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JUDGMENT. 1. The claimant vide originating summons filed on 04/06/2018, submitted five questions for determination. They are: 1. Whether the appointment of the claimant as Director General, Securities and Exchange Commission, (SEC) in strict compliance with the provisions of section 5(1) and (2) of the investments and securities Act is valid, legal and subsisting. 2. If answer to question (1) above is in the affirmative, Whether the letter of the 2nd defendant dated 29/11/2017 that caused the claimant to cease holding office as Director-General, Securities and Exchange Commission, (SEC) is not contrary to the provisions of section 8(1)&(2) of the investments and securities Act 2007. 3. If answer to question 2 above is in the affirmative, Whether it is ultra vires of the 2nd defendant to have issued the letter dated 29/11/17, which caused the claimant to cease holding office as Director-General, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Contrary to the provisions of section 8(1)&(2) of ISA 2007. 4. Whether the public service rules 03405 and 03406 respectively relied upon by the 2nd defendant in carrying out the purported suspension which caused the claimant to cease holding office as Director-General, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) are in existence to cloth the action of the 2nd defendant with validity and legality. 5. Whether the administrative panel of inquiry set up by the 2nd defendant was properly constituted to be fair, impartial and unbiased in view of the fact that the 2nd defendant had already adjudged the claimant guilty of proven cases of financial misconduct, unlawful carting away of sensitive documents, in addition to unsatisfactory response to queries served on him. 2. In anticipation of favourable resolution of the above questions, the claimant is seeking for the following reliefs. They are:- 1. A DECLARATION that the appointment of the claimant as a director-general, securities and exchange commission(SEC) in strict compliance with the provision of section 5(1)&(2) of the investments and securities Act 2007 is valid and legal 2. A DECLARATION that the letter of the 2nd defendant dated 29th November 2017 caused the claimant to cease holding office as director general, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) contrary to the provision of section 8(1) and (2) of the investment and securities Act 2007. 3. A DECLARATION that the 2nd defendant has no power ab initio to have by the letter dated 29th November, 2017 caused the claimant to cease holding office as director general, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Contrary to the provision of section 8(1) and (2) of the investment and securities Act 2007. 4. A DECLARATION that the public service rules 03405 and 03406 respectively relied upon by the 2nd defendant in carrying out the purported suspension of the claimant as director general, securities and exchange commission(SEC) are not in existence and cannot cloth action of the 2nd defendant with validity and legality. 5. A DECLARATION that the administrative panel of inquiry set up by the 2nd defendant is biased, partial and against the principle of natural justice. 6. AN ORDER setting aside the administrative panel of inquiry constituted by the 2nd defendant to investigate the claimant as indicated in the letter of suspension. 7. AN ORDER reinstating the claimant as director general of the 1st defendant. 8. AN ORDER directing the 1st defendant forthwith to pay to the claimant all his entitlement, emoluments, allowances and other perquisites of the office of director general of the 1st defendant for the entire period under which he had been on the purported suspension. 3. The originating summons is supported by a 20 paragraphs affidavit, with six exhibits. The affidavit was sworn to by the claimant himself. A written address was also filed along with the originating summons. 4. A. U. Mustapha, SAN, counsel for the claimant in oral adumbration relied on all the depositions in the affidavit in support and the exhibits attached therein. The learned silk also adopted his written address as his argument. 5. In the written address five issues were for determination. They are: 1. Whether the appointment of the claimant as Director General, Securities and Exchange Commission, (SEC) is in strict compliance with the provisions of section 5(1) and (2) of the investments and securities Act is valid, legal and subsisting. 2. Whether the letter of the 2nd defendant dated 29/11/2017 that caused the claimant to cease holding office as Director General Securities and Exchange Commission is not contrary to the provisions of section 8(1) & (2) of the Investments and Securities Act 2007. 3. Whether it is ultra vires of the 2nd defendant to have issued the letter dated 29/11/17, which caused the claimant to cease holding office as Director General, Securities Exchange Commission Contrary to the provisions of section 8(1)&(2) of ISA 2007. 4. Whether the public service rules 03405 and 03406 respectively relied upon by the 2nd defendant in carrying out the purported suspension which caused the claimant to cease holding office as director general SEC are in existence to cloth the action of the 2nd defendant with validity and legality. 5. Whether the administrative panel of inquiry set up by the 2nd defendant was properly constituted to be fair, impartial and unbiased in view of the fact that the 2nd defendant had already adjudged the claimant guilty of proven cases of financial misconduct, unlawful carting away of sensitive documents, in addition to unsatisfactory response to queries served on him. ARGUMENTS OF THE ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION. ISSUE ONE 6. The learned silk began his argument on this issue by referring to section 5(1) and (2) of the Investment and Securities and paragraph 1 of the affidavit in support of this application and submitted that the circumstances under which the appointment of the claimant as Director-General of the Securities and Exchange Commission can cease are as stated in section 8(1) & (2) of Investment and Securities Act, 2007. Learned Silk contended that none of the circumstances had been established against the claimant and the procedure laid down in section 8(2) of Investment and Securities Act had not been followed in respect of his appointment as Director-General, Securities and Exchange Commission. Having regards to the above, it is the submission of the learned Silk that the appointment of the claimant as Director-General of Securities and Exchange Commission is valid, legal and subsisting. ISSUE TWO 7. In arguing issue two, Learned Silk representing the claimant refers to the definition of the words ‘cease’ and ‘suspension’ in the Black’s law Dictionary (Eight Edition) and submitted that from the definition of the two words, it amounts to saying the obvious that the 2nd defendant’s letter exhibit GWARZO 4 dated 29th November, 2017 caused the claimant to cease holding office as Director-General of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). counsel con tended that the 2nd defendant acted ultra vires in issuing exhibit GWARTZO 4. ISSUE THREE 8. on issue three, counsel contended that it is crystal clear from the provisions of section 8(1) & (2) of Investment and Securities Act that it is the president that can cause the claimant to cease holding his office either by suspension or removal under the circumstances listed in section 8(1) & (2) of Investment Securities Act. The best the 2nd defendant (as minister) can do is to make a recommendation to the president to that effect, which must be confirmed by the senate of the federal republic of Nigeria. 9. Counsel submitted that going by the provision of section 11(1) of the Interpretation Act, Cap 123, LFN, 2004, since it is the president that can appoint a person into the office of Director-General with the approval of the senate, it follows therefore, that the power of suspension can only be vested on the president. To buttress his position, on applicability of section 11(1) (b) of the Interpretation Act, the Learned Silk placed reliance on the cases of LONGE Vs FBN PLC (2006) LPELR-7682(CA) and that of ABUBAKAR & ANOR. Vs THE EXECUTIVE GOVERNOR, GOMBE STATE & ORS (2002) LPELR-11247(CA). It is the contention of counsel that from the provisions of section 11(1) (b) of the Interpretation Act and the two cases cited, the person who appoints is the only person who has the power to remove or suspend the person so appointed. Hence the exercise of power by the 2nd defendant in purportedly suspending the claimant is ultra vires her power. It is also argued by counsel that where a statute provides for a particular method of doing a thing, no other method can be adopted in doing same. In support of this proposition counsel relied on the case of CRUTECH V OBETEN (2011) 15 NWLR (PT.1271) 588. Also cited and relied is the case of ANYA V IYAYI (1993) 7 NWLR (PT.305) 290. 10. Counsel also submitted that juxtaposing the actions of the 2nd defendant with the authorities cited above, it would become apparent that the 2nd defendant acted without requisite powers or authority to so do. There is nothing in the operative statute that empowers the 2nd defendant to suspend or remove the claimant from office as Director-General of the 1st defendant. Counsel forcefully argued that the suspension of the claimant by the 2nd defendant vide letter dated 29/11/17, exhibit GWARZO 4, is ultra vires the 2nd defendant’s power and same is therefore null, void and of no effect whatsoever. According to counsel the law on the above position was stated clearly by the Supreme Court in the case of UNTH M. B. V NNOLI (1994) 8 NWLR (PT.363) 376. 11. It is submitted that the lines of the authorities are to the effect that the courts will protect the right of individuals deprived of an office without due adherence to the rule of law. On this contention counsel placed reliance on the case of FCSC V LAOYE (1989) b2 NWLR (Pt.106) 730, GOVERNMENT OF LAGIS STATE BY OJUKWU & ANOR (1986) 2 SC 202. ISSUE FOUR 12. In arguing issue 4 Learned Silk submitted that vide exhibit 4 letter of suspension, the claimant’s suspension was purportedly made pursuant to PSR 03405 and 03406. However, the claimant in paragraph 13 of the affidavit in support of the originating summons avers that the public Service Rules being relied upon to suspend the claimant are not in existence. According to counsel the big question begging for answer is whether there is in existence PSR 03405 and 03406 on the premises of which the claimant’s purported suspension could be anchored as indicated in exhibit GWARZO 4. In answering the question posed the claimant submitted that such public service rules are not in existence and they could not have been legally invoked by the 2nd defendant to premise the purported suspension. Furthermore the said public service rules referred to by the 2nd defendant are not in existence and because appropriate authority that has the power to suspend or remove the claimant if need be under section 8(1) & (2) of Investment Securities A 2007 did not author exhibit GWARZO 4, the claimants’ suspension having no foundation cannot stand in law, it is void, incurably bad and a nullity. This principle was applied in MACFOY Vs UAC (1961) 3 ALL ER P.1169. and in ONYERO &ANOR Vs NWADIKE (2011) 12 SC P.15. ISSUE FIVE 13. The claimants made reference to paragraph 9, 10, 11 and 12 of their affidavit on event that led to his suspension. He cited section 33(5) of the 1999 constitution FRN (As amended) that every person charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until he is proven guilty. It is against this background the claimant submits that the said administrative panel of enquiry set up by the 2nd defendant was so set up to be partial, bias and unfair to the extent that the constitution of the administrative panel of enquiry offends the principle of natural justice. The test for determining real likelihood of bias was stated by the supreme court in ONIGBEDE Vs BALOGUN (2002)6 NWLR (pt.762). It is settled law that where constitution of a panel of enquiry is tainted with bias or with real likelihood of bias and partiality, such panel is liable to be set aside. This principle was illustrated in LPDC Vs FAWEHINMI(1985) 2 NWLR (PT 7) 300. In concluding his submission on this issue counsel submitted that where it has been established that the quasi-judicial tribunal set up by the 2nd defendant failed to observe the rule of natural justice. The court will set aside the entire proceeding. In the case of FCSC V LAOYE (1989) Supra) Karibbi-Whyte, JSC (as he then was) stated as follows:- ‘‘It is settled that the consequence of a breach of the rules of natural justice is that the decision reached thereby will be set aside..’’ 14. Counsel further contended that drawing strength from the above judicial authorities and going by the position taken by the 2nd defendant in reaching a conclusion as to the guilt of the claimant even before Administrative panel of inquiry invited the claimant, that a reasonable ma in this instance cannot help but reach a decision that the said panel was not properly constituted to be unbiased and impartial. Counsel urged this court to resolve all the issues argued against the defendants, and in favor of the clamant. RESPONSE BY THE 1ST DEFENDANT 15. In response to the originating summons the 1st defendant filed a 16 paragraphs counter-affidavit and a written address in opposition to the originating summons. 16. Chief Chris Uche, SAN, counsel for the 1st defendant in opposing the originating summons informed the court that he is relying on all the depositions contained in the 16 paragraphs counter-affidavit. The Learned Silk also adopted the written address as his argument. 17. In the written address three issues were distilled for resolution by the court. They are:- 1. Whether having been statutory (sic) empowered to recommend the appointment and removal of the claimant as Director-General of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) by virtue of section 5(1) and 8(2) of Investment and Securities Act 2007, the 2nd defendant can validly suspend the claimant from office pending the determination of allegations of financial misconduct against him. 2. Whether the actions of the 2nd defendant in suspending the claimant from office was not valid or legal. 3. Whether the administrative panel constituted by the 2nd defendant in accordance with extant laws was not fair and unbiased in the conduct of its proceeding against the claimant. 18. It is the submission of Leaned Silk that the 2nd defendant has the power to suspend the claimant as Director-General of the 1st defendant. It is common knowledge that departments and agencies of government such as the 1st defendant are under the supervision and monitoring of various ministries. In the case at hand the 1st defendant is a parastatal under the direct supervision of the federal ministry of finance, which is headed by the 2nd defendant and as such the 2nd defendant is very influential and instrumental in regulation of the 1st defendant. Thus why by the provisions of section 5(1) and 8(2) of Investment and Securities Act, the 2nd defendant was to play a pivotal role in the appointment as well as the removal of the Director-General of the 1st defendant. The 2nd defendant is mandated to recommend to president suitable persons to be appointed as the Director-General and where such person is found defective, it is also the duty of the 2nd defendant to recommend to the president removal thereof. This is because it is the 2nd defendant supervise the 1st defendant directly. With the power of to supervise the 1st defendant, the 2nd defendant also has the powers to inquire into any suspected wrong doing committed by the head of the 1st defendant and to discipline any offender. This power has statutory backing by virtue of section 298 of the investment and Securities Act 2007, for the effective discharge of the function of the 1st defendant. 19. It is the submission of counsel that the public service rule 160501 empower supervisory boards/councils to discipline officers in parastatals. However, it is common practice in the civil service that where any parastatal is without a board/council, the minister in charge of that parastatals takes over the duty of the board/council. It is submitted that at the time discipline of the claimant there is no board as the board has been dissolved. Consequently, the powers of discipline the claimant rest squarely on 2nd defendant who can discharge same without making recourse to the president. Further to this is the fact that the investment and Securities Act, 2007 did not make specific provisions as to the discipline of the claimant but however, empowered the 2nd defendant by virtue of section 298 of the Act to give necessary directives for the effective discharge of the function of the 1st defendant. 20. It is submitted that the action of the 2nd defendant has in no way contravened the provision of section 8(1) and (2) of the Investment and Securities Act 2007. There is nowhere in the evidence before the court that the claimant was removed, he was only suspended. And that suspension from office cannot be termed as removal. Counsel referred to the blacks’ law dictionary 10th edition was suspension was defined as a temporary deprivation of a person’s power or privileges, esp of office or profession. 21. Counsel contended that in plethora of cases that defined suspension, it differ from removal from office. The Learned jurist, Niki Tobi, JCA (as he then was) (of blessed memory) in the case of UNIVERSITY OF CALABAR V ESIAGA (2004) FWLR (Pt.706) 381, defined suspension from work as follows:- ‘‘The word (suspension) carries or conveys a temporary or transient disciplinary procedure which keeps away the victim or person disciplined from his regular occupation or calling, either for a fixed or terminal period or indefinitely.’’ Counsel contended that the claimant was suspended appropriately. ISSUE TWO 22. Arguing issue two counsel for the 1st defendant submitted that the action of 2nd defendant in suspending the claimant from office is valid and legal despite the typographical error in citing the rules relied upon in exhibit GWARZO 4, that is PSR 030405 and PSR 030406. It is submitted by application of the latin maxim falsa demostratio non nocet cum de corpore (persona) constat, i.e a false description doesn’t void a document if the intent is clear. In essence, exhibit ‘’GWARZO 4’’ remains unaffected provided it has been described sufficiently. In support of this contention counsel relied on the case of AGBETOBA & ORS V LAGOS STATE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL & ORS. (1991) LPELR-238(SC) remains unaffected provided it has been described sufficiently. And OKAFOR V LAGOS STATE GOVT & ANOR (2016) LPELR-41066(CA). It is the contention of counsel that the most important thing is that the decision of the 2nd defendant is legal, it is immaterial whether the public service rules cited was wrong or not. ISSUE THREE 23. In arguing issue three, counsel contended that the administrative panel having been constituted in accordance with the extant laws was fair and unbiased in the conduct of its proceedings. A proceeding of a tribunal or court of law cannot be said to be biased where same has been conducted within the fundamental principles of justice. The interpretation of judicial bias was aptly stated by the Supreme Court in the case of WOMILOJU V ANIBIRE (2010) 10 NWLR (PT.1203) 545, @ 961-562. 24. it is the contention of counsel that the proceeding of the administrative panel of inquiry was conducted in line with principle of fair hearing and the claimant was given a level playing ground in which he had the opportunity and chance to present his case, this can be seen in exhibit SEC 1, wherein the claimant made submissions and tendered evidence before the panel. It is submitted that for the claimant to succeed on bias there must be cogent evidence as opposed to mere vague suspicion to support his contention of bias. It is also submitted the allegation has to be made against a judge or panel of judges that conducted the proceedings. This is not the situation in the instant case. It submitted that the 2nd defendant was never a member of that panel of inquiry. The mere fact that the 2nd defendant constituted the panel of inquiry against the claimant does not suffice to raise the issue of bias particularly as canvassed in paragraph 7.08 of the claimant’s written address which does not hold water. Counsel urged the court to refuse all reliefs sought by the claimant and dismiss this action with substantive cost. THE RESPONSE BY THE 2ND DEFENDANT. 25. In response to the originating summons the 2nd defendant on 6/9/18 filed a 44 paragraphs counter-affidavit in opposition. The counter-affidavit was sworn to by one Augustina Yayu, a legal officer in the Legal Unit of the Federal Ministry of Finance. 26. Chinedu Achumie, Esq; counsel for the 2nd defendant in his oral submissions before the court relied on all the averments contained in the counter-affidavit and the exhibits attached therein. Counsel also adopted the written address filed along with the counter affidavit as his argument. In the written address counsel formulated twin issues as the issues calling for resolution. They are: 1. Whether this suit is not statute barred and claimant’s right of action extinguished in view of the fact that the suit was commenced more than 3 Months after the cause of action (sic) arose. 2. Whether the 2nd defendant can invoke the provisions of the public service rules in suspending the claimant for serious misconduct in the absence of similar or any disciplinary procedures in the investment and securities Act 2007 for discipline of a Director General. 27. Arguing issue one, counsel submitted that this suit is statute barred in view of the provisions of section 2 of the public officers protection Act, as the suit was instituted on the 4/06/2018 more than 3 Months after the alleged cause of action has aroused. The claimant was suspended from office by the 2nd defendant on 29th November 2017. According to counsel the claimants’ right of action has long been extinguished by the passage of time thereby robbing the court of the requisite jurisdiction and competence to entertain this suit. This position is supported by a court of appeal decision in the case of MR. M. A. D. UKIRI Vs CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND ANOR. (2011)ALL FWLR (P.t 577) P.783 at 786. To further buttress his submission, counsel also relied on the case of FORESTRY RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF NIGERIA V MR. I. A. ENAIFOGHE GOLD (2007) ALL FWLR (PT.380) 1444, CBN V JACOB OLADELE AMAO & 2 ORS. (2011) ALL FWLR (PT.558) 806 28. It is the contention of counsel that, it is an elementary principle of law that facts which has been admitted need no further prove. Consequently since the claimant admitted in paragraph 2 and 3 of his affidavit in support of his originating summons that he was suspended by the 2nd defendant on 29/11/2017, no further evidence is needed in proof of the fact that as at the time he eventually instituted the action on 4/06/2018, his right which may have hitherto existed had evaporated and extinguished. Counsel urged the court to so hold. 29. Counsel conceded that section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act admits for some exceptions, especially where the public officer acted outside the scope of his or her authority, then in that situation the officer cannot claim protection under the public officers protection Act. However, counsel was quick to add that the situation at hand is that the 2nd defendant acted under relevant laws especially the public service rules which regulates conduct of public officers in parastatal and other government agencies in absence of similar and relevant internal rules. Therefore, the exceptions to the general rule are not applicable to this case. To support this submission counsel placed reliance on the case of ALHAJI JIBRIL BALA HASSAN Vs DR. MU’AZU BABANGIDA ALIYU & 2 ORS. (2010) NSCQR VOL.43 P.139. 30. It is the submission counsel that an administrative panel of inquiry whose action sought to be set aside by the claimant concluded and submitted its report on 28/01/2018 and whose recommendations have been forwarded to Mr. President for further directives, has become legally impossible to set aside and the law does not compel or command the impossible. 31. In concluding his submission on this issue counsel urged the court to hold that this suit is statute barred and dismiss same as being incompetent and for the fact that it is impossible to set aside an administrative panel of inquiry which had since concluded and completed its assignment and submitted its report. ISSUE TWO 32. In arguing issue two, counsel submitted that the legality and validity of the appointment of the claimant as Director-General of the 1st defendant by the then president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Dr. Googluck Ebele Jonathan, pursuant to section 5 of Investment and Securities Act with effect from 20th May 2015 is not and has never been in contention. However what is in contention is whether the 2nd defendant can suspend the claimant pursuant to the provisions of the Public Service Rules on allegation of serious misconduct and to this question, counsel responded in the affirmative. It was also submitted that suspension of the claimant by the 2nd defendant was done in compliance with the disciplinary rules and regulation guiding the public service and public officers and that same was not contrary to, but rather complimentary to the provisions of section 8(1) & (2) of Investment and Securities Act, in view of the fact of this case, the status of the claimant as at the date of suspension and the total absence of disciplinary procedure for a Director General in the Investment Securities Act 2007. 33. It is the contention of counsel that section 7 of the investment and Securities Act provides that the Director-General shall be responsible for the day to day management and administration of the 1st defendant. This according to counsel presupposes that whenever the board is in place, the Director-General shall be answerable to the board. The said section did not however expressly state who the Director-General should be answerable to, where there is no board. It is submitted that this lacuna has consistently been filed by policy directive of the Federal Government on the dissolution of boards and by the provision of section 298 of the investment and Securities Act 2007 which provides that the minister may give directive to the commission such directives as appear to him to be just and proper for the effective discharge of the functions of the commission under this Act and it shall be the duty of the commission to comply. It is the contention of counsel based on the provisions of section 298 of the investment and Securities Act 2007, which, amongst the directives the minister may give to the commission is that suspending the claimant from office for serious misconduct. 34. It is the contention of counsel that as complimentary to section 298 of the investment and Securities Act 2007, the general policy directive of the federal government is that whenever the board of a federal government agency and in in this case the 1st defendant is dissolved, the Director-General automatically becomes answerable to the minister who supervises the commission in the absence of the board. This position is supported by circulars usually issued by the office of the secretary to the government of the federation on dissolution of boards of federal government owned agencies, which directs that all matters requiring board attention should be referred to supervising ministries for action. Exhibits FMF 11 and FMF 12 Which are circulars dated 20th October 2011 and 16th July 2015, respectively are examples of such circulars. It is the contention of counsel that the supervisory role of 2nd defendant over the 1st defendant include discipline of the claimant whose disciplinary procedure is not contained in the 1st defendant’s staff manual and therefore submit that pursuant to the provisions of section 298 of the investment and Securities Act 2007 and the policy directives of Federal Government as always communicated in circulars upon the dissolution of boards, the 2nd defendant acted within her supervisory powers when she authorized the issuance of a preliminary letter to the claimant and subsequently suspended him from office on allegations of serious misconduct is not only governed by the Act establishing it, but also comes under the policy directives of government and the public service rules. 35. It is further contended that the 1st defendant as a parastatal and agency of Federal Government is under the supervising role of the 2nd defendant and the supervising over the 1st defendant includes discipline of the claimant as Director General of the 1st defendant. It is the contention of counsel that the 1st defendant as a parastatal and agency of the federal government, is not only governed by the Act establishing it, but also comes under the policy directives of government and the public service rules and this position is very well supported by the provisions of rule 160101 of the public service rules 2008, which defines parastatal as a ‘government owned organization established by statute to render specified service (s) to the public. It is structured and operates according to the instrument establishing it and comes under the policy directives of government.’’ 36. It is the submission of counsel that contrary to the erroneous misconception of the claimant regarding the applicability of section 8(1) and (2) of the Investment and Securities Act, the said provision applies to members of the Board where there is Board in place. In the absence of the Board like the case at hand, the claimant can only be dealt with under the provisions of the public service rules. It is also argued that section 8(2) of Investment and Securities Act does not apply to this case this is because claimant was not suspended by the 2nd defendant as a member of the board of the 1st defendant but rather as the Director General/Chief Executive of the 1st defendant while acting pursuant to her supervisory powers. Section 8(2) of the investment and Security Act 2007 like section 8(1) applies to board members of the 1st defendant. It is submitted vide exhibit FMF 13 the claimant was intimated of the dissolution of the board of 1st defendant which was done vide circular of 16/7/16 ref no. SGF.19/S.81/X1X/964, this brought to an end the life of the board of the 1st defendant and membership of the claimant of the said board ceased to exist from the date of its dissolution. 37. Counsel maintained that suspension of claim on the 29/11/17 was as a Director-General/Chief Executive of the 1st Defendant and not as a member of the Board of the 1st defendant. This is because as at the time of suspension members of the board had long ceased to exist and the claimant cannot by any stretch of the imagination claim to be a member of the Board of the 1st defendant which had become extinct as at that date having been dissolved on 16/7/15 along sides other Board of other Federal Government Parastatals exhibit FMF 12 is a circular dated 16/7/15. Counsel urged the court to hold section 8(1) and (2) of investment and Securities Act does not apply to the Director-General of the 1st defendant (as a public officer) in the absence of the Board. The provision of section 8(1) and (2) could be said to be in abeyance in the absence of the Board in the 1st defendant. Counsel urged the court to so hold and discountenance every argument put forward by the claimant in support of the originating summons which places heavy reliance on the applicability of section 8(1) and (2) of ISA 2007 as the claimant in all circumstances of the case and in his status as Director General. Counsel also argued that in view of the inapplicability of section 8(1) and (2) of the ISA 2007 to the case of the claimant, the provision of section 11 of the interpretation Act and all the cases cited by the claimant are irrelevant and inapplicable in the case at hand. 38. Assuming without conceding that the provision section 8(1) and (2) was applicable to the case of the claimant, it is submitted that there is a lacuna inherent in the said provision which can only be cured by recourse to the public service rules 2008 as the section did not provide details of the procedure to be adopted in disciplining the claimant either as a member of the board or as Director-General of the Board. The import of Rule 160103 of the public service rules is to effect that recourse must be heard to the rules in the absence of internal rules or lacuna in the establishment act of the federal government agency or parastatal to ensure that discipline is maintained in the course of service. It is contended that the provisions of rules 030406 is clear and unambiguous. A person may be suspended to ensure that the officer does not interfere with the investigation. Counsel submitted that the suspension of the claimant as Director-General of the 1st defendant is valid and followed due process. It is further submitted that the president in the performance his executive functions, can either act directly or through his cabinet ministers. Counsel maintained that it is the law that the president in the performance of his executive functions can act either directly by himself or indirectly through his ministers and members of the cabinet with respects to disciplinary issues. The 2nd defendant as a supervising Minister of the 1st defendant acted on behalf of Mr. President and suspended the claimant from office in accordance with the public service rules. 39. On mis-stated rules under which claimant was suspended vide exhibit GWARZO 4 counsel submitted that it was typographical error which does not goes to substance. According to counsel the raising of the issue is use of technicality which court have long jettisoned. BELLO V YAKUBU (2008) 14 NWLR (Pt.1106) 104 39. In concluding his submission counsel urged this court to refuse the reliefs sought by the claimant and dismiss the action for being incompetent, frivolous and misconceived, as the 2nd defendant has the requisite authority to suspend the claimant for serious misconduct in the circumstances of this case, investigate allegations against him and make appropriate recommendations to Mr. President 40. THE 3RD DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE TO THE ORIGINATING SUMMONS. The 3rd defendant in reaction to the originating summons filed a 4 paragraphs counter-affidavit sworn to by one Thomas Etah, a clerk in the office of the Honourable Attorney-General of the federation. A written address was filed along with the counter-affidavit. 41. Abdullahi Abubakar, Esq; Principal State Counsel, Federal Ministry of Justice in his oral submission in opposition to the originating summons on behalf of the 3rd defendant placed reliance on all the averments contained in the four paragraphs counter-affidavit and the exhibits attached therein. Counsel also adopted the written address as his argument. In the written address a sole issue for determination was formulated to wit: ‘‘Whether having regard to the combined effect of section 289, 5(1) 7 (2), 8(1) & (2) of the Investment and Securities Act, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2007 and Public Service Rules 160103, 160101,160102, 160201(a) (b), 160502, 03505 and 03406, 2009 the 2nd defendant can suspend the claimant pending investigation by the independent Corrupt Practices And Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and trial? 42. In arguing the issue for determination, counsel contended that sections 5(1) & (2), 8(1) & (2) of the investment and Securities Act 2007 in respect of appointment and conditions of service cannot be read in isolation without combining same with the public service rules. It is submitted that the 2nd defendant has the solitary supervisory power over the claimant and the 1st defendant to recommend the appointment of the claimant to president or disqualification and cessation of appointment and also to issue directives as appears to be just and proper for effective discharge of the functions of the commission 1st defendant, and it is mandatory for the commission to comply with such directives. 43. Counsel refers to sections 5(1) & (2), 8(1) & (2) and 298 of the Investment and Securities Act 2007 and Public Service Rules and contended that a careful study of the provisions clearly revealed that the 2nd defendant as the supervisory authority over the 1st defendant, has the sole duty to recommend the removal of the claimant from office and issue directives for the proper functioning of the 1st defendant. It is clear from the provisions that the power to appoint and instances where the office of the Director-General be deemed to have ceased, it is strongly contended that the provisions for the internal disciplinary measures especially as it relates to the claimant is provided for under section 298 of the Investment and Securities Act 2007 and such power is conferred on the minister 2nd defendant. It is submitted the word directives as used by section 298 include disciplinary measure the power to suspend the claimant where it appears just and proper for the effective discharge of the functions of the 1st defendant. The suspension of the claimant cannot be said to have breached any provision of the investment and Securities Act 2007. This is more so that the provision of section 5 (2) deals with the terms of office of the claimant. While section 8 provides for instances where the Director-General may be removed from office in the event of any circumstance like unsound mind, bankruptcy, conviction for felony and being guilty of serious misconduct. It is submitted that the claimant was removed from office not contrary to provisions of section 5 and 8 of the investment and Securities Act, but suspended from office for having engaged in act of serious misconduct. The suspension as a disciplinary measure is not covered under section 8 of the investment and Securities but under the provision of section 298 of the Investment and Securities Act, 2007 which, confers on the minister the power to issue directives to the 1st defendant including the clamant as deemed just and proper 44. It is also argued that the suspension of claimant is proper when it is considered that the claimant is being investigated and prosecuted for alleged misappropriation of funds. The continuous stay in office of the claimant during investigation will no doubt affect the just and effective functions of the 1st defendant. This is more so that there is strong probability of the claimant tempering with sensitive documents relevant to the investigation or intimidating star witnesses relevant to the alleged investigation. More importantly, the claimant needs no divided attention in discharging the function of the 1st defendant. 45. Counsel submitted that in the event of this court holding that the provision of section 298 of the investment and Securities Act does not solely confer on the 2nd defendant the power to suspend the claimant, it is our strong contention that if the investment and securities Act does not provide for the internal rules and regulation with respect to disciplinary action of the claimant, the 1st defendant being a parastatal is a federal government agency and the applicable law with regards to regulation not covered by the investment and securities Act is the public service rules. Counsel referred to the provisions of Rules 160103, 160101, 160102 of the Public Service rules 2008 and section 13 of the Investment and Securities Act 2007 and contended that the claimant is seriously acting under a strong misconception that the internal regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission does not contain disciplinary action without adverting his mind to the general provision cited above in the public service rules. Counsel urged the court to so hold and dismiss the case. 46. Counsel also referred to Rules 030405(a), (b), and (c) , 030406 and submitted that these rules exist in the gazette the fact that it was wrongly cited as 03405 and 03406 cannot be used as a ground to declare the suspension of the claimant as invalid. It is contended by counsel that reliance on the wrongly cited provisions to contest validity of suspension will amount to using technicality to defeat substantial justice. SAMUEL AYO AMOJU V FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (2008) NSCQR VOL. 33, page 75. It is also argued that claimant cannot claim ignorance of the fact that the reference to PSR 03405 and 03406 as opposed to 030405 and 030406 was a typographical error considering his level of experience in service. Claimant cannot use this technicality to prevent the cause of justice. Counsel submitted that the claimant has not denied the fact that he paid himself severance benefit while still in service. Counsel urged the court to so hold and dismiss the case. PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS BY THE DEFENDANTS. 1st DEFENDANT APPLICATION 47. Upon being served with the originating summons commencing this suit, the 1st defendant entered a conditional appearance and filed notice of preliminary objection on 11/07/18. The notice of preliminary objection was brought pursuant to Order 17 Rules 9 and Order 18 Rules 2(2) of the NICN RULES 2017. The objection is seeking for dismissal of this suit for want of jurisdiction on the grounds stated below:- I. The suit is wrongly commenced by way of originating summons as facts in issue are hotly in dispute. II. The suit is statute barred, being a suit commenced against public officers and having not being commenced within the three months window allowed by the statute. III. The action is incompetent and does not disclose any reasonable cause of action. 48. The notice of preliminary objection is supported by a 6 paragraph affidavit sworn to by one Alexander Ebute, a litigation officer in the law firm of Chief Chris Uche (SAN) & CO. A written address was also filed along with the notice of preliminary objection. 49. Chief Chris Uche, SAN, Learned Silk representing the 1st defendant in arguing the preliminary objection relied on the depositions contained in the affidavit in support and adopted the written address as his argument. In the written address in support of the notice of preliminary objection, counsel outlined the grounds for the objection as contained in the motion paper and argument on the objection. 50. Counsel began his submission by contending that the issue of jurisdiction is very fundamental as it is the life-line of an action and the font et origo of the authority of a court. It has been variously described as life-wire, the life blood, bedrock and/or foundation of any litigation. A decision reached without jurisdiction is a nullity and the proceeding become an exercise in futility. To buttress this submission counsel relied on the case of IBRAHIM V GAYE 2002 13 NWLR PR.784 267. Any defect in competence is fatal to the proceedings. APC VNDIC (2006) 15 NWLR (Pt.1002) 404. It is also submitted that court are creatures of statutes based on constitution, and their jurisdiction equally are founded on statutes and therefore no court can assume jurisdiction without the enabling statute. In otherwords no court has jurisdiction at large. Thus every court must satisfied itself that the matter before it is within its jurisdictional competence, else every step taken by the court including the judgment thereof, no matter how well conducted and well delivered, becomes a nullity ab initio FUMUDAH V ABURO (1991) 9 NWLR (pt214) 210. It is further submitted that absence of jurisdiction can be manifested in a number of ways including but not limited to want of compliance with condition precedent to institution of an action incompetence of originating processes, want of locus standi, subject matter outside statutory powers of court, extra territorial claims, nondisclosure of reasonable cause of action etc. the 1st defendant cited the case of MADUAKOLAM Vs NKEMDILIM(1962)ALL NLR (part 4)587, where the supreme court listed three criteria to guide a court of law in determining if it has jurisdiction to entertain a case. 51. The first ground of the 1st defendants’ notice of preliminary objection is that this suit is wrongly commenced by way of an originating summons as facts in issue are hotly in dispute. From the annexures in support of the originating summons, it is clear and apparent that the fact in issue are highly contentious in the light of various allegations of violation of public service rules and financial regulation that led to the suspension of the claimant from office and the finding of the administrative panel of inquiry set up in accordance with the law to investigate the claimant in relation thereto, including amongst several other abuses, the illegal collection of the sum of N104,851,154.94 by the claimant as severance package from the same organization he was still working for. 52. It is trite that originating summons is not suitable for commencing hostile proceedings. It is only to be used where the sole principal question in issue is or is likely to be one of the construction of written law or of any deed, will, contract or some question of law. Disputes involving hostile or hotly contested facts can only be resolved by oral evidence from the parties and/or their witnesses. The case of KEYAMO Vs HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY LAGOS STATE & ORS (2002)18 NWLR (799)605@613 IS relevant. The claimant has sought to ingeniously strip and skim his case of the flesh of the facts in order to portray same as merely questioning the source of the power to appoint or fire him whereas the documents in support of his originating summons are replete with facts demonstrating dispute of facts. Counsel relied on exhibit Gwarzo 2, 3, 4 and 6 annexed by the claimant himself which clearly demonstrates the combativeness of the facts in issue. Counsel submitted that this suit has been commenced by a wrong and inappropriate procedure and same ought to be struck out. 53. On the second ground of objection that the suit is statute barred, it is the submission of counsel that this court cannot exercise jurisdiction in a matter that is caught up by the statute of limitation, which in this case is the Public Officers (Protection) Act, LFN 2004. According to counsel from the originating summons and affidavit in support of the claimant action, the crux of the claimant suit is the validity or otherwise of the act of the Honourable Minister of Finance to suspend the claimant. In essence the summary of the claimant/respondent case is the challenge of action or exercise of duty of a public officer. A public officer is defined in the civil service rules (2008) is a person who exercises or formerly exercise for the purpose of the government, the functions of any officer or employer under the state. In support of this submission counsel relied on the Supreme Court decision in the case of IBRAHIM V JSC KADUNA STATE (1998) NWLR (pt548) 669. Counsel contended that an action against a public officer for any act done pursuant to any public duty must be commenced within three months following the action complained of. 54. It is the submission of counsel that the claimant’s cause of action arose on 29th November 2017 when he was served with a letter of suspension or on 28th January 2018, when the report of the panel set up to investigate the claim was received. Therefore the commencement or institution of this suit about 7 months or 4 months after the cause of action arose cannot avail the claimant as the action is statute barred and his right is extinguished. The 1st defendant cited the following cases in their support; OSUN STATE GOVT Vs DANLAMI NIG LTD (2007) 9 NWLR (PT.1038) 66, EGBE Vs ADEFARASIN (1987)1 NWLR(Pt 47)1. In concluding argument counsel urged this court to hold that this action having been commenced and instituted on the 4/6/18 is statute barred. It is unsustainable and incompetent. Counsel urged the court to resolve this issue in favour of defendant. 55. On the third ground of objection, that the suit is incompetent and does not disclose any reasonable cause of action. It is submitted that the facts and document presented by the claimant discloses that he was suspended from office whereas his question for determination and reliefs sought are founded on the premise of termination of employment by way of causing to cease holding office. Exhibit Gwarzo 4 annexed by the claimant shows that he was suspended from office and that is his grouse. Even the argument that Public Service Rules 03405 and 03406 are not in existence does in any way disclose any reasonable cause of action, as the Honourable can see that Rules 030405 and 030406 were the Rules intended and they are in existence as seen in the Public Service Rules annexed by the claimant to his affidavit in support of the originating summons. Counsel contended that the suit of the claimant shows no reasonable cause of action as the claimant’s cause of complaint is grossly inconsistent and incompatible with his questions for determination and reliefs sought. 56. Lastly, counsel submitted that the administrative panel of inquiry referred to by the claimant in his originating summons submitted its report since 28th January 2018, and the claimant deliberately failed to annex, exhibit or present a copy of the report of the said panel or show that he applied for it and it was not given to him. 57. In concluding his submission counsel contended that this suit is patently misconceived, vexatious, speculative and a gross abuse of court process. This court has inherent power under section 6(6) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, (as amended) to arrest abuse of process of court. Counsel also relied on the case of FERDINAND OIL MILLS PLC V UBA PLC & 2 ORS. (2010) 1 NWLR (Pt.1176) 583. Counsel urged the court to uphold the 1st defendant’s preliminary objection and dismiss the claimant’s suit for lack of jurisdiction. 3rd DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTION. 58. Vide a notice of preliminary objection dated 24/7/18 and filed on 30/07/2018, the 3rd defendant is challenging the jurisdiction of this court to entertain the claimant’s suit. The notice of preliminary objection was brought pursuant to section 2(a) of the Public Officers (protection) Act and under the inherent jurisdiction of this court. The grounds for the objection are as follows:- I. The claimant’s suit is caught by the limitation period under section 2(a) of the officer’s protection Act. II. The alleged cause of action arose on 29/11/17 and the claimant commenced this action on 4/06/17, seven months after the cause of action arose and outside the three months’ limitation period allowed for the commencement of action against a public officer. III. The action is statute barred, hence incompetent before this court. IV. This court lacks the jurisdiction to hear and determine this suit. 59. Abdullahi Abubakar, Esq; Principal State Cousel, Federal Ministry of Justice, in making oral submission before the adopted the written address filed along with the notice of preliminary objection as his argument. In the written address twin issues were formulated for determination to wit; a. Whether the claimant’s suit is statute barred b. Whether in this suit, there is a cause of action before this honorable court. 60. In arguing issue one counsel contended that the claimant has commenced this suit outside the 3 Months limitation period to maintain action against a public officer, therefore the claimant suit is caught by the limitation Act and it is statute barred. This is because the alleged cause of action arose on 29th November 2017 and the claimant commenced this action on 4th June 2018, seven months after the cause of action arose. Thus, this action is statute barred. N support of this view counsel relied on the case of FRANCIS OFILI Vs CIVIL SERVICE COMMMISSION (2008) ALL FWLR (Pt.434) at 1623. Counsel also relied on the Supreme Court decision in SULGRAVE HOLDINGS INC. V FGN & 3 ORS. (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt.1329) 319, where it was held that it is only when an action is commenced within the period of three (3) Months as prescribed by the provisions of section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection ) Act that the courts will be clothed with the power to entertain the action, otherwise the action is statute-barred. In this case, the appellants had themselves to blame for sleeping over their rights and thus caught by the provisions of the Act’’. ISSUE TWO 61. Counsel submitted that it is trite that a cause of action is defined as the operative fact or facts (factual situation) which gives rise to a right of action which in itself is a remedial right. It is the emergence of a factual situation which enables a party to an action in court to have a cause of suing a party. Thus, in the case of ADEKOYA Vs FEDERAL HOUSING AUTHORITY (2008) 11 NWLR (Pt 1099)539 at 551 quoted and applied the definition of cause of action, as defined by Justice Oputa in the case of EGBE V ADEFARASIN (1987) 1 NWLR (PT.47) 1. It is contended that cause of action is the entire set of circumstances that give rise to an enforceable right. Counsel submitted that the defendants did not wronged the claimant the suspension of the claimant from office is to enable the ICPC Properly investigate the allegation of misappropriation of public funds against him with a view to preventing any attempt to temper with evidence or influence key witnesses in the cause of investigation. 62. It is the contention of counsel that withdrawing the sum of 104 million from public fund as severance benefit while in office is never in dispute between the claimant and defendants in this suit, the point of dispute is for claimant to justify paying himself the said sum or the defendant to establish misappropriation of public fund which cannot fairly be settled, while the claimant is on seat as Director-General of the 1st defendant. It is argued that the claimant can only be entitled to damages if he is declared innocent by a court of competent jurisdiction. 63. In concluding his submission counsel contended that this suit is caught by statute of limitation is statute barred and no reasonable cause of action disclosed. REACTION OF THE CLAIMANT TO THE 1st and 3rd DEFENDANTS NOTICES OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTION. 64. A. U. Mustaph, SAN, in his oral submission informed the court that the claimant in opposition to the 1st defendant’s notice of preliminary objection has filed on 7/7/18 a 6 paragraphs counter-affidavit sworn to by one Igbang Daniel, a litigation Secretary in the law firm of A. U Mustapha (SAN) & Co. a written address was also filed along with the written address. Counsel relied on all the averments contained in the 6 paragraphs counter-affidavit and adopted the written address as his argument. 65. In the written address four issues were formulated for determination to wit; a. Whether paragraph 4(a),(b),(c) and 5 of the affidavit of the 1st defendant in support of its preliminary objection, being riddled with arguments and conclusion ,offends the relevant provisions of section 115(1)&(2) of the evidence Act and are liable to be struck out. b. Whether this suit is properly commenced by originating summons. c. Whether a public officer can take protection under the public officers’ protection Act in circumstances where I . the Act complained of is a continuing act; or ii. the public officer in question acted mala fide, ultra vires and in total disregard of the laws of the federal republic of Nigeria. d. Whether this suit discloses a reasonable cause of action. 66. It is submitted in favor of issue one that, paragraph 4(a),(b),(c) and 5 of the affidavit of the 1st defendant in support of his preliminary objection being riddled with argument and conclusion, offends the relevant provision of section 115(1)&(2) of the evidence Act and should be deleted or discarded and struck out from the body of the said affidavit. This issue examines the competence of the preliminary objection filed by the 1st defendant from the prospective of the competence of certain paragraphs of the affidavit in support of same. The content of the affidavit are either argumentative, conclusion of inferences which is the province of the court. The law is trite that an affidavit is merely to state facts and no more, leaving the court to make its independent conclusion. To support this argument counsel calls the aid of the case of GENERAL &AVIATION SERVICES LTD Vs THAHAL (2004) 4 SC 109. Counsel submitted that paragraph 4(a) (b) (c), 5 are only worthy of one consideration that is striking out for offending the provisions of section 115 of the Evidence Act. Counsel submitted that if the objection of the claimant is sustained there is nothing left as facts in the affidavit to support the objection of the defendant. Once the offending paragraphs are thrown out the remaining averment cannot sustain the notice of preliminary objection. ISSUE TWO 67. Counsel contended that the answer is in the positive as the suit was properly commenced by originating summons. Counsel referred to Order 3 Rules 3 of the NICN Rules 2017 and the case of JIMOH Vs ALESHINLOYE II(2014)15 NWLR (pt 1430) 277. To see whether this suit was properly commenced recourse must be had to the originating processes and the affidavit evidence. It is contended that the issue the court is to resolved borders on interpretation of certain provisions of the Investment and Securities Act as they relate to suspension or removal from office. Therefore the best form of commencement is via originating summons. 68. The contention of counsel for the 1st defendant that the facts are hotly contested has not been substantiated by way of proof. It is submitted that the 1st defendant has not placed any material before the court either by facts deposed to in the affidavit or exhibits attached to the said affidavit to show that any fact, not to mention facts are hotly in dispute. It is trite that no matter how beautiful the written address of a counsel is, it cannot take the place of evidence. To buttress the point made counsel relied on the case of PRESIDENTIAL IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL GOVT LANDED PROPERTIES Vs AYWILA & ANOR (2017) LPELR-43204(CA). 69. It is further submitted that in determining whether facts are hotly in dispute or contentious, it is the duty of court to examine the nature of the claim and facts deposed to in the affidavit in support of the claim to determine whether the facts in support of the originating summons is contentious. Here there is no counter affidavit filed by the 1st defendant to compare with the claim, for the purpose of determining whether there are hotly disputed facts. Where the 1st defendant filed a counter affidavit, it does not automatically make facts in this suit contentious. ESENE & ORS Vs THE SPEAKER EDO STATE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY & ORS (2012) LPELR(CA). It is contended that exhibits GWARZO 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the affidavit in support were not in conflict with any averment. There is nothing contentious in them 2 and 3 are query and answer to is in conflict with any provisions of the affidavit evidence. ISSUE THREE 70. In arguing issue three the claimant answers it in the negative. It is forcefully argued by counsel that the claimant’s suit is for ventilation of labour employment rights and it being so, the suit as instituted is not subject to the kind of time limitation contained in the Public Officers (Protection) Act and is accordingly not statute barred. It is also argued that the issue of statute of limitation raised by the 1st defendant as affecting the jurisdiction of this court is misplaced. It is trite that whether or not an action is affected by the limitation law as to make it statute barred is an issue that can only be raised as a defense and not one to be raised as affecting the jurisdiction of the court. The court settled this matter in JOHN OVOH Vs THE NIGERIAN WEST MINSTER DREDGING AND MARINE LTD (UNREPORTED) suit no NIC/9/2002 delivered on April, 2008. It is also submitted that the claimant was suspended from office as Director General of the 1st defendant by the 2nd defendant via a letter dated 29/11/2017 and up till date he is still under the unlawful suspension. According to counsel can it be said that the statute of limitation has caught up with this suit? It is contended that the claimant’s suit has not been caught up by the statute of limitation as it is a continuing damage or injury and it has not ceased. Counsel in support of this contention refer this court to the case of CBN Vs AMAO (2010) 16NWLR (Pt.1219) 271. 71. Assuming without conceding this suit is statute barred, it is submitted that the Public Officers (Protection) Act is enacted to protect public officers who act lawfully and bonafide within the scope of their authority and power in the performance of their duties. Counsel contended that a careful perusal of the documentary evidence adduced before the court will show that the 2nd defendant acted in bad faith and ultra vires. They are not authorized to appoint a Director General of the 1st defendant, then where did they derive the right to suspend him. It is submitted that the power to recommend to president appointment or removal Director General of SEC. the duty of the 2nd defendant is to recommend the appointment and/or removal of a director general of SEC. it is submitted that since the 2nd defendant is not the president who makes such appointment, nor are they the senate who confirm such appointment , the 2nd defendant acted ultra vires, without authority and outside the colour of her office as public officer and cannot rely on section 2 of the public officers protection Act. The case of AG ADAMAWA STATE Vs AG FEDERATION (2014)14 NWLR(pt.1428)515 at 553. 72. In concluding his submission it was argued that appropriate person who ought to have brought this limb of objection is the 2nd defendant whose act is complained of and not the 1st defendant who was joined as a necessary party being the commission the claimant was director general. ISSUE FOUR 73. According to counsel a reasonable cause of action can be deciphered from the statement of claim, in an action commenced by originating summons, the affidavit filed by the claimant which shows the particulars to identify the cause of action. It is only those depositions in the affidavit that the court can look at and examine. On this contention counsel relied on the case of AJAYI Vs MILITARY ADMINSTRATOR , ONDO STATE (1997) 5 NWLR (pt.503) 237. It is the contention of counsel that the deposition of the claimant particularly paragraphs 6 to 19 discloses an infraction by the 2nd defendant on the right of the claimant consequent upon which he has suffered damages It is submitted that the reference to ‘termination’ in this case is apposite because the effect of wrongful suspension which deprives the claimant of fulfilling his duties as prescribed by law is that his employment has been constructively terminated or in other words, he has been constructively dismissed. 74. In concluding his submission counsel urged the court to dismiss the notice of preliminary objection of the 1st defendant with substantial cost as it is misconceived, ill-founded unmeritorious and an attempt to delay the hearing of this suit. CLAIMANTS’ REPLY TO 3RD DEFENDANT/APPLICANT’S NOTICE OF PREMINARY OBJECTION. 75. The claimants’ filed a reply to the 3rd defendant’s notice of preliminary objection on 06/09/2018. The claimant formulated two issues for determination to wit; 1. Whether a public officer can take protection under the public officers’ protection Act in circumstances where: a. The act complained of is a continuing act; or b. The public officer (s) in question acted mala fide, ultra vires and in total disregard of the laws of the federal republic of Nigeria. 2. Whether this suit discloses a reasonable cause of action. 76. It is the contention of counsel that the claimant answers for issue one is in the negative, the claimant’s suit is that of ventilation of labour/employment right and its being so, the suit as instituted is not subject to the kind of time limitation contained in the public officers protection Act and is accordingly not statute barred. To support his contention counsel placed reliance on the case of ABIODUN &ORS Vs. GOVERING COUNCIL COLLEGE OF EDUCATION, OYO STATE &ANOR (2011) 22 NLLR (P.t 62)316 at 346. Furthermore it is submitted that the issue of statute of limitation raised by the 3rd defendant as affecting this honorable court’s jurisdiction to entertain this suit is misplaced with due respect to the 3rd defendant. It is trite that whether or not an action is statute barred is affected by limitation law as to make it statute barred is an issue that can only be raised as a defense and not one to be raised as affecting the jurisdiction of the court. The action of the claimant was brought within the time allowed by the act as same is a continuous act that has not even ceased. 77. It is argued that the claimant was unlawfully suspended from office as director general of the 1st defendant on 29/11/2017 is till date under the said suspension. Can it be right to say that the claimant suit is caught up by the limitation of action Act, when the suspension having not being ceased but is continuous? Certainly the answer is in the affirmative. It is submitted that the claimant’s suit is not is not statute barred as argued by the 3rd defendant as the act complained of is continuous and has not ceased in inference the court to the case of CBN Vs AMAO (2010) 16 NWLR (pt.1219)at 295. Assuming without conceding that this action is statute barred, we submit that the Public Officers (Protection) Act is an act which was enacted to protect public officers who act lawfully or bonafide and intra vires within the scope of authority and powers conferred on him or her in the performance of official duties. It is the contention of counsel that looking at the provisions of Investment and securities Act (SEC), there is no provision empowering the 2nd defendant to suspend the claimant as director general of the 1st defendant and the defendant have so acted has Acted Ultra vires his power and is accordingly guilty of bad faith and cannot seek protection under the public officers protection Act. It is contended that the 2nd defendant being neither the president nor senate acted ultra vires and cannot rely on the officers protection Act. FRANCIS OFILI Vs CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (2008) ALL FWLR (P.t 434)at 1623. ISSUE TWO 78. On issue two counsel submitted that, in deciding whether there is a reasonable cause of action, the determining factor is the statement of claim or in an action for originating summons, the affidavit filed by the claimant. AJAYI Vs MILITARY ADMINSTRATOR,ONDO STATE (SUPRA). It is sufficient for a court to hold that a cause of action is reasonable once the statement of claim (supporting affidavit to an originating summons ) discloses some cause of action or some question fit to be decided by a judge notwithstanding that the cause of action is weak or not likely to succeed. A suit is said to disclose a reasonable cause of action when it sets out the legal right of a claimant and the obligations of the defendant. A solemn review of the deposition of the claimant, particularly paragraphs 6 to 19 disclosed an infraction by the 2nd defendant on the right of the claimant consequent upon which he suffered damages. 79. The 3rd defendant’s assertion in paragraph 4.03 and 4.11 of the 3rd defendant’s written address in support of preliminary objection, it is submitted that evidence which ought to be in the affidavit and not the written address. It is trite that no matter how a written address is well crafted, it cannot take the place of an evidence. That was the holding of the court in PRESIDENTIAL IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL GOVERNMENT LANDED PROPERTY Vs AYWILA &ANOR(2017) LPELR-43204(CA). Since the 3rd defendant did not file affidavit in support of the preliminary objection, the evidence of the 3rd defendant as contained in paragraphs 4.03 and 4.11 should be discountenanced. 80. Furthermore since in the 3rd defendant’s paragraph 4.10 above, there was a suspension, it is submitted that, that in its self is a cause of action especially when viewed in the light of the fact that the party that purported to have suspended lacked powers to do so. It is the submission of the 3rd defendant in their written address that there is no cause of action is misconceived, ill-founded and wrong and same should be discountenanced by this court. REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW 81. The counsel for the 1st defendant began his reply on points of law by citing the case of ISHAYA BAMAITI V THE STATE (2001) 8 NWLR (Pt.715) 270 and submitted that paragraph 4 of the 1st defendant’s affidavit in .in the cited. 82. On commencement by originating summons, counsel submitted that it is trite law that the originating summons procedure is intended to be used in limited circumstances. That is to say where there is no dispute on question of facts or the likelihood of such dispute. NATIONAL BANK OF NIGERIA V ALAKIJA (1978) 9-10 SC 39, DOHERTY V DOHERTY (1964) 1 ALL NLR 299 and ANATOGU V ANATOGU (1997) 9 NWLR (PT.519) 49. 83. On statute barred, counsel submitted that the argument of the claimant that issue of statute barred can only come as a defence is highly misconceived. It is submitted that issue of statute barred raised issue of jurisdiction and can be raised at any stage or at any point. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION & ANOR V AKWA IBOM STATE NEWSPAPER LTD & ANOR. (2013) LPELR-21138(CA). It is settled that issue of jurisdiction can be raised at any time. In conclusion counsel urged the court to discountenance the submissions of the claimant and grant the prayers contained in the notice of preliminary objection. COURT’S DECISION. 84. I have carefully perused the originating processes commencing this suit as well as the notices of preliminary objections filed by the 1st and 3rd defendants contesting the competency of this suit. I have equally examined the various responses to the processes filed in this suit and the oral submissions of counsel canvassing their respective position. 85. On 8/4/19 this court ordered that both the originating summons and the notices of preliminary objection be taken together. Having taken the substantive suit and the preliminary objections at the same time, I shall first and foremost determined the preliminary objection. This is because the issues canvassed touches on competency of the court to determine the substantive suit. 86. From the combined reading of the preliminary objections, filed by the 1st defendant and the 3rd defendant, the issues that needs to be resolved are: 1. Whether the claimant suit is statute barred. 2. Whether the claimant’s suit has disclosed reasonable cause of action. 3. Whether this is a proper matter to be commenced via originating summons. RESOLUTION OF ISSUE ONE 87. The counsel for the 1st and 3rd defendants are of the view that this suit is caught by the provision of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act. While the claimant is of the view that section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act is not applicable to this suit. Even if it is held to be applicable, the suit falls within the exception to the general rule as the case is that of continuance of damage/injury and the defendants acted outside the colour their offices and in bad faith. 88. There are no dearth of authorities on the purpose of Public Officers Protection Act. The Public Officers (protection) Act, is meant to protect public officers in civil liability for any wrongdoing that occasion damages to any citizen, if the action is not instituted within three months, after the act, default or neglect complained of. See YABUGE V COP (1992) 4 SCNJ 116; (1992) NWLR (PT.234) 152, (1992) LPELR-3505(SC). As submitted by counsel for the claimant the law is designed to protect only the officer, who acts in good faith and does not apply to acts done in abuse of office and without semblance of legal justification. See OFFOBOCHE V OGOJA LOCAL GOVERNMENT & ANOR (2001) 16 NWLR (PT.739) 458, (2001) 7 SC (Pt.iii) 107. Where statute has provided period within which an action can be commenced, proceedings shall not be brought after the expiration of the period prescribed. Any action instituted or commenced after the period prescribed for its commencement will be statute barred. See IBRAHIM V JSC KADUNA STATE (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt.584) 1, EGBE V ADEFARASIN (1986). There is no disputing the fact that from 29/11/17 when exhibit GWARZO 4 was issued to the claimant by the 2nd defendant to 4/6/18 when this suit was instituted by the claimant it is a period of more than three Months. 89. However, looking at the Originating Summons commencing this suit, there is no disputing the fact that this suit was instituted by the claimant to contest the validity of the decision in exhibit GWARZO 4, suspending the claimant from the office of the Director-General Securities and Exchange Commission, which means the claims of the claimant borders on contract of service or for labour. The law is now settled that section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act does not apply to cases of contracts. See OSUN STATE V DALAMI NIGERIA LTD (2007) 9 NWLR (Pt.1038) 66, (2007) 3 SC (pt.i) 131, (2007) 6 SCM 145, (2007) LPELR-2817(SC), NATIONAL REVENUE MOBILIZATION ALLOCATION AND FISCAL COMMISSION & 2 ORS. V AJIBOLA JOHSON & 10 ORS (2019) 2 NWLR (PT.1656) 247. Based on the foregoing decisions of the apex court of the land, I am left with no option than to hold that since this is an action based on contract of service the provision of the Public Officers Protection Act is not applicable to this case. This means that the claimant’s suit though filed outside three Months period stipulated by section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection is not statute barred. 90. Having held that this suit is not statute barred, the consideration of whether the suit falls within the exceptions to the general rule or that the act is not within the colour of the office of the defendant or that it was in bad faith will not arise. The reason that those issues have become moot and academic. And courts are not meant to delve into moot and academic issues. Courts of law are not proper fora for engaging in academic discourse they are meant to deal with live issues that have utilitarian value to the parties in litigation. It is not the business of a court of law or tribunal to engage in academic exercise. See D. E. N. R. LTD V TRANS INT’L BANK LTD (2008) 18 NWLR (PT.1119) 388, ADEOGUN & ANOR. V FASHOGBON & ORS. (2008) 17 NWLR (PT.1115) 149, PLATEAU STATE GOVERNMENT V AG FEDERATION (2006) 3 NWLR (PT.967) 346. Issue one is resolved in favour of the claimant. RESOLUTION OF ISSUE TWO 91. The law reports are replete with decisions to the effect that a matter cannot be heard on its merits unless there is a reasonable cause of action and the party bringing the action has a right to bring the action. The court in which the action has been brought can only validly exercise jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter in such circumstances. It is only in such circumstances that the court can exercise the judicial power of the constitution vested in it by section 6(6) of the Constitution as amended. There must be a cause of action before an intending litigant can initiate any legitimate proceedings. A suit is aimed at vindicating some legal right or claim and such legal right can only arise when certain material facts arise. It is only when facts establishing a civil right or obligation and facts establishing infraction or trespass on that right and obligation exist side by side, a cause of action is said to accrue. Existence of a cause of action is an indispensable pre-requisite of our jurisprudence for successful prosecution of a suit before a court of law. A cause of action connotes, factual situation the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the court a remedy against another person or the facts which constitute the essential ingredients of an enforceable right or claim. The phrase comprised every fact which is material to be proved to enable the plaintiff to succeed. See EGBE V ADEFARASIN (1985) 5 SC 50, ALESE V ALATUYI (1995) 7 SCNJ 40, SAVAGE V EWEICHIA (1972) 1 ALL NLR (Pt.i) 251. It is also referred to as act on part of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complain. A cause of action therefore, is constituted by bundle of aggregate of facts which the law recognize as giving the plaintiff a substantive right to make a claim. A reasonable cause of action simply means a cause of action with some chances of success when only the allegation in the pleadings are considered. See OSHIBOJA V AMUDA (1992) 7 SCNJ 316, RINCO CONST. CO. V VEEPEE IND. LTD (2005) 9 NWLR (929) 85, IBRAHIM V OSIM (1988) 6 SCNJ 203, THOMAS V OLUFOSOYE (1986) 1 NWLR (PT.18) 669. 92. Once the requisite factual elements are present, a cause of action enures notwithstanding the fact of the weakness and the unlikelihood of success of the case. This means so long as the statement of claim or the particulars disclose some cause of action or has raised some questions fit to be decided by a judge or jury, the mere fact that the case is weak or not likely to succeed is no ground for striking out. However, where upon examination it is found that the statement of claim discloses no cause of action or the alleged cause action is bound to fail, and the court is satisfied that no amount of amendment no matter how ingenious will cure the defect, the statement of claim will be struck out and the action dismissed. Where no civil right and obligation of the claimant is raised in the statement of claim for determination, the statement of claim ought to be struck out. 93. I have painstakingly have a hard look at the Originating Summons and the affidavit in support, which in the present case are the processes to be considered in determining whether there is a reasonable cause of action or not. It is manifestly clear that the claimant processes have captured questions on civil rights and obligation of the claimant. The suit is contesting the validity of adverse decision conveyed to the claimant depriving him of the performance of his duties as Director General of the 1st defendant, as per exhibit GWARZO 4, which the claimant is challenging by institution of this suit. 94. I have no doubt in my mind that the claimant has disclosed a reasonable cause of action against the defendants. The mere fact that the case of the claimant is weak or may not likely succeed shall not be a ground to preclude this court from inquiring into the claims of the claimant. Issue two is resolved in favour of the claimant. ISSUE THREE: 95. The 1st defendant has vehemently opposed the mode of commencement of this suit in that originating summons is not the appropriate mode by which this suit should have been commenced. According to the Learned Silk for the 1st defendant the facts are hotly in dispute. This according to counsel is from the annexures in support of the originating summons, which makes the facts in issue to be highly contentious in the light of the various allegations of violation of public service rules and financial regulations that led to the suspension of the claimant from office and finding of administrative panel of inquiry set up in accordance with the law to investigate the claimant in relation thereto. 96. In response to the issue of commencement of this suit via originating summons, the Learned Silk representing the claimant submitted that this suit was properly commenced before the court for having been commenced in accordance with the rules of this court which allows use of originating summons as one of the mode of commencement of action before the court. The learned silk relied on the provision of order 3 rule 3 of the rules of this court in canvassing his position. Reliance was also placed on JIMOH V ALESHILOYE ii (2014) 15 NWLR (Pt.1430) 227. 97. Order 3 rule 1 of the rules of this court has provided various modes by which a litigant wishing to commence an action can choose from. The use of originating summons is permitted where the sole question is, or is likely to be that of the construction of any constitution, enactment, agreements or any other instrument relating to employment, labour and industrial relations in respect of which the court has jurisdiction by virtue of the provisions of section 254C (1) paragraph (1) (i) and (ii) of the constitution of the federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) or by any Act or law in force in Nigeria. See EZEIGWE V NWAWULU (2010) 4 NWLR (pt.1183) 159, NATIONAL BANK OF NIGERIA LTD V ALAKIJA (1979) 9-10 SC 59. 98. Generally commencement of action by way of originating summons is a procedure for use in cases where the facts are not in dispute or there is no likelihood of their being in dispute. Originating Summons is also reserved for issues like the determination of short question for construction and not matters of such controversy that the justice of the case could demand settings of pleadings. See DIN V AG FEDERATION (1986) 1 NWLR (pt.17) 471, OBASANYA V BABAFEMI (200) 15 NWLR (Pt.689) 1, FAMFA OIL LTD V AG FEDERATION (2003) 18 NWLR (Pt.852) 453, where Belgore JSC, (as he then was later CJN) has this to say on Originating Summons; ‘’The very nature of an originating summons is to make things simpler for hearing. It is available to any person claiming interest under a deed, will or other written instrument whereby he will apply by originating summons for the determination of any question of construction arising under the instrument for a declaration of interest. It is a procedure where the evidence in the main is by way of documents and there is no serious dispute as to fats but what the plaintiff is claiming is the declaration of his right’’ 99. Applying the principles of law enunciated in the above decided cases to the dispute before the court, I am not in any doubt that the case at hand is meant for the interpretation of certain provisions of the Investment and Securities Act, more particularly sections 5 and 8 of the Investment and Securities Act, as well as that of exhibit GWARZO 4, with the aim of substantially determining whether the decision contained in exhibit GWARZO 4 is in line with extant laws, rules and regulations. In the circumstance, as it was mainly for interpretation of a statute and a written document, it was rightly brought to the court by filing originating summons asking for declaratory and other orders. This clearly shows that vide order 3 rule 3 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria, (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017, proceeding may be initiated via originating summons, where, the sole or principal question in issues is likely to be one of construction of a written law or of any instrument made under any written law or where there is unlikely to be any substantial dispute. See UBA V EKPO (2003) 12 NWLR (Pt.834) 932 SALEH V MONGUNO (2003) 1 NWLR (Pt. 801) pg. 221; JIMOH V OLAWOYE (2003) 10 NWLR (Pt. 828) pg. 307; N.B.N. Ltd. v. ALAKIJA (1978) 9 - 10 SC 59; OLOYE V ALEGBE (1983) 2 SCNLR 35; DIN V A-G FEDERATION (1986) 1. 100. It is trite law that the Originating Summons Procedure is not meant to be invoked in a hostile action between parties and in which the parties concerned need to know beforehand the issues which they are called upon to contend with from pleadings. There can be disputed facts which originating summons procedure could resolve, but where the disputed facts are substantial, the proper mode of commencing such an action is by writ of summons so that pleadings can be filed. In other wards originating summons procedure is appropriate where there is no substantial dispute of facts between the parties or likelihood of such dispute. In the case at hand the core questions for determination centers on whether the decision communicated to the claimant as per exhibit GWARZO 4 was in tandem with the provisions of Investment and Securities Act. There can be no substantial dispute in the supporting affidavit as the matter is for construction of a written law and a written document. See JIMOH V OLAWOYE (2003) 9 NWLR (Pt.826) 462, OGUNSOLA V A. P. P. (2003) 9 NWLR (Pt. 826) 462; OLUMIDE V AJAYI (1997) 8 NWLR (Pt.517) 433; UNILAG V AIGORO (1991) 3 NWLR (PT.179) 376; ADEYEMO V BEYIKO (1999) 13 NWLR (Pt.635) 472. 101. In view of the foregoing, the two notices of preliminary objections filed by the 1st and 3rd defendants fails and are hereby dismissed for lacking in merit. 102. Having dealt with the two notices of preliminary objection, I shall now turn to the resolutions of the questions posed in the Originating Summons. 103. The facts culminating into this suit are very simple and straightforward. The background facts which made the claimant to issue this originating summons are that vide exhibit GWARZO 1, following the confirmation by the Senate of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the claimant was appointed to the office of the Director General of the 1st defendant with effect from 20th May 2015 pursuant to section 5(1) & (2) of the Investment and Securities Act, for a period of five (5) years. While the claimant was in the service of 1st defendant, vide exhibit GWARZO 2, a letter titled Preliminary letter was served on the claimant accusing him of infraction of the provisions of the Public Service Rules. Vide exhibit GWARZO 3, the claimant responded to exhibit GWARZO 2. On 29/11/17, the claimant received exhibit GWARZO 4 which is a letter suspending the claimant from office as Director General of the 1st defendant. The suspension of the claimant was to pave way for a thorough investigation to be undertaken. The suspension is to last pending the conclusion of the investigation by an administrative panel of inquiry. 104. The claimant formulated five issues for resolution, the 1st defendant formulated three issues. The 2nd defendant formulated twin issues. While the 3rd defendant formulated sole issue for determination. From the facts as disclosed by the various affidavits evidence before the court as well as argument canvassed by counsel in support of their respective positions before the court. The central issue in litigation between the parties in this suit is the validity of exhibit GWARZO 4, letter suspending the claimant from office or has the 2nd defendant got the vires to issue exhibit GWARZO 4. 105. Before, considering the main issue for resolution, I shall resolve the issue of wrongful description of the Public Service Rules as encapsulated in exhibit GWARZO 4. The claimant has made heavy whether on the non-existence of Rules 03405 and 03406, based on which exhibit GWARZO 4 was issued. All the counsel for the defendants are in Unisom that the Public Service Rules quoted in the suspension letter was printers devil i.e an erratum and the correct Rules are 030405 and 030406 and they are extant in the Public Service Rules. The Supreme Court in the case of AGBETOBA & ORS. V LAGOS STATE EXECUTIVE CONCIL (1991) LPELR-238(SC), was faced with a similar problem of false description of a statute and the apex court held that false description cannot vitiate a statute. Applying the principles of law enunciated in the AGBETOS’s case it is my view that the false description of the Public Service Rules 030405 and 030406 as 03405 and 03406, cannot in any way whatsoever affect the existence of the rules and their operation. In the circumstance, I hold that the wrongful description or non-proper citing of the correct rules alone cannot invalidated exhibit GWARZO 4. I So hold. 106. The counsel for the claimant relies heavily on sections 5(1) & (2) and 8(1) & (2) in canvassing the position that the 2nd defendant does not have requisite power to issue exhibit GWARZO 4 to suspend the claimant from work or stop the claimant from performance of his official duties as Director General of the 1st defendant. The counsel for the defendants on the other hands were of the view that the 2nd defendant has the requisite power to issue exhibit GWARZO 4 suspending the claimant from work. It was also contended that even, if section 298 of the Investment and Securities Act, 2007 is not applicable, the 2nd defendant can still be justified in issuing exhibit GWARZO 4, since she has supervisory power over the 1st defendant. It was also the case of the defendants that with the dissolution of Board of 1st defendant, all powers of the Board have by virtue of policy directive of government been reposed on the 2nd defendant. Therefore, the 2nd defendant performs the responsibilities of the Board. Counsel also argued that in the event it was held that the 2nd defendant cannot by virtue of supervisory control of the 1st defendant and power to issue directive cannot suspend, such power of suspension can be invoked under the Public Service Rules. On this reliance was placed onPublic Service Rules nos. 160101, 160102, 160103 and 160501. 107. The counsel for the 3rd defendant that formulated single issue for resolution, argued that the claimant’s suspension by the 2nd defendant was based on allegations of misappropriation of funds and violations of the ICPC Act, levelled against the claimant. It is in order to pave way for smooth investigation that query was issued to claimant and subsequently suspended from work as a result of prima facies case made against him, so as not jeopardize investigation by ICPC. From the evidence before the court the correct position is that the suspension of the claimant was not predicated on ICPC investigation. Exhibit GWARZO 4 is very clear and unambiguous. The suspension was to allow investigation panel set up by the 2nd defendant to investigate the claimant and do its job without let or hindrance. The investigation referred to in exhibit GWARZO 4 is not that of ICPC. 108. There seems to be consensus among the parties in this suit that the claimant was duly appointed as Director General of the 1st defendant by the president ant and commander of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic Of Nigeria in line with extant provisions of section 5(1) & (2) of the Investment and Securities Act 2007, for a period of five (5) years with effect from 20/5/15. This, means, the claimant now has residue of one year to complete his 1st tenure of five (5) years terms. This means that the issue of appointment of the claimant is not in contest. There is no dispute regarding appointment of the claimant. What is in issue is power of the 2nd defendant to suspend or take disciplinary action against the claimant. 109. The 1st defendant has based his argument on the 2nd defendant’s power to suspend the claimant on the role given to the 2nd defendant to recommend for appointment and removal of the occupant of the office of the claimant. According to counsel power to supervise is equivalent to power to inquire and discipline. The counsel for the 2nd and 3rd defendants also anchored their argument on the same line with the 1st defendant. 110. Generally, suspension is a legitimate means through which an employee is temporarily relieved of his post, duty, or day to day official activities or engagement in order to enable a thorough investigation be conducted regarding allegations of misconduct or infractions bothering on criminality be investigated by appropriate investigative committee. The suspension of employee is usually done, where an employee if allowed to continue with the function of his office he may in one way or the other interfere with the processes of investigation or temper with evidence. The power to suspend depend upon the terms of the particular contract of employment. Suspension will be wrongful on part of the employer if there is no power to suspend given by the contract. LONGE V FBN (2006) 3 NWLR (PT.967) 228, MOBIL PRODCING UNLTD V UDO TOM UDO (2008) LPELR-8440(CA) 111. The big question on the lips is whether the 2nd defendant has power to suspend the claimant under the law? 112. In order to answer this question I have assiduously examined the provisions of the law as well as the provisions of the Public Service Rules which were relied by the parties in making out their respective cases. For proper appreciation I shall set out the relevant laws and the Public Service Rules with a view to seeing where the said power resides. They are:- Appointment and Tenure of members of Board. 5(1) the Director-General and the three full time Commissioners shall be appointed by the president upon the recommendation of the Minister and confirmation by the Senate. (2). The Director General shall hold office for a period of 5 years in the first instance and may be reappointed for a further term of five years and no more. Disqualification and cessation of appointment. 8(1) A member of the board shall cease to office if he: (a) Become of unsound mind; (b) Become bankrupt or makes a compromise with creditors; or (c) Is convicted of a felony or any offence involving dishonesty; or (d) Is guilty of serious misconduct in relation to his duties; or (e) Is a person who has a professional qualification and is disqualifies or suspended (other than at his own request) from practicing his profession in any part of Nigeria by the order of any competent authority made in respect of him personally. (2) The president may at any time and upon the recommendation of the minister remove a person to whom sub-section (1) of this section applies; Provided no full-time member of the Board of the Commission shall be removed from office without the approval of the Senate. Section 298 – Without prejudice to the foregoing provisions of the Act, the minister may give to the Commission such directive as appears to him to be just and proper for the effective discharge of the function of the Commission under this Act, and it shall be the duty of Commission to comply. The relevant provisions of the Public Service Rules are:- 160101 – A parastatal is a government-owned organization established by statute to render specified service(s) to the public. It is structured and operates according to the instrument establishing it and also comes under the policy directives of government. 160102 – Parastatals shall be classified into four (4) categories as follows:- Regulatory Agencies: (i) General Services; (ii) Infrastructure/utility Agencies; (iii) Security Agencies. 160103 – Parastatals are to retain and improve existing rules, procedures and practices in their establishments and ensure that there are no deviations from the general principles contained in the Public Service Rules. For example variation in probationary periods and maturity periods for promotion only reflect organizational peculiarities and not inconsistencies with the public service rules. However, in the absence of internal rules and regulations on any matter, the relevant provisions of the public service rules shall apply. SECTION 5 – DISCIPLINE 160501 – The power to exercise disciplinary control over officers in Parastatals is vested in the supervisory Board/Council in accordance with their respective conditions of service. 160502 – The Provisions of section 2 to 6 in Chapter 3 of the Public Service Rules shall guide all parastatals in addressing disciplinary matters provided that where reference to the Federal Civil Service Commission, Head of the Civil Service of the Federation or the Permanent Secretary, Board/Council shall perform such function. 113. It is clear as day light that the above provisions of the law and Public Service Rules are lucidly clear as they say what they says. In construing statutory provisions or any instrument, court are always enjoined to interpret the documents or provisions under scrutiny of the court to be given their real natural grammatical meaning. This is because the object of all interpretation is to discover the intention of the law makers which is deducible from the language used. Once the meaning is clear the court is to give effect to it. The court are not to defeat the plain meaning of an enactment by an introduction of their own words into the enactment. The words of the statute must be interpreted in accordance with the intent of the legislature. The primary duty of court in interpretation of a statutory provisions is to give effect to the words used. See ROSEEK V ACB (1993) 8 NWLR (pt.312) 382. It is not and never a duty of a court to sympathize with a party in interpretation of a statute merely because the language is harsh or can cause hardship. That is the function of legislature. See KRAUS THOMPPSON ORGANIZATION V NIPSS (2004) 7 NWLR (PT.901) 44. The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. We should not make lawful that which will not be lawful without a statute or conversely, to prohibit results which would otherwise follow. Judges are not called upon to apply their opinions of sound policy so as to modify the plain meaning of statutory words. See EHUWA V ONDO STATE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION (2006) 18 NWLR (PT.1012) 544, OGBUANYINYA V OKUDO (1979) 6-9 SC 32. 114. In PDP V INEC (2001) FWLR (PT31) 2735, the apex court stated that; ‘in interpreting statutory or constitutional provisions, such provisions should not be read in isolation of other parts of the statute or construction. The statutes should be read as a whole in order to determine the intendment of the makers of the statute or constitution, every clause of the statute should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act so as far as possible to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute or series of statutes relating to the subject-matter’’. It is settled principle of interpretation of statutes that the court should ascertain the intention and purpose of the law makers and give effect to same. The court should not give statute a construction that would defeat the very intention and purpose of the law maker’’. 115. Having at the back of the mind the guiding principles to be employed in construing statutory provisions it will be right to state straightaway that the provisions of section 5(1) and (2) of the Investment and Securities At 2007 were meant to govern the appointment of the Director General of the 1st defendant the claimant in this case. Exhibit GWARZO 1 is very clear and it is a consensus that the claimant was duly appointed in line with the law. There is no dispute on the appointment of the claimant in so far as this suit is concerned. The next provision is section 8(1) & (2) of the Investment and Securities Act, 2007, this is a provision that from the title deals with disqualifications and cessation of appointment of the members of the Board of the 1st defendant. Taking into consideration the whole provisions of section 8 of the Investment and Securities Act, the irresistible conclusion one will reach is that it makes provisions for eligibility, suspension and removal of members of the Board of the 1st defendant. I took this view after considering the meaning of the word ‘cessation’ used in the section which is synonymous with, ‘end, ending, termination, stopping, halting, finish, finishing, stoppage, closing, closure, close, conclusion, winding up, discontinuation, discontinuance, breaking off, abandonment, interruption, suspension, cutting short’. In interpreting statute the purpose of the provision being considered has always been of immense assistance in coming with purposeful and meaningful construction that will be in accord with the dictate and intendment of law makers. See IGP V MARKE (1957) 2 FSC 5. MOBIL V FBIR (1977) 3 SC 53, the court is to give effect to purpose of legislation or provisions being interpreted. The purposeful interpretation of this section demands that it is a provision made for both removal and suspension 116. Section - 298 of the Investment and Securities Act, 2007, which was provided under Miscellaneous, with sub-title of Power of Minister to issue directives, this section has conferred on the Minister power to give general directives to the commission such directives as it appear to him to be just and proper for the effective discharge of the function of the commission under the Act and it shall be the duty of the commission to comply. This section 298 unlike sections 5 and 8 of the Investment and Securities Act, has made general provisions, it cannot therefore be said to derogate from the provisions regarding appointment, qualifications, cessation and removal, which are specific in nature. It is the law that in considering situations where general and special provisions are seen to apply to a subject matter, the law takes the course which does not permit a general provision to derogate from special provision. It follows that where a subject matter is covered by both general and special provision, the special provisions apply in such a way that one general provisions does not derogate from its effect. The Latin Maxim is ‘specialia generalibus derogant’. See SCHRODER V MAJOR (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt.101) 1, ARDO V NYAKO & ORS. (2014) LPELR-22878(SC), KRAUS THOMPSON ORGANIZATION V NIPSS (2004) LPELR-1714(SC). 117. It is clear and I so hold that the provisions of section 298 of the investment and Securities Act, 2007, though looks like is applicable to the situation at hand, is never the less in applicable as it is a general provisions which cannot in anyway derogate from the clear and unambiguous provisions of section 8 of the Investment and Securities Act, 2007, which makes special provisions governing qualification, suspension and removal. 118. The provisions of Rules 160101, 160102, 160103, 160501 and 160502, were provisions contained in Chapter 16 of the Public Service Rules, which deals with application of the Public Service Rules to the Federal Government Parastatals. It is clear from the rules the 1st defendant is a parastatal of the Federal Government and the Public Service Rules applies to it where there are no local rules and regulations made to govern any situation that may warrant application of the rules. Even where rules are made the public service rules will apply to situations where no provision has been made by the local rules and regulations. On disciplinary action the power is vested in the supervisory Board/Councils in accordance with the parastatals rules and regulations. The provisions of section 2 to 6 in chapter 3 of the public service rules shall apply to parastatals in carrying disciplinary proceeding. 119. The defendants placed reliance on the public service rules to submit that the 2nd defendant is empowered to take disciplinary action against the claimant on misconduct by way of suspending the claimant. They therefore, argued that the public service rules have given the 2nd defendant power to issue exhibit GWARZO 4. 120. However, a careful and painstaking perusal of the entire chapter 16 of the Public Service Rules will reveal that the power of appointment, promotions, leaving of service and disciplinary control vested in the Board of the 1st defendant is in respect of officers of the 1st defendant appointed by the Board of the 1st defendant under section 15 of the Investment and Securities Act. The said power of discipline does not extend to the Chairman of the Board, Director General or members of the Board. This clearly shows that the 2nd defendant does not have power to suspend or issue suspension order against the claimant as the claimant is not subject to the disciplinary power of the Board of the 1st defendant as enshrined in chapter 16 of the Public Service Rules. As his employment was not made pursuant to provisions of any conditions of service of the 1st defendant or in the absence made pursuant to public service rules. What is clear and not disputed by the parties in this case is that the claimant’s appointment was made pursuant to section 5(1) and (2) of the Investment and Securities Act and not under the public service rules. In any event there is no evidence before the court to suggest that the claimant’s appointment was made under the Federal Civil Service commission or made pursuant to section 15 of the Investment and Securities act 2007 to bring it within the purview of the public service as the defendants want the court to believe. 121. Indeed, what is apparent is the fact that apart from contract of employment under the Public Service Rules, there are other contract of service brought about by statute and even by the Constitution. In the case at hand the claimant’s appointment is purely based on statute and how he can be removed from office is equally provided by the statute under which his appointment was made. His appointment is not that of a public servant or officer which was made permanent and pensionable to warrant application of public service rules to his case. Hs appointment is purely based on statutory provisions of section 5 of Investment and Securities Act 2007, which is a tenure based appointment made by the President of the country. This has excluded the claimant’s appointment from the shackles of the Public Service Rules. 122. I have in earlier part of this judgment held that the provisions of section 8 of the Investment and Securities Act, has provisions for suspension of appointees under section 5 of the Act. It is now left to determine on whose shoulders the power of suspension lies. 123. The defendants more particularly 2nd defendant have strenuously tried to argue that the 2nd defendant derives power to suspend the claimant from policy directives of government on dissolution of Boards of parastatals. On this the defendant relied on exhibits FMF 11, FMF 12 and FMF 13. Vide internal memo dated 29/7/15, the office of the claimant was notified on 3/8/15 of the dissolution of Boards of parastatals and directed to comply with exhibit FMF 12 in that respect. However, a careful examination of exhibit FMF 12, will clearly shows that there was no policy directive that mandated the 2nd defendant to take charge of the function of the Board of the 1st defendant. Rather, vide the content of paragraph 3 of exhibit FMF 12 all matters requiring the attention of the Board of 1st defendant are to be referred to President through the Permanent Secretary of the Federal Ministry of Finance and not through the 2nd defendant. This position was further fortified by the content of exhibit FMF 13 which was a letter dated 31/7/15 on letter head paper of Ministry of Finance addressed to the claimant intimating the claimant that any matter requiring attention of the Board shall be channeled to the President through the Permanent Secretary of the Federal Ministry of Finance. This exposition has answered all the argument canvassed by the defendants that the claimant by suspending claimant was exercising the power conferred on the Board of the 1st defendant to deal with matters of the Board as per exhibits FMF 11 – 13, (where is the power?). I made bold to say that there has been no such policy which is in existence as per exhibits FMF 12 -13 that conferred on the 2nd defendant power to suspend the claimant. I so hold. 124. My findings to the effect that the 2nd defendant does not have the vires to suspend claimant is as well supported by the provisions of section 11(1) (b) of the Interpretation Act. The law has long been settled that he who has the power to hire has the power to fire as well as power to suspend. Since the appointer of the claimant as per the provisions of section 5(1) and (2) of the Investment and Securities Act, resides in the president on confirmation of the Senate, it is only the president that can validly suspend or remove the claimant from his position. The minister’s role is only to recommend and in this case the 2nd defendants failed in her duty of recommendation, instead the 2nd defendant decided on her own to usurp the powers of the President. The usurpation of the powers of the President is manifest in the submissions of counsel for the defendants where it was argued that the report of investigation panel has been submitted to the president this goes to show that all actions taken by the 2nd defendant were without the knowledge or approval of the President. Exhibit GWARZO 4 also clearly shows stark absence of the approval of the president. Having not not shown the authority given to 2nd defendant by the President to act on his behalf in respect of the statutory duty, the 2nd defendant has woefully failed to prove the power to exercise disciplinary control over the claimant talk less of power to suspend him from duty. The 2nd defendant tried to argue that there is dichotomy between the Director General of 1st defendant as a member of the Board and as a public officer. There is no basis for creating any distinction between the claimant being a Director General as public officer and as member of the board. It is to be noted that the office of the claimant was creation of statute and it was because of his being Director General that he is a member of the Board. This has therefore rendered the argument of counsel to the effect that dissolution of Board has made application of section 8 in abeyance is a farce. It is my view that the dissolution of the Board of the 1st defendant does not have any negative effect on the claimant as his appointment was not effect. Since his appointment was saved by the dissolution his, membership of the board has also been saved by implication. 125. From the totality of the various reactions of the defendants to the claimant’s suit, what emerges is that the defendants presumably believe that 2nd defendant has power of disciplinary control over the claimant on the assumption that the claimant is an employee of the 1st defendant like other employees under section 15 of the Investment and Securities Act whose appointment are to be governed by the Public Service Rules as members of staff of a parastatal of a federal government. To accept the postulations of the defendants, that the 2nd defendant has power to suspend the claimant because the 2nd defendant has assumed supervisory power over 1st defendant and that the lacuna in the legislation has been filled by policy of the government which empowered 2nd defendant to exercise the powers of the Board of the 1st defendant and exercise disciplinary control over the claimant including power to suspend him, will definitely do violence to the clear and unambiguous provisions of the law. It will also amount to standing the law on its head, which by implication suggest the law being amended by the court. I must at this juncture sound a clear warning that this court cannot be hoodwinked into delving into the arena of making laws, as that is the province of the legislature. The duty of this court is to declare the law and apply the law. The court can only espouse but cannot amend or make law. If there is any need for an amendment to existing law, the duty to do so falls on the legislature. It is trite law that it is the duty of legislature to make or amend laws, the duty of judiciary is to interpret the laws so made. See AMOSHIMA V THE STATE (2011) LPELR-471(SC) and EMESIM V NWACHUKWU & ORS (1999) 6 NWLR (PT.605). The court has no power to fill any gap or lacuna as the defendants want this court to do in this case. That duty is in the province of the legislature. 126. On the allegation of the administrative panel of inquiry set up by the 2nd defendant could not guarantee fair hearing, impartiality and unbiased in view of the fact that the 2nd defendant had already adjudged the claimant guilty of proven cases of financial misconduct, unlawful carting away of sensitive documents in addition to unsatisfactory response to query served on him. The charge of lack of fair hearing impartiality bias can only be made against a court of law or a quasi-judicial body established by law. But not to an administrative panel of inquiry. It is to be noted that the committee set up by the 2nd defendant is not a judicial or quasi-judicial body to try the claimant. It is a mere fact finding committee which its findings is subject to further examination and consideration. The claimant having not made his challenge of lack of fair hearing and bias against court of law or a quasi-judicial body has failed to prove that there is any violation of fair hearing or bias. 127. It is trite law that an ad hoc committee that has no statutory power to discipline an erring worker cannot affect the civil rights and obligations of the worker. This issue has long been settled by the Supreme Court in the case of UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA TEACHING HOSPITAL & ANOR V NNOLI (supra). I cannot not phantom how recommendations by an ad hoc committees not established by the statute as prelude to the taking of disciplinary action can affect any question as to civil rights and obligations of the claimant. In the case of REV. PROF. PAUL EMEKA V REV. DR. CHIDI OKOROAFOR & ORS. (2017) 11 NWLR (PT.1577) 410, the apex Court says that ; ‘‘All administrative bodies, even though they are not courts, are bound to observe the rules of natural justice and fairness in their decision, which affect the rights and obligations of citizens. However, in order to seek to enforce his fundamental rights to fair hearing provided under chapter iv of the constitution, the alleged violation must be in respect of proceedings before a court or tribunal established by law and not before domestic or standing ad hoc tribunals’’. 483 paras D-F 128. It is without any doubt from the above decision of the Supreme Court that breach of Fundamental Right under section 36 of constitution arises only where the denial of fair hearing has been charged against a court or tribunal established by law and not before domestic or standing ad hoc tribunals raised departmentally by parties. The case of the claimant in this suit is violation of his fundamental rights by ad hoc committee which decision are decision of non-judicial body, there is no violation of the right of claimant that can be subject of enforcement before a Court of Law. See also BAKARE V LSCC (1992) 8 NWLR (PT.262) 641, where the Supreme Court at page 699 paragraph H, has this to say: ‘‘section 33 (1) of the 1999 Constitution (now section 36(1) of 199 Constitution) from its very words deals with determination of the civil rights and obligations of a person by a Court or a tribunal established by law. It deals with judicial bodies and does not necessarily extend to all bodies not judicial but all the same deciding on rights and obligations’’. 129. Where the charge of denial of fair hearing or bias as in this case is not against a court or tribunal established by law but is against a domestic, standing ad hoc committee of a non-judicial body, the infringement of the right cannot be sustained. 130. From the foregoing it is clear that the claimant has substantially established most of his claims. And failed in some. In the circumstance the order of the court is as follows:- 1. A declaration is hereby granted nullifying the suspension of the claimant from office as contained in exhibit GWARZO 4, as null and void and of no effect whatsoever for having been made without authority and is ultra vires the power of the 2nd defendant. 2. A declaration that the administrative panel of inquiry set up by the 2nd defendant is biased, partial and against principle of natural justice is hereby refused for not being based on law. 3. An order is hereby granted setting aside the suspension of the claimant by the 2nd defendant, as the 2nd defendant has no vires to suspend the claimant. 4. An order is hereby granted reinstating the claimant back to his position as Director General of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 5. An order is hereby granted directing the 1st defendant to pay the claimant all his entitlements, allowances emoluments and all other entitlement as per his employment as from 29/11/17 to date and subsequently till the expiration of his tenure or lawful determination of his appointment. 6. The monetary aspects of this judgment shall be complied with within 60 days from today. Judgment entered accordingly. Sanusi Kado, Judge