU14. In the final written address of the Claimant, her counsel relied heavily on Rules 14, 17 and 19 of the Guidelines to submit that the dismissal of the Claimant was unlawful. The said Guidelines was issued by the 1st Defendant. It is stated expressly in the preface that the Guidelines took effect from 3rd August 1998. The said Guidelines was not in existence at the time of the Claimant’s dismissal in June 1997. Its provision did not have retrospective effect for it to be applicable in determining the lawfulness of the Claimant’s dismissal. The Claimant did not produce the PSR she relied on in evidence. Although the Claimant complained that her dismissal was done in violation of the PSR, she did not refer to provisions of the PSR so violated in her dismissal. She did not also produce it in evidence. Her counsel too did not refer to any provision of the PSR. The Guidelines tendered in evidence did not apply to her case. Notwithstanding these observations, I find in this case that the Claimant was not given fair hearing before she was compulsorily retired and then dismissed from service. The Claimant was a public servant in the Federal Civil Service. Her employment was regulated by the PSR and thus enjoyed statutory flavour. She cannot be validly removed from the employment on grounds of discipline without giving her opportunity to be heard on the allegations made against her before any disciplinary punishment is handed down to her. In GARBA vs. UNIVERSITY OF MAIDUGURI (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. l8) 553, the Supreme Court held that fair hearing implies that the person knows what the allegations against him are; what evidence has been given in support of such allegations; what statements have been made concerning these allegations; the person has a fair opportunity to correct and contradict such evidence and the body investigating the charge against such person must not receive evidence behind his back. In this case, both the Special Committee of the Ministry of Defence and the 1st Defendant did not give the Claimant fair hearing. The Claimant was not given notice of all the allegations against her or opportunity to respond to all the allegations for which she was punished. She was not invited to defend herself before the Special committee. Fair hearing is a constitutional right of the Claimant. The Claimant is entitled to fair hearing before the Defendants can lawfully punish her for any misconduct. Administrative bodies or panels or committees are bound to observe the rules of natural justice and of fairness in their decisions affecting the rights and obligations of individuals. This basic principle of law was reiterated in SAIBU vs. KWARA STATE POLYTECHNIC, ILORIN (2008) LPELR-4524(CA), thus: “All administrative bodies, even though they are not courts of law, ore bound to observe the rules of natural justice and of fairness in their numerous decisions which affect the rights and obligations of citizens, including employees of governments”. In JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISION OF CROSS RIVER STATE vs. YOUNG (2013) LPELR 20592 (SC), the Supreme Court decided thus: It is basic that where a body, whether judicial, quasi-judicial, Administrative or Executive in inception, acts judicially in the sense that it is to determine the civil rights and obligations of a person, or to find him guilty or liable of a fault, he must be given a hearing before the issue can be properly decided. This is as enjoined by the provision of Section 36(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 – the grundnorm. Even then, adjudicating bodies like tribunals, though not expected to act fully like of Court of law, are enjoined in their hearing of matters to act in good faith and fairly listen to both sides before deciding”. It must be emphasised that observance of the principle of fair hearing cannot be compromised when it comes to removal of civil servants from their employment on disciplinary grounds. The Claimant was not given fair hearing before the decision to retire her or dismiss her from service was reached. The failure to accord the Claimant fair hearing rendered the entire disciplinary proceedings and the consequential compulsory retirement and dismissal of the Claimant unlawful, wrongful, null and void. Both the premature retirement of the Claimant on 31/12/1995 and her subsequent dismissal from service on 24/6/1997 are hereby set aside. The claims sought by the Claimant in relief 4 are in alternatives. The Claimant sought an order reinstating her to the Federal Civil Service or an order commuting her purported dismissal to retirement from with effect from June 1997 to enable her collect her retirement benefits. In employments protected by statute, where the employee is found to have been unlawfully removed from the employment, the consequential order to be made by the court is an order reinstating the employee to the employment. See OKEME vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, EDO STATE (2001) FWLR (Pt. 36) 873; OLORUNTOBA-OJU vs. ABDUL-RAHEEM (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 497) 1. When the Claimant was cross examined by counsel for the 1st Defendant on 16/7/2018, she said she was still within service age as she has a year more to reach 60 years of age. The Claimant has by now reached 60 years. She ought to have retired from service by now. It will be impracticable to order her reinstatement. In view of the setting aside of the compulsory retirement and subsequent dismissal, the Claimant is deemed to have remained in the employment from December 1995 to the date she ought to lawfully retire from service in accordance with the dictates of the PSR. Since reinstatement of the Claimant is no longer possible, she is entitled to be paid all her salaries, allowances and entitlements accruing to her from date of her premature retirement to the date she lawfully reached retirement age in the service. She is also entitled to be paid all her retirement benefits. In EZE vs. GOVERNOR OF ABIA STATE (2014) 14 NWLR (Pt.1426) 192 at 215 – 216 the Supreme Court held as follows: “If such a person is removed from office in a manner the court finds to be wrong, he shall be entitled to all his entitlement, to wit: salaries, allowances etc… Once the learned trial Judge was unable to order the reinstatement of the appellants because their tenure had lapsed, His Lordship was right to order that they be paid their entitlements in lieu of their reinstatement, since unpaid salaries are necessary and incidental to the relief seeking reinstatement.” The Claimant’s case has merit. Her claims are granted. The Claimant’s retirement and dismissal are declared unlawful, null and void and are hereby set aside. In lieu of reinstatement of the Claimant, the Defendants are ordered to forthwith compute and pay to the Claimant all her salaries, allowances and other entitlements from December 1995 to the date she retired lawfully from service. Her retirement benefits should also be computed and paid to her at once. Cost of N200,000 is also awarded to the Claimant. Judgment is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Judge