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JUDGMENT Introduction & Claims 1. By his General Form of Complaint dated 12/8/13 Claimant commenced this action and sought the following reliefs against the Defendant - 1. A declaration that the purported termination of his employment with the Defendant is invalid, effectual, wrongful and in breach of his terms of employment with the Defendant. 2. =N=79,442.67 being 1 month’s salary in lieu of notice for the month of July, 2013. 3. Terminal benefit in the sum of =N=1,906,600.08. 2. The Defendant entered an appearance, denied liability and filed its statement of defence along with all the requisites frontloaded processes. Case of the Claimant 2. Claimant opened his case on 15/2/16 and testified in chief as CW1. Claimant adopted his witness deposition dated 28/2/14 as his evidence in chief and tendered 9 documents as exhibits. The documents were admitted in evidence and marked as Exh. UA1 - Exh. UA9 respectively. 3. The case of the Claimant as revealed from his evidence in chief and exhibits tendered is that he was by a letter dated 15/10/08 employed by the Defendant (then known as Afribank Registrars Limited) as a dispatch rider and resides at 3A Ajagbe Compound Off Raimi Street Sari-Iganmu Lagos State; that Defendant is a limited liability company and carries on business at 2A Gbagada Express Way Anthony Village Lagos State as Registrars to companies, shares registration and advisory services; that the terms of his employment are contained in his letter of appointment and in the Defendant’s staff Handbook; that his letter of appointment specifically stated that ''other terms and conditions of service shall be applicable to the grade''; that the other terms and conditions of service are contained in the Defendant’s Staff Handbook as approved by the Board of the Defendant; that his appointment was confirmed by the Defendant vide its letter dated 18/5/09; that by the said letter of confirmation of appointment, he became subject to the terms and conditions applicable to confirmed staff in the Defendant company and was elevated to Driver II; that the Defendant by a letter dated 28/6/13 purportedly terminated his appointment in clear breach of the applicable terms and conditions of service; that as a confirmed staff he was entitled to 1 month notice or 1 month’s salary in lieu of notice; that the Defendant served him a letter dated 28/6/13 (a Friday) termination the employment on 1/7/13 being the next working day; that his appointment was terminated after he had completely rendered service to the Defendant for the month of June; that the Defendant was supposed to give him 1 month’s notice or month’s salary in lieu of notice for the month of July 2013 and that no salary in lieu of notice was paid to him on 28/6/13 in clear violation of the terms and conditions of his employment; that his salary in lieu of notice for 1 month is =N=79,441.67. 4. Claimant further averred that upon a proper termination of his employment as a confirmed staff who served the Defendant for more than 5 years he is further entitled to a terminal benefit of =N=1,906,600.08 calculated as follows: annual basic salary plus all allowances for every year of service up to a limit of 2 years which annual emolument aggregates to =N=953,300.04x2; that the Defendant all through his stay in the Defendant company referred to and used the staff Handbook; that the Defendant’s Board of Directors had, at all times material to this action, adopted the staff Handbook as containing the terms and conditions regulating its relationship with its staff; that the Defendant in its Annual Returns for the year 2011 adopted the Staff Handbook in computing the terminal benefits of its 44 members of staff in its Financial Statement for 2011 and filed same at the Corporate Affairs Commission; that the said Financial Statement which unequivocally applied the Staff Handbook in the computation of the claimant’s terminal benefit and was signed by the Defendant’s current Chairman and current acting Managing Director, presented at its Annual General meeting and adopted at the said meeting before it was filed as Annual Returns for the year 2011 at the Corporate Affairs Commission and that he was entitled to one month notice or one month salary in lieu of notice and relies on the Defendant’s Staff Handbook and Defendant’s letter dated 28/6/13. 5. It was the case of the Claimant that the Defendant vide its Internal Mail dated 28/7/11 had earlier informed him that he could be laid off under Clause 3.18 of the Staff Handbook as a result of the Central Bank of Nigeria's directive to Banks to divest from the non-banking sector; that the Defendant adopted the said internal mail and made provision for his terminal benefit relying on the redundancy clause as shown in its financial statement for the year ended 2011 which was approved by the Board of Directors of the Defendant, signed by the Defendant’s current Chairman and current acting Managing Director, approved by the defendant at its annual general meeting and incorporated in the financial statement filed at the Corporate Affairs Commission; that the terminal benefits of 44 members of the Defendant’s staff which includes his terminal benefit formed part of the total liabilities deducted from the total assets of the Defendant before arriving at its net asset as can be seen in the financial report for 2011; that since the issuance of the writ by some employees the Defendant on or about 20/8/13 after it had been served with the Court processes of the first set of employees that applied to court for their terminal benefits, unilaterally and without his knowledge paid the sum of =N=98,906.25 into his salary account; that his Solicitors by their letter dated 21/8/13 rejected the payment and requested the Defendant to recall the payment or consider it as part payment and that he has not been paid his 1 month’s salary in lieu of notice and terminal benefit till date. 6. Under cross examination, CW1 testified that he stands by his deposition that his letter of appointment refers to Exh.UA2; that Exh. UA2 is stated on Exh. UA1; that the Handbook was given to him upon his appointment – Exh. UA2. I did not sign Exh. UA2; that termination of his employment is not on any of the 8 grounds in Exh. UA2; that his qualification when he joined Defendant is SSE/CE; that WAEC qualification is not in Art 3.2 of Exh. UA2; that he was a junior staff of the Defendant; that he worked more than 5 years with the Defendant; that he was appraised by Defendant; that he does not know how many times he was appraised in a year; that No Long Service Award was given to any of the staff of Defendant; that he does not know that 2 weeks is the probation period in Exh. UA1; that Exh.UA2 received Board's approval; that his monthly salary is =N=79,441.67 based on the conditions of service; that his salary and allowances; that it includes variables pay; that his salary multiply by 12 is his annual pay; that on 2/7/13 Defendant paid some money to his account which they did not specify but which he regarded as non accident bonus which was due and payable then; that on 20/8/13 Defendant paid =N=98,906.25 to his account but he got his Lawyer to write to the Defendant since his entitlement was more than that; that he regarded it as part of his entitlement due from Defendant; that his appointment was terminated on ground of services no longer required; that Skye Bank acquired Mainstreet Bank; that he does not know if financial statement deals with profit and loss of preceding year; that Exh. UA7 was made by Defendant; that his name is not on Exh. UA7 and Exh. UA8 and that Exh.UA8 is not contained on Exh.UA. 7. On 18/9/16 Mr. Chester Onyemaechi Ukandu testified as CW2. He was in Court on subpoena. After being put on oath, witness stated that he was the founding Managing Director of the Defendant from 2005-February 2012 when he retired from the Defendant; that Claimant was a staff under him while he was with the Defendant; that Exh. UA2(1-16) shown to him is the Defendant Staff Handbook; that it was in use while Claimant was with the Defendant; that it is still in use; that the Defendant has no other Staff Handbook; that Exh. UA3(1-15) shown to him is the Minutes of Board of Directors meeting of the Defendant held on 13/9/06 together with Appendix 1Salary Structure and Appendix 2 Other Benefits attached to the Minutes in accordance with paragraph 8.02 on page 8 of the Minutes; that he presented Appendix 1 and 2 to the Board for approval; that they were approved on page 10 of the Minutes and that Appendix 1 & Appendix 2 were compiled into Staff Handbook of the Defendant. Witness testified further that Exh. UA7 is the Annual Returns of the Defendant; that on page 22 under 15A, the terminal benefits of staff were computed using the staff Handbook - Exh. UA2; that the staff benefit was part of the short term investment of the Defendant after it was approved; that he was no longer in the service of the Defendant when Exh. UA7 was prepared; that Exh. UA8 shown to him was an Internal Memo prepared by the Defendant and signed by him as the Managing Director/Chief Executive Officer; that as at the time he signed Exh. UA8, he was a member of the Board of the Defendant and that paragraph 2 of Exh.UA8 referred to a Staff Handbook which is Exh. UA2. 8. Under cross examination, the Defendant tendered 3 documents through the witness. The documents were admitted in evidence and marked as Exh. COU1 - Exh. COU3 respectively. The witness testified that he was informed of this case and was served the subpoena this morning – 19/9/16; that the Board on 13/9/06 approved the terms and conditions of service and same was compiled to staff Handbook; that after compilation copies of the Handbook was sent to the Directors; that there are 8 ways by which a staff can be disengaged from the service of Defendant by Exh. UA2; that he was not in the service of Defendant when Claimant was disengaged; that on page 10 of Exh. UA3 is the signature of the Chairman of the Board of Defendant; that Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 are Board documents presented by him for approval; that his signature is on the said Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 to Exh. UA3; that he attended Board meeting of 17/5/07 when the minutes of meeting of 13/9/06 were considered and adopted; that the minutes presented by the Company Secretary included Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 hence he did not object; that page 9 of Exh. UA3 is part of the minutes; that the minutes have only one Appendix I and Appendix 2; that between July and December 2011 he was Managing Director of Defendant; that there were 45 staff including myself on the payroll of Defendant; that one Julius Koleoso resigned during the period; that he is not part of the staff referred to in Exh.UA8; that Exh. UA2 was sent for printing in March 2008; that the 1st printed batch was received in April 2008 and 2nd batch in May 2008; that he filed a suit against Defendant in 2013 and Judgment delivered and that in that suit he tendered his letter of appointment. 9. Witness added that there was a Handbook in a loose form; that it was only printed later in 2008; that financial year of Defendant is Jan – Dec in 2011; that provisions can be made for future liabilities in a financial year; that there was no buy out scheme to buy Defendant when he was there for there was no offer; that there was no divestment throughout his stay with the Defendant even up till now; that in his suit against Defendant he made witness statement on oath and further statement on oath; that Managing Director does not hand over Handbook to staff; that Human Resources Department would hand it over; that it is not his duty to know when it was handed over to the Claimant; that he does not know; that Human Resources in change of staff matters and Handbook; that Head of Human Resources determines the protocol for handing Handbook over to new employee; that the Handbook became operational on 13/9/16 and that in the suit against Defendant he claimed according to the terms and conditions of his employment as contained in the Handbook. Case of the Defendant 10. The Defendant opened its defence on 30/1/17. It called one Adetayo Ogunnbanjo as its DW1. The witness adopted his witness depositions dated 19/9/13 and 1/6/15 as his evidence in chief and tendered 17 documents. The documents were admitted in evidence and marked as Exh. D1 - Exh. D17 respectively. 11. The case of the Defendant as revealed from the evidence in chief and exhibits tendered is that it employed the Claimant as a Dispatch Rider vide a letter dated 15/10/08 with effect from 20/10/08 detailing the terms and conditions of his employment; that his monthly emolument includes basic salary and other allowances such as transport, medical, tea, lunch; housing, etc; that his appointment was terminated vide a letter 28/6/13, effective 1/7/13; that it authorized its Banker on 1st July, 2013 to pay the Claimant his one month basic salary in lieu of notice and the Banker paid the Claimant the sum of =N=7,250.00 as his one month basic salary in lieu of notice on 2/7/13; that it further on 20/8/13 credited the Claimant’s salary account with the sum of =N=98,906.25 as ex-gratia disengagement benefits; that the Claimant then instituted this suit to challenge his termination and sought to be paid total emolument in lieu of notice as well as two years total emoluments as redundancy benefit as provided for under clause 3.18 (the redundancy clause) of the alleged Handbook which the Defendant company has constantly and meticulously testified was not its Handbook having not been approved by the Board of Directors; that the Claimant was only entitled to be paid one month basic (=N=7,250.00) in lieu of notice which sum was paid directly to the Claimant’s salary account on 2/7/13 and that terminal benefit paid by the Defendant on 20/8/13, in the sum of =N=98,906.25 was ex-gratia which the Claimant acknowledged and stated under cross -examination that he has spent same. 12. Under cross examination, DW1 testified that the Contract of Service of the Claimant did not state the length of notice to be given to him; that Claimant was given one month notice as provided by law; that Claimant was paid a month’s basic salary in lieu of notice on 1/7/13; that Defendant instructed its Bankers on 1/7/13 to credit the account of the Claimant; that by Exh. D8 Claimant’s account was credited on 2/7/13; Defendant did not respond to Exh.UA9; that as at 27/8/13 there was =N=112,631.85 in the account of the Claimant; that the total sum paid into claimant’s account is =N=106,156.25; that on 2/7/13 Claimant’s account was credited with his monthly basic salary of =N=7,250 in lieu of notice; that himself and Defendant do not know anything about Exh.UA2; that Exh UA3 shown to him has some extraneous attachments outside the minutes of Defendant’s Board meeting of 13/9/06; that no Handbook existed for Defendant; that the Defendant had 44 staff including Mr. Chester Ukandu in 2011 and that the Handbook Exh.UA2 does not exist. 13. One Mr. Oluwadare Akingbola testified as DW2 on 25/9/17 and simply adopted his witness deposition dated 11/6/15 as his evidence in chief. While being cross examined, the witness stated that terms and conditions of appointment were clearly stated in Claimant’s letter of appointment; that on 13/9/06 Defendant had a Board meeting; that the presentation by the founding Managing Director of Defendant to the Board was approved; that the Staff Handbook referred to in Exh. UA7 must be the one approved by the Board of the Defendant but Defendant does not have staff Handbook; that he knows Mr. Ahaiwe; that he cannot remember how much Claimant was paid after termination of his employment; that he cannot confirm if there was a response to EXh.UA9; that the terms of engagement referred to in Exh. D2 paragraph 2 is the status of the employee as at the date of termination of his employment. . Counsel Final Written Submission 14. At the close of trial and pursuant to the direction of the Court, learned Counsel on either side filed and served their final written addresses. The final written address of the Defendant, a 35-page document dated 21/12/17, was filed on the same day. In it, learned Counsel set down the following 3 issues down for determination - 1. Whether Exh. AU3 (Photocopies of loose sheets purported to be the Defendant's minutes dated 13th September, 2006 with extraneous attachments), Exh. UA2 (Photocopy of purported Defendant's Staff Handbook), Exh. UA9 (Photocopy of the purported Internal Mail dated 28th June, 2011) and Exh. UA8 (Defendant's Annual Returns for the year 2011) are relevant and admissible under the Evidence Act. 2. Whether or not the Claimant's appointment was validly terminated. 3. Whether the Claimant is entitled to the sum of =N=1,906,600.08 or any other sum as redundancy benefit by virtue of his contract of employment. 15. Arguing these issues, learned Counsel submitted that the document admitted and marked by the Court as Exh.UA3 is not the same as the one admitted by the Court in Suit No: NICN/LA/335/2013 and tendered and admitted in this case as Exh. D10; that once the Defendant produced the original the need for the copy tendered is dispensed with citing Ainoko v. Yunusa & Ors. (2008) LPELR-3663(CA); that Exh. UA3 is a secondary copy of Exh. D10; that in any event, Exh. UA3 was tendered by CW1 who was not the maker of same and hence could not be cross examined on it citing Okezie Victor Ikpeazu v. Alex Otiti & Ors. (2016) LPELR-40055(SC). Counsel urged the Court to expunge the exhibit as admitted. Learned Counsel prayed the Court to expunge Exh. UA2 arguing that the copy admitted was signed and dated specifically after the commencement of this suit as against the copy frontloaded; that an unsigned document commands no weight citing Mbang v. Guidian News paper Limited & Anor. (2010) LPELR-11838; that Claimant's letter of employment - Exh. UA1 did not refer to the alleged Staff Handbook-Exh. UA2. Counsel prayed the Court to expunge Exh. UA2 for being irrelevant to this case and unreliable. 16. Respecting Exh. UA9 the Internal Mail idated 28/7/11 learned Counsel submitted that the exhibit is inadmissible being a photocopy and absence of proper foundation laid citing sections 87 & 89, Evidence Act, 2011. Counsel urged the Court to expunge same from records. 17. Counsel submitted that Claimant was not the maker of Exh. UA8- Annual Returns and hence not admissible through him; that the exhibit is irrelevant to the determination of this suit which is essentially to determine on the validity of termination of the employment of the Claimant; that the exhibit is at best hearsay and offends the provision of sections 37 & 38, Evidence Act, 2011. Counsel prayed the Court not to attach any probative value to the exhibit. 18. On whether the employment of the Claimant was properly terminated, learned Counsel submitted that in a master/servant relationship, the master can terminate the service of the servant at any time by giving the appropriate notice or making payment in lieu citing Idufueko v. Pfizer Products Limited (2014)12 NWLR (Pt. 1420) 96. Counsel referred to Exh. UA4- letter of confirmation of employment and submitted that though noperiod was stated for termination in that exhibit by Section 11(1) & (2), Labour Act Claimant was entitled to one month notice or one month salary in lieu of notice; that Claimant having been paid one month salary in lieu and accepted the sum could not now complain of wrongful termination citing Angel Spinning Dyeing Limited v. Ajah (2000)13 NWLR (Pt. 685); that indeed Claimant got more than was due to him as he was given ex gratia payment in addition and that should the Court hold that Claimant's employment was wrongfully terminated whatever balance is left should be set off from the ex gratia paid to him. 19. On whether the Claimant is entitled to his claims before the Court, learned Counsel submitted that Exh. UA2 the Staff Handbook was not part of the terms of employment of the Claimant; that the fact that the exhibit contained policies and procedures which were not agreed on at the meeting of 13/9/06 makes it obvious that Exh. UA2 was never made pursuant to the decisions taken at the meeting; that the exhibit was not properly admitted and that it should be expunged from records; that the testimonies of CW2 are not credible since he supervised the preparation of the Handbook and made sure it suited his benefits in anticipation of litigation, citing Section 83(3), Evidence Act, 2011& Nigeria Social Insurance Trust v. Klifco Nigeria Limited (2010) LPELR-2006(SC) prayed the Court to discountenance same and place no evidential value on Exh. UA2. Learned Counsel submitted that Claimant was not entitled to claim under Clause 3.18 of Exh. UA2; that Claimant's employment was not terminated on ground of redundancy referring to Exh. D1. Learned Counsel prayed the Court to dismiss the case of the Claimant in its entirety. 20. The final written address of the Claimant was filed on 18/1/18. In it, Counsel set down 5 issues for determination thus - 1. Whether the Claimant was employed by the Defendant under certain terms of employment. 2. Whether the terms in the Minutes of 13/9/06 and the Handbook are binding on the Defendant. 3. Whether the claimant’s employment was wrongfully terminated. 4. Whether the claimant is entitled to his claim. 5. Whether the one month salary underpayment (basic salary) made in July 2013 amounted to a waiver on the part of the claimant to claim against the Defendant. 21. Arguing these issues, learned Counsel submitted respecting issue 1 that Exh. UA2 was used in dealing with staff including himself; that same was corroborated by the evidence of CW2 ; that proof of use of Handbook legitimizes its contractual nature citing A.G, Rivers v. A.G, Akwa Ibom (2011)13 MJSC 1; that the Defendant having denied the existence of the minutes of 13/9/06 and the Staff Handbook (Exh. UA2) in their pleadings and by an affidavit dated 20/2/14 cannot now turn around to contest the documents tendered by the Claimant. Counsel further urged the Court to hold that, by virtue of the testimonies of CW1 & CW2 as well as Exh. UA7 & Exh. UA8, the Defendant is bound by the terms in Exh. UA2 & Exh. UA3. 22. On whether the terms in the minutes of 13/9/06 and the Handbook are binding on the Defendant, Counsel referred to the evidence of CW2 who was the Managing Director of the Defendant at the time that the Board of the Defendant on 13/9/06 approved some terms of employment and that the terms were incorporated in Exh. UA2 and given to members of staff of the Defendant including the Claimant; that in the exercise of the power conferred by Article 32, the Board delegated its power to the Management of the Defendant to deal with other staff benefits as discussed at the meeting of 13/9/06; that there is no evidence that the Board of Defendant acted beyond the power conferred on it respecting the Staff Handbook. 23. On whether the Claimant's employment was wrongfully terminated, learned Counsel submitted that Claimant's employment was terminated by Exh. UA5 dated 28/6/13 stating in paragraph 2 that In accordance with your terms of engagement, you are entitled to receive (one) month basic salary in lieu of notice; that by Article 3.8 of the Staff Handbook ''confirmed staff may be terminated by either giving to the other three(3) months notice in writing or payment in lieu in the case of management staff while one month (1) notice in writing or payment in lieu in case of other staff''; that the Defendant in July 2013 unilaterally and without agreement with the Claimant paid =N=7,250 into Claimant's salary account because Defendant had the details of Claimant's account; citing Morohunfola v. Kwara Tech (1986)6 CA (Pt. 11) 187 at 205-206 submitted that if an employer, who had unilaterally terminated the employment of his employee, paid unknown to that employee, into the employee's Bank account the amount due to him in lieu of notice the employee would not be said to have accepted the said amount; that while Claimant's employment was terminated on 28/6/13 payment of basic salary was paid into his account without his knowledge on 2/7/13 and that the termination was not in accordance with the terms of the Claimant's employment. Counsel prayed the Court to hold that Claimant's employment was wrongly terminated. 24. Respecting whether the Claimant is entitled to his claims, learned Counsel submitted that he has argued that the employment of the Claimant was wrongly terminated and that Claimant is entitled to one month full salary in lieu of notice; that Claimant's relief (c) for the sum of =N=1,906,600.00 is founded on Clause 3.8 of Exh. UA2 the Staff Handbook; that the payment made on 2/7/13 did not satisfy the requirement of the law and agreement in Clause 3.8 of Exh. UA2; that payment in breach of agreement amounts to non-payment and a breach of contractual agreement citing Chukwuma v. SPDC, Morohunfola v. Kwara v. Tech and that the provisions of Section 11 does not apply where parties have a written contract citing Section7(1)(e) & (f) & Section 7 (6) (a)&(b), Labour Act. Counsel prayed the Court to find for the Claimant. 25. Finally, on whether the one month salary under payment made in July 2013 amounted to a waiver on the part of the Claimant to claim against the Defendant, learned Counsel submitted that by Exh. UA9 dated 21/8/13 the Defendant was told to either recall the money paid into Claimant's account or regard same as part payment of the total entitlement of the Claimant but that the Defendant elected not to heed the exhibit and that a creditor is not obliged to accept payment of a smaller sum in full and final payment for a larger sum unless there is further consideration flowing from a debtor or there is accord and satisfaction or the agreement evidencing of the terms is stated under a deed citing Mary Ola v. Ofoegbu (2010)3 CLRN 176. Learned Counsel prayed the Court to grant all the claims of the Claimant with substantial cost. Decision 26. I have carefully read and understood all the processes filed by learned Counsel on both sides. I heard the oral testimonies of the witnesses called at trial, watched their demeanor and patiently evaluated all the exhibits tendered and admitted at trial. I also listened attentively to the argument of learned Counsel at the stage of adopting their final written addresses. Having done all this, I narrow the issues for the just determination of this case to the following - 1. Whether the termination of the employment of the Claimant was wrongful. 2. Whether the Claimant has proved all or any of his claims to be entitled to same. 27. Before I proceed with this Judgment, it is imperative that I make a comment or two on some of the issues raised by the learned Counsel to the Defendant as regards some of the exhibits tendered and admitted. Learned Counsel argued against the admissibility of Exh. UA2 - Defendant's Staff Handbook, Exh. UA3 - Minutes of the Board of Directors meeting of 13/9/14, Exh. UA8 - Defendant's Annual Return for the year ended December, 2011 and Exh. UA9 - Defendant's Internal Memo dated 28/7/11. A major ground for the objection is that Claimant was not the maker of these exhibits and hence could not be cross examined on them; that Claimant did not sign Exh. UA2 (Staff Handbook), that Exh. UA3 is not the same as the original and that Exh. UA8 is not relevant to the case of the Claimant. I had admitted these exhibits at trial having found them both pleaded and relevant to the case of the Claimant. I have no reason to change from that position. Secondly, of a truth Claimant was not the maker of those exhibits. Yet the evidence of the CW2 who was subpoenaed is instructive and germane to the importance of the exhibits sought to be expunged from this proceedings. CW2 was the then Managing Director of the Defendant. Under a barrage of cross examination the evidence of the witness remained unshaken and uncontroverted. Witness identified Exh. UA2 as the Defendant Staff Handbook and that it was in use while he was with the Defendant and that it is still in use as the Defendant has no other Staff Handbook; that Exh. UA3 is the minutes of the Board of Directors of Defendant meeting of 13/9/06 and that Exh. UA8 was the Internal Memo prepared by the Defendant and signed by him as the Managing Director/Chief Executive Officer of the Defendant. I find the testimony of CW2 both believable and relevant to the case of the Claimant. I find his evidence respecting the exhibits complained against by the learned Counsel to provide a clear part for the Court to be able to justice in this case. 28. The first issue set down for determination is whether the termination of the employment of the Claimant was wrongful. The question whether or not the appointment of an employee is validly determined is a fundamental one. It goes to a breach of terms and condition of engagement. In determining whether or not the Claimant's appointment was validly terminated in the instant case it is imperative to examine the applicable terms and conditions under which the parties entered into their employment relationship. Employment relationship is a voluntary one. There is free exit and free entry. It is open to either party to bring an to the relationship. The only caveat is that such determination must accord with the agreed terms and conditions. See for instance Organ & Ors v. N.L.N.G. Ltd & Anor. (2013) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1381) 506, Garuba v. Kwara Inv. Co. Ltd. (2005) 5 NWLR (Pt. 917) 160, Osisanya v. Afribank (Nig.) Plc (2007) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1031) 565. In an employment with statutory flavour, where the procedure for employment and discipline, including dismissal, are clearly spelt out in the relevant statute, the employer must comply strictly with its provisions in terminating the employment or in dismissing the employee. Any other manner of terminating the employment which is inconsistent with the statute is null and void and of no effect. See Bamigboye v. Unilorin (1999) 10 NWLR (Pt. 622) 290; Olatunbosun v. N.I.S.E.R. Council (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt. 80) 25; Comptroller General of Customs & Ors. v. Gusau (2017) 4 SC (Pt. II) 128. 29. In other cases where the employment is governed by the agreement of the parties, removal by way of termination of appointment or dismissal must be in accordance with the terms agreed upon. Failure to comply with the terms renders the termination wrongful but not null and void. The only remedy available to an employee in an ordinary master and servant relationship for wrongful termination of employment is a claim for damages. The rationale being that a servant, though wiling, cannot be foisted upon an unwilling master. See U.B.N. Ltd v. Ogboh (1995) 2 NWLR (Pt. 380) 647 @ 664; Ibama v. S.P.D.C (Nig.) Ltd. (2005) 17 NWLR (Pt. 954) 364; Olanrewaju v. Afribank Nig. Plc. (supra). Where the parties have agreed that the contract of employment may be terminated by either party upon the giving of notice or the payment of the equivalent salary for the period of notice, the measure of damages for wrongful termination or dismissal is the amount the servant would have earned over the period of notice. See Dudusola v. Nigeria Gas Co. Ltd. (supra); Chukwumah v. Shell Petroleum (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt. 289) 512; Fakuade v. O.A.U.T.H (supra); Osisanya v. Afribank (Nig.) Plc. (supra). I find and hold that by the terms of engagement of the Claimant he was entitled to a month notice or payment in lieu. 30. Now what are the terms and conditions of engagement between the parties in this case? Exh. UA1 is the Letter of Appointment of the Claimant. It was dated 15/10/08. After stating the remunerations attached to the Claimant and indicating that the Claimant would be on probation for at least 6 months after which his appointment would be confirmed, the exhibit simply states in the immediate clause that During your period of probation, not less than 30 days notice is required from either side in case of termination or resignation of appointment. Claimant's appointment was confirmed on 18/5/09 by Exh.UA4. The third paragraph of that exhibit is perhaps the most relevant, if any, to issue of condition for disengagement of staff. It states thus - ''Other terms and conditions of service shall be applicable to the grade''. 31. Nothing is said in this exhibit as relates to issues of disengagement of service or termination of same. The service of the Claimant was terminated on 28/6/13 by Exh. UA5. The second and third paragraphs of that exhibit draw us closer to the other terms of engagement between the parties. They are as follows - ''In accordance with your terms of engagement (emphasis mine), you are entitled to receive 1 (one) month basic salary in lieu of notice. As such, your bank account will be credited accordingly. Your disengagement benefits will also be paid to you in due course'' (emphasis mine). 32. Exh. UA5 made mention of terms of engagement and the fact that Your disengagement benefits will also be paid to you in due course. 33. I am inclined to ask what are those terms of engagement? Where are they contained? Where also are the disengagement benefits of the Claimant stated? In support of his case, the Claimant pleaded and exhibited Exh. UA2. That document is the titled Staff Handbook. It is said to contain Policies, Terms and Condition of Service ... 34. On page 7 Clause 3.8 deals with Termination of Employment. While sub-paragraph (a) deals with Management Staff on Probation, sub-paragraph (b) states that confirmed staff appointments may be terminated by either party giving the other three months notice in writing or payment in lieu in the management staff while one month notice in writing or payment is required in lieu in case of other staff. Respecting disengagement benefits, learned Counsel to the Claimant drew my attention to page 10 of Exh. UA2 where clause 3.18, provides under Redundancy, that - Where the company deems it necessary for any reason whatsoever to lay off an employee, the affected employee shall be paid severance package as follows: total emolument multiplied by number of year(s) with which the employee has serve(sic) the company up to a maximum of two (2) years''. 35. It appears to me that Exh. UA2 has successfully filled in the lacunae as relates to the terms of engagement of the Claimant and her terminal benefits. 36. Learned Counsel to the Defendant in his final written address from page 11 to 15 urged this Court to discountenance Exh. UA2. Counsel had submitted inter alia that the exhibit was not frontloaded, that it was not signed, that it was not incorporated into the contract of service of the Claimant and that CW2 who made the Exh. UA2 did so without the approval of the Board of the Defendant. There are no controversies that the document constituting Exh. UA2 was pleaded by the Claimant. Thus, even without it being tendered in evidence it is open to this Court to have a look at it for purpose of doing justice to the parties in the case before it. In Abiodun v. A. G. of the Federation (2007) LPELR-8550 Sankey J.C.A following Fumudoh v. Agoro (1991)9 NWLR (Pt. 214) 210, Agbasi v Ebikorefe (1997)4 NWLR (Pt. 502) 630 & A.G, Federation v. Ralph Uwazuike & Ors. (2006) LPELR-11858(CA) held that a Court of law can take notice of a document in its file even where it was not tendered before it and can do so suo motu if such documents will lead toward doing justice between the parties before it. See also Cavendish Petroleum (Nig.) Limited & Anor. v. Deribe (2018) LPELR (CA). I must say that the argument of the learned Counsel that the maker of the exhibit did not have approval of the Board of the Defendant is a weak and futile submission and one which will certainly not fly. The reason being that the maker was the Managing Director of the Defendant at the time and also a member of the Board. The maker was closer to the Board of the Defendant that the Claimant. The maker was privy to meetings of the Board and decisions taken by the Board. In any event, there is no evidence before me to the effect that the maker required the approval of the Board to make the exhibit. Exh. UA2 provides the missing link respecting the terms of engagement of the Claimant as well as the terminal benefits to which she was entitled. It is interesting to note that letter of disengagement issued to the Claimant by the Defendant referred unequivocally to terms of engagement and terminal benefits of the Claimant. The existence of Exh. UA2 enables the Court to make the necessary and unavoidable inferences on the case of the Claimant. 37. Aside from this, I find the evidence of DW1 equally assisting in resolving the issue of the status of Exh. UA2 and its relevance to this case. DW1 was the Company Secretary of the Defendant. While being cross examined, the witness stated that CW2 made presentation to the Board and that his presentation was approved and captured in the minutes. DW1 as Company Secretary of the Defendant conceded that he prepared and filed Exh. UA8 (Annual Returns of the Defendant). Under paragraph 15(a) of that exhibit is the following - ''(a). Termination benefits are those that are payable as a result of the Company terminating employment before the normal retirement date or an employee's decision to accept an offer of voluntary redundancy. Termination benefits have been accrued in the books because the Company is demonstrably committed, without realistic possibility of withdrawal, to a formal detail plan to review the employment terms of existing( emphasis mine) personnel as directed by the parent company. Using the provisions of the staff handbook(emphasis mine) the termination benefit was computed for 44 employees of the Company as at year end using the following basis: total emolument multiplied by number of year(s) which the employee has served the Company up to a maximum of two (2) years''. 38. Again, Exh. UA8 prepared by the Defendant talked about employment terms of existing employees and staff handbook. The question is therefore asked here again as to where are those employment terms and staff handbook? It is left to the Court in the entire circumstances to make inferences or analytical deductions to address the justice of this case. The inferences and deductions I make taking cognizance of the whole gamut of this case are that Exh. UA2 is the staff handbook containing the terms and conditions of engagement by the parties in this case and that parties are bound by the same. 39. In Igwe v. (INEC) & Anor. (2012) LPELR-9834(CA), AJi J.C.A pointed out that a Court can make inferences or analytical deductions from certain established facts and situations before the Court but the Court must never speculate. Speculation is a mere imaginative guess which even when it appears plausible should not be allowed by Court to fill any gab in the evidence before it. See Ibori v. FRN (2009) 3 NWLR. (Pt 1127) 94 & Olalomi Ind. Ltd v. Nig. Ind. Dev. Bank (2009) 99 WRN 1 at 37. 40. Now, was the employment of the Claimant validly terminated? Was the employment terminated in accordance with the terms of engagement by the parties? Claimant's appointment was terminated by Exh. UA5 dated 28/6/13 effective from 1/7/13. I have evidence before me to the effect that the Defendant paid into the account of the Claimant a month basic salary in lieu of notice in July of 2013 rather than on 28/6/13 when Claimant's appointment was terminated. It was the submission of the learned Counsel to the Claimant that the amount was paid into the account of the Claimant without his knowledge or consent and that his letter to the Defendant to either recall the amount so paid or regard same as part payment of the entitlement of the Claimant was ignored. The Claimant ought to have been paid the requisite one month notice in lieu of notice on 28/6/13 rather than on 2/7/13. That failure is a breach and renders the termination invalid and wrongful. See Chukwumah v. SPDC (1993)14 NWLR (Pt. 289) 512. I resolve issue 1 in favour of the Claimant and against the Defendant. I find and hold that the employment of the Claimant was wrongfully terminated by the Defendant. 41. Before I draw curtain on issue 1, there is the ancillary issue as to whether what was due to the Claimant as a month salary was a month basic salary or a total monthly emolument. The Defendant paid the sum of =N=7,250.00 to the Claimant in lieu of notice. Under Exh. UA2 on page 7 Clause 3.8 Claimant is entitled to one month notice in writing or payment in lieu. What the Claimant was entitled in lieu of notice is one month salary and not one month basic salary. Indeed, if it were not to be so, Exh. UA2 would have stated as such in clear and unambiguous terms. I find and hold that the payment of one month basic salary to the Claimant was in breach of the agreement between the parties. It only goes to make the termination of the employment of the Claimant wrongful. In cognizance of the foregoing and in order to give effect to this Judgment, I deem it imperative to make a consequential order. By Exh. UA6, the monthly salary of the Claimant was =N=74,,061.55. The Defendant is here ordered to pay to the Claimant the sum of =N=74,061.55 (being Claimant's monthly salary) less the sum of =N=7,250.00 (already paid to the Claimant) being the one month salary payment due to the Claimant in lieu of notice of disengagement. 42. The second issue is whether the claimant is entitled to the sum of =N=1,906,600.08 or any other sum as terminal benefit by virtue of his contract of employment. In support of his entitlement to this sum, the Claimant placed reliance on Exh. UA2 (Staff Handbook) & Exh. UA3. The latter was to be the origin of the former. While resolving issue 1, the Court had dealt extensively on the relevance of Exh. UA2. The position of this Court therefore respecting that exhibit remains intact. 43. I propose, at this stage, to deal fully with the issue posed by the Defendant as regards Exh. UA3. It was the argument of the Defendant that Exh. UA3 as admitted was a copy and of inferior quality to Exh. D5 the alleged original and beside that Exh. UA3 contained some extraneous attachments. Counsel thus urged the Court to discountenance Exh. UA3 and rely on Exh. D5. Exh. UA3 was the minutes of the Board of the Defendant held on 13/9/06. It was pleaded and frontloaded by the Claimant at trial. Claimant subsequently issued a Notice to Produce on the Defendant for it to produce that exhibit along with Exh. UA10 and Claimant's Solicitors' letter dated 20/8/13. In reaction to the Notice to Produce, the Defendant by an 8-paragraph affidavit deposed to by one Chimezie Sunday Ahaiwe as Acting Managing Director and filed on 14/4/14 averred as follows in paragraphs 5, 6 & 7 ''5. That the above mentioned documents are not and have never been in the Defendant's possession or custody. ''6. That the purported documents do not exist as they are a creation of the Claimant's imagination. Therefore the purported documents cannot be tendered because the documents do not exist. ''7. That the Claimant intends to misled(sic) the court by requesting the above documents which are not and has never been in the Defendant's possession or custody''. 44. At trial the Defendant tendered Exh. D10 as authentic document in place of Exh. UA3 the same document Defendant had deposed to as none existing. Defendant did not offer any explanation as to how Exh. D10 suddenly appeared from nowhere. Exh. D10 ought not have been admitted in view of the deposition of Mr. Chimezie Sunday Ahaiwe. The tendering of that exhibit finds no support in law. Exh. D10 was no doubt admitted in error. It was not even pleaded. Indeed, it is trite law, that a trial court is under an onerous duty to admit and act upon only on an evidence which is properly admissible within the purview of the provisions of the Evidence Act and other relevant statutory provisions. Where, however, the trial court inadvertently admits such an inadmissible evidence, the Court is under a duty not only to expunge it from its record but to also not act on it. See Ajayi v.Oufisher (1956) 1 FSC 90, Alashe v. Olori Ilu (1990) NMLR 66; Inyang v. Eshiet (1990) 5 NWLR (Pt. 149) 178 and Hashidu v. Goje (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt. 843) 352, (2004) All FWLR (Pt. 228) 662. See also Thomas JCA in Orji v.Ohuabunwa (2007) ALL FWLR (Pt.351) 1533 at 1556. I find and hold that Exh. D10 was wrongly admitted at trial. I thus expunge the same from the record of this Court it having no utility in the just determination of this case. 45. Secondly, the Defendant attacked the admissibility of Exh. UA10 on the ground inter alia that it was a photocopy; that Claimant was not its maker and that in any event the exhibit was not relevant to the case of the Claimant. That exhibit was the Internal Memo issued by the Defendant to all its staff. Of a truth that exhibit was tendered by the Claimant. It is also correct that Claimant was not the maker of the said exhibit. The exhibit was made by CW2 as the Managing Director of the Defendant. On 6/6/17, CW2 attended the Court proceedings as a subpoenaed witness. CW2 while under oath identified Exh. UA10. He testified thus - ''Exh. UA10 is the general memo of Defendant dated 28/7/11 and signed by me as MD/CEO. I was a Board member. The Handbook referred to is Exh. UA2''. CW2 was cross examined from 12.10pm to 1.27 pm. Learned Counsel to the Defendant had an ample opportunity to cross examine the witness on Exh. UA2. Unfortunately and for reasons best known to him did not ask the witness any question respecting Exh. UA2. I dare say that the quality of the exhibit remained unchallenged or impinged by the Defendant. I find and hold that the exhibit is reliable enough in proof of establishing the facts contained in it. The Court is therefore to place reliance on same and I so do. 46. The claim of the Claimant for entitlement to the sum of =N=1,906,600.08 or any other sum as terminal benefit by virtue of his contract of employment is based on the combined reading of Exh. UA8 (General Memo - Terminal Benefits), Exh. UA3 (Minutes of the Board meeting of 13/9/06), Exh. UA2 (Staff Handbook), Exh. UA5 (letter of Services no longer required) & Exh. UA7 (Defendant's Annual Returns & Financial Statement for 2011). Exh. UA5 acknowledged the entitlement of the Claimant to disengagement benefits. As far back as 2011, Exh. UA8, titled Re: General Memo - Terminal Benefits issued by the Defendant to its staff, had stated inter alia that - ''In view of the proposed divestment of Afribank Nigeria Plc equity holding in the Company which will change the ownership structure, Board and management of the Company, it has become necessary to prepare for the future irrespective of our plan to bid for the acquisition of the shares under a management buy-out scheme (MBO). ''Management has therefore decided to compute the Terminal benefits of (44) employees of the Company using the provisions of sections 3.18 of the staff hand book. ''Consequently, adequate provision has been (sic) in the boos of the Company for the financial ending December, 31st 2012, and cash back up for the terminal benefits placed in a deposit account dedicated for the payment of staff terminal benefit. ''When it becomes necessary and the Company decides to disengage Staff during this period of divestment process, such disengagement will be treated as voluntary redundancy and their terminal benefit paid as computed accordingly. ''However, any employee whose appointed(sic) is terminated by management on disciplinary grounds or who resign voluntarily, during the period of the divestment process, the relevant provisions of the Hand Book will apply in such circumstance''. 47. I have found and held in different places in the course of this Judgment that Exh. UA2 is the Staff Handbook referred and applicable to the parties in this case. I have no reason to resile from that finding and holding. I need to add, perhaps just for the sake of doing so, that it is immaterial the words used for disengaging the Claimant vis-a-vis the words used in the Staff Handbook be it service no longer required or termination. The essence of both is that the employee is disengaged from his employment. In both situation, the employee is never denied or debarred from collecting or being paid his terminal benefits. Thus in Clause 3.18, Exh. UA2 provides that - ''When the company deems it necessary for any reason whatsoever to lay off an employee, the affected employee shall be paid severance package as follows: total emolument multiplied by number of year(s) with which the employee has serve(sic) the company up to a maximum of two (2) years''. 48. The phrase used in this clause is lay off. That phrase I hold connote the same meaning as terminate, disengage, redundant and so on within the context of this case. Claimant is therefore entitled to claim under it. Claimant was appointed on 15/10/08 effective from 20/10/08 while his appointment was confirmed by Exh. UA4 on 18/5/09. By Exh. UA6 (Claimant's pay slip of June 2013) his monthly total earning was =N=79,441.67. His annual emolument comes to =N=1,952,396.64. When that figure is multiplied by 2 within the purview of Clause 3.18 of Exh. UA2 it comes exactly to the sum of =N=1,906,600.08 as claimed by the Claimant. The Defendant is here ordered to pay to the Claimant the sum of =N=1,906,600.08 being his terminal benefit less the sum of =N=98,906.25 paid in to Claimant's Bank account on 20/8/13 by the Defendant as ex gratia. 49. This case was commenced in 2013. It is already almost 7 years old. It is one of the oldest cases in this Court. No doubt if the Claimant had been paid his due as found by this Court, the need to go through the whole gamut of litigation would not have arisen. I take cognisance of the time and money spent on this case and hold that Claimant is entitled to the cost of this proceedings assessed at =N=500,000.00. Defendant is here ordered to pay to the Claimant the sum of =N=500,000.00 as cost of this case. 50. Finally, for the avoidance of doubt and for all the reasons as contained in this Judgment 1. I declare that the termination of the employment of the Claimant is wrongful for failure to comply with the terms of engagement between the parties. 2. I declare that Claimant is entitled to a month salary in lieu of notice of disengagement. 3. The Defendant is ordered to pay to the Claimant the sum of =N=79,441.67 (being Claimant's monthly salary) less the sum of =N=7,250.00(already paid to the Claimant) being the one month salary payment due to the Claimant in lieu of notice of disengagement. 4. The Defendant is here ordered to pay to the Claimant the sum of =N=1,906,600.08 being his terminal benefit less the sum of =N=98,906.25 paid by the Defendant to the Claimant as ex gratia on 20/8/13.. 5. Defendant is ordered to pay to the Claimant the sum of =N=500,000.00 as cost of this proceedings. 6. The sum ordered to be paid to the Claimant by the Defendant under this Judgment aside from cost shall be paid with 20% interest per annum 30 days from today until final liquidation. 7. All the terms of this Judgment are to be complied with within 30 days from today. 51. Judgment is entered accordingly. ____________________ Hon. Justice J. D. Peters Presiding Judge