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JUDGMENT INTRODUCTION 1. The claimant commenced this action by way of writ of summons and statement of claim on 12th December 2007 at the Federal High Court, Lagos. Subsequently, the following processes were filed by both parties: amended statement of claim dated 15th October 2009; amended statement of defence dated 9th November 2009; and reply to the amended statement of defence dated 11th May 2010. Pursuant to the Third Alteration to the 1999 Constitution vesting the jurisdiction to entertain labour matters on this Court, this matter was transferred to this Court. Pursuant to this Court’s directive, parties compiled and filed all the processes and documents to be relied upon. While the claimants filed their compiled processes and documents on 12th January 2018, the defendant filed its own on 25th January 2018. A reply to the amended statement of defence was also filed by the claimant. 2. The claimants’ claims against the defendant are as follows: (1) A declaration that the defendant has breached the contract of employment between the plaintiffs and the defendant by refusing and or failing to make a complete payment of all end of service entitlements to the claimants. (2) An order directing the defendant to forthwith pay the said end of service entitlements to the claimants that is: • N137,387,375.87 being 10% of the claimants’ gratuity • N36,137,650.83, being 10% of the claimants’ pension for one year • N377,126,513.12, being one year pension in the first instance • N372,896,194.00, being the unpaid furniture grant which became due on the 1st of June 2005 (3) (a) An order directing the defendant to provide each of the claimants, houses based on the deductions made. IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO 3(a) (b) The defendant should give account of the total deductions made by the defendant from the monthly salaries of the claimants under the Federal Housing Fund Scheme from 1992 to 2002, and thereafter effect a refund of the said deduction made from each of the claimants’ salaries back to each of the claimants. 3. At the trial, the 1st claimant, Mr Olapade Samuel Oyebola Olatinwo, testified as the witness for the claimants. The documents of the claimants were tendered and admitted as Exhibits C1 to C19. The defendant on its part called one (1) witness as DW, Mrs Pearl Amoge Okponyia, an Assistant General Manager with the defendant. The defendant’s total of ten sets of exhibits, namely, Exhibits A, A1, A2, A3, B, B1, B2, B3, C, C1, C2, C3, C4, D, D1, D2, D3, E, E1, E2, E3, F, F1, F2 F3, G, G1, G2, G3, H, H1, H2, H3, H4, I, I1, I2, I3, J, J1, J2 and J3 were tendered and admitted. The exhibits are payments of annual pensions, monthly pension, pension arrears, total arrears, final reasonable emolument sheet, pension/gratuity form showing payment of three (3) months’ salary in lieu of notice, advice to pay reparation allowance to staff that have left service to each of the claimants and the defendant’s conditions of service as Exhibit D4. 4. The claimants had caused to be issued a subpoena against the Director General (DG) of the Bureau of Public Service Reform (BPSR) which was duly served on the DG. On 24th October 2018, Mrs R. N. Shittu, Assistant Legal Adviser from the Office of the Director General of the BPSR, appeared for the DG, and informed the Court that the DG was not in the country; therefore, it would be impossible for him to comply with the order of subpoena. She subsequent referred to the attempt made by the Bureau to comply with the said processes, when through an affidavit showing cause why an order of committal should not be made against the DG, the Bureau caused the Certified True Copies of the circular on Public Service Reform dated 28th April 2005 and circular on Public Service Reform dated 16th June 2005 to be attached thereto. On 28th November 2018, after the non-appearance of the said DG in Court, the claimants’ solicitor was allowed to tender the said Certified True Copies of the circulars from the Bar, and they were respectively admitted as Exhibits C20 and C21 respectively. 5. At the close of trial, this Court ordered that final written addresses be filed by parties. The defendant’s final written was filed on 24th January 2019, while the claimants’ was filled on 25th March 2019. The defendant did not file any rely on points of law. THE CASE BEFORE THE COURT 6. The claimants were employed by the defendant and worked in various departments/section and airports/airstrips owned by the defendant before they were retired with immediate effect without notice. To the claimants, the Federal Government in 2005, when the Public Service was restructured, reviewed the severance entitlements of Federal Civil Servants. In consequence, a circular was issued in 2005 to all Federal Ministries and Parastatals to effect payment of the severance entitlements. That in accordance with Chapter 5.20(i) of the Conditions of Service, furniture grant of one year basic salary shall be granted every four years to all categories of staff on GL 01 to 17; for which the defendant effected payment for the first four years (1st June 2001 to 31st May 2005) to some of the claimants, and all other claimants who were not paid before the termination of their employment in 2006, were thereafter paid in 2007, during the claimants’ negotiation with the defendant. 7. The claimants went on that while in employment, sometime in 1993, the defendant commenced a monthly deduction of 4% from the claimants’ monthly salaries under the National Housing Fund (NHF) Scheme, which deductions were to be remitted to the Federal Mortgage Bank (FMB) by the defendant for the purpose of facilitating mortgage facility to all employees of the defendant to own house through the scheme. That this deduction continued since 1992 to 2002 when it was stopped with the defendant not giving any account or return of money of the deductions. 8. The claimants continued that pursuant to the Pension Act, the defendant’s conditions of service, the Revised Public Service Rules 2000 and circular revising Public Service Rules 2000 and Regulation of 2005, they are accordingly entitled to one year pension (N377,126,513.12 in all), gratuity (N137,387,375.87 in all), 10% of each claimant’s pension for one year (N36,137,650.83 in all), unpaid furniture grant to some of the claimants which became due on 1st June 2001, unpaid furniture grant to all the claimants which became due on 1st June 2005 (the total sum being N372,896,194.00 for 851 claimants) and a refund of deductions made under the NHF scheme for each of the claimants. That the defendant, in its attempt to pay all the claimants their final entitlements made only the following payments: pension, gratuity, unpaid leave grant for year 2006, arrears of salary, 3 months salary in lieu of notice of retirement and repatriation allowance. Accordingly, that as at 2006, when these entitlements were paid to the claimants, the defendant had not paid all the claimants their furniture grant that became due since 1st June 2001 but which the defendant completed the payment to other claimants in 2007. The case of the claimant, therefore, is that the defendant only partially paid their severance package; and all entreaties to pay the balance had been rebuffed by the defendant, the defendant saying that it is not owing any sum. 9. The case of the defendant is that the claimants were former employees of the defendant before their disengagement from service. The claimants’ retirement benefits were as provided for in the defendant’s conditions of service which came into effect on 1st September 2002 and the Pension Reform Act 2004. The circular purported to govern the conditions of service of the claimants is inapplicable to the defendant as the said circular applied to only workers in the core Federal Ministries and not parastatals. The defendant is a Federal Government parastatal that has its own conditions of service distinct from employees of the Federal Ministries. The severance benefits contained in the said circular relied by the claimants is inapplicable to it as it applied to offices that were abolished. That the offices of the claimants were not abolished and that payment of entitlements were based on its conditions of service and that some of the plaintiffs are still drawing monthly pensions paid by the defendant except those who were not pensionable but were paid gratuity. By paragraph 5.20 of its conditions of service, payment of furniture grant shall be paid every four years (4) to all categories of staff on GL 01 to 17 and the claimants were all paid and could have been due for another payment on 1st September 2006 had they not been retired on 17th August 2006. 10. That the claimants were retired as a result of restructuring exercise of the Federal Government in Ministries and Parastatals. That upon the claimants retirement from its service, their entitlements including gratuity, pension, reparation allowance and other benefits were computed and paid accordingly into the various claimants’ Bank accounts. That the Federal Housing Fund deducted from the claimants’ salaries was done on the Federal Government directive and in accordance with the National Housing Fund Act (No. 3) of 1992 and same were forwarded to the Federal Mortgage Bank that was appointed by the Federal Government for the remittance of such deductions who in turn issued passbooks to each staff as evidence of remittance. That the deductions for Federal Housing fund was stopped by the defendant because the system used then was manual as Federal Mortgage Bank could not produce a comprehensive database for all payments made by the defendant except the passbooks issued to individual staff. That it is not its responsibility to return all the monies deducted from the claimants’ salaries as such deductions were remitted to the Federal Mortgage Bank who in turn issued passbooks to the contributors. That payment of furniture grant is dependent on approval from the management as it is not automatic. That the first payment on furniture grant was made in 2002 which the claimants have admitted in paragraph 28 of their amended statement of claim. That the claimants would have been due for second payment on 1st September 2006 had they not been retired on 17th August 2006 since it is payment made every four (4) years in accordance with the defendant’s conditions of service. 11. That all the entitlements of the claimants have been paid in accordance with its conditions of service and same have been collected by the claimants. That some of the claimants that are qualified for pension are drawing monthly pension from the defendant except those who are not pensionable. That the claimants are not entitled to the claims as contained in paragraph 30 of its amended statement of claim as those entitlements are inapplicable to its conditions of service. That the claimants signed and collected their entitlements and cannot be heard to complain afterwards simply because they were given notice to vacate the staff quarters, which they were occupying illegally having been retired from the service of the defendant. That all payments made to the plaintiffs were evidenced with payment vouchers. That the defendant is not indebted to the claimants to the sum of N550,651,539.82 (Five Hundred and Fifty Million, Six Hundred and Fifty-One Thousand, Five Hundred and Thirty-Nine Naira, Eighty-Two Kobo) or any sum as alleged. That it is not the defendant’s responsibility to provide houses for the claimants based on the deductions made in respect of the Federal Housing Fund. That the claimants’ action as constituted be dismissed with substantial cost as it is frivolous, vexatious, gold-digging and an abuse of court process. THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE DEFENDANT 12. The defendant submitted three issues for determination: (1) Whether having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, it could be said that the defendant breached the contract of employment between it and the claimants by refusing and or failing to make a complete payment of all end of service entitlements to the claimants. (2) Whether from the evidence and documents exhibited by the claimants, it could be said that they have established a sustainable case against the defendant entitling them to the reliefs sought. (3) Whether the claimants are entitled to the reliefs sought from the Court after being paid their retirement benefits by the defendant in accordance with the defendant’s conditions of service and the Pension Reform Act. 13. On issue (1), the defendant submitted that a breach of contract is the actual failure by a party to a contract to perform his obligations under that contract or an indication of his intention not to do. That in an action for breach of contract of employment, all the Court can do is to enquire into the procedure by means of which the servant was dismissed or retired and whether the servant has been paid his statutory or common law entitlement such as appropriated months salary in lieu of notice, referring to Oyedele v. University of Ife Teaching Hospital [1990] 6 NWLR (Pt. 155) 194 and Garabedin v. Janakin [1961] All NLR 177. That the claimants were ex-employees of the Defendant who were retired in 2006 and whose entitlements were computed and paid to them individually in accordance with the defendant’s conditions of service (Exhibit D4) and the Pension Reform Act 2004. That DW in her witness statement on oath at paragraph II and her evidence in chief stated what the end of service entitlements of the claimants are which comprises of gratuity, pension arrears, reparation allowance, arrears of salary if any, three (3) months’ salary in lieu of notice and other benefits based on total length of service were computed and paid to each of the claimants. That DW further stated that these payments were paid into different Bank accounts of the claimants, tendering also Exhibits A - A3, B - B3, C - C4, D - D3, E - E3, F - F3, G - G3, H - H3, I - I3 and J - J3 being payment vouchers evidencing the entitlements of each of the claimants, which were admitted in evidence. It thus the submission of the defendant that it being a law abiding parastatal could not have breached the contract of employment of the claimants that were retired after paying their entitlements in accordance with its conditions of service. Furthermore, that the claimants did not lead any evidence to show how the defendant breached their contract of employment except that the defendant refused or failed to pay complete end of service entitlement, which is not correct. The defendant then urged the Court to hold that the defendant having paid all the entitlements of the claimants in accordance with its conditions of service and under the Pension Reform Act could not be said to have breached its contract of employment with the claimants. 14. For issue (2), the defendant submitted that CW under cross-examination admitted that he was paid gratuity and reparation allowance only and denied payment of annual pension, monthly pension, pension arrears and 3 months’ salary in lieu of notice. The defendant then referred to its Exhibit A-A3. That CW under cross-examination stated that his employment was regulated by Federal Republic of Nigeria Public Services Rules (Exhibit C2), photocopy of the defendant’s conditions of service (Exhibit C2A), Federal Government circular on Public Service Reform of 28th April 2005 termed Guidelines for Implementation of the Transitional Recommendation of the Report of the Presidential Committee on the Review and the Revision of Public Service Rules, Regulations and Procedures (Exhibit C3), Revised Guidelines for the Submission of Staff Severance List by MDAS dated 16th June 2005 (Exhibit C3A), Generic Guidelines for the Reform of Parastatals dated March 2006 (Exhibits C20 and C21). To the defendant, Exhibits C3 and C3A are the same documents as Exhibits C20 and C21. That it is on record that CW under cross-examination stated that his employment was regulated by Exhibits C2 and C2A. It is the defendant’s submission that contrary to this testimony, the employment of the claimants was not regulated by C2, which is the Public Service Rules that is applicable to workers in core Federal Ministries as against parastatals that have their conditions of service. The defendant urged the Court to reject the said document. 15. In respect of Exhibit C2A, the defendant submitted that a committee set up to draft conditions of service does not have power of approving a working condition of service as such powers is vested on the Board of Directors of such parastatals. To the defendant, the said conditions of service i.e. Exhibit C2A relied upon by the claimants is a draft and unapproved document having no commencement date, hence the Court should reject the admission of such document as exhibit and expunge any evidence led based on the document as it is watery, weightless and of no legal validity; referring to Exhibit D4 that has commencement date of 1st September 2002 and paragraph 4 of DW written statement on oath dated 23rd November 2017 in support of this submission and urging the Court to hold that Exhibit D4 is the conditions of service that regulated the claimants’ employment as at the time of their retirement. Furthermore, that CW under cross-examination admitted being retired on 17th August 2006 but could not remember under what operative conditions of service that was in existence but stated that he would not be surprised if it was 1st September 2002 conditions of service that was in operation as at the time of their retirement. It is thus the defendant’s submission that CW contradicted himself when he stated under cross-examination on the one hand that his employment was regulated by C2 and C2A and on another that it was regulated by Exhibit C2, D4 and directive from the Presidency, which directive he did not know. The defendant then urged the Court to hold that evidence that is inconsistent cannot be relied upon and acted on as correct hence this piece of evidence should be rejected. 16. The defendant went on that it is the law that facts not pleaded and evidence led thereon goes to no issue, citing Alhaji Sanni Shaibu v. J. O. Bakare [1984] 12 SC 187 at 194-196 and Ferdinand George v. UBA [1972] 8 & 9 SC 264 at 274-276. To the defendant then, Exhibits C16 and C17 were not pleaded and are not relevant to the case of the claimants who relied heavily on Exhibits C20 and C21, urging the Court to disregard the said exhibits and evidence led, if any. 17. Continuing, the defendant submitted that he who asserts must prove. On Exhibits C14 and CI5, the defendant submitted that the case of the claimants is speculative as to the computation of their claims. That their witness did not give evidence on how they came about the computation of figures as such did not emanate from the defendant. That the claimants just sat down in the comfort of the office of their solicitor and computed figures that they termed unpaid furniture entitlements and unpaid severance entitlements without adducing evidence on how they came about it. That the failure of the claimants to give evidence on how they arrived at their computation and figures in fatal to their case, urging the Court to so hold. 18. On Exhibit C18, it is the defendant’s submission that no evidence was led by the claimants on how the said guidelines apply to their employment. It is the further submission of the defendant that the generic guidelines for the reform of parastatals only gave criteria or yardstick on how the reform should be done but did not provide special monetary package for workers of parastatals that would be disengaged, urging the Court to hold that C 18 is inapplicable in the instant case. 19. That Exhibits C3 and C3A are the same exhibits as C20 and C21. It is the defendant’s submission that the claimants’ counsel applied for subpoena under Order 3 Rule 18(4) of the NICN Rules on the Director General Bureau for Public Service Reforms (BPSR) to produce and give evidence on Exhibits C20 and C21 as the claimants’ witness. However, in the course of the trial, the witness to the subpoena did not come to Court but produced the Certified True Copy of Exhibits C20 and C21. During the proceedings, the claimants’ counsel informed the Court of the difficulty in securing the attendance of his witness to the subpoena but appealed to the Court to allow him tender Exhibits C20 and C21 from the Bar, which the Court granted based on section 12 of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Act 2006; hence counsel dumped or tendered C20 and C21 into the Court. That Exhibits C20 and C21 had no witness that gave evidence on them; rather the said Exhibits C20 and C21 were tendered from the Bar by the claimants’ counsel. To the defendant, a counsel cannot be a witness in a matter he is appearing as counsel to the extent of tendering a document to be acted upon by the Court, citing P. N. Emerah & Sons Nig Ltd & anor v. Mazi Benson Duru [1998] 9 NWLR (Pt. 504) 86 Ratio 2 and Usikaroh v. Itsekiri Communal Land Trustees [1991] 2 NWLR (Pt. 172) 150. That since there was no witness to give evidence on Exhibits C20 and C21, the Court should expunge the said Exhibits C20 and C21 from lists of documents to be relied upon. 20. Additionally, that pleadings however strong and convincing the averments may be, without evidence or proof thereof go to no issue. That through pleadings people know exactly the points which are in dispute with the other. That evidence must be led to prove the facts relied on by the party or to sustain allegations raised in pleadings. That a mere averment in pleading proves nothing unless admitted, citing Sani Abacha Foundation v. UBA [2010] 41 (Pt. 1) NSCQR 360 at 376-377 Ratio 3. It is thus the defendant’s submission that since there was no testimony by the claimants on Exhibits C20 and C21, they cannot claim the benefits of Exhibits C20 and C21. Furthermore, that even if the Court would look at Exhibits C20 and C21, DW in her testimony under cross-examination stated that Exhibits C20 and C21 do not apply to the defendant as it is a self-sustaining and income generating agency that has its own conditions of service. She stated further that Exhibits C20 and C21 apply to organizations and parastatals that do not have conditions of service. That DW stated further in paragraph 7 of her written statement on oath that the severance benefits contained in the purported circulars that are Exhibits C20 and C21 are inapplicable to the defendant as the said circulars applied to offices that were abolished as a result of restructuring of any agency of Government. That the offices of the claimants were not abolished but that the claimants were retired for effective repositioning of the defendant and not for any other purpose. To the defendant, the motive which impelled an employer to terminate lawfully a contract of employment is not relevant to the determination of an action by the employee for breach of the contract of employment, citing Oyedele v. Ife UTH (supra) at 199. The defendant then urged the Court to hold that Exhibits C20 and C21 are inapplicable to the claimants as they were not beneficiaries of the severance benefits contained therein. 21. Issue (3) is whether the claimants are entitled to the reliefs they seek after being paid their retirement benefits by the defendant in accordance with the defendant’s conditions of service and the Pension Reform Act 2004. To the defendant, regarding the claimants’ relief (1), the defendant did not breach the contract of employment by refusing or failing to make a complete payment of all their end of service entitlement. That DW gave evidence and tendered payment vouchers evidencing the end of service entitlements of each of the claimants that were credited to their various Bank accounts comprising gratuity, pension arrears, reparation allowance, arrears of salary if any, three months salary in lieu of notice and other benefits. That the claimants are not entitled to the severance benefits contained in Exhibits C20 and C21, which they relied upon as those exhibits are inapplicable to the defendant that is a self-sustaining and income generating agency that has its own conditions of service. Furthermore, that the benefits of Exhibits C20 and C21 applied to offices that were abolished which is not the case herein as the offices of the plaintiffs were not abolished but were retired for effective repositioning of the defendant. 22. The defendant went on that no evidence was led by the claimants nor their witness on subpoena to the satisfaction of the Court on how they became entitled to the benefits that are enshrined in Exhibits C20 and C21. To this effect, that C20 and C21 could be regarded as documents dumped on the Court as it is not the duty of the Court to relate those documents to the evidence adduced by CW. 23. On the claim for furniture grant, that DW in her written statement on oath at paragraphs 4, 8 and 16 stated that the employment of the plaintiff and their retirement benefits were as provided for in the defendant’s conditions of service which came into effect on 1st September 2002 and the Pension Reform Act 2004. She stated in paragraph 8 that by paragraph 5.20 of the defendant’s conditions of service (Exhibit D4), payment of furniture grant shall be paid every four (4) years to all categories of staff on GL 01 to 17 and that the plaintiffs were all paid and could have been due for another payment on 1st September 2006, had they not been retired on 17th August 2006. That CW under cross-examination admitted receiving payment for furniture grant in 2005 under the draft 2001 conditions of service of the defendant (Exhibit C2A) and not under Exhibit D4 which came into effect on 1st September 2002, the year the claimants received their first furniture grant and could have been due for the second payment on 1st September 2006, had they not been retired on 17th August 2006. That from the evidence of DW, the claimants are not entitled to furniture grant having been retired earlier than when they could have been due for another payment on 1st September 2006 in accordance with its 1st September 2002 conditions of service, urging the Court Lord to so hold. 24. On the claim for the refund of Federal Housing Fund deducted by the defendant, that DW in paragraph 12 of her written statement on oath stated that the Federal Housing Fund deducted from the claimants’ salaries was done on Federal Government Directive and in accordance with the National Housing Fund Act (No. 3) of 1992 and same were forwarded to the Federal Mortgage Bank that was appointed by the Federal Government for the remittance of such deductions who in turn issued passbooks to each staff as evidence. That DW under cross-examination stated that the deductions for Federal Housing Fund was stopped by the defendant because the Federal Mortgage Bank could not produce a comprehensive database for all payments made by FAAN except the passbooks issued to individual staff. It is the defendant’s submission from the evidence of DW that it is not the responsibility of the defendant to return all the monies deducted from the claimants’ salaries for Federal Housing Fund; as such, deductions were remitted to the Federal Mortgage Bank who in turn issued passbooks to the contributors. That the National Housing Fund Act Cap N45 LFN 2004 by its section 17 empowers the contributor to the Fund to apply for a refund within 3 months upon retirement from his employment or attainment of the age of 60 years. The defendant accordingly urged the Court to hold that it is not the responsibility of the defendant to provide houses for the claimants based on the deductions made in respect of the Federal Housing Fund or to refund the deductions that were remitted to Federal Mortgage Bank that issued passbooks to individual contributor. In conclusion, the defendant urged the Court to dismiss the claims of the claimants with substantial cost as it is frivolous, gold-digging and unmeritorious. THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE CLAIMANTS 25. The claimants adopted the first issue as formulated by the defendant and then formulated three other issues for determination. The four issues of the claimants accordingly are: (a) Whether having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, it could be said that the defendant breached the contract of employment between it and the plaintiffs by refusing and or failing to make a complete payment of all end of service entitlements of the claimants. (b) Whether by virtue of the provisions of Chapter 5.20 of the defendant’s conditions of service, which came into effect on 1st June 2001, the defendant is liable to pay furniture grant to the claimants. (c) Whether the defendant having conceded to have made deductions from the claimants’ salaries, is bound to give account of the deductions made and thereafter make a refund into the individual claimants’ accounts. (d) Whether having disengaged the claimants from the service of the defendant as a result of the restructuring exercise, the claimants are entitled to benefit from the severance entitlements by virtue of the circulars issued by the Federal Government. 26. The claimants took issues (a) and (d) together; and submitted that pursuant to the combined provisions sections 1 and 30 of the Federal Airport Authority of Nigeria (FAAN) Act LFN, the defendant was created as an agency or parastatal under the control and management of the President of the country, through the Ministry that is in charge of Aviation, referring to the combined provisions of sections 147(1) and 148 of the 1999 Constitution, with respect to the power of the President to appoint Ministers, delegate responsibilities to such Minister with respect to any agency or department. Also referred to is section 171 of the 1999 Constitution with respect to the power of the President to appoint and delegate responsibilities to the Office of Head of Civil Service of the Federation and Heads of Extra Ministerial Departments of the Government. The claimants then submitted that the defendant, having been established under the provisions of FAAN Act, its operations and administrative decisions are subject to the supervisory responsibilities of the Minister of Aviation, as may be appointed by the President. That while section 10(1) of the FAAN Act empowers the defendant to approve conditions of service for its employed staff, the provisions of clause 1001 of Chapter 1 of the Federal Government Public Service Rules (as Revised up to 1st January 2000) states that the provisions of the said Public Service Rules (as Revised) apply to all Public Offices, except the stated offices. That while the Public Service Rules states the procedures for engagement, disengagement and other procedures on other issues concerning the staff, the Preamble of the Rules states that, the Rules are to be read in conjunction with Circular, Instructions and Gazette Notices. That it is also important to note that clause 3 of the Preamble states that, amendments to the Rules shall be made through circulars, which would be issued from time to time. Accordingly, that while both the claimants and the defendant are bound by the provisions of the conditions of service as may be issued, and the Public Service Rules in the determination of the claimants’ engagement as public officers, the terms of engagement as spelt out in the individual letters of engagement, the conditions of service and the Public Service Rules are opened to being altered or amended by circulars as may be issued from time to time by Head of Civil Service of the Federation. 27. The claimants continued that while it is very simplistic to assert, as the defendant seeks to do, that the terminal benefits of the claimants arising as a result of the premature retirements of the claimants are limited to what are stated out in the conditions of service and the provisions of the Pension Act, once a circular is issued by the Head of Civil Service of the Federation, seeking to alter the Rules guiding the terms of disengagement services entitlements to mitigate or ameliorate the consequences of the amendment and eventual retirement, then the content of such circular should be interpreted for the benefit of the disengaged staff. That there is a duty to protect the claimants, which duty became more compelling when a consideration is given to the fact that none of the disengaged claimants was alleged to have committed any infraction or misconduct or even given opportunity to respond to the reasons for the premature retirement of the claimants, having been obviously retired by the President pursuant to the provisions of clause 04601, Section 6 of Chapter 4 of the Public Service Rules i.e. overriding public interest. 28. Furthermore, that the defendant, having averred in its paragraph 5 of the amended statement of defence that the retirement benefits of the claimants are as stated in the provisions of the Pension Act, is correspondingly an admission that the claimants are Public Officers within the context of the Public Service Rules; the 1999 Constitution; and the 2nd Schedule, under the Interpretation section 24 of the Pension Act, where Nigeria Airports Authority (the defendant’s previous name) was listed as one of the organizations regarded as a Public Service. Therefore, that as a preliminary point, the defendant’s assertion, through its amended statement of defence in paragraph 9 and the oral testimony of its witness, that the defendant is a self-sustaining body, is direct contradiction of its paragraph 12 of its statement of defence and the evidence of its witness during cross-examination when she said – “As a self-sustaining body, the defendant communicate to the Ministry of Aviation through the Perm Sec to the Ministries”. Also, that the defendant’s position contradicts sections 8 and 12(a) of the FAAN Act. 29. Accordingly, that while it is not disputed that the defendant is a parastatal or an agency under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Aviation, guided by its conditions of service, as enabled in section 10(1) of the FAAN Act, the combined provisions of sections 148 and 171 of the 1999 Constitution, section 8 of the FAAN Act, section 24 of the Pension Act, the Preamble and clause 01001, Chapter 1 of the Public Service Rules, and even clause 11.2.1 of Chapter 11 of the defendant’s conditions of service recognize situations when overriding circulars and regulations also determine the payments to be made to prematurely retired employees. 30. The claimants then asked whether in view of the foregoing, it can be said that the defendant has fully complied with his contract of employment with respect to the end of service entitlements due to the claimants. In further answer, the claimants referred to the fact of employment of the claimants as averred in different Departments of the defendant as well as paragraph 18 of the amended statement of claim, where it was averred that each employee of the defendant was given a copy of the conditions of service when it was approved by the defendant in 2001; and the defendant was put on notice to produce the original copy. That it is important to note that nowhere in its amended statement of defence did the defendant deny the existence of the conditions of service, which came into effect on 1st June 2001; rather, it only averred in its paragraph 5 that “the retirement benefits of the Claimants were as provided for in the Condition of Service which came into effect on the 1st September 2002”. 31. To the claimants, if the defendant is trying to assert the alleged occurrence of an event on 1st September 2002, the question is: what was the state of affairs before that 1st September 2002? That the defendant did not specifically deny the fact that there was a conditions of service in place before 1st September 2002 as averred by the claimant. That the defendant’s failure to specifically aver the facts in existence before 1st September 2002 or first specifically deny the existence of the conditions of service effective 1st June 2001 places an undischarged burden on the defendant to produce the original copy of the conditions of service effective 1st June 2001. That the defendant clearly did not deny that it has custody of the original copy of the conditions of service effective 1st June 2001. Furthermore, that the defendant failed to convince this Court of the existence of even its own conditions of service that allegedly became effective 1st September 2002, beyond just pleading it and tendering as an exhibit. That the question is: does the defendant’s conditions of service have any evidential value? The claimants answered in the negative; submitting that if indeed the conditions of service tendered by the defendant is authentic and the one relied upon ever before the disengagement of the claimants, then it should have been duly signed by all the “Would-be Signatories” itemised towards the last page of the tendered document, from the General Manager (Admin) downwards sign it; just as each one of the same officers endorsed their signatories on the claimants’ tendered conditions of service. 32. The claimants went on that it is noteworthy that just as the defendant did not specifically deny the coming into effect of the claimants’ conditions of service on 1st June 2001, it equally did not deny that all its identified 14 management officers did not endorse their signatures as represented by the claimants. That the defendant never averred that the signatures endorsed thereon were forged. Therefore, the applicable conditions of service relevant in determining some of the issues as raised by the claimants is Exhibit C2A. 33. To the claimants, the power to approve and enforce Exhibit C2A by the defendant, having been derived from section 10(1) of the FAAN Act, the President of the country, being both the constitutional and statutory approving and supervising officer over the defendant by virtue of the previously mentioned provisions of the enabling laws, is subject to the overriding regulations and circulars as may be issued from time to time. That the defendant actually conceded in paragraph 12 that there was a general restructuring which commenced in 2005 by the Federal Government, which affected Federal Ministries and parastatals. But in a contradictory twist, it averred in paragraph 8 of its defence that the restructuring of the Federal Public Service only affected the core Ministries and not parastatals. That pursuant to these averments, there is an undischarged burden of proving how the defendant and other parastatals/agencies were exempted from the effect of Exhibits C20 and C21. That the defendant in fact gravitated from the averment that, the defendant is self-sustaining to not being affected by the circular authorizing the general restructuring by the Federal Government. It further in paragraph 10 of its defence asserted that even within the defendant’s service structure the claimants' offices were not abolished as the circulars only affected offices that were abolished. That this is a classical case of superb maneuvering and legal gymnastics. That in one breath in paragraph 10 it asserted that the circular for restructuring as issued by the Head of Civil Service of the Federal on behalf of the President only affected abolished offices (of which the claimants’ offices were not affected as a result of the circulars), in another breath in paragraph 12 of its defence it asserted that the defendant exercised its power to retire the claimants pursuant to the direction and authority of its supervising Ministry, and that the claimants were affected by the same restructuring exercise of the Federal Government concerning the Ministries and Parastatals. 34. The claimants continued that the defendant admitted in its defence that the claimants were prematurely retired as a result of the general restructuring which is reflected in the various letters of disengagement issued by the defendant, which confirms the acceptance of the approving authority of the President of the country. Therefore, the defendant cannot at this stage deny the applicability and entitlement of the claimants to the severance compensation, and at the same time accept to comply with the guidelines that led to the restructuring and retirement of the claimants; referring to the oral evidence DW, when she said: I know that there was restructuring which affected the Claimants. The Claimants were retired based on the restructuring exercise. The basis upon which restructuring exercise was conducted included looking at those whose qualifications were no longer relevant, those who had disciplinary issues, etc. The criteria used for the restructuring are not all reflected in Exhibit C21. Only some are reflected. Not all that is stated in Exhibit C21 that applies to the defendant. The defendant manage its own purse. Exhibit C20 and C21 refers to all Parastatals that do not have Conditions of Service. We have Conditions of Service. The Public Service Rules have provisions that allow Parastatals to have their own Condition of Service. To the claimants, this is a clear admission by the defendant that in deciding which of its employees to be affected by the Federal Government restructuring exercise, it relied on the criteria that are relevant to it in the guidelines stated out in Exhibit C21. That having accepted and participated in the exercise kickstarted by the Federal Government, through the circular dated 28th April 2005 with respect to the guidelines resulting in identifying the claimants to be affected and the eventual issuance of the disengagement letters, the defendant cannot approbate and reprobate at the same time. 35. That as a matter of constitutional and statutory responsibilities reposed in the defendant, it does not have that power to choose which content of a circular or regulation it wants to follow. Therefore, its assertion in its defence and oral testimony that it paid the claimants based on the terms as contained in the conditions of service is a direct infraction of law, as even the conditions of service it says it relied upon is only a supplementary regulation which a circular from the Presidency can override. Also that by virtue of the guidelines as listed out in the addendum attached to the circular dated 16th June 2005, the defendant again had the un-discharged burden of proving to the Court that the circulars only apply to offices that have been abolished, and that the claimants’ offices were not in any way abolished. That the defendant failed in this respect. Therefore, while the claimants are not denying the fact that they were only paid after they were retired, the claimants are seeking to be paid a complete end of service entitlements. These claims arising as a result of the circulars and restructuring exercise are in addition to the ones already paid. This is more pertinent in view of the fact that nowhere in the circulars and guidelines was it stated by the Federal Government that a staff retired as a result of the exercise cannot take benefit of both end of service entitlements. Finally, that the defendant has breached its contract with the claimants to pay all end of service entitlements as stated in the Exhibit C21 in addition to the entitlements paid pursuant to the Exhibit C2A. 36. Issue (b) is whether, given Chapter 5.20 of the defendant’s conditions of service, which came into effect on the 1st June 2001, the defendant is liable to pay furniture grant to the claimants. To the claimants, the defendant is not denying that it was liable to pay a year’s salary to the claimants as furniture grant every four years pursuant to clause 5.20 of Chapter 5 of the conditions of service. That the only dispute the defendant tried to throw in is that because its own version of the conditions of service came into effect on 1st September 2002, then the claimants were not entitled to be second payment of the furniture grant. That the claimants have already proved, even by the admission of the DW, that Exhibit D4 was not signed by anybody; therefore, it is not relevant in the determination of the applicable conditions of service. 37. That the claimants’ conditions of service became effective on 1st June 2001, which made the defendant to effect payment to some of the claimants between 1st June 2001 when the 1st furniture grant became due and 31st May 2005 as averred in the claimant’s paragraph 22. That the defendant in paragraph 11 of its defence did not deny the fact of payment between 1st June 2001 when the 1st furniture grant became due and 31st of May 2005, as averred by the claimants. That it did not equally deny the averment that the remaining claimants who were not paid between 1st June 2001 and 31st May 2005 were later paid in 2007 after they had been retired. That DW’s evidence under cross-examination that the 1st furniture allowance was paid in 2003 September goes to no issue as it was never pleaded. That in further proof of the defendant’s liability to the claimants, the claimants did a breakdown of the total sum due to each claimant as reflected in the breakdown marked as Exhibit C14. That the defendant’s only defence is that the claimants are excluded from the payment of the furniture grant because they were disengaged before the due date for the second payment. That it did not challenge the breakdown of the individual claims for the grant. Therefore, that judgment should be entered for the claimants as claimed in the summary of breakdown filed by claimants as being unchallenged. 38. Issue (c) is whether the defendant, having conceded to have made deductions from the claimants’ salaries, is bound to give account of the deductions made and thereafter make a refund into the individual claimants’ accounts. That the claimants seek the provision of housing units for each claimant, or in the alternative, the defendant should give an account of the 4% monthly deductions it made from the salaries of the claimants from 1992 till when it stopped the deductions under the National Housing Scheme, and thereafter effect a refund to the claimants. For these claims, the claimants relied on their averments in paragraphs 25, 26 and 27 of the amended statement of claim, and paragraphs 11, 12, 21, 22 and 27 of the claimants’ reply to the defence. That the defendant did not deny any of the averments, but conceded in its paragraph 15, 16 and 41 of the defence to the effect that it indeed made the 4% deductions from the claimants’ salaries, but had to stop further deductions when the Federal Mortgage Bank, the receiving Bank, could not produce a comprehensive database of all payments made by it to the Bank, except for the mysterious passbooks issued to individual staff. To the claimants, even DW admitted that the defendant made deductions from 1992 to 2001 even though the claimants’ averment that the deductions were stopped in 2002 was not denied in its defence. That the defendant, by virtue of its status as the employer that pays the claimants’ salaries, made the deductions, purportedly remitted to the Federal Mortgage Bank, owes the claimants that duty of care in ensuring that the deductions were remitted to the Bank. That in as much as the defendant has failed to show evidence of remittance to the Mortgage Bank, which is confirmed by its averment that it stopped further deductions when the Mortgage Bank could not produce a comprehensive database of remittance, the defendant has a burden to prove actual remittance to the Bank. It is only if it is able to show evidence of these remittances that it can be excused from giving account and making refunds to the claimants. That the defendant should not be allowed to make the Court to speculate on whether it actually made the remittances. That having failed to prove remittance, the liability to refund is on the defendant based on the admitted failed scheme. That despite the denial of the claimants that they were not given any passbook, the defendant equally failed to prove its assertion of issuance of passbooks by the Mortgage Bank. 39. Furthermore, that the defendant’s assertion in paragraph 41 of its defence has no basis, as the defendant failed to prove the condition precedent to section 17 of the National Housing Fund Act, as stated in section 9(2) of the Act. That it must prove the existence of privity of contract between the claimants and the Bank with the evidence of issuance of passbooks to the claimants, each passbook showing the details of remittances. Accordingly, that having failed to show proof of remittances to the Bank, the defendant should be made to give account of deductions made and effect refunds to the claimant from 1992 to 2002. 40. The claimants proceeded to react to the arguments of the defendant. On the defendant’s issue (1) the claimant submitted that an adequate response to the defendants submissions have been earlier made by the claimants. 41. For the defendant’s issue (2), the claimants stated that they have shown that they were public officers, having been duly employed by an agency of the Federal Government; and that this much was admitted by DW, when she said: “The Public Service Rules have provisions that allow parastatals to have their own Conditions of Service”. That this oral evidence surprisingly contradicts the defendant’s argument to the effect that the Public Service Rules does not apply to “Parastatals”. That it is simply a confirmation that the conditions of service as may be issued by the defendant or any other parastatal are subject to the provisions of the Public Service Rules. 42. The claimants then submitted that the defendant’s argument it paid the claimants’ end of service entitlements pursuant to the defendant’s conditions of service is double speak; and that the question is: which conditions of service? Is it Exhibit D4 that was unsigned or another conditions of service, which it did not plead or tender? That the defendant failed to adduce evidence of the Board’s approval for Exhibit D4. In any case, that this is a new issue that was never pleaded by, the defendant. That the defendant’s argument naturally raises concern with respect to the extent that the defendant was ready to go, just to avoid liability. 43. The claimants went on that the defendant conceded that it gave its employees copies of the conditions of service to guide its contractual relationship with the staff. That it was never the responsibility of the staff to ensure that the Board of Directors of defendant gives its approval to the conditions of service as given to each staff. Again, that the question is: which conditions of service was the defendant complying with since it made the decision to come up with a conditions of service, either in 2001 or 2002? That the law regards as done that which ought to have been done; there is a responsibility of the defendant’s part to ensure the Board approved the terms before issuing and complying with it. In any case, that section 10 of the Second Schedule made pursuant to section 2(4) of the FAAN Act says: “Any document purporting to be a contract, instrument or other document duly signed or sealed on behalf of the Authority shall be received in evidence and shall, unless the contrary is proved, be presumed without further proof to have been signed or sealed”. Therefore, that assuming the defendant’s argument is anything to go by, having not denounced Exhibit C2A, and having failed to plead the issue of the non-endorsement of the Board of Directors in its defence, and the clear provisions of section 10 of FAAN Act, the defendant is estopped from making such submissions. That having being silent on the status of Exhibit C2A in its defence, it cannot through its final address raise an issue of Exhibit C2A being a draft or an unapproved document with no commencement date. Additionally, that there was never any issue of CW contradicting himself; the claimants having clearly pleaded the fact that Exhibit C2A is the applicable conditions of service, and in any case, during his re-examination, the witness testified that Exhibit D4 was never given to any of the claimants when they were in Service. 44. Regarding Exhibits C16 and C17, the claimants referred paragraphs 6 and 7 of the claimant’s reply to the amended statement of defence, where the said Exhibits C16 and C17 were pleaded, and that in any case, one does not plead evidence but relevant facts. 45. The claimants continued that by virtue of the depositions in paragraphs 25-28 of the defence and DW’s evidence under cross-examination, the only challenge to the claimants’ case is that it has paid the end of service entitlements to the claimants, solely in accordance with the conditions of service, based on its assumption that it can take the benefits of the restructuring exercise by prematurely retiring the claimants based on the directives of its approving and supervising officer (the President), and at the same time it can repudiate or deny the claimants from taking advantage of the benefits of the same exercise. That Exhibits C14 and C15 were produced based on the accepted and unchallenged criteria of 10% of each claimant’s gratuity and 10% of each claimant’s pension for one year. These bases were clearly admitted and confirmed in the said paragraph 26 and 27 of the defence. 46. The claimants proceeded that while Exhibit C18 is the generic guidelines for the reform of parastatals, it did not also include the special monetary package for workers of parastatals that would be disengaged. That Exhibit C21, the circular of 16th June 2005, clearly indicates that the attached guidelines or addendum for the criteria to determine which officers to be affected, and the severance package for the employees in the Ministry, Department and Agencies, which the defendant is one. 47. Furthermore, that the exhibits having already admitted by this Court pursuant to its powers under section 12 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006, it is too late in the day for the defendant to again raise arguments on their admissibility, which amount to seeking to make this Court set aside its ruling on their admission as to the exhibits, relying on Nwonu v. Udeaja [1990] 1 NWLR (Pt. 125) 188 SC at 210 - 211. That it is wrong for a trial Judge having admitted documents as exhibits in evidence to expunge them in his judgment unless the admission of such document in the first instance amounts to a nullity. That it must be noted that rulings of a court admitting the exhibit as evidence are decisions or orders of the Court and the inherent jurisdiction of a court to set aside its judgment or order is limited to judgments or orders which are nullities. 48. Furthermore, that as to whether the claimants’ solicitor could tender Certified True Copies of Exhibits C20 and C21, the claimants referred to Agagu v. Dawodu [1990] 7 NWLR (Pt. 160) 56 CA at 65, which held: Whoever procures a Certified True Copy of a Public document is competent to tender such document in evidence in any proceedings in Court without calling the Public officer who has the custody of the public document. Section 111 does not and it will be most anomalous to prevent a party to a proceedings from tendering in evidence a Certified True Copy of a document. 49. The claimants submitted further that given that the evidence of DW to the effect that the defendant was self-sustaining was not pleaded, the oral evidence on it goes to no issue. And that even the submission of defendant as to self-sustenance contradicts the provisions of section 12(a) of the FAAN Act, which says the defendant receives allocation from the Federal Government. Lastly, that DW failed to show this Court where it was stated in Exhibits C20 and C21 that it is only parastatals that do not have conditions of service that can take the benefit of the severance package. The claimants concluded by urging the Court to enter judgment in their favour. COURT’S DECISION 50. I have carefully considered the processes filed and the submissions of the parties. By relief (1), the claimants are praying for “a declaration that the defendant has breached the contract of employment between the plaintiffs and the defendant by refusing and or failing to make a complete payment of all end of service entitlements to the claimants”. Relief (2) then proceeds to pray for certain monetary sums representing the end of service entitlements of the claimants. Relief (3) prays for provision of houses to each claimant or an account of the total deductions made by the defendant from the monthly salaries of the claimants under the National Housing Fund (NHF) scheme. By Gabriel Ativie v. Kabelmetal (Nig.) Ltd [2008] LPELR-591(SC); [2008] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1095) 399; [2008] 5 - 6 SC (Pt. II) 47, a claim is circumscribed by the reliefs claimed; and the duty of a plaintiff, therefore, is to plead only such facts and materials as are necessary to sustain the reliefs and adduce evidence to prove same. What all the reliefs of the claimants portend is that the case of the claimants is a claim for end of service benefits i.e. special damages. See 7UP Bottling Company Plc v. Augustus [2012] LPELR-20873(CA), which held thus: The claims for gratuity, pension, housing fund, salary up to 24th October, 2002 are all special damages and must be strictly proved. That is, each of the said items must be proved to the satisfaction of the Court as the Court is not entitled to make its own estimate of same. It must be proved with credible evidence and without such proof no special damages can be awarded… See also NNPC v. Clifco Nigeria Ltd [2011] LPELR-2022(SC), which held that a claim for special damages cannot succeed because it is admitted as special damages are never inferred from the nature of the act complained of. They do not follow in the ordinary course as is the case with general damages. They are exceptional and so must be claimed specially and proved strictly. That the fact that it appears to be admitted does not relieve the party claiming it of the requirement of proof with compelling evidence as special damages are exceptional in character and so there is no room for inference by the Court. It is unreasonable to consider a claim for special damages reasonable in the absence of proof. A claim for special damages succeeds on compelling evidence to justify it and not on the sums claimed appearing reasonable to the Court. See further Mr Ignatius Anyanwu & ors v. Mr Aloysius Uzowuaka & ors [2009] LPELR-515(SC); [2009] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1159) 445 SC. 51. For the claimants to accordingly succeed in the instant case, they must specifically plead and prove all the particulars of the sums they claim, showing in the process how they came by the quantum of entitlements and the particular provisions of the law or instruments that gave them the entitlements. This Court has thus in so many cases indicated what must be done by a claimant in order to succeed in a claim for special damages. In the more recent case of Mr Suraju Rufai v. Bureau of Public Enterprises & ors unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/18/2013, the judgment of which was delivered on 4th June 2018, this Court summarized the position thus: In labour relations, the burden is on the claimant who claims monetary sums to prove not only the entitlement to the sums, but how he/she came by the quantum of the sums; and proof of entitlement is often by reference to an instrument or document that grants it (Mr. Mohammed Dungus & ors v. ENL Consortium Ltd [2015] 60 NLLR (Pt. 208) 39), not the oral testimony of the claimant except if corroborated by some other credible evidence. See Ineh Monday Mgbeti v. Unity Bank Plc unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/98/2014, the judgment of which was delivered on 21st February 2017, Mr Charles Ughele v. Access Bank Plc unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/287/2014, the judgment of which was delivered on 10th February 2017, Otunba Gabriel Oladipo Abijo v. Promasidor (Nig.) Ltd unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/602/2014, the ruling of which was delivered on 17th January 2017, Kelvin Nwaigwe v. Fidelity Bank Plc unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/85/2014, the judgment of which was delivered on 24th January 2017 and Stephen Ayaogu & 16 ors v. Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/38/2010, the judgment of which was delivered on 27th October 2017. 52. Furthermore, the law is that all items of loss, that is, constituting the claim for special damages must be specified by the claimant before they may be proved and recovery granted. See Christopher U. Nwanji v. Coastal Services Nig. Ltd [2004] LPELR-2106(SC); [2004] 11 NWLR (Pt. 885) 552; [2004] 18 NSCQR 895. Additionally, the claimant has a duty to give specific particulars of the special damages he is claiming. This is to enable the opposing party know what he is to meet in the case. See AG, Anambra State v. CN Onuselogu Enterprises Ltd [1987] LPELR-614(SC); [1987] NWLR (Pt. 66) 47; [1987] All NLR 579; [1987] 9 - 11 SC 197 and Marine Management Associates Inc. & anor v. National Maritime Authority [2012] LPELR-206(SC). Now, where can the claimant specify the items of loss, the specific particulars of the special damages being claimed? Only in the pleadings. 53. I looked through the claimants pleadings and found some factual contradictions in the case of the claimants. First, the suit itself is filed by 11 claimants who are suing for themselves and on behalf of 846 other claimants described as year 2006 retirees of the defendant. Exhibit C1 then lists out 857 as the claimants. However, paragraph 16 of the amended statement of claim has the other claimants (aside for the 11 on the face of the complaint) to be 840; with paragraph 43 putting the total number of claimants as 851. How are we to account for the difference of 6? Secondly, paragraph 25 of the amended statement of claim has it that the deduction of 4% from the monthly salaries of the claimants under the National Housing Fund (NHF) Scheme commenced in 1993. However, paragraph 26 of same pleadings has the commencement date as 1992. Which date is correct? Thirdly, paragraphs 22 and 28 of the amended statement of claim indicate that some claimants were paid furniture grant while others were not paid. The claimants paid and those not paid were not revealed in the pleadings. However, paragraph 29 of same pleadings states that none of the claimant was paid the second furniture grant which became due on 1st June 2005 before their retirement in 2006. Lastly, In relief (2), the claimants claim for “N137,387,375.87 being 10% of the claimants’ gratuity”. In paragraph 44 of the amended statement of claim, the claimants indicated thus: “…10% of Gratuity, being N137,387,375.87…for the 851 Claimants herein is N550,651,539.82…” Now, nowhere in the reliefs would the figure “N550,651,539.82” be found as a claim. If the claimants’ intended that each claimant is to get N137,387,375.87” and that “N550,651,539.82” is the sum total, then they got it wrong as “N137,387,375.87” multiplied by 851 claimants is “N116,916,656,865.37”, a sum certainly not claimed by the claimants. As it is, the Court is not told how N550,651,539.82 was arrived at by the claimants. 54. It is not the Court’s duty to fix a litigant’s bad or defective pleadings. As His Lordship Tur, JCA puts it in Chief James Onyewuke v. Modu Sule [2011] LPELR-9084(CA), a trial Judge should not embark on a voyage seeking to repair the damage caused by counsel in failing to plead material facts necessary to obtain judgment in the temple of justice since Courts are not carpenter’s workshops where Judges toil to mend defects in pleadings. I shall return to the claimants’ pleadings in due course. 55. The key defence of the defendant is that the claimants did not prove their case. To establish this defence, the defendant first attacked the exhibits tendered by the claimant; for if the Court agrees with the defendant in that regard, it would have shown that the claimants have no supporting evidence in proof of their claims. In respect of Exhibit C2(a), the defendant submitted that a committee set up to draft conditions of service does not have power of approving a working conditions of service as such powers is vested on the Board of Directors of such parastatals. To the defendant, the said conditions of service i.e. Exhibit C2(a) relied upon by the claimants is a draft and unapproved document having no commencement date, hence the Court should reject the admission of such document as an exhibit and expunge any evidence led based on the document as it is watery, weightless and of no legal validity. That Exhibit D4 is the proper conditions of service that governed the claimants’ employment at the time of their retirement. In reaction, the claimants contended that the defendant did not specifically deny the coming into effect of the claimants’ conditions of service on 1st June 2001; it equally did not deny that all its identified 14 management officers did not endorse their signatures as represented by the claimants. That the defendant never averred that the signatures endorsed thereon were forged. Therefore, the applicable conditions of service relevant in determining some of the issues as raised by the claimants is Exhibit C2(a). The claimants also submitted that assuming the defendant’s argument is anything to go by, having not denounced Exhibit C2(a), and having failed to plead the issue of the non-endorsement of the Board of Directors in its defence, and the clear provisions of section 10 of FAAN Act, the defendant is estopped from making such submissions. That having being silent on the status of Exhibit C2(a) in its defence, it cannot through its final address raise an issue of Exhibit C2(a) being a draft or an unapproved document with no commencement date. In Mr Usanga Eyo Brian v. Polaris Bank Limited unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/412/2014, the judgment of which was delivered on 20th March 2019 this Court held thus: “…submitting a bill for onward transmission to management for approval cannot be read to mean the approval”. I, however, took a careful look at Exhibit C2(a). There is nothing on the face of it showing that it is a draft as argued by the defendant. I therefore find it difficult to agree with the defendant that it should be treated as a draft. At the last page, page 63, it is endorsed by Committee members including persons representing SSASCGOC and NUATE, the two trade unions operating in the defendant. This fact alone makes Exhibit C2(a) more of a collective agreement than a draft. I so find and hold. Whether the terms and conditions in Exhibit C2(a) are helpful to the case of the claimants depends more on the state of the claimants’ pleadings than the terms and conditions themselves. 56. The defendant also urged the Court to disregard Exhibits C16 and C17. To the defendant, the law is that facts not pleaded and evidence led thereon goes to no issue; and since Exhibits C16 and C17 were not pleaded, they are not relevant to the case of the claimants who relied heavily on Exhibits C20 and C21. The claimants’ reaction as to the defendant’s argument of some documents as pointed out being inadmissible was that the exhibits having already admitted by this Court pursuant to its powers under section 12 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006, it is too late in the day for the defendant to again raise arguments on their admissibility, which amount to seeking to make this Court set aside its ruling on their admission as to the exhibits. Also that DW failed to show this Court where it was stated in Exhibits C20 and C21 that it is only parastatals that do not have conditions of service that can take the benefit of the severance package. Exhibit C16 is a letter dated 11th November 2009 from the Federal Civil Service Commission (FCSC) to the claimants’ lawyer informing the claimants that the FCSC does not deal with severance payment for staff of parastatals. Exhibit C17 dated 10th March 2010 is a letter from the Bureau of Public Service Reforms (BPSR) to the claimants’ lawyer informing the claimants that the Bureau was not involved in the reform exercise of the defendant which is a self funding organization; consequently, the document used for the computation of the severance package of parastatals handled by the Bureau would not be relevant in this case. Both Exhibits C16 and C17 were generated after 12th December 2007, the date this suit was filed at the Federal High Court. This fact alone does not make them inadmissible in virtue of section 83(3) of the Evidence Act 2011 since no personal interest was shown as the overriding basis upon which they were generated. See Nigeria Social Insurance Trust v. Klifco Nigeria Ltd [2010] LPELR-2006(SC) and UTC (Nig.) Plc v. Lawal [2013] LPELR-23002(SC). The argument of the defendant, however, is that Exhibits C16 and C17 were not pleaded and so cannot be used in this case. The general rule is that it is material facts, not evidence in proof of, that must be pleaded. See Hon. Taye Adenoma Oyefolu v. Hon. Abayomi Sadiq & ors [2008] LPELR-4816(CA). I looked through the claimants’ pleadings and I did not find material facts for which Exhibits C16 and C17 are in proof of. In this sense, I agree with the defendant that there are pleadings to support the admission of Exhibits C16 and C17 in evidence. I so find and hold. 57. To the defendant, paragraph 5.20 of its conditions of service (Exhibit D4) enjoins that payment of furniture grant shall be paid every four years (4) to all categories of staff on GL 01 to 17; and that the claimants were all paid and could have been due for another payment on 1st September 2006 had they not been retired on 17th August 2006. Here the defendant acknowledged that it retired the claimants. In other words, the retirement of the claimants by the defendant was not of the claimants’ own volition or a product of any wrongdoing on the part of the claimants. This being so, the defendant must be read to have deliberately retired the claimants so as to avoid paying the claimants whatever furniture grant they may be entitled to in year 2006 having last collected same 4 years earlier (2002). By this fact, the defendant appears blind to the law of arithmetical approximation; and the fact that in interpreting contracts of employment, ambiguity is resolved in favour of that which gives the employee an advantage. 58. Exemplifying the law of arithmetical approximation, in Mr Samson Iyanda v. First Bank of Nigeria Ltd unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/292/2016, the judgment of which was delivered on 28th January 2019, this Court held thus: …By Appendix 7, the claimant was born on 7th November 1960. When the claimant wrote Appendix 5, he was three weeks away from being 55 years old. To be specific, he was 54 years, 11 months, 9 days old. By law of arithmetical approximation (where anything from half but less than one is approximated to the next whole number), the claimant was 55 years at the time of writing Appendix 5. I so find and hold… 59. And typifying the rule that ambiguity must be resolved in favour of the employee, this Court in Mr M. A. Chiroma v. Forte Oil Plc unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/165/2018, the judgment of which was delivered on 2nd May 2019 held thus: In interpreting contracts of employment, ambiguity must be resolved in favor of that which gives the employee an advantage. See James Adekunle Owulade v. Nigerian Agip Oil Co. Ltd unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/41/2012 the judgment of which was delivered on 12th July 2016. And in Prince Benjamin Saliu Ikani v. Chairman/Chief Executive National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) & 2 ors unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/351/2013, the judgment of which was delivered on 16th July 2018, this Court held that: …circulars, where they confer a benefit on employees surely apply as such; but where they confer burdens or take away benefits, then much more than the 1st and 2nd defendants made out is needed for them to apply unfavourably to employees. Without more, therefore, the argument of the defendant that the claimants cannot be paid furniture grant simply because they are entitled to it on 1st September 2006 but were retired on 17th August 2006 and so did not complete the requisite 4 years to be so entitled cannot stand. I so find and hold. 60. On Exhibits C14 and CI5, the defendant argued that the case of the claimants is speculative as to the computation of their claims. That the claimants did not give evidence on how they came about the computation of figures. Exhibits C14 and C15 are the computations made by the claimants themselves as to their respective 2006 furniture claim and severance claim. Exhibits C14 and C15 are self generated and so cannot be proof of the claimants’ claim for furniture and severance claims. See Peter Yinkore & 73 ors v. Neconde Energy Limited & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/611/2012, the judgment of which was delivered on 12th February 2019 at paragraph 107. 61. On Exhibit C18, it is the defendant’s submission that no evidence was led by the claimants on how the said guidelines apply to their employment. Also that the generic guidelines for the reform of parastatals only gave criteria or yardstick on how the reform should be done but did not provide special monetary package for workers of parastatals that would be disengaged, urging the Court to hold that Exhibit C18 is inapplicable in the instant case. I looked through Exhibit C18 and I agree with the defendant that the claimants did not show how the said exhibits entitles them to the sum sums they claim in this case as end of service benefits. I do not accordingly see how relevant Exhibit C18 is to the claimants’ case. I so find and hold. 62. To the defendant, Exhibits C20 and C21 tendered from the Bar had no witness that gave evidence on them. They were accordingly dumped on the Court by the claimants’ counsel and so should be expunged and not relied on by the Court. In determining the applicability or otherwise of Exhibits C20 and C21 to the claimants’ case, I need to correct an argument of the defendant. The defendant had submitted that DW in her testimony under cross-examination stated that Exhibits C20 and C21 do not apply to the defendant as it is a self-sustaining and income generating agency that has its own conditions of service. That she stated further that Exhibits C20 and C21 apply to organizations and parastatals that do not have conditions of service. The defendant further indicated that DW stated in paragraph 7 of her written statement on oath that the severance benefits contained in the purported circulars that are Exhibits C20 and C21 is inapplicable to the defendant as the said circular applied to offices that were abolished as a result of restructuring of any agency of Government. That the offices of the claimants were not abolished but that the claimants were retired for effective repositioning of the defendant and not for any other purpose. The interpretation of documents is not the function of a witness. It is a function of law meant for the Court. See Ambassador D. C. B. Nwanna v. National Intelligence Agency & 2 ors unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/123/2011, the judgment of which was delivered on 16th December 2013, Mr Ugochukwu Duru v. First Guarantee Pension Ltd unreported Suit No. NIC/LA/246/2011, the judgment of which was delivered on 2nd February 2015 and Mr Akindele Adedipe v. Oracle Software Nigeria Limited unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/214/2016, the judgment of which was delivered on 15th May 2019. It is not in DW’s place to tell the Court whether a document is applicable or not. That question can only be determined upon a proper interpretation of the words of the documents itself. How did DW come by the fact that Exhibits C20 and C21 only apply to organizations and parastatals that do not have conditions of service? Is DW not, in the guise of giving evidence, interpreting these documents? I think so. The defendant is an agency of the Federal Government and so especially Exhibit C21 applicable to Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) is applicable to this case. I so find and hold. 63. The contention of the claimants is that while section 10(1) of the FAAN Act empowers the defendant to approve conditions of service for its employed staff, the provisions of clause 1001 of Chapter 1 of the Federal Government Public Service Rules (as Revised up to 1st January 2000) states that the provisions of the said Public Service Rules (as Revised) apply to all Public Offices, except the stated offices. That while the Public Service Rules states the procedures for engagement, disengagement and other procedures on other issues concerning the staff, the Preamble of the Rules states that the Rules are to be read in conjunction with Circular, Instructions and Gazette Notices. The claimants urged the Court to note that clause 3 of the Preamble states that, amendments to the Rules shall be made through circulars, which would be issued from time to time. The argument of the claimants, therefore, is that while both the claimants and the defendant are bound by the provisions of the conditions of service as may be issued, and the Public Service Rules in the determination of the claimants’ engagement as public officers, the terms of engagement as spelt out in the individual letters of engagement, the conditions of service and the Public Service Rules are opened to being altered or amended by circulars as may be issued from time to time by Head of Civil Service of the Federation. 64. The claimants did not allude to Mr Chinweorder Chukwu Awa v. Nigeria Social Insurance Trust Fund [2015] 60 NLLR (Pt. 211) 544 where this Court dealt with the legal status of the preamble to the Public Service Rules; and held that the preamble cannot control the enacting part of the statute or be part of the Public Service Rules. It is merely to introduce the Rules as published. Furthermore, that even within the context of the strict legal usage, a preamble, although part of the Act, is not used in construing the Act unless there is ambiguity in interpreting the sections of the Act. The reliance by the claimants on a preamble is unhelpful to their case. I so find and hold. 65. The case of the claimants is that while they are not denying the fact that they were only paid after they were retired, they are seeking to be paid a complete end of service entitlements. That these claims arising as a result of the circulars and restructuring exercise are in addition to the ones already paid. That this is more pertinent in view of the fact that nowhere in the circulars and guidelines was it stated by the Federal Government that a staff retired as a result of the exercise cannot take benefit of both end of service entitlements. Finally, that the defendant has breached its contract with the claimants to pay all end of service entitlements as stated in Exhibit C21 in addition to the entitlements paid pursuant to the Exhibit C2(a). The only problem here is that the claimants did not prove to this Court how they came about the quantum of the sums they are claiming especially in terms of their pleadings. The claimants made the point that they were paid only part of their end of service benefits. There is no pleading as to that part that was paid in order for the Court to ascertain the part that remained unpaid. Gratuity, pension and furniture grant is often calculated on the basis of an employee’s salary. There is no pleading whatsoever as to the respective salaries of the claimants. In short, their is no pleadings as to the particulars needed to ascertain how the claimants came by the quantum of the sums they claim. I indicated earlier that the reliance the claimant placed on Exhibits C14 and C15 cannot sustain their claims since these exhibits are self generated and so cannot be proof of the claimants’ claim for furniture and severance claims. 66. Relief 3 consists of two reliefs sought for in the alternative. Relief 3(a) is for an order directing the defendant to provide each of the claimants, houses based on the deductions made. In the alternative, relief 3(b) is that the defendant should give account of the total deductions made by the defendant from the monthly salaries of the claimants under the Federal Housing Fund Scheme from 1992 to 2002, and thereafter effect a refund of the said deduction made from each of the claimants’ salaries back to each of the claimants. In their submissions on this relief, the defendant cited section 17 of the National Housing Fund (NHF) Act 2004, while the claimants cited section 9(2) of same Act. Section 9 of the NHF Act dealing with deductions by employers from monthly salary of workers provides that: (1) An employer who has in its employment an employee earning a basic salary of N3,000 and above per annum shall deduct 2.5 per cent of the monthly salary of that employee as the employee’s contribution. (2) The amount deducted pursuant to subsection (1) of this section shall be remitted to the bank within one month of the making of the deduction. Section 17 of the NHF Act dealing with refund to a contributor after retirement from office, on its part, provides that: Any contributor who has not obtained a housing loan from the bank and has - (a) attained the age of 60 years; or (b) retired from his employment and becomes incapable of continuing the contribution to the Fund as specified in this Act, shall be eligible to a refund of his contribution within three months of the application at the rate of interest prescribed by the Minister. 67. To start with, these sections cited by the parties do not provide that an employer is to provide the employee with a house as the claimants are praying for per relief 3(a). It is not known that the deductions made can even foot the bill of a house as sought for in relief 3(a). I can only say here that it is often funny, and indeed worrying, the kind of reliefs lawyers advise clients to ask for in cases filed. Relief 3(a) as claimed cannot, therefore, be granted. I so find and hold. 67. This leads me to the alternative relief 3(b), which is that the defendant should give an account of the deductions it made and then effect a refund of the said deductions. There is no doubt that there is a duty on the part of the defendant to render account of the deductions to the claimants. See Honika Sawmill (Nig.) Ltd v. Hoff [1992] 4 NWLR (Pt. 238) 673 CA at 679, which held that as between an employer and an employee, the onus is on the employee to prove that the employer employed him on a stipulated salary and that he worked for the employer during the relevant period; and it is for the employer to prove not only that he paid the employee his salary for work done by the employee in the relevant period but also how much the salary that he paid the employee was. It is the defendant who deducted NHF sums from the claimants’ respective salaries. So the duty is on the defendant to render the account of such deductions. But whether the claimants are thereby entitled to a refund of the deductions made would depend on the the true import of section 17 of the NHF Act. Section 17 provides that any contributor who has not obtained a housing loan from the bank and has attained the age of 60 years; or retired from his employment and becomes incapable of continuing the contribution to the Fund as specified in this Act, shall be eligible to a refund of his contribution within three months of the application at the rate of interest prescribed by the Minister. There is nothing before the Court to show that the claimants have attained the age of 60 years. There is nothing before the Court to show that the claimants applied for a refund of their respective contributions. There is nothing before the Court indicating the interest prescribed by the Minister. All these are preconditions to a refund of contributions under the NHF scheme. As it is, therefore, the claimants have not proved their claim to even the alternative relief 3(b). Ordering the defendant to render account under relief 3(b) cannot be made since the order to make refund of the NHF contributions has not been proved and so cannot be made. 68. In all, the claimants have not proved their case. The case accordingly fails and so is hereby dismissed. 69. Judgment is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip, PhD