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JUDGMENT The Claimant commenced this suit vide a Complaint filed on 9th October 2015. In his amended Complaint filed on 24th October 2016 but deemed filed on 8th December 2017, he sought the following reliefs: 1. A Declaration that the purported termination of the Claimant’s appointment conveyed by the Defendant’s letter dated 1st day of July 2015, to take effect 30days from the date of the said letter, is wrongful, null and void and of no effect whatsoever and howsoever. 2. An Order of mandatory injunction directing the Defendant to reinstate, promote and place the Claimant in the same position with his colleagues who are still in the service and which he would have been but for the purported dismissal. 3. An Order directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant forthwith, all his salary, entitlements, benefits and perks attaching to his rank from 14th June 2008 to 19th April 2009 during which his appointment was wrongfully and illegally terminated. 4. An Order of perpetual injection restraining the Defendant whether by itself, servants, agents and/or privies from further acting and or implementing the contents of the Notice of termination of Appointment dated 1st July, 2015, effective 30 days from the date of the letter, in any manner whatsoever and howsoever. 5. Cost of this suit at N250,000.00 only. The amended complaint was accompanied with an amended statement of facts and the deposition of the Claimant as the only witness in his case. The Defendant filed its statement of defence on 20th April 2019 together with the deposition of its only witness. The Claimant filed a reply to the statement of defence and his additional witness statement on oath. Hearing commenced on 16th April 2018. The Claimant testified for himself as CW1. One Matthew Edoka Ameh testified on behalf of the Defendant as DW1. Hearing ended on 28th January 2019 and parties were ordered to file final addresses in compliance with court rules. These were filed and subsequently regularized. Parties adopted their respective final written addresses on the 20th day of May 2019. CLAIMANT’S CASE During the hearing of the suit, the Claimant adopted his written statements on oath. The evidence of the Claimant is in line with the averments contained in his amended statement of facts and his reply to the statement defence. The case of the Claimant is that he was appointed by the Defendant as Assistant Executive Officer on grade level 06 in a letter dated 18th July 2005 and by a letter dated 14th September 2009, his appointment was confirmed with effect from 27th July 2007. One of the terms of his employment in the letter of appointment includes that the terms of his employment are those applicable in the public service. The Claimant also said the terms and conditions which governed his employment with the Defendant are as contained in the Public Service Rules 2010 and the Guidelines for appointment, promotion and discipline of staff issued by the Federal Government in 2004. On 28th August 2013, while serving as store keeper and maintenance officer at the Defendant’s Academy in Keffi, he got a report from a staff of the Defendant, Mr. Clement Renos, that on resuming work that morning, he discovered that the generator doors were opened and he found a pipe used to siphon diesel from the generator lying on the ground. The security of the Defendant’s Academy in Keffi was contracted out to Yacham Security, a private security outfit, to secure the entire Academy and its properties. When the Claimant received the report, he confronted 2 security guards of Yacham Security, Boyi Audu and Ifeanyi Okafor who admitted to the theft of the diesel. Thereafter, the Claimant called the supervisor of the security firm, one Musa, to inform him of the theft of diesel. Although Boyi Audu and Ifeanyi Okafor begged him not to report the incidence to Mr. M. E. Ameh, the C.C. [Training] in charge of the Academy, he refused and reported the matter to Mr. M. E. Ameh but Mr. M. E. Ameh waited for more than 2 months before bringing the matter to the Defendant’s notice. On 6th December 2013, the Claimant was issued a query by Mr. M. E. Ameh and on 7th March 2014, Mr. M. E. Ameh issued the Claimant another query. The 2 queries violated rule 030307 of the PSR 2010 which imposed a mandatory duty on the Defendant to state the circumstances of the offence, the rules or regulation which the Claimant has broken and the likely penalty. The Claimant responded to the queries in writing wherein he denied involvement in the matter. After his written response to the queries, he was invited as witness before 3 panels of investigation which are the panel headed by Alh. Sule Yahaya, the SDD and the Ad-hoc panel of senior staff management committee. The Claimant also denied involvement in the matter in the panels. The panels of investigation interviewed several witnesses in his absence, and he was not given opportunity to hear and cross examine the witnesses. He was also not given copies of the documents relied on by the panels to enable him to prepare his defence. The panels submitted their reports after their investigations and their recommendations were that the Claimant should be transferred to another department, surcharged and reduced in grade level, but the Defendant failed to implement the recommendations. The Claimant further averred that his for the alleged offences was irregular. Then on 1st July 2015, the Claimant was issued a letter of termination of his appointment which termination was to take effect 30 days from the date of the letter. The allegation of theft of diesel, amplifier, and projectors was a criminal offence, but he was not charged and tried for the offences in court. He also alleged that his right to fair hearing was breached in the trial by the panels. It was also averred that the termination of his appointment was not in accordance with the PSR. The period of commencement of his disciplinary action to its completion was more than 60 days prescribed in the PSR. The Claimant said he wrote a letter of appeal to the Defendants but when it became obvious that the Defendant is not ready to redress his case, he engaged his counsel to institute this case for which he paid N250,000 as legal fees. He stated further that the allegation of theft of diesel, amplifier and projector was orchestrated by Mr. M. E. Ameh in concert with operatives of Yacham security to have him removed from the employment. One of the guards, Okafor Ifeanyi, later confessed on oath that they were hired by Mr. M. E. Ameh to frame up the Claimant before the panels. The Claimant further said, in his further evidence made in support of the averments in the reply to the statement of defence, that the rules of the public service contemplated in his appointment and confirmation letters is the PSR, the Guidelines for appointment, promotion and discipline of staff issued by the Federal Government in 2004 and the ICPC condition of service. His appointment has statutory flavour and the only way to terminate his employment is by strict compliance with the provisions of these conditions of service regulating his appointment. The allegations of theft, bribery and forgery are criminal offences. They are not the same with misconduct or gross misconduct. The criminal allegations against him ought to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and since he denied the allegations, his guilt ought to have been determined in a competent court before his employment can be terminated. DEFENDANT’S CASE The Defendant’s witness is one Mr. M. E. Ameh, a staff of the Defendant. He said he was the coordinating consultant in the Defendant’s training Academy in Keffi. This witness told the court that the Claimant was an employee of the Defendant and the terms of his employment were as stated in his employment letter dated 18th July 2005 and nowhere else. The Claimant was a storekeeper of the Defendant at the material time and he was responsible for the safe keeping of equipments under his custody. As employee of the Defendant, the Claimant was answerable to him being the coordinating consultant on training of the Defendant. The witness said he had been suspecting the Claimant of improprieties in the discharge of his duties. On 28th August 2013, he received information from the security company attached to the Defendant’s academy in Keffi of the theft of diesel involving the Claimant, Clement Renos and some staff of the security company, Yacham Security Co. Ltd. The Defendant investigated the incident and the Claimant and Clemant Renos were queried. The Claimant was given 2 queries dated 6/12/2013 and 7/3/2014 but he did not reply any of them. The queries were for insubordination, complicity in theft of diesel, and gross negligence in the performance of his duties. When the Claimant refused to respond to the queries, the matter was reported to the Head of Administration of the Defendant who referred the matter to the Special Duties Department [SDD] to investigate the allegations against the Claimant and make recommendations. The SDD carried out an investigation and issued a report dated 6th May 2014. Three panels investigated the Claimant and none of them exonerated the claimant. The panel’s report further reveal that the claimant gave N2000 bribe to Ifeanyi Okafor and Ezekiel Ishaya, officers of Yacham security Ltd to cover up his involvement in the theft of diesel. Further investigation revealed that the Claimant had forged the signature of the witness to receive the sum of N34,000 on 30th April 2013. The Claimant also applied for the sum of N85,000 on 26th June 2013 for the purchase of items without consent of the witness and the items were never received in the Defendant’s store. The Board of the Defendant reviewed the case of the Claimant and Clement Renos and decided that their services were no longer needed and should be terminated in line with the condition of service 2013. The Claimant was allowed to defend himself before the committees. He was given fair hearing. The Claimant’s employment was rightly terminated on 1st July 2015 and the termination was in accordance with the PSR and the rules of the Defendant. DEFEDNANT’S ADDRESS The Defendant’s final written address raised the following issues for determination to wit: 1. Whether the suit of the Claimant was competently constituted before this court. 2. Whether the Claimant has proved his case before this honorable court to entitle him to the reliefs claimed. 3. Whether the Claimant has not materially contradicted himself by both documentary and oral evidence before this honorable court. On Issue One, learned counsel for the Defendant urged the court to hold that the amendment of the Claimant's statement of claim was made to overreach an objection legally filed to the competency of the action was not properly grounded in law and equity and goes to affect the constitutional right of the Defendant to all available defenses as it takes away a facility for its defense of this action. Counsel submitted that the suit was instituted outside the three months period stipulated by Section 2(A) of the Public Officers’ Protection Act, is statute barred and incompetent, and this court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain it. Counsel urged the court to disregard and expunge the purported amendment of the Plaintiff's statement of facts dated 24th October 2016 and find that the statement of facts dated the 9th October 2015 having been filed outside the statutorily allowed period is incompetent, and to dismiss this suit. On Issue Two, the Defendant counsel submitted that the evidence before the court shows clearly that the due process as set out in the ICPC Conditions of Service of the Defendant was followed in the dismissal of the Claimant. Counsel further submitted that the Claimant was accorded a fair hearing before he was eventually dismissed. See ARIJE vs. ARIJE & ORS (2018) LPELR-44193(SC). Counsel submitted that the Claimant’s employment was regulated by the Public Service Rules 2010 as well as the ICPC Conditions of Service, and that the Claimant was legally and lawfully dismissed of his duties with the Defendant in consonance with the law regulating his employment, and more so, that his letter of dismissal takes effect from the date it was served on him, and no other date. Counsel further argued that the Plaintiff is not entitled to file a reply to their statement of defence. See of UNITY BANK PLC vs. BOUARI (2008) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1086) 372. On Issue three, learned counsel maintained that the Claimant appeared before the three disciplinary panels, was given an opportunity to defend himself and even cross examine his accusers. Counsel urged the court to hold that the evidence led in support of his reliefs claimed by the Claimant are rendered contradictory. CLAIMANT’S ADDRESS The Claimant’s final written address raised the following issues for determination to wit: 1. Whether having regard to the Supreme Court’s decision in CBN vs. IGWILO (2007) 4-5 SC 154, the Claimant’s appointment with the Defendant is one with statutory flavor and as such could not be lawfully terminated by the 1st Defendant without the compliance with the procedures stipulated in chapter 3 of the public service rules, 2004 and per v of the guidelines for appointment, promotion and discipline, 2004? 2. Whether having regard to the entire circumstances of this case, the Defendant was not in gross violation of the Claimant’s right to fair hearing and rules of natural justice as enshrined in Section 36(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. (As Altered). 3. Whether the Claimant’s contract of employment with the 1st Defendant was validly terminated in accordance with her terms and conditions of employment. On Issue One, Learned counsel for the Claimant answered this issue in the affirmative and submitted that having regard to the Supreme Court’s decision in CBN vs. IGWILO (2007) 4-5 SC 154, the Claimant’s appointment with the Defendant is one with statutory flavor and as such could not be lawfully terminated by the 1st Defendant without full compliance with the procedures stipulated in Chapter 3 of the Public Service Rules, 2004 and the Defendant’s condition of service. On Issue Two, the Claimant counsel submitted that having regard to the entire circumstances of this case, the Defendant was in gross violation of the Claimant’s right to fair hearing and rule of natural justice as enshrined in Section 36 (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as altered). Counsel reiterated that the Claimant’s grouse is that he was not given fair hearing in the investigation leading to the decision to dismiss him by the Defendant. Counsel submitted that the entire trial of the Claimant before three committees and the Board of Defendant, as can be seen from the foregoing, was tainted with irregularities and breached the Claimant’s right to fair hearing. On Issue Three, the Claimant counsel answered this issue in the negative and submitted that the Claimant’s contract of employment with the 1st Defendant was not validly terminated in accordance with her terms and conditions of employment. Counsel submitted that the Defendant didn’t comply with the procedure in Rule 030303 of the Public Service Rules before dismissing the Claimant. Counsel argued that rather than the Board of the Defendant inviting the Claimant to appear before it, the Claimant was only invited by the ad-hoc committees and SSDC and further, that the Board acted on the committee’s report without hearing the Claimant before terminating his appointment, thereby denying the Claimant his right to fair hearing. See the case of OLORUNTOBA-OJU vs. ABDUL-RAHEEM (2009) 6 SCNJ 1, @ 47 lines 9-15. Counsel submitted that in view of the nature of the charge against the Claimant, the Board of the Defendant was wrong when it arrogated to itself the powers and function of a court and worse, without any hearing, fair or unfair, came to its conclusion to terminate the Claimant’s appointment in spite of; and because of, the serious criminal charges levied against him. Counsel argued that the procedure adopted by the Defendant in an attempt to try Claimant fell short of the requirement for a fair hearing which amounted to a serious infraction of the Claimant’s constitutional right to fair hearing. Counsel urged the court to dismiss the arguments of the Defendant and grant the Claimants reliefs. DEFEDNANT’S REPLY In their reply on points of law, learned counsel for the Defendant urged the court to dismiss the Claimants suit with substantial courts claiming that there was no nexus of some issues raised in the Claimants address with the suit and the exhibits tendered. Counsel submitted that it is trite that the case of a plaintiff or claimant succeeds on its own strength and never on the weakness of the defence; see the case AKANDE vs. ADISA & ANOR (2012) LPELR-7807(SC). Further arguments proffered by counsels will be referred to, if necessary, in this judgment. COURT’S DECISION The 1st issue argued by counsel for the Defendant in the Defendant’s final written address is on the Defendant’s objection to the jurisdiction of this court to entertain the Claimant’s suit. Learned counsel for the Defendant maintained that the Claimant’s suit is statute barred by the effect of Section 2 [a] of the Public Officers’ Protection Act (Hereinafter referred to as POPA). This objection had been raised by the Defendant in a notice of preliminary objection filed on 26th September 2016 and had been determined by this court in a ruling delivered on 8th December 2017. The Defendant’s objection was dismissed, and this court held that the Claimant’s suit is not statute barred. That decision is final, and I have become functus officio in respect of that issue. My ruling can only be subject to an appeal to a higher court. The Defendant cannot have me sit on appeal over my decision or to review the decision I have taken on the issue. It is an abuse of court process for the Defendant to raise the same issue I have already determined in this suit. In determining this case, I will adopt the 3rd issue formulated by the Claimant’s counsel in the final written address of the Claimant. The issue is: Whether the Claimant’s contract of employment with the Defendant was validly terminated in accordance with the terms of the Defendant’s condition of service. In reliefs 1 and 2 of his claims, the Claimant sought a declaration that the termination of his employment is null and void and an order reinstating him to the employment. These claims can be granted only to employment found to have statutory flavour. See ESIEVWORE vs. NEPA (2002) FWLR (Pt. 124) 398 at 408; ODONIBOYE-OBU vs. N.N.P.C (2003) FWLR (Pt. 146) 959 at 992; N.I.I.A vs. ANYAFALU (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 325) 141 at 162. The Claimant pleaded the fact that his employment is regulated by statute. He referred to the content of his employment letter which mentioned that the terms of his appointment shall be as applicable in the public service. It is on the basis of this content of the employment letter the Claimant averred that his employment is regulated by the Public Service Rules 2010 (hereinafter referred to as PSR). He further averred that the guidelines for appointment, promotion and discipline of staff issued by the Federal Government in 2004 and the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) condition of service also regulated his employment. The Claimant tendered his appointment letter in evidence but did not tender any of these conditions of service in evidence. The appointment letter is Exhibit A. In the 2nd paragraph of the Claimant’s appointment letter, it states that the terms of the Claimant’s appointment shall be as applicable in the Public Service. The Defendant is established in Section 3 [1] of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act as an agency of the Federal Government. Section 318 of 1999 Constitution [as amended] defined "Public Service of the Federation" to mean the service of the Federation in any capacity and includes service as- “(c) member or staff of any commission or authority established for the Federation by this Constitution or by an Act of the National Assembly”. By this provision of the Constitution, service in the Defendant is service in the public service of the Federation. The Claimant’s employment letter contains among others, that the terms of the Claimant’s appointment shall be as applicable in the public service. The PSR is the condition of service applicable in the public service. Therefore, the PSR regulated the Claimant’s appointment. The PSR is recognized as a subsidiary legislation and it confers on the Public Servant the status of employment protected by statute. See FUT, YOLA vs. MAIWUYA (2013) ALL FWLR (Pt. 677) 753 at 762. Section 4[1] of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act provides that the Defendant has the power to appoint, dismiss and exercise disciplinary control over its staff and for this purpose, it shall prescribe its own rules and regulations. In paragraph 16 [j] of the statement of defence, the Defendant averred that the Claimant’s appointment was terminated in accordance with the Defendant’s condition of service. DW1 tendered the condition of service in evidence and it was admitted as Exhibit M. This condition of service was made pursuant to the provision of Section 4[1] of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act. In paragraph 2 [d] and [g] of the Claimant’s reply to the statement of defence, he pleaded that one of the conditions of service which regulated his employment was the ICPC condition of service issued pursuant to the ICPC Act. The condition of service in Exhibit M was made by the Defendant to regulate the employment of its staff. Therefore, this condition of service and the PSR regulate the Claimant’s employment and they give the Claimant’s employment statutory colouration. I find that the Claimant’s employment enjoyed statutory flavour. In such employment which is statutorily protected, the employee cannot be validly removed from the employment without strict adherence to the provisions or terms and conditions contained in the statute, regulation or PSR for the removal of the employee. Where a public servant is removed from office without recourse to or in the manner not in line with the applicable rules, the termination will be null and void, and the effect is that the employee will be reinstated to the employment. See OKEME vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, EDO STATE (2001) FWLR (Pt. 36) 873; OLORUNTOBA-OJU vs. ABDUL-RAHEEM (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 497) 1. From the totality of the case of the Claimant, his grouse in this action is in respect of the termination of his employment. He said his employment was terminated vide the letter dated 1st July 2015 and he wants this court to declare that the termination was wrongful, null and void and of no effect for all the reasons he advanced in his evidence. The Claimant said his employment is regulated by the PSR 2010, the guidelines for appointment, promotion and discipline of staff issued by the Federal Government in 2004 and the ICPC condition of service. He averred further that his appointment has statutory flavour and the only way to terminate his employment is by strict compliance with the provisions of these conditions of service regulating his appointment. The Claimant then alleged that his employment was terminated on disciplinary grounds but the process leading to the termination was irregular and not in accordance with the terms and conditions contained in the PSR 2010, the Guidelines for appointment, promotion and discipline of staff issued by the Federal Government in 2004 and the condition of service of the Defendant. The main complaints made by the Claimant against the termination of his employment are the following: i. He was issued two queries by the Defendant but both queries violated Rule 030307 of the PSR 2010. ii. He appeared before three panels of investigation, but he was not given fair hearing. The panels interviewed several witnesses in his absence, and he was not given opportunity to hear and cross examine the witnesses. He was also not given copies of the documents relied on but the panels to enable him prepare his defence. iii. The allegation of theft of diesel, amplifier and projectors was a criminal offence, but he was not charged and tried for the offence in court nor was his guilt determined in a competent court before his employment was terminated. iv. The disciplinary proceeding exceeded 60 days prescribed in the PSR. The Defendant, on the other hand, alleged that the Claimant committed some infractions in the employment amounting to misconducts under the condition of service and he was subjected to disciplinary action which resulted to the termination of his employment. DW1 tendered the Defendant’s condition of service and the reports of the panels of investigation in evidence. The letter by which the Claimant’s employment was terminated is Exhibit D tendered by the Claimant. The content of the letter is as follows: “NOTICE OF TERMINATION OF APPOINTMENT Pursuant to the terms of your appointment, your services are no longer required and your appointment is hereby terminated. The termination is sequel to the provision of rule 030101 [iii] in the ICPC conditions of service and it takes effect 30 days from the date of this letter. You are therefore to hand over all properties of the Commission in your custody including your ID card while the accounts department is by this directed to compute and pay to you any entitlements that may be due to you, and to recover from you any indebtedness to the commission. The Commission wishes you all the best in your future endeavours. signed Oglafa, E.E. Secretary to the commission.” This letter is the evidence of the termination of the Claimant’s employment. Usually, it is from the letter of termination of employment the reason for the termination or the intention of the employer is found. In this case, the reason stated in the Claimant’s termination letter for terminating the employment is contrary to the contention of the parties in this action. There is no indication in the letter that the Claimant’s employment was terminated for having committed any misconduct in the employment or on disciplinary grounds. The Defendant stated in the letter that the Claimant’s employment was terminated because his services are no longer required. The Defendant also stated that the termination is pursuant to the provision of Rule 030101 [iii] of the ICPC conditions of service. In effect, although both parties alleged that the Claimant’s employment was terminated on disciplinary grounds for having committed some misconducts, the termination letter indicated otherwise. By the content of the letter, the Claimant’s employment was terminated on the basis of Rule 030101 [iii] of the Defendant’s conditions of service. The Defendant’s condition of service is Exhibit M. I have examined its content and I observe that it provided two ways the Defendant may terminate the employment of its staff. One of them is as provided in Rule 030101 of the Defendant’s condition of service which provides that the Defendant may at any time and without being obliged to state reasons, terminate the appointment of its staff in the following circumstance: i. Staff on probation- one month’s notice or one month’s salary in lieu ii. Contract staff- one month’s notice or salary in lieu as may be specified in contract letter iii. Confirmed staff- one month’s notice or one month’s salary in lieu of notice Then, there is the provision for termination of employment on disciplinary grounds in rules 050201 to 051014. These rules set out the offences in the employment which constitute misconduct or gross misconduct, the punishment for the misconducts and the procedure for investigation and discipline of the employee. Going by these provisions of the condition of service, it is clear to me that the Defendant has the right in the contract to terminate the employment of any of its staff at any time and without any reason by giving the staff the prescribed notice or payment of equivalent salary in lieu of notice or to terminate the employment of the staff on disciplinary grounds by following the disciplinary procedure set out in the condition of service. In the letter of termination, the Defendant premised the termination of the Claimant’s employment on Rule 030101 of the Defendant’s condition of service and did not give any reason for the termination. The Claimant’s employment was terminated simply for services no longer required. The Defendant has the right under the said rule of the condition of service to terminate the Claimant’s employment at any time and for no reason. It is clear to me from the content of the termination letter that the Defendant exercised this right when it terminated the Claimant’s employment. In view of the content of the termination letter, the Claimant has no reason to have concluded that the termination of his employment was as a result of a disciplinary action. Although the Defendant has averred in this case that the Claimant’s employment was terminated as a result of his being found guilty of misconducts, the Defendant’s averment cannot change the content of the termination letter. It is settled law that the court cannot go outside the letter of termination to discover the reason for the termination of the employment. This principle was emphasised as follows in IWUOHA vs. MOBIL PRODUCING (NIG) UNLTD (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 664) 144 at 150-151: “Learned counsel submitted that the lower court was right when it held that in considering the issue whether the termination of the appointment of the appellant was right or wrong, the court must confine itself to the letter terminating the appointment and not go outside it to look for other reasons which the appellant thinks or suspect may have been behind the termination. This represents the correct position of the law. It is settled that where no other reason is stated for the termination of appellants appointment, except that his services “were no longer required”, the court cannot go outside the said letter to discover the reasons for the termination”. See also CHUKWUMA vs. S.P.D.C (NIG) LTD (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt. 289) 512; CBN vs. AMIKA (2000) 13 NWLR (Pt. 683) 21; TEXACO NIG. PLC vs. KEHINDE (2002) FWLR (Pt. 94) 143 at 167. In my view, it is only when the Defendant gives the reason for terminating the employment in the letter to be on ground of misconduct or on disciplinary grounds that the court can inquire into whether the disciplinary procedure in the PSR or in the Defendant’s condition of service was observed or not before the claimant’s employment was terminated. Consequently, the Claimant’s allegations that the disciplinary procedure in PSR or in the Defendant’s condition of service was not followed or the failure to afford him fair hearing before the termination of his employment are irrelevant in the consideration of the lawfulness or otherwise of the termination of his employment. It is clear that the Claimant’s employment was not terminated on disciplinary grounds. In such a situation, it was not necessary for the Defendant to follow the disciplinary procedure in the PSR or in the Defendant’s condition of service or to afford the Claimant any hearing before termination of the employment. What the Defendant is required to do in terminating the employment in Rule 030101 of the Defendant’s condition of service is to give the prescribed notice or pay the salary in lieu of notice. The only question left to consider at this point is whether the Defendant terminated the employment in accordance with the prescribed procedure rule 030101 of the condition of service? That is, if the Claimant was given one month notice or paid one month’s salary in lieu of notice. The Claimant pleaded the fact that his employment was confirmed with effect from 27th July 2007 in a letter dated 14th September 2009. The confirmation letter is Exhibit B. The Claimant was a confirmed staff of the Defendant and by rule 030101 of the condition of service, the Defendant ought to give the Claimant one month’s notice or pay him one month’s salary in lieu of notice to lawfully terminate the employment. The Claimant said he received the letter of termination of his employment on 1st July 2015 being the date of the letter. The Claimant was informed that the termination will take effect 30 days from the date of the letter. That is to say the Claimant was given one month’s notice of termination of his employment. The Defendant complied with the requirement of Rule 030101 of the Defendant’s condition of service when it terminated the Claimant’s employment. In view of the foregoing, I find that that Claimant’s employment was terminated by the Defendant in accordance with the provisions of the condition of service. The termination of the Claimant’s employment, not being on disciplinary grounds, was not unlawful or null and void. I find no merit in the Claimant’s suit. The suit is hereby dismissed. No order as to cost. Judgment is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Judge