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JUDGMENT In his Originating Complaint filed on 24th November 2016, the Claimant sought the following reliefs: a. A Declaration that the stoppage/suspension of the Claimant's salary the by Defendant is unlawful, null and void. b. An Order voiding and invalidating all the actions of the Defendant and touching on and affecting the salary of the Claimant. c. An Order directing the Defendant to forthwith pay all the outstanding salaries and allowances of the Claimant. d. An Order voiding and invalidating his purported dismissal from the employment of the Defendant. e. An Order directing the Defendant to forthwith re-instate him to work. f. An Order directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of N30,000,000 (Thirty Million Naira) as compensation for the Claimant’s permanent disability. g. An Order directing the Defendant to refund to the Claimant, a total sum of N573,710.00 (Five Hundred and Seventy-Three Thousand, Seven Hundred and Ten Naira) Only, as money spent and accrued to the Claimant. The Complaint was accompanied with a statement of facts and the deposition of the Claimant as the only witness in his case. The Defendant filed a statement of defence which was amended on 16th March 2018. The Defendant called two witnesses in this case. Hearing commenced de-novo on the 24th day of May 2018 and ended on the 13th day of March 2019 and parties were ordered to file Final Written Addresses. These were filed and regularized, and parties adopted their respective addresses on the 24th day of May 2019. CLAIMANT’S CASE The case of the Claimant is that he was employed by the Defendant as a sales representative on 13th January 2014. One of the terms of his employment, stated in his employment letter, is that the employment can be terminated by either party by giving one month’s notice to the other party. He was being paid salary from the time of his employment, but the last salary paid to him was in June 2016 even though he was not disengaged. As a sales representative for the Defendant, he was a major distributor and sales agent covering the Northern part of the country. In the course of his duties sometime in February 2014, while using the Defendant’s Isuzu Carter van to convey goods of the Defendant to Kano, he had a ghastly motor accident. He suffered severe spine and spinal cord injury from the accident. He went through series of treatments and surgeries which he paid for. Despite the treatments and surgeries, the injury resulted into a permanent disability. The injury became critical to the extent that he was confirmed to have rib fracture and spinal cord injury leading to weakness of both lower limbs and inability to control urine. Winners Medical Diagnostics and Research Institute, Garki, also diagnosed him to have Hematuria with other pathological problems for which the sum of N116,000 was required for treatment but he has not been able to raise the sum. The Defendant received the sum of N2,133,430 from the Defendant’s insurer on the Claimant’s behalf as compensation for the injury he sustained and to cover medical bills, but the Defendant paid the sum of N1,915,000 for medical bills and withheld the sum of N218,480 from the sum. He paid medical bills of N239,280 which expenses ought to be the Defendant’s. He has not been dismissed by the Defendant and there is no correspondence to him which affected his employment. He was never issued a dismissal letter. Giving further evidence in support of the averments in his reply to the amended statement of defence, the Claimant stated that he met the conditions precedents for his employment. He has a valid driver’s license at the time of his employment, and he has been a licensed driver by the FRSC since 1996. He was offered a valid and complete appointment and he accepted the offer after meeting the requirements for the employment. In February 2014, he was conveying the Defendant’s goods to Kano and not Kaduna. The accident resulted from a burst tyre with the Defendant’s Isuzu Carta van. His employment letter specified the salary payable to him. The total salary per annum is the sum of N720,002. He was paid salaries as a bonafide staff till June 2016. The management did not by-pass any requirement to pay him salary all the months he was in the hospital. The Defendant unlawfully stopped his salary. The Defendant received the sum of N2,129,744 from the insurer but paid only the sum of N1,413,506 for medical expenses. He does not know the destination for the balance of N716, 238. The initial medical expenses he paid was the sum of N1,572,000 and not N1,413,506. The Defendant withheld N716,238 from the sum of N2,129,744 it received from the insurer after paying the sum of N1,413,506 to him. He is still a staff of the Defendant as he did not receive any letter that he has been disengaged. He is not aware the Defendant’s depot is closed or the fact that he was laid off. He has not been able to do anything meaningful with his life as a result of the incapacitation. DEFENDANT’S CASE In defence of the claims of the Claimant, the Defendant’s first witness is one Shedrack Soweh, the Defendant’s Area Sales Manager, Northern Nigeria. He said the Claimant was given provisional employment on 13th January 2014 as sales representative in the Abuja depot to cover the northern parts of the country. By the Defendant’s corporate policy, the Claimant was required to provide guarantor, valid drivers’ license issued by the FRSC among other conditions before his employment letter can be issued or before his letter of employment can be valid. The Claimant did not produce a valid driver’s license as at the date of his employment despite stating that he was licensed to drive a motor vehicle. The Claimant’s lack of driving abilities resulted to the accident in which the Defendant’s vehicle was destroyed. The Claimant lacked requisite experience to drive a vehicle and he does not have a driver’s license. Within a month of his employment, the Claimant embarked on a night journey to Kaduna against the advice of his depot manager and he was involved in an accident. All the medial bills submitted by the Claimant were settled or refunded by the Defendant. The Claimant did not submit documents which would have enabled a bank account to be opened for payment of his salaries. The Defendant’s management however by-passed this requirement and paid the Claimant his salaries every month even when he was on admission in the hospital. The Defendant received the sum of N2,129,744 from Royal Exchange General Insurance out of which the sum of N1,413,506 was meant to cover medical expenses. The Defendant paid all the medical expenses submitted by the Claimant even above what the insurance company verified as medical expenses. The Defendant did not withhold any money meant for the Claimant’s hospital expenses nor is the Defendant aware of any hospital bill which the Claimant settled but not refunded. The Defendant did not wrongfully terminate the Claimant’s employment but when the Abuja depot for which the Claimant was employed to work closed down business in June 2016, all the workers in the depot were paid their last month salary and laid off, including the Claimant. The Claimant did not suffer any permanent disability because he was able to come to work and discharge his duties after his discharge from hospital before the depot closed down. The Claimant is also carrying on with his life since the depot closed down and he does not depend on anyone for his movement or daily routine. DW2 is one Sule Tajudeen, a staff of FRSC at its information technology centre. This witness appeared to give evidence in the matter pursuant to a subpoena issued and served on the Corps Marshall of the FRSC. In paragraph 3 of his deposition, the witness explained that he has the authority of the Corps Marshall to represent him in these proceedings with respect to the subject of the subpoena served on the Corps Marshal. Let me mention here that the subpoena was issued and served on the Corps Marshall of the FRSC at the instance of the Defendant. I have read the evidence of this witness and I must point out my observation straightaway. The facts contained in the evidence of DW2 were not pleaded by the Defendant. His evidence basically was on the authenticity or genuineness of the driver’s licenses tendered in evidence by the Claimant. These are Exhibits G, G1 and G2. The witness said he investigated the 3 drivers’ licenses and he discovered that Exhibits G and G2 were forgeries while only Exhibit G1 was issued by the FRSC. These facts and some other facts mentioned by the witness were not pleaded by the Defendant. The case of the Defendant with regard to the driver’s license is that the Claimant did not possess a driver’s license and he did produce one at the time of his appointment. The Defendant did not allege that the Claimant forged any driver’s license. The evidence of DW2 is therefore a significant deviation from the pleading of the Defendant. In the circumstance, the evidence of DW2 is of no use to the Defendant’s case. I will treat it as such. CLAIMANT’S FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS The Claimant in his final written address formulated the following issues for determination to wit: 1. Whether the PW1 herein has established his case by credible evidence, thus entitling him to judgment as claimed. 2. Whether the defense of not meeting the conditions the Defendant claimed contained in the Corporate Policy can avail the Defendant in this case. 3. Whether the PW1 is entitled to the reliefs claimed from the Defendant. On Issue One, learned counsel for the Defendant answered the question posed by the issue in the affirmative. Counsel submitted that by the evidence adduced, the Claimant was able to prove to this court that he is disabled as a result of the accident. See NDULUE vs. OJIAKOR (2013) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1356) 311 S.C. Counsel argued that the Defendant failed to show any medical report to debunk the positions as contained in Exh C-C15, Exh D, Exh E, Exh D1, Exh D2, Exh D3, Exh D4, Exh D5, Exh E to substantiate this position, but loosely stated as mentioned above. Counsel added that the Defendant DW1 failed to show any evidence substantiating the fact that the management of the Defendant expended any sum of money on behalf of the PW1. On Issue Two, the Claimant’s counsel made reference to paragraph 4 of the Claimant’s additional depositions that he had been licensed since the year 1996 and thereafter tendered in evidence Exh G1, G2 and G3 respectively to prove it. Counsel argued that the Defendant does not have the authority to declare the licenses forged and urged the court to so hold. On Issue Three, it was the submission of the Claimant’s counsel that from the arguments of the Claimant, it is clear that the evidence adduced by the Claimant is weighty enough to make the pendulum in this suit swing in favour of the Claimant. Counsel urged the Court to hold that the Claimant has proven his case against the Defendant and is therefore entitled to judgment. DEFENDANT’S FINAL WRIITEN ADDRESS The Defendant in his final written address formulated the following issues for determination to wit: a. Whether in the light of the facts before this Honourable court and the evidence adduced during trial, the Claimant was wrongly dismissed by the Defendant and therefore entitled to be reinstated back to work and be paid all his salaries from June 2016 to date. b. Whether the Claimant having falsely represented to the Defendant that he is competent to drive and having provided invalid drivers' license to obtain employment, he is not liable to contributing to his accident and therefore not entitled to claims for his medical treatment. c. Whether in the light of the facts before this Honourable Court, the evidences adduced during trial and the physical circumstances of the Claimant, he is entitled to be paid compensation for permanent disability. On Issue One learned counsel for the Defendant submitted that the Claimant's employment with the Defendant ceased as a result of redundancy occasioned by the collapse of the Defendant’s business at their depot in Idu Industrial Layout, Abuja which is the place the Claimant was employed to work. See N.N.B PLC vs. OSOH (2001) 13 NWLR (Pt.729) 232 at 262-263 paras F-B. Counsel also submitted that the Claimant's appointment was terminated on grounds of redundancy and therefore his claim for damages and arrears of salaries cannot succeed. See ODINKENMERE vs. IMPRESIT BAKOLORI (NIG) LTD (1995) 8 NWLR (Pt. 411) page 52 at 64. Counsel urged the court to dismiss paragraphs 20 (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) of the Claimant's claim. On Issue Two, the Defendant’s counsel submitted that the Claimant was not licensed to drive a vehicle and that the drivers' license he presented to the Defendant to secure the employment was forged. In addition, counsel submitted that the Claimant was assigned a roadworthy vehicle to carry out his duties, he was not proficient in his driving as he did not have a valid drivers' license which entitled him to drive hence the Claimant contributed to the accident and injuries to himself and therefore should bear part of his medical expenses. It was the submission of counsel that the Claimant, not having laid foundation for his claim in paragraph 20 (g) of his complaint and urged the court to direct that the claim fails and to dismiss the claim for the sum of N573,710. On Issue Three, the Defendant’s counsel deemed it worthy of note that the medical reports stating the Claimant's injuries and his physical conditions which alluded to his inability to walk or undertake any task were written and dated March, 2014 when the Claimant was still undergoing treatment a few weeks after the accident. Counsel submitted that from the evidence given before this court by the Claimant and his physical appearance during trial, the claimant is not and cannot be categorized as someone who has suffered permanent disability and that the Claimant’s claim for N30million compensation is not based on any negligent act of the Defendant or based on specific breach of contract between the parties. Counsel argued that the quantum of compensation due to any employee is determined by the Board of the NSITF and where the said sum is insufficient, the employee can then file an appeal to this Court for review of the sum after exhausting all the appeal processes of the ECA 2010. Counsel added that where an employee who has suffered some disability from injuries brings an action for compensation other than from tort, the action is premature, and the claim cannot be entertained by the court. See ABONYI AGBO GEOFFREY vs. DANGOTE AGROSACKS LIMITED (unreported Suit No: NICN/LAG/315/2013) delivered 7th December, 20l7. Counsel submitted that even if the Claimant had suffered any form of permanent or partial disability as defined by the ECA 2010 and was entitled to compensation from the injuries sustained, his claims should have been directed to the Management Board of the NSITF in the first instance and not to the Court. Counsel urged the court to so hold and dismiss the claim of the Claimant accordingly. CLAIMANT’S REPLY ADDRESS Upon the regularization of the Defendant’s Final Written Address, the Claimant filed a reply on points of law on the 16th day of May 2019. In his reply on points of law, learned counsel for the Claimant argued that the Defendant per Exhibit A can terminate the appointment of the Claimant at any time provided he has fulfilled certain conditions. See AHMED vs. CBN (2013) 11 NWLR Pt. 1365 SC. Counsel added that the argument of the Claimant’s redundancy must fail because the process enshrined in Exhibit A was not followed. Counsel urged the court to exclude the evidence of driver’s license as same is too remote to be material in all circumstances of this case. See Section 1(a) and 115 (2) of the Evidence Act. Counsel urged the court to hold that the Claimant is a proficient driver with valid driver’s license issued by the Federal Road Safety Corp. Counsel further argued that the Defendant failed to show any evidence substantiating the fact that the management of the Defendant expended any sum of money on behalf of the Claimant. It was also argued by learned counsel to the Claimant that the ECA 2010 does not apply in this case before the court. Counsel urged the court to so hold and to resolve the case in favour of the Claimant. COURT’S DECISION I have heard the evidence adduced by the parties in this case. I have also considered the arguments by the learned counsels for the parties in the final written addresses. In determining this case, I will consider the issue whether the Claimant has proved his case to entitle him to the claims he sought in the suit. The fact that the Claimant was employed by the Defendant as a sales representative on 13th January 2014 vide Exhibit A is not in dispute. In the pleading of the Claimant and in his evidence, he said the terms of his employment, as contained in his employment letter, include that the employment can be terminated by either party by giving one month’s notice to the other party. He also said he was, at no time given any letter of disengagement or dismissal but the last salary paid to him was in June 2016. The Claimant further stated that he is still a staff of the Defendant, and he is not aware that the Defendant’s depot is closed or the fact that he was laid off. Perhaps, it is on the basis of these facts the Claimant sought orders of this court voiding his dismissal and reinstating him to his employment. See reliefs [d] and [e]. In response to the Claimant’s allegations, the Defendant averred that the Claimant was employed specifically to work in the Abuja depot of the Defendant and when the Abuja depot closed down business in June 2016, all the workers in the depot including the Claimant were paid their last month’s salary and laid off. DW1 tendered Exhibit L in evidence as the proof of the close down of the Abuja depot. The Defendant averred that it did not wrongfully terminate the Claimant’s employment. From the facts and evidence of the Claimant, his case is that he is still an employee of the Defendant. He said his employment has not been terminated nor has he been dismissed. These averments of the Claimant are however in contradiction to reliefs [d] and [e] sought by him. The Claimant could not have said he has not been terminated or dismissed but he seeks orders voiding the termination of his employment. If he knows that his employment has not been terminated, then which termination does he want this court to void? Also, if his case is that he is still in the Defendant’s employment, then which employment does he want this court to reinstate him to? The facts presented by the Claimant are not in agreement with reliefs [d] and [e] which he sought on the basis of those facts. In any case, the Defendant has said the Claimant’s employment has been terminated as against the Claimant’s averment that his employment has not been terminated. In view of these opposing positions, I will examine the facts to find if the Claimant’s employment has been terminated or not and whether he is entitled to reliefs [d] and [e]. Both in the amended statement of defence and the evidence of DW1, the Defendant’s case is that the Claimant was employed specifically to work in the Abuja depot of the Defendant and when the Abuja depot closed down business in June 2016, all the workers in the depot, including the Claimant, were paid their last month’s salary and laid off. In his reply to the amended statement defence and his further evidence, the Claimant stated that he is not aware that the Defendant’s Abuja depot is closed or the fact that he was laid off. However, when the Claimant was cross examined by counsel for the Defendant, he made the following statement: “The last time I went to work at Idu Industrial Layout was 30th May 2016. That was the day they told us to go home. Mr. Ramish, the Regional Manager told us to go home as they wanted to close the office. They promised to reach us whenever they need us. I have not gone back there again because they have not called me. All the employees working in Idu Industrial Layout were affected by that directive. I am aware that the Idu Industrial Layout office of the defendant has been closed down since then… I received my salary from the time I was employed up till May 2016. It was on 30th May we were asked to go… Since I left the defendant on 30th May 2016, I have not done any work till date.” This evidence of the claimant supports the Defendant’s averments that the Abuja depot was closed down and the workers were laid off. Although the Claimant pleaded in his reply to the amended statement of defence and also said in his evidence-in-chief that he is not aware that the Defendant’s Abuja depot was closed or the fact that he was laid off, his evidence under cross examination reveals that he is not truthful about the facts. From his evidence under cross examination, it is obvious that the Claimant was told that the Abuja office was to be closed down and the workers were no longer needed. He is also aware the Abuja office has been closed down since then and he has not worked for the Defendant ever since. The evidence given by the Claimant under cross examination is in tandem with the facts narrated by the Defendant. I will take it to mean that the Defendant’s position is the correct state of affairs. That is to say it is a fact that the Claimant worked in the Defendant’s Abuja depot and in June 2016, the depot was closed down and the workers, which included the Claimant, were informed and accordingly laid off. There is also evidence from the parties that the workers were also paid the salary for the last month they worked which was the month of May 2016. The Claimant averred that he was not given any letter terminating his employment. That, perhaps, is the reason he said his employment has not been terminated. The Defendant averred that the workers of the Abuja depot were laid off, but it did not say it gave the Claimant a letter of termination of his employment. DW1 did not tender any letter terminating the Claimant’s employment in evidence. The Defendant however relied on an internal memo from the Defendant’s Human Relationship Manager to the head of the Abuja depot dated 15th June 2016. This document, which was tendered by DW1 and admitted in evidence as Exhibit L, is a memo conveying the decision of the management of the Defendant to close the Abuja depot and the fact that arrangement was being made to settle the workers’ terminal benefits. Although it is clear from the content of the memo that the Abuja depot of the Defendant was to be closed down and the employment of workers in the depot is to be terminated, the memo does not qualify as a letter of termination of employment. From the facts, it is clear to me that no letter of termination of employment was given to the Claimant. DW1 confirmed this fact when he said under cross-examination that no specific document was addressed to individual staff. From the evidence of DW1 and the evidence of the Claimant under cross examination, the Claimant and other workers in the Abuja depot were informed orally that they have been laid off from their employment. Exhibit A is the Claimant’s employment letter. One of the terms of his employment is that after confirmation of the employment, either party can terminate same by one month’s notice or payment of one-month’s salary in lieu of notice. This condition of the employment did not specify the mode by which the notice should be given. Thus, it is not mandatory that the notice of termination must be in writing. In my view, an oral notice to the Claimant is sufficient compliance with the terms of the employment. It is even a settled principle in master and servant employment, as in this case, that such employment can be terminated in writing, orally or by conduct of the parties. See IFETA vs. SHELL (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 314) 305 at 334; OPUO vs. NNPC (2002) FWLR (Pt. 84) 11 at 25. Therefore, an oral notice of termination of the employment given to the Claimant is as good as a notice in writing to him. The only problem is that the Defendant who gave oral notice to terminate the employment must comply with the agreed duration of notice. Let me also say that in a relationship of master and servant, infraction of the terms of employment in the dismissal or termination of the employment of the servant amounts merely to wrongful dismissal or termination but it does not render the dismissal or termination null and void. See ESIEVWORE vs. NEPA (2002) FWLR (Pt. 124) 398 at 408. Thus, even were the Defendant did not give adequate notice to terminate the employment, it will only render the termination wrongful and entitling the Claimant to damages but it does not void or invalidate the termination. I will also emphasise the point that it is the right of the master to terminate or dismiss the servant’s appointment for any reason or for no reason at all. By Exhibit L, the Defendant had a reason for terminating the employment of the workers in the Abuja depot. The Claimant confirmed under cross examination that the Abuja depot was truly closed down since June 2016. Whether the closure of the Abuja depot was a valid or genuine reason for terminating the workers’ employment is not important in this matter. The law is that once the master has professed to have terminated the employment, the court will rarely make an order that the employment still subsists or to reinstate the employee. Reinstatement is rarely a servant’s remedy for wrongful dismissal or termination of a master and servant employment. This is because the court will not force a servant on an unwilling master. See TEXACO NIG. PLC vs. KEHINDE (2002) FWLR (Pt. 94) 143 at 164; JIRGBAGH vs. U.B.N PLC (2000) FWLR (Pt. 26) 1790 at 1807; U.B.N LTD vs. OGBOH (1995) 2 NWLR (Pt. 380) 647. Therefore, since the Defendant had exercised its right under the contract to terminate the employment, whether rightly or wrongly, the employment remains terminated. I find from the facts that the Claimant’s employment had been terminated in June 2016. He is no longer in the Defendant’s employment. It is my view also that the termination of the Claimant’s employment cannot be voided or invalidated, nor can the Claimant be reinstated to the employment. Consequently, I find no merit in reliefs [d] and [e] sought by the Claimant. The Claimant, thinking that his employment is still subsisting, sought reliefs a, b and c. The Claimant sought this court to declare that the stoppage of his salary is unlawful and sought an order to the Defendant to pay him all his outstanding salaries and allowances. In his evidence, the Claimant said his employment letter specified the salary payable to him and he was being paid salary from the time of his employment till June 2016 when the Defendant unlawfully stopped his salary. On the other hand, DW1 stated that the Claimant was laid off in June 2016 and his salary for the last month he worked was paid to him. I have said it earlier in this judgment that the Claimant’s employment was terminated by the Defendant in June 2016. The Claimant did not perform any duty for the Defendant from that time. From the date the employment was terminated, the Claimant ceased to be a staff of the Defendant and he is not entitled to be paid salaries from then. It is clear that the Claimant’s salary was stopped as a result of termination of his employment. Therefore, the stoppage of his salary is not unlawful. Let me also observe that the Claimant was not owed any salary as at the time of termination of his employment. It is his case that he was paid his salaries up to the time of termination of his employment. The month before the termination was May 2016. The facts pleaded by the parties and the evidence adduced by them are in agreement on the fact that the Claimant was paid his salary for May 2016, being the last month he worked for the Defendant. As it is, there is no merit in reliefs a, b and c sought by the Claimant. However, with the oral termination of the Claimant’s employment, he was not given one month’s notice as required in the terms of his employment. The last salary paid to him was salary for the month of May 2016 being the month he worked last. There is no evidence that the Claimant was paid one month’s salary in lieu of notice. The Claimant is entitled to be paid one-month salary in lieu of notice. The Claimant was employed by the Defendant on 13th January 2014 and in February 2014, barely one month after he resumed work, while driving the Defendant’s vehicle to convey its products to Kano in the course of his employment, he had an accident and sustained injury. The Claimant said he suffered severe spine and spinal cord injury from the accident for which he went through series of treatments and surgeries in various hospitals. The injury he sustained resulted into a permanent disability. He was confirmed to have rib fracture and spinal cord injury leading to weakness of both lower limbs and inability to control urine. As a result of the incapacitation, he has not been able to do anything meaningful with his life. On the strength of these facts, the Claimant claims the sum of N30,000,000 as compensation for his permanent disability. The Defendant’s side of the story is that the Claimant did not have a driver’s license at the time, and he lacked requisite experience to drive a vehicle. It was his lack of driving abilities that resulted to the accident. The Defendant also averred that the Claimant embarked on a night journey to Kaduna against the advice of his depot manager and it was in that journey he was involved in the accident. The Defendant further averred that the Claimant did not suffer any permanent disability because he was able to come to work and discharged his duties after his discharge from hospital before the depot closed down. The Claimant is carrying on with his life since the depot closed down and he does not depend on anyone for his movement or daily routine. I do not find any dispute on the fact that the Claimant had a motor accident in the cause of his employment. The Claimant was driving the Defendant’s vehicle for the business of the Defendant when the accident happened. There is also no dispute that the Claimant suffered injuries from the accident, and he was admitted in the hospital and treated for his injuries. The Defendant’s contentions are that the accident resulted from the fault of the Claimant and that the Claimant did not sustain permanent disability. The Defendant made so much issue about the Claimant not possessing a valid drivers’ licence when he drove the vehicle involved in the accident. In its statement of defence as well as in the evidence of DW1, the Defendant stated that one of the requirements the Claimant was to provide before his employment letter can be issued or before his letter of employment can be valid was a valid driver’s license issued by the FRSC. The Claimant did not produce a valid driver’s license as at the date of his employment even though he represented that he was licensed to drive a motor vehicle. The Claimant does not have a driver’s license and he lacked requisite experience to drive a vehicle. It was the Claimant’s lack of driving abilities that caused him to have the accident. The Claimant denied these allegations in his reply to the amended statement of defence and averred in response that he has a valid driver’s licensed at the time of his employment and he has been a licensed driver by the FRSC since 1996. To prove that he was licensed to drive a motor vehicle, the Claimant tendered 3 drivers’ licenses in evidence. These are Exhibits G1, G2 and G3. It was in an attempt by the Defendant to discredit these various drivers’ licenses or to show that they were not validly issued by the FRSC that the Defendant subpoenaed the Corps Marshal of FRSC. I have expressed the view in this judgment that the evidence of DW2, who represented the Corps Marshall, amount to none issue in this proceeding. The Defendant’s averments that the Claimant does not have a driver’s license and so lacked requisite experience to drive a vehicle is an attempt to absolve itself of any fault in the accident. Put in another word, the Defendant is saying that the Claimant was entirely responsible for the cause of the accident. In the attempt, the Defendant forgot the fact that it was the one who gave the vehicle to the Claimant to drive for the performance of his duties for to Defendant. When the Defendant averred that the Claimant did not produce a valid driver’s license as at the date of his employment, it implies that the Defendant knew of the Claimant’s lack of a drivers’ license when it gave the vehicle to the Claimant to drive upon his employment. The Claimant was driving the vehicle in the line of his duties when the accident occurred. The evidence of DW1 also shows that the Defendant was aware that the Claimant was to drive the vehicle on the day of the accident on a trip for the business of the Defendant. The Defendant has now raised it as a defence that the Claimant could not drive a motor vehicle at the time of the accident because he did not have a valid drivers’ license at the time. The Defendant knew of this fact, yet it gave the vehicle to the Claimant to drive. If the cause of the accident was because the Claimant lacks driving abilities, then the Defendant cannot be heard in these proceedings to say its hands are clean as to the cause of the accident. The defendant is to be blamed for giving the Claimant a vehicle to drive or allow him drive long distance when it knew that the Claimant had no abilities to drive or had no drivers licence. The Defendant cannot now shift the blame for the accident on the Claimant. In its attempt to absolve itself of blame, the Defendant succeeded in exposing its negligent conduct in preventing the Claimant from avoidable accident and injury. The Defendant also alleged that the Claimant embarked on the journey at night against the advice of his depot manager when he had the accident. This is another allegation by the Defendant to point the cause of the accident to the Claimant’s default. The Defendant did not mention the time of the accident as to believe it occurred at night. Also, the Defendant did not tender any official report of the accident. Therefore, the allegation that the Claimant drove at night or that the accident occurred at night has not been established. The Defendant has failed to show that the accident occurred as a result of the fault of the Claimant. Asides the foregoing, I do not think the issue of whether the Claimant’s defaults caused the accident is a relevant issue in this case. The Claimant’s case is simply a claim for compensation for the permanent disability he suffered in the course of his employment. The Claimant did not make any allegation of negligence or breach of duty of care on the part of the Defendant which caused the accident, nor did he claim for damages for breach of employer’s duty of care. It is when the Claimant alleges negligence or breach of duty against the Defendant that the Defendant can make a case to show that it was the Claimant who was at fault for the occurrence of the accident. What is relevant for consideration in this issue is whether the Claimant suffered permanent disability from the accident and whether he is entitled to compensation. In the final written address of counsel for the Defendant, learned counsel referred to the Employee Compensation Act 2010 [ECA] and submitted that since the Claimant did not base his claim for compensation on negligence or breach of duty, his claim for compensation can only be brought within the avenue of the ECA 2010. It was submitted further that by the provisions of ECA, the Claimant ought to make his claim for compensation to the Board of NSITF and not to file an action on court. Counsel submitted that the Claimant’s claim for payment of compensation is premature; it cannot be entertained by this court and should be struck out. Counsel referred to the unreported decision of this court in ABONYI AGBO GEOFFREY vs. DANGOTE AGROSACKS LTD. In the Claimant’s reply on points of law, his counsel submitted that the ECA and the decision in ABONYI AGBO GEOFFREY V. DANGOTE AGROSACKS LTD are not applicable to this case. It was submitted that the Defendant did not mention ECA during the case and it did not plead that it was a contributor to the Fund or that it reported the Claimant’s injury to the Board. According to counsel for the Claimant, the Defendant not being a contributor to the Fund and having failed to report the Claimant’s injury to the Board, there was no basis for which the Claimant could make a complaint to the board for payment of compensation. When it has to do with claims for personal injury suffered in the workplace, it may either be brought under the tort of negligence or breach of duty by an employer or under the law regulating compensation for injury suffered in the workplace in Nigeria which is the ECA 2010. See Section 7 (1) of the Employee Compensation Act 2010 which provides that any employee, whether or not in a workplace who suffers any disabling injury arising out of or in the course of employment shall be entitled to payment of compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Then Section 12 of the Act defined when action can be brought outside the Act as follows: “(1) The provisions of this Act are in lieu of any right of action, statutory or otherwise, founded on a breach of duty of care or any other cause of action, whether that duty or cause of action is imposed by or arises by reason of law or contract, express or implied, to which an employee, dependant or member of the family of the employee is or may be entitled against the employer of the employee, or against any employer within the scope of this Act, or against any employee, in respect of any death, injury or disability-arising out of and in the course of employment and where no action in respect of it lies. (2) The provisions of sub-section (1) of this section shall apply only when the action or conduct of the employer, the servant or agent of the employer or the employee, which caused the breach of duty, arose out of and in the course of employment within the scope of this Act.” By the above provisions of the ECA, claims under the Act is available only when the employee did not institute action for breach of duty of care or situations where no action lies in respect of any death, injury or disability arising out of and in the course of employment. That is to say a claim for compensation for injury sustained in the employment and claim for damages for breach of employer’s duty of care are two sides of a coin. The employee can either file a suit to claim damages for breach of the employer’s duty of care or claim for compensation under the ECA. Where no suit founded on breach of duty was filed or where no action lies in respect of the disability, then a claim for compensation for permanent disability suffered in an employment can only be made under the Act. I have said earlier that the Claimant did not bring his case under the tort of negligence or breach of duty of care owed by his employer to him. His case is simply for payment of compensation for the permanent disability he suffered in the course of his employment. Therefore, the Claimant’s claim for compensation comes within the operation of the ECA 2010. In view of the case made out by the Claimant for payment of compensation, the Claimant’s claim for compensation for permanent disability ought to be made in accordance to the provisions of the Act. The Claimant’s counsel submitted that the Defendant did not mention ECA during the proceedings. In my view, the Defendant does not need to mention or plead ECA before relying on it in the case. In the first place, it is the Claimant’s case and the reliefs he sought that determines what law is applicable to his case. In any case, ECA is a legislation which this court is permitted to judicially notice and apply if it is applicable to the case. Learned counsel for the Claimant also argued that the Defendant did not plead that it was a contributor to the Fund or that it reported the Claimant’s injury to the Board and for these reasons, the Claimant could not have been expected to bring his claim for compensation under the Act. I think the Defendant does not have any duty in this case to plead these facts mentioned by counsel for the Claimant. The Claimant who made a claim for compensation in this case is expected to aver facts which will enable him to succeed and not for the Defendant to help the Claimant prove his claim. None of the parties pleaded the fact that the Defendant was a contributor to the NSITF or the fact that the Claimant’s injury was reported to the Management Board of the NSITF. Therefore, these facts are not before this court. The Claimant is the one who ought to have pleaded the facts that the Defendant was not a contributor to the NSITF or the fact that the Claimant’s injury was not reported to the Management Board of the NSITF. If he has done so, perhaps, it would have been a reason to allow him to maintain this claim since he would not have had a basis to claim for compensation under the Act. Now, the Claimant’s claim for compensation for the permanent injury he suffered in the Defendant’s employment ought to have been made in accordance with the provisions of the ECA and to the appropriate authority. It was not so. Rather, the Claimant filed this action where he claims, among others, payment of compensation for his permanent disability. The Claimant’s claim for compensation is not competent before this court, in my view. This view has previously been expressed by this court in the judgment of this court in suit no. NICN/LA/315/2013 between ABONYI AGBO GEOFFREY vs. DANGOTE AGROSACKS LTD delivered on 7/12/2017 (unreported), where my learned brother, Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip, observed as follows: “Since in the instant case the claimant is not claiming in negligence, the claim under the ECA would mean claim to the appropriate body, the Nigeria Social Insurance Trust Fund (NSITF) Management Board, under the ECA and not in this Court. By Sections 21 and 22 of the ECA, it is the NSITF Management Board that determines what is payable for permanent total disability (section 21) or permanent partial disability (Section 22). It is when the Claimant is not satisfied with the outcome of his claim under the ECA that he can appeal to this Court, after exhausting all the appeal processes of the ECA. All of this the claimant did not do. He instead came to this court. To my mind, the Claimant is inappropriately before this court. He will need to exhaust the claim Processes of the ECA, and their prerequisites, before he can come to this court as far as his claim for N5 million is concerned. This being so, I hold that the claimant is prematurely before this court as far as the claim for N5 million is concerned. The claim for N5million as per reliefs (1) and (3) is accordingly incompetent and so is liable to be struck out”. I hold that the decision of this court in ABONYI AGBO GEOFFREY vs. DANGOTE AGROSACKS LTD is applicable to this case. Before the Claimant will even be entitled to the compensation he sought in this case, he must prove that he is suffering from the permanent disability he alleged. Although the Claimant alleged that he suffered permanent disability from that accident hence his claim for compensation for the permanent disability, the Defendant denied this allegation and averred that the Claimant did not suffer any permanent disability because he was able to come to work and discharge his duties after his discharge from hospital and he is also carrying on with his life without depending on anyone for his movement or daily routine. From the pleadings of the parties, issues were joined as to whether or not the Claimant suffered permanent disability from the accident. This issue ought to be determined by this court, but I do not think I can go any further in the claim for compensation. To proceed to determine the issue at this point when the claim for compensation is not competent before this court may result to foreclosing the Claimant from bringing an action in the future on the claim. The justice of the case requires that I simply strike out the claim without more. The last relief sought by the Claimant is for an order directing the Defendant to refund to him the sum of N573,710 which is money spent and accruing to him. In his statement of facts and in the deposition of the Claimant which accompanied the statement of facts, the Claimant stated that the Defendant received the sum of N2,133,430 from the Defendant’s insurer on the Claimant’s behalf as compensation for the injury he sustained and for medical bills but the Defendant paid the sum of N1,915,000 for medical bills and withheld the sum of N218,480 from the sum. The Claimant also stated that he further paid medical bills of N239,280 which expenses ought to be the Defendant’s. Then in his reply to the Defendant’s amended statement of defence and his further evidence, the Claimant said the amount received by the Defendant from the insurer was the sum of N2,129,744 but the Defendant paid only the sum of N1,413,506 for medical expenses. The Claimant said the Defendant withheld N716,238 from the sum of N2,129,744 it received from the insurer after paying the sum of N1,413,506 to him. The Defendant averred that it did not withhold any money meant for the Claimant’s hospital expenses nor is the Defendant aware of any hospital bill which the Claimant settled but was not refunded. The Defendant received the sum of N2,129,744 from Royal Exchange General Insurance out of which the sum of N1,413,506 was meant to cover medical expenses. The defendant paid all the medical expenses submitted by the Claimant even above what the insurance company verified as medical expenses. I have gone through the facts and evidence presented by the Claimant, but I find that he has failed to satisfactorily prove to the court how the sum he claims came about. I cannot find where he showed that he is entitled to the refund of the sum of N573,710 from the Defendant. In his statement of facts, he pleaded the sum of N218,480 which was withheld by the Defendant. Then in his reply to the amended statement of defence, he pleaded the sum of N716,238 withheld by the Defendant. If I am even to assume that the refund has to do with the sum allegedly withheld by the Defendant, then the sums pleaded by the Claimant, besides being in conflict, are not in any way proof of the sum the Claimant claims as refund from the Defendant. In his statement of facts where the Claimant sought the claim for the refund, what he stated in paragraphs 16 and 17 is that the Defendant withheld the sum of N218,480 from the insurance money and he further paid medical bills amounting to N239,280 which would have been at the expense of the Defendant. Also, assuming these are the sums the Claimant meant he should be refunded by the Defendant, I went ahead to add the sums together and what I got is the sum of N457,760, which is less than the sum claimed by the Claimant. The sum claimed by the Claimant as refund did not also arise from the medical bills of the Claimant. He told the court that the Defendant paid the sum of N1,915,000 for his medical bills from the insurance payment. Then in his further evidence, he said the sum paid by the Defendant for his medical expenses from the insurance money was the sum of N1,413,506. The evidence of the Claimant with respect to the amount paid for his medical bills is at variance. In any case, the Claimant has shown that his medical bills were settled by the defendant. I did not see the claim for refund arising from unsettled medical bills. There is no evidence whatsoever from the Claimant to show how he became entitled to the refund of the sum of N573,710 from the defendant. In conclusion of this judgment, I find and hold that the Claimant has not proved his case. Consequently, he is not entitled to the reliefs sought by him. Specifically, reliefs a, b, c, d, e and g are hereby dismissed. Relief f is struck out. I hereby order the Defendant to pay to the Claimant, one-month salary which ought to have been paid to him in lieu of notice of termination of his employment. I make this order pursuant to the powers conferred on this court in Section 14 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006. No order as to cost. Judgment is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Judge