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JUDGMENT The Claimant commenced this suit by a Writ of Summons filed on 10th April 2008 before the Federal High Court, Abuja. The suit was later transferred to this court pursuant to an order of the Federal High Court made on 7th July 2014. When the matter began in this court, the Claimant amended his processes a number of times by leave of this court. In his further amended statement of fact filed on 17th April 2018, the Claimant sought the following reliefs: (a) A Declaration by this Honourable Court that the purported retroactive termination of the Claimant’s appointment/employment was wrongful, unlawful and of no effect. (b) A Declaration that the Claimant is entitled to the arrears of his accrued travel allowances for his travel to South Africa, United Kingdom, United States of America, Italy, Germany and Holland made between February 2005 to October 2006. (c) An Order of this Honourable Court directing the Defendant to re-instate the Claimant back to its employment, same having been wrongfully terminated (d) An Order directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant his salaries of N14,721.97 (Fourteen Thousand, Seven Hundred and Twenty-One Naira, Ninety Seven Kobo) per month and all other entitlements due to the Claimant from May 2007 till the final determination of this suit. (e) An Order directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of $11,600 (Eleven Thousand, Six Hundred Dollars) being special damages for arrears of accrued allowances and entitlements due to the Claimant by virtue of his official duties outside Nigeria during his employment with the Defendant. (f) The sum of N1,000,000.00 (One Million Naira Only) being the amount paid to the Claimant's solicitors for this recovery action. The parties filed and exchanged pleadings in this case and they also called witnesses. Hearing commenced on the 8th day of December 2017. The Claimant testified for himself as CW1. One Mrs. Charity Bailey, an administration Manager testified for the Defendant as DW1. Hearing ended on the 11th day of July 2018 and parties were ordered to file final addresses. Parties’ addresses were duly regularised and adopted on the 4th day of December 2018. CLAIMANT’S CASE The Claimant is the only witness who testified in proof of his claims. In his evidence, the Claimant stated that he was given a temporary appointment by the Defendant on 14th April 1997 as a Production Assistant I. He was later upgraded to a permanent status at the end of 6 months probationary period. On 25th June 2003, he was posted from NTA 2, Channel 5 to the Directorate of Programs HQ, Lagos. He worked in the Directorate of Programs up to January 2005. While in the Defendant’s employment his net monthly salary was N14,712.97 and he was at grade level 6 when his employment was wrongfully terminated. During the employment, he was sent on various official assignments within and outside Nigeria. For his duties outside Nigeria, his allowance was $175 per day which is paid either before or upon return from the trip. In 2005, he went on an official assignment to South Africa. Before he left for the trip on 11th February 2005, he applied for his travelling allowance for 21 days amounting to $2,675. He was told by Mr. Peter Igbo, his boss, that he will be paid when he returned. He was not paid the allowance until the time his employment was terminated. He was sent on another assignment to the United Kingdom via United States of America on 8th May 2005 and his allowances amounted to $5,250. He was also not paid. On 25th September 2006, the Defendant sent him on another assignment to Germany, Italy and Holland. He applied for his travelling allowance in the sum of $3,675 but he was promised to be paid. He went on the trip but the sum has not been paid to him. He made efforts to be paid these allowances but his boss, Mr. Peter Igbo, was not forthcoming. Then on 14th May 2007, he received a letter dated 8th May 2007 from the Defendant terminating his appointment. The Claimant stated further that the termination of his appointment was wrongful. The termination letter stated that the termination took retroactive effect from 9th November 2006 but he was paid his salary for May 2007. He also said no disciplinary procedure was put in place to investigate his case. and he was not tried before any disciplinary committee in accordance with the Defendant’s Manual and Scheme of Service. His solicitor wrote a pre-action notice to the Defendant and the Defendant replied with a promise to look into the matter. He stated further that he has not been paid his allowances nor has he been reinstated. In his further evidence-in-chief, the Claimant stated that his appointment letter dated 14/4/1997 contain that his appointment can be terminated within 6 months of the appointment or converted to permanent appointment and he will be issued a confirmation letter. After 6 months of probation, his appointment was converted to permanent status, but he was not issued a confirmation letter which contains the terms and conditions of his appointment, which letter is in the custody of the Defendant. The confirmation letter referred to the Defendant’s Administrative Manual and Scheme of service as the rules and regulations governing the Claimant’s employment with the Defendant. Chapter 12 of the condition of service provides the procedure for staff discipline but the Claimant’s employment was terminated without following the provisions of the condition of service. The Claimant further said he was not tried by a disciplinary committee nor was he given fair hearing before his employment was terminated. The Claimant tendered several documents in evidence in support of his case. They are Exhibits A to H. DEFENDANT’S CASE In defence of the suit, the Defendant called one witness. She is Charity Bailey, the Administration Manager of the Defendant. In her evidence, the witness stated that the Claimant was a former staff of the Defendant, but the Defendant never sent the Claimant on any official assignment outside Nigeria. The Defendant is not obligated to pay the Claimant any allowance for trips to the counties he said he went to. It is the practice in the Defendant that when an employee is to be sent on official assignment, a letter is addressed to employee stating the duration and allowance payable. Also, the scheme of service did not mention payment of entitlements to disengaged staff who had served for 10 years. The Claimant can only draw pension from his Pension Fund Administrator and not from the Defendant. Before the Claimant was disengaged by the Defendant, he was served series of queries and warnings for acts of dereliction of duty, absenteeism, negligence of duty, indiscipline, refusal to remit official money, failure to answer query, among others. DW1 concluded that the Claimant’s employment was not terminated wrongfully as due process was followed before he was disengaged. DW1 tendered some documents in evidence. These are Exhibits J to V. The Defendant’s counsel, by leave of this court, tendered the letter of confirmation of the Claimant’s employment in evidence from the bar. It is Exhibit W. After the close of evidence, counsels for the parties filed their final written addresses. The addresses were adopted on 4th December 2018. DEFENDANT’S ADDRESS The Defendant in its final written address, raised the following issues for determination to wit i. Whether the Jurisdiction of this Honourable Court can be invoked by the Claimant when the Originating Process i.e. the Amended Complaint upon which this Suit was heard, was not signed by an identifiable Counsel. ii. Whether upon preponderance of evidence, the Claimant has been able to prove his case before this Honourable Court, to entitle him to arrears of his accrued travel allowances/entitlements for his purported official abroad trips embarked upon on behalf of the Defendant. iii. Whether having regard to the type and nature of the employment between the Claimant and the Defendant, that being of 'Master Servant Relationship', it can be said that the Claimant's employment was wrongfully terminated by the Defendant. On Issue One the Defendant submitted that the Amended Complaint of the Claimant i.e. the Originating process, upon which this suit was conducted, was not signed by an identifiable legal practitioner which would have activated the Court to assume Jurisdiction. On this point counsel relied on the authorities of M. C. C. (NIG.) LTD. vs. COSEDA (NIG.) LTD. (2018) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1629) 47 at 58, paras. D-F, BRAITHWAITE vs. SKYE BANK PLC. (2012) LPELR-SC 32512010; (2013) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1346). Counsel argued that where an Originating process is incompetent, any proceedings conducted by the Court in the suit so commenced is a nullity and liable to be set aside by the Court. See the case of PROF. ELAIGWU vs. TONG (2006) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1532) 165 at 189, paras. C-G and KIDA vs. OGUNMOLA (2006) 13 NWLR (Pt. 997) P. 377 @ 394, paras. E-F. Counsel urged the court to hold that the originating processes in this suit are incurably defective and to resolve this Issue in favour of the Defendant. On Issue Two, learned counsel submitted that the Defendant would not have sent the Claimant on those official trips without a formal letter, and there is no letter or any other document before this Honourable Court to show that the Defendant actually sent the Claimant on those purported official trips. Counsel argued that the Claimant who testified as CW1, never gave any explanation or shred of evidence to justify anyone of his supposedly embarked official assignments overseas were not communicated to him in writing by the Defendant which leaves a gap in the Claimant's case. See the case of GALADIMA vs. STATE (2012) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1333) 610 at 628 paragraph G. Counsel further argued that the legal implication of this omission on the part of the Claimant is that the Law will presume that the Claimant intentionally withheld those documents, knowing fully well that they will be unfavourable to his case. See Section 167 (d) of the Evidence Act, 2011. Further, counsel placed reliance on a plethora of judicial authorities and urged the court to expunge the inadmissible documents admitted in evidence and not attach any probative value to the said inadmissible documents C5, D, E, F & G. On Issue Three, learned counsel for the Defendant argued that the Claimant’s employment was not wrongfully terminated by the Defendant and that the relationship that existed between the parties was that of a master and servant relationship. See LONGE vs. F. B. N. PLC. (2010) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1189) 1 at p. 57, para. E, per Adekeye, J.S.C. In addition, counsel submitted that the issue of wrongful termination of the Claimant’s employment will only come to play if the employment of the Claimant was one with statutory flavour. Counsel placed reliance on the authority of DUDOSALA vs. N. G. CO. LTD. (2013) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1363) 423 at p. 436, paras. 8-0 and submitted that if the termination of the Claimant's employment was not in line with the laid down terms of the contract of employment between him and the Defendant, the Claimant would only be entitled to damages which will be calculated as his salary for the period of the notice, which in this case was one month basic salary and not re-instatement or other entitlements as contemplated by the Claimant. See OSISANYA vs. AFRIBANK PLC (2007) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1031) 566 at Pg.581. Counsel urged the court to find in favour of the Defendant. CLAIMANT’S ADDRESS In response, the Claimant filed their final written address wherein the Claimant counsel first sought to respond to the issues formulated by the Defendants counsel. On the issues formulated by the Defendant, learned counsel for the Claimant urged the court to discountenance the arguments of counsel to the Defendant that the court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain this suit. Counsel submitted that the cases of M. C. C. (NIG.) LTD. vs. COSEDA (NIG.) LTD; BRAITHWAITE vs. SKYE BANK PLC; KIDA vs. OGUNMOLA; and OKORO vs. UNION BANK OF NIGERIA LTD; cited by learned counsel to the Defendant are not applicable to the instant case, as the Originating process for commencement of this suit, were duly signed, and sealed by an identifiable legal practitioner; Okechukwu Ajunwa Esq, and that the lack of indication is a mere irregularity. Counsel made further submissions to counter counsel’s submissions in the Defendants final written address and urged the court to discountenance the said submissions. Counsel proceeded to formulate a sole issue for determination to wit; i. Whether in the light of the overwhelming evidence available before this court, the Claimant has established his claims to entitle him to the reliefs sought. On the sole issue, the Claimant counsel sought to argue on two ambits, i.e. wrongful termination of employment and entitlement to allowances. On the ambit of wrongful termination, counsel submitted that that since the Claimant has established with credible evidence to the effect that his employment with the Defendant was wrongly terminated in that the necessary procedure laid for the said termination was not followed, the onus shifts on the Defendant to lead evidence to proof what he asserted in its defence. This is in line with judicial authority in various cases, especially in the case of LAMU vs. BONGDEN (2017) LPELR – 43317. Counsel submitted that the Defendant has failed to discharge the onus on it and that the implication of this is that the case of the Claimant for wrongful termination of employment is uncontroverted. Counsel also submitted that by the combined effects of Sections 5(5) and 32 of the Nigeria Television Authority Act, 1976 and the contents of Exhibit H, the Claimant's employment is undoubtedly one with statutory flavour. Counsel therefore urged the court to discountenance the arguments and submission of the learned counsel to the Defendant that the Claimant's employment is of Master and Servant relationship. It was the submission of learned counsel for the Claimant that the remedy for wrongful termination of the Claimant's employment is re-instatement and damages representing his salaries during the period of the purported termination. See OLUFEAGBA & ORS. vs. ABDUR- RAHEEM & ORS. (2006) LPELR - 2613 (SC). Counsel urged the court to exercise its discretion and to depart from the strict provisions of Sections 89 to 102 of the Evidence Act, 2011 considering the peculiar circumstances of this case, being guided by considerations of doing justice between the parties, and to ensure ultimately that the dispute between the parties is decided on its merits. Counsel urged the court to hold in favour of the Claimant. DEFENDANT’S REPLY In their Reply on points of law, the Defendant’s counsel made submissions based on the two ambits formulated by the Claimant. On the first subhead, learned counsel for the Defendant contended that the silence, admission or denial of the Defendant as argued by the Claimant's Counsel is immaterial and inapplicable in this case. Counsel placed reliance on AROMOLARAN vs. AGORO (2014) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1438) at pp. 174 - 175, paras.D- C and submitted that given the provisions of Rule 12.6 of the NTA Manual, and the nonchalant behaviour of the Claimant towards the queries issued against him (i.e. Exhibit J-U), the Director General could choose to bypass the procedures stipulated under Rule 12.1 (2) of the Manual. Counsel also submitted that the admission or non-admission of Exhibits T-U is inconsequential because, facts not contradicted are deemed admitted, and facts admitted go to no issue. See AKUDO vs. GUINNESS NIG. PLC. (2011) LPELR-8948 (CA). On sub-issue two, counsel argued that that it is impossible for an organization such as the Defendant to produce a file of an employee such as the Claimant which was why the Court specifically told the Defendant's Counsel to produce the letter of confirmation and tender same from the bar on the next adjourned date, since other documents are already before the Court. Counsel submitted that a party on whom Notice to produce is served, is under no obligation to produce the document named therein and therefore the provision of Section 167(d) of the Evidence Act 2011 (formerly Section 149 (d) of the old Evidence Act) cannot be applicable. See the case of BUHARI vs. OBASANJO (2005) 13 NWLR (Pt. 941) p.1 at pp.262-263, para G-A. Counsel urged the court to discountenance the argument of the Claimant and dismiss the claims and hold in favour of the Defendant. COURT’S DECISION: In the final written address of the Defendant, the issue was raised that the Claimant’s originating process was not signed by an identified legal practitioner. This issue touched on the competence of the Claimant’s action and the jurisdiction of this court to hear and determine this action. I will first determine the issue before going any further in this judgment. The arguments of the counsel for the Defendant is that the Claimant’s amended Complaint and the further amended statement of claim, upon which this suit was heard, were not signed by any identified legal practitioner. Both processes were authored by three counsels who are Okechukwu Ajunwa, Esq., Chinasa Maduka Esq., and Emmanuel Mbisike, Esq., but it cannot be ascertained who among these counsels signed the Claimant's amended Complaint and the further amended statement of claim. It was argued further that since the amended Complaint was not signed by an identifiable Counsel as required by law, the whole proceedings embarked upon by parties before this honourable Court is null and void and the Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit. It was also submitted that only a Legal Practitioner who has been enrolled in the Supreme Court of Nigeria can validly sign Court Processes on behalf of Litigants. Counsel relied on Sections 2(1) and 24 of the Legal Practitioners Act and PEAK MERCHANT BANK LTD. vs. N.D.I.C (2011) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1261) 253. Counsel submitted also that where an Originating process is incompetent, null and void, a Court of Law would have no Jurisdiction to hear and determine any suit or action commenced by it. In response, the Claimant’s counsel submitted that although the Amended Complaint and the Further Amended Statement of Claim were authored by Okechukwu Ajunwa, Chinasa Maduka and Emmanuel Mbisike, the Nigeria Bar Association Seal of Okechukwu Ajunwa was affixed to them and the name of Okechukwu Ajunwa was carefully ticked as the counsel who signed the processes. It was submitted that this court has jurisdiction to entertain the case. The Claimant’s counsel also submitted that assuming it was not indicated on the processes which of the three counsels signed the processes, it will amount only to a technical issue. The courts have been enjoined to do substantial justice instead of technical justice. Counsel relied on Order 5 Rule 6(3) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017. I have mentioned earlier that this suit was transferred to this court from the Federal High Court. The suit was instituted in the Federal High Court vide a Writ of Summons filed on 10th April 2008. In my view, that is the originating process in this matter. The amended Complaint, which is the object of the Defendant’s objection, is not the originating process of this action. It was an amendment made after the suit was transferred to this court. The originating Writ of Summons in this suit does not have the defects the Defendant’s counsel complains about in his objection. The Writ of Summons and the statement of claim were duly signed by Emelu Japhet Esq., counsel for the Claimant. For this reason, the assertion by the Defendant’s counsel that this suit is incompetent because it was not indicated on the originating process which counsel signed same is not tenable. I have examined the complaints of the Defendant’s counsel with regard to the amended Complaint and the further amended statement of facts. As rightly observed by the Defendant’s counsel, the names of Okechukwu Ajunwa Esq., Chinasa Maduka (Mrs.) and Emmanuel Mbisike Esq., appeared on the processes with a signature on top of the names. The processes were actually signed, only that it was not indicated which of the 3 counsels signed the processes. Also, the NBA stamp of Okechukwu Ajunwa Esq., one of the counsels listed on the processes, was affixed to both processes. It is on record that these amended processes were filed pursuant to the leave of this court. The Defendant was served the motions in which the Claimant sought leave to amend together with the amended processes, but the Defendant did not oppose the motions. Accordingly, leave was granted to the Claimant to amend, with an order deeming the amended processes as properly filed and served. The Defendant became aware of the defects now in issue since the time of service of the said processes on the Defendant. But it failed to raise it until the matter was heard and concluded. The Defendant’s counsel decided to bring up the issue only at the stage of final address. In my view, what the Defendant has done here is to ambush the Claimant with a view to steal a match on the Claimant. Such an objection to the competence of the suit ought to have been raised by way of motion on notice since the time the Defendant was served with the said processes. See Order 3 Rule 21 (2) NICN Rules 2017. I agree totally with the Claimant’s counsel that the instant issue raised in the final address of the Defendant is a mere technicality. Order 5 Rule 6 (3) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017 empowers this court to be fair and flexible in its procedure while considering the facts of any matter before it and not to allow technicalities to defeat the cause of justice to the parties. Accordingly, I shall discountenance the objection of the Defendant and proceed to determine this case on its merit. I have carefully examined the facts of the Claimant’s case and I have also considered the reliefs he sought in the case upon those facts. Upon the examination of the claims of the Claimant and the evidence adduced by him, it is observed that his case is on two fronts. They are his claim for wrongful termination of his employment and his claim for payment of arrears of travel allowances. I will examine each of these heads of claims in this judgment to see if he is entitled to any or all of the claims. In relief 1, the Claimant sought a declaration to the effect that the termination of his employment was wrongful, unlawful and of no effect. He also sought, in reliefs 3 and 4, orders of this court re-instating him to the employment and payment of his salaries and all other entitlements from May 2007 till the final determination of this suit. In his pleading and evidence, the Claimant stated that he was appointed by the Defendant on 14th April 1997 as a Production Assistant I and after 6 months of probation, his appointment was upgraded to a permanent status. He worked for the Defendant until 14th May 2007 when he received a letter dated 8th May 2007 terminating his appointment. Although he was paid his salary for May 2007, the termination of his appointment was wrongful for the fact that the termination letter stated that the termination took retroactive effect from 9th November 2006. Also, no disciplinary procedure was put in place to investigate his case and he was not tried before any disciplinary committee contrary to the conditions of service contained in Chapter 12 of the Defendant’s Administrative Manual and Scheme of service. The Claimant further alleged that his employment was terminated without following the provisions of the condition of service and he was not given fair hearing before his employment was terminated. In defence of the claims, the Defendant, in the statement of defence and evidence of DW1 averred that the Claimant was a former staff of the Defendant whose employment was terminated following due process. Before the Claimant was disengaged by the Defendant, he was served series of queries and warnings for acts of dereliction of duty, absenteeism, negligence of duty, indiscipline, refusal to remit official money, failure to answer query, among others. The fact that the Claimant was an employee of the Defendant is not in dispute. Also, it is clear that the Claimant’s employment was terminated by the Defendant. The issue in dispute in this regard is whether the termination of the employment was wrongful and unlawful or not. In reliefs 1, 3 and 4, the Claimant has sought a declaration to the effect that the termination of his employment is wrongful, null and void and an order reinstating him to his employment. By seeking such reliefs in this case, the Claimant, perhaps, believes his employment is one protected by statute. This is so because in employment cases, these reliefs are grantable only to employment regulated by statute. Counsels to the parties have also disagreed in their written address on the status of the Claimant’s employment. While the Defendant’s counsel submitted that the Claimant’s employment is that of master and servant, the Claimant’s counsel argued that the Claimant’s employment is regulated by statute. Therefore, in order to determine these claims sought by the Claimant, it is necessary to consider whether the Claimant’s employment enjoys statutory backing, or it is just a master and servant relationship. In his case, the Claimant did not specifically refer to his employment as one governed by statute, either in his pleading or in his evidence. He did however mention in paragraph 2 of his further amended statement of facts that the Defendant is established under Cap 329 of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990. The Claimant also averred in his pleading and evidence that the Defendant’s relationship with the Claimant was governed by the conditions of service contained in his appointment letter and in the Defendant’s Administrative Manual and Scheme of Service. This court takes judicial notice of the NTA Act, LFN 2004. The Defendant is established in Section 1 of the Act. In Section 5 (5) of the Act, the Defendant is empowered to appoint staff and agents as it may deem necessary for the efficient performance of the Defendant’s duties under the Act. Then in Section 32 of the Act, the Defendant is empowered to make the conditions of service to regulate the employment of its staff. The Section provides as follows: “32. (1) The Authority may, with the approval of the Minister, make bye-laws relating generally to the conditions of service of the officers and servants of the Authority; and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, such bye-laws may provide for- (a) The appointment and disciplinary control of all employees of the Authority; and (b) Appeals by such employees against dismissal or other disciplinary measures. (2) Bye-laws made under subsection (1) of this section, need not be published in the Federal Gazette but the Authority shall bring them to the notice of all affected persons in such manner as it may, from time to time determine.” Exhibit A is the Claimant’s employment letter. One of the conditions of the employment contained in paragraph (d) of the letter is that the Claimant will be subject to “the terms of the Authority’s Staff Regulation and to such other regulations and instructions as the Authority may issue from time to time”. Exhibit H tendered by the Claimant is the Defendant’s Administrative Manual and Scheme of Service (same as Exhibit V tendered by the Defendant). The fact that this document contains the terms and condition of service regulating employment in the Defendant is not in dispute. In its introductions in Chapter 1, it contains the following instructive provisions, among other: Section 1.1: These Rules and Regulations are hereby published for information of all and will apply henceforth throughout the Authority. The Rules and Regulations seek to introduce necessary controls and provide correct guidance on the proper conduct of staff generally, in NTA offices and in all work environments. Section 1.3 (a): These administrative rules and regulations and others that may be made from time to time shall apply to all employees of the Authority and form the condition of service within the Authority. From the above provisions in Exhibit H, it is clear that it is the Staff Regulation referred to in the Claimant’s employment letter as the condition of service governing the employment. It is also clear from the provisions that the conditions of service in Exhibit H was made by the Defendant pursuant to the provision of Section 32 of the NTA Act. Employment types are those regulated by statute or those under common law relationship of master and servant. Where the terms and conditions of a contract of employment are provided for by statute or regulations made under the statute, it is said to be an employment with statutory flavour or protected by statute. Where this is not the case, the employment is merely that of master and servant. See OBAJE vs. N.A.M.A (2014) All FWLR (Pt. 732) 1811 at 1826; ODONIBOYE-OBU vs. N.N.P.C (2003) FWLR (Pt. 146) 959 at 992; N.I.I.A vs. ANYAFALU (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 325) 141 at 162. It is the law that an employment has statutory flavour when the appointment is protected by statute or where the conditions of service are contained in regulations derived from statutory provisions. See IMOLOAME vs. WAEC (1992) 9 NWLR (Pt. 265) 303. In OLUSEYE vs. LAWMA (2013) 17 NWLR (Pt. 849) 307 at 318 it was held thus: “An employment with statutory flavour arises where the body employing the man is under some statutory or other restriction as to the kind of contract which it makes with its servants on the grounds on which it can dismiss them. Generally, where an employment or a contract of service is governed by the provisions of statute or where the conditions are incorporated into regulations which derive their force from a statute, an employee who is a party to the contract of service is said to enjoy a legal status higher than the ordinary one of master and servant." See also CBN vs. IGWILO (2007) LPELR - 835 (SC); FAKUADE vs. O.A.U.T.H. (1993) 5 NWLR (Pt. 291) 47; IDEH vs. UNIVERSITY OF ILORIN (1994) 3 NWLR (Pt. 330) 81. The Defendant is empowered under Section 32 of the NTA Act to make the condition of service which will regulate the employment of its staff. The Defendant accordingly made Exhibit H which contains terms and conditions regulating employment in the Defendant. It is therefore clear that the conditions of service in Exhibit H are derived from the NTA Act. That makes the employment in the Defendant an employment with statutory flavour. The Claimant’s employment with the Defendant was therefore one statutorily protected. The relationship between the Claimant and the Defendant was not one of master and servant contrary to the submissions of counsel for the Defendant. By the nature of the Claimant’s employment, the Defendant was expected to comply with the provisions of the conditions of employment in Exhibit H in terminating the employment of the Claimant. Failure to terminate the employment in accordance with the terms and conditions of the employment will make the termination wrongful and a nullity. It is the Claimant’s case that his employment was terminated through a letter dated 8th May 2007, but the termination of his employment was not in accordance with the terms of condition of service in the Defendant’s Administrative Manual and Scheme of service. His complaints against the termination are these: i. Non-compliance with the provisions of the condition of service by failing to observe the disciplinary procedure or constitute a disciplinary committee to investigate him on any allegation. ii. His termination was made retroactive effect from 9th November 2006. iii. He was not given fair hearing before his employment was terminated. In Paragraphs 7 and 8 of his further amended statement of facts, the Claimant referred to the provisions of Chapter 12 of Exhibit H and set out the procedure for termination of appointment in the section. He also said this procedure was not followed when his employment was terminated. When the Claimant put reliance on Chapter 12 of Exhibit H and averred that the procedure therein was not followed and that he was not given fair hearing, he appears to contend that his employment was terminated on disciplinary grounds. That was why he alleged that his employment was wrongfully terminated. The Claimant did say that no disciplinary procedure was put in place to investigate his case and he was not invited before any disciplinary committee or tried before any such committee. That is to say there was no disciplinary process that took place before the Claimant’s employment was terminated. On the other hand, the Defendant averred that due process was followed before the Claimant’s employment was terminated. DW1 did not go further to explain the due process that was followed before the Claimant’s employment was terminated. It is clear to me however, from the case of the Defendant, that the disciplinary process prescribed in Chapter 12 of Exhibit H did not take place before the Claimant’s employment was terminated. One of the conditions of service in Exhibit H is the right of any of the parties to terminate the employment. This is in Section 2.14 of Exhibit H. It provides: “(A) An employee shall be free at any time, with or without stating any reason therefore to resign his appointment with the Authority upon giving due notice except if the officer is resigning to forestall any disciplinary action that is pending against him. The Authority has a reciprocal right to terminate an employee’s appointment upon giving him due notice. Due notice for this purpose is as follows: (i) staff who have served for ten (10) years and above – three (3) months. (ii) staff who have served for less than ten (10) years- one (1) month. Management reserves the right to waive the notice.” (B) An employee may resign his appointment by paying the equivalent amount of his basic salary to the authority in lieu of notice. Similarly, the Authority will pay the sum equal to the basic salary of an employee in lieu of notice of termination of appointment. By these conditions of service, any of the parties is permitted to terminate the employment at any time by giving the other party prescribed notice or payment of equivalent salary in lieu of notice. Then in Section 12.4 of Exhibit H, the Defendant is empowered to dismiss a staff or terminate a staff’s employment on grounds of discipline. Sections 12.1 to 12.3 set out the disciplinary procedure to be followed before a termination or dismissal can be handed down on the staff. Going by these provisions of the condition of service, it is clear to me that the Defendant has the right in the contract to terminate the employment of any of its staff at any time without any reason or to terminate the employment of the staff on disciplinary grounds. The termination letter is Exhibit E. It is dated 8th May 2007. The Claimant said he received it on 14th May 2007. The letter contains thus: TERMINATION OF APPOINTMENT: This is to convey Management decision to terminate your appointment with retroactive effect from 9th November 2006. You are to surrender the Authority’s property in your possession including the NTA identity card to the office of the Director of Administration. Signed A. O. Omisore (Mrs.) From the case of the parties, there was no disciplinary procedure which took place before the Claimant’s appointment was terminated. Also, the termination letter did not state any reason for the termination nor did it contain that the appointment was terminated on disciplinary grounds. Obviously, the Claimant’s employment was not terminated on disciplinary grounds. The content of Exhibit E reveals that the Defendant simply exercised its right under the condition of service to terminate the Claimant’s appointment. In such a situation, it was not necessary for the Defendant to follow the disciplinary procedure or afford the Claimant any hearing before termination of the employment. What the Defendant is required to do in such mode of termination is to give the prescribed notice or pay the salary in lieu of notice. In view of the terms of the condition of service giving the parties the right to terminate the contract at any time without any reason and the content of the termination letter, I find that the termination of the Claimant’s employment was not on disciplinary grounds as to require compliance with the disciplinary procedure in Exhibit H and affording the Claimant fair hearing. The allegations of the Claimant that the termination of his appointment was wrongful because of non-compliance with the disciplinary procedure and denial of fair hearing cannot stand. The Claimant has also alleged that the termination of his employment was wrongful on the ground that the termination of his employment was made retroactive from 9th November 2006. The termination letter indicated that the Defendant decided to take the date of the termination of the Claimant’s employment retroactively from 9th November 2006. Meanwhile the letter of termination was dated 8th May 2007 and served on the Claimant on 14th May 2007. The retroactive date of the termination is contrary to the provision of the condition of service in Exhibit H. When the condition of service prescribed the giving of notice of termination or payment of salary in lieu, it implies that it did not permit termination of employment to be made retroactively. Also, there is provision in the condition of service which empowers the Defendant to make retroactive termination of employment. The Defendant was therefore wrong to have taken the date of the termination of the Claimant’s employment retroactively from 9th November 2006. However, I do not think the fact that the termination was made retroactive is sufficient to make the termination wrongful or to occasion setting aside the termination. Only the retroactive date of the termination is affected and that is what could be set aside. In my view, the termination of the Claimant’s employment took effect from the date of the termination letter, being the date the Defendant’s decision to terminate the employment was communicated to the Claimant. I have examined all the allegations the Claimant made against the termination of his employment, but I find his allegation that the termination of his employment was wrongful unsubstantiated. I cannot find any serious fact with which to make the declaration of wrongful termination of employment sought by the Claimant. Consequently, the Claimant’s claim for reinstatement and payment of his salaries and entitlements from May 2007 has not been made out. It is a fact which I found in this case that the Defendant terminated the Claimant’s employment based on the terms of the employment in Section 2.14 of the condition of service. The section prescribes the giving of 3 months’ notice of termination or payment of salary in lieu of notice. The Claimant was employed by the Defendant on 14th April 1997. As at 8th May 2007 when the Claimant’s employment was terminated, he had put in 10 years of service in the Defendant’s employment. By the terms of the employment in Section 2.14 of the condition of service, the Claimant was entitled to be given 3 months’ notice or paid 3 months’ salary in lieu of notice. It is clear from the content of the termination letter that the Defendant did not give due notice to the Claimant. The fact that the Defendant made the effective date of termination of the Claimant’s employment retroactive to 9th November 2006 is ample evidence establishing the fact that the Defendant did not give the Claimant the required notice of termination of his employment. Having not given notice, the Defendant’s obligation in the condition of service was to pay the Claimant 3 months’ salary in lieu of notice. It is observed that the proviso to Section 2.14 (A) of the condition of service provides that the Defendant reserves the right to waive notice. There is no such proviso in Section 2.14 (B) on payment of salary in lieu of notice. In effect, while the Defendant may waive or not give notice, it does not have such right when it comes to payment of salary in lieu of notice. In his evidence, the Claimant mentioned that he was paid salary up to the month of May 2007. The Defendant on the other hand did not give any evidence to show that it paid salary in lieu of notice to the Claimant. The salary for May 2007 paid to the Claimant does not qualify or represent 3 months’ salary the Defendant ought to pay to the Claimant in lieu of notice. Clearly, the Defendant did not pay 3 months’ salary to the Claimant in lieu of notice. Although the Claimant’s employment had been terminated by the Defendant pursuant to the Defendant’s right in the contract, the Defendant is not precluded from paying the Claimant salary in lieu of notice. The salary in lieu of notice is a right of the Claimant in the contract which cannot be denied him. Let me observe that the Claimant did not make a case on the failure of the Defendant to give him due notice or for not paying him salary in lieu of notice. The Claimant did not make this default of the Defendant one of the grounds for his allegation of wrongful termination of his employment. The burden of proof of his allegation of wrongful termination of his employment is on the Claimant. It is not the duty of this court to help the Claimant establish his claims. Therefore, this court cannot consider the fact that he was not given notice or paid salary in lieu to make a case for the Claimant on the claims he sought in this case except to say that he is entitled to be paid what is due to him in the condition of service which is his 3 month’s salary in lieu of notice. The Claimant said his net monthly salary was the sum of N14,712.97. His 3 months’ salary will amount to N44,138.91. This is the sum to be paid to him. The second leg of the Claimant’s claims is his claim for unpaid travel allowances. These claims are those in reliefs (b) and (e). The total sum claimed by the Claimant as his unpaid travel allowance is the sum of $11,600. In his evidence, the Claimant stated that during his employment with the Defendant, he was sent on various official assignments outside Nigeria and his travel allowance per day was the sum of £175. In 2005, he went on an official assignment to South Africa for 21 days and his travel allowance amounted to $2,675; He was sent on another assignment to the United Kingdom via United States of America on 8th May 2005 and his travel allowance amounted to $5,250; On 25th September 2006, the Defendant sent him on another assignment to Germany, Italy and Holland and his travel allowance amounted to the sum of $3,675. He went on these trips and did apply for these allowances but he was not paid up till the time his employment was terminated in May 2007. In defence of this claim, the Defendant averred in the statement of defence and in the evidence of DW1 that the Defendant did not send the Claimant on any official assignment outside Nigeria. It was also averred that the practice of the Defendant is to communicate official business through memos and written medium to its staff and when an employee is to be sent on official assignment, a letter is addressed to the employee stating the duration and allowance payable. The Defendant is not obligated to pay the Claimant any allowance for trips to the countries he went to for his personal visits. The Defendant has denied sending the Claimant for the trips to the countries for which the Claimant claims travel allowances. The Defendant has thus denied liability for the allowances claimed by the Claimant. Therefore, the burden of proof of his claim for the allowances alleged is on the Claimant. See Sections 131, 132 and 134 of the Evidence Act 2011. See also ARASE vs. ARASE (1981) 5 SC 33 at 145, MAXIMUM INSURANCE CO. LTD vs. OWONIYI (1994) 3 NWLR (Pt. 331) 178 at 192. To prove that he went on the trips to South Africa, United Kingdom, United States of America, Germany, Italy and Holland, the Claimant relied on his visas to these countries which he tendered in evidence. They are Exhibits C1, C2, C3, C4 and C5. Under cross examination, the Claimant confirmed that the visas are the only evidence he has to show that he was sent outside the country. I have examined these exhibits but, in my view, these visas do not show that the Defendant sent the Claimant on the trips or that the Claimant went on the trips on account of the Defendant. The visas are not sufficient evidence to prove that the Defendant sent the Claimant on the official duties to those countries or to hold the Defendant responsible to pay the Claimant allowances for the trips. Under cross examination, the Claimant stated that the Defendant communicated to its staff through letters and internal memos. This evidence corroborates the Defendant’s averment that it usually communicated official business through memos and written medium to its staff. Having said as much, the Claimant failed to tender any evidence to show that the Defendant was aware of the trips or authorised them or took any step to facilitate the Claimant’s going on the trip. Also, nothing was tendered to show that any of the productions or recordings made during the trips was handed over to the Defendant or utilised by the Defendant as to imply that the Defendant was aware of the Claimant’s role in the production. The Claimant mentioned one Miss Ifeoma David as one of the persons with whom he travelled for the recordings and one Mr. Peter Igbo, the Claimant’s immediate boss, whom the Claimant usually discusses with regarding payment of the Claimant’s travel allowances. But none of them was called to testify in support of the Claimant’s case. Again, the Claimant stated that his travel allowance for official duties outside Nigeria is the sum of $175 per day. It is the multiplication of this sum with the number of days the Claimant allegedly spent on the trips that amounted to the sum of $11,600 he claims in this suit. The Claimant failed however to tell this court how he became entitled to the sum of $175 per day travel allowance outside Nigeria. It is not contained in his employment letter or in the Defendant’s Administrative Manual and Scheme of Service as part of his condition of service. The Claimant has not proved how he is entitled to the sum he claims as arrears of travel allowance. In sum, the Claimant has failed to give any cogent evidence to prove his claim for unpaid travel allowance. In conclusion of this judgment, my view is that the Claimant has not proved the claims he sought in this case. I do not find any merit in his case. Accordingly, the reliefs he sought are hereby dismissed. The Defendant is however ordered to pay to the Claimant the sum of N44,138.91 being the 3 months’ salary the Claimant ought to have been paid in lieu of notice of termination of his employment. No order as to cost. Judgment is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Judge