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JUDGMENT In his Originating Complaint filed on 14th May 2015, the Claimant sought the following reliefs: 1. A Declaration that the purported termination of the appointment of the Claimant by the Defendant vide a letter of 20th February 2015 with ref. No. BPP /P/1095/VOL.1/92 is unlawful, null and void and of no effect whatsoever. 2. A Declaration that the Claimant's employment with the Defendant brought into being by virtue of a letter of employment dated 8th April 2010 remains extant and subsisting. 3. An Order reinstating the Claimant to his employment with the Defendant forthwith. 4. An Order directing the Defendant to immediately compute and pay to the Claimant all salaries, emoluments, allowances, bonuses and all other benefits to him from February 2015 till date. 5. And for such further or other orders as this Honourable court may deem fit to make in these circumstances. The Complaint was accompanied with a statement of facts and the deposition of the Claimant as the only witness in his case. The Defendant filed a statement of defence and called a lone witness. Hearing commenced on 8th February 2018 and ended on 11th June 2018 and parties were ordered to file Final Addresses. These were filed and subsequently regularized. Parties adopted their respective final written addresses on the 20th day of May 2019. CLAIMANT’S CASE The case of the Claimant is that he is a Nigerian from Utugwang, Obudu Local Government Area, Cross River State and was born on 19th November 1962 at Ikom, Ikom Local Government Area, Cross River State. He left Nigeria after his Secondary School education to the United States of America. In May 1981, he obtained his Associate of Applied Science in Accounting from Fayetteville Technical Institute, North Carolina and in May 1983, he obtained his Bachelor of Business Administration Degree in Accounting from Clark Atlanta University, Atlanta, Georgia. He also obtained a master’s degree in Accounting from the University of Phoenix, Arizona, in July 2006. He worked in various companies in the USA between 1983 and 2010. By a letter dated 27th October 2009, he applied to the Defendant for employment into the position of Director [Finance and Management Services] and on 8th April 2010, the Defendant offered him appointment as the Director [Finance and Management Services] on Grade Level 17. He accepted the appointment and returned to Nigeria to resume work. His employment with the Defendant was regulated by the Federal Civil Service Rules, the conditions of service of the Defendant and other rules and regulations applicable to the Civil Service of the Federation. On 20th February 2015, he was served with a letter by the Defendant wherein he was directed to present originals and photocopies of the following documents to the Defendant within 48 hours of receipt of the letter: NYSC discharge certificate or exemption certificate, First School Leaving certificate, WASC/GCE certificate, Bachelor’s Degree and Master’s Degree certificates. Before he could respond to the said letter, he was served another letter dated 20th February 2015 terminating his employment on the ground that he failed to comply with the request in the earlier letter of 20th February 2015. The Defendant did not allow him to provide the required documents within the time allowed before the Defendant terminated his employment. The Claimant said the Defendant violated his right of fair hearing as a result. He made several efforts to have the Defendant’s management reverse the termination, but it was not successful. The reason given in the termination letter for the decision was that he did not possess NYSC discharge certificate or exemption certificate which was a condition precedent for taking up employment in the Federal Public Service. The Claimant averred that by the time he returned to Nigeria to take up appointment with the Defendant, he had passed the age of eligibility for mobilisation for National Youth Service and the issuance of exemption certificate was not applicable to him. He also averred that the NYSC Act did not apply to him as at the time he returned to Nigeria in 2010. According to the Claimant, the Defendant was wrong to rely on the provisions of the Act to terminate his employment as non-possession of NYSC certificate or exemption certificate is not a ground for termination of employment under the Public Service Rules of the Federation and the conditions of service of the Defendant. The procedure adopted in terminating his employment is not in compliance with the procedure provided by the Public Service Rules of the Federation and the conditions of service of the Defendant. The reason given for termination of his employment is not a term of his employment or a term upon which his employment can be terminated. In the Claimant’s additional evidence adduced in respect of the averments in his reply to the Defendant’s statement of defence, he further said the Defendant wrongfully terminated his appointment on 20th February 2015 without giving him fair hearing by refusing him time to produce his NYSC discharge certificate. It was the same day both the letter requesting him to produce his certificates and the termination letter were served on him. He was not given adequate time to produce his NYSC discharge certificate. He went to the office on 24th February 2015 to return the Defendant’s property in his possession and not to resume work. The conditions precedent alleged by the Defendant does not apply to him because his appointment had been terminated on 20/2/2015 and he is entitled to contest same in court. DEFENDANT’S CASE The Defendant’s witness [DW1] is one Ifesinachi Ofoedu, a Deputy Director, Human Resources in the Defendant’s employment. He stated that the Claimant was appointed as a Director [Finance and Management Services] in a letter dated 8th April 2010. The letter mentioned that the general conditions guiding the employment are those contained in the Defendant’s staff condition of service. In a routine verification of the qualifications of all members of staff of the Defendant carried out between 2012 and 2014, it was discovered during the exercise that the Claimant did not possess the NYSC discharge certificate or the exemption certificate before taking up appointment with the Defendant. Upon this discovery, the Claimant was issued a notice dated 20th February 2015 to produce the originals and photocopy of some certificates, including NYSC discharge or exemption certificate, within 48 hours. In response to the Defendant’s request, the Claimant submitted some certificates except the NYSC discharge or exemption certificate. The possession of NYSC discharge or exemption certificate is a condition precedent for the Claimant to take up appointment with the Defendant. As at the time the Claimant submitted his credentials, he did not possess the NYSC discharge or exemption certificate and did not make it available to the Defendant. The Claimant was given ample time to present the originals as well as photocopies of the certificates, but he never did. The 48 hours given to him in the letter of 20/2/2015 lapsed and he failed to produce the documents. When it became clear that the Claimant does not possess NYSC discharge or exemption certificate, his employment was terminated by a letter of termination erroneously dated 20th February 2015 but written and served on claimant on 24th February 2015 when he reported for work on that day. The Claimant’s right to fair hearing was not breached before his appointment was terminated. The Claimant’s appointment was not terminated on 20th February 2015. The Claimant reported to work at 7.30 am on 24th February 2015 and that was the date he was served the letter of termination of his appointment. The presentation of NYSC discharge or exemption certificate is a condition precedent to the taking up of any appointment in the Federal Civil Service and the failure vitiates such appointment. If the NYSC discharge or exemption certificate is not available at the point of employment, the staff is expected to make same available soon after resumption of work. The provisions of the NYSC Act apply to the Defendant and to all Nigerians. The Act made it mandatory for any person seeking appointment into the Federal Public Service to present either the NYSC discharge certificate or NYSC exemption certificate. The Defendant followed due process in the termination of the Claimant’s appointment as he was not qualified to be appointed by the Defendant in the first place. DW1 also said the Claimant did not exhaust the internal conflict resolution process in the PSR and the Defendant’s staff condition of service before bringing this action. The Claimant thus violated a fundamental condition precedent to the institution of this suit. It was also averred that this suit is also incompetent for the fact that the Claimant failed to address or serve the processes in this action on the Director-General of the Defendant as required by statute. DEFENDANT’S FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS In their final written address, learned counsel for the Defendant filed a sole issue for determination to wit: Whether the Claimant has proved his case to entitle him to the reliefs sought. On this sole issue for determination, learned counsel for the Defendant submitted that the Claimant failed to prove his case as the Defendant followed due process in the termination of the Claimants appointment and as the Claimant was never qualified to be employed by the Defendant in the first instance. Counsel argued that the Claimant having admitted that he did not have the NYSC discharge or exemption certificate, has indirectly admitted that he ought not to be in the Defendant's employ. Further, counsel submitted that the Claimant failed to follow laid down procedures as specified in the BPP Condition of Service, before heading to the court. Counsel submitted that the Claimant did not embrace any internal conflict resolution mechanism, a condition precedent for the institution of this instant suit against the Defendant. Counsel argued that this condition precedent having not been fulfilled, results in the Court lacking the requisite jurisdiction to determine the issues in this suit as any decision herein will amount to a nullity. Counsel, amongst other authorities, cited the cases of UAC LTD vs. MACFOY (1962) A.C. 152; MADUKOLU vs. NKEMDILIM (1962) 2 SCNLR 341; LAFIA LOCAL GOVT vs. EXECUTIVE GOV. OF NASARAWA STATE (2012) LPLER - 20602 (SC) 16 to 17. On the letter of termination, it was the submission of learned counsel that the effective date is the date it was received and not as dated, and counsel placed reliance on paragraph 15 of the Defendants Statement of Defence. Counsel urged the Court to dismiss the entire suit and refuse the reliefs of the Claimant as stated in the Statement of Claim and to uphold the decision of the Defendant as being proper and in order with the employment policy applicable in Nigeria. CLAIMANT’S FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS The Claimant in his final written address raised a sole issue for determination to wit: Whether the Plaintiffs have proven their case thereby entitling them to the judgment Honourable Court On the sole issue for determination, learned counsel for the Claimant submitted that he never claimed to have obtained the NYSC discharge certificate and that the Defendant never demanded same of him per Section 12 of the National Youth Service Act. Counsel argued that although the law does not place a punishment on the Federal Government or any of its agencies that fail to comply to this provision, the Defendant who is an agent of the Federal Government of Nigeria has therefore waived his right to insist on the provisions of the section. Placing reliance on the case of YEMISI vs. FIRS (2012) LPELR-7964 (CA), the Claimant’s counsel submitted that the termination of the employment of the Claimant from the service of the Defendant is against the spirit and letters of Sections 3 and 4 of Chapter 3 of the Federal Government Public Service Rules, 2009 and Chapters 1 and 7 of the Defendant's Staff Conditions of Service hence, counsel argued that the Defendant cannot terminate the employment of the Claimant on any ground. The Claimant counsel urged the court to hold that the termination of the employment of the Claimant is a nullity for want of the required 3 Months’ Notice or payment of Salary in lieu of Notice. See FEDERAL MEDICAL CENTRE, IDO EKITI & ORS. vs. OMIDIORA KOLAWOLE O. (2O11) LPELR-149(CA). In urging the court to apply the principle of law espoused in the case of EKWEOZOR & ORS vs. THE REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF SAVIOURS APOSTOLIC CHURCH OF NIGERIA (2014) LPELR-23572 (CA), the Claimant counsel asserted that the Defendant did not tender the copy of the termination letter he admitted because same would have shown categorically that the letter of termination was served on the 20th of February, 2015. Further, counsel submitted that since the required steps were not followed before the termination of the Claimant's employment, the said termination therefore ought to be declared null and void and set aside. Counsel also submitted that the employment of the Claimant is coloured with statutory flavour as the terms of his employment is protected by Section 10 of the Bureau of Public Procurement Act. In conclusion, counsel urged the court to discountenance the objections raised and to enter Judgment in favour of the Plaintiff as per their writ. DEFENDANT’S REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW In their reply on points of law, learned counsel for the Defendant addressed the sole issue for determination raised by the Claimant under 5 subheads and reiterated the address he gave in his final written address and submitted that the case is made for the Defendant as the Claimant's own admission herein has put paid to his argument. Counsel maintained that the Claimant has not proved the essential ingredients which entitles him to reliefs sought and urged the court to resolve the issue formulated for the determination of the court in favour of the Defendant. Further arguments proffered by learned counsels for the parties were reviewed and will be referred to if necessary, in this judgment. COURT’S DECISION I have heard the evidence adduced by the parties in this case. I have also considered the arguments by the learned counsels for the parties in the final written addresses. In determining this case, I will consider the following two issues: 1. Whether the Claimant’s suit is competent. 2. Whether the Claimant has proved his case to entitle him to the claims he sought in the suit. ISSUE 1: In paragraphs 19, 27 and 28 of the statement of defence, the Defendant contended that the Claimant’s suit is incompetent for these reasons: 1]. the Claimant did not exhaust the internal conflict resolution process in the Public Service Rules (PSR) and the Defendant’s staff condition of service before bringing this action. The Claimant thus violated a fundamental condition precedent to the institution of this suit. 2]. the Claimant failed to address or serve the originating processes in this action on the Director General of the Defendant as required by statute. DW1 mentioned same facts in his evidence. In the Claimant’s reply to the statement of defence as well as in his evidence, the Claimant stated that these issues raised by the Defendant did not apply to him because his appointment had been terminated on 20/2/2015 and he was no longer bound by the Defendant’s condition of service or the PSR. Upon the termination of his employment, he was no longer expected to explore internal remedies having become an external body. I have seen from the record of this suit that the Defendant has previously raised these same issues in a notice of preliminary objection filed on 22nd July 2015. The ruling of this court on the NPO was delivered on 22nd April 2015. The court extensively considered and determined the Defendant’s contention that the suit is incompetent because the originating processes in this action was not addressed or served on the Director General of the Defendant. The Defendant was overruled on the issue. The ground of objection that the Claimant did not exhaust the internal conflict resolution process before instituting this suit was not specifically determined, that, perhaps, was what permitted the Defendant’s counsel to reargue that point in the Defendant’s final written address. With respect to the issue that the Claimant did not exhaust internal process before instituting this suit, counsel for the Defendant, in the final written address, referred to provisions in Chapter 9 of the PSR on procedure for making of representations to petitions. I have examined the said provisions of the PSR, but I find that they have no bearing to the contention of the Defendant. I have seen Rule 090201[ii] which provides as follows: “Without prejudice to their constitutional rights, officers should as much as possible exhaust all avenues provided in the public service Rules and circulars for redress before proceeding to courts.” This provision of the PSR is merely advisory. It has not mandated or made compulsory exploration of internal avenues before approaching the court for redress. In fact, the exploration of internal mechanism in the provision is without prejudice to the officers’ constitutional right of access to court. That is to say the right of an employee to institute action in court is not restricted by the provision. I have not seen any other provision in the PSR that require exhausting internal resolution mechanism as a condition precedent to filing a suit in court. Learned counsel for the Defendant also cited paragraph 100 of the Defendant’s condition of service which contain provisions on procedure for handling internal grievances. Upon reading the provisions under the paragraph, I observe that the procedure for grievance reporting and resolution outlined in the paragraph apply to grievances arising in a subsisting employment. The provisions do not contemplate the grievance of a staff that is no longer in the employment. From the date the Claimant’s employment was terminated, he was no longer bound by the condition of service. Accordingly, he was not expected to take the steps for grievance reporting provided in the condition of service. Contrary to the pleading of the Defendant and the submissions of its counsel, I cannot find any condition precedent which the Claimant failed to observe before instituting this suit. The Claimant’s suit is competent, and I so hold. ISSUE 2: The facts and evidence presented by the parties show that the Claimant was employed by the Defendant on 8th April 2010. The Claimant’s employment letter is Exhibit B. The Claimant was employed as a Director on grade level 17. Also, the fact that the Defendant terminated the Claimant’s employment vide a letter dated 20th February 2015, which is Exhibit G, is not in dispute. It is the termination of the Claimant’s employment that is his grievance in this action. The Claimant sought, among other, a declaration that the termination of his appointment vide the letter of 20th February 2015 is unlawful, null and void. The facts relied on by him to seek the claim are that the Defendant wrongfully terminated his appointment on 20th February 2015 without giving him fair hearing by refusing him time to produce his NYSC discharge certificate which he was requested to produce in an earlier letter given to him the same date his employment was terminated. The Claimant also made the following averments against the termination of his employment: the reason given in the termination letter that he did not possess NYSC discharge certificate or exemption certificate for which his employment was terminated was a condition precedent to taking up employment in the Federal Public Service; by the time he returned to Nigeria to take up appointment with the Defendant in 2010, he had passed the age of eligibility for mobilisation for National Youth Service and the issuance of exemption certificate was not applicable to him; non possession of NYSC certificate or exemption certificate is not a ground for termination of employment under the Public Service Rules of the Federation and the conditions of service of the Defendant and that the procedure adopted in terminating his employment is not in compliance with the procedure provided by the Public Service Rules of the Federation and the conditions of service of the Defendant. The Defendant’s position is that during a routine verification of the qualifications of all members of staff of the Defendant, it was discovered that the Claimant did not possess the NYSC discharge certificate or the exemption certificate before taking up appointment with the Defendant. The possession of NYSC discharge or exemption certificate is a condition precedent for the Claimant to take up appointment with the Defendant. Therefore, the Claimant was issued a notice dated 20th February 2015 to produce the originals and photocopy of his NYSC discharge or exemption certificate within 48 hours. Although the Claimant produced some certificates, he did not produce the NYSC discharge or exemption certificate and his employment was terminated for not possessing NYSC discharge or exemption certificate. The Defendant further aver that the Claimant was given ample time to present the originals as well as photocopies of the certificates. The provisions of the NYSC Act made it mandatory for any person seeking appointment into the Federal Public Service or in the Defendant to present either NYSC discharge certificate or NYSC exemption certificate. Being a condition precedent to the taking up of any appointment in the Federal Civil Service, the failure to present NYSC discharge or exemption certificate vitiates the appointment. Non-possession of NYSC discharge or exemption certificate made the Claimant unqualified to be appointed by the Defendant in the first place. Besides disputing the Claimant’s allegation of unlawful termination of the employment, the Defendant contends that the Claimant’s employment was not a valid employment in the first place justifying why it had to be terminated. The parties have joined issues on the validity of the employment. Therefore, before I consider whether or not the termination of the employment was unlawful, there is need to resolve the issue of the validity of the employment. In Exhibit F, dated 20th February 2015, the Defendant informed the Claimant that a verification exercise conducted by the Defendant revealed the fact that the Claimant did not possess NYSC discharge or exemption certificate before taking up employment with the Defendant. The Claimant was also told that NYSC discharge or exemption certificate is a precondition for employment in the Public Service of the Federation and his non-possession of same contravenes Sections 2[1] and 12[1] of the NYSC Decree. The Claimant was requested to present his NYSC discharge certificate or exemption certificate, among other documents, to the Defendant within 48 hours of his receipt of the letter. Exhibit G is the letter terminating the Claimant’s employment. It is dated 20th February 2015. The reason stated therein for terminating the Claimant’s employment is that he did not possess NYSC discharge certificate or exemption certificate which is a condition precedent to taking up employment in the Federal Public Service. The Claimant’s action was said to have contravened Sections 2[1] and 12[1] of the NYSC Decree hence his employment was terminated. From the content of the letter of termination, the Claimant’s employment was terminated for non-possession of NYSC discharge certificate or exemption certificate before taking up employment with the Defendant. It was also stated that possession of NYSC discharge certificate or exemption certificate is a condition precedent for taking up employment in the Federal Public Service. I have examined the facts pleaded by the Claimant and the evidence adduced by him and I observe that he conceded to the fact that he did not present either NYSC discharge certificate or exemption certificate for his employment with the Defendant. Also, the Claimant did not say he has obtained NYSC discharge certificate or exemption certificate as at the time of termination of his employment. Without any doubt in this matter, the Claimant did not possess or present the NYSC discharge certificate or exemption certificate at the time of his employment or at the time of termination of his employment. The claimant did contend that the reason given for termination of his employment is not a term of his employment nor is it a term upon which his employment can be terminated. Both parties referred to the Defendant’s staff condition of service as containing the terms and conditions regulating the employment as well as the PSR. The condition of service is in evidence as Exhibit E while the PSR is Exhibit D. Paragraph 7.1 of the Defendant’s staff condition of service contains the requirements for employment in the Defendant. It provides that to be eligible for first appointment with the Defendant, a candidate must, among other requirements, possess minimum educational qualification and experience specified for the following cadre of employment: for senior staff, the candidate must possess a minimum of first degree or its equivalent and must also possess a discharge or exemption certificate from the NYSC. For Management staff, in addition to requirements for senior staff, the candidate must have not less than 12 years cognate experience. In paragraph 4.1 of the condition of service, senior staff means officers on Grade Level 7 to 14 while management staff means DG and officer on Grade Level 15 to 17. The Claimant’s employment letter shows that he was employed as a Grade Level 17 officer. The Claimant was employed as a management staff. Therefore, as a requirement for employment with the Defendant, he must possess NYSC discharge or exemption certificate. Clearly, in view of the requirements for employment in spelt out in paragraph 7.1 of the staff condition of service, possession of NYSC discharge or exemption certificate was a term of the Claimant’s employment and it was a condition for his employment in the Defendant. I have earlier said it that the Claimant did not possess or present NYSC discharge or exemption certificate at the time of his employment. By the condition of service, he was not qualified for employment into the Defendant’s employment. The Claimant’s employment into the Defendant’s employment without possessing NYSC discharge or exemption certificate was a breach of the terms and conditions of service. Now, to justify his non-possession of NYSC discharge or exemption certificate at the time of his employment with the Defendant in April 2010, the Claimant said by the time he returned to Nigeria to take up appointment with the Defendant, he had passed the age of eligibility for mobilisation for National Youth Service and the issuance of exemption certificate was not applicable to him. He also said the NYSC Act did not apply to him as at the time he returned to Nigeria in 2010. The NYSC Act in Section 2 has specified the category of persons eligible to undertake the national youth service in Nigeria. It provides as follows: “(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, every Nigerian shall- (a) if, at the end of the academic year 1972-73 or, as the case may be, at the end of any subsequent academic year, he shall have graduated at any university in Nigeria; or (b) if, at the end of the academic year 1974-75 or, as the case may be, at the end of any subsequent year, he shall have graduated at any university outside Nigeria; or (c) if, at the end of the academic year 1975-76 or, as the case may be, at the end of any subsequent year, he shall have obtained the Higher National Diploma or such other professional qualification as may be prescribed; or (d) if, at the end of the academic year 1975-76 or, as the case may be, at the end of any subsequent academic year up to the end of the 1983-84 academic year, he shall have obtained the National Certificate of Education, be under an obligation, unless exempted under subsection (2) of this section or section 17 of this Act, to make himself available for service for a continuous period of one year from the date specified in the call-up instrument served upon him. (2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, with effect from 1 August 1985, a person shall not be called upon to serve in the service corps if, at the date of his graduation or obtaining his diploma or other professional qualification- (a) he is over the age of thirty; or (b) he has served in the armed forces of the Federation or the Nigeria Police Force for a period of more than nine months; or (c) he is member of staff of any of the following, that is- (i) the Nigerian Security Organisation; or (ii) the State Security Service; or (iii) the National Intelligence Agency; or (iv) the Defence Intelligence Agency; or (d) he has been conferred with any National Honour.” The implication of the above provisions of the NYSC Act is that it is mandatory for every Nigerian citizen who graduated from any university in Nigeria or outside Nigeria from the year 1972-73, unless exempted, to undertake the mandatory one-year National Youth Service. Those who may be exempted from the National Youth Service are those who, as at the date of their graduation, are over 30 years of age or have served in the military or paramilitary bodies or have been conferred with National Honour. Those who complete the national youth service are issued the discharge certificate while those exempted are issued exemption certificate. See Sections 11 and 17 of the Act. By the pleading of the Claimant in paragraphs 3 and 6 of the statement of facts, he is a Nigerian and was born on 19th November 1962. He obtained his first degree in May 1983 from Clark Atlanta University, Atlanta, Georgia, USA. At the date the Claimant obtained his first degree, he was 21 years old. The Claimant was below 30 years of age at the date he graduated from the University. As at 1983, the Claimant was eligible to undertake the mandatory one-year National Youth Service and he has not shown that he falls into any of the category of persons exempted from service. At the time the Claimant came to take up the appointment with the Defendant in April 2010, he was 48 years old. The Claimant was above the age of service at the time. This is the reason the Claimant said he had passed the age of eligibility for mobilisation for National Youth Service in 2010 and that the NYSC Act no longer applied to him at the time. It appears to me the Claimant did not have a good understanding of the provisions of Section 2 of the NYSC Act when he made those averments. Once a Nigerian citizen graduated below 30 years of age, he is eligible for mobilisation for National Youth Service. If the person did not undertake the National Youth Service at the right time, the fact that the person became older than 30 years will not remove his obligation to serve, which obligation he acquired at the age of graduation. Thus, it is the age of graduation that determines eligibility to serve and not the age of the person at the time of returning to Nigeria. Since the Claimant graduated below 30 years of age, he ought to have participated in the National Youth Service and obtain the NYSC discharge certificate anytime from 1983 when he obtained his first degree. Therefore, the Claimant’s assertion that the NYSC Act did not apply to him in 2010 does not hold water. Even if it was the Claimant’s view that he had passed the age of eligibility for mobilisation for National Youth Service in 2010 when he returned to Nigeria, he ought to have obtained an exemption certificate. The Claimant acknowledged this fact under cross examination when he said a discharge letter would have been appropriate in his case if the condition was made known to him at the time of acceptance of the offer; he would have gotten it within 2 days or he would have gone for service if he knew. The bottom line is that the Claimant did not obtain either the NYSC discharge certificate or the exemption certificate. Then, there is Section 12 (1) of the NYSC Act which provides as follows: “For the purposes of employment anywhere in the Federation and before employment, it shall be the duty of every prospective employer to demand and obtain from any person who claims to have obtained his first degree at the end of the academic year 1973-74 or, as the case may be, at the end of any subsequent academic year the following- (a) a copy of the Certificate of National Service of such person issued pursuant to Section 11 of this Act; (b) a copy of any exemption certificate issued to such person pursuant to Section 17 of this Act; and (c) such other particulars relevant thereto as may be prescribed by or under this Act.” The import of this provision is that every person who obtained first degree from the academic year 1973-74 must obtain Certificate of National Service or exemption certificate and present it for employment anywhere in the Federation. Although the provision made it the duty of the employer to demand for the NYSC discharge certificate or exemption certificate from the applicant before employment, the intendment of the legislators in that provision is that the NYSC discharge certificate or exemption certificate is a must have for employment in Nigeria for any person who graduated or obtained first degree from the year 1973/74. The learned counsel for the Claimant hanged on this duty placed on the employer to argue in paragraphs 3.8 to 3.12 of the Claimant’s final written address that the Defendant had waived its right when it failed to ensure that the Claimant did not come into the employment of the Federal Government of Nigeria without possessing the NYSC Certificate or exemption letter. Let me first point out that the allegation of waiver on the part of the Defendant is a point of defence for the Claimant in respect of the issue of the validity of his employment raised by the Defendant. The fact of waiver by the Defendant was not pleaded by the Claimant, whether in the statement of facts or in his reply to the statement of defence. Counsel for the Claimant raised it for the first time in the final written address. The Claimant ought to have pleaded it for him to be able to rely on it. See Order 30 Rule 8 of the rules of this court. It is the law that waiver must be specifically pleaded and where it was not so pleaded, it cannot be relied on. See ASAKA vs. RAMINKURA [2015] All FWLR [Pt. 787] 774 at 792; OKONKWO vs. COOPERATIVE AND COMMERCE BANK [NIG.] PLC [2003] FWLR [Pt. 154] 457. Having not pleaded waiver, the Claimant will not be allowed to rely on it. In any case, I do not think the Defendant’s failure to demand from the Claimant his NYSC discharge Certificate or exemption certificate at the point of employment was a waiver of its right. Where it is argued that a statutory provision has been waived, it has to be considered whether the statute conferred private or individual right, which may be waived, or whether the statutory provision confers rights of a public nature as a matter of public policy which right cannot be waived as no one is permitted to contract out or waive a rule of public policy. See OLUFEAGBA vs. ABDUR-RAHEEM [2010] All FWLR [Pt. 512] 1033 at 1073; KOSEBINU vs. ALIMI [2006] All FWLR [Pt. 295] 700 at 716; FEED AND FOOD FARMS [NIG.] LTD vs. N.N.P.C. [2009] All FWLR [Pt. 484] 1436 at 1458. The provisions of Section 2 and 12 [1] of the NYSC Act requiring possession of NYSC discharge Certificate or exemption certificate for employment in Nigeria is one of general policy and it involves public interest. It is not a right private to the Defendant. Therefore, it was not open for the Defendant to waive such a statutory provision or public right, either by consent or conduct. By Section 12 [1] of the NYSC Act and paragraph 7.1 of the staff condition of service, possession and presentation of either NYSC discharge certificate or the exemption certificate is a prerequisite for employment in the Defendant. The facts that the Claimant did not possess either the NYSC discharge certificate or the exemption certificate at the time of his employment made him unqualified for employment by the Defendant. The Claimant’s employment was therefore faulty and irregular ab initio. It was entered into in contravention of the NYSC Act. The employment was not a valid or lawful employment. A contract entered into contrary to provisions of a statute is illegal and the courts cannot enforce such a contract. See FELIX GEORGE AND COMPANY LTD. vs. AFINOTAN [2015] All FWLR [Pt. 778] 920 at 951. From the facts, when the Defendant discovered that the Claimant did not present NYSC discharge certificate or the exemption certificate for employment and when he also failed to present them when he was given Exhibit F, the Defendant became satisfied that the Claimant did not possess either the NYSC discharge certificate or the exemption certificate. It consequently and immediately terminated the employment. Rightly so, having discovered that the Claimant did not have either the NYSC discharge certificate or the exemption certificate, he cannot be left in the employment in the Federal Public Service, which was not a lawful employment by none possession of the NYSC discharge certificate or the exemption certificate for the employment. The Claimant had to be eased out and the only way to do that is to terminate the employment at that point. His employment was not terminated on disciplinary grounds. Now, the Claimant claims for unlawful termination of his employment. An employment that was entered into in violation of mandatory statutory requirements for the employment is invalid and void. Where a statute prescribes requirements for validity of any act, failure to comply with the requirements vitiates and voids the act. See OKWUOSA vs. GOMWALK [2017] All FWLR [Pt. 882] 1182 at 1209. The Claimant’s employment with the Defendant was void ab initio. It means that there was no valid employment in the first place. It is only when there was a valid employment that the manner of its termination can become an issue capable of being inquired into by this court. To proceed to consider the Claimant’s allegation of unlawful termination of the employment will amount to agreeing with him that a valid employment existed between the parties capable of being terminated. Should this court proceed to consider the Claimant’s allegation that his employment was unlawfully terminated and find that the Claimant was not validly removed from the employment, can this court order his reinstatement, which happens to be the remedy for unlawful removal from statutory employment? I think not. The employment, which was an invalid and illegal employment, as in this case, cannot be entitled to such indulgence. Which is why I hold the view that this court does not have any responsibility, at this stage of the case, to inquire into the lawfulness or otherwise of the termination of the employment. In view of the foregoing, I do not find any merit in the Claimant’s case. It is dismissed. No order as to cost. Judgment is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Judge