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JUDGMENT The Claimant commenced this suit vide a Complaint filed on 13th October 2016. The reliefs sought by the Claimant against the Defendants are as follows: a. A Declaration that having been forced to retire from service by the Defendants before the due date, the Claimant is entitled to her full pension befits and gratuities. b. A Declaration that having gone back on their option to allow her complete 35 years unbroken years of civil service, even when she has not attained the retirement age of 60 years, she is entitled to her arrears of salary for the period between 1st January 2007 and 22nd July 2009. c. An Order of the court mandating the Defendants to pay the Claimant the sum of N9,372,166 being arrears of salaries for 30 months, i.e. from 1st January 2006 to 22nd July 2009 when she was wrongfully kept away from her employment. d. An Order of the court directing the Defendants to deduct and remit her pension contributions for the period January 2007 to July 2009 to her retirement savings account with First Guarantee Pension Limited with PIN No. PEN200090889419. e. An Order mandating the Defendants to remit the Claimant’s pension contributions for the months of January 2012 to November 2012 into her retirement savings account with First Guarantee Pension Limited with PIN No. PEN200090889419. f. An Order for payment of general damages in the sum of N10,000,000 for the trauma, suffering and embarrassment caused the Claimant by the Defendants’ action. g. Cost of action in the sum of N2,000,000. In their statement of defence, the Defendants included a counter-claim against the Claimant. The reliefs sought in the counter-claim are as follows: i. An Order mandating the Claimant to pay the Defendants the sum of N1,409,158.3 being the excess salary inadvertently paid to the Claimant from October 2013 to February 2014. ii. An Order for the payment of the sum of N20,000,000 as general damages iii. The cost of the action. Pleadings were duly exchanged and intervening applications duly taken and resolved. Trial commenced on the 30th day of November 2017. The Claimant testified for herself as CW1. One Garba Musa testified for the Defendants as DW1. Hearing ended on 27th November 2018 and parties were ordered to file Final Written Addresses. These were accordingly filed and duly regularized. Parties adopted their respective addresses on the 4th day of March 2019. CLAIMANT’S CASE In proving her claims, the Claimant testified as the only witness in her case. Going by the averments in the Claimant’s pleadings and in the evidence given by her, the Claimant’s case is that she was an employee of the Defendants in its Hospital Management Board as a Chief Nursing Officer, which employment has statutory flavour, and she was given an employment letter to that effect. She was wrongfully disengaged from service between the months of October 2006 and July 2009 when she had not reached the mandatory paid service of 35 unbroken years of service in the civil service or attained the mandatory retirement of 60 years in accordance to the Civil Service Rules. She contested her disengagement from service and she was reinstated through a letter dated 22nd July 2009. In the letter, the Defendants told her that she was not entitled to financial benefits or promotion between the periods she was disengaged. If she had not been wrongfully disengaged for 30 months in the first place, she would have been due for retirement in October 2013 when she would have completed 35 years in service. The Claimant further stated that when the Defendants told her that she was not entitled to financial benefits or promotion between the period she was disengaged, the Defendants chose to allow her complete her unbroken 35 years of service. Accordingly, her time of retirement was automatically extended to October 2016. However, the Defendants breached this understanding when they wrongfully disengaged her for the second time with effect from 21st February 2014 in a notice of disengagement. In response to the letter of disengagement, she wrote a letter dated 23rd June 2014 to the 1st Defendant contesting her disengagement. She demanded withdrawal of the letter of disengagement or payment of her full entitlements for the period from October 2006 to July 2009 when she was kept away from her employment. The Defendants did not reply her said letter or the reminder she wrote on 18th September 2015. They also did not pay her retirement’s benefits or arrears of salaries. Then on 14th March 2016, her solicitors wrote a letter to the 2nd Defendant. The Defendants responded in a letter dated 22nd March 2016 wherein the Claimant was informed that her matter is receiving due attention. It is the Claimant’s statement also that for the period in October 2006 to July 2009 when she was wrongfully kept away from her employment, she was entitled to the sum of N9,372,166 at monthly salary of N277,831.66. She also stated that she opened a retirement savings account with First Guarantee Pension Limited with PIN NO. PEN200090889419 into which her employers pay in her monthly pension contributions. Between January 2012 and November 2012, her pension, amounting to the sum of N380,437.42, was not remitted into her retirement savings account. In addition, the Claimant averred in his reply to the statement of defence and in his further evidence that compulsory retirement in the civil service is 60 years of age or 35 years of pensionable service whichever is earlier. Due to the period of 1st January 2007 and 29th July 2009, a period of 31 months’ or 2 years and 7 months, when she was wrongfully kept away from her employment without justification, she could not have served for 35 years as at 27th October 2013 or reached 60 years of age at that date. Thus, she was not expected to retire on 27th October 2013. She said also that as at the time she was retired on 21st February 2014, she was not due for retirement as she had only put in 33 years of service at the time. Due to her wrongful retirement from the period 1/1/2007 to 22/7/2009, she was no more expected to retire on 27/10/2013 but in May 2016 when she would have properly served for 35 years in line with the Public Service Rules. According to the Claimant, the salaries paid to her between October 2013 and February 2014 were her entitlements for work done and ought not to be refunded. She also said the Defendants did not remit her pension between January 2012 and November 2012. In further support of her claims, the Claimant tendered several documents in evidence. These documents were admitted and marked Exhibits A to M6. DEFENDANTS’ CASE On the part of the Defendants, they called one witness. DW1 is Garba Musa, an Assistant Chief Executive officer of the Department of Administration and Finance, FCT Hospital Management Board, Health and Human Resources Secretariat, Federal Capital Territory Administration. In the evidence of DW1, which is in line with the facts pleaded by the Defendants in their statement of defence and counter claim, he said the Claimant was employed on 27th October 1978 by the Edo State Hospital Management Board as student community midwife on salary grade level 4. The Claimant transferred her service to the Federal Civil Service Commission and was deployed to the then Ministry of Federal Capital Territory Administration on 18th November 2004 but to take effect from 8th October 2002 being the date the Claimant resumed duty. On resumption of duty, the Claimant was posted to Wuse General Hospital of FCT Hospital Management Board. The Claimant served up till 1st October 2006 when she was retired from service by the Defendants as a result of restructuring. The Claimant appealed against her retirement and she was reinstated into the service vide a letter dated 22nd July 2009. The conditions of her reinstatement, as contained in the letter, are as follows: that the period between October 2006 and her assumption of duty shall not attract financial benefits or promotion in retrospect; that the Claimant shall refund the retirement benefits earlier collected or alternatively, the sum shall be deducted from the Claimant’s monthly salary; that the restoration of her salary will commence from the date she resumes duty. DW1 stated that the Claimant accepted the reinstatement and all these conditions in an acceptance letter signed by the Claimant on 20th September 2010. The Claimant also stated that she was on national assignment and wished to resume duty at the end of the national assignment. As at the date of her retirement, the Claimant was a Chief Nursing Officer on grade level 14 and she was reinstated to the same position and level as there was no break in the service of the Claimant at the time of her reinstatement. The Claimant resumed duty on 20th February 2012, as evidenced by the assumption of duty certificate signed on that date by the head of department of nursing department, and she was paid her salaries from the date she resumed duty up till February 2014. The Claimant was posted to Wuse District Hospital vide a posting letter dated 19th December 2011. The Defendants did not deduct any sum from the Claimant’s salary, and they did not receive refund of the retirement benefits earlier paid to the Claimant. DW1 stated further that compulsory retirement age in the civil service is either 60 years of age of 35 years of pensionable service whichever is earlier. On 21st February 2014, the Defendants issued the Claimant a notice of retirement from service. The Claimant started her appointment on 27th October 1978 and was expected to retire on 27th October 2013 when she served for 35 years in line with the Public Service Rules. When the Defendants observed that the Claimant was overdue for retirement, the Defendants commenced retirement process of the Claimant and other staff who are overdue in service. The Defendants inadvertently paid the Claimant excess salary from October 2013 to February 2014 in the total sum of N1,409,158,03. The claimant was directed to refund the excess salary or else it will be deducted from her retirement benefits. The Claimant did not refund the excess salary. That the Claimant was not entitled to salary between October 2006 and July 2009 because she did not work for that period. DW1 further stated that the Claimant’s entire pension has been remitted to her retirement savings account. Through DW1, Exhibits N to Y were tendered in evidence by the Defendants. After the parties had called their witnesses, counsels for the parties filed their final written addresses which were adopted on 4/3/2019. DEFENDANTS’ WRITTEN ADDRESS In their final written address, learned counsel for the Defendants formulated the following issues for determination to wit; 1. Whether this suit is statue barred by virtue of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, Cap P 41, Vol. 14, LFN, 2004. 2. Whether the 2nd and 3rd Defendants are not legal persons or juristic persons. 3. Whether the Claimant has discharged the burden of proof placed on her by proving her case on the balance of probability and preponderance of evidence, to entitle her to the reliefs sought. 4. Whether the Defendants are not entitled to the reliefs sought and contained in their Counter-Claim? On Issue One, it was the submission of learned counsel to the Defendant that this action is statute barred by operation of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, Cap P41 LFN, 2004 when it was instituted on the 13th October 2016. See HASSAN vs. ALIYU (2010) 17 NWLR (Pt. I223), 547 at 549, Ratio 1 & 7, ABUBAKAR vs. GOV. GOMBE STATE (2002) 17 NWLR (Pt. 797), 533 at 548-548 and DAUDU vs. UNAM (2002) 17 NWIR (Pt.769), 362 at 365-366. Counsel also submitted that the Claimant’s retirement from Service was carried out in pursuance or execution of appropriate lows and public duty within the extended definition given in the case of IBRAHIM vs. JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt. 584) 1. On Issue Two, it was the contention of the Defendants counsel the 2nd and 3rd Defendants are not legal or juristic persons neither expressly nor impliedly created by any statute, therefore they cannot sue or be sued in their names whatsoever. Counsel placed emphasis on the fact that the constitution and not the parties has the right to confer jurisdiction on the court and that where a court has no jurisdiction to try a matter, the matter ought to be struck out. See GOV. KWARA STATE vs. LAWAL. (2007) 13 NWIR (Pt. 1051), 347 at 357 – 358. Counsel urged the Court to uphold their objection and dismiss this suit for being stale. See ETIM vs. IGP (2001) 11 NWLR (Pt. 724), 272. On Issue Three, counsel placed reliance on Section 136(1) of the Evidence Act and submitted that the Claimant was unable to discharge the burden of proof placed on her to prove her case on the preponderance of evidence. See SMAB INTER-TRADE LIMITED vs. BUKAR ALI BULANGU (2013) LPELR-214I (CA). In addition, counsel submitted that a court is bound by the terms of a contract and that where the parties have embodied the terms of their contract in a written document, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to add to, subtract from or contradict the terms of the written instrument. See S.F. & P. LTD. vs. N.D.I.C (2012) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1309), 522 @ 528. On Issue Four, learned counsel for the Defendant urged the court to hold that the Defendants had proved their case and are therefore entitled to the reliefs sought and contained in their counter – claim. CLAIMANT’S WRITTEN ADDRESS In the Claimant’s final written address, learned counsel for the Claimant formulated the following issues for determination to wit: 1. Whether this action is maintainable against the Defendants in view of Section 2(a) of the Public Officer's Protection Act, Chapter P41, Vol. 14, LFN, 2004. 2. Whether the 2nd and 3rd Defendants are not legal persons or juristic persons. 3. Whether the Claimant is entitled to any of her reliefs having regard to the pleadings and totality of evidence (both oral and documentary) in this case. 4. Whether in the light of the evidence and pleadings, in this case, the Defendants are entitled to the grant of the reliefs contained in their counter-claim. On Issue One, learned counsel for the Claimant argued that the submission of the Defendants on statute bar was misconceived. Counsel submitted that an examination of Section 2 (a), the court will find that the statutory limitation period of three months does not begin to run in a case of continuance of damage or injury until the cessation of the damage or injury. See A.G, FEDERATION vs. ABACHA (2010) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1221) 1 @ 24, PARAS F- G. On Issue Two, counsel submitted that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants can sue and be sued in their name and that an artificial body with juristic personality need not necessarily be an incorporated body created by statute, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of CHIEF GANI FAWEHINMI vs. NIGERIAN BAR ASSOCIATION & 4 ORS (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt. 105). On Issue three, counsel urged the court to grant the reliefs sought by the Claimant and find that the Claimant’s employment has statutory flavour, the Claimant is entitled to arrears of salary from 1st October 2006 to July 2009 and that the Claimant is entitled to her Pension contributions during the period from 1st October 2006 to July 2009 and January 2012 to November 2012. On Issue four, counsel argued that the Claimant was entitled to the claims sought from the court and submitted that they had led evidence to attest to this fact. DEFENDANTS REPLY In their reply on points of law, the Defendant reiterated his submission in his final written address. Counsel submitted that documentary evidence is preferable to oral statement where such documents exist and that the Defendants reinstated the Claimant into service of the Defendants vide Exhibit J & P is conditional, and the Claimant having unconditionally accepted the reinstatement with the terms and condition therein in Exhibit Q, she cannot withdraw from it. See YADIS (NIG.) LTD vs. G.N.I.C LTD (2007) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1055) S.C. 584 @ 590, Ratio 4. Counsel further argued that the Claimant claims that she is entitled to her pension contributions during the period from 1st October 2006 to July 2009 and failure to produce any document to prove same, the court ought to discountenance same. Counsel urged the court to discountenance the argument of the Claimant and find in favour of the Defendant. Further arguments in respect of the various addresses were duly considered. Reference will be made to them in the course of this judgment if necessary. COURT DECISION In a preliminary objection filed by the Defendants on 25th April 2017, they contended that the Claimant’s suit is statute barred by the effect of Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Act, and that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants cannot be sued, as they are not juristic persons. The objection was heard on 23rd May 2017. In a bench ruling delivered same day, this court, per E.D.E. Esele J, held that the ruling on the NPO is reserved to be delivered together with the judgment in the substantive suit. In the final written address of the Defendants, their counsel also raised and argued the same grounds of objection. The time is now ripe for this court to determine the Defendants’ objection before proceeding to consider the main case, that is if it will still be necessary to do so. One of the grounds of the Defendants’ objection is that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants are not legal or juristic persons and as such, they cannot sue or be sued in their names. It was submitted by counsel for the Defendants that courts do not have jurisdiction to entertain suits against non-juristic persons. In the response of the learned counsel for the Claimant to this issue, it was submitted that it is not necessary for an artificial body to be created by statute before can sue or be sued. Counsel stated further that capacity to sue or be can may arise by implication when a body has been assigned specific public functions and in the exercise of those functions, rights of other persons are affected. The 2nd and 3rd Defendants are assigned public functions and 2nd Defendant dealt with the Claimant in its name with which sued as shown in Exhibits F, P and U. Since the 2nd and 3rd Defendants have the capacity to carry it public functions, they are juristic persons with capacity to be sued. The Defendants’ contention is that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants are not juristic persons because they are not established by statute. The Claimant’s counsel mentioned that the 2nd Defendant was created on 31st December 2004 for the administration of the Federal Capital Territory, but counsel failed to mention the statute or instrument which created the 2nd Defendant. The counsel to the Claimant did not say anything as to whether or not the 3rd Defendant is a creation of statute. Having considered the arguments of learned counsel for the Claimant, it has not been shown that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants are creation of statute. It is therefore clear to me that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants are not statutory establishments. The law recognizes two categories of persons who can sue or be sued in the court. They are natural persons or artificial persons or institutions having juristic personality. Thus, a party who commences an action in court or who is sued to court must be a person known to law, either as natural person or corporation (aggregate or sole). See ZAIN NIG. LTD vs. ILORIN (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 681) 1518 at 1550; N.F.C.A. vs. LALOKO (2003) FWLR (Pt. 144) 482 at 495-496. From the submissions of counsel for the parties, there is no doubt that the Defendants are not creation of statute. Does this fact imply that they cannot be sued? Although the law is that it is only natural persons or corporations that have the capacity to sue and be sued, the law has created an exception whereby some bodies are impliedly conferred with right to sue or be sued even though unincorporated or created by statute. The bodies which enjoy such privilege are not legal persons so to say but have a right to sue or be sued by the name with which they are known or operate. In THOMAS vs. LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE BOARD (1965) 1 All NLR 174, the Supreme Court held that unincorporated bodies which have power to do certain acts which can result in injury to others are implied to have power to sue and be sued for those acts. Also, in KPEBIMOH vs. THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS, WESTERN IJAW TEACHERS TRAINING COLLEGE (1966) 1 NMLR 130 at 133, the capacity of an unincorporated body to be sued was stated as follows: "Now, although a corporation and an individual or individuals may be the only entity known to the common law who can sue or be sued, it is competent to the Legislature to give to an association of individuals which is neither a corporation nor a partnership nor an individual a capacity for owning property and acting by agents, and such capacity in the absence of express enactment to the contrary involves the necessary correlative of liability to the extent of such property for the acts and defaults of such agents. It is beside the mark to say of such an association that it is unknown to the common law. See also CARLEN (NIG.) LIMITED vs. UNIVERSITY OF JOS [1994] 1 NWLR (Pt. 323) 631, where it was held that a thing or body which can own property, employ servants and which can inflict injury must be taken to have impliedly been given the power to make it suable in a court of law for injuries done by it. From the foregoing, it is clear that some unincorporated bodies with power to carry out certain functions also have power to be sued for their actions or liabilities. In this case, the Claimant claims are basically for payment of arrears of salary for the period October 2006 to July 2009 and her pension. She claims the reliefs from the Defendant because, according to her, they are her employers and wrongfully retired her between the period October 2006 and July 2009. I have examined the documents tendered in evidence by the Claimant. Some of them are correspondences from the 2nd Defendant to the Claimant and they include notices of retirement, letter of reinstatement, payslips, among others. From the exhibits, the cause of the Claimant’s action was done by the 2nd Defendant and from the payslips, the duty to pay the salary being claimed by Claimant is that of the 2nd Defendant. That is to say the 2nd Defendant is a body in existence with public functions and powers to take decision which could affect the rights of person. If in the exercise of its functions the right of anyone is infringed, can it be said that the 2nd Defendant cannot be sued simply because it was not created by statute? I think not. If the 2nd Defendant cannot be sued for its actions, it should not also exist as a public body to carry out public functions. This is because if it cannot be answerable for its wrongdoing by being sued in court, it will mean that it has been given a blanket licence to commit wrongdoings. It will also mean that those who are affected by the actions of the 2nd Defendant will be left without any remedy. This cannot be the intention of the common law when it was being laid down that non-juristic persons cannot sue or be sued. I think it was for this reason the exception to the effect that unincorporated bodies which have power to do certain acts which can result in injury to others are implied to have power to sue and be sued for those acts. Furthermore, this court is a court of equity. It will not allow a wrong to stay unaddressed simply because the Defendant who committed the wrong is not created by statute. In as much as that body has an identity and has power to do certain acts which can result in injury to others, it can be sued. It is on the strength of the foregoing I hold that the 2nd Defendant can be sued in this action for redress in respect of acts done by it or for the performance of its obligation to the Claimant. As for the 3rd Defendant, the documents before me reveal that it is only a department in the 2nd Defendant. In view of this fact and in addition to the fact that the 3rd Defendant is not shown to be a creation of statute, the 3rd Defendant cannot be or be made a party in this suit. It is the 2nd Defendant and not the 3rd Defendant that should be sued for the claims of the Claimant in this case. Consequently, the 3rd Defendant is struck out from this suit. Another ground of the Defendants objection is that the Claimant’s suit is statute barred by Section 2 (a) of POPA. It was submitted by counsel for the Defendants that the Defendants are public officers and their act complained of by the Claimant has to do with the execution of or failure to exercise their public duty or law. It was also submitted that the averments in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Claimant’s statement of facts show that the Claimant’s cause of action arose on 21st February 2014 when she was issued with notification of retirement from service or on 23rd June 2014 when she wrote to the 1st Defendant to contest the retirement. But the Claimant filed this suit on 13th October 2016 which is a period more than 3 months from when her cause of action arose. Counsel submitted that the suit is statute barred and should be dismissed. In response, the Claimant’s counsel submitted that none payment of the Claimant’s salary is a continuous injury to date. It was submitted that each day the Claimant’s salary and pension remain unpaid constitute continuing damage or injury to her. Counsel argued further that Section 2 of POPA does not apply to claims for work or labour done. Since the Claimant’s suit is for recovery of arrears of salary, pension and other entitlements which come under payments for work and labour already done, it is not statute barred. The main claims of the Claimant in this suit are those in reliefs a, b, c, d and e of the Complaint. What the Claimant sought for in this reliefs are payment of her salary arrears for the period 1st January 2007 to 22nd July 2009 and the remittance of her pension contributions for the same period and that of January 2012 to November 2012. It is now settled that claim for unpaid salary and claim for pension are not affected by POPA or statutes of limitation. See OSUN STATE GOVERNMENT vs. DALAMI (NIG) LTD. (2007) NWLR (Pt.1038) 66; F.G.N vs. ZEBRA ENERGY LTD. (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt. 891) 162 at 197; POPOOLA vs. A.G. KWARA STATE (2011) All FWLR (Pt.604) 175. These authorities have laid down the exceptions to the application of Section 2 (a) of POPA. This court too, in a number of its decisions, has maintained the position that claims for salaries, pension or gratuity relating to labour performed is not affected by Section 2 (a) of POPA. Once it is shown that the claim is for payment of entitlements for work or labour done, POPA will not be allowed to bar the action. Taking into consideration the reliefs sought by the Claimant in this suit, it is my view that the case of the Claimant clearly falls into the permissible exceptions to POPA. I therefore hold that Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act does not apply to this case. This suit is not statute barred. I can now examine and determine the claims of the parties in this suit. In doing so, I will adopt issues 3 and 4 formulated by the counsels for the parties in the final written addresses but I will rephrase them in this manner: 1. Whether the Claimant has proved her case to entitle her to the reliefs she sought in this action. 2. Whether the Defendants are entitled to the reliefs sought in the counter claim. ISSUE 1: In the pleadings and the evidence adduced by the parties, they have agreed that the Claimant’s employment with the Defendants was an employment in the Civil Service and the employment was regulated by the Public Service Rules. In view of that assertion, it is necessary I mention here that employment regulated by the PSR is an employment protected by statute. See FUT, YOLA vs. MAIWUYA (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 677) 753 at 762. Therefore, the Claimant’s employment with the Defendants was employment regulated by statute. The parties have also agreed that under the PSR, compulsory retirement in the Civil Service is either 35 years of service or 60 years of age, whichever comes first. Now, the Claimant’s contention in this case is that between the months of October 2006 and July 2009 when she was retired from service, she had not served for 35 years in service nor attained the mandatory retirement age of 60 years under the Civil Service Rules. She was reinstated vide a letter dated 22nd July 2009 but again, she was retired from service with effect from 21st February 2014. She averred that for the period from October 2006 to July 2009 when she was wrongfully kept away from her employment, she was entitled to be paid her salaries for the period amounting to the sum of N9,372,166 at a monthly salary of N277,831.66. It is for this reason the Claimant claims in reliefs (b) and (c) the sum of N9,372,166 as arrears of her salary for the period January 2007 to July 2009. On the other hand, the Defendants contended that although the Claimant was retired from service on 1st October 2006 and then reinstated in July 2009, there was no break in the service of the Claimant at the time of her reinstatement. The Claimant entered the civil service on 27th October 1978 and was expected to retire on 27th October 2013 when she served for 35 years in line with the Public Service Rules. The Defendants further asserted that that the Claimant was not entitled to salary between October 2006 and July 2009 because she did not work for that period. From the case of the parties and the claims of the Claimant for arrears of salaries between October 2006 and July 2009 when she was on retirement, the simple issue to be considered is whether the period the Claimant was on retirement between October 2006 and July 2009 was part of her service years. In the evidence of DW1, he said the Claimant was employed into the civil service of Edo State on 27th October 1978 but she later on transferred her service to the Federal Civil Service Commission who deployed the Claimant to the then Ministry of Federal Capital Territory Administration, which is now the 2nd Defendant, on 18th November 2004 but to take effect from 8th October 2002. Exhibit K (and Exhibit N) is the letter of the Claimant’s transfer of service and deployment to the 2nd Defendant. When the Claimant was cross examined by counsel for the Defendants, she admitted that the date of her 1st appointment was October 1978. It thus appears the fact that the Claimant was employed into the Civil Service on 27th October 1978 is not in dispute. The Public Service Rules prescribes 35 years of service or 60 years of age for compulsory retirement from service. From 27th October 1978, the Claimant ought to retire from service on 27th October 2013 being the date she would clock 35 years in service. The Claimant said she was retired on 1st October 2006. The retirement letter is Exhibit L dated 1st October 2006. The Defendants retired the Claimant from service with effect from 1st October 2006. As at the date of that retirement, the Claimant had not spent 35 years in service. The facts and evidence of the parties disclose that the Claimant was later reinstated into service vide a letter dated 22nd July 2009, Exhibit J, and then she was again retired vide Exhibit A dated 21st October 2014. In paragraphs 8 and 9 of the statement of facts, the Claimant averred that had she not been wrongfully disengaged from October 2006 to July 2009, she would have been due for retirement in October 2013 when she would have completed 35 years in service. She also stated that the Defendants automatically extended her retirement date to October 2016 and chose to allow her complete her unbroken 35 years of service when they told her that she was not entitled to financial benefits or promotion between the periods she was disengaged. Also, in the Claimant’s reply to the statement of defence and defence to counter claim, she averred that the period from 1st January 2007 to 29th July 2009 when she was kept away from her employment, she could not have served for 35 years as at 27th October 2013 and she was not expected to retire on 27th October 2013 because due to the wrongful retirement covering 1/1/2007 to 22/7/2009, her retirement date ought to be in May 2016 when she would have properly served for 35 years. What the Claimant contends in effect is that she was not to retire in October 2013 but to retire in October 2016 because the period of her retirement between October 2006 and July 2009 did not count in her years of service and as such, her retirement date automatically extended to October 2016 when she would clock 35 years in service. With this assertion of the Claimant, she appears to be confused as to what she wanted in this action. In the first place, she claims for payment of her salaries for the period she was retired between October 2006 and July 2009. That is to say, the Claimant wanted this court to believe she remained in service in that period of her first retirement and that the period formed part of her period of service. The other aspect she presented is in conflict with her claim in this case. When the Claimant’s retirement date is extended to October 2016, as she asserted, it will imply that the period of her 1st retirement will not count as part of her period of service. Therefore, she does not have any reason or business to claim for salaries she ought to earn for the period of her first retirement. It will amount to double reward to the Claimant if she is awarded the salaries claimed and the same time extending her date of retirement to October 2016. In any case, what she claims in this case is unpaid salaries during the period of the 2006 to 2009 retirement and not to pronounce that she was due for retirement in October 2016. In my view, the Claimant will be entitled to claim for salary for the period from October 2006 to July 2009 when it is determined that the period counted as part of her service years. I have mentioned it earlier that the Claimant ought to complete 35 years of service on 27th October 2013. The Claimant was actually retired the second time in a letter dated 21st February 2014. The letter is Exhibit A. In the letter, the Claimant was informed that she was overdue for retirement as she was to have retired since 27th October 2013. Having served for more than 35 years, the Claimant was accordingly disengaged with immediate effect with instructions to refund salaries she was paid from 27th October 2013. From the content of the letter, the Defendants retired the Claimant with effect from 27th October 2013. By the date of the second retirement, the Claimant ordinarily had completed 35 years in service. In view of the date of the Claimant’s retirement by the Defendant, it is clear that the period October 2006 to July 2009 was counted as part of her 35 years of service. The Defendants further admitted to this fact when they aver in paragraph 13 of the statement of defence that there was no break in the service of the Claimant at the time of her reinstatement in July 2009. Under cross examination, DW1 said that when the Claimant ought to retire on 27th October 2013, the period of her disengagement between 2006 and 2009 was considered as part of her 35 years of service. He also said the Claimant was considered to be in service in the period. Therefore, it is clear that the period from October 2006 to July 2009 was part of the Claimant’s period of service and it was reckoned with in retiring the Claimant from service on 27th October 2013. This takes me to the first relief sought by the Claimant where she sought a declaration that she is entitled to her full pension benefits and gratuity having been forced to retire before her due date. This relief appears to relate to the Claimant’s retirement of 27th October 2013 and her contention that she ought to retire in October 2016. I have held in this judgment that the Claimant was properly retired on 27th October 2013. The Claimant was not retired before her due date. Therefore, I find no merit in the declaration sought by the Claimant. The Defendants aver that the Claimant is not entitled to the salary she claims for the period October 2006 to July 2009. According to the Defendants, the Claimant did not work for the period. They also relied on one of the conditions of her reinstatement in Exhibit J which states that the period between October 2006 and the Claimant’s assumption of duty shall not attract financial benefits or promotion in retrospect. It is now not in doubt that the Claimant was not due for retirement when she was retired in October 2006. The fact that the Defendants retired the Claimant when she was not due for retirement was a violation of the PSR. The Defendants acknowledged their fault in the retirement of the Claimant when they saw reasons in her appeals and decided to reinstate her. But the Claimant had been kept away from her employment from October 2006 to July 2009 without justification and the Defendants also took the period into account in retiring the Claimant from service. The Claimant should not be allowed to suffer on two fronts on a matter which was entirely the fault of the Defendants. In my view, the Claimant is entitled to her salaries for the period. The Defendants cannot be heard to say the Claimant did not work in the period when it was them who wrongfully kept her from working in the period. Let me also say that the condition for the Claimant’s reinstatement which states that she is not entitled to financial benefits or promotion between the period of October 2006 and her assumption of duty cannot be used to deny the Claimant her lawful entitlements. The Claimant’s employment is regulated by statute. Therefore, she cannot be retired from service in a manner which contravenes the PSR. As I have found in this judgment that the Claimant’s retirement in October 2006 was not in accordance with the PSR, the implication is that the retirement was of no effect. Consequently, the Claimant is entitled to her salaries for the period and the conditions in the letter of reinstatement cannot stop her lawful entitlement. In view of the above findings, it is now necessary to determine how much was the total salary not paid to the Claimant within the period of her retirement in 2006. The sum claimed by the Claimant as her total unpaid salary for the period of retirement is the sum of N9,372,166. In paragraph 18 of the statement of facts, the Claimant pleaded that for the period of October 2006 to July 2009 when she was wrongfully kept away from her employment, she was entitled to the sum of N9,372,166 at a monthly salary of N277,831.66. It is clear from this averment that the Claimant claims salary for the months of October 2006 to July 2009. However, she changed her case in her reply to the statement of defence when she said she was kept away from her employment from 1st January 2007 to 29th July 2009. In her claims also, particularly reliefs b and c, the Claimant claims for salaries from January 2007 to July 2009. Although the facts are clear to the effect that the Claimant was retired in October 2006 and was reinstated in July 2009, there is no explanation from the Claimant as to why she moved her claim for unpaid salaries to start from January 2007. Her pleading and evidence show she claims from October 2006 but what she claims is from January 2007. Among the payslips tendered by the Claimant in evidence are those for October and December 2006. These are marked Exhibit M3 (f) and (g) respectively. They show that the Claimant was paid salaries for these months. Perhaps, the Claimant received salaries for the months of October to December 2006 that was why her claim did not cover these months. I will hold that since the Claimant claims from January 2007 to July 2009, she is deemed to have conceded to have been paid salary for October, November and December 2006. The Claimant said her monthly salary was N277,831.66 and she calculated her total unpaid salary from January 2007 to July 2009 to be the sum of N9,372,166. The last salary received by the Claimant before her retirement in October 2006 was for the month of September 2006. The payslip for this month is Exhibit M3 (e). The sum of N70,536.75 was paid to the Claimant as salary for that month. The Claimant also received salaries for October to December 2006. The sums paid to her for each month was N70,536.75. That is to say the Claimant’s salary at the time of her retirement in October 2006 was N70,536.75. After the Claimant’s reinstatement, the evidence of the first salary she received is Exhibit M4, being salary slip for May 2012. It shows the Claimant was paid the sum of N1,358,407.43, representing arrears of salary. There is no breakdown of the months comprised in the arrears and how much was the salary for each month. It is however observed that there was increase in the Claimant’s salary from the last salary before the retirement. As it is, this court does not know what the amount of the Claimant’s salary was between January 2007 and July 2009. The N277, 831.66 stated by the Claimant was the amount of the last salaries she received before she was given the retirement letter in February 2014 as shown in Exhibits M6 and T22. It is thus clear to me that the Claimant used her salary as at the time she was retired in February 2014 to calculate her salary for the period of January 2007 to July 2009. There is no evidence as to what the Claimant ought to be paid as salary between January 2007 and July 2009. To use the Claimant’s salary as at the time of retirement in 2014 to calculate her unpaid salaries, as she did, will be grossly improper. It is my view in this judgment that the claimant is entitled to her salaries for the period of January 2007 to July 2009. However, the amount she claims in this action is not feasible in view of how she arrived at the figure. The appropriate order to make in the circumstance is for the Defendants to calculate the appropriate salaries of the Claimant, using her positions and grade level from January 2007 to July 2009 and pay same to her. The Claimant also claims payment of her pension contributions. This is in reliefs (d) and (e) of the Complaint. What she sought in these reliefs is the remittance of her pension contributions for the period from January 2007 to July 2009 and January 2012 to November 2012 into her retirement savings account. In her evidence, the Claimant said she opened a retirement savings account with First Guarantee Pension Limited with PIN NO. PEN 200090889419 into which her employers pay her monthly pension contributions. Between January 2012 and November 2012, her pension, amounting to the sum of N380,437.42, was not remitted into her retirement savings account. The Defendants denied the allegation of the Claimant and averred that all the pension of the Claimant has been remitted to her retirement savings account. It is observed that the Claimant did not give any evidence relating to none remittance of her pension between January 2007 to July 2009. She has however stated in her evidence that it was this period she was wrongly retired, and salaries were not paid to her in the period. Without much ado, the necessary implication of the averments of the Claimant is that her pension contributions were also not deducted and remitted into retirement saving account in the period. The Defendants did not deny not paying salaries to the Claimant from January 2017 to July 2009. They did not also show any evidence of payment of the claimant’s pension within the period. From the items on the payslips put in evidence in this case, it is noted that pension contributions are paid same time as salary and the amounts are indicated in the payslip. Since salaries were not paid to the Claimant from January 2007 to July 2009, it is my finding that her pension contributions for the period were also not deducted and remitted into her retirement savings account. In my conclusion on the Claimant’s claim for salary arrears for the period 2007 to 2009, I did hold that the Defendants should calculate the salary payable to the Claimant for the period. With regard to the Claimant’s pension contribution for the period, I will order the Defendants to deduct the Claimant’s pension contributions from the salary payable to her for the period January 2007 to July 2009 and remit same to her retirement savings account. The balance of the salary is what should be paid to her. As for the pension for January 2012 to November 2012, I have examined the payslips for the months of May, June, July, August, September, October, November and December 2012. They are Exhibits M4 (a to g). The payslips for May, June, July, August, September, October and November 2012 did not show any deduction for pension. The payslip for December 2012 shows that the sum of N17,345.11 was deducted from the Claimant’s salary as pension. It is thus clear that the Defendants did not deduct and remit any pension contribution for the Claimant for the months of January 2012 to November 2012. It is observed that the amount of monthly pension is usually deducted from the Claimant’s salaries, together with other deductions. It is after the deductions that the net pay is paid to the Claimant as salary. Now, if the amount for pension was not deducted from the Claimant’s salary for the period, it means that it was part of the sum paid to the Claimant after the other deductions were made. It is only when an amount for pension was deducted from her salary that it can be remitted into the Claimant’s retirement saving account. If nothing was deducted from her salaries for the period as pension, nothing can also be remitted into her retirement savings account as pension. Therefore, the fact that the Claimant was paid her salaries for the months without pension deducted therefrom implies that the amount which ought to be deducted as pension had been paid directly to the Claimant. In that case, I cannot order the Defendants to deduct pension at this stage, unless I first order the Claimant to refund the salaries for the period to the Defendants to enable the deduction to be made. Since that cannot be done at this state, I will simple hold that the Claimant is not entitled to her claim for deduction and remittance of pension contribution for the months of January 2012 to November 2012. In reliefs (f) and (g), the Claimant claims the sum of N10,000,000 as general damages and the sum of N2,000,000 as cost of action. These claims were not proved. The Claimant sought the general damages for the trauma, suffering and embarrassment caused to her by the Defendants’ action. But she did not, neither in her pleadings or evidence, mention that the Defendants’ action caused her any suffering or trauma. This is in addition to the settled principle that, save for situations where the court will award damages in the form of salary in lieu of notice where notice of termination of employment was required but not given, general damages is not awarded in matters between employer and employee. See ARINZE vs. FIRST BANK (2000) 1 NWLR (Pt. 639) 78; PIONEER MILLING CO. LTD. vs. NANSING (2003) FWLR (Pt. 151) 1820 at 1827-1828. Consequently, reliefs (f) and (g) hereby fail. ISSUE 2: The Defendants counter-claimed against the Claimant for a refund of the excess salary paid to the claimant from October 2013 to February 2014. The sum claimed from the Claimant as salary paid to him for the period is the N1,409,158.3. In the evidence of DW1, he said the Claimant was expected to retire from service on 27th October 2013 when she served for 35 years but when it was discovered that she was overdue for retirement, she was retired in a letter dated 21st February 2014, which is Exhibit A. However, the Defendants inadvertently paid the Claimant excess salary from October 2013 to February 2014 in the total sum of N1,409,158.03. The Claimant was directed to refund the excess salary or else it will be deducted from her retirement benefits but she failed to refund the excess salary. The defence of the Claimant to this claim is that the salaries paid to her from October 2013 to February 2014 were her entitlements for work done and ought not to be refunded. She also attempted to make a case of extended retirement period to justify the salary received by her from October 2013 to February 2014. The Claimant said she was no longer required to retire in October 2013 but in May 2016 because of the exclusion of the period of October 2006 to July 2009 from her years of service. I have already held in this judgment that this position does not hold water. The period of her first retirement counted in her years of service and the correct date for her retirement was October 2013 being the date she completed 35 years in service. The only remedy for the Claimant for the period she was kept from the employment between October 2006 and July 2009 is payment of her salary for the period and not to extend her retirement date. By the provisions of the PSR, the Claimant ought to retire compulsorily from service on 27th October 2013 when she completed 35 years of service. By Rule 020810 (ii) of the PSR, a civil servant cannot remain in service after reaching the retirement date. Consequently, from 27th October 2013, the Claimant ought not to remain in service or entitled to salaries thereafter. Any salary received by the Claimant after the date she ought to have retired was underserved and illegal emolument and must be returned. The Defendants claim the sum of N1,409,158.03 as the salary paid to the Claimant from October 2013 to February 2014. They failed however to state the monthly break down or how the sum was earned to the total amount they claim. Notwithstanding, the Defendants pleaded and tendered the salary payslips of the Claimant in evidence. Exhibits T18, T19, T20, T21 and T22 are the Payslips of the Claimant for the period October 2013 to February 2014. The Claimant too tendered payslips for the months of October 2013 to January 2014 in evidence. These are Exhibits MJ, MK, ML and M6 respectively. These payslips establish the fact that the Claimant was paid salaries by the Defendants after the date she should have retired from service. Part of the salary refund claimed by the Defendant is that paid for the month of October 2013. It has been said in this judgment that the date of the Claimant’s retirement was with effect from 27th October 2013. That is to say the Claimant was in the employment in the month of October 2013 and she is accordingly entitled to the salary for that month. The Defendants claim for refund of salary can be considered only from the months of November 2013. The payslips show that the salaries earned by the Claimant for the months of November 2013, December 2013, January 2014 and February 2014 are N277,831.66, N277,831.66, N277,831.66 and N277,831.66 respectively. Out of these sums, there were deductions, some of which are for the Claimant’s benefit like cooperative contribution, cooperative loan deduction and union dues. While others, such as NHF, pension and tax, are statutory deductions. In my view, the claimant is not entitled to refund the statutory deductions. In the months of November 2013, December 2013, January 2014 and February 2014, statutory deductions per month amounted to N44,578.27. When deducted from the monthly earnings, the total salary received by the Claimant was the sum of N233,253.39 each of the months. Accordingly, the total salary paid to the Claimant for the months of November 2013, December 2013, January 2014 and February 2014 is the sum of N933,013.56. This is the sum the Claimant ought to refund to the Defendants. The Defendants have not convinced me to grant the sum of N1,409,158.03 which they claim as salary refund. The Defendants further claim for general damages in the sum of N20,000,000 and cost of action from the Claimant. The Defendants have not proved any damages suffered or the cost expended in the prosecuting this action. These claims have not been proved. In the averments of the Defendants in the statement of defence and counter claim, they averred that the Claimant did not refund the retirement benefits paid to her when she was first retired in October 2006 neither did they deduct the sum from the subsequent salaries paid to her. Having made this averment, the Defendants did not make any claim on it in the counter claim. In that circumstance, this court has not been called to make any determination with regard to that allegation. In this judgment, I find that the parties are entitled to some reliefs but not in the terms sought by them. Section 14 National Industrial Court Act 2004 empowers this court to grant any relief or remedy to any party in a proceeding before this court which the party appears to be entitled to in respect of any legal or equitable claim brought before the Court so that all matters in dispute between the parties may be completely and finally determined. In accordance with the provision of the Act, I am inclined to grant to the parties the reliefs I find them to be entitled to. In conclusion of the judgment therefore, I make the following pronouncements: 1. The Claimant’s reliefs (a), (d), (f) and (g) fail and are hereby dismissed. Reliefs (b), (c) and (e) are granted in the following terms: i. The Defendants are ordered to calculate the appropriate salaries of the Claimant, using her positions and grade level from January 2007 to July 2009. ii. Having done the calculation of the Claimant’s salary as ordered above, the Defendants should deduct the Claimant’s pension contributions for the period of January 2007 to July 2009 therefrom and remit same to her retirement savings account. The balance of the salary is what should be paid to her. 2. Reliefs (ii) and (iii) sought by the Defendants in the counter claim have no merit and they are hereby dismissed. Relief 1 succeeds only in the sum of N933,013.56. Accordingly, the Claimant is ordered to pay to the Defendants the sum of N933,013.56 being the excess salary paid to the Claimant for the months of November 2013, December 2013, January 2014 and February 2014. 3. It is ordered that the Defendants should deduct the Claimant’s liability (in (2) above) from the total sum payable to the Claimant (in (1) above), and then pay the balance, if any, to the Claimant. 4. The Defendants are mandated to carry out the above orders within 30 days from today. Parties shall each bear their respective costs. Judgment is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Judge